

DURHAM, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT

Operations and Management Study

A Study by the International Association of Chiefs of Police



September, 2016

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the fall of 2015, the City of Durham contracted with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to conduct a study of the Durham Police Department (DPD). A team of staff from the IACP conducted several onsite visits, and engaged significant analysis of current data and new data generated as a part of this study. This report outlines our findings and recommendations.

Studies of this nature are predisposed toward the identification of areas requiring improvement, and accordingly, they have a propensity to present what needs work, without fully acknowledging and highlighting positive aspects of an organization. Admittedly, this report follows a similar progression. Because of the numerous recommendations contained within this study, those consuming this report might mistakenly conclude that the police department is in a poor condition. We wish to state the opposite up front quite clearly.

Notwithstanding the recommendations we have outlined, the Durham Police Department (DPD) is a generally efficient and well-organized agency with a strong commitment to community policing and collaborative problem solving efforts. Staff at all levels present a high level of commitment and pride in their work and the DPD. Those at the DPD provided us with unfettered access to staff and all data at their disposal, without reservation or hesitation. It was evident to our team that the command staff at the DPD want what is best for the agency and the community, and they are willing to take the necessary steps to see that any necessary changes occur.

This study examined numerous areas of department operation, and our analysis determined that several areas within the police department require adjustment in order to meet service demands, and in order to improve relationships between the police department and the community. Our study provides 46 recommendations, separated into three prioritized categories. These recommendations follow several major themes.

- Prioritizing and hiring sufficient staffing
- Making sure staff are properly allocated
- Implementing strategies to improve police and community relationships
- Focusing on community policing practices
- Adjusting the organizational structure to meet operational needs
- Improving accountability and transparency, both internally and externally
- Tending to the needs of staff, sworn and non-sworn
- Improving recruitment and retention of officers

This report outlines the methodology used to conduct our analysis of the operations of the Durham Police Department. We relied upon the accuracy of data provided by the DPD to determine staffing recommendations, and in some cases, the data provided

challenged those efforts. However, we believe that our analysis is balanced, and that it fairly represents the conditions, expectations, and desired outcomes that we studied, and those which prompted and drove this inquiry. Where we used external data for comparison purposes, we have provided references.

Many of our recommendations in this report are procedural and they do not involve a significant fiscal note. However, we are also recommending the addition of a significant number of personnel, and we are recommending an adjustment in the sworn officer strength for the department so that vacancies do not result in staffing falling below functional operational levels. In addition, we are recommending the hiring of several non-sworn personnel and an expansion of alternative reporting methods, such as telephone reporting and online reporting, which carry with them some financial demands.

There are a few things to consider with respect to these recommendations, and this is particularly true with respect to those that involve the addition of staff. We recognize the financial constraints facing communities, and understand that hiring multiple personnel, even in a larger city, requires significant capital. Our recommendations outline what we feel are best-practices and optimal staffing levels, but we understand that even when leaders agree in principle to fulfilling these needs, it can take multiple budget cycles to accomplish those goals. For this reason, we recommend that agencies and government leaders take the time to prioritize immediate needs and fiscal capabilities and to organize long-range plans to accomplish agreed upon objectives.

We also wish to point out that at first glance, the number of additional staff we are recommending may seem substantial, and some may question the need. It is important to understand that these staff additions must cover multiple shifts and operational teams. It is also worth mentioning that our recommendations correspond to agency workload, and these additions intend to improve overall organizational efficiency and effectiveness, ultimately leading to greater public safety and community trust.

Additionally, although we stand behind the core statements and purpose of our recommendations, we recognize that the details concerning implementation may require modification or revision in order to meet departmental needs. Accordingly, we consider our implementation suggestions as but one possible method for accomplishing the stated goal, and understand that the department may need or choose to take a different approach for a variety of reasons.

We wish to express our appreciation for the opportunity to collaborate with you on this very important project.

The IACP team

INTRODUCTION

The City of Durham, North Carolina, initially contracted with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in the fall of 2015 to conduct a study of the Durham Police Department (DPD) to determine staffing levels required to meet organizational mission and goals relative to patrol and investigative responsibilities. However, changes within the police administration provided an opportunity for a more comprehensive study, and the city agreed to expand the initial contract to include a full study of police operations. This report outlines those efforts.

The expanded and comprehensive study of the police department focused on the following areas:

- Policing Characteristics and Trends
- Mission, Goals, Values, and Objectives
- Policing Style
- Crime and Crime Workload
- Organization
- Staffing Requirements and Resource Leveraging
- Community Services – Patrol, Traffic, and Investigations
- Crime Prevention and Fear Reduction
- Crime Analysis and Data-Driven Policing
- Professional Standards and Trust Building
- Management Support Services
- Legal Support
- Human Resources
- Career Development
- Information Management
- Communications
- Resources and Resource Management

The IACP team conducted this study in four phases:

Phase I - Data Collection

Phase II - Data Analysis and Evaluation

Phase III - Development of Preliminary Findings

Phase IV - Final Report

Phase I focused on the collection of information about DPD operations and policing conditions. The IACP team engaged a combination of data collection techniques, obtaining data from existing sources, and generating new primary research data in areas targeted. As part of the data collection process, our team interviewed more than 50 DPD personnel (command, non-command, and non-sworn), and numerous stakeholders and private citizens. IACP staff observed numerous department operations and rode along in

a dual role, with officers selected by DPD, conducting an interview with the officer, and making operational observations. Policy statements, rules and regulations, statistical reports, and other written documents were gathered by IACP staff, along with a broad array of data sets including calls for service data, personnel leave data, caseloads for detectives, and training records.

Data collection included a brief survey of DPD staff assigned to the investigations division, soliciting their judgments concerning workload, daily activities, and other duties. We also distributed a survey to the patrol division, to collect direct data related to calls for service, report writing, and supplemental work assignments. We also provided a cultural climate survey to all staff.

We conducted an online community survey, soliciting open-ended remarks from the public. In addition, we held a community forum to gather additional information concerning the views of the public.

Phase II concentrated on analysis and evaluation of data, development of improvement recommendations, and preparation of several drafts of our report. Evaluation involved comparison of policies, procedures, and operations with contemporary professional police standards, which included a composite of policies and practices favored by the IACP staff. This phase also involved collection of supplementary data, and corroboration of information obtained earlier in the study.

Phase III, which overlapped with Phase II, involved the development of preliminary findings and recommendations. This was a collaborative process involving the study team, in-house IACP advisors, and external subject matter experts. The IACP team shared these results with DPD executives to assess their compatibility with client expectations. This process required repeated efforts to corroborate information collected earlier, to fill data gaps, and to obtain feedback on a number of innovations and proposals in the report.

Phase IV entailed the preparation of this final report.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For technical assistance and a continuing demonstration of cooperation, we wish to acknowledge the following individuals:

- Acting Chief of Police Larry Smith
- Deputy Chief Anthony Marsh
- Mr. William Gascoigne, Senior Program Manager
- Mr. Jason Schiess, Analytical Services Manager

Most of all, our thanks go to all of the men and women of the Durham Police Department who participated in interviews, allowed our staff to ride-along with them, and completed surveys and/or took the time to provide information, ideas, and suggestions.

CHANGING CONDITIONS

The DPD is a dynamic organization. We recognize that the DPD has experienced numerous changes since the start of this study in the fall of 2015. Conditions examined in this report may have changed in the time that has elapsed between report preparation and delivery. Understandably, we have had to freeze conditions in order to prepare the report. The most current information on the conditions of the organization resides with the command staff of the police department, including information on actions, which constitute consideration and implementation of recommendations.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - SUMMARY

Overall, the IACP found the DPD to have characteristics of an effective law enforcement agency. This report contains numerous recommendations for the DPD to improve further its operations. We have provided a brief summary list of the priority recommendations below. Each of our recommendations includes a priority rating, and an indication of which section within this report the recommendation emanates from. Additional information pertaining to our recommendations is contained with the individual sections. We have also provided a full list of recommendations at the end of this report.

It is our recommendation that the agency should implement Priority 1 recommendations as soon as possible, followed by Priority 2 recommendations, and lastly, Priority 3 recommendations. We also recognize there are multiple ways in which an agency may implement necessary changes. Accordingly, while our recommendations provide one pathway for improving operational functions, we understand that the agency may engage alternate strategies that seek to achieve the same results we identify in our recommendations.

PRIORITY 1 RECOMMENDATIONS

Eliminate District 5 and Reallocate Personnel and Resources – Section III

Reorganize and Repurpose HEAT, VIRT, and SET Teams – Section III

Improve Relationship between the Police Department and City Officials – Section III

Prioritize Patrol Staffing – Section IV

Establish Minimum Patrol and Operational Staffing – Section IV

Augment Patrol Staffing – Section IV

Modify the Work Schedule – Section IV

Ensure Proper Beat Deployment and Integrity – Section IV

Reemphasize Community Policing as a Department Strategy – Section V

Acknowledge and Address Public Perceptions of Racism and Discriminatory Policing by DPD – Section V

Engage a Co-production Policing Model – Section V

Examine and Revise Case Management System for Investigations – Section VIII

Increase Marked Patrol Fleet – Section XV

PRIORITY 2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Increase Staffing in the Records Unit – Section III

Create a Community Resources Division for Non-Sworn Uniformed Personnel – Section III

Establish a Public Housing Unit – Section III

Re-Purpose Traffic Services/Motors Unit – Section III

Reduce Staffing to Organized Crimes Unit – Section III

Improve Communication and Engagement with the District Attorney – Section III

Develop a Support Plan for Non-Sworn Staff – Section III

Improve Effectiveness of Public Affairs Unit – Section III

Re-emphasize and Focus Policing Efforts on Youth Engagement – Section VI

Prioritize Investigations and Crime Scene Investigations Staffing – Section VIII

Reduce Operational Vacancies and Address Attrition Issues – Section XIII

Augment the Professional Standards IA Unit Staffing – Section XIV

PRIORITY 3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Track and Count Aggravated Assault Incident Numbers, in addition to Victim Totals – Section I

Monitor Part II Case Reporting Practices – Section I

Establish Access to Traffic Citation Data from the Courts – Section I

Examine Recruit Attrition Causes – Section I

Conduct a Pay and Benefits Analysis for Sworn Staff – Section II

Strategize Approaches to Improve the Organizational Climate – Section II

Communicate Organizational Goals and Establish Internal Goals - Section II

Review Performance Appraisal Process - Section II

Reduce Senior Command Staff by merging two Senior Command Staff Positions, or Revise Organizational Oversight - Section III

Augment Staffing in the Crime Lab Unit - Section III

Examine Salary of Non-Sworn Staff and Implement a Recognition Strategy - Section III

Examine Pay Structure of Durham Crime Information Unit

Repurpose the Bike Patrol Unit - Section III

Merge Major Crimes and Interdiction Unit - Section III

Improve the Use of Alternative Reporting Strategies, including Crash Reporting - Section IV

Improve the Documentation of Officer Activity - Section IV

Move Non-Familiar Aggravated Assaults Investigations to Homicide Unit - Section VIII

Examine Domestic Violence Investigation Processes for possible revision - Section VIII

Create an Internal Policy Advisory Committee - Section IX

Update the Policy Manual as Outlined - Section IX

Acquire Basic Crime Scene Cameras for Squad Cars - Section XV

CHAPTER I. THE POLICING ENVIRONMENT

Examination of the environment that must be policed, as it is today and as it is likely to be tomorrow, is an essential prerequisite to informed judgments regarding policy, and operational and resource requirements for the Durham Police Department (DPD). The geography, service population, economic conditions, levels, and composition of crime and disorder, workload, and resources in Durham, are salient factors that define and condition the policing requirements, response capacity, and opportunities for innovation. We examine these factors in this chapter.

The City of Durham established the police department in 1869. The police department has authorization for 633 positions (512 sworn and 121 non-sworn). There are 259 officers assigned to the Patrol Operations Bureau, with 196 officers assigned the primary responsibility of responding to Calls for Service (CFS). The primary function of the patrol officer is to provide public safety by maintaining order, responding to CFS, conducting traffic enforcement, maintaining high visibility to deter criminal activity and to have positive interactions with the citizens of Durham to help establish a good rapport. Additional patrol officer responsibilities include conducting preliminary investigations, identifying, pursuing, and arresting suspects, rendering aid to victims, including psychological, emotional and physical care, preparation of cases for court, including testimony, and writing reports that document accurate accounts of events.

SECTION I: SERVICE POPULATION

The City of Durham is the fourth largest city in North Carolina.¹ Durham is home to two major universities, Duke, and North Carolina Central, and it is part of the *Research Triangle* area, which boasts a metropolitan statistical area population of over two million residents. Although initial growth for the City of Durham occurred in relation to the tobacco industry, more recently, the city has shifted its focus and reinvigorated its development in other areas.²

The City of Durham experienced significant population growth between 2000 and 2010, increasing from 187,035 to 228,330 residents, which represents a 22 percent increase. The city also has grown in land mass, and it now encompasses 107.5 square miles.³

Based on U.S. census data, the estimated population for the City of Durham in 2014 was 251,893. This represents a population increase of 10.32% from 2010 data. Based on these trends, expressed in Table 1 below, growth projections estimate that Durham's

¹ OJP Diagnostic Center, 2015 Diagnostic Analysis for the City of Durham

² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durham,_North_Carolina

³ <http://durhamnc.gov/346/Comprehensive-Plan>

population will reach 283,210 by 2020, which represents an increase of 24% (nearly 55,000 people) over the 2010 population. The City of Durham strategic plan estimates growth in Durham County at 47 percent by 2030.

TABLE 1: Population Trends

POPULATION	1980 Census	1990 Census	2000 Census	2010 Census	2014 ACS Est.	2020 Projected
Population	100,831	148,450	187,035	228,330	251,893	283,210
Increase		47,619	38,585	41,295	23,563	54,880
% Change		47.23%	25.99%	22.08%	10.32%	24.04%

2000-2014 Data Source: <http://factfinder.census.gov>

1980 Census Source:

http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980/1980censusofpopu8011uns_bw.pdf

1990 Census Source: <https://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/1990s/tables/SU-99-05.txt>

In addition to overall totals, examining population demographics reflects interesting characteristics. Table 2 below reflects population age ranges in 2010 and 2014, as well as projections for the year 2020.

TABLE 2: Population Age Ranges

Population by Age	Census 2010 Number	2010 Percent	ACS 2014 Number	2014 Percent	Percent Change 2010- 2014	Projected 2020	Projected 2020 Percent
0 - 4	17,583	7.70%	18,191	7.58%	3.46%	18,799	7.46%
5-9	14,305	6.27%	15,104	6.29%	5.59%	15,903	6.31%
10-14	12,492	5.47%	13,622	5.67%	9.05%	14,752	5.86%
15 - 19	15,754	6.90%	15,933	6.64%	1.14%	16,112	6.40%
20 - 24	21,370	9.36%	20,246	8.43%	-5.26%	19,122	7.59%
25 - 34	44,392	19.44%	46,288	19.28%	4.27%	48,184	19.13%
35 - 44	32,520	14.24%	34,103	14.20%	4.87%	35,686	14.17%
45 - 54	27,739	12.15%	28,881	12.03%	4.12%	30,023	11.92%
55 - 59	12,209	5.35%	13,193	5.49%	8.06%	14,177	5.63%
60-64	9,820	4.30%	11,723	4.88%	19.38%	13,626	5.41%
65 - 74	10,613	4.65%	13,010	5.42%	22.59%	15,407	6.12%
75 - 84	6,341	2.78%	6,121	2.55%	-3.47%	5,901	2.34%
85+	3,192	1.40%	3,692	1.54%	15.66%	4,192	1.66%
Total	228,330		240,107			251,884	

2010 Data Source: <http://factfinder.census.gov>

2014 Source: <http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF>

In 2014, nearly 52% of the population in Durham was between the ages of 20-54. Projections suggest minimal changes to this percentage of the population, with only a slight increase to 52.8% projected by the year 2020. This is important because this segment of the population is significant and active in terms of crime and service demands.

