Math Camp

Justin Grimmer

Professor Department of Political Science Stanford University

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How to Optimize

- When functions are well behaved and known → analytic solutions

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
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
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
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





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- Intuition from proof—what happens as we approach from the right?
- critical intuition first, second derivatives

Second Derivatives

Definition

Suppose $f: \Re \to \Re$ is differentiable. Recall we write this as f' and suppose that $f': \Re \to \Re$. Then if the limit,

$$\lim_{x \to x_0} R(x) = \frac{f'(x) - f'(x_0)}{x - x_0}$$

exists, we call this the second derivative at x_0 , $f''(x_0)$.

$$f(x) = x$$

$$f'(x) = 1$$

$$f''(x) = 0$$

$$f(x) = e^{x}$$

$$f'(x) = e^{x}$$

$$f''(x) = e^{x}$$

$$f(x) = \log(x)$$

$$f'(x) = \frac{1}{x}$$

$$f''(x) = \frac{-1}{x^2}$$

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{x}$$

$$f'(x) = \frac{-1}{x^2}$$

$$f''(x) = \frac{2}{x^3}$$

$$f(x) = -x^2 + 20$$

$$f'(x) = -2x$$

$$f''(x) = -2$$

Approximating functions and second order conditions

Theorem

Taylor's Theorem Suppose $f: \Re \to \Re$, f(x) is infinitely differentiable function. Then, the taylor expansion of f(x) around a is given by


$$f(x) = f(a) + \frac{f'(a)}{1!}(x-a) + \frac{f''(a)}{2!}(x-a)^2 + \frac{f'''(a)}{3!}(x-a)^3 + \dots$$


$$f(x) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{f^n(a)}{n!}(x-a)^n$$

R Code!

Concavity, Convexity, Inflections


Second derivatives provide further information about functions






Concavity, Convexity, Inflections

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Concave Up/ Convex


Definition

Suppose $f:[a,b] \to \Re$ is a twice differentiable function. If, for all $x \in [a,b]$ and $y \in [a,b]$ and $t \in (0,1)$


$$f((1-t)x + ty) < (1-t)f(x) + tf(y)$$

We say that f is strictly concave up or convex. Equivalently if f''(x) > 0 for all $x \in [a, b]$, we say that f is strictly concave up.


$$f(x) = e^x$$
, [1, 4]




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
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
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
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
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
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
Concave Up, Second Derivative




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
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Concave Up, Second Derivative



 $e^x > 0$ for all $x \in [1, 4]$

Concave Down


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$$f((1-t)x + ty) > (1-t)f(x) + tf(y)$$

We say that f is strictly concave down. Equivalently if f''(x) < 0 for all $x \in [a, b]$, we say that f is strictly concave down.

Concave Down



- Show Concave down with graph test for $x \in [1, 4]$
- Show concave down with second derivative test for $x \in [1,4]$

Optimization


Theorem

Extreme Value Theorem Suppose $f : [a, b] \to \Re$ and that f is continuous. Then f obtains its extreme value on [a, b].

Corollary

Suppose $f:[a,b]\to\Re$, that f is continuous and differentiable, and that f(a) nor f(b) is the extreme value. Then f obtains its maximum on (a,b) and if $f(x_0)$ is the extreme value of f $x_0\in(a,b)$ then, $f'(x_0)=0$.


Extrema on End Points



Maximum in Middle, Concave Down


$$f(x) = -x^2 + 5.$$

Rolle's Theorem




Minimum in Interior, Concave Up

$$f(x) = x^2 + 9x + 9$$




Local Optima

$$f(x) = \sin(x)$$



Inflection points

$$f(x) = x^3$$



Recipe for optimization

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
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- Check End Points!

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
3) Check end points

$$f(0) = -0^{2} = 0$$

$$f(-3) = -(-3)^{2} = -9$$

$$f(3) = -(3)^{2} = -9$$

Example 2: $f(x) = x^3$, $x \in [-3, 3]$



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2) Second Derivative:

$$f''(x) = 6x$$
$$f''(0) = 0$$

No information

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, $x \in [-3, 3]$

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$$f(0) = 0^3 = 0$$

 $f(-3) = -3^3 = -27$
 $f(3) = 3^3 = 27$

Neither maximum nor minimum, saddle point

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$$U_i''(x) = -2 < 0 \rightarrow \text{Concave Down}$$



