Party Nomination Strategy and its Representational Consequences in Interactive Mixed-Member Majoritarian Systems [*]

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Abstract

I argue that interactive mixed-member majoritarian systems (interactive MMMs), a variant of mixed member systems that allows parties to nominate the same candidates in both majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) tiers (dual listing), diminish the representational advantages commonly associated with PR systems. Analyzing comprehensive, candidate-level data of Japan's lower house elections, I show that parties give higher list ranks to senior candidates, incumbents, and dual-listed candidates. Furthermore, incumbents are more likely to be dual-listed than non-incumbents. These patterns apply across parties, but are less applicable to situations of intra-party disputes and government transitions, where seniors and incumbents may give their way to newcomers. My analysis suggests that interactive MMMs sustain representational inequalities between groups by reducing the electoral prospects of newcomers and making legislative turnover less frequent.

1 Introduction

2 Theory

2.1 Theoretical Expectations

2.2 Case: Japan's Mixed-Member Majoritarian System

3 Data and Method

4 Result

4.1 Aggregate-Level Analysis

4.2 Party-Specific Analysis

4.3 Election- / Party-Specific Analysis

5 Discussion

5.1 Legislative Turnover

5.2 Representation

Country	Eligibility	Average	% U30	% U40	% U45
Canada	18	50	1.95	16.88	30.19
France	18	49	4.85	26.52	37.95
Germany	18	47	8.83	28.94	41.98
Italy	25	49	1.25	16.25	35
Japan	25	55	0.22	6.02	17.2
UK	18	51	3.69	21.69	34
USA	25	57	0.46	10.42	20.14

Note. Age demographics of lower house members in the G7 countries, as of January 2023. Eligibility is the minimum age to run for the house.
Source. Inter-Parliamentary Union (2024).

Table 1: Age Demographics of Lower Houses in the G7 Countries

6 Conclusion

Figure 1: Age Composition of Legislators Elected from the Two Tiers

Figure 2: Age Comparison: Average vs. New Candidates

7 Bibliography

Inter-Parliamentary Union (2024). Data on age: By country. https://data.ipu.org/age-brackets/.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2024). Election (Senkyo). https://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_seisaku/senkyo/index.html.

Reed, S. R. and Smith, D. M. (2017). The Reed-Smith Japanese House of Representatives Elections Dataset.

A Summary Statistics

A.1 Candidate-Level Summary

A.2 Magnitudes of PR Blocks, 1996 - 2017

Bloc	1996	2000	2003	2005	2009	2012	2014	2017
Hokkaido	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Tohoku	16	14	14	14	14	14	14	13
Kita-kanto	21	20	20	20	20	20	20	19
Tokyo	19	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Minami-kanto	23	21	22	22	22	22	22	22
Hokuriku Shinetsu	13	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Tokai	23	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Kinki	33	30	30	30	29	29	29	28
Chugoku	13	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Shikoku	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Kyushu	23	21	21	21	21	21	21	20

Magnitudes of each PR regional district for elections 1996 - 2017.
Data source: Reed and Smith (2017); Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2024)

Table A1: Magnitudes of PR Blocks

## A.3   Distribution of List Rank

Figure A1: Distribution of List Rank

A.4 Age of Winners

Figure A2: Age Comparison: Average vs. New Legislators