GROWTH IN THE CITY OF DURHAM

As previously noted, the City of Durham has grown significantly in land mass, encompassing 107.5 square miles as of 2010. In 1990, Durham was 72.5 square miles, and in 2000, it was 98.2 square miles. Overall, the city has grown by 35 square miles in the past twenty years. During that same period, the city grew in population from 136,611 (in 1990), to 228,330 (in 2010).⁴

Growth in this regard is an important factor, as increases in population and geographical size can both affect staffing needs. It is important here to note that the IACP staffing models does not calculate staffing needs based on a ratio of population to number of officers, as we believe this is an imperfect and poor measure for defining such needs. However, increasing population generally results in measurable increases in work demands for police departments. These increases in demands for service can vary widely, depending upon myriad factors, so it is difficult to predict with certainty how they will affect demands for service; increases to demands for service may be nominal, or significant. In contrast, adding land mass, automatically adds to the workload of a police agency. This is because there are more areas to patrol, and these areas take more resources to cover. Further, expanding the land area also contributes to longer response times to calls for service (absent an influx of resources). In short, increases in both geography and population are important factors in determining the current and near future demands upon the DPD.

SECTION II: DURHAM CITY GOVERNMENT


The City of Durham, located in Durham County, operates under a Council-Manager form of government. In this form of government, the Council is the governing body of the city, elected by the public. The Council hires the City Manager to carry out the policies it establishes.

The Council consists of six members and an elected Mayor. The Council provides legislative direction, while the Manager is responsible for preparing the budget, and directing day-to-day operations and personnel management. The Mayor and Council, as a governing body, are responsible for setting policy and approving the budget. The

⁴ <http://durhamnc.gov/346/Comprehensive-Plan>

Manager serves as the Council's chief advisor, and serves at the pleasure of the Council. Figure 1 below provides an overview of the governmental structure.

FIGURE 1: Durham Governmental Structure



SECTION III: BUDGET

The adopted budget for fiscal year (FY) 2015-2016 reflects an overall increase for the city of 7.07% over the fiscal 2011-2012 budget; see Table 3 below. Growth in the budget has been steady and gradual since FY 2011-2012, with incremental increases in each of the approved FY budgets up to the 2014-2015 budget. The city's approved FY 2015-2016 operating budget represents a .46% decrease as compared to the FY 2014-2015 budget. The approved budget reflects community engagement, established priorities, and distribution of funding to targeted areas of focus.

TABLE 3: Durham City Budgets

	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	% Change 2011-2012 to 2015-2016
Approved Budget	\$362,511,227	\$373,172,468	\$376,545,543	\$389,933,630	\$388,150,718	7.07%
Percent Change		2.94%	0.90%	3.56%	-0.46%	

Source - <http://durhamnc.gov/209/City-Budgets>

Durham Police Department Budget

Budgets for the Durham Police Department increased steadily between FY 2011-2012 and FY 2015-2016, see Table 4 below. Over this period, the police department budget has increased 10.75%.

TABLE 4: Police Department Budgets

	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	\$ Change 2014-2015 to 2015-2016
Expenditures	\$49,282,952	\$51,478,978	\$52,888,579	\$54,061,127	\$54,581,852	\$520,725
Percent Change		4.46%	2.74%	2.22%	0.96%	

Source - <http://durhamnc.gov/209/City-Budgets>

On its surface, this amount seems significant, and from a capital outlay perspective, it is a large increase. Despite the substantial fiscal increase, sworn staffing levels in the police department have not shifted significantly; see Table 5 below.

TABLE 5: Historic Sworn Staffing Levels

Year	Population	# of Officers
2010	233,790	485
2011	231,225	476
2012	235,563	537
2013	242,865	517
2014	249,738	501
2015*	254,732	512

Source: <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications>

*2015 reflects the authorized staffing number of officers, and projected population.

It is important to note that except for the 2015 statistics, the numbers reflected in Table 5 represent actual sworn strength as reported by DPD to the FBI in the annual Uniform

Crime Report. The 2015 numbers reflect that authorized sworn strength for the police department. The average number of officers, as calculated between these six years, is 504.

In Table 6 below, we provide a breakdown of the current authorization for sworn officer staffing for the Durham Police Department.

TABLE 6: Current Authorized Sworn Staffing Levels

Position	2015
Chief/Deputy Chief	5
Captain	12
Lieutenant	14
Sergeant	51
Detective	54
Corporal	64
Officer	261
Officer Recruit	55
TOTAL	516

Source: Durham Human Resources

However, the total reflecting 516 officers shown here is misleading, as 55 officers in this total are in training, and are not able to operate independently. This is a significant factor, which we will expand upon in other areas within this report.

TABLE 7: Diversity Profile

	Asian	African American	Hispanic	Other	White	Grand Total
Chief/Deputy Chief	0	2	0	0	3	5
Captain	0	6	0	0	6	12
Lieutenant	0	9	0	0	5	14
Sergeant	0	18	2	0	31	51
Detective	0	13	6	1	34	54
Corporal	0	16	1		47	64
Officer	0	71	10	4	176	261
Officer Recruit	1	8	7	1	38	55
TOTAL	1	143	26	6	340	516
Percentage	0.19%	27.71%	5.04%	1.16%	65.89%	

Source: Durham Human Resources

In Table 7 above, we provide a breakdown of the racial diversity within the Durham Police Department. DPD sworn staffing is predominately white at 65.89%, with minority officers comprising the remaining 34.11% of officers. The percentage of white vs. non-white officers is somewhat disproportionate to the City of Durham population, which has an African American population of 40%, and a white population of 48.3%.⁵ Still, this composition of diversity within the department is substantial compared to other agencies we have studied, and it validates claims by DPD officials that minority recruitment is a key priority.

Table 7 above also displays the diversity of the DPD by rank. There are 92 supervisory positions within the DPD, ranging from Corporal to Chief. Out of those 92 positions, 51 are African American, reflecting 55.43% of the total, which is substantial, and representative of the community population.

Table 8 below displays the gender profile of the DPD. Overwhelmingly, males dominate the workforce, with 85.66% of sworn staff. There are currently 31 executive-level positions (lieutenant and above) within the police department; females staff seven of these positions, representing 22.58% of the total. Although the racial make-up of the DPD is significantly diverse, we cannot say the same with respect to the gender breakdown. Despite a fair percentage of female officers in executive-level positions, women overall are underrepresented within the department.

TABLE 8: Gender Profile

Gender Profile	Female	Male	Grand Total
Chief	0	0	0
Assistant Chief	0	5	5
Captain	2	10	12
Lieutenant	5	9	14
Sergeant	7	44	51
Detective	16	38	54
Corporal	9	55	64
Officer	31	230	261
Recruit Officer	4	51	55
Grand Total	74	442	516
Percentage	14.34%	85.66%	

Source: Durham Human Resources

⁵ OJP Diagnostic Center, 2015 Diagnostic Analysis for the City of Durham

SECTION IV: CRIME, ARRESTS, AND DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS

Crime

The IACP team reviewed myriad crime data collected by the DPD and as reported to the State of North Carolina crime report. These data outline crime statistics between 2010 and 2014. The tables below represent two different segments of crime data. Under FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) guidelines, Part 1 crimes are those considered most serious, including: homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, arson, and auto theft, see Table 9 below. UCR classifies all remaining crimes as Part 2 crimes; see Table 10 below.

TABLE 9: Part 1 Crimes

Crime Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	5 Year Average	Variance from Avg.	2013-2014 Trend
Homicide	23	27	21	27	22	24	-2	-18.52%
Rape	60	63	65	67	73	66	7	8.96%
Robbery	664	699	615	607	654	648	6	7.74%
Aggravated Assault	873	916	1,011	885	1,086	954	132	22.71%
Burglary	3,653	3,874	3,284	3,326	3,652	3,558	94	9.80%
Larceny	7,000	6,767	6,291	6,728	6,852	6,728	124	1.84%
Auto Theft	718	628	705	714	579	669	-90	-18.91%
Arson	29	23	59	29	25	33	-8	-13.79%
	13,020	12,997	12,051	12,383	12,943	12,679	264	4.52%

Source: <http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx>

In reviewing the Part 1 crime data, there is a small overall decline in crime of about .26% between 2010 and 2014. However, the crime trend between 2013 and 2014 is up slightly by 4.52%. Looking at each of the Part 1 crimes, larcenies and auto thefts are down, however; rape and robbery are both up. Additionally, aggravated assaults are up substantially (22.71%) from 2013, adding 201 additional crimes to the total. Part of the dramatic increase in aggravated assaults may relate to how the FBI UCR counts these crimes. For crimes against a person, the FBI UCR counts each person affected as a separate crime. This means that, in the case of a drive-by shooting, if twenty people were present, any of whom the perpetrator could have shot, UCR counts each person as a separate statistic. We are aware that the City of Durham experienced several of these types of aggravated assaults in 2014, which may have driven these numbers up significantly, potentially skewing this statistic. What this means is that the number of aggravated assaults, while substantial and concerning, does not reflect the total number of actual incidents. To understand fully these numbers over time, the department may find it beneficial to count and report the number of aggravated assaults separately (in addition

to UCR practices), so it can better track the number of incidents, as opposed to only the number of potential victims.

Table 10 below, reflects the total Part 2 crimes recorded between 2010 and 2014.

TABLE 10: Part 2 Crimes

Part II Crimes (all other criminal offenses)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	% Change 2013-2014
All Other Offenses	583	628	670	683	648	-5.12%
Counterfeiting	55	35	48	*	*	N/A
Disorderly Conduct	64	64	85	84	15	-82.14%
Drug Violations	1,645	1,602	1,783	1,624	1,403	-13.61%
Driving While Impaired	510	460	488	408	472	15.69%
Embezzlement	121	118	125	117	133	13.68%
Forgery	109	105	137	36	97	169.44%
Fraud	1,167	1,235	1,266	1,553	1,571	1.16%
Gambling	2	0	1	*	*	N/A
Liquor Law Violation	10	25	48	61	18	-70.49%
Offenses Against Family	71	91	114	86	120	39.53%
Pornography	9	4	3	*	*	N/A
Prostitution	70	86	43	62	55	-11.29%
Sex Offense	136	156	170	111	136	22.52%
Simple Assault	1,571	1,653	1,822	1,513	1,649	8.99%
Stolen Property	60	57	41	52	46	-11.54%
Vandalism	2,421	2,197	1,835	1,821	1,768	-2.91%
Weapons Violation	295	285	303	237	249	5.06%
TOTAL	8,899	8,801	8,982	8,448	8,380	-0.80%

Source: Durham PD Annual Reports

*Data Not Available

Much of the data reflected in Table 10 is consistent over time. However, some of the data appears to reflect significant shifts in crime rates. In some cases, the size of the shift caused us to question the reliability of the data. For example, for years 2010-2013, the department reported an average of 74.25 cases involving disorderly conduct. Yet in 2014, the department reported only 15 disorderly conduct cases. However, according to data from the state crime report, DPD made 15 arrests for disorderly conduct in 2014. In addition, the department reported an average of 112 forgery cases for years 2010, 2011, 2012, and

2014. However, in 2013, the department only recorded 36 cases. In this category, for example, the result is a one-year increase between 2013 and 2014 of 169.44%. In our experience, observations of this nature typically reflect inconsistent practices in the coding of offenses that can lead to large swings in individual crime rates, which may or may not accurately reflect the current condition. For this reason, we would suggest that the department examine these reporting practices to ensure continuity and consistency in these data. However, what is more important in this case is that the data, in aggregate, are relatively consistent as a whole. Accordingly, we feel that these data provide an accurate summary of the total Part 2 crimes, even if some reporting practices may have resulted in inaccurate categorization.

In Table 11 below, the totals show that serious crime (Part 1 crime) is down slightly (.59%) from 2010, but up by 4.52% between 2013 and 2014. Part 2 crimes are down by (5.83%) from 2010, but down only slightly (.80%) between 2013 and 2014. Taken as a whole, crime in 2014 is down 2.72% from 2010, but up over 2013 by 2.36%.

TABLE 11: Part 1-2 Crimes

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2010-2014 Change	2013-2014 Change
Part 1 Crimes	13020	12997	12051	12383	12943	-.59%	4.52%
Part 2 Crimes	8899	8801	8982	8448	8380	-5.83%	-0.80%
Total	21919	21798	21033	20831	21323	-2.72%	2.36%

Source: Part 1 and Part 2 Tables

In addition to examining rates of crimes, it is also important to analyze what percentage of crimes the police department solves. We provide the clearance rates for Part 1 crimes in table 12 below.

TABLE 12: Part 1 Case Clearance Rates

Part 1 Offenses vs. Clearances (Exceptionally Cleared or by Arrest)	2012 Offenses	2012 Cleared	2012 Pct. Cleared	2013 Offenses	2013 Cleared	2013 Pct. Cleared	2014 Offenses	2014 Cleared	2014 Pct. Cleared
Homicide Offenses	21	17	80.95%	27	18	66.67%	22	12	54.55%
Sex Offenses, Forcible	65	30	46.15%	67	41	61.19%	73	28	38.36%
Robbery	615	197	32.03%	607	211	34.76%	654	206	31.50%
Aggravated Assault	1,011	605	59.84%	885	518	58.53%	1,086	571	52.58%
Burglary	3,284	503	15.32%	3,326	399	12.00%	3,652	547	14.98%
Larceny	6,291	1,705	27.10%	6,728	1,673	24.87%	6,852	1,788	26.09%
Auto Theft	705	106	15.04%	714	106	14.85%	579	111	19.17%
Arson	59	11	18.64%	29	9	31.03%	25	7	28.00%
Totals	12,051	3,174	26.34%	12,383	2,975	24.02%	12,943	3,270	25.26%

Source: <http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx>

Although the FBI UCR classifies Part 1 crimes as the most serious, crime reports label certain offenses like homicide, sex offenses, robbery, and aggravated assault, as violent crimes. Looking at the violent crime offenses in Table 12 above, in 2014 DPD experienced a decline in their clearance rate, compared to the clearance rates from 2012 and 2013. In 2012, Durham had 1,712 violent crimes, with a clearance rate of 49.59%. In 2013, the city had 1,586 violent crimes, and the clearance rate was 49.68%. However, for 2014, there were 1,835 violent crimes, and the police department cleared 44.52%, which represents about a 5% decline. The largest percentage decline occurred in the clearance rate for homicides, but each of the violent crime categories experienced a reduction in clearance rate, some small, some substantial.

There is no national statistic for clearance rates for violent crimes, or other crimes, and a clearance rate of 44.52% does not reflect poorly on the agency. However, the reduction in clearance rate of 11% over a one-year period is significant. Due to limitations in the investigations data available to us (which we highlight later in this report), we were unable to identify the cause for this decline. It is notable, however, that the city experienced 249 more crimes labeled violent in 2014, as compared to 2013. Due to their nature, these crimes take longer to investigate, and they require greater resources. This may provide some explanation as to the clearance rate decline.

In Table 13 below, we provide clearance rates for Part 2 crimes. Like the clearance rates for Part 1 crimes, clearance rates for Part 2 crimes also declined between 2013 and 2014, although the decline of 5.72% was not as substantial. Again, it is notable that crime clearance rates for Part 2 crimes had been increasing, moving from 54.50% in 2010, to 59.29% in 2013, before declining to 53.57% in 2014.

