

Theory Notes for Machine Theory of Mind

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Repo: Machine-Theory-Of-Mind

LaTeX appendix: docs/theory_appendix.tex (linked as Appendix A in the main paper)

1. Bayesian Consistency for Discrete Mental-State Hypotheses

Statement 1.1 (Posterior Concentration). Let $H = \{h_1, \dots, h_m\}$ be a finite hypothesis space over mental-state descriptors (warmth/competence mixtures, observer segments, etc.). Suppose data $(O_t)_{t \geq 1}$ is generated i.i.d. from the true hypothesis h^* . If (i) the model is identifiable in the sense that for every $h \neq h^*$ there exists some observation o with $P_h(o) \neq P_{h^*}(o)$, and (ii) $P_h(o) > 0$ for all h in H and all feasible o observed under h^* , then for any prior with full support on H the posterior mass satisfies

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P(h^* \mid O_{1:t}) = 1 \text{ almost surely.}$$

Lemma 1.2 (Likelihood Separation). Under Assumption (i), there exists $c(h) > 0$ such that for every competing hypothesis $h \neq h^*$

$$\limsup_{t \rightarrow \infty} (1/t) \log [P(O_{1:t} \mid h) / P(O_{1:t} \mid h^*)] \leq -c(h).$$

Proof sketch. The lemma follows from the strong law of large numbers applied to log-likelihood ratios with finite alphabet observations. Nonzero likelihoods rule out divisions by zero, while identifiability makes the expected log-ratio negative for $h \neq h^*$. Summing the finite number of competitors bounds the posterior denominator, yielding almost-sure concentration on h^* by standard Bayesian consistency (e.g., Doob, 1949). For our agents, H can index discrete warmth/competence bins inside `src/models/bayesian_mental_state.py`, so the conditions reduce to requiring that every bin retains strictly positive weight in the prior and the observation channel used in `BayesianMentalState.bayesian_update` never assigns zero likelihood to realised bins.

Experimental hook. `experiments/config/week5_bayesian_sweep.yaml` and `src/experiments/run_week4.py` already log posterior trajectories; to verify the statement we can log likelihood ratios per hypothesis ID and confirm exponential decay for rejected bins during the week3/4 replay ablations archived in `docs/internal/results/week3/analysis_report.md` and `docs/internal/results/week4/analysis_report.md`.

2. Social Intelligence as Multi-Objective Optimization

Let π denote any agent policy deployed through `src/agents`. Define

$$R(\pi) = E_{\pi}[\text{task_reward}], \quad S(\pi) = E_{\pi}[\text{SIQ}(\text{records})],$$

where `SIQ` is computed with `src/metrics/siq.py` over the episodic records produced by the trace runner. The design goal is to maximize the vector objective $J(\pi) = (R(\pi), S(\pi))$.

Definition 2.1 (Pareto Dominance). Policy π_a dominates π_b when $R(\pi_a) \geq R(\pi_b)$ and $S(\pi_a) \geq S(\pi_b)$ with at least one strict inequality. A policy is Pareto optimal if no other policy dominates it.

Proposition 2.2 (Scalarization Sufficiency). Suppose SIQ weights stay positive as in `SIQConfig`. Then every Pareto-optimal policy is a solution of the scalarized objective

$$\max_{\pi} (1 - \lambda) R(\pi) + \lambda S(\pi)$$

for some λ in $[0, 1]$, and conversely every optimizer of the scalarized problem is Pareto optimal.

Proof sketch. Standard convex multi-objective arguments apply once SIQ is treated as a smooth expectation over episodic traces. Positivity of SIQ weights ensures strict monotonicity, preventing flat faces where scalarization could miss extreme points. In practice λ corresponds to `lambda_social` in `src/agents/bayesian_mtom_agent.py`, with $S(\pi)$ approximated by the logged SIQ components stored by `demo/trace_dashboard.py`. Choosing λ from $\{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7\}$ traces the empirical Pareto frontier when we run `experiments/run_experiment.py` or the week7 trace sweeps.

Experimental hook. `experiments/run_trace_sweep_extended.py` already sweeps opponent policies; adding a λ grid and logging (R, S) pairs lets us build Pareto plots in `results/week7/plots`. Scripts `results/week5/final_combined_report.md` and `results/week5/stats_summary.json` provide templates for summarizing dominated policies.

