Mending Memory

An essay on technics and colonialism

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Declaration

1. This thesis is my own work containing, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no material published or written by another person except as referred to in the text.

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2. Research undertaken for this thesis did not require the approval of a University Ethics Committee.

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3. A full draft of this thesis was submitted to my supervisor by the draft submission deadline.

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Acknowledgements

Contents

Abstract

Technology is traditionally conceived as operating according to an instrumental logic, efficiency for efficiency's sake. In this essay, I will demonstrate another side of technology, the possessive, by advancing an anticolonial critique. Put simply, I argue that the neoliberal individual, state, and their relation are technologies that have become appropriated into the telos of technology, Enframing. Accordingly, their ideological constructions, utilised to maintain possession, perpetuate the totalising instrumentality of technology. From my critique, I make the conclusion that Enframing is dangerously simplifying memory, both culturally and ecologically. I also characterise the cosmology behind Enframing, as that which devours other cosmologies. To mend memory and dissolve technology's possessive, through the opening of cosmology, I propose a pluralism of technics embedded in an affirmation of the land. Within this pluralism, I advance a novel technic of my own, *making-anarchic*: the making of the unmaking of time.

Introduction

"They knew no relation but possession. They were possessed."

(Ursula K. Le Guin, *The Dispossessed*, 64)

Our lives are defined by possessions. But where do these objects end? Where do we begin? And what does this matter? This essay was born from the ominous revelation of a new 'possession' – the Anthropocene – the geological epoch carved out by human activity, our newest trophy, representing *a world that we have made.* Disorientation reigns today, as we look up and see only devastation, we almost believe that the world runs off its own machinations. Looking at technology, we conceive a radical logic, of efficiency begetting efficiency, fastening profits to the local capitalist's pockets. But is that all there is? Is that really technology's story?

I have three primary aims in this essay, each adding a unique contribution to the philosophy of technology literature. First, I want to expose another side of technology, the possessive, by focusing on colonialism's effect on technics. Second, I want to show the need

for anticolonial theory within the philosophy of technology. The second aim will be achieved performatively in the analysis of the first. Third, I want to offer a new relation to technics that moves beyond technology.

I have broken this essay into five chapters. They are best considered in two ways. First, in terms of content. The first chapter *introduces* technology's totalising instrumentality. The middle three chapters *critique* technology and open its possessive from the colonial relation. The last chapter *creates* a perspective in response. Second, in terms of time. Each chapter inches closer to the present, from Ancient Greece → Enlightenment → European contact with Australia → Australian Settler State → Future. Figuratively, the perpetuation of technology's possessive across these times can be understood as the condensing of a memory. I seek to mend this memory. The plot of my essay is as follows:

First, in *Memory Makers* I will follow a lineage in the philosophy of technology. This presents technics as having co-evolved alongside humans, constituting our memory and our sense of time. Given technics possess their own telos, technology's totalising instrumentality represents a distortion called *Enframing*. Enframing is the appropriation of the human's movement by the technical system, creating that feeling of a spiralling loss of control. In reply, this literature places a large emphasis on the individuation of the individual-collective relation. I will argue the overemphasis on capitalism and instrumentality blinds the literature to the potential *instrumentality of this individual and collective*. I call this the *technology of being*, within which resides a possessive logic.

To substantiate my critique, in the following three chapters I will demonstrate the existence of the technology of being from an anticolonial perspective. In *The Rememberer,* I will introduce a counter theory of human origination as cosmological and argue that being has become instrumentalised by 'Men' to justify a possessive impulse. In *The Memory,* I will deconstruct the 'moment' of dispossession by the State and argue 'Man's possessive impulse

is *made* into the collective's possessive pulse. From these two chapters I will contend that technology's possessive logic resides within an inscribed normative field of relations, Enframing thus securing itself in 'Man's' denial of dispossession. In *The Remembrance*, I will substantiate my critique by arguing technology's possessive is visible within colonial ideological constructions. From my critique, I will conclude technology is dangerously simplifying memory.

Lastly, in *Mending Memory*, I will respond to the memory harmed in Enframing by affirming a plurality of technics. Throughout my critique I will bound technology to being one *cosmotechnic* amongst others, thus opening the possibility of other technical relations. I will define Enframing's cosmology as bestial, as that which devours other cosmologies, and seek a pluralism of technics in the affirmation of land. Amidst these technics, I will also propose my own novel construction, *making-anarchic*.

Before beginning my analysis, I must make two notes. First, I will use the term *movement* as a metaphorical aid to indicate dynamism, and the possibility of enacting change. For example, where the human possesses movement over the technical system, they can intervene. But, if the technical system possesses movement within itself, intervention is limited. This is also perspectival, as colonial relations of domination force the belief that the colonised are without agency, a lack of movement becomes naturalised. Second, a semantic distinction must be remembered: technic designates all domains of practice, from tool-use in building to qualities like grace and humour; technē refers to the Ancient Greek cosmological interpretation of technics; technology and Enframing are used interchangeably to designate the instrumental and possessive distortion in technics which has led to totalisation.

§1 Memory Makers:

the instrumentalised technic

"Well, I guess cyborgs like myself have a tendency to be paranoid about our origins…"

(Marmoru Oshii, *The Ghost in the Shell*)

To begin an examination of technology's possessive, in this chapter I will explore a line of thought in the philosophy of technology that focuses on totalisation. First, Martin Heidegger will introduce us to the Greek understanding of technics, *technē*, and characterise technology as a totalising call into instrumentality, what he calls *Enframing*. I will find his account lacking because it cannot explain the connection between technē and technology. Second, Bernard Stiegler will solve this issue by showing us how technics have co-evolved with the human to become our exteriorised memory. Enframing, for Stiegler, is the steady appropriation of the human's internal movement by the technical system. However, Stiegler's overdetermination of instrumentality leaves a blind spot. His solution – the individuation of the individual-collective relation – might itself be contributing to Enframing. Lastly, Yuk Hui will inject movement into

our disempowering critique of Stiegler by proposing technics is mediated by cosmology, thus opening a pluralism. Despite his affirmation, Hui dismisses anticolonial theory and eco-philosophy, realms of thought that should bolster his argument.

Throughout, the over-determination of instrumentality and capitalism forecloses other perspectives. In the chapters following I will radicalise Hui's idea, and affirm anticolonial thought, to critique technology from the colonial relation. This will substantiate my worry with Stiegler and open the possessive side of technology. I will demonstrate the existence of the *technology of being*, the instrumentalization of the individual-collective relation. From this I will conclude Enframing dangerously *simplifies* cultural and ecological memory. To mend this memory, in the last chapter I will explore a pluralism of technics, and within that propose a novel construction of my own, *making-anarchic*. For now, we must familiarise ourselves with the telos of technology.

The Totalisation of Technology

In 'The Question Concerning Technology' Heidegger grounds the conception of technology's instrumentality. To understand technology's emergence, he frames it as distinct from the Greek's notion of *poiēsis* [bringing-forth], where *technē* [making] opposes *physis* [nature]:

> "What presences by means of *physis* has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth,
> e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself. In contrast, what is brought forth by
> the artisan or the artist, e.g., the silver chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing
> forth not in itself, but in another, in the craftsman or artist."[1]

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[1] Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in *The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 10–11.

In technics, the principle of movement *belongs* to the person and is imparted onto matter to 'bring-forth' the artefact. Whilst in Nature, the principle of movement is inherent to the blossom. He continues: "Technē is a mode of *alētheuein* [revealing]. It reveals what does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us… it is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that technē is a bringing-forth."[2] But how does *technē* morph into technology, a bringing-forth as manufacturing?

In my reading, Heidegger situates Plato as marking the shift to technology because of a certain equivocation. Rather than knowing as practice, *technē* shifts towards *epistemē,* a knowing *of* essence.[3] Here, making tends towards the mind 'grasping'. The apotheosis of this being Plato's forms, where essences are situated above the sensible, introducing a set of oppositions: ideas/matter; nature/culture; body/mind.[4] Technē thus becomes forgotten behind epistemē, reduced to the 'grasping' of the mind. This explains Heidegger's claim that the end of philosophy marks the beginning of cybernetics.[5] Stiegler will further this thought.

For Heidegger, technology is an *instrumentalised revealing*, where *causa efficiens* reigns, the logic of efficiency for efficiency's sake.[6] It is thus distinct from poiēsis: "The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [*Herausfordern*], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such."[7] This "challenging revealing" is totalising: "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be

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[2] Heidegger, 13.

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 52; Richard Parry, "Episteme and Techne," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2021 (Stanford: Stanford University, 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/episteme-techne/.

[4] Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Desmond Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955), (509) 273.

[5] Martin Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 57–58.

[6] Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 6; Aristotle, "Physics," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. William Ross, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 333, §195a, 1-15.

[7] Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 14.

immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for further ordering…
We call it standing reserve."[8]

As totalisation, the *movement* of technology now exists exterior to the maker. It works along its own ambiguous teleology, "regulating and securing" its own development by calling on people.[9] Our dependence on the electrical grid, for example, necessitates its maintenance, it calls upon us for regulation. The self-movement of technology thus has its own telos, what Heidegger calls Enframing [*Gestell*], which in its derivative form means a "frame" or "skeleton."[10] For Heidegger, "Enframing means the gathering of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve."[11] We are thus called into an instrumental movement by technology, slowly bereft of our own movement, *technē* as *poiēsis*.[12] The danger of Enframing is a world reduced to standing-reserve. An eery premonition of the world made in the Anthropocene.

In response, Heidegger wishes to safeguard *poiēsis*.[13] Yet he contradicts himself by necessitating a certain instrumentality therein. Heidegger must either reject the instrumentality that he considers necessary, or *poiēsis* is partly instrumental, contrary to his initial conception. This tension arises because Heidegger divorces technē and Enframing. How does technology's self-movement appear? And how could we nullify instrumentality and return to *poiēsis*? A presupposition lies within, of an event like pandora's box, cutting a line across history, where the self-movement of technology suddenly manifests.

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[8] Heidegger, 17.
[9] Heidegger, 17.
[10] Heidegger, 20.
[11] Heidegger, 20.
[12] Heidegger, 27.
[13] Heidegger, 34.

Origination in the Toolman

Stiegler solves Heidegger's shortcomings by proposing that the movement within technics has always existed alongside the human. He makes this argument by critiquing the general form of Heidegger's faulty presupposition, the origin story of 'the fall'. The fall begins with Plato's overdetermination of *anamnesis* [remembrance]. The 'grasping' of essence is an act of *remembrance* of our time amongst the forms as a soul. As Socrates says in dialogue with Meno:

> "So, we need not be surprised if it [the soul] can recall the knowledge of virtue or anything else which, as we see, *it once possessed*… there is no reason why he should not find all the rest… for seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection."[14]

In elevating *anamnesis,* Plato opposes *hypomnesis*, the impaired memory that requires technics. As Stiegler says:

> "[O]n the one hand, [Plato] founds the discourse on the immortality of the soul, in *condemning the body* as a *fall from the origin*, a prison of the soul, site of passion, and *cause of forgetting* by the soul of its knowledge of the origin, and, on the other hand, *opposes* anamnesis to *hypomnesis*: the latter, as a *technics of memory* (and he is concerned here essentially with the writing of books)… is for Plato what renders the soul *forgetful,* replacing *true* memory with *artificial* memory, and accentuates *the forgetting of the origin* into which the soul has fallen in its descent into the body."[15]

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[14] Plato, "Meno," in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Cairns Huntington (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 364, §81d-e.

