

Insurance Tickets: Parties' Nomination Strategies in Japan's Mixed-Member Electoral System

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Today's Talk

Nomination under Dual Listing

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Overview

Theory

Data and Method

Result

Discussion

- **RQ.** How do parties nominate candidates in the PR tier of Japan's mixed-member systems?
- **Case.** House of Representatives election, 1996-2017
- **Findings.**
 - Parties are motivated to prioritize senior / incumbent candidates;
 - **Dual listing** incentivizes parties to give **insurance tickets** to these candidates.
- **Implications.**
 - Legislative turnover;
 - Minority representation.

Japan's Mixed-member System

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- The 1994 reform
- SMDs (SNTV) + PR blocks (closed lists)
- Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM)
- **Dual listing**
 - Can nominate candidates simultaneously in the two tiers
 - Can give any of dual-listed candidates the same rank within a list
 - “Best-loser” rule to decide winners among equally-ranked candidates
 - Very common

Dual Listing is Very Common

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


Figure 1: Proportion of Dual-Listed Winners

Theoretical Expectation

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Claim

- Parties are motivated to prioritize senior / incumbent candidates;
 - Dual listing incentivizes parties to give second chances to these candidates.
-
- Parties care about post-election goals.
 - Policies, ministerial posts, legislative bargaining, ...
 - Senior politicians are generally better equipped with resources.

Hypotheses

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- **Dual listing**

- H1.** Senior candidates are more likely to be dual-listed.

- H2.** Incumbents are more likely to be dual-listed.

- **List rank**

- H3.** Senior candidates are ranked higher.

- H4.** Incumbents are ranked higher.

- H5.** Dual-listed candidates are ranked higher.

- H1 - 5 should apply to all parties.

- H1/3 should be less applicable when parties recently lost government / had internal disputes.

Data. the Reed-Smith JHRED (Reed and Smith, 2018)

- PR candidates
- 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017

H1 - 2. Logistic models

- DV: candidate i 's dual-listing status
- IV: candidate i 's N of past wins; incumbency status

H3 - 5. Negative binomial models

- DV: candidate i 's list rank
- IV: candidate i 's dual-listing status; N of past wins; incumbency status

Controls. female dummy, district magnitude, year and party FEs

Senior Candidates (H1) and Incumbents (H2) More Likely to be Dual-Listed

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
Theory

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- Male, LDP, Tokyo Block ($M = 20$), 2012



Senior Candidates (H3), Incumbents (H4), Dual-listed Candidates (H5) Ranked Higher

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
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- H3 / 4 hold after controlling dual-listing status.

Election- and Party-Specific Analyses

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Findings:

- Many parties prioritize senior and incumbent candidates, but only majority-seeking parties turn to dual-listing to do so:
 - LDP / DPJ - CDP: H1 - 5 applicable
 - JCP (/Komeito): H3 - 4 applicable
- Parties prioritize senior and incumbent candidates even when the door of opportunity is open:
 - H1 - 5 applicable to LDP in 2005 / 2012 elections

Findings

- Parties are strongly motivated to prioritize senior / incumbent candidates;
- Dual listing incentivizes **majority-seeking parties** to give second chances to these candidates.

Implications:

- 1 Lower legislative turnover;
 - Limited N of candidates parties can nominate.
 - Priority on returning candidates = fewer new candidates.
- 2 Lower minority representation.
 - Follows from lower turnover.
 - c.f., representational advantages of PR systems.
 - e.g., youth underrepresentation (more details in the paper!)