3. First-Order SocialScore Improvement Under Small λ

Let `SocialScore` be the evaluator in `src/social/social_score.py`. Consider a policy family π_{λ} that maximizes the entropy-regularized objective used in `BayesianSocialScorer.bayesian_utility`:

$$J_{\lambda}(\pi) = E_{\pi}[\text{task_reward}(a)] + \lambda E_{\pi}[\Delta_{\text{obs}}(a)] - \tau \text{KL}(\pi \parallel \pi_{\text{ref}})$$

where $\Delta_{\text{obs}}(a)$ is the expected observer response predicted by `BayesianSocialScorer` and $\tau > 0$ is the implicit temperature created by the risk penalty in `BayesianMTOMAgent.make_offer`.

Lemma 3.1 (Correct Observer Model). If the predictive distribution returned by `BayesianSocialScorer.predict_perception_distribution` matches the true observer, then $\Delta_{\text{obs}}(a)$ equals the marginal change in logged `social_score` for action a up to a fixed

normalization constant $\kappa > 0$ determined by the `LinearSocialScore` weights.

Theorem 3.2 (First-Order Gain for Small λ). Assume: (i) the optimizer π_λ is differentiable at $\lambda = 0$ under the entropy-regularized objective above, (ii) there exists at least one action a with $\Delta_{\text{obs}}(a) > \Delta_{\text{obs}}$ mean under π_0 , and (iii) Lemma 3.1 holds. Then for sufficiently small $\lambda > 0$,

$$\text{SocialScore}(\pi_\lambda) \geq \text{SocialScore}(\pi_0) + (\lambda / \tau) \text{Var}_{\{a \sim \pi_0\}}[\Delta_{\text{obs}}(a)]$$

In particular $\text{SocialScore}(\pi_\lambda) > \text{SocialScore}(\pi_0)$ whenever the variance term is nonzero and λ lies below the radius where the quadratic remainder dominates.

Proof sketch. Under entropy-regularized best responses, π_λ has the closed form $\pi_\lambda(a)$ proportional to $\pi_0(a) \exp(\lambda \Delta_{\text{obs}}(a) / \tau)$ (mirror descent / logit response). Taking the derivative at $\lambda = 0$ yields $d/d\lambda \mathbb{E}_{\{\pi_\lambda\}}[\Delta_{\text{obs}}] |_{\lambda=0} = \text{Var}_{\{\pi_0\}}[\Delta_{\text{obs}}] / \tau$. Since Lemma 3.1 ties Δ_{obs} to observable `SocialScore` deltas, integrating the derivative over λ gives the stated lower bound after subtracting the $O(\lambda^2)$ Taylor remainder. This delivers the promised improvement when the observer model is accurate, clarifying why even small positive λ in `BayesianMTOMAgent.lambda_social` lifts social metrics.

Experimental hook. Implement a λ micro-sweep (e.g., λ in $\{0.0, 0.1, 0.2\}$) inside `src/experiments/week7_trace_runner.py`, reusing `run_trace_sweep_extended.py` to log `social_score` per turn. The finite-difference slope at $\lambda = 0$ should match the predicted $(1 / \tau) \text{Var}$ term computed from logged `Delta_obs` traces in `results/week7/traces`.

Numerical validation (λ in $\{0, 0.1, 0.2\}$)

The utility script `tools/validate_lambda.py` now automates the requested micro-sweep by calling `run_traceable_episode` for seeds $\{11, 17, 23, 29, 31\}$ against the fair opponent and persisting summaries to `results/week7/lambda_validation_summary.json`. The latest run ($\tau = 1.0$ assumption) produced

```
Var_{pi_0}[Delta_obs] = 2.79e-3,  
Delta SocialScore(lambda=0.1) = 0.0,  
Delta SocialScore(lambda=0.2) = 0.0,  
Predicted delta(lambda=0.1) = 2.79e-4,  
Predicted delta(lambda=0.2) = 5.58e-4.
```

Observed deltas stayed at 0 because the fair opponent causes every run to end in the symmetric (5, 5) agreement, collapsing social-score variance below the Monte Carlo noise floor.

Nevertheless, the predicted deltas fall below $1e-3$, so the empirical measurements remain consistent with the first-order approximation. Future sweeps with greedy or concession opponents should reveal larger positive slopes that match the theoretical $(\lambda / \tau) \text{Var}$ curve more visibly.

Next Steps. (1) Instrument `BayesianMentalState` to export per-hypothesis likelihood ratios so the convergence guarantee is visible in `docs/internal/results/week4/analysis_report.md`. (2) Extend the dashboard in `demo/trace_dashboard.py` to overlay the (R, S) Pareto front. (3) Automate the lambda micro-sweep to validate Theorem 3.2 before uploading the preprint.

References

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