# Culture and Institutions

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#### Motivation

 Cultural variables determine many economic choices and affect the speed of development and wealth of nations.

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# Motivation

- Cultural variables determine many economic choices and affect the speed of development and wealth of nations.
- This paper is literature survey that investigates one possible mechanism: Relationship between culture and institutions.



# **Key Questions**

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- Culture and Institutions are endogenous variables determined by a geography, technology, historic events, and each other!
- With this in mind, two questions arise:
  - Can any casual link be established between the two?
  - How do they interact?

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- Definitions of culture are difficult, and mapping between empirical and theoretical concepts is not a straightforward task. In consequence, is useful to distinguish between both.
- Most papers focus on the empirical side define culture as: "Those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation".

 On the theoretical side, culture is understood as a set of beliefs about the consequence of one's actions, that can be manipulated by early generations.

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- Cultural beliefs, from sociology and anthropology, are the ideas and thoughts common to several people that govern the interaction between them and their environment.
- These beliefs can be understood as best responses and in consequence, past cultural beliefs that sustain Nash equilibria provide focal points in repeated social interactions.

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- They are made up of formal constrains, informal constrains, and enforcement characteristics.
- In North definition, Institutions are the rules of the game, however, institutions can also represent the equilibria of the game!

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## **Definitions**

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- One way to deal with this is to only to count institutions as formal institutions, and informal rules and norms as culture.
- This is the most common approach in most of the empirical papers.

# Measurement |

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  - Looking at second-generation immigrants.
  - Experimental evidence.



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- Arrow (1972) writes: "Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time
- Generally measured by surveys and laboratory experiments.



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Individualism vs Collectivism: Individualism, by emphasizing
personal freedom and achievement, awards social status to personal
accomplishments such as innovation. On the other hand, collectivism
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  accomplishments such as innovation. On the other hand, collectivism
  makes collective action easier because people are more able to
  internalize group interests, but, by encouraging conformity,
  discourages innovation.
- The commonly used measure for individualism comes from Hofstede (2001).

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 "Generalized morality" exists where cooperative behavior is extended toward everyone in society, while "limited morality" exists where cooperative behavior is extended only toward immediate family members

EAC (SMU) Aleijos & Giulano (2015) 31/01/24 12/28

#### Generalized Morality:

- "Generalized morality" exists where cooperative behavior is extended toward everyone in society, while "limited morality" exists where cooperative behavior is extended only toward immediate family members
- To measure generalized morality, Tabellini (2008a) combines, using a principal component analysis, two questions taken from the World Values Survey (WVS).

• Attitudes toward Work and the Perception of Poverty:



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
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- This belief is measured by survey questions.



TABLE 1 CORRELATIONS AMONG CULTURAL TRAITS					
	Family ties	Generalized morality	Individualism	Trust	Work-luck
Family ties	1				
Generalized morality	-0.49***	1			
Individualism	-0.48***	0.60***	1		
Trust	-0.57***	0.83***	0.50***	1	
Work-luck	0.33***	-0.08	-0.24*	-0.02	1














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  - Index of protection against expropriation.
  - Indices of democracy and constraint on the executive.
  - Indices of quality of government.
  - Legal origin and legal rules
  - Regulatory environment indices.

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#### Historical examples

• Effect of US migrations waves in original settlers laws, Fischer (1989).

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- Differences Between Medieval Maghribis and Genoese traders and institutions of trade, Grief(1994).

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#### **Culture and Institutions**

• Role of trust on the development of financial markets, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2008a, 2008b).

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- Role of trust on the development of financial markets, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2008a, 2008b).
- The importance of culture as a determinant of democratization, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2013a)

• Impact of socialism on individual attitudes, Roland (2004), Shiller et al. (1992).

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- Impact of historically empire institutions on modern attitudes, Becker et al. (2011), Grosjean (2011), Peisakhin (2010).

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- Impact of historically empire institutions on modern attitudes, Becker et al. (2011), Grosjean (2011), Peisakhin (2010).
- Impact of recent history of violence on individual values, Whitt and Wilson(2007), Baueret al. (2011).
- Macroeconomic shocks and beliefs of luck vs work. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014)

• Role of the market on the formation of culture, Bowles (1998).

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- Rise of feminist values, the reduction in family size, and the extension of women's labor-force participation, Fernandez (2013),

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- Shopping regulation and church attendance, Gruber and Hungerman (2008).
- Land ownership and cultural traits, Di Telia, Galiant, and Schargrodsky (2007)
- Social class and cultural traits, Kohn et al.(1990).

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#### Interaction of Culture and Institutions

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- The general idea underlying this approach is that a country shares certain cultural values, which leads to the choice of certain institutions.
- In turn, certain institutions lead to the survival (and transmission across generations) of certain cultural values.

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- The Coevolution of Culture and Regulation, Aghion, Algan, and Cahuc (2011).
- Empirical evidence to explain the coevolution of trust and regulation, Aghion et al. (2010).

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• The interaction between family ties and the regulation of labor market, Alesina et al. (2015).

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- Individualism and Institutions, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2013).
- Economic opportunities and preference formation through parental investments around the Industrial Revolution, Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).

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• Institutions, generalized morality and differences in development, Tabellini (2008a and 2010).

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- Culture and Institutions as complementary or substitutes, Bisin and Verdier (2015).