[15] Bernard Stiegler, "How I Became a Philosopher," in *Acting Out*, trans. David Barison, Daniel Ross, and Patrick Crogan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 15–16.

Stiegler's argument is an expansion of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of Plato's privileging of speech over writing.[16] Plato valorises the mind's clarity and remembrance, but what allows this very idea to pass through time is writing. He forgets the supplement which allows his ideas to disseminate. Stiegler radicalises this notion by conceptualising the supplement as being all technics (as writing needs the hand/pen/paper/computer). Our movement requires the movement of technics, they are an inheritance from the past and opening to the future *as memory supports*:

> "The already-there is the pre-given horizon of time, as the past that is mine but that I have nevertheless not lived, to which my sole access is through traces left of that past. This means there is no already-there, and therefore no relation to time, without artificial memory supports. The memory of the existence of the generations that preceded me, and without which I would be nothing, is bequeathed on such supports."[17]

Technical objects form our relation to time. Thus, our existence has always been constituted by their exterior movement. There was no *fall* into Enframing. Rather, we have co-evolved with technics. Stiegler substantiates this artificial evolution on two fronts.

First, anthropologically, Stiegler extends Leroi-Gourhan's concept of the universal technical tendency. The proto-human's cerebral-cortex developed alongside the flint over hundreds of thousands of years, in "an evolution so slow… that one can hardly imagine the human as operator, that is, as its inventor; rather, one much more readily imagines the human as what is invented."[18] Movement has always existed in technics, *artificially* impacting our

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[16] Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981); for more on their connection see Anne Alombert, "From Derrida's Deconstruction to Stiegler's Organology: Thinking after Postmodernity," *Derrida Today* 13, no. 1 (2020): 33–47.

[17] Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 159.

[18] Stiegler, 134.

evolution, constituting our time. Accordingly, Stiegler affirms a universal technical tendency which bounds technics to a certain evolutionary trajectory, one constrained by our own materiality. As Leroi-Gourhan says, it "drives the flint held in the hand to acquire the handle, the bundle hung on two poles to equip itself with wheels, the society founded on matriarchy to become patriarchal."[19] As a narrative of developmentalism, we should caution the specifics of such exegesis, especially the latter conclusion. Yet, with this idea, we can see our beginning alongside the movement of technics.

Second, existentially, Stiegler invokes myth to interpret our lives as beginning with the fall.[20] In Plato's *Protagoras*, a sophist tells the story of creation, where Zeus commands Prometheus to distribute qualities to all living beings.[21] Epimetheus takes over this task. But, having handed out all the qualities, he realises he has left humans without. To make up for this fault, Prometheus steals fire from the gods and hands it over to humanity. Stiegler thus concludes, we are in our origin without a *property*:

> "Humanity is without qualities, without predestination: it must invent, realize, produce qualities, and nothing indicates that, once produced, these qualities will bring about humanity, that they will become *its* qualities; for they may rather become those of technics."[22]

At the origin there is only a "de-fault", a forgetting that we cannot remember beyond, for which technics makes up the difference.[23]

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[19] André Leroi-Gourhan, *L'homme et La Matière* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1943), 27; cited in Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1*, 51.
[20] Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1*, 186.
[21] Plato, "Protagoras," in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Cairns Huntington (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 308–52, §309-362.
[22] Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1*, 193–94.
[23] Stiegler, "How I Became a Philosopher," 16.

How, then, should we understand technology? "For they may rather become those of technics." Here, Enframing glimmers in the de-fault of origin. Technics – qualities and objects of supplement – become appropriated by the technical system itself. As Simondon says, "concretised" into an ever greater unity.[24] This is most visible in industrialisation, where "the laborer serves the machine tool, and it is the latter that has become the technical individual – in the sense that it is within the machine-tool, and within the technical system to which it belongs, that an individuation is produced."[25] With Enframing, the possibility of enacting difference – an individuation – is appropriated by the machine. The worker tends to passivity, they begin to *receive* movement:

> "As this worker is progressively dis-individuated by the machine, the devaluation of work becomes unstoppable… in hyper-industrial society, the individual is essentially a consumer. But, consumption seems to consist in a tendency towards the annulment of the I/we difference, such that there is no longer any individual… but only what I have referred to as the one."[26]

After Marx, Stiegler calls this "proletarianization".[27] We increasingly become alienated from the axes of control, and instead get *put-to-use.* Enframing thus doesn't merely reveal the world as a store of energy in standing-reserve. Rather, it is also an accelerating instrumental appropriation of our movement, nullifying the possibility of enacting change. The danger of

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[24] Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. Cécile Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2017), 26.

[25] Bernard Stiegler, "Pharmacology of the Proletariat," in *For a New Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 37.

[26] Bernard Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery - Volume 1: The Hyperindustrial Epoch*, trans. Barnaby Norman (Oxford: Wiley, 2014), 59.

[27] Stiegler, "Pharmacology of the Proletariat," 27.

Enframing is when it begins to move "quicker than any will, whether individual or collective," past our awareness and past the normative regulations of the law.[28]

To curb proletarianization, Stiegler calls for a raising of technological consciousness through a "general organology… [in order] to understand the historical tendencies which have led to the specificity of our present time."[29] The outcome, a "general *organological horizon* with, for and against which it is necessary to struggle, in the name of what concerns *us*, and in so far as we remain an *us*, to remain individual singularities."[30] Put simply, we must maintain possession over our individuation, both individually and socially. Stiegler offers glimpses of what this means elsewhere, through empowering forms of social re-organisation. Specifically, he advocates a "contributory economy" which cultivates the "knowledge of life, work and conceptualisation."[31]

However, Stiegler essentialises the social to the *polis* [city], and thus remains tied to Greek and Enlightenment values. There are two problems with this. First, what if the directive of a general organology, to safeguard the individual and collective works according to the same logics as Enframing? If the human is invented by technics, maybe it too has become instrumentalised. *Maybe the human is a technology.* Moreover, if we consider the modern Settler State, haven't their laws always been instrumentally wired towards appropriation? The individual-collective relation Stiegler postures might itself be concretised in the totalisation of technology.

Stiegler's focus on the hyper-industrial society and proletarianization overdetermines instrumentality, thus blinding him to the possibilities of alternative individual-collective technical relations. If, as Anna Tsing suggests following Sidney Mintz, "sugarcane plantations

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[28] Bernard Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption: Technology and Madness in Computational Capitalism*, trans. Daniel Ross (Oxford: Wiley, 2019), 8.
[29] Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery - Volume 1*, 14.
[30] Stiegler, 101.
[31] Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption*, 42.

were the model for factories during industrialization," shouldn't we explore colonialism to understand dis-individuation?[32] With the question being, what is the role of (dis)possession in Enframing?

In the following three chapters, I intend to substantiate this critique by demonstrating the existence of the *technology of being*: the instrumentalised individual-collective relation. It is not my intention to claim this technology is total, and that we are devoid of individuation. Rather, I want to accentuate the hyper-industrial critique with a perspective from the colonial relation. Because, in the overdetermination of instrumentality, the *possessive* has been underdetermined. My project seeks to amend this. However, my critique disempowers Stiegler's project, in that Enframing is now more total. To alleviate this harm, my last chapter will deal with a response to the possessive in technology, one inspired by Hui.

This leads me onto the second problem, Stiegler's universalisation of Western philosophy. He reaffirms the question of technics to a fault. In thinking of ourselves as a *lack of quality*, we might then think too much of possession. The primacy of the 'tool-man' relation makes the social derivative. Yet, if the tool opens the world, doesn't this world then reflect back onto the tool? Driving Stiegler's thought is the Greek distinction between *physis* and *technē*, that Nature is a realm of pure mechanical becoming and humanity the only real site of individuation. Given the possibility of the technology of being, perhaps we can find the movement we need by opening our cosmological perspective.

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[32] Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 40; Sidney Wilfred Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), 47.

Introducing the World's Plurality

Hui offers us an opening, as he proposes cosmology inflects technics, thus creating a plurality of technical relations. He expresses this in the following antinomy:

> "(1) Technics is anthropologically universal, and since it consists in the extension of somatic functions and the externalisation of memory, the differences produced in different cultures can be explained according to the degree to which factual circumstances inflect the technical tendency. (2) Technics is not anthropologically universal; technologies in different cultures are affected by the cosmological understanding of these cultures, and have autonomy only within a certain cosmological setting – technics is always *cosmotechnics*."[33]

Under this model, Stiegler's Prometheanism becomes a singular cosmotechnic. Rather than a universal technical tendency, the cross-cultural differences between technics are made primary. By seeing the social as determinative, not derivative, cosmology becomes a site of movement: "in so far as technics is both driven by and constrained by cosmological thinking, it acquires different meanings beyond its somatic functionalities alone… not only biological and geographical, but also social, cultural, and metaphysical."[34] As the perceived movement of the world reflects back onto the tool, cosmology both constrains and opens possibilities of action.

Hui seeks a cosmotechnic from Chinese philosophy to move beyond Enframing. His analysis focuses on the possibility of a new relation to technology, by exploring the *Qi* [tool] and the *Dao* [the way].[35] Consider his example of a butcher: "Pao Ding's knife never cuts the

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[33] Yuk Hui, *The Question Concerning Technology in China: An Essay in Cosmotechnics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016), 19; Yuk Hui, "Cosmotechnics as Cosmopolitics," *E-Flux* 86 (2017), https://www.e-flux.com/journal/86/161887/cosmotechnics-as-cosmopolitics/.
[34] Hui, *The Question Concerning Technology in China*, 217.
[35] Hui, 35.

tendons, not to mention coming up against the bones: instead, it seeks the void and enters it with ease; in doing so, the knife accomplishes the task of butchering the cow without endangering itself… and fully realises itself as a knife."[36] Guided by the *Dao*, the knife goes beyond efficiency, and finds harmony with the world. The inflection of cosmology can thus extend technics beyond instrumentality. Indeed, Hui argues we need to counter the homogenisation of history in Enframing, as technology represents a totalising Western memory.[37] With cosmotechnics, we can "go back to the question of time and open up a pluralism which allows a new world history to emerge."[38]

Opening the "other history," the lost and forgotten voices has been the directive of anticolonial theory.[39,40] Yet, Hui distances his project from such work. For example, he rebukes Chakrabarty because he exemplifies the tendency to "reduce political and material questions to the register of inter-textuality… [whereby] technological unconsciousness will *necessarily* continue."[41] Similarly, he dismisses the resurgence of Indigenous ontologies as merely being a "return to nature," in line with other eco-philosophy.[42] This affirms the worrying assumption that Indigenous cosmologies are *without* technics. As his own argument attests, cosmologies are at one and the same time technical because the technical object mediates our interaction with the world. So, does that mean Indigenous ontologies are without cosmology? The proposition is absurd, for the latter necessarily involves the former. In fact, a large part of the ecological damage of modernity comes from the violent erasure of Indigenous technics. For example, a proposed marker for the beginning of the Anthropocene was the

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[36] Hui, 104.