In contrast to the violent crime statistics, which are on the rise, the number of Part 2 crimes is on the decline, with 2014 reflecting 602 less incidents than the five-year high point recorded in 2012. Again, we were unable to ascertain the reasons behind the decline in clearance rates for Part 2 crimes. Still, we conclude elsewhere in this report that the department is well understaffed. When considered in combination with increases in more serious crimes, and the increasing demands on the work capacity of staff, there is good reason to believe that these factors may affect other aspects of operational effectiveness, including clearance rates.

TABLE 13: Part 2 Case Clearances

Part II Clearances	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Grand Total
All Other Offenses	369	413	474	466	396	2,118
Counterfeiting	11	9	9	3	12	44
Disorderly Conduct	50	55	75	74	37	291
Driving While Impaired	514	470	485	414	462	2,345
Drug Violations	1,551	1,548	1,686	1,730	1,312	7,827
Embezzlement	68	63	76	87	85	379
Forgery	43	55	45	20	24	187
Fraud	312	265	267	310	323	1,477
Gambling	3	0	1	0	0	4
Liquor Law Violation	10	23	44	63	16	156
Offenses Against Family	35	31	46	36	39	187
Pornography	7	1	3	1	12	24
Prostitution	63	86	44	61	52	306
Sex Offense	81	99	80	75	49	384
Simple Assault	1,237	1,352	1,333	1,201	1,201	6,324
Stolen Property	55	55	35	51	38	234
Vandalism	178	189	215	215	231	1,028
Weapons Violation	263	244	258	202	200	1,167
Sub-Total	4,850	4,958	5,176	5,009	4,489	24,482
Total	8,899	8,801	8,982	8,448	8,380	43510
Pct. Cleared	54.50%	56.33%	57.63%	59.29%	53.57%	56.27%

Source: DPD Data Analysis Division

*Totals immediately above are from Table 11.

When examining crime statistics, it is important to consider the local environment (the community), including a comparison of the larger environment (state or national trends). Like other states, North Carolina maintains a record of crime statistics from all of its cities. This allows us to compare crime statistics in Durham against other communities within North Carolina, and Table 14 below includes this comparison.

In Table 14, we have included the nine largest cities within the State of North Carolina, with a population over 100,000. The table reflects crime rates statistically as the number of projected crime victims per 100,000 people living within the jurisdiction. Comparatively, Durham's crime rate is high, at 5,511, with only two cities reflecting higher crime rates, Winston-Salem (6,356) and Fayetteville (5,556). It is important to recognize that crime rates, while an important benchmark, do not necessarily reflect the how well the police agency is combatting crime. They do demonstrate, however, a relative crime factor, which is helpful in determining the significance of crime in the community, and the need for the police to take appropriate action to reduce it.

TABLE 14: 2014 Crime Rate Comparisons

North Carolina Cities over 100,000 Population	Population	Incident Rate Per 100,000	Total Incidents	Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter	Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft	Arson	Sworn Officers
Cary	144,671	1,327	1,928	3	6	35	58	343	1,421	55	7	197
Charlotte-Mecklenburg	830,259	4,308	35,938	46	208	1,588	3,215	6,072	22,949	1,694	166	1,811
Durham	234,378	5,511	12,943	22	73	654	1,086	3,652	6,852	579	25	501
Fayetteville	208,190	5,556	11,614	20	72	468	483	2,510	7,427	587	47	375
Greensboro	271,535	4,231	11,600	22	52	482	784	2,507	7,113	528	112	694
High Point	107,652	4,055	4,394	4	23	140	335	998	2,630	236	28	221
Raleigh	415,127	3,286	13,701	16	82	679	953	2,417	8,793	702	59	750
Wilmington	109,409	5,433	5,900	14	37	240	475	1,344	3,418	354	18	256
Winston-Salem	229,530	6,356	14,666	13	76	428	1,173	3,724	8,469	706	77	569
Averages				18	70	524	951	2,619	7,675	605	60	597
Durham + or -				4	3	130	135	1,033	-823	-26	-35	-96

Source: <http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Default.aspx>

In addition to looking at the crime rate, it is also of value to look at the violent crime rates. In Table 14, the City of Durham has a higher than average number of violent crimes in each of the categories; Durham also has a significantly higher than average number of burglaries. For non-violent crimes, Durham is lower than average in each category, but DPD also has fewer officers than the comparable cities of Greensboro and Winston-Salem. Additionally, although Table 14 reflects that DPD has a sworn strength of 501

officers, this number is inaccurate and artificially high (because sworn recruits are counted in this total), which we will address elsewhere in this report.

Arrests

Examining arrest rates provides an understanding of the types of activities in which the department is engaging, and they help demonstrate clearance rates for various crimes. Table 15 below provides a listing of adult arrests by DPD between 2010 and 2014, and Table 16 below relates to juveniles.

The 2014 adult arrest numbers are generally consistent with the five-year averages, however, the 2014 arrest numbers showed a downward trend from 2013 to 2014 in most categories. In examining the percentages of shift, some appear dramatic. However, when reviewing the actual numbers, it is apparent that most of the shifts are nominal. Still, the number of arrests is down slightly (4.25%), as are case-clearances, and crime is up slightly (2.36%). It is important to monitor these numbers to ensure that staffing and resource demands are not contributing to these declines.

Juvenile arrests made in 2014 (see Table 16 below) follow a similar pattern to adult arrests. The number of juvenile arrests in 2014 is down from 2013, by 16.36%, amounting to 88 fewer arrests. It is notable that the number of juvenile arrests in 2010 was 1,027. The number of juvenile arrests in 2014 was 450, which represents a 56.18% reduction over five years.

In addition to observing these trends, there is another aspect of these arrest statistics that is of significance, and that relates to arrests for minor marijuana offenses. During the course of our citizen interviews, the IACP team heard from many that there was significant concern regarding arrests for minor offenses involving marijuana, and that these arrests were particularly oppressive with regard to the youth in the African American community. Several people explained that the Virginia justice system treats youths ages 16-17 as adults, and that these minor infractions cause tremendous difficulty, as those charged must disclose these offenses on job applications, or in other circumstances requiring such disclosure.

As part of our analysis, we examined the arrest tables in an effort to determine the extent of this reported issue. In doing so, we wish to point out that the arrest tables below emanate from the North Carolina Public Safety Crime Reports, not from DPD. Regardless of how the justice system regards youths aged 16-17 (as adults or juveniles), these reports reflect adults as those 18 years of age and older. From Tables 15 and 16, we observed that there were 261 adults charged with possession of marijuana in 2014, and 38 charged with manufacturing/sale of marijuana. There were 16 juveniles charged with possession of marijuana, and one charge for manufacturing/sale. Given the population in the City of

Durham, these numbers are extremely low, and they do not suggest over-enforcement of minor marijuana laws against adults, or juveniles.

TABLE 15: Adult Arrests

Crime Category	Adult					5 Year Average	Variation from Avg.	2013-2014 Trend
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014			
Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter	18	14	15	20	10	15	-5	-50.00%
Manslaughter by Negligence	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.00%
Forcible Rape	15	15	5	8	10	11	-1	25.00%
Robbery	140	96	90	128	122	115	7	-4.69%
Aggravated Assault	334	330	297	310	317	318	-1	2.26%
Burglary	351	360	274	227	276	298	-22	21.59%
Larceny (Theft)	903	677	730	732	751	759	-8	2.60%
Other Assault	1,202	1,105	1,052	978	894	1,046	-152	-8.59%
Arson	5	0	5	4	1	3	-2	-75.00%
Forgery & Counterfeit	86	68	56	64	74	70	4	15.63%
Fraud	357	340	272	231	277	295	-18	19.91%
Embezzlement	55	50	70	62	56	59	-3	-9.68%
Stolen Property	155	123	108	118	107	122	-15	-9.32%
Vandalism	140	117	116	110	100	117	-17	-9.09%
Weapons	170	147	147	97	95	131	-36	-2.06%
Prostitution & Commercial Vice	61	82	36	44	58	56	2	31.82%
Sex Offenses	27	24	31	22	20	25	-5	-9.09%
Sale/Mfg. Opium or Cocaine	159	93	72	69	57	90	-33	-17.39%
Sale/Mfg. Marijuana	95	66	67	50	38	63	-25	-24.00%
Sale/Mfg. Synthetic Narcotics	2	3	3	1	1	2	-1	0.00%
Sale Other Dangerous Drugs	3	7	3	4	9	5	4	125.00%
Possession Opium or Cocaine	308	262	268	229	181	250	-69	-20.96%
Possession Marijuana	299	289	328	332	261	302	-41	-21.39%
Possession Synthetic Narcotics	16	10	17	12	10	13	-3	-16.67%
Possession Other Dang. Drugs	10	11	12	15	5	11	-6	-66.67%
Offenses against Family and Children	42	18	26	24	20	26	-6	-16.67%
Driving Under the Influence	486	330	345	311	343	363	-20	10.29%
Liquor Laws	42	51	32	34	28	37	-9	-17.65%
Disorderly Conduct/Drunkenness	51	45	43	52	66	51	15	26.92%
All Other Offenses	1,626	1,323	1,403	1,357	1,217	1,385	-168	-10.32%
TOTALS	7,158	6,056	5,923	5,645	5,405	6,037	-632	-4.25%

Source: <http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx>

*Adults includes those persons ages 18 and over.

TABLE 16: Juvenile Arrests

Crime Category ARRESTS	Juvenile					5 Year	Variation from Avg.	2013-2014 Trend
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Average		
Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter	2	0	1	1	2	1	1	100.00%
Manslaughter by Negligence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Forcible Rape	6	0	2	0	0	2	-2	0.00%
Robbery	43	20	23	35	41	32	9	17.14%
Aggravated Assault	23	32	15	20	25	23	2	25.00%
Burglary	86	57	50	70	70	67	3	0.00%
Larceny (Theft)	241	159	150	151	122	165	-43	-19.21%
Other Assault	152	102	61	81	51	89	-38	-37.04%
Arson	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	-100.00%
Forgery & Counterfeit	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	-100.00%
Fraud	17	6	7	3	1	7	-6	-66.67%
Embezzlement	3	1	0	1	0	1	-1	-100.00%
Stolen Property	17	14	15	9	10	13	-3	11.11%
Vandalism	42	30	17	16	22	25	-3	37.50%
Weapons	39	15	19	15	22	22	0	46.67%
Prostitution & Commercial Vice	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Sex Offenses	4	3	2	1	1	2	-1	0.00%
Sale/Mfg. Opium or Cocaine	2	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.00%
Sale/Mfg. Marijuana	6	7	5	6	1	5	-4	-83.33%
Sale/Mfg. Synthetic Narcotics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Sale Other Dangerous Drugs	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Possession Opium or Cocaine	10	3	5	5	1	5	-4	-80.00%
Possession Marijuana	42	26	32	33	16	30	-14	-51.52%
Possession Synthetic Narcotics	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Possession Other Dang. Drugs	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Offenses against Family and Children	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.00%
Driving Under the Influence	2	4	2	1	0	2	-2	-100.00%
Liquor Laws	0	2	6	1	1	2	-1	0.00%
Disorderly Conduct/Drunkenness	9	4	2	8	1	5	-4	-87.50%
All Other Offenses	55	62	54	55	45	54	-9	-18.18%
Runaways	225	202	31	23	17	100	-83	-26.09%
TOTALS	1,027	750	503	538	450	654	-204	-16.36%

Source: <http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx>

*Juveniles includes those persons under 18 years of age.

SECTION V: TRAFFIC

We examined various traffic data for this study. The number and rate of vehicle crashes are the most common measures of the success of traffic functions. Table 17 below depicts the various types of motor vehicle crashes responded to by DPD for which there is a report. In summary, DPD has handled more than 11,000 motor vehicle crashes in 2014, which represents a 12% increase over 2011.

TABLE 17: Traffic Crash Data

Crash Type	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Non-Reportable	789	820	963	1,032	3,604
Reportable	9,117	9,596	9,882	10,068	38,663
<i>Fatal</i>	7	15	19	15	56
<i>Injury</i>	1,749	1,923	1,907	1,920	7,499
<i>Property</i>	6,421	6,749	6,937	7,125	27,232
<i>Unknown</i>	184	147	192	135	658
<i>NULL/Blank</i>	756	762	827	873	3,218
Total	9,906	10,416	10,845	11,100	42,267

Source: DPD Analytical Services Division

Table 18 below reflects several categories for traffic stops initiated by the DPD. These data capture the basis of the traffic stop, and are part of the department's efforts to monitor impartial policing efforts.

TABLE 18: Traffic Enforcement Data

Initial Purpose of Stop	2012	2013	2014	Grand Total
Checkpoint	988	1,120	618	2,726
Driving While Impaired	5	6	4	15
Investigation	545	370	308	1,223
Other Motor Vehicle Violation	326	281	141	748
Safe Movement Violation	467	569	422	1,458
Speed Limit Violation	3,306	4,947	4,934	13,187
Seat Belt Violation	231	448	459	1,138
Stop Light/Sign Violation	964	1,071	735	2,770
Vehicle Equipment Violation	680	740	529	1,949
Vehicle Regulatory Violation	2,528	2,886	1,824	7,238
Grand Total	10,040	12,438	9,974	32,452

Source: Durham Analytical Services

What is notable in Table 18 is that the number of stops declined dramatically between 2013 and 2014. It is also significant that in 2014 the agency reported more vehicle crashes than traffic enforcement efforts.

TABLE 19: 2014 Traffic Stops by District

District	Total
Unknown	1310
D1	4092
D2	5639
D3	6338
D4	5160
D5	1238
DSO	19
Grand Total	23796

Source: DPD 2014 CAD Data

Table 19 above shows the count of traffic stops recorded in CAD for 2014 by district. There is consistency in the numbers between the districts, with district 5 being lower, as expected, due to deployment of significantly less resources.

Overall, the number of reported crashes and traffic stops are important, as these reflect the current and ongoing challenges related to traffic patterns and traffic enforcement. The number of annual crashes is also significant, because it correlates to a significant amount of work effort. Understanding and monitoring traffic enforcement efforts is important, too, as increased traffic enforcement efforts often manifest in reduced crash rates.

The IACP team attempted to gain access to other traffic enforcement data, but we learned that traffic citation data from DPD flows directly to the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Court, and that these data are not readily accessible to the department. Although DPD has access to certain data, such as areas in which traffic stops occur, and the impartial policing data collected from those stops, the department does not have access to data regarding the number of citations, and the types of violations cited.

SECTION VI: ORGANIZATION

The primary responsibility of the DPD is for protecting and safeguarding the lives and property of Durham residents through enforcement of criminal laws and safety education. The department carries out these core functions through five operational bureaus: Uniform Patrol, Investigative Services, Administrative Services, Community Services, and the Office of the Chief. The following information provides a brief description of each bureau.

Uniform Patrol Bureau:

This bureau includes the traditional uniformed patrol officers, the District Investigators, Bicycle Squad, Canine (K-9) Unit, Traffic Services Unit (TACT), Warrant Squad, Motorcycle Unit, Secondary Employment, Court Liaison, Desk/Towing Unit, the Reserves and the High Enforcement Abatement Team (HEAT). The divisions and units within this program provide specific law enforcement services to the public, which includes patrol responses to 911 requests for assistance, investigation and clearance of property crimes and crimes against persons, tracking of suspects, searching for lost children and the elderly, youth crime, and locating illegal drugs.

Community Services Bureau:

This program includes the G.R.E.A.T. Unit, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), Community Resources Unit, CIT/MHOP, and Victim Services. These units assist elementary and middle school students resist pressure to use drugs, ensure that schoolchildren cross the roadway safely at marked areas with school crossing guards, work with a youth group known as the Police Explorers, and provide efforts to reduce the number of firearms on the street. They also provide positive alternatives for at risk youth, provide crime prevention and community liaison services to the community, maintain the Mobile Substations, provide an honor guard for ceremonial events, help those with mental health issues to receive the appropriate services, and provide victim services.

Investigative Services Bureau:

This program consists of the Special Operations Division (SOD), the Criminal Investigations Division (CID), and the Forensic Services Division (FSD). SOD consists of the Selective Enforcement Team (SET), the Organized Crime Unit, the Major Crimes Unit, an Interdiction Unit, a Biological/Chemical Emergency Response Team (BCERT) and the Violent Incidents Response Team (VIRT). CID consists of the Fraud Unit, Homicide Unit, Special Victims Unit, and a Domestic Violence Unit. FSD consists of a Crime Scene Unit, a Crime Lab Unit, and a Property/Evidence Unit; the Crime Lab Unit has a Digital Forensic section, a Firearms and Tool Marks section, and a Latent Print Comparison section. These sections provide specific investigative services for crimes such as homicides, assaults, fraud, prostitution, and gambling activities, respond to chemical and biological emergencies, perform drug raids and respond to hostage situations, maintain custody of all property and court evidence, process crime scenes, respond to and investigate domestic violence cases, and provide collective intelligence on gang membership and activity. They also employ strategies to reduce violence by collaborating with federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, Immigration Customs Enforcement, and US Marshals Service.


Administrative Services Bureau:

This bureau includes Training and Recruiting, Fiscal Services, Planning, Special Projects, Inventory Control, Emergency Information Services, Crime Analysis/Intel Unit, Records Management, the Telephone Response Unit, and Personnel Services. The Training Unit provides in-service and new recruit training. The Fiscal Services Unit provides fiscal management and grants administration. The Planning and Special Projects Units provide long term planning for growth requirements. Inventory Control provides oversight of the police fleet and supply room inventory. Emergency Information Services provides computer support, statistical database maintenance, front line mobile data terminal and e-citation support. The Crime Analysis/Intel Unit analyzes and compiles reports of crime-related data to assist officers in their crime abatement efforts. The Records Management function is responsible for the data files contained in the records management system, and for maintenance of the DCI/Warrants functions. The Telephone Response Unit handles all non-emergency calls. The Recruiting Unit actively seeks qualified applicants and the Personnel Services Unit oversees the administration of our Human Capital.⁶

Figure 2 below provides an overview of the major sections and bureaus within the police department, including the number of personnel allocated, both sworn and non-sworn. Figure 3 below provides an expanded view of the various sub-units of the department.

⁶ City of Durham 2015-2016 Budget Documents <http://durhamnc.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/4266>

FIGURE 2: Durham Police Department Allocated Personnel




Source: City of Durham 2015-2016 Budget Documents <http://durhamnc.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/4266>

The department has two deputy chiefs, one each for the operations section, and the operations support section. There are four assistant chiefs, one for the Northside Operations Bureau of Patrol, one for the Southside Operations Bureau of Patrol, one for the Investigative Services Bureau, and one for the Administrative Services Bureau.

A captain and a lieutenant oversee each of the patrol districts. Each patrol team within districts 1-4 has a sergeant and two corporals allocated to it. District 5, which is much smaller in resource deployment, has one sergeant allocated to each patrol team. A sergeant and a corporal oversee each of the major units within CID and SOD. Other units, such as GREAT, training, and recruiting, each have supervisors allocated to them. Based on our review of the personnel allocations, it appears that there is a sufficient supervisory span of control within all of the organizational units within the DPD.

FIGURE 3: Durham Police Department Organizational Chart



The patrol staff work 12-hour shifts, which creates a *platoon* environment. Within patrol, each district has an A-Side and a B-Side, with one side working while the other side is off. Structurally, each side has a day shift and a night shift. The department essentially allocates personnel within patrol equally, with the exception of District 5. Districts 1 and 2 each have 40 officers, Districts 3 and 4 each have 36 officers, and District 5 has 12 officers. There are no overlaps between shifts and there are no accommodations made within personnel deployments for peak periods of calls for service, which we will explore elsewhere in this report.

Staffing

Tables 5 and 6 below (repeated for reference), depict the staffing levels of the DPD, including the allocation of personnel among the various ranks and assignments.

TABLE 5 (Repeated): Historic Sworn Staffing Levels

Year	Population	# of Officers
2010	233,790	485
2011	231,225	476
2012	235,563	537
2013	242,865	517
2014	249,738	501
2015*	254,732	512

Source: <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications>

*2015 reflects the authorized staffing number of officers, and projected population.

TABLE 6 (Repeated): Current Authorized Sworn Staffing Levels

Position	2015
Chief/Deputy Chief	5
Captain	12
Lieutenant	14
Sergeant	51
Detective	54
Corporal	64
Officer	261
Officer Recruit	55
TOTAL	516

Source: Durham Human Resources

When examining staffing levels and allocations, and other organizational metrics and measures, it can be helpful to compare one organization against another to help illustrate

any significant variances between them. IACP has conducted numerous prior staffing and organizational studies, and we often look back at these data for this expressed purpose. Another resource that we often reference is the survey of benchmark cities. Several police chiefs created this survey in 1997 as a means to establish comparative statistics. There are 29 agencies currently contributing data to this survey, and we find the site very valuable and informative.⁷

Despite the value in looking at benchmarks and metrics from other communities, it is worth mentioning that these comparisons have limitations; accordingly, our analysis of various organizational and operational factors rely more heavily on data specific to the agency we are studying. Still, benchmark data, and data from other studies, provide a strong comparative value, and we will reference them at various points within this report.

Table 20 below, shows the distribution of personnel at DPD, relative to the benchmark cities. For the benchmark survey, executive includes the rank of chief, and two steps below. Mid-level includes three steps below the chief, to the step above line-level supervisor.

TABLE 20: Personnel Allocation Comparison to Benchmark Cities

	Population	Authorized Officers	Executive	Mid-Level Supervisors	First-Line Supervisors	All Officers
Benchmark Averages	164,560	231	3.50%	3.30%	12.10%	81.20%
Durham Allocations	251,893	516	18	14	115	369
Durham Percentage			3.49%	2.71%	22.29%	71.51%

Source: <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

NOTE: Executive include the Chief of Police and two steps below. Mid-level includes three steps below the Chief, to one-step above line-level supervisor. First-line supervisors includes Corporals (64).

Comparatively, the number of personnel allocated to the executive rank at DPD is in line with the benchmark averages. The mid-level rank is slightly lower at DPD, but not significantly. In examining the number of first-line supervisors at DPD, we note that the percentage is significantly higher than the benchmark cities. Because DPD has a higher percentage of first-line supervisors, the remaining percentage of officers is significantly lower than the benchmark average. We attribute these variances to the use of corporals (64) within the DPD organizational structure. When we remove the corporals from these totals, the number of first-line supervisors shifts to 51, which represents about 9.88

⁷ Access to the site is available through the following the URL: <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

percent of the total of personnel. This change also shifts the all-officers category, which then becomes 433, or 83.91 percent of the total. As noted previously, we believe that the organizational structure and supervisory span of control is functional and appropriate. Accordingly, despite some variances from the benchmark averages, we believe the personnel allocations by rank are proper.

Attrition is a challenge in Durham, as it is with many departments. An analysis of departures over the past five years indicates the department is losing an average of 41 sworn staff each year (including crime scene investigators). Table 21 below shows annual separations by category for 2011-2015.

TABLE 21: Annual Separations

Reason	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total	Average
Discharged	0	1	0	1	1	3	1
Resigned	8	9	10	22	18	67	13
Retired	12	21	11	11	11	66	13
Police Recruits	24	11	12	11	12	70	14
*Grand Total	44	42	33	45	42	206	41

Source: City of Durham Human Resources Data

*Includes Crime Scene Investigators

Aside from the total number of separations, which we consider high, the number of resignations is trending upward, doubling since 2010. Determining what is high or low is somewhat subjective, and myriad factors may affect this. However, assuming an equal annual hiring distribution among licensed officers, and assuming a 30-year career, we would expect to see 1/30th of the workforce retire annually. Given DPDs compliment of roughly 516 officers, this would translate into about 16 officers. Looking strictly at the retirements, the attrition rate (for retirements) at DPD is in line with this estimate. As a practical matter, we recognize that the distribution of hiring is often not equal; not everyone stays for 30 years in the profession (or in one place), and some areas, like the research triangle area in North Carolina, are more conducive to lateral transfers among officers. Still, DPDs annual loss of roughly 8% of its workforce is debilitating in many respects. It also demands greater attention in consistently balancing these losses.

Aside from the obvious cost issues surrounding the replacement of officers, attrition complicates other aspects of the police operation. It has been our experience, and our observation, that when vacancies occur within a police agency, regardless of where they occur within the ranks, the true vacancy usually occurs in Patrol and/or Investigations. This is not necessarily immediate, but when retirements occur in other areas within the agency, those positions are typically backfilled using Patrol or Investigations staff. DPD has worked hard to hire staff to fill these vacancies, but this has been hampered by low interest (based on a small numbers of applicants), and a lengthy hiring process. These

factors, along with the inability to hire at a rate that maintains a minimum sworn strength authorized by the city (referred to as over-hires), have contributed to operational vacancies (untrained personnel who, although employed, cannot perform their job function without the guidance and assistance of a training officer or supervisor) within the department, which negatively affect organizational effectiveness. This is particularly true for the patrol and investigations divisions. There is a significant need to reduce overall attrition, but also to ensure the minimizing of operational vacancies.

In addition to the number of sworn staff who have left the agency, about 11-12 recruits left the department over each of the past four years. This is both problematic and troubling. It is problematic because of the lag-time in filling a police position. It is commonplace for the hiring and training process, including field training, to take 15-18 months. When a person is hired and they ultimately do not work out, the clock for rehire resets, which elongates the hiring process. From a staffing perspective, this creates lengthy periods in which the department is working short. In addition to lengthening the hiring process, loss of a significant number of recruits also means a loss of financial investment in that individual.

It is also concerning that on a consistent basis 11-12 recruits regularly leave the agency, presumably due to performance issues (or policy violations, etc.). Although these separations likely contribute to the overall quality and integrity of the organization, the failure rate may be indicative of issues with the overall screening process for applicants. We would encourage DPD to continue to monitor this to look for any commonalities, and to adjust hiring practices, as they apply to these circumstances.

One of the byproducts of a high attrition rate is that the experience level of the officers on the street suffers. In Table 22 below, we highlight the experience profile of the agency, separated by division.

TABLE 22: Experience Profile

Section	# of Officers	Average Years
Administrative Services	13	21
Patrol Operations	228	9
Operations Support	90	16
Investigations	131	14

Source: DPD Human Resources

As Table 22 depicts, the average tenure of officers in the patrol operations division is the lowest within the organization, and this is typical in other organizations as well. However, the average of nine years of experience in patrol is relatively low, particularly in comparison to other areas. In addition, the average of nine years is somewhat deceiving, due to the many officers in the patrol division with a high experience level.

Out of the 228 officers in patrol, 156 have 10 years or less experience, and 104 have five years or less. This is not surprising, given the attrition rate, but it is an important metric, as it points to the need to improve retention overall.

During our interviews, we learned that officers can transfer out of patrol to a specialized unit with only 18 months with DPD, and we learned that many officers are quick to do so. Several officers explained that there is little incentive to remain in patrol, and that staffing is such an issue, that there is a good reason to move to another assignment, if for nothing else, just to be able to get time off when requested. We cannot say that this is the sentiment of all, but the gap in experience in patrol is suggestive of a need for further review.

SUMMARY

Population growth in the City of Durham has been steady, and this growth will likely continue. Despite growth in the city and even within the police budgets, police department staffing has not increased in recent years, the need for which is a focal point of this study. The police department has a diverse workforce, both with respect to gender and race, but attrition remains an issue, both for sworn officers, and for recruits.

Crime rates, arrest/clearance rates, and other enforcement data, are within the general expected ranges for a city like Durham. There is some concern over small increases in some crime categories, while arrests and clearance rates, and traffic enforcement rates, are declining. However, these statistics are not significantly disparate and they do not suggest the need for significant change in policing approach. Still, as we will address elsewhere in this report, there are some staffing issues within DPD, and we conclude that addressing these will prove beneficial to the agency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: **Track and Count Aggravated Assault Incident Numbers, in addition to Victim Totals**

Priority (1-3): **3**

Details:

As we have noted, aggravated assault totals may include multiple victims from a single incident, which can provide misleading information concerning the number of aggravated assault incidents occurring within the City of Durham. In order to avoid any confusion in this regard, we recommend including and reporting an incident total in tracking aggravated assaults, in addition to tracking total victim counts.

Short Recommendation: Monitor Part II Case Reporting Practices

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Significant variances in some reported categories for Part II crimes suggest inaccurate or inconsistent categorization of offenses (see Table 10). We recommend examining these categories to isolate these occurrences, and to work with records staff to identify whether there are inaccuracies, and if so, how to engage more accurate reporting strategies in the future.

Short Recommendation: Establish Access to Traffic Citation Data from the Courts

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

At present, DPD does not have access to citation data related to the number of citations issued by officers, and the types of violations cited. Analyzing these data in relation to crash statistics is an important component in determining strategies to reduce crashes and to improve public safety. These data also provide the department with the opportunity to examine work volume and practices by individual employees. Accordingly, we recommend working with the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Court to gain access, or to determine a mechanism for reporting these data back to the agency.

Short Recommendation: Examine Recruit Attrition Causes

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

The cost incurred for hiring and training a police recruit is substantial, and accordingly, when recruits are not successful, the agency loses precious financial resources. Moreover, losing recruits in the midst of the training process also elongates the time required to replace vacancies, which works against operational effectiveness. We recommend that the department examine the reasons for attrition within the recruit ranks, to determine the need for adjustments to the hiring process.

CHAPTER II: CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP

SECTION I: WORKFORCE SURVEY

Workforce perceptions, attitudes, and expectations constitute essential information for understanding the current culture and effectiveness of the DPD, diagnosing opportunities for constructive change, and managing organizational transformation. The IACP surveyed the workforce to capture this information and to broaden staff involvement in the study.

Survey Structure

The electronic survey consisted of respondent profile items (assignment, years of service and time in rank, rank/title, age, race, gender, and education), 75 content items (opinion, perception), 7 organizational climate items, and an open comments option. The survey elicited employee responses in 26 different categories:

- Command Staff
- Leadership
- First Line Supervisors
- Trust and Ethics
- Fairness
- Communications – Internal
- Training
- Policies
- Accountability
- Equipment
- Technology
- Job Satisfaction and Commitment
- Work Volume
- Job Safety
- Valuing Diversity
- Pay and Benefits
- Community Needs and Problem Solving
- Community Policing/Engagement
- Patrol Staffing and Schedule
- Investigations Staffing and Schedule
- Organizational Standards
- Responsibility
- Warmth and Support
- Clarity/Goals
- Conformity

- Rewards

The content section of the survey consisted of forced-choice questions, a contrasting perspectives portion relating to organizational climate factors, and a final section that provided space for open-ended responses to any of the survey items or other topics.

At our request, the police department distributed the survey electronically to every member of the agency, sworn and civilian, via a link provided through the DPD email system. Acting Chief Smith promoted participation in the form of an internal email. Survey protocols promoted anonymity.

Survey Response

The city authorizes the police department to employ roughly 637 full-time personnel. The department distributed surveys to all personnel, and 329 persons completed it fully, which amounts to approximately 51.5% of authorized full-time staff (assuming full distribution and that all positions are filled). Assessed by total number of respondents, distribution by rank, and years of service, we consider the respondent profile sufficiently representative to reflect the perceived culture of the DPD. The percentage of respondents is notable for a couple of reasons. First, a typical survey return rate is often closer to 20%. This is particularly true in reference to external surveys (community). Although internal surveys often fare better than external ones, a 50% return rate is substantial. In addition, the high return rate reflects strong participation, particularly when considered in relation to the number of surveys and questionnaires the department has asked staff to complete recently. We consider this rate of return remarkable, and indicative of the desire of staff to engage in the process of self-analysis and improvement.

Respondent Profile

In Table 23 below, we have identified the profile of those who responded to the survey.

Salient characteristics of the population sample that responded include:

- **Experience:** 56.5% of those who responded have at least 10 years of experience with the agency.
- **Age:** 87.2% of the responses were from persons aged 30 and above. This demonstrates a very mature respondent pool.
- **Rank>Title:** 72.3% of the responses were from line-level officers, with ranking officers comprising 14.9%.

- Unit/Assignment:** 86.6% of the responses were from sworn officers, including command, investigations, patrol, and other sworn staff.
- Diversity:** The race and gender profile of the respondents projects a strong balance.

TABLE 23: Respondent Profile

Unit Assignment	Total
Executive and Command Staff, Sworn	13
Non-Sworn Supervisor or Manager	13
Other Non-Sworn Personnel	50
Patrol - Sworn Officer	143
Investigations Division - Sworn	66
Specialty Division or Assignment - Sworn	63

Rank/Title	Total
Lieutenant and Above	19
Sergeant	30
Sworn Officer	238
Civilian	61

Years of Service	Total	In-Rank
0-4 Years	85	165
5-9 Years	77	84
10-14 Years	61	51
15-20 Years	89	36
More than 20 Years	36	12

Age	Total
21-29	61
30-39	108
40-49	123
50 or over	56

Education	Total
High School	50
Associate Degree	46
Less than 4 Yr. Degree	73
Bachelor's Degree	135
Some Graduate Work	13
Graduate Degree	31

Race	Total
African American	81
Hispanic	16
White	233
Other	18

Gender	Total
Male	263
Female	85

Source: IACP Workforce Survey, Durham PD

Survey Analysis – Content Section

Survey results are most useful to isolate conditions and practices, which need attention, and/or those that offer an opportunity to advance the effectiveness of operations, achievement of outcomes, and the overall health of the workplace. For each content survey dimension, respondents chose between the following responses: never, occasionally, usually, frequently, or always. We assigned numeric values of 1-5 (with 1

being low and 5 being high), respectively. In some cases, if the question did not apply, respondents could also choose an N/A type response. Table 24 below provides the final average scoring for each of the 26 categorical areas in the content section of the survey.

TABLE 24: Survey Responses

Survey Category	Average
Command	3.24
Leadership	2.85
First Line Supervisor	4.04
Trust and Ethics	3.04
Fairness	2.89
Communication	3.28
Training	3.20
Policies	3.63
Accountability	2.76
Equipment	3.34
Technology	3.28
Job Satisfaction and Commitment	3.52
Work Volume	3.07
Job Safety	3.72
Valuing Diversity	3.72
Pay and Benefits	1.69
Community Needs and Problem Solving	3.26
Community Policing/Engagement	3.28
Patrol Staffing and Schedule	2.25
Investigations Staffing and Schedule	3.80
Org. Climate Standards	3.88
Org. Climate Responsibility	3.03
Org. Climate Warmth and Support	3.84
Org. Climate Clarity/Goals	3.64
Org. Climate Conformity	2.37
Org. Climate Rewards	2.58

Source: IACP Workforce Survey, Durham PD

Of the 26 dimensions in the survey, the average employee ratings were at or over 3.0 in all but seven categories. We have highlighted the average responses below 3.0 in the table above. It is our assessment that five of these dimension relate to leadership areas including: leadership, fairness, accountability, and organizational climate conformity and rewards. Pay and benefits rated the lowest among all dimensions and Patrol Staffing and Schedule was second lowest.

For each of the 26 dimensions in the survey, there are multiple questions. This is by design, as the structure of a survey that measures multiple responses to a particular dimension, contributes to the value of the aggregate responses. In general, examining single responses does not provide a full understanding with respect to a particular issue. However, we noted several questions within the survey that had very high, or very low responses, which we felt worthy of mention. We have included those questions, and the average totals, below.

Notable Response Averages:

Q-28 Policies: Rating - 4.03

I use policies, procedures, and rules to help make decisions.

Q-64 Valuing Diversity: Rating - 4.07

Employees are welcome and accepted, regardless of race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex, or sexual orientation.

Q-49 Job Satisfaction: Rating - 4.21

My work is important.

Q-69 Job Satisfaction: Rating - 4.39

I am committed to the profession of policing.

Q-50 Work Volume: Rating - 4.50

The work required for my job keeps me busy.

Q-57 Patrol Staffing and Schedule: Rating - 1.84

Department staff levels are adequate to meet citizen needs.

Q-76 Patrol Staffing and Schedule: Rating - 1.84

The deployment of personnel in patrol is adequate to meet call for service demands.

Q-83 Patrol Staffing and Schedule: Rating - 2.50

The department has clear expectations for officers to engage in community policing activities.

We will not provide a narrative with regard to each of the questions noted here, as we think the responses provide a sufficient explanation on their own. However, these responses represent a large sub-section of the agency, and whether largely positive or negative, they firmly express the opinions of staff.

The only question that we will isolate here is question 83, immediately above, which pertains to community policing. We were somewhat surprised by the mid-line average

for this question, as virtually everyone we spoke with, from command staff to line-staff, expressed knowledge of the department's desire for officers to engage in community policing. Although we will address this elsewhere in the report, it is worth mentioning here that we have concluded that generally, officers lack the operational capacity to engage in meaningful community policing efforts. It is evident that some highly proficient officers, or those operating in less demanding beats, have time for these activities; however, the vast majority of officers do not.

Organizational Climate

The second portion of the survey involved an analysis of the organizational climate. These questions intend to address many of the same categories in the content section, and to a certain extent, they are duplicative. However, by their construction, these questions provide a different vantage point, and a readily observable range, both in reference to how the organization currently functions, and ideally how it should function, based on the opinions of the respondents. We have provided these data in Table 25 below.

TABLE 25: Organizational Climate

CONFORMITY: The feeling that there are many externally imposed constraints in the organization; the degree to which members feel that there are rules, procedures, policies, and practices to which they have to conform, rather than being able to do their work as they see it.		
Conformity is very characteristic of the organization		
Current 6.71		Desired 5.49
Conformity should be a characteristic of the organization		
RESPONSIBILITY: Members of the organization are given personal responsibility to achieve their part of the organizations goals; the degree to which members feel that they can make decisions and solve problems without checking with supervisors each step of the way.		
There is great emphasis on personal responsibility in the organization		
Current 6.35		Desired 7.53
There should be great emphasis on personal responsibility in the organization		
STANDARDS: The emphasis the organization places on quality performance and outstanding production; the degree to which members feel the organization is setting challenging goals for itself and communicating those goals to its members.		
High challenging standards are set in the organization		
Current 5.77		Desired 7.31
High challenging standards should be set/expected in the organization		
REWARDS: The degree to which members feel that they are being recognized and rewarded for good work rather than being ignored, criticized, or punished when things go wrong.		
Members are recognized and rewarded positively within the organization		
Current 4.43		Desired 8.13
Members should be recognized and rewarded positively within the organization		
ORGANIZATIONAL CLARITY: The feeling among members that things are well organized and goals are clearly defined rather than being disorderly or confused.		
The organization is well-organized with clearly defined goals		
Current 5.42		Desired 8.08
The organization should be well-organized and have clearly defined goals		
WARMTH AND SUPPORT: The feeling of friendliness is a valued norm in the organization; that members trust one another and offer support to one another. The feeling that good relationships prevail in the work environment.		
Warmth and support are very characteristic of the organization		
Current 5.27		Desired 8.05
Warmth and support should be very characteristic of the organization		
LEADERSHIP: The willingness of organization members to accept leadership and direction from other qualified personnel. As needs for leadership arise, members feel free to take leadership roles and are rewarded for successful leadership. Leadership is based on expertise. The organization is not dominated by, or dependent on one or two persons.		
Members accept and are rewarded for leadership based on expertise		
Current 5.09		Desired 8.06
Members should accept and be rewarded for leadership based on expertise		

Source: IACP Workforce Survey, Durham PD

There are three important aspects of the organizational climate survey from Table 25, which make this a versatile tool. The first aspect relates to the *correct* or *right* response. Each organization is different, and accordingly, there is no pre-identified proper level associated with any of these questions. The responses reflect the collective desires of the staff at DPD, and as such, they are representative of the current and desired culture of the DPD, as opposed to an arbitrary standard set elsewhere.

The second aspect of this tool is that it has great utility. The categories in this questionnaire are clear and the agency can easily identify, based on the responses, which areas require focused attention.

The third notable aspect of this tool is that it is brief and easily replicable. The agency can re-administer this survey at various intervals. Doing so can provide the agency with comparative data to examine the prior condition against the current perceptions of staff, and the results can help the agency recognize whether their efforts at shifting one or more of these cultural areas, are successful.

Qualitative Responses

The survey provided respondents with an opportunity to provide a narrative, or qualitative response, to any of the survey questions, or with respect to any other organizational area. Like the survey, these responses were anonymous. We have reviewed and analyzed the 133 individual responses, and grouped these into categories. The overarching themes that arose were in the areas of: compensation and benefits, internal leadership and local government, staffing, scheduling, retention, communication and morale, and equipment and vehicles. The information below expands upon the thematic areas identified.

Q. 91 – Please use this section to explain any of your choices, and / or to express your view on any topic not covered.

Compensation and Benefits:

In reviewing the comments, respondents indicated that, as compared to departments in the surrounding areas, the compensation at DPD is not equitable. The estimated pay disparity ranged from \$5,000 to \$10,000 but there is insufficient data to verify the accuracy of this claim. Several respondents expressed that retention of officers may be due to the pay disparity and the increase in workload.

Internal Leadership / Local Government:

Responses indicated that there are ongoing challenges between the department and the city management. Some held the belief that the city management is more responsive to the community and not as supportive to the department. Additionally, some respondents implied that the department has promoted some supervisors without proper qualifications, and/or due to favoritism. In addition, some respondents suggested that some supervisors have lost touch with the work of the officers and the work they do, which has caused relationships to deteriorate.

Staffing / Scheduling / Retention:

Respondents indicated that retention of officers is a challenge. Those surveyed expressed that the officers at DPD receive excellent training, and that the volume of calls for service provides them a great deal of experience. Although these aspects are beneficial to DPD overall, this has been an attraction for other departments, and many officers transfer to other agencies after only a few years of service with DPD. This can then leave the department with having the added expense of putting additional officers through the academy. Several also expressed that the 12-hour shift rotation currently in use is demanding on the officers, and that staffing the shifts properly has been an issue.

Communication / Morale:

Many of the respondents suggested that the morale of the department is low and the communication between the command staff and the line officers is not where it should be. Several noted that while leadership expressly states that patrol is the backbone of the department, the actions of DPD leaders do not seem to support this statement. According to some, when leaders engage disciplinary action, it varies from person to person, and that sentiment has eroded a sense of trust within the department.

Equipment / Vehicles

Due to their extended use, the patrol vehicles are in deteriorating condition. Many officers expressed that take home vehicles would improve the overall efficiency and availability of the fleet, and that it might help with retention, too. Some staff noted that there is a lack of available patrol units, which frequently affects response times for calls of service.

SECTION II: MISSION, VISION, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES

The DPD is a traditional, full-service police agency, reacting and responding to crimes as they occur, with focused attention to known high crime areas and follow up investigation to apprehend offenders.

The mission of the Durham Police Department mission is,

To minimize crime, promote safety, and enhance the quality of life in partnership with our community.

The vision of the Durham Police Department is,

The vision of the Durham Police Department is to be a progressive law enforcement agency committed to reducing crime by providing the best quality of

service, fostering public confidence and maintaining the highest standards of excellence as a community partner for positive change.⁸

The Durham Police Department has a strategic plan for FY 2015-2016, which outlines various agency strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges. The strategic plan includes several goals, objectives, and associated measures for success (See Appendix B). The goals and objectives in the strategic plan include:

Goal - Well Managed City: Provide professional management that is accountable, efficient, and transparent.

Objective: Effectively recruit, train, and retain well-qualified and diverse employees

Objective: Increase departmental transparency through better communication

Objective: Increase the public's trust in the Durham Police Department

Goal - Safe and Secure Community: Provide safe and secure neighborhoods, which are fundamental to the quality of life and economic vitality of the city.

Objective: Meet response time standards to maximize resident and officer safety

Objective: Reduce incident rates

Objective: Provide enhanced traffic/pedestrian/bicycle safety

The strategic plan includes action steps for each of these objectives

Within the FY 2015-2016 budget documents for the City of Durham, there is an extensive section dedicated to public safety, and in particular, the police department. The police department section contains various budgetary and staffing figures, and it includes several department goals and objectives, along with corresponding measures. The goals and objectives in the FY budget documents correspond to the goals and objectives outlined within the police department strategic plan.

Goal:	Safe and Secure Community			
Objective:	To maintain the number of violent crimes at or below 700 per 100,000			
Initiative:	Pursue proactive efforts to include data driven policing and community-based initiatives.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
# Violent Crimes per 100,000 Residents	772	700	761	700
# Property Crimes per 100,000 Residents	4,737	4,700	4,622	4,700

⁸ <http://durhamnc.gov/664/Mission>

Objective:	To ensure an average response time of 5.8 minutes or less to Priority 1 calls.			
Initiative:	Maintain adequate staffing levels of well-trained call takers in Uniform Patrol and continue use of AVL system.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
Average response time to all Priority 1 calls.	6.0	5.8	5.8	5.8

Objective:	To respond to 57% or more of Priority 1 calls in less than 5 minutes.			
Initiative:	Maintain well-trained officers in Uniform Patrol and staff Uniform Patrol beats appropriately to maintain beat integrity and monitor response times to Prior 1 calls; continue collaboration with communications on call-taking issues.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
% Priority 1 calls responded to in less than 5 minutes	52.40%	57%	55%	57%

Objective:	Decrease an identified high utilizer's calls for service for the year following initial contact.			
Initiative:	Maintain officers that are well-trained in CIT intervention and referral methods.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
% Decrease in CIT High Utilizer's 911 Calls for Service	70%	60%	60%	60%

Objective:	Establish 30 new neighborhood watch programs.			
Initiative:	Provide communities with sufficient information and assistance for ease of establishing neighborhood watch programs.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
# of new Neighborhood watch programs	60	30	34	30

Objective:	Decrease burglaries in a defined RAP area by 50% within the 90-day period following a primary RAP response compared to the preceding 90 days.			
Initiative:	Initiate RAP response to areas where repeat burglaries are experienced.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
% decrease in burglaries following Primary RAP response	79%	50%	50%	50%

Objective:	To maintain a lower percentage of children re-offending who attended a Juvenile Justice Call-in than those who did not attend a Call-in.			
Initiative:	Educate and encourage parents of juvenile offenders to have their children attend a Juvenile Justice Call-in.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
% Children Re-Offending who Did Not/Did Attend Call-in	40%/20%	TBD	50%/17%	50%/25%

Objective:	To maintain a minimum FY Violent Crime Clearance Rate of 50% or higher.			
Initiative:	Maintain well-trained investigators, monitor case clearance rate and maintain enhanced information sharing with the community.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
Violent crime FY clearance rate	45%	50%	44%	50%

Objective:	To maintain a minimum FY Property Crime Clearance Rate of 23% or higher.			
Initiative:	Maintain well-trained officers, monitor case clearance rate and maintain enhanced information sharing with the community.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
Property Crime FY clearance rate	21%	23%	21%	23%

Goal:	Well-Managed City
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Objective:	To achieve a real vacancy rate of 0% per month for authorized and funded sworn positions.			
Initiative:	Maintain aggressive, diverse recruiting efforts and utilize over-hires to meet operational needs.			
Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
Average sworn real vacancy rate	0%	0%	0%	0%

Objective:	To conduct a citywide survey that measures the perception of safety in the City.			
Initiative:	Conduct annual survey through the Durham Convention & Visitors Bureau.			

Measures:	Actual FY14	Adopted FY15	Estimated FY15	Adopted FY16
% Residents that feel personally safe in Durham	62%	70%	65%	70%

The department has clear goals and objectives, all of which are admirable and provide definitions for the measures used to assess achievement. Based on our analysis, it appears that organizational leaders make decisions in concert with these goals and objectives. However, it is not evident that leadership has communicated these goals and the associated decisions throughout the organization, which has contributed to feelings among officers that organizational leaders are detached from line staff.

We also observe in examining these goals and objectives, that apart from working to ensure full staffing, all of these items focus outwardly. There are no focused goals for improving internal department operations.

SECTION III: ETHICS, INTEGRITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The stated goals and objectives for the department provide a measure of outward accountability. There are defined measures for the stated goals, and despite the difficulty in measuring many aspects of policing, these goals provide a good mechanism for public accountability. However, we are aware that the DPD has experienced significant issues with its public image in recent years, and other than a public survey, no other stated goal seeks public input or collaboration with the police department. There is also strong evidence of direct intervention by the city council in setting police department policy, and in setting direction for the agency. This level of direct involvement is rare, and it is indicative of a belief that leadership within the police department has not acted in a manner that is commensurate with the general policy expectations of the governing body, and what the council feels are the expectations of the community. To resolve these perceptions, the department needs to engage the community more directly, and establish goals and objectives that establish accountability for doing this.

In addition to outward accountability, the police department needs to ensure internal accountability. During our study, we received many anecdotes from officers, who identified individual circumstances in which they questioned internal accountability actions by organizational leaders. In some cases, these examples related to a lack of accountability where warranted (based on their perception), and in others, they expressed concerns over circumstances in which agency leaders held officers accountable in what they perceived as an unfair or unequal approach. In most cases, those we spoke with acknowledged the need for accountability, and indeed, most prefer a system of accountability that ensures appropriate actions. However, many expressed a concern that accountability within the organization is not equal.

We recognize the difficulty and complexity in managing discipline and other personnel matters, and that frequently, leadership cannot comment with respect to specific incidents, disciplinary matters, or other personnel actions. However, using clear and transparent processes consistently, often contributes to trust in these circumstances, and there may be a need to improve organizational communication in this regard.

SECTION IV: LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNICATION

The IACP team had an opportunity to observe organizational leaders in various meetings, and in our interviews with them. We found the leadership, at all levels, competent and engaged, and concerned with making decisions that benefit the community and the organization. We noted robust discussion concerning various department matters, and significant attention to detail, including how decisions might affect the community, the organization, and individuals. From our vantage point, organizational leaders are working collaboratively (particularly at the command level) to address the various issues that arise in the functional operation of a police agency. However, our team had access to organizational leaders and decision-making meetings that line-level supervisors and officers do not have. In our interviews with officers, we found that many did not share these same perceptions.

Virtually all of the officers interviewed expressed a good relationship with their immediate supervisor, and this was particularly true at the line-level. Officers indicated they felt supported at that level, that they had open communication with their supervisor, and that their supervisor was competent and treated them fairly and appropriately. Officers expressed that they were empowered to complete their work, and that they knew they could get help from their supervisor if they needed it. At the line-level, officers felt communication regarding department matters was good and that their supervisor conveyed information to him or her that was available.

Conversely, officers felt that the command staff made decisions regarding policies and other matters, without an inclusive process, and without a firm understanding of how those decisions would affect them and the operation. Officers expressed that there is very little quality communication between patrol and the command staff, noting that even the sergeants have little opportunity or voice in decision-making; some of the sergeants we interviewed expressed a similar view.

SECTION V: MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION

The DPD uses a COMPSTAT style process to analyze crime within the city. This process involves numerous data provided by the data analysis division within the department, and unit commanders must respond to and report on these data at prescribed intervals. The department uses this format to strategize the use of resources, and as a mechanism

to hold commanders responsible for those under their charge. We had an opportunity to observe one of these meetings and we found the engagement appropriate and reasonable.

Beyond COMPSTAT, we did not find any other formal process of supervisor accountability and reporting.

SECTION VI: MENTORING AND COACHING

The department has a program for personnel development called the Individual Development Plan (IDP). This is a joint effort between the Durham human resources department and the DPD employee services unit. We reviewed the IDP guidelines and found them thorough and complete. The IDP provides officers with the opportunity to establish their career path within DPD, and a mechanism for putting this into writing, and into action. The primary responsibility for developing and carrying out the plan rests with the employee. However, supervisors are responsible for supporting the employee through the planning and execution of the plan. We have found few agencies that have formal plans for individual development, mentoring, and coaching and we were impressed with the detail of this plan. We did not review any employee plans, but we feel there is tremendous benefit for those who engage this process.

It is also worth mentioning that many organizations struggle with the internal development of personnel, particularly with respect to succession planning. The IDP process is ideal in this regard. It affords officers the opportunity and a tool to plot their own course for career development, and it does so intentionally. If DPD uses this process consistently, it will certainly pay dividends at all ranks, and in terms of ensuring the positioning for advancement of well-qualified officers as opportunities arise.

We also noted General Order 1050 R-1, Professional Excellence Program. This program provides non-disciplinary assistance to those employees who may require additional guidance. This program provides an action plan for employee improvement, which we believe is a good approach. It also identifies the assignment of a mentor. Again, we applaud this step; however, there is no mention of mentor responsibilities. In addition, this plan only refers to employees requiring special assistance, and does not apply to aspiring leaders who might benefit positively from a similar plan.

SECTION VII: PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS

We had an opportunity to review the Performance Management System for DPD. This document outlines the guidelines for performance appraisals and coaching, and it includes instruction on supervisor and peer critiques, as well as how to complete a performance appraisal. As with the IDP, we found the structure of the performance management system comprehensive and systematic. This document provides good guidance for raters, including references to common evaluation errors. Appraisals also

relate directly to the individual's IDP, which we noted as a strong connection for employee growth and development.

Despite the positive nature of this document, we heard that there are some frailties in this process. One sergeant conveyed that the evaluation process is flawed. The sergeant noted that community involvement for officers receives 40% of the weight in the evaluation. However, officers have very little or no time available to perform this function, due to call volume and staffing levels. According to this sergeant, supervisors receiving these appraisals have returned them for revision, essentially directing line-level supervisors to adjust them in ways that inaccurately reflect what the officers spend their time doing. This has worked against the credibility of the process.

As with the IDPs, we did not review any individual performance evaluations. Accordingly, we cannot say whether the concerns expressed are accurate. However, we found strong evidence to suggest that officers have little time for significant community involvement, which supports the sergeant's comments. The point of a performance evaluation is to evaluate work actually done, or work that employees are expected to perform. However, when the opportunity is not present to complete required work, there is a fundamental flaw in the evaluation process. We note elsewhere in this report that community involvement is important, and something that the agency should strive to maximize. However, if staff are unable to perform any function due to conditions that are out of their control, rating them on this metric is inappropriate, and it is suggestive of a need to modify the process.

SECTION VIII: UNION/LABOR MANAGEMENT

The DPD does not have a union, but employees have the opportunity to file grievances either with the Employee Services office, or with the Chief of Police. In reviewing the most recent accreditation report for DPD, we found that the average number of grievances filed over a three-year period was six. Given the size of the police operation, we do not feel that this number of formal grievances is significant. On the contrary, the relatively small number suggests an employee-focused perspective by organizational leaders, and one that seeks to eliminate grievances before they occur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: **Conduct a Pay and Benefits Analysis for Sworn Staff**

Priority (1-3): **3**

Details:

Many officers expressed that pay and benefits for the DPD are low and that this is contributing to officers leaving. Pay is but one factor that prompts employees to leave an organization. However, it is worth exploring this issue in order to answer the fundamental question. If pay and benefits are inequitable with respect to comparable

communities, the city should know this, so that they may make informed decisions regarding whether they wish to close any gaps.

Short Recommendation: Strategize Approaches to Improve the Organizational Climate

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

The cultural survey and organizational climate questionnaire provided significant feedback concerning employee perceptions of the operational culture and leadership at DPD. The nature of the Organizational Climate survey provides leaders with a vantage point to understand both current and desired conditions within the agency, as perceived by staff. Leaders should analyze these responses and identify strategies that contribute to categorical improvements.

Short Recommendation: Communicate Organizational Goals and Establish Internal Goals

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Although the department has established goals, staff within the organization indicated these goals are not well known, see Table 25. Additionally, as we noted previously, the goals identified in the budget process relate primarily to external (community) goals, with no internal goals established, other than maintaining staffing levels. We recommend a process whereby leaders communicate organizational goals throughout the agency, and the establishment of internal goals related to leadership and other areas identified within this report.

Short Recommendation: Review Performance Appraisal Process

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Staff indicated that the performance appraisal process has limited utility, due to structural elements that require employees to perform in areas in which they currently cannot (e.g., community engagement). Based on our limited sample, we cannot ascertain whether this is an accurate assessment, however, we recommend that leaders examine this process to identify whether the current appraisal process requires modification.

CHAPTER III: OPERATIONS, ORGANIZATION STAFFING, AND STRUCTURE

SECTION I: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The DPD utilizes a decentralized structure with respect to patrol, and certain aspects of patrol support and investigations. The structure of each of the five patrol operations districts is the same, with a captain providing oversight. All of the districts include patrol and investigations units. Districts 1-4 have specialized enforcement teams called HEAT teams, but district 5 does not. District 5 includes the bike, canine, and traffic services units for the department. In addition to the investigators at the district level, the department also has a centralized investigations bureau. This bureau includes special operations, criminal investigations, and forensic services. The office of the chief includes the professional services unit and the public affairs unit. In addition, the department has a centralized administrative services bureau, which includes planning, IT, fiscal services, analytical services, training, and the community services unit.

With a few noted exceptions, we believe that the organizational structure of the DPD is appropriate, and that it provides a good combination of decentralized decision-making, along with corporate oversight. From our analysis, the organizational layout, including the varied levels of command, is logical and functional. Our assessment is that there is a proper span of control, both for sworn and non-sworn personnel.

On review of the organizational chart, we note that there appears to be an unbalanced layer of command in the operations support section. Within the organizational structure, the Operations Support Deputy Chief directly supervises only the Administrative Services Bureau Assistant Chief, who is responsible for supervising the six divisions within the bureau. In contrast, the Operations Section Deputy Chief supervises three Bureau Assistant Chiefs and the Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Operations. Each of these individuals supervise numerous divisions and units. We are aware that the Administrative Services Bureau Assistant Chief is not a sworn officer; however, this is not a hard requirement for the position. We also recognize and understand that both the Operations Support Section Deputy Chief, and the Administrative Services Bureau Assistant Chief, contribute greatly to the overall functioning of the agency. Still, our assessment is that one commander could manage this work, with appropriate delegation of other responsibilities to those in each of the divisions and units. We feel that at a minimum, the organizational structure in this regard requires additional review.

Another area we feel is duplicative and inefficient is District 5. This district only has two beat areas, and the department staffs it differently from the other districts. The district has only two investigators and a limited patrol staff. The city is set to build the new headquarters within the current District 5 boundaries, and there is no compelling reason

to maintain this as a separate district. Eliminating this district would recapture one sergeant and two investigators, as well as the patrol staff.

In our recommendation, the captain from District 5 would retain oversight of the specialty units previously within that district. All would operate from headquarters in a new division called the Special Services Division, with the captain reporting to the Northside Operations Bureau Chief.

SECTION II: POLICING PHILOSOPHY AND OPERATIONS

One of the central components of our analysis includes an assessment of the policing philosophy and the prioritized focus of the organization. This is important, because our staffing model includes substantial discretionary time, which functions best in an environment that is predisposed to promoting community policing. In our discussions with various personnel throughout the organization, we heard consistently that the department emphasizes community policing as a philosophy and policing strategy. This was true among and across all ranks. Although leadership promotes this focus, we also heard consistently that officers lack sufficient time to engage these efforts in a meaningful way; we will discuss this further in Section V of this report.

In addition to a community policing philosophy, we determined that the agency engages significant efforts in using data-driven and intelligence-led policing strategies. As noted previously, the department utilizes a COMPSTAT system to monitor crimes, rates of crimes, and mitigating strategies engaged by command staff. We observed this process and found it appropriate and effective.

In addition to engaging data for COMPSTAT purposes, the department also utilizes intelligence data for deploying resources and in predictive policing efforts. Based on our review, the department is using these data appropriately, and in a manner that intends to address crime issues. The unfortunate byproduct of using data in this manner is that it can lead to community perceptions of disparate policing practices. In fact, we found some community members who expressed this opinion. It is our assessment that while the department does deploy resources disparately in terms of where the community needs them, department policing strategies and personnel deployments do not appear discriminatory. Some in the community would argue this point, and as we note elsewhere in this report, these concerns are a prompt for a co-production policing model, which more directly engages the community in establishing policing priorities.

SECTION III: SUPPORT SERVICES, SPECIALTY PROGRAMS, AND ASSIGNMENTS

In this section, we review the various non-sworn and sworn sections of the department. Many of these units function well at current staffing levels. However, in some cases, we conclude that units are either over- or under-staffed.

NON-SWORN PERSONNEL

Our IACP team met with two large groups consisting primarily of non-sworn staff, and we conducted interviews with those groups, as well as some individuals. Those in the group or individual interviews included administrative assistants, the fiscal unit, public affairs, crime analysts, data analysts, PSN coordinator, data integrity, CALEA accreditation manager, facility planning/special projects, victim services, records, and the executive assistant to the chief.

During these group discussions, we did not sense any specific morale issues, but those interviewed conveyed a feeling that management sometimes takes them for granted, or that organizational leaders do not always recognize their ability to contribute (via solicited input). In addition, non-sworn staff indicated lack of training opportunities as a challenge for the department and non-sworn members. Non-sworn staff indicated there is no organized formal basic training (after being hired) on the computer systems they are required to operate as part of their regular duties (e.g., RMS, MUNIS, CAD Search). Staff indicated they learn this on the job when their supervisor has time to teach them. Additionally, staff explained there is no leadership training for those promoted (in non-sworn positions), either before or after promotion. According to those interviewed, the training budget used to be at the division level, but it is now part of a department-wide budget, with many levels of approval required to have training approved. Staff indicated they feel this process is prohibitive, and that they are responsible for finding and submitting a request for their own training, with a hope that the command staff will approve it.

Those interviewed singled out the issue of communication with leadership (referring to police department leaders, as well as the city manager's office, with whom they interact) as a general frustration. They stated that there were very few opportunities for non-sworn staff to participate in roundtable-type meetings (like this one), where their input and feedback is solicited and ultimately considered in a problem solving process. Staff suggested that they felt positioned to make positive contributions to such discussions, and expressed a desire for greater involvement in decision-making that affects them.

Non-sworn staff also expressed concerns regarding decreases in support staff positions, due either to the department not filling positions, or the elimination of positions due to budget issues. Staff suggested this has affected their ability to deliver good customer

service. Specifically, those interviewed indicated that the staffing in IT is too low, in comparison to the workload.

Some non-sworn members indicated that they feel supported by the command staff, while others expressed a sense that those at the captain level dismiss their concerns, instead of passing them up the chain for action. They also identified a lack of collaboration and communication between captains and their various units that have similar interests or mission crossover. As a result, there is some unnecessary duplication of effort. In addition, several of the non-sworn personnel reported that their pay is low, compared to that of other agencies that are in the vicinity. They also pointed out that most of the staff is doing more work today than they did ten years ago, but for the same pay.

In addition to the interviews, our team also examined other data, including the command data worksheets provided by unit commanders. The following is a brief overview of the additional non-sworn areas we examined.

Fiscal Division

This unit has eight non-sworn personnel. These personnel manage the general fund for the department and they manage and provide support for the following areas: procurement, budgeting, inventory of non-fixed assets, travel/training requests, timekeeping.

In addition, this unit manages and provides oversight for grants, including fiscal management, compliance management, grant writing and researching new funding opportunities, grant contract administration and reporting, and management of forfeiture and special revenue funds.

Public Affairs Unit (PAU)

The PAU focuses on media relations and providing information to the citizens of Durham about crime alerts, public service announcements, and certain activities/events of the Durham Police Department. PAU has three civilians in the unit with oversight provided by a newly created captain position. Personnel in the PAU include a Public Affairs Manager with 17 years of experience as government communication manager, a reporter with 25 years of experience with the Herald Newspaper, assigned to Deputy Chief Smith, and a media relations specialist with 26 years of municipal public information/public affairs experience.

Recently, based on an initiative by the City Manager, the city brought in the Department of Justice (DOJ) to provide the agency with recommendations to improve their public relations with the community. One of the recommendations involved ensuring that the

Police Chief and Deputy Chief receive training on how to speak to the media; this training was recently completed.

DPD has received significant negative attention in the media, and much of this has come at a time when the law enforcement profession is under scrutiny. Many within the department expressed that they felt the public, and the media, were unfairly characterizing the DPD as a discriminatory agency. Our team found evidence of these types of allegations, both in media releases, and in views expressed by the public. We are aware that an important aspect of the PAU is to improve the image of the department, and we recommend concentrated and regular efforts in positively promoting the agency through various means.

In the course of our study, we learned that the PAU used to fall directly under the Office of the Chief. We also learned that the department recently created a captain position to oversee the PAU. Based on the current structure of this unit, the inclusion of a captain position appears that it may be unnecessary. All three of the individuals in this unit have extensive media experience, yet they report to a captain with no formal training in media relations. Even if the captain had significant expertise, the placement of an additional layer between the police chief and the PAU may be unwarranted. In fact, the more people that have to relay information to and from the chief, the greater the possibility that misinformation can work its way into the process. Accordingly, this reporting configuration may be in need of further review.

Administrative Services/Information Technology

The administrative services and information and technology division has three units; the emergency information services unit, the audio-video team, and the server/database administration.

Emergency Information Services (EIS Unit). There are five non-sworn personnel in this unit. EIS is responsible for administration, maintenance, and support of the department's computer, and IP telephone technologies. Duties include daily management and support of the Police Records Management System (RMS), mobile dispatching, other public safety software, local and remotely connected computers, printers, wireless communications, and mobile data computers (MDCs). This unit completed 3,291 helpdesk tickets in 2015.

Audio-Video (AV) Team. There are five non-sworn personnel in this unit/team. This team supports the various AV programs and initiatives of the department. These include In-Car Cameras, Interview Rooms, Body-Worn Cameras (BWC), Surveillance cameras, and all related management systems. A typical workday would involve troubleshooting/repairing in-car cameras, searching for and providing videos upon request of the office of the district attorney, or departmental personnel, and providing

other types of user support related to the department's AV programs. This team completed 1,638 helpdesk tickets in 2015.

Server/Database Administration. There is one non-sworn staff member assigned to these responsibilities. This staff member, the Datacenter Engineer, provides server and database support for the police department. This includes managing the department's servers and ensuring they are operating at maximum efficiency and are available 24/7. The Datacenter Engineer is responsible for all server updates and patches as well as server based software system upgrades. The Datacenter Engineer Works with the IT manager in planning for future server and storage hardware needs for the department.

Employee Services

There are four non-sworn personnel in this division. Staff in this division ensure compliance with legal guidelines, city policies, police general orders, and human resources best practices in the classification, compensation, guidance, working conditions, and other aspects of employment for Durham Police employees, both sworn and non-sworn.

Analytical Services Division

This unit has 29 non-sworn personnel spread among three units, including the data analysis unit, records support and TRU unit, and the DCI/Warrant control unit. The records unit (which includes the data analysis, records support, and TRU staff) processes police reports, including receipt, quality control, distribution, and archiving/retention. In-house records is staffed by six civilians, who handle customer service, TRU, crash reports, faxes, department of motor vehicles items, and felony screening. They also scan in all documents related to domestic violence, homicides, juvenile cases, and special victim unit incidents. The data analysis section with has five civilians that review officer reports for accuracy and scan in supplemental reports that officers send in via inter-office mail. They also ensure records conform to UCR/NIBRS reporting standards.

The third part of the analytical services unit consists of DCI/Warrant Control Unit (WCU), which handles NCIC and warrant entries. There are 2 supervisors and 12 employees assigned to this unit. This unit has four squads that provide coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. There are supposed to be four positions to each squad, but several years ago, the department reallocated a position from each shift, so now there are only three positions to each squad.

The DPD is about to move from UCR to the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), and that entails much more data entry. When the agency switches to NIBRS it will also start entering Part 1 offenses, which currently occurs outside of this unit. We project that this shift will cause a significant increase in workload and that current staffing

levels will not be able to meet the increased work demand. The state has mandatory deadlines to meet for performing the data entry, so there is no option to forestall the data entry. To ensure that the records unit is able to meet these demands, we recommend an increase in staffing.

Durham Crime Information Center

The crime information center consists of two units, the Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) and the Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU). The CAU is non-sworn, and has seven personnel. The CIU has four sworn personnel.

The purpose of the CAU is to provide information to operations personnel regarding crime series, patterns, and trends, in order to facilitate the effective and efficient deployment of police resources. This unit generally focuses on the what, when, where, and how of criminal activity.

The purpose of the CIU is to provide actionable intelligence to operations personnel regarding criminal organizations active in Durham, in order to prosecute crime and prevent public disorder. This unit generally focuses on who is involved in criminal activity, and why.

During our study, we learned that the City Council approved a pay structure for the crime information center that allows each employee to obtain a minimum of two hours of overtime per pay period. We do not recommend the use of overtime to maintain operational needs. Overtime should be used only when there are anomalies in normal work schedules. If there is fixed overtime in a unit, then it is essential to determine a way to streamline workloads so current staffing can keep up with demand, or increase staffing. If the overtime is a supplement for a pay disparity, we recommend adjusting pay, in lieu of paying overtime.

Forensics Services Division

The Forensic Services Division is comprised of the Crime Scene Unit (CSU), the Crime Lab Unit (CLU), and the Property and Evidence Unit (PEU).

Crime Lab Unit. The CLU is an accredited crime lab unit, which has three areas of focus, referred to as disciplines. The three areas of discipline are latent prints, firearms, and digital forensics. The CLU should have six employees plus a supervisor assigned to it, but there are only five employees; one position is vacant and a contractor currently staffs it. The digital forensics section conducts computer and video examinations, the firearms section conducts firearms, ammunition, tools and tool impressions examinations, and the latent print section examines latent prints for comparison standards and for inclusion in a database.

The following information provides an overview of the activity of the CLU for 2014:

Digital Forensics Section:

- 566 exams completed
- 6897 photographs taken
- 137 video analysis completed
- 322 cell phones analyzed
- 30 computers analyzed
- 220 videos retrieved
- 111 other types of media analyzed
- 47 field responses

Firearms Section:

- 320 cases completed
- 370 examinations completed

Latent Print Section:

- 3109 cases completed
- 4676 prints entered into databases
- 928 identifications made
- 27,000+ prints manually examined

Crime Scene Investigators. The DPD has an excellent and accredited CSU, with 17 full-time staff, including 12 crime scene investigators, 4 crime scene specialists, and a forensics supervisor. There are different teams of CSIs that work 24/7. The CSU processes serious crime scenes such as homicides, suicides, aggravated assaults, and sexual assaults. Because of the work they do, and the 24/7 nature of it, DPD should make sure the unit is fully staffed. This is important because of their vital role, and the fact that this function removes a significant burden from the patrol officers. Although we are not offering this as a recommendation, the department may wish to consider adding staff to this unit. Because of their level of expertise, CSIs typically do a much better and more thorough job with evidence collection than the patrol officers. With more thorough up-front processing of crime scene, it could also alleviate some of the follow up work that investigators often have to do on their own. Evidence personnel also provide more in-depth documentation of evidence, which can be essential in the successful prosecution of cases. Additionally, having an evidence technician process more crime scenes instead of patrol will allow officers to clear calls more quickly. This is a policy decision, but something the department may wish to consider.

Items for the DPD to consider include:

- Civilian employees do not cost as much as sworn employees.
- There is a lower equipment outlay to hire civilian employees.

- Civilian employees do not need to go through the 26-week academy.
- By increasing staffing to this unit and expanding their duties, patrol officer will have more time to handle other calls for service or be more proactive.

In 2014, CSU activity included:

- 2484 calls for service answered
- 24 community presentations given
- 449 lab requests completed

Property and Evidence Unit. The case management system that they utilize in this unit is OSSI (RMS) with a bar code reader, which reportedly works very well. The unit has four evidence technicians, one senior evidence technician, and one evidence supervisor. The unit transports items to and from the state crime lab, and is responsible for all property and evidence maintenance, including disposition of all property through retention, destruction, sale at auction, or returning it to the proper owner. Personnel work a regular workweek, but are also available for callback, if needed.

In 2014, there were over 40,000 items submitted to the PEU and almost 17,000 items were disposed. The PEU submitted over 6000 items to the state crime lab and deposited over 1.1 million dollars. The number of items in inventory is approximately 200,000

To be fully staffed the CSU should have six people, in addition to the supervisor. Digital forensic is currently short one person, although there is a contract person currently filling this vacancy. Personnel in this division is very important. Forensic Accreditation, which is different from CALEA and is more stringent, relies upon adequate staffing. There should be two people in each focus of discipline at all times. If not, the agency risks losing their accredited status. Because these units are always at the minimum staffing, the only way an employee can take off work is if the supervisor covers their position, or another employee with the same skill set covers it.

In addition, a new law will go into effect on July 1, 2016, that will affect all three disciplines. If any unit falls below the required standards, the lab will immediately fail. With only two people for each discipline, there is no backup, should a person get sick, injured, or quit. There are also other accelerated cost implications associated with the current staffing levels. The firearms unit currently has a contract employee that gets paid \$200 a case, which is not cost effective. There is also significant budgeted overtime across these three disciplines for the assigned civilians, as well. The department could eliminate much of this with an influx of personnel.

SWORN UNITS

Bike Patrol

The bike patrol unit has 21 sworn staff members. These officers operate in three teams. Bike team 10 works M-F 0800 to 1630, team 20 works 1600-0200 5 days on, 4 off, 5 on, 4 off, 5 on , 5 off, and team 30 works opposite team 20, but from 1300-2330. The bike unit has Mobile Field Force responsibilities, and the department often schedules them to work protest events, which average about three per month.

The primary responsibility of this unit is the proactive high visibility presence in the downtown core and other areas of District 5. Bike patrol officers assist patrol in call taking, conduct patrols on the city bike trails, and coordinate traffic flow of large planned events in downtown. The unit has frequent positive citizen engagement, associated with the obvious accessibility of the officers on bikes. The unit also conducts many problem-solving projects that ordinarily the patrol or district HEAT teams would handle. This unit is also responsible for providing an officer at city hall during business hours for security.

This unit is also engaged in citywide efforts to enhance pedestrian and bicycle safety. The unit conducts enforcement operations around the city on a monthly basis and at the same time conducts safety seminars for interested groups. Daily Activities can include traffic and parking enforcement, visible directed patrols, 911 calls for service, business and community engagement activities, bike trail patrols, etc.

Despite their value and popularity, there is inefficiency in the use of the bike patrol unit. Personnel assignments to bike patrol are more than 10% of the allotment of personnel to patrol. Bike patrol units handle an average of about 30 CFS per year, while patrol officers handle 700-900 on average. Although the bike patrol unit does not have primary responsibility for CFS, it is evident that they are underutilized in this regard, and they could do more.

Table 26 below, provides an overview of the types of activities that the bike patrol unit engaged in during calendar year 2015.

TABLE 26: Bike Patrol Activity - 2105

Bike Patrol Activity (Patrol Days 1,062)	Totals
Calls Answered	627
Assist Other Officers (Code 8)	1181
Street Lights Called In	26
Abandoned Vehicles Moved	2
Problem Houses Identified	1
Community Projects	57
Community Problems Solved	62
Property Checks Conducted	5358
Special Operations	102
Directed Patrols / Foot Patrols	9264
Business Contacts	7553
Citizen Contacts (no arrest/no report)	32825
Field Interview / Intel Submissions	4
Knock & Talks	2
Search Warrants Executed	1
Subpoenas Served	66
License Checks Conducted	6
Stolen Vehicles Recovered	5
Accident Investigations	17
Traffic Stops	12
Refusal To Stop	1
Parking Tickets Issued	160
Traffic Citations - Infraction Charges	8
Traffic Citations - Misdemeanor Charges	1
DWI Charge	2
Arrest Warrants/Crim. Summons Served	17
B & E Charge	1
Larceny Charge	1
Firearms Confiscated	1
On-View Misd. Charges Not Listed	4
Custodial Arrests	9
(Blank for new category 1)	112
Trail Hours	167
Total Activity	57655

Source: District 5 Command Data Worksheet

Canine

There are nine sworn positions in this unit. The canine officers work a rotating 12-hour schedule, with 1.5 hours off per day for care of the dogs. The sergeant works a modified schedule to provide as much day and night coverage as possible. This unit provides support functions to uniform patrol and other departmental units by conducting suspect tracks, article searches, narcotics searches, vehicle searches, missing person searches, etc. In addition to those functions, the unit is also available for limited calls for service and proactive patrols. These units have citywide jurisdiction. Table 27 below, outlines the activity of this unit for 2015; this unit appears appropriately staffed.

TABLE 27: Canine Activity - 2015

Canine Activity	CYTD
Canine Calls	1050
Patrol Calls	1232
Patrol Assists/Non K9	3818
Suspects Tracked	444
Victims Tracked	8
Assisting Other Agencies	88
Programs/Demonstrations Provided	77
Weapons Seized/Recovered	45
K9 Apprehensions	52
Directed Patrols	1820
Perimeter Coverage	91
Building Searches	58
Area Searches	67
Article/Evidence Searches	122
Narcotic Searches	316
Other Activity	5
Traffic Stops	164
Traffic Citations	11
Criminal Arrests	5
DWI Charges	0
Warrants/Summons	24
Warning Tickets	19
Stolen Autos Recovered	8
Burglaries Found	12
Total Activities	9536

Training	2015
Training Hours (Unit)	962.25
Training Hours (Individual)	721.53

Source: District 5 Command Data Worksheet

Traffic Services

The department divides the traffic services unit into two distinct working units, the Traffic and Crash Team (TACT), and the Motors unit. The TACT unit investigates all fatal crashes, and the most serious motor vehicle crashes that occur in the City of Durham. TACT officers are highly trained and use scientific methods and techniques in their investigations. They are available to respond to crashes on a 24-hour basis. The motor unit consists of six motorcycle officers, whose primary duty is providing funeral escorts throughout the city. Motors officers provided roughly 1,250 funeral escorts in 2015, at considerable cost. Their secondary function is that of traffic enforcement and assisting TACT with crash investigations. The primary goal of the traffic services unit is to ensure the safe and lawful movement of motor vehicles on the roadways within the City of Durham. The department engages in selective enforcement programs, designed to target high accident locations around the city and respond to citizen complaints concerning dangerous driving. Traffic services falls under the command of District 5.

The department also tasks the traffic services unit with educational initiatives involving traffic and pedestrian safety. Through NC BikeSafe, Watch for Me NC, MADD and other initiatives, the unit conducts displays and presentations to members of the community. Daily duties can consist of traffic accident investigation, traffic enforcement, and escorts. This unit also conducts 25% or more of all traffic stops conducted by officers in the DPD.

As with the bike patrol, we conclude that the current configuration of the traffic services unit is inefficient. There is a significant need for motor vehicle crash investigation and traffic enforcement within the city, and both of these efforts require additional personnel. For example, motor vehicle crashes currently consume nearly 11% of patrol officer time. In addition, the use of sworn officers for funeral escorts, while popular, is a very expensive and ineffective use of resources.

Many organizations engage non-sworn personnel for various work activities, including providing funeral escort services, and we feel DPD would benefit greatly from creating such a unit. This unit of Community Resource Officers (CROs), could provide security for city hall, conduct funeral escorts, and supplement other department needs such as staffing the Telephone Response Unit (TRU), performing routine transports, and assisting with the delivery of squad cars for vehicle maintenance. These positions can also provide a pool of ready applicants for open police officer positions within the agency. We propose adding 10 officers to this new division, and allocating four of these to the motors unit to conduct funeral escorts. We also propose moving four sworn officers out of the motors unit and into the TACT unit, to assist with managing motor vehicle crashes, and to provide additional resources for traffic enforcement.

Investigative Services Bureau/Special Operations Division (SOD)

The Special Operation Division (SOD) is comprised of the Major Crimes Unit (MCU), Organized Crime Unit (OCU), Interdiction Unit (INT), Violent Incident Response Team (VIRT), Warrant Squad, the Selective Enforcement Team (SET), and the Bio-Chemical Emergency Response Team (BCERT).

Major Crimes Unit (MCU). There are eight sworn officers assigned to this unit. These officers work a rotating schedule from Tuesday - Friday 0800-1830, or Wednesday - Saturday 1200-2200. The MCU is responsible for general narcotics enforcement in the city. They investigate citizen complaints of street-corner drug dealers and others involved in the illegal use or distribution of controlled substances. This unit targets those who sell drugs in the open street, in public establishments, out of private dwellings, out of vehicles, on or around school property, and in areas frequented by juveniles. In addition, the MCU is responsible for providing vice enforcement services designed to address unlawful vice activities by members of organized groups or associations, as well as independent or non-organized individuals, to include gambling, prostitution, the sale and distribution of obscene or pornographic material, and the illegal use and/or sale of alcoholic beverages. Specific targets of this unit are both individuals and organized groups engaged in illegal vice activities. The measures for effectiveness for this unit include cases worked, cases cleared, arrests, long term investigations, types of charges, traffic stops, citations issued, raids and search warrants, gang arrests, weapons seized, drugs seized, money spent on confidential informants, and money paid for drugs.

Organized Crime Unit (OCU). There are 14 sworn officers assigned to this unit, all of whom work a schedule that complies with their unit of assignment. The department assesses unit effectiveness against cases worked, cases cleared, long term investigations, arrests, indictments, money seizures, and drug seizures

The Organized Crime Unit (OCU) includes investigators assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Drug Unit and Violent Crimes Task Force, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Marshals task forces. Investigators assigned to these task forces utilize a variety of sophisticated techniques to target and investigate organized groups, families, and associations engaged in illegal narcotics activities, gun trafficking and complaints dealing with homeland security. Members of the OCU employ sophisticated techniques to investigate drug crimes and illegal weapons possession so that Durham residents can enjoy a crime free city.

With 14 officers assigned to it, OCU is the largest investigative section of the department. Given the staffing concerns within the department, this section appears overstaffed. We note that there are four investigators assigned to the ATF, and three assigned to the DEA. We recognize the value in these federal partnerships, but feel that there is excessive

staffing in this area. Accordingly, we recommend reallocation of three officers from this unit.

Interdiction Unit (INT)

The Interdiction Unit investigates crimes related to the transportation of illegal substances into and out of the City of Durham. The 10 investigators assigned to this unit use a variety of surveillance and patrol techniques in order to interdict persons transporting illegal narcotics along the major highways in the city as well as the train and bus terminals.

The Highway Interdiction Unit is a sub-unit within the Interdiction Unit. This is a proactive unit on the interstate enforcing laws and curbing the flow of narcotics. This unit is assessed based on cases worked, cases cleared, arrests, types of charges, traffic stops, citations issued, raids and search warrants conducted, gang arrests, weapons seized, drugs seized, money spent on confidential informants, money paid for drugs, and money seized from highway, interdiction searches

In examining the form and function of the Major Crimes Unit (MCU) and the Interdiction Unit (INT), we note strong similarities in mission.

Violent Incident Response Team (VIRT)

The Violent Incident Response Team (VIRT) responds to and follows up on violent incidents that occur in the City of Durham. Investigators assigned to this unit will enforce laws, track criminal activity, plan and implement effective criminal suppression tactics, investigate violent crimes to include narcotic and weapons violations and other quality of life issues throughout the City of Durham. This response to violent crime uses the Focused Deterrent Policing philosophy and Proactive Policing Strategies. There are seven officers in this unit. They work a rotating schedule, Tuesday – Friday 0800-1830, or Wednesday – Saturday, 1400-0200. This unit is assessed based on cases worked, cases cleared, arrests, types of charges, traffic stops, citations issued, raids and search warrants conducted, gang arrests, weapons seized, drugs seized, money spent on confidential informants, money paid for drugs, and money seized from highway, interdiction searches.

Warrant Squad

There are four officers assigned to this unit. The Warrant Squad is responsible for serving outstanding warrants throughout the City of Durham and reducing the backlog of unserved warrants that have accumulated over time. Measurements for effectiveness include the number of warrants, criminal summons, and court orders served.

Bio-Chemical Emergency Response Team (BCERT)

The Bio-Chemical Emergency Response Team will respond to all criminal Bio-Chemical emergencies within the city and will provide appropriate training to all sworn personnel. There is one fulltime person assigned to this unit.

Selective Enforcement Team (SET)

The Selective Enforcement Team is responsible for providing selective enforcement services within the City of Durham. There are 12 officers in this unit and they work Tuesday – Friday 0800-1830. This unit is comprised of officers specially trained and equipped to respond to hostage and barricaded subject situations, sniper, counter sniper, terrorist incidents, dignitary protection, drug raids, high risk arrest and search warrants, and to support other units and divisions in surveillance. The department divides this team into two tactical units, the Black Team and Blue Team. Both teams are on-call to provide services 24 hours per day. The effectiveness of this unit is assessed based on the number of search warrants served, barricaded suspects, surveillance operations, arrests, traffic stops, warrants served, and training activities

HEAT Teams (High Enforcement Abatement Team)

Districts 1, 2, 3, and 4 each have their own HEAT unit. The purpose of HEAT is to target problem areas, persons, and crime trends. District commanders utilize these teams at their discretion to target “hot spots,” as well as quality of life issues such as street-level drug sales, prostitution, and loitering. In addition, the police chief has occasionally engaged 90-day targeted initiatives, in which the HEAT units assume a primary role. The responsibilities of HEAT members are to confiscate guns, document gang members, make drug arrests, serve search warrants, conduct license checkpoints, and assist patrol officers and investigators when necessary.

In interviewing officers from various districts and specialty units about their job functions, we identified an overlap in some job functions of HEAT, with that of VIRT, SET, Major Crimes, and Drug Interdiction. The majority of the overlap is with low-level narcotics, but all of these units have some similarities in terms of enforcement efforts.

It is understandable for the agency to want to target areas where serious crimes occur or where there is a high volume of crime. Having a unit such as HEAT is an excellent way to address these issues. However, we feel that the current configuration of the HEAT units, when examined against the other specialty units, is excessive.

HEAT, VIRT, and SET

Between these three units, there are a total of six sergeants, seven corporals, and 41 other officers. Although there are some minor subtleties between the different units, much of

their mission is the same, and it appears duplicative and inefficient. We recommend merging these three units, and reconfiguring their purpose and use. We propose the creation of two HEAT teams, one North and one South. Each team would have a supervising lieutenant, and be split into two units of seven, each with a sergeant, corporal, and five officers. The SOD would supervise this unit.

The actual number of SWAT callouts is relatively low, reported at about 12 for 2014 (although SET also conducts all drug raids within the City). This unit could manage those activities, in addition to high enforcement duties. The reconfiguration of these units would result in the recapture of 19 officers, plus 2 sergeants and 3 corporals. In addition, this restructuring may result in the recapture of several take-home squad cars, which the department can return to fleet use.

Community Service Division

This division consists of the Victim Services Unit, Community Resource Unit, GREAT Unit, PAL/Explorer/COP and the Crisis Intervention Team/Project Safe Neighborhood.

The staff on the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) focus on the mental health of citizens that require police services or assistance. There is one sergeant and one corporal that do both CIT and Victim Services (VS). There is one corporal and two investigators that only work for CIT. Staff from VS mail letters to all victims of robbery, aggravated assaults, sexual assaults, and relatives of homicide victims (who often help with funeral expenses).

Civilians run Project Safe Neighborhoods, which has one gun crime analyst and one person that does outreach to community, churches, and juvenile call-ins. A juvenile call-in involves an alternative resolution process for juveniles who have committed a crime. In these cases, the juvenile appears before a group of citizens in the community for the citizens to try to address the issue and curb the juvenile's behavior, prior to the need of legal authority. There is also one additional person that works on Project Build. The civilian assigned to Project Build does not really work for the agency, but works for the county, with a focus of keeping kids out of gangs. However, the department funds this position.

SECTION IV: STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIPS

As part of our efforts, we interviewed a variety of professional stakeholders, including both professional affiliations and those from the community. We also interviewed staff with respect to various stakeholder relationships. The following represents the notable outcomes.

Durham Housing Authority (DHA)

There are 14 DHA communities throughout the City of Durham, several of which in the past provided offices for the designated patrol officers to use while on duty 24/7. These offices were, in effect, sub-stations within those communities, which allowed for one-on-one contact between the residents and the officers. The officers conducted foot patrols and became familiar with the people and the youth, which fostered good relationships and trust and deterred crime to some degree. The residents felt safer knowing there were officer(s) at the substation or patrolling somewhere in their community.

Since the department closed these offices, the communities do not see the same presence of patrol officers within the neighborhoods and housing units, and the quality of contacts with the officers has been negatively affected (citizens' report that the officers never get out of their cars and get to know the people). The result is that the trust and relationships have eroded, and based on community feedback, the biggest losers are the youth. The consistency of officers assigned to the communities contributed to the positive relationships, but now the officers are always different and the whole dynamic is less effective with youth and adults.

The DHA continues to try to address the crime problems by gathering residents in a Watch Group, that meet once a month and discuss crime, intervention and prevention. They study daily CFS reports in all 14 communities and look for trends. They know the priorities in each community and they attempt to engage with DPD to collaborate and take some action. From their perspective, DPD is not being responsive to these efforts and do not actively collaborate. The PACs are a good means for collaboration, and DPD participates, but there is a need for more public participation. Many believe this will only happen when officers are back in the communities and the relationships and public trust improves.

Throughout the course of this study, we discovered a common thread of distrust between certain segments of the community and the police department. This was most apparent with respect to the DHA communities. Accordingly, we recommend that the department re-emphasize and re-establish a specific presence in these areas by assigning officers to these duties.

Mayor, City Manager, and City Council

Several persons we interviewed, described the interactions between the mayor, city manager, and city council, with respect to the police department. Several expressed concerns over the city council being too involved in setting department policies, a sense that council members are quick to assume officers are guilty when citizens make

complaints, and that some government officials have been publicly critical of the police department.

Based on our observations and interviews, the city council has exerted a high level of oversight over the police department. This level of oversight and the associated actions by government officials, have contributed to a sense of distrust among these entities, which has also contributed to a deterioration of community confidence in the police department. Many within the police department feel unappreciated and unfairly persecuted, and this has led to significant morale issues within the agency.

The city council is the hiring authority, and they are right to exert their authority when necessary in furtherance of community needs. Those within the police department must understand and recognize this hierarchical relationship. At the same time, the city council must understand the delicate balance between exerting their authority, and the potential this creates for reducing public trust in the police department. When this occurs, the result is a less effective agency, and it paves the way for crime and criminals to flourish.

It is evident that there is a measure of animosity and distrust among and between some government officials and the police department, and that this has negatively affected numerous people, as well as the ability for the police to do their jobs effectively. We believe that improving relationships between the police department and government officials should be a priority, and that all involved should exert significant effort in working together and collaboratively, in setting policy and addressing community problems.

District Attorney (DA)

Roger Echols, elected DA since 2010, stated that one of his key goals was to improve the effectiveness of the relationship between his office and the DPD from a communication aspect, with both leadership and line level. He feels that this requires buy-in from command staff, and that building this type of a relationship remains a challenge. The DA indicated that since 2008, the police department permanently assigned an investigator to DAs office, specific to homicides. This was and continues to be a huge positive for all.

In contrast, the DA stated that there have been issues with getting necessary follow-up on cases, apathy by officers with respect to court dates, insufficient reporting that creates discovery problems later, and quality issues with reports related to a lack of detail and chain of custody issues. The DA indicated that he feels most of the officers are trying, but that there are significant operational and quality issues that remain unresolved.

SECTION V: ACCREDITATION

The Durham Police Department is an accredited agency through CALEA (The Commission for Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies). We reviewed the CALEA accreditation report from 2013, which was very complimentary. The report indicated that DPD has passed their CALEA evaluation without issues, at the Gold Standard level, which “focused on pragmatic activities, outcomes, and processes that are assessed through interview and observations,” and which look “beyond simple compliance,” and examine “effectiveness and service delivery.”⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: Eliminate District 5 and Reallocate Personnel and Resources

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

We believe that maintaining District 5 is inefficient and inconsistent with other personnel deployments within the police department. We recommend eliminating this district, and capturing the existing District 5 patrol beats within the other districts. The bike patrol would continue patrolling, but with additional and full-time patrol support in those beats. We recommend recapturing one sergeant from this action, and repurposing the two investigators assigned to District 5 to the homicide unit; see Section VIII below.

All of the specialty units currently assigned to District 5 would operate from the new headquarters, with oversight from the captain previously assigned to District 5. These units would be part of the new Special Services Division, with the captain reporting to the Northside Operations Bureau Chief.

Short Recommendation: Reorganize and Repurpose HEAT, VIRT, and SET Teams

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

These three units currently include six sergeants, seven corporals, and 41 other sworn line-level officers, totaling 54 personnel. The responsibilities of these units overlap significantly; we recommend merging them and creating a new structure. The HEAT teams would fall within the SOD bureau. All officers would operate within two HEAT teams, each with responsibility to two districts (North and South). Each HEAT team would have 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 10 officers. At the department’s discretion, each HEAT team could function as two operational units to allow for deployment during the day and night shifts. This new structure would total 30 officers.

⁹ CALEA Assessment Report – Durham (NC) