# Experiments in High-Frequency Trading: Market Stability and Resiliency

(Work in Progress)

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Research Plan

### Research Plan

Research Plan

- Build and study a more realistic (complex) environment (e.g., fundamental not directly observed).
- New formats and market rules (e.g., IEX, Kyle-Lee flow market).
- § Further questions (order shredding, competition and fragmentation).
- 4 Experiment: more lab and public tournament.

## **Exogenous Processes**

- There is a v(t) signal that is not publicly observed.
- v(t) follows a Poisson jump process (or...)
- Exogenous traders now arrive with limit orders around v(t) at random times at rates  $\lambda_a$ ,  $\lambda_b$  for asks and bids.
- Limit prices for bids:  $p_b = x_b + v(t)$
- Limit prices for asks:  $p_a = x_a + v(t)$
- $x_b \sim G_b$  and  $x_a \sim G_a$  (Gs independent of v(t))
- Note  $F_b(p) = G_b(p-v)$  and  $F_a(p) = G_a(p-v)$
- Time in force:  $T_b$ ,  $T_a$ , for bids and asks, respectively.

## **Exogenous Processes**

Instantaneous, expected exogenous demand and supply at time  $t > max\{T_a, T_b\}$  and price p are:

$$D(p) = T_b \lambda_b \left( 1 - F_b(p) \right). \tag{1}$$

$$S(p) = T_a \lambda_a F_a(p). \tag{2}$$

Clearing price  $p^*$ , satisfies:

$$\frac{T_a \lambda_a}{T_b \lambda_b} = \frac{1 - F_b(p^*)}{F_a(p^*)} \tag{3}$$

## **Exogenous Processes**

If we define h as:

$$h(p|v) = \frac{1 - G_b(p - v)}{G_a(p - v)} \tag{4}$$

The clearing price is:

$$p^* = h^{-1} \left( \frac{\lambda_a T_a}{\lambda_b T_b} \right) \tag{5}$$

Therefore under some symmetry conditions (e.g.,  $T_b \lambda_b = T_a \lambda_a$ and  $G_a(0) = 1 - G_b(0)$ :

$$p^*(t) = v(t) \tag{6}$$

v(t) also generates an exogenous NBBO representing the rest of the market (BBE, BOE).

## **Trading Algorithms**

#### Notation/definitions:

- The trading period [0, T]. Events indexed by t or  $\tau$ .
- $x(t, \rho)$ : signed volume at time t. Number of net buy and sell executions in recent times, via exponential average.
- z(t,d): order imbalance at time t. Stat for order book state
- $y_i(t)$ : trader i's **inventory** position.
- *BB*(*t*): Best bid at the main exchange.
- BO(t): Best offer at the main exchange.
- BB<sub>F</sub>(t): Best bid at the external exchange(s).
- BO<sub>F</sub>(t): Best offer at the external exchange(s).
- S: price tick.

## **Trading Algorithms**

Calculating signed volume:

Piece-wise constant over time. Remains constant until there is an update at an execution time.

**Experiment Interface for Lab** 

For the CDA, it is defined recursively:

- At time = 0,  $x(0, \rho) = 0$ .
- Suppose last update occurred at t and there is an execution at time  $t + \tau$ .
- Then:

$$x(t+ au,
ho)=e^{-
ho au}x(t,
ho)+I_S$$

where:

$$I_S = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if execution at } BO \\ -1 & \text{if execution at } BB \end{cases}$$

# Trading Algorithms

Algorithms follow a simple rule that reacts to stats in the external market (public signals) and to competitors behavior in the main market.

x(t) is the leading indicator of price increase.

$$\widetilde{Bid}_{i}(t) = w \left[ BB_{E}(t) + b_{x}x_{E}(t) \right] + w' \left[ BB_{-i}(t) + b_{x}x(t) \right] - b_{y}y(t)$$

$$\widehat{Ask}_{i}(t) = w \left[ BO_{E}(t) + b_{x}x_{E}(t) \right] + w' \left[ BO_{-i}(t) + b_{x}x(t) \right] - b_{y}y(t)$$
 where w'=1-w.

# **Traders' Strategy Space**


#### Trading strategies:

- Out
- 2 Manual trader
- 3 Algorithmic: Traders adjust:
  - $b_x$  sensitivity to leading indicators of price movement
  - b<sub>v</sub> sensitivity to own inventory
  - w weight given to external exchange signals

### Technology strategies (latencies):

- Slow (high latency)
- Fast (low latency)
- (or continuous)

## Interface



Video

### **New Market Formats**

- 1 Investors' Exchange
  - Order delay
  - Quote protection (pegging to NBBO)
- 2 Kyle-Lee flow
  - Submit flow orders
  - Can be sniped, but for negligible amounts.

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