[37] Hui, 241.

[38] Hui, 261.

[39] I choose the term 'anticolonial' over 'postcolonial' as I maintain colonialism is ongoing.

[40] Stuart Hall, "Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities," in *Culture, Globalization and the World System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 49.

[41] Hui, *The Question Concerning Technology in China*, 305.

[42] Hui, 241.

reduction in carbon from the advent of Colonisation in the Columbian Exchange.[43] The death of fifty million people and accompanying cessation of farming and fire management practices erased many lines of life-affirming ecological and *technical* relationships.[44] The destruction of technics is part of the ongoing damage of colonialism.

If Hui wishes to affirm a pluralism of technics, then the inclusion of anticolonial theory, Indigenous ontology, and eco-philosophy should be welcomed. In responding to Stiegler, I will thus also performatively respond to Hui, by breaching cosmology through the thought he so readily dismisses. This will guide my own response to Enframing. In the fourth chapter I will characterise the 'missing cosmology' behind technology from the colonial-relation. By making this explicit, I will then radicalise the possibilities of cosmotechnics in the final chapter, by proposing a pluralism of technics, and introducing my own novel conception, *making-anarchic*.

To raise the problem of the possessive, I have presented a line of thought on technology as a totalising instrumentality. Heidegger introduces us to the internal movement of technics in Enframing. Stiegler places this movement as a co-evolutionary development alongside humans, constituting our memory. Hui introduces pluralism by arguing cosmology inflects technics.

In the next three chapters I will substantiate my critique of Stiegler and (performatively) Hui. I will demonstrate the existence of the *technology of being*, the instrumentalisation of individual-collective relation. This will reveal the other side of technology, the *possessive*. Along the way we will characterise the 'missing cosmology' behind technology. To begin, I will introduce a counter theory of origination which makes the social primary. With this we will explore the instrumentalisation of 'Man' towards his possessive impulse.

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[43] Simon L. Lewis and Mark A. Maslin, "Defining the Anthropocene," *Nature (London)* 519, no. 7542 (2015): 174; Heather Davis and Zoe Todd, "On the Importance of a Date, or, Decolonizing the Anthropocene," *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies* 16, no. 4 (December 20, 2017): 771.
[44] Lewis and Maslin, "Defining the Anthropocene," 175.

§2 The Rememberer of Dispossession:

the instrumentalised individual

"And yet what do I see from my window but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines? Yet I judge these to be men."

(René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, 57)

Over the next three chapters I will demonstrate the existence of the *technology of being* to form my critique of the philosophy of technology. As the instrumentalised *relation* between individuals and their collective, I will dedicate a chapter to each. Here, I will define the instrumentalised individual as 'Man'. In the next chapter, I will define the instrumentalised collective as State. And in the chapter thereafter, I will explore how their concretisation (as the technology of being) forms the possessive logic of Enframing.

I will define the instrumentalised individual across three sections. First, as a counter position to Stiegler, I will engage Sylvia Wynter's theory of the human being as storyteller. Through cosmology the social takes primacy over technics. I will defer choosing between their

theories so I can follow the critical aspect of Wynter's account. Second, I will note Christianity's effect on Platonism. The shift, from recollection to redemption, introduces to being: a linear progress narrative; a privileged subject; and self-referential justification. Third, I will follow Wynter's analysis of the privileged 'Man' alongside the beginnings of colonialism. Increasingly, this 'Man' appropriates the movement of God, raising an element of the 'missing cosmology': 'Man' as prime-mover. I will argue this appropriation marks the emergence of a *possessive impulse,* and that this 'Man' justifies his barbarous actions towards this end increasingly by reference to himself. In other words, *he instrumentalises himself.* As such, 'Man' becomes a technology, one that covets the memory of reality – he becomes the only rememberer. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate the other side of the technology of being, how 'Man's' impulse is *made* into the possessive pulse of the State.

Origination in the Storyteller

Frantz Fanon provides a starting point for considering the instrumentalised individual as he argues *being* is socially constituted. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon describes a doubling between skin (phylogeny/ontogeny) and masks (sociogeny). In this, ontology privileges white being, casting the Other to mechanical becoming:

> "Ontology – once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside – does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man."[45]

Within the colonial social order, being black is bound to whiteness. It is derivative, yet also supports the agency of the white man. The social narratively forms the ontological, which

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[45] Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Makmann (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 110.

becomes internalised, performed, and naturalised. "If there is a flaw, it lies not in the 'soul' of the [colonized] individual, but in his environment."[46] Accordingly, for Fanon, movement is found in a cosmological break from this white social-ontological bind:

> "There is a zone of nonbeing, an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval can be born… *Man is a yes that vibrates to cosmic harmonies*. Uprooted, pursued, baffled, doomed to watch the dissolution of the truths that he has worked out for himself one after another, he has to give up projecting onto the world an antimony that coexists with him."[47]

Fanon exposes how we naturalise the narrativized elements of our social order and believe them as ontologically determined. He therefore raises a distinction between being and the social, what we can understand as the movement of the cosmological.

As a counter to Stiegler, Wynter makes Fanon's critique concrete. For her, we are hybrid beings. But, instead of beginning with the fall, she starts with the *story* of the fall. The defining characteristics of our "hybrid human origin… [are] *the fully completed co-evolution, with the human brain, of the faculties of language and storytelling*."[48] Again, we can question the security of this anthropological conception. Yet, the intuition feels right, we cannot escape the narrative, Stiegler's invocation of mythology reveals as much. Following Wynter, movement is therefore found in the openness of our social codification, our cosmology, not merely in our relation to technical objects.

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[46] Fanon, 188.

[47] Fanon, 10 [emphasis added].

[48] Sylvia Wynter, "Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations," in *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis*, ed. Katherine McKittrick (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 72.

The presupposition behind Wynter's proposal is that we are biologically determined to be cosmologically bound, what Gregory Bateson calls a descriptive statement.[49] With Fanon, we see the reigning descriptive statement in Western ontology animates the white man and reduces all others to mechanistic becoming. The question becomes, how do people break through the constraints of colonial domination? Fanon's assertion of the "yes that vibrates to cosmic harmonies" posits self-actualisation as a site of liberation. Interestingly, Wynter characterises this as sort of technic:

"[O]ur human eusocial systems are… hybrid languaging cum storytelling (if biologically implemented) living systems… I call these the laws of human auto-speciation, thereby of *autopoiesis*."[50]

We *make ourselves* and in doing so shift the relations of domination. Thus, Wynter concludes the human being is not a noun, rather, "being human is a praxis."[51] We have converged with Stiegler as this casts the human as technic. Yet, at this rate, we can't be satisfied with either as each performs what the other makes derivative: Stiegler presents a cosmology by favouring technics; Wynter presents a technic by favouring cosmology. To keep following Wynter's account, I will defer this tension to the last chapter.

Inverting Wynter's declaration, we can see the necessity of the critical element of her account: if the human is conceived as a noun, it can become instrumentalised. Specifically, if the white man is ontologically determined as possessing movement, his construction *as human* could become an instrumental technology towards the maintenance of himself and his

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[49] Gregory Bateson, "Conscious Purpose versus Nature," in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology* (Maryland: Jason Aronson, 1987), 441–42.
[50] Wynter, "Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations," 28 [emphasis changed]
[51] Wynter, 23.

possessions. He could become a technology which secures Enframing. The question is, does the white man have an impulse towards possession?

A Note on Redemption

Before diving into the possessive impulse, I must background the beginnings of colonialism by commenting on the Christian distortion of Platonism. For Plato, the anamnesic gaze pursues re-collection over the course of a lifetime. But what is a lifetime? In *The Republic*, Plato presents the universe and life as ordered cyclically in the image of a spindle.[52] Life, therefore, follows a cycle of reincarnation.[53] In Christianity, the "fallen flesh" is made singular, the life of a soul is lived only once, and judgement for eternity accorded within that time. Thus, not only the beginning, *but the end* determines a life. Christianity's eschatology narrows re-collection to redemption. The Latin *redimere* means 'buy back', the *lack* that Stiegler identifies shifts to *debt*.

The stakes of a lifetime are therefore amplified. A life becomes *instrumental* for seeking salvation. A life pursues possession of a one-way ticket to the Augustinian City of God. Normativity is configured in the conceptualisation of the good religious subject. Because there is only one form of redemption, progress maps onto a singular linear trajectory. Without multiplicity, other forms of life must be placed on this line. Since the Christian subject touches the future as heaven, all other modes of being are placed *behind*, in the past. As Walter Benjamin says, "only in the messianic realm does a universal history exist. Not as written history, but as festively enacted history."[54] Understood so, the finitude of Christian life has

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[52] Plato, *The Republic*, 393–401 (§614-620).
[53] Plato, 399 (§619).
[54] Walter Benjamin, "Parilipomena to 'On the Concept of History,'" in *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 4, 1938-1940* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), 404.

three consequences, it: enshrines the linear progress narrative of modernity; constrains the individual to a singular mode of being; and tightens justification to a form of self-reference.

The Possessive Impulse

To expose the possessive impulse, I will now explore a cosmological shift alongside the beginnings of colonialism. I will not be defining a chain of events that have caused modernity. Rather, I will be considering how the epistemological, theological, and political all become expressions of a general process of transformation, heralding the beginning of colonialism, the displacement of the Church's absolute hegemony and the rise of the modern State.[55] For this reason, I will affirm David Graeber's characterisation of modernity as an era marked by a *perversion* which begins to place profit above life, thus legitimising so many barbarous acts.[56]

Wynter provides a schematic by which to consider this cosmological perversion as she defines the emergence of 'Man' across colonialism. Following her account, the possessive impulse appears and multiplies as these 'Men' begin to instrumentalise their being to justify their actions. I have picked three distinct moments of 'Man's' emergence, each appropriating the movement of God. The last is my addition.

First, a theological shift.[57] In *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola transgresses the bounds of theological orthodoxy, daring to *move* the seat of God. The omnipotent is recharacterized into a "Caring Father" who has made the universe for Man's benefit:

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[55] Sylvia Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3, no. 3 (2003): 275.

[56] David Graeber, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004), 49–50.

[57] Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom," 276.

"Now the highest Father, God the master-builder… took up man… and placing him at the midpoint of the world… spoke to him as follows: We have given to thee, Adam, no fixed seat… that thou mayest feel as thine own, have as thine own, possess as thine own seat, the form, the gifts which thou thyself shalt desire… Thou, like a judge appointed for being honorable art the moulder and maker of thyself."[58]

Pico valorises the fallen flesh of Man. In his account, we were placed on Earth intentionally lacking by God, so that 'Man' could admire creation, and in that vein, create himself. The term 'possess' comes from the Latin concatenation of *potis* meaning 'able' and *sedere* meaning 'sit'. With Pico, we arrive at another transmutation of our quality: the lack which became a debt is now affirmed as a *seat of possibility*. The good religious subject becomes the enterprising individual. Here, with the movement of God an impulse to possession appears in 'Man'.