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$$U'_{i}(x) = -2(x - \mu)$$

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Second Derivative Test

$$U_i^{''}(x) = -2 < 0 \rightarrow \mathsf{Concave\ Down}$$

We call μ legislator i's ideal point



$$U_i(\mu) = -(\mu - \mu)^2 = 0$$

$$U_i(\mu - 2) = -(\mu - 2 - \mu)^2 = -4$$

$$U_i(\mu + 2) = -(\mu + 2 - \mu)^2 = -4$$

Maximize utility at μ

In statistics classes we'll learn about parameters from data.

$$f(\mu) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \exp(\frac{-(Y_i - \mu)^2}{2})$$

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= $\exp(-\frac{(Y_1 - \mu)^2}{2}) \times ... \times \exp(-\frac{(Y_N - \mu)^2}{2})$

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$$= \exp(-\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (Y_i - \mu)^2}{2})$$

In statistics classes we'll learn about parameters from data. Here is an example likelihood function: We want to find the Maximum likelihood estimate

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$$= \exp(-\frac{(Y_1 - \mu)^2}{2}) \times \dots \times \exp(-\frac{(Y_N - \mu)^2}{2})$$

$$= \exp(-\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (Y_i - \mu)^2}{2})$$

Theorem

Suppose $f: \Re \to (0, \infty)$. If x_0 maximizes f, then x_0 maximizes $\log(f(x))$.

$$\log f(\mu) = \log \left(\exp\left(-\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (Y_i - \mu)^2}{2}\right) \right)$$

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$$= -\frac{1}{2} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_i^2 - 2\mu \sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_i + N \times \mu^2 \right)$$

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$$\frac{\partial \log f(\mu)}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{1}{2} \left(-2 \sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_i + 2N \mu \right)$$

$$0 = -\frac{1}{2} \left(-\sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_i + 2N\mu^* \right)$$

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$$\bar{Y} = \mu^*$$

$$0 = -\frac{1}{2} \left(-\sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_i + 2N\mu^* \right)$$
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 $f''(\mu) = -N$

Example 5: IR Bargaining (from Jim Fearon, Part 1) Countries fight wars, usually to get stuff.

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
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- Suppose country 2 selected value x. What should country 1 invest to maximize utility?



$$\frac{\partial U_1(a_1)}{\partial a_1} = -1 + \frac{na_1^{n-1}(a_1^n + x^n) - (na_1^{n-1}a_1^n)}{(a_1^n + x^n)^2}v$$

$$= -1 + \frac{na_1^{n-1}x^n}{(a_1^n + x^n)^2}v$$

Set n = 1 (for simplicity)

$$0 = -1 + \frac{x}{(a_1 + x)^2}v$$
$$a_1^* = \sqrt{v}\sqrt{x} - x$$

(0.1)

Second derivative!

$$U_1''(a_1) = \frac{-2vx}{(a_1+x)^3}$$

One more—check endpoints


$$egin{array}{lll} a_1^* &=& 0, \ \mbox{if} \ \sqrt{v}\sqrt{x}-x < 0 \ a_1^* &=& 0, \ \mbox{if} \ \sqrt{v} < \sqrt{x} \ a_1^* &=& \sqrt{v}\sqrt{x}-x \ \mbox{otherwise} \end{array}$$

Optimization Challenge Problem

- Suppose a candidate is attempting to mobilize voters. Suppose that for each investment of $x \in [0, \infty)$ the candidate receives return of $x^{1/2}$, but incurs cost of ax. So, candidate utility is,

$$U_i = x^{1/2} - ax$$

What is the optimal investment x^* ?



Analytic (Closed form) → Often difficult, impractical, or unavailable

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- Methods for optimization:

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
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 - Branch and Bound ...


Iterative procedure to find a root


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
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
Iterative procedure to find a root Often solving for x when f(x) = 0 is hard \rightarrow complicated function Solving for x when f(x) is linear \rightarrow easy Approximate with tangent line, iteratively update










































































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
$$0 = f''(x_0)(x_1 - x_0) + f'(x_0)$$

$$x_1 = x_0 - \frac{f'(x_0)}{f''(x_0)}$$

Example Function

 $f(x) = x^3 + 2x^2 - 1$ find x that maximizes f(x) with $x \in [-3, 0]$






$$f'(x) = 3x^2 + 4x$$

 $f''(x) = 6x + 4$


Suppose we have guess x_t then the next step is:

$$x_{t+1} = x_t - \frac{3x_t^2 + 4x_t}{6x_t + 4}$$































 $x^* = -1.3333$



















































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













































































To the R Code!

Today/Tomorrow

- A Framework for optimization
 - Analytic: pencil and paper math
 - Computational: iterative algorithm that aids in solution
- Integration: antidifferentation/area finding