PasswordStore Initial Audit Report

Version 0.1

Cyfrin.io

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PasswordStore Audit Report

YOUR_NAME_HERE

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PasswordStore Audit Report

Prepared by: YOUR_NAME_HERE Lead Auditors:

- YOUR_NAME_HERE

Assisting Auditors:

- None

Table of contents

See table

- – Issues found
- Findings
  - – High
    - * [H-1] Passwords stored on-chain are visable to anyone, not matter solidity variable visibility
    - * [H-2] `PasswordStore`::`setPassword` is callable by anyone

About YOUR_NAME_HERE

Disclaimer

The YOUR_NAME_HERE team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
	High	H	H/M	M
Likelihood	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

```
1  2e8f81e263b3a9d18fab4fb5c46805ffc10a9990
```

Scope

```
1  src/
2  --- PasswordStore.sol
```

Protocol Summary

PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a user's passwords. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users. Only the owner should be able to set and access this password.

Roles

- Owner: Is the only one who should be able to set and access the password.

For this contract, only the owner should be able to interact with the contract.

Executive Summary

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	0
Gas Optimizations	0
Total	0

Findings

High

[H-1] Passwords stored on-chain are visable to anyone, not matter solidity variable visibility

Description: All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from the blockchain. The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable, and only accessed through the `PasswordStore::getPassword` function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

However, anyone can direclty read this using any number of off chain methodologies

Impact: The password is not private.

Proof of Concept: The below test case shows how anyone could read the password directly from the blockchain. We use foundry's cast tool to read directly from the storage of the contract, without being the owner.

1. Create a locally running chain

```
1  make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract to the chain

```
1  make deploy
```

3. Run the storage tool

We use 1 because that's the storage slot of `s_password` in the contract.

```
1  cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

You'll get an output that looks like this:

0x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014

You can then parse that hex to a string with:

```
1  cast parse-bytes32-string 0
      x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

And get an output of:

```
1  myPassword
```

Recommended Mitigation: Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password on-chain to decrypt the password. However, you'd also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with the password that decrypts your password.

[H-2] `PasswordStore::setPassword` is callable by anyone

Description: The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that `This function allows only the owner to set a new password`.

```
1     function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
2 @>      // @audit - There are no access controls here
3         s_password = newPassword;
4         emit SetNetPassword();
5     }
```

Impact: Anyone can set/change the password of the contract.

Proof of Concept:

Add the following to the `PasswordStore.t.sol` test suite.

```
1 function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public {
2     vm.prank(randomAddress);
3     string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
4     passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);
5     vm.prank(owner);
6     string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
7     assertEq(actualPassword, expectedPassword);
8 }
```

Recommended Mitigation: Add an access control modifier to the `setPassword` function.

```
1 if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
2     revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
3 }
```