Second, an epistemological shift. The Copernican revolution upsets the static Ptolemaic cosmology, which posed the structural opposition between the perfection of spirit (sameness) and the natural man (difference).[59] "The premise that the Earth did not move was very central to the form of Christian theology that was hegemonic at the time."[60] So, with the revelation that "the Earth indeed also moves" comes a "*cognitively open…* generalised *natural scientific* conceptual space."[61] Here, the natural sciences took their first independent steps. Looking back, we believe that these discoveries chastened the status of the human. However, this is because of our current perspective. At the time, "theocentrically… to be at the center was to be at the dregs of the universe… so when Copernicus says that the Earth also moves, he is revalorizing

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[58] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, ed. Paul J. W. Miller, trans. Charles Glen Wallis (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), 4–5.

[59] Sylvia Wynter, "The Ceremony Must Be Found: After Humanism," *Boundary 2* 12/13, no. 3 (1984): 25.

[60] Wynter, "Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations," 14.

[61] Wynter, 16.

the Earth… of the same homogenous physical substance as the heavenly bodies! ”[62] Here, 'Man' moves against God, owning his place amongst the stars.

Third, an ontological shift. With the movement of God and all heavenly bodies, comes the fixity of 'Man', and thus the 'Man' as mover. René Descartes exemplifies this shift, as the self becomes possessed through the very doubt of God. From here on out, the *certainty* of the individual will carry forward the movement of the world:

> "Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed and immovable; in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain and indubitable."[63]

Rather than God, *movement* comes from 'Man'. With the certainty of the cogito, a distinct change occurs within perception. As Heidegger notes:

> "The representing subject makes itself sure of itself and that means makes itself sure continually also of what it represents as a particular something… the representing is now correct when it is right in relation to this claim to secureness."[64]

Notably, security defines the motivations of 'Man', the same as Enframing. Here, 'Man' prioritises himself as mover, to a fault.

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[62] Wynter, "Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations," 14 [emphasis removed].

[63] René Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in *Rene Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy in Focus*, ed. Stanley Tweyman, trans. George Robert Thompson Ross (London: Routledge, 1993), 50.

[64] Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead,'" in *The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 88–89.

These three moments take place over the course of about one-hundred and fifty years, alongside the advent of colonialism in the Colombian Exchange. In each instance, 'Man' appropriates what was once God's movement. First, with the encouraged consent to appraise creation. Second, in a transgression against the heavenly bodies. Third, in the securing of himself as fixed. An impulse to possession is present in the first instance, in the shift from debt to a seat of possibility. In the appropriation of God 'Man' increasingly justifies himself by reference to himself. 'Man', the individual, becomes instrumentalised in justifying the actions of the possessive impulse. We can therefore define an element of technology's 'missing cosmology': 'Man' as prime-mover.

This instrumentalisation and self-referential justification is made clear if we consider the emergence of the biological sciences through the theory of evolution. As Wynter says, evolutionism was the "first [origin narrative] in our human history to be not only part myth but also part natural science."[65] In his analysis of settler colonialism, Patrick Wolfe agrees: "what distinguishes the evolutionist narrative is… that it *was* a narrative… it had a temporal syntax; it was sequential, cumulative, end-driven."[66] Colonisers, as pastoralists, were 'superior' to the colonised "because they had once *been* nomads but were so no longer."[67] The power of this theory, is that progress becomes crystallised in a "model that supposedly pre-exists – rather than coexists with – all the models of human societies."[68] Whilst science supposedly chastens the human by reducing us to a biological organism, 'Man' instrumentalises this concept (himself) to justify his possessions, to justify his *technology*.

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[65] Wynter, "Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations," 35 [emphasis removed].

[66] Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event* (London: Cassell, 1999), 45.

[67] Wolfe, 45.

[68] Wynter, "Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations," 21 [emphasis removed].

In a sense, the discoveries of science become instrumental in establishing the white man as the only rememberer. Ontological biases are 'confirmed' and perpetuated through phylogenetics and the development of the technical system itself. The cosmological is singularised to the movement of the white man, naturalising a certain social order. Toward the maintenance of this order and its burgeoning capitalism, 'Man' increasingly instrumentalised himself in justifying the actions of his possessive impulse.

I am not maintaining Enframing led to colonialism. We must remain steadfast in placing responsibility on the barbarous perversion of the patriarchal white man. However, we can posit that the technical system has *appropriated* how this 'Man' has instrumentalised himself. This makes sense given 'Man' increasingly justifies himself by reference to 'his' technology. We could say, the individual has been concretised in Enframing. To substantiate this, we must demonstrate how the possessive impulse is *inscribed* into 'Man's normative field of relations, how it is *made* into the State's possessive pulse. Only then can we see how the technology of being mediates Enframing's instrumentality with a possessive logic.

In this chapter, I have defined one side of the technology of being, the instrumentalised individual. In the first section, I introduced Wynter's theory of origination in opposition to Stiegler. By doing so, the cosmologically inflected social became primary, thus bringing another site of movement into our account. I deferred picking between these theories, so I could follow Wynter's critical account. Second, I noted Christianity's distortion of Platonism. Shifting re-collection to redemption introduces: a linear progress narrative, a privileged subject, and self-referential justification. Third, I followed Wynter's analysis of the privileged 'Man' in the beginnings of colonialism. In his appropriation of God's movement, an element of the 'missing cosmology' came forward: 'Man' as prime-mover. I argued this marks the emergence of the *possessive impulse* and that this 'Man' instrumentalises himself towards justifying

barbarous acts. Being instrumentalised as 'mover', coveting the memory of reality, 'Man'

becomes the only rememberer. Next, I will define the other side of the *technology of being* –

the instrumentalised collective, therein we will see the possessive pulse.

§3 The Memory of Dispossession:

the instrumentalised social

"'Hands too many,' he whispered, coughing, 'running like mice over every dwelling, trying to reshape, push, mould, trying to make things different. White hands.'"

(Mozzie Fishman in Alex Wright's *Carpentaria*, 125-6)

In this chapter, I will demonstrate the existence of the other side of the technology of being, the State as an instrumentalised collective. As the State mediates the normative field of settlers, legitimising their possessions, relationality becomes bound to Enframing.[69] The legitimacy of this ground of normativity depends on dispossession conceived as an event. If, as I will argue, dispossession is ongoing and needs to be maintained, I will propose a *possessive pulse* is made (and remade) within the structural maintenance of the State.

First, I will open up Marx's understanding of primitive accumulation through anti-colonial theory. Second, I will analyse the collectivised possessive impulse of settlers, arguing

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[69] To maintain context, I will be using the term 'settler' interchangeably with the 'Man' defined last chapter.

they perceive land as mere *potential* to be actualised by technology. Third, I will dive into the *memory* of dispossession by following Derrida's deconstruction of the law's foundation.[70] In this, the State maintains its structure around silencing the initial act of violence. Thus, I will conclude primitive accumulation is recursive, and that the State's structure maintenance houses a possessive pulse. Lastly, I will field an objection against the immateriality of my critique. This will be further substantiated in the next chapter, where I consider the consequence of the concretisation of the technology of being and its possessive logic – the simplification of memory.

Primitive Accumulation ≠ Proletarianization

To begin, we need to consider the ground beneath proletarianization, dispossession as *primitive accumulation.* With Stiegler, Marx's concept of proletarianization is extended from the loss of the worker's time to a loss of individuation. The worker is stripped of possessing and moving the means of production. The totalisation of the technical system presumes that the modes of production form the *ground* of society. But how did this *efficient ground* emerge?

In Marx's terms, the accumulation of capital presupposes dispossession, an initial concretisation of capital by the bourgeoise. Marx argues this "primitive accumulation" is an *event*, useful only for considering capitalism: "we are not concerned here with the conditions of the colonies. The only thing that interests us is the secret discovered in the New World by the political economy of the Old World."[71] For Marx, primitive accumulation functions as the first moment of proletarianization, introducing a twofold world of owners and workers.

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[70] I am conflating the term 'memory' to mean 'moment'. For a take on how perception of a moment is already a memory, see Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation*, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

[71] Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), 940.

Glen Coulthard helps us understand the limits of Marx's conceptualisation. He makes three points. First, the rigid temporal framing confines dispossession to a moment in time.[72] Second, the temporal syntax invokes developmentalism, casting the dispossessed as backward.[73] Lastly, colonial relations of power are reduced to force, forgetting symbolic violence.[74] Instead, Coulthard argues dispossession is ongoing, has no reference to progress, and is maintained coercively and ideologically.[75] Considered from another angle, primitive accumulation therefore maintains that *possession is ongoing*, that in the efficient ground hums a possessive pulse.

But why is (dis)possession conceived as one off? From the perspective of the settler, being initially composed of lack, he must make/take a seat for himself. His impulse is defined by the divide between *physis* and *technics,* whereby the latter actualises the former. In perceiving the world this way, technics transposes matter, shifting its state, thus marking an event. Yet, we need not maintain this perspective. Wolfe makes Coulthard's critique explicit regarding settler colonialism as he argues "invasion is a structure not an event."[76] Following their lead, I will critique this perspective of dispossession as an event. I will dive into the 'memory' of the State's foundation to understand it's rationalisation of this 'event'. But to consider the settler's field of normativity, I must first establish the collectivisation of the possessive impulse.

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[72] Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 9.
[73] Coulthard, 9.
[74] Coulthard, 15.
[75] Coulthard, 15.
[76] Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*, 2.

Collectivising the Impulse

The expropriation of Australia by the British State was enacted on a doctrine of *terra nullius.* To maintain this, Indigenous peoples were reduced to the same state as the land, what Aimé Césaire calls "thingification."[77] Manicheanism, a continuation of Christian normativity, casts baseness as bad, and by contradistinction, the settler as good.[78] Because the settler has technics, they can *transform* the bad, bring it into their own domain, *civilise* it, *cultivate* it. As we saw last chapter, the settler justifies possession by reference to himself. This justification is also a collective motivation. In John Locke's words:

> "Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has a right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever he removes out of the state of nature hath provided, and left in it, he hath mixed labour with, and joined to it something of his own, and thereby makes it his property."[79]

In this perspective, labour splits totality into possessor, possessed, and possessable. Labour becomes the proof of being, and therefore defines technics. But what exactly is the technic of labour? Locke continues, "as much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property."[80] Labour is the agricultural, an instrumentalisation of

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[77] Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, [1955] 2000), 42.

[78] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance. Farrington (New York: Grove Press, [1961] 1968), 42–43.

[79] John Locke, "The Second Treatise: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government," in *Two Treatises of Government: And a Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. Ian Shapiro (Yale University Press, [1689] 2003), 111–12.

[80] Locke, 113.

the land, and is thus made distinct from other technics, it becomes the technological. Emer de Vattel makes this clear:

> "There are others, who, to avoid labour, choose to live only by hunting… those who still pursue this idle mode of life, usurp more extensive territories than, with a reasonable share of labour, they would have occasion for, and have, therefore, no reason to complain, if other nations, more industrious… come to take possession of a part of those lands."[81]

Vattel demonstrates the double-sided character of technology, a mutuality between instrumentality and possession. Technics are cast onto the arrow of progress with Manichean overtones. The technics of Indigenous peoples are thus reduced to *physis*.

The implication behind the settler's perspective is that all intersubjectivity is bound between settlers and all relationality is mediated by *technology*. In separate diary entries, Cook confirms as much, talking of encounters with Indigenous peoples:

> "We were never able to form any *connections* with them, they had not so much as touch'd the things we had left in their huts on purpose for them to take away"[82]

> "[They] set no value upon anything we gave them, nor would they ever part with anything of their own for one article we could offer them."[83]

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[81] Emer de Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, ed. Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, trans. Thomas Nugent (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, [1758] 2008), 129–30.

[82] James Cook, *Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, ed. J. C. Beaglehole, vol. 1, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); cited in Stuart Banner, "Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early Australia," *Law and History Review* 23, no. 1 (2005): 103.

[83] Cook, *Journals of Captain James Cook*, 1:399; cited in Banner, "Why Terra Nullius?," 103.

Cook's statement expresses dissonance regarding the fact of Indigenous possession. Their 'possession' in his speech-act becomes void in the afterthought. From Cook's perspective, not wanting a 'superior' technical object casts Indigenous peoples as subsistent and backward.[84] If I do not exchange, I am not a possessor, and so must be (dis)possessable.

In these moments, the possessive impulse characterises the social relations of the settler. The settler engages in labour, a *technology* which *instrumentalises* the land, relieving it from *physis* and making it into his seat. Settlers as movers, constrain relationality to their normative prescriptions which mediate their vying possessive impulses. Any movement beyond, whether from Indigenous peoples, or the land, is denied. Indeed, the land is merely seen as a *potential,* that which can be actualised. We can thus define two more elements of the 'missing cosmology': intersubjectivity as exchange; land as denial.

The collectivised impulse therefore defines the settler's normative framework – the law – and implicates all territory as possessable. Land that is not possessed by law has the quality of possibly being possessed as stated by the law. 'Unpossessed' land is at once inside and outside its confines. The universalisation of the law to a space *exterior* raises a problem. What if there are other obligations governing there? A tension exists between the defined prescriptions of the law and the *ground* of normativity.

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[84] Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive*, 112.

The Possessive Pulse

To explore the 'memory' of dispossession, I will now follow Derrida's deconstruction of the moment of the law's foundation.[85] Two things should be noted. First, Derrida's account pursues the creation of this normative framework *ex nihilo*, not the *res extensa* of the monarchical State's settler colonialism. My reason for following Derrida, is that part of my critique will be against this assumption of *ex nihilo*. Second, this deconstruction works through ontology, and therefore, refers to *the ground* of being. We will strategically equivocate this sentiment with the land.

To begin this deconstruction, consider the following paradox: if there was no law prior to the founding of State, how are we to judge the foundational act? Is it violent? Is it unjust? In Derrida's words:

> "*All* Nation States are born and found themselves in violence. I believe that truth to be irrescusable. Without even exhibiting atrocious spectacles on this subject, it suffices to underline a law of structure: the moment of foundation, the instituting moment, is anterior to the law or legitimacy which it founds. It is thus *outside the law*, and violent by that very fact."[86]

Terra nullius is necessarily violent because it inscribes beyond itself. As Derrida defines elsewhere, this "*coup de force*" is a "performative and therefore interpretative violence."[87] It is

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[85] I have coupled this deconstruction together across two works invoking the same paradox: Jacques Derrida, "On Forgiveness," in *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, trans. Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001), 27–62; Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" in *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson, trans. Mary Quaintance (New York: Routledge, 1992); the latter is a response to Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," in *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-26*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), 236–52.

[86] Derrida, "On Forgiveness," 57.

[87] Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" 13.

performative, because it legitimises itself in the act of inscription. It is interpretative because it bounds the land as *void* and therefore possessable. Although violent, is this unjust?

> "Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground. Which is not to say they are in themselves unjust, in the sense of "illegal.""[88]

Although violent, the act is not unjust because it is inscribed in a non-ground. Derrida's observation situates the settler's obligations in the inscription. Whilst violence can be done to an outside, this outside cannot set any obligations of its own. This rationale is cause for concern.

The assumption of *ex nihilo* is that there is no reference point (ground). Yet when is this ever the case? When considering our analysis of the Australian State, the no-ground is perceived as such only by reference to the ground of Europe. At the outset, the perspective of *terra nullius* presumes a ground elsewhere, which designates the 'no-ground' and casts it as potential-ground. But if there is this potential to *become* ground, surely this signifies a certain groundedness already?

Getting ahead of ourselves, we can open this question only if we expand ourselves cosmologically, beyond the binary of *physis* and *technic*. As Irene Watson argues, the land fosters its own relationality in a "natural system of obligations" which are not imposed but lived. [89] For her, there is a law inhering in all things, which founds Indigenous ontology. "There is no rule," however, "that would enable the extinguishment of the law and/or the

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[88] Derrida, 14.

[89] Irene Watson, *Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law: Raw Law* (London: Routledge, 2014), 5, 12.

extinguishment of our relationship to our ancient territories."[90] Here, the ground is allowed movement, space to breathe, and in doing so, other obligations come-forth.

The settler's perspective, therefore, denies the ground. There is never a no-ground, only an *ungrounding* which is at once an acknowledgement of ground. We must ask, how is this denial perpetuated? "The foundational violence is not forgotten," Derrida says, "the foundation is made *in order to* hide it; by its essence it tends to organise anmnesia." And elsewhere, "here a silence is walled up in the violent structure of the founding act. Walled up, walled in because silence is not exterior to language."[91] Conservation of the denial of ground is built into the *structure* of the State. The edifice is erected to forget the founding violence, but in doing so maintains its presence. Therefore, violence finds repetition in the maintenance of *efficient ground*:

> "Iterability requires the origin to repeat itself originarily, to alter itself so as to have the value of origin, that is, to conserve itself… this iterability inscribes conservation in the essential structure of foundation."[92]

The structure of the State is built around silencing violence. By having to maintain this initial fault, dispossession cannot be an event, because the structure must constantly cover its violent act. Like the settler, the State needs to *instrumentalise* its very being to maintain the relationality of possession. This makes sense given its body is composed of such 'Men'. Primitive accumulation is therefore recursive because of this ongoing denial of land. And given this instrumentalisation, I contend the State's structural maintenance hums the possessive pulse, the *making* of the settler's impulse, thus rounding out the technology of being.

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[90] Watson, 8.
[91] Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" 14.
[92] Derrida, 43.

An Objection Brings-Forth the Skeleton

Before moving into the next chapter, I must field an objection: hasn't the *Mabo* case and *Native Title Act* acknowledged the existence of a ground before the founding violence?[93] Yes, our collective has 'technically' acknowledged *terra nullius* is a myth. Indigenous peoples are now entitled to *make* land claims. However, in this very construction, we see how possession is still conditioned. Sovereignty is now maintained by recourse to an 'Act of State': "the result from *Mabo*, is that Indigenous people did not lose their native title rights but were stripped of their sovereign rights to manage their own affairs, to live according to their own laws."[94] What is this, if not part of primitive accumulation's recursion and the hum of the possessive pulse? To make this clear, consider the words of Justice Brennan in *Mabo*:

> "This Court is not free to adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human rights that would fracture the *skeleton* of principles which gives the body of law its shape and internal consistency."[95]

Casting ourselves back, the *skeleton* is a derivative meaning of *Gestell* [Enframing]. To equivocate here, doesn't this suggest the technological uptake of the State? After all, in *Mabo* the State secures itself. Whilst the State could go beyond itself to establish itself, it cannot go beyond itself to remove itself. Why? Because the land is now *efficient ground*, what it sees as the only ground. Tautologically, the State maintains itself by reference to its existence. Therein we see the possessive logic of Enframing. A 'memory' repeating: *I possess therefore I am.*

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[93] *Mabo and others v. Queensland* (No. 2) (1992) HCA 23, (1992) 175 CLR; *The Native Title Act* 1993 (Cth) https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00178

[94] Phillp Falk and Gary Martin, "Misconstruing Indigenous Sovereignty: Maintaining the Fabric of Australian Law," in *Sovereign Subjects: Indigenous Sovereignty Matters*, ed. Aileen Moreton-Robinson (Melbourne: Routledge, 2007), 38.

[95] *Mabo and others v. Queensland* (No. 2) (1992) HCA 23, (1992) 175 CLR, par 29.

In the next chapter, my reply to this objection will be expanded as we explore the concretisation of the technology of being and its possessive logic - the simplification of memory. For now, we must be satisfied with having demonstrated the existence of the technology of being: the instrumentalised individual-collective relation. Therein, we have seen how a possessive *impulse* emerges in 'Man' and is then *made* into the *pulse* of the collective as State. The technology of being thus composes this normative field of relationality, mediating instrumentality through a possessive logic. This makes sense if we consider the elements of the 'missing cosmology' defined in this chapter: intersubjectivity as exchange; land as denial. These elements limit movement to possessors, thus needing mediation by a field of normativity which legitimises possessions *through* the metric of technics as technology.

In this chapter I have argued the State is an instrumentalised collective. First, I introduced an anticolonial critique of Marx's understanding of primitive accumulation, opening the assumption of dispossession as an event. Second, I examined the collectivised possessive impulse of settlers, and argued they perceive land as a mere *potential* to be actualised by technology. Third, I dived into the *memory* of dispossession by following Derrida's deconstruction of the law's foundational moment. The State's structure is built around silencing the initial act of violence, thus debunking dispossession as an event, and revealing the recursion of primitive accumulation. I proposed a possessive pulse is made (and remade) within the structural maintenance of settlers and the State. Lastly, I fielded an objection against the immateriality of my critique. My reply will be further substantiated in the next chapter where I will explore the consequence technology of being and its possessive logic.

§4 The Remembrance of (Dis)possession:

the simplification of memory

"Contemporary mechanical dream mine time animals

Creating sacred sites for the future

Is what our kids will proudly tell

Their stories around the campfires

Of the mechanical snakes slithering across land

Creating new traditional pathways and song lines

…

Dream mine time animal's destroyer of land."

(Charmaine Papertalk Green, 'Dream Mine Time Animals'

in *False Claims of Colonial Thieves*, 8)

In this chapter, I will establish two conclusions to round out the critical aspect of my essay. First, the consequence of the *technology of being* and its possessive logic. Second, a characterisation of the 'missing cosmology' behind Enframing. I will be utilising the term dream-mine-time-lines to denote the conventional skeletonization of technology in Enframing, and thus mark it as distinct from the technology of being (that which remembers these lines).

Last chapter, I demonstrated that the possessive pulse persists in the structural maintenance of the *memory* (moment) of dispossession. Given this, the concretisation of the

technology of being must persist ideologically in *narrative*, as *remembrance*. To establish this intuition, in the first section I will maintain the possessive pulse persists in the settler's narrative of the wild. Second, I will argue the pulse continues through the construction of 'Aboriginality'. To get land back, Indigenous peoples are required to remember themselves instrumentally, to fold into the technology of being. Third, I will conclude that the technology of being results in a *simplification* of cultural remembrance, as instrumentality is geared towards possession and vice versa. By extension, I will conclude the dream-mine-time-lines result in a simplification of ecological remembrance. Last, I will characterise the 'missing cosmology' as bestial: a cosmology which devours other cosmologies. The consequence of this – the ubiquity of disaffection. In the next and final chapter, I will try to mend disaffection and the simplification of memory through a pluralism of technics, which includes a novel construction of my own, *making-anarchic*.

The Wild's Possessive Pulse

The possessive pulse is made in hiding the violence of dispossession. Given this, its concretisation should work ideologically, fostering a particular form of remembrance. To explore this, I will consider the settler's narrative of the wild. Why? Because it maps neatly onto our discussion of *ground* last chapter. From a settler's perspective, the totalisation of technology in Australia has occurred through a territorialisation of the 'wild' where Nature reigns sovereign. The State is formed by making *something* from the *nothing* of terra nullius. State as sovereign meets Nature as sovereign at the "frontier", a line cast between *physis* and *technics*. At the frontier, the settler looks out at the wild as simultaneously nothing (no-ground) and everything (potential-ground).

The wild's tension is similarly expressed within the settler colonialism literature. On one hand, Aileen Moreton-Robinson identifies a strategic victimhood employed by the settler, as

the "landscape stands in as the oppressor" in order to disavow "the violence committed against Indigenous people."[96] Thus, another beat of the possessive pulse. On the other hand, Deborah Bird Rose identifies an exaggerated majesty as "the coloniser celebrates his pre-presence in glorifying 'wilderness' as a place where he can encounter his own absence." [97] The contradictory perspectives reconcile if we consider the 'wild' in relation to the maintenance of possession. When possession is threatened, the wild becomes oppressor. When possession is secure, the wild becomes nothing. Elsewhere, Rose perceives this distinction in gendered terms:

> "Nature is conceptualised in two attitudes, one of which is domesticable, and one of which is hostile to civilisation. Aboriginal men and impenetrable growth will be cleared out to make way for civilisation. Aboriginal women and rich fertile land are capable of responding to the bushman and becoming civilised, although they will of course, always be women and land."[98]

What cannot be brought into efficiency is eradicated, whilst the remaining 'cultivatable' relationships are privileged. This is the making of the dream-mine-time-lines, the mediation of technology in everything. In making everything into nothing and nothing into something, the settler strives for the omnipotence and omnipresence of God. As Rose says: "on the frontier the coloniser establishes his right to play God and destroy the world in order to fulfill his vision of creation."[99] We know that land is more than the wild. As land it fosters its own series of obligations and has already been engaged as such by Indigenous technics for thousands of years.

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[96] Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive*, 157.
[97] Deborah Bird Rose, *Reports from a Wild Country: Ethics for Decolonisation* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004), 65.
[98] Rose, 104.
[99] Rose, 63.

As Marcia Langton says, it is already a "cultural landscape."[100] The narrative of the wild is thus a remembrance of land in denial, invoked to both perpetuate and justify dispossession.

Constructing 'Aboriginality'

The wild narrative is a moment in the concretisation of the possessive pulse, fostering a distorted remembrance of dispossession. But what happens in federation when there is no longer a 'frontier'? "Are we to think of the frontier as running through people's veins?"[101] I propose this concretisation continues in the attempts to absorb Indigenous belonging into the technology of being. In this process, a controlled 'Aboriginality' is constructed by settlers to maintain their possessions. Like the wild narrative, this 'subject' is constructed by intervening in the cosmology of Indigenous peoples, to destroy the threat and privilege the cultivatable, by requiring them to instrumentalise their own being. This construction becomes evident if we consider the internalisation of frontier.

When settlers officially recognised Indigenous peoples as people through the conferral of citizenship in 1967, and possessors in the capacity of native title in 1993, the violence of settler colonialism was brought-forth. Yet the possessive has been maintained by settlers as they dictate *remembrance*, they are the *rememberers*. We can consider this development in a series of crude timelines that reconceptualises the wild's narrative dynamic as the frontier totalises over the land. First, an instrumental 'Aboriginality' is incrementally internalised from 'savage' → 'cattle-killer' → 'owned by State' → 'liberal individual'. Second, the encounter with the expert settler is pacified, from soldiers → frontiersmen → officials → judges, with the violence of murder/rape → child abduction → paternalisms → legalisms. The exception being

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[100] Marcia Langton, "What Do We Mean By Wilderness?: Wilderness and Terra Nullius in Australian Art," *The Sydney Papers*, 1996, 30.
[101] Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*, 165.

the ongoing coercive violence of the police. Third, the technology that cuts into the frontier becomes more symbolic, from the gun → cattle → mission → title. Fourth, a reigning knowledge order maintains State hegemony by justifying the violence through various forms of racialisation,[102] from social contract theory[103] → evolutionary eugenicism[104] → synchronic relativism.[105] Over this time, from the settler's perspective, an Indigenous subject emerges from the apparent nothingness of Nature. Each adjustment maintains the wild's narrative structure by mediating the terms of 'property' and 'being'. From what Wolfe calls the "logic of elimination"[106] to what Elizabeth Povinelli calls the "logic of multiculturalism."[107]

Ostensibly, Indigenous peoples 'possess' the same rights as anyone else (if you ignore the years of violence, cultural vilification, and economic inequality). But as we saw last chapter these rights are still mediated by the State. "The right to negotiate under native title and the right to consent under land rights regimes," Moreton-Robinson says, "are nothing more than the right to a process."[108] Moreover, as Watson points out, this right places Indigenous peoples at the "lowest end of the property rights hierarchy" as *extinguishment* provides the State the power to determine when land titles no longer exist.[109] This is a diminished but not erased *terra nullius*. It places the burden of proof on the Indigenous subject, thus making it *nobody's land,* and therefore the State's, until established otherwise.

This burden is made heavier when we consider what is required: constant presence on the land in concert with the maintenance of 'traditional' practices. Indigenous technics, previously denied during invasion, become a means by which land-titles are conferred. To

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[102] Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso, 2016), 10.
[103] Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive*, 56.
[104] Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*, 48.
[105] Wolfe, 57.
[106] Wolfe, 33.
[107] Elizabeth A. Povinelli, *The Cunning of Recognition Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism.* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 28.
[108] Moreton-Robinson, *The White Possessive*, 169.
[109] Watson, *Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law*, 37.

examine the difficulty of this requirement, consider an interaction between two cases. In *Yanner v Eaton*, a member of the Gangalidda nation was charged with killing estuarine crocodiles by harpoon without a license.[110] In this instance, it was found their right to hunt crocodiles wasn't extinguished because they proved an unbroken presence on land through colonial standards of measurement: genealogical analysis and carbon dating.[111] Whereas the native title claim sought in *Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria* was dismissed because the orally transmitted testimonies of their ongoing presence on land weren't up to colonial standards of measurement.[112] The two cases meet in how they observe the 'evolution' of technics. In *Yorta Yorta,* Justice Callinan comments on the *Yanner* case:

> "The extent to which longstanding law and custom may evolve without ceasing to be traditional may raise difficult questions. The manner went uncontested in *Yanner v Eaton*, although for myself I might have questioned whether the use of a motor boat powered by mined and processed liquid fuel, and a steel tomahawk, remained in accordance with a traditional law or custom, particularly one of alleged totemic significance."[113]

Whilst in the *Yorta Yorta* case, "intensive husbandry and agriculture on both sides of the Murray River" were considered "incompatible with the traditional way of life… or any evolution of it."[114] Where the State's possessions are threatened, a 'traditional' Aboriginality is required which must defy over two hundred years of the dream-mine-time.[115] In placing the burden of proof on Indigenous peoples, the efficient ground is made eternal by the logic of the

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[110] *Yanner v Eaton*. 1999. HCA 53, 201 CLR; *Fauna Conservation Act* 1974 (Qld). https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-1974-044
[111] *Yanner v Eaton*. par 132.
[112] *Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria*. 2002. HCA 58, 214 CLR 422, par 190.
[113] *Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria*, par 187.
[114] *Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria*, par 190.
[115] Watson, *Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law*, 85.

State. Indigenous peoples must *instrumentalise* their own being to have land returned. They must remember themselves and the memory of dispossession in colonial terms. But they must do so without the might of a perverted, militarised, hegemonic structure. By requiring instrumentality for possession, the State reveals what its normative inscriptions are, an impossible burden of proof, only made possible by the force of an arbitrary limit.

Where 'Aboriginality' doesn't threaten the settler's possession, it is cultivated to encourage the dream-mine-time-lines, in what Wolfe calls "repressive authenticity."[116] For example, Wolfe analyses the *Possum and Wallaby Dreaming* mosaic outside Canberra's Parliament House.[117] This mosaic was adapted from a painting by Kumantyne Jagamara, an artist of the Walpiri nation in the Northern Territory. By choosing an Indigenous design from thousands of kilometres away, and having Italian artisans adapt it into a mosaic, the artwork becomes alienated from the land. The dispossession of the local Ngunawal people, whose land parliament sits on, is therefore obfuscated. [118] Further examples proliferate in the commodification of 'Aboriginality': tourist attractions offering the authentic 'bush' experience; [119] the patenting of Indigenous remedial knowledges by Big Pharma;[120] and the bio-colonialism in genetically modifying native plant species. [121] In each instance, the cultivatable in 'Aboriginality' is privileged and the indomitable eradicated. Thus, I propose the concretisation of technology's possessive persists ideologically, constraining 'Aboriginality' to the

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[116] Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*, 179.

[117] Wolfe, 207–8.

[118] Wolfe, 208.

[119] Watson, *Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law*, 93; For an example of the settler's fetishization of Aboriginality in the outback see 'The Fellowship of Mates' in Rose, *Reports from a Wild Country*, 115–30.

[120] Henrietta Marrie, "Indigenous Sovereignty Rights: International Law and the Protection of Traditional Ecological Knowledge," in *Sovereign Subjects: Indigenous Sovereignty Matters*, ed. Aileen Moreton-Robinson (Melbourne: Routledge, 2007), 53.

[121] Marrie, 58.

instrumentalisation of the technology of being, forcing a particular remembrance of dispossession.

A Conclusion on Technology

The technology of being is an extension of Enframing, instrumentalising the individual-collective relation. Through Stiegler, we know the technical object is a retentional device that stores the memory of being. The technology of being therefore has its own distinct memory, one which we have seen perpetuates land-denial. Whilst Enframing through the dream-mine-time, privileges certain relationships in the land, Enframing through the technology of being, privileges how these relationships are remembered. In both instances, in the land, and in being, memory is simplified. This is best summarised in Watson's words:

> "Nungas' relationship to ruwe [land] is now increasingly replaced by a shopping mall and social media existence. To remove people from the ruwe is to inherently precipitate group dissolution… Our status is, on one hand, continually debased, but on the other, cultivated by modern colonialists who work to 'harvest' our cultures for commercial exploitation."[122]

The remembrance of the dream-mine-time-lines and the technology of being privilege the totalisation of Enframing, and in doing so simplify memory. Diversity, of course, remains within these memories, that is the creative absorption of capitalism that the philosophy of technology typically explores. What the anticolonial perspective shows is the possessive's harm. To adequately respond to memory's simplification, we must now characterise the 'missing cosmology' reigning behind technology.

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[122] Watson, *Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law*, 122–23.

A Conclusion on the 'Missing Cosmology'

Throughout my critique I have defined three elements of 'missing cosmology' behind technology: human as prime-mover; intersubjectivity as exchange; land as denial. But how should we characterise them? I propose a bad reading of Rose's statement on pastoralism:[123]

> "In pastoral societies generally, ancient and modern, people have to negotiate a particular problematic: that animals are both their productive resource and their subsistence. To kill and eat one's own's beasts is to foreclose on long-term productivity, whether that be milk, dung, blood, and other products of living beasts, or, under capitalism, money. To kill and eat one's neighbour's beasts allows one to escape the dilemma."[124]

The success of colonialism-come-capitalism has been its ability to cast any (cosmological) belief as backward. Besides, of course, the objectivity of the sciences, which posits the *universal*, the *pre-and-post-historic*, the actual ordering of things. Within this system, beliefs become bundled up, paternalized, reduced to mythological superstition. The taxonomic tendency of science preserves them, but only as artefacts. In a sense, cosmologies themselves become concretised into the growing skeleton of Enframing, a series of objects *remembered* by *the rememberers*. Given this, I contend that the 'missing cosmology' behind technology is bestial, devouring other cosmologies (other beasts), appropriating their memory, aggregating them as relics in its totalising skeletonization.

The grand irony of modernity is that the bestial cosmology is turning on itself, devouring its own remembrance. It states that 'Man' is the only mover. As this essay has made clear, the technical system has steadily appropriated 'Man's' movement. The consequence being, within

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[123] A bad reading is a hurried figuration, the idea comes from Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, "The University and the Undercommons," *Social Text* 22, no. 2 (2004): 107.

[124] Rose, *Reports from a Wild Country*, 82.

colonial-come-capitalist societies, disaffection reigns. The technology of being is now becoming a site of profit and appropriation. Our very *performance* of possession is becoming commodified. We see this in *Capitalist Realism*, where Mark Fisher argues that the worker's representation, the quantified audit of their performance, rather than their actual output, marks the measure of success.[125]

Fisher thus extends proletarianization, as we move to being a *spectator of ourselves*. His example is just one moment in a surging Data economy, where surveillance-come-computational capitalism gears towards *mining* the technology of being. This makes sense, when territorialisation has run its course, and cosmologies have been skeletonised, the most lucrative territory becomes the possessors themselves. The cosmology behind technology is devouring itself making disaffection endemic. As Fisher contends, perhaps the only belief left is capitalist realism, that *there is no alternative*.[126] Given our argument, a Colonial Realism appears just as naturalised. Thus, by constraining movement to 'Men', the bestial cosmology functions in its other element - the denial of land. To begin mending memory, in the next chapter, I will present a pluralism of technics which open our relationship to the land. Central to this will be my own novel construction, *making-anarchic*.

This marks the end of my critique of technology from the colonial relation. In this chapter, I explored the consequence of technology's possessive logic and the cosmological character of Enframing. First, I argued that the settler's narrative of the wild is a concretisation of the possessive pulse, fostering a particular remembrance of dispossession. Second, I followed the internalisation of this narrativized pulse in the construction of 'Aboriginality' within the technology of being. To get land back Indigenous peoples must instrumentally remember their

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[125] Mark Fisher, *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* (Oregon: Zero Books, 2009), 42.
[126] Fisher, 2–4.

own being. Third, my analysis allowed me to conclude Enframing is simplifying memory, both culturally and ecologically. Last, I characterised the 'missing cosmology' as that which devours other cosmologies. The consequence being the dissemination of disaffection.

§5 Mending Memory:

fragments of making's plurality

"At the very time when it most often mouths the world, the West has never been further

from being able to live a true humanism – a humanism made to the measure of the world."

(Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, 73)

Over the past three chapters I have *brought-forth* my critique of technology from the colonial

relation. I demonstrated the existence of the *technology of being*: the instrumentalisation of the

individual-collective relation. 'Men' in their collective as 'State' become the only rememberers,

their coveted remembrance of (dis)possession maintains themselves and their technology. The

fact that technology is maintained within the setter's normative field of relations, reveals

another aspect of how Enframing regulates and secures itself. By utilising anticolonial theory,

I have thus moved beyond instrumentality to consider the other side of technology, *the*

possessive. Their mutual entanglement has propelled the totalisation of technology, simplifying

memory in the land and history.

To mend the memory harmed in Enframing I will now explore making's plurality. This will involve the creation of a novel construction of my own, *making-anarchic.* Before beginning, I must make two notes. First, my proposal will not be all encompassing. I will reject that such is desirable or practicable. Second, the constraints of this essay prevent a thorough and systematic engagement. The chapter will thus be composed of five fragments, sketching out what making's plurality could mean.

First, to ground my approach I will resolve the tension between Stiegler and Wynter with Donna Haraway's cyborg. Second, I consider the cyborg's technic, *sympoiesis*, which seeks to mend memory with *other* makers. However, I will reject Haraway's affirmation of totalisation as it essentialises a single form of making. Third, to open pluralism, I will consider 'anarchical realism', a cosmological perspective without totality. Fourth, I will concretise this perspective by considering the time of other worlds. Last, I will argue we can dissolve technology through *making-anarchic*: the making of the unmaking of time. This technic is made to the measure of other worlds, opening stolen time to other makers, mending the memory of responsibility.

Origination in the Cyborg

To begin mending memory, I want to germinate other forms of making from the ground of my critique. We can do so in the deferred tension of my essay – theories of origination. Stiegler advanced the co-evolution of 'Man' and 'Tool'. Whilst Wynter advanced the co-evolution of 'human' and 'story'. In a sense, they are both correct. On the one hand, Stiegler's Prometheanism is irreducibly a narrative because it is a myth. On the other hand, Wynter's storytelling is irreducibly a technic because it is mediated by the symbol. But which is primary?

In *A Cyborg Manifesto,* Haraway reconciles this conflict in origination. By doing so, she proposes a radical identification with our possessions. "We are all chimeras," she says,

"theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism – in short, cyborgs."[127] Haraway's target is *borders*. Through the cyborg she opens up these territories of (re)production and imagination, confusing identities and transgressing the taxonomic reserve of technoscience.[128] But what then is our origin?

> "In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense – a "final" irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic *telos* of the "West's" escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self at last untied from all dependency, a man in space."[129]

Haraway claims there is no edge to the human. We extend endlessly, blurring the lines of *physis* and *technics*. The bestial cosmology only maintains their distinction, and thus our alienation. The metaphysical desire for (re)completeness culminates in a totality that is irrevocably broken. Our technics and narratives move to close up the gap, to privilege a *narrative*, an *arrow*, of progress. The technical object stores the narrative, and the narrative stirs the object, propelling the desire for closure onward, but is never itself complete. They encircle one another: "the boundary is permeable between tool and myth… myth and tool mutually constitute each other."[130] Haraway thus reconciles Stiegler and Wynter. In extending our being through networks and ecosystems, Haraway radically affirms the alienating disaffection of modernity.

Whilst this ironically breaks down disaffection, I question the need to affirm totalisation. In the Settler State, this radical affirmation doubles down on sovereignty. I don't belong to this

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[127] Donna J. Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in *Manifestly Haraway* (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2016), 7.
[128] Haraway, 14.
[129] Haraway, 8.
[130] Haraway, 53.

land, and this land doesn't belong to me. Instead of essentialising the totalisation of 'our' world,

perhaps we should consider another brokenness, the possibility of multiple worlds.

Handing Out the Carrier Bag

Despite Haraway's problem with totalisation, her account opens the organic, and thus breaks

down the denial of land in Enframing. For this reason, I wish to consider how her cosmology

affects technics. In her later work, *Staying with the Trouble*, Haraway defines a practice for the

Anthropocene, a making in light of unexpected entanglement, inventive connection, and

multispecies recuperation.[131] We can consider this the cyborg's technic. She calls it *sympoiesis*,

a *making-with*:

> "Nothing makes itself; nothing is really autopoietic or self-organizing… *Sympoiesis* is a
>
> word proper to complex, dynamic, responsive, situated, historical systems. It is a word for
>
> worlding-with, in company."[132]

Her target is autopoiesis, the self-making of the neoliberal man, what we've called the

technology of being.[133] This idea comes from Ursula Le Guin's rejection of the tool-man and

his heroic story of him, his weapon, and the beast.[134] Instead, Le Guin proposes to consider

narrative according to the carrier bag theory of evolution: that our relationship with technics

developed from a container/bag used to hold gathered items.[135] The story of the carrier bag, of

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[131] Donna J. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 29.

[132] Haraway, 58.

[133] Haraway, 33.

[134] Ursula K. Le Guin, "The Carrier Bag Theory of Fiction," in *The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology*, ed. Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 152.

[135] Le Guin, 150; for carrier bag theory of evolution see Elizabeth Fisher, *Woman's Creation: Sexual Evolution and the Shaping of Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975).

sympoiesis, is far more than the tip of an arrow, it is "full of wimps and klutzes… tiny grains of things smaller than a mustard seed, and intricately woven nets which when laboriously unknotted are seen to contain one blue pebble… full of beginnings without ends."[136] For the cyborg, *sympoiesis* brings-forth other beings in the world as makers, and tellers, and thus breaches *physis*.

However, I want to refrain against rejecting self-making. Casting ourselves back, Wynter proposed *autopoiesis* within and against colonial social codifications. As Fanon says, "since the other hesitated to recognise me, there remained only one solution: to make myself known."[137] Where being has been denied, self-making is required. Only when self-making totalises does it become dangerous. Fanon agrees, warning of decolonisation: "the apotheosis of independence becomes the curse of independence, and the colonial power through its immense resources of coercion condemns the young nation to regression."[138] Self-making should strive to move beyond colonial forms of organisation. As Fanon argues, the young nation must move towards forming a unique culture from the struggle against domination, to define a "new humanism both for itself and for others."[139] In a sense, *sympoiesis* poses as an ideal, where the simplification of memory hasn't proliferated. For there to be a *making-with*, there must have already been a *self-making*. Both contribute to the mending of memory.

Haraway's cyborg opens the organic, *physis*, bringing other makers into 'our' world, as they come along with us in our carrier bag. Yet, Enframing has *weaponised* so much of the world by bringing it into autopoietic instrumentality. Room for the other's self-making is lacking, thus foreclosing the possibilities of making-with. Rather than affirm totalisation, I want to consider the possibility of a making which *unmakes* the cyborg, dissolving the memory

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[136] Le Guin, "The Carrier Bag Theory of Fiction," 153.

[137] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 115.

[138] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 97.

[139] Fanon, 246.

of 'our' world into others. We need to hand out the items of our carrier bag. As Haraway herself says, "we are humus, not Homo... we are compost, not posthuman."[140] But this doesn't mean we are in everything, rather, it means we cease to be along the way. In *composting the cyborg,* we are *unmade.* We are *unmade* by the makers of other worlds. But what sort of making is *unmaking*?

Anarchical Chains

To conceptualise mending memory through the dissolution of ourselves into other worlds, we must bring nuance into the concept of connection. It is often said that everything is connected to everything. But does that mean I'm responsible for everything? This notion weakens responsibility as we become overwhelmed by a spiralling chain of events. Rather than identifying with either my own world (self-making) or the whole world (making-with), is there an in between, which allows both to persist, and other worlds to come forward?

In *Fields of Sense*, Markus Gabriel argues that the 'world' as a totality doesn't exist. Instead, he proposes an *anarchical realism*, a "realism without an overall principle that governs everything."[141] In its negative form, his argument proceeds by way of a semantic problem: the statement "the world does not exist" is correct because we can never successfully refer to the world. He proves this by reformulating Russel's paradox, where the 'world' signifies the set of all facts about the world, and the world-picture is list of all these facts. But in our world-picture, when we compile our list of facts, we must include the fact of the list itself, thus leading to an infinite regress:

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[140] Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 55.

[141] Markus Gabriel, *Fields of Sense: A New Realist Ontology*, Speculative Realism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 22.

"There will always be another list we can write in order to achieve a world-picture and any list will (slightly) change the world by adding facts and objects to it."[142]

There is a generative aspect to the 'world', *it is always being made* and therefore cannot be contained. We can also preclude a generative principle that governs the world, because in the moment of world-making, this principle itself will shift. Gabriel takes this semantic argument to the ground of existence: "the world as a whole is never successfully referred to, and the idea of the world as a whole is incoherent. The world as a whole does not exist."[143]

But what does the non-existence of the world mean? I see two pictures of *brokenness* here. First, a 'broken totality' like we saw with Haraway, each time we bundle it up, 'the world' breaks free. Second, a complex and broken notion of worlds: "there are infinitely many chains of infinity that do not hang together… the popular myth of the *Butterfly Effect* as a result of the connection of everything… is just plain nonsense."[144] I caution Gabriel's disdain, but with this notion of brokenness, we can make a distinction in connection. Responsibility becomes marked only by causal connections along *particular* chains. We need not maintain everything is connected. We can perceive the edge of our memory.

Other Worlds of Time

The anarchical perspective means that other worlds hold other makers. To consider how we can mend memory by *unmaking* ourselves into these worlds, we must first conceptualise notions of time without the *technological*. Rose offers us this picture through her concept of "multispecies knots of time", where responsibility is forged through the (re)making of *particular* connections:

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[142] Gabriel, 18.
[143] Gabriel, 464.
[144] Gabriel, 364.

"My focus is on one particular intersection: where generational time intersects with synchronous encounter… Generational time involves flows from one generation to the next. Synchrony intersects with sequential time, and involves flows among individuals… as they seek to sustain their individual lives."[145]

Instead of technical objects, an ecosystem can be considered as interweaving knots of ethical time, made and reaffirmed over generations of mutualism. As an example, Rose offers the knot of time between the flying fox and the Eucalypt in the Victoria River region. The flying fox eats the fruit of the Eucalypt, and carries pollen away on its fur:

"It is a story of desire: of how flying foxes and trees want to live, how they attract and benefit each other, and how the patterns fit and keep renewing themselves. It is a story of mutual gifts across species and through time."[146]

She continues: "Forest futures are borne on fur and tongue, and on the wings that beat through the night carrying the animal to the tree, and carrying the tree's possibilities."[147] The obligations of the land persist in these knots of time as sympoiesis and autopoiesis enfold together.

By considering responsibility through ethical knots of time, *particular* connections carry the memory forward. The relationship between the fox and the Eucalypt is one *without 'us'*, a temporal object, and memory, we don't possess. Members of the local Yarralin nation see the

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[145] Deborah Bird Rose, "Multispecies Knots of Ethical Time," *Environmental Philosophy* 9, no. 1 (2012): 129.
[146] Rose, 134.
[147] Rose, 136.

flying fox as representative of the coming of the rain.[148] The memory's significance emanates outward and carries along *particular* causal chains to others. As Rose says, "there is no way to determine where connectivity and responsibility stop."[149]

Yet, she continues, "in flourishing life systems they do not stop."[150] Again, this assumes an all or nothing connectivity. But the makers of a knot of time are what matter in the relationship. To mark a distinction, I want to argue '*connection*' is that relationship of responsibility between individuals in a knot of time. Whereas we can use the term '*accord'* to describe the ambiguous relationship between different worlds (because we cannot know how things hang together). Conceived so, I believe we can conceptualise a making which mends the memory of accords between worlds.

But am I not now responsibly linked to this memory? Yes, and no. This ethical knot of time is relevant only insofar as I represent the ongoing destruction of colonialism. I wish to identify with ethical time, insofar as I wish to dissolve unethical time, what we've known as Enframing, and what Rose calls the doubling of death:

> "The dead who are left with no living descendants to call out to them and whose lives they
> can nurture will become doubly dead: having already died, they now become lost to the
> present because the present itself is becoming lost."[151]

In the totalising torrent of autopoiesis, the white man and technology have broken accords between worlds, making themselves from the unmaking of ethical time. We are implicated in these worlds only insofar as we have brought our possessive hubris into them. To mend the

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[148] Rose, 132; for more on this memory see Deborah Bird Rose, *Dingo Makes Us Human: Life and Land in an Australian Aboriginal Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 82–83.
[149] Rose, "Multispecies Knots of Ethical Time," 138.
[150] Rose, 138.
[151] Rose, *Reports from a Wild Country*, 176.

memory of ethical time, to allow other forms of sympoiesis and autopoiesis to come forward, a reversal is required: the making of the unmaking of our *technological* time.

Making-anarchic

By pursuing a pluralism of technics and worlds we have slowly arrived at a concept in need of a name. Alongside other forms of making, I propose an *anarco-poiesis*, or what I simply call, *making-anarchic.* 'Anarchic' because it is 'without ruler', without recourse to Nature or 'Man'. As making, it unmakes time, dissolving the possessive across worlds, shifting memories, and forgetting the ruling line of totality. Making-anarchic is a negative moment, which sits behind *sympoiesis, autopoiesis,* and other forms of making, and provides them opportunities to proliferate. It offers the gift of time and is thus necessarily involved in plurality.

In a sense, just as the self-making of 'Man' and Enframing denied making-with, this denial also carried across to making-anarchic. The proliferation of technology has worked through the unmaking of ethical time. The accords between worlds have been broken, and connection forced without any grounded obligation to responsibility. As we have seen, these ethical knots of time were only perceived as *potential* matter to be incorporated into the property of 'Man'. The telos of Enframing has appropriated the possessive, breaching, and devouring other worlds, living up to its bestial cosmology.

Rather than doubled up death, making-anarchic allows the conception of doubled up life: a momentary technical intervention providing the necessary support to leave other worlds, engineered to dissolve into the making of others. Conceptually, it is perhaps best explained through bioresorbable technologies, where advances in electronics have allowed fabricated stents to enter our blood stream, unclog arteries, and to naturally dissolve away. Similarly, we need to *intervene into our intervention* in other worlds, to offer time to the other's vitality, and then fade away.

Making-anarchic thus finds ready resonance with the emergence of green *technologies*. But it is not merely a war on waste. Because it seeks to *compost the cyborg*, to dissolve the *technology of being*, it works on the very conception we have of ourselves, our politics, and our 'world'. At task here is the naturalisation of Nation States, the proliferation of neoliberalism, and the disaffection of colonial-come-capitalist realism. It is not 'our' individuation that needs to be safeguarded, but the makers of other worlds. Making-anarchic is thus the dissolution of Settler State's overdetermined sovereignty, the giving of land back, the possibility of other makings, and the hope of mending of memory.

I have composed this chapter in a series of fragments, hoping to bring-forth multiple worlds, and multiple technics. Hanging these threads of accord together, I proposed *making-anarchic*: the making of the unmaking of time. To get there, I first grounded my creation in my critique by reconciling Stiegler and Wynter's tension through Haraway's cyborg. Through Le Guin, Haraway posed the cyborg's technic as *making-with*. Whilst I found this powerful, I rejected her affirmation of totalisation, and its annulment of making's plurality. To consider the possibility of multiple worlds, I engaged Gabriel's no-world theory. Affirming this concept, I explored the making of other worlds through knots of ethical time. There I made the distinction between *responsible* connection and the blurry accord between worlds. Finding the need for making the unmaking of time, I finished by giving this a name, *making-anarchic*. With *making-anarchic* comes other technics, other worlds, but most of all, the dissolution of the possessive, and the possibility of mending memory.

Conclusion

"The hold's terrible gift was to gather dispossessed feelings in common, to create

a new feel in the undercommons."

(Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, *The Undercommons*, 97)

Throughout this essay I have sought to achieve three aims. My first aim was to expose another

side of technology, the possessive, by focusing on colonialism's effect on technics. In the first

chapter, I introduced the ground of the philosophy of technology. There, I found a critical take

on technology's totalisation which focuses on instrumentality and capitalism. Such focus left a

blind spot in the literature, the possibility of the *technology of being*: the instrumentalised

individual-collective relation. This technology bears the possessive. Over the following three

chapters I demonstrated the existence of this technology. First, in the instrumentalised

individual and 'his' possessive impulse. Second, in the instrumentalised State and its

possessive pulse. Other than instrumentality, I argued Enframing thus also regulates itself

through the possessive, as the settler's field of normativity legitimises dispossession *and*

technology. Third, I substantiated Enframing's possessive logic, by looking at the concretisation of the technology of being within ideological constructions. From this perspective, I concluded that Enframing simplifies memory. Thus, rounding out my first aim.

My second aim was to demonstrate the need for anticolonial theory in the philosophy of technology. By engaging such thought for my critique, this was performatively achieved. My third aim was to suggest a new relation to technics. Throughout our critique we developed the idea that cosmology inflects technics, and thus opens a pluralism. To move towards this pluralism, I brought-forth a characterisation of the 'missing cosmology' behind Enframing as bestial: a cosmology which devours other cosmologies. Central to this perspective was the primacy of 'Man's' movement, and the denial of land. To mend the memory harmed in Enframing, in the last chapter I explored the interaction of multiple technics, in a reaffirmation of the land. Within this, I advanced my own novel construction, *making-anarchic*: the making of the unmaking of time.

The Anthropocene marks a world possessed, therein, colonialism continues in its dark legacy. Borders have been drawn across lands, bodies, and minds, carrying death and decay. The white man and his technology, the weaponised technics of the West, have carved these lines of exclusion, condemning many generations to a final song. Despite this onslaught, the dispossessed remain, strong and defiant in the face of such adversity. Given land back, given unmade lines, given the gift of time, so much life could filter through.

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