

# Youth Underrepresentation and Parties' Nomination Strategy in Mixed-Member Systems

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# Puzzle: Youth Representation in Japan

Youth and  
Party  
Nomination

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(UTokyo)

Overview

Theory


Data and  
Method

Result

Discussion

References

- U40 MPs: 6% in 2023
  - Mixed-member system (SMD + PR) in the lower house
- PR should promote youth representation, but...
  - Winners' age: 53.7 (SMD) vs. 53.0 (PR)



# Today's Talk

## Youth and Party Nomination

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### Theory

### Data and Method

### Result

### Discussion

### References

- **RQ.** Why does the PR tier in Japan's mixed member system underrepresent young people?
- Explain how **dual listing** gives parties incentives to give their senior members and incumbents **"second chances"**, preventing new candidates' entries via the PR tier.
- Present evidence from the House of Representatives elections, 1996 - 2017.
- Discuss implications for comparative politics.

# Do Electoral Systems Affect Youth Underrepresentation?

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- PR promotes minority representation (Norris, 2004)
  - Collective evaluation of party lists
  - Party incentives to represent various cleavages
- More young MPs under PR (e.g., Joshi (2013))
  - Cross-national studies
  - Does not answer "how"
- We don't know what happens in mixed-member systems.
  - "Best of the both worlds"?
  - PR > MM > majoritarian?

# Japan's Mixed-member System

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- Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM)
  - SMDs (SNTV) + PR blocks (closed lists)
- **Dual listing**
  - Can nominate candidates simultaneously in the two tiers
  - Can give any of dual-listed candidates the same rank within a list
  - “Best-loser” rule to decide winners among equally-ranked candidates
  - **Very common**
  - A source of “contamination effects” (e.g., Ferrara et al. (2005))?

# Dual Listing is Very Common

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
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**Figure 1:** Proportion of Dual-Listed Winners

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# Dual Listings Would Exacerbate Youth Representation

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## Claim

### Dual listing

- incentivizes parties to give second chances to senior candidates / incumbents
- prevents younger candidates' entry via PR tier.

Parties would dual-list their senior members when possible.

- Post-election goals, e.g., policies.
- Coalition formation.
- Distribution of ministerial posts.
- Legislation.

Less frequent turnover → youth underrepresentation



# Hypotheses

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- List rank
  1. Dual-listed candidates are ranked higher.
  2. Incumbents are ranked higher.
  3. Senior candidates are ranked higher.
- Dual listing
  4. Incumbents are more likely to be dual-listed.
  5. Senior candidates are more likely to be dual-listed.

## Data: the Reed-Smith JHRED (Smith and Reed, 2018)

- PR candidates
- 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017

# Empirical Strategy

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## H1 - 3: Negative binomial models


- DV: candidate  $i$ 's list rank (minus 1)
- IV: candidate  $i$ 's dual-listing status; N of past wins; incumbency status
- Controls: female dummy, District magnitude, year and party FEs

## H4 - 5: Logistic models

- DV: candidate  $i$ 's dual-listing status
- IV: candidate  $i$ 's N of past wins; incumbency status
- Controls: female dummy, District magnitude, year and party FEs


# H1: Dual-Listed Candidates Ranked Higher

- Male, LDP, Tokyo Block ( $M = 20$ ), 2012




## H2: Incumbents Ranked Higher

- Male, LDP, Tokyo Block ( $M = 20$ ), 2012




# H3: Senior Candidates Ranked Higher

- Male, LDP, Tokyo Block ( $M = 20$ ), 2012



# H4: Incumbents More Likely to be Dual-Listed

- Male, LDP, Tokyo Block ( $M = 20$ ), 2012



# H5: Senior Candidates More Likely to be Dual-Listed

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
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- Male, LDP, Tokyo Block ( $M = 20$ ), 2012





## Claim

### Dual listing

- incentivizes parties to give second chances to senior candidates / incumbents
- prevents younger candidates' entry via PR tier.

- 1 Dual-Listed Candidates are ranked higher.
- 2 Incumbents are ranked higher.
- 3 Senior candidates are ranked higher.
- 4 Incumbents are more likely to be dual-listed.
- 5 Senior candidates are more likely to be dual-listed.

# What If Dual Listing Had Not Been Allowed?

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- Parties have incentives to nominate young candidates in PR.
  - Competing incentive to give out insurances under dual listing
- Parties would have nominated new candidates instead of incumbents / senior members.
- New candidates are younger than other candidates / MPs.
- Youth underrepresentation would have been mitigated.

# What If Dual Listing Had Not Been Allowed?

- New candidates are much younger than the average.

Year	All	Novice
1996	52.3	46.9
2000	52.4	46.8
2003	51.0	44.6
2005	50.6	44.9
2009	52.0	48.2
2012	49.6	44.5
2014	51.6	48.7
2017	52.0	48.7

**Table 1:** Age Comparison: PR Candidates

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# Implications and What's Next

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- Implications:
  - ① Contamination effects in MM systems reduce representational advantages of PR systems.
  - ② In terms of minority representation, MM systems are not in the middle between majoritarian and PR systems.
  - ③ A potential mechanism of youth underrepresentation: Electoral system → party incentives → youth representation
- What's next
  - More elaborated theory
  - What about MM systems in other contexts?
  - What about other minority groups, e.g., women?
- Limitation: counterfactuals
  - Path-dependence of nomination strategies
  - Identities of counterfactual nominees

# References

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References

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
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# Motivation: Youth Underrepresentation

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- Youth underrepresentation in many democracies. Why?



**Figure 2:** Proportion of U40 MPs. From Stockemer and Sundström (2022, p.47).

# Youth Underrepresentation in G7 Countries

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Country	Eligibility	Average	% U30	% U40	% U45
Canada	18	50	1.95	16.88	30.19
France	18	49	4.85	26.52	37.95
Germany	18	47	8.83	28.94	41.98
Italy	25	49	1.25	16.25	35
Japan	25	55	0.22	6.02	17.2
UK	18	51	3.69	21.69	34
USA	25	57	0.46	10.42	20.14


**Table 2:** *Source.* Inter-Parliamentary Union (2023).



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


- Mixed-Member system: SMD + PR
- PR should promote youth representation, but...
- **Candidates'** mean age:
  - SMD: 51.0
  - PR: 51.4

# No Evidence that Pure-PR Candidates are Younger

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Mean age:

- SMD: 51.0
- PR: 52.8

# What If Dual Listing Had Not Been Allowed?

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- New candidates are younger across the two tiers.

Year	Age (all)	Age (novice)
1996	51.1	47.5
2000	51.6	47.7
2003	51.1	47.0
2005	50.6	46.4
2009	50.9	47.2
2012	50.4	47.0
2014	52.2	49.9
2017	52.8	49.4

**Table 3:** Age Comparison: SMD + PR Candidates