

Week 1 Mini Paper

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In a bid to support the argument for moral skepticism, J.L. Mackie argues that objective moral facts would need to be incredibly weird and unlike any other type of rules, specifically that they would need to be intrinsically reason giving. This is the first premise of Mackie's argument for queerness. He uses this to argue that since we have been unable to rigorously discern objective moral values, then it follows that there simply are no objective truths. While I do subscribe to moral skepticism, I object to Mackie's first premise that objective moral facts would need to be intrinsically reason giving. I think it's totally plausible that moral facts could exist outside of our motivations to follow them, and that we will just never know what they are unless we create/discover a system that effectively tests the truth values of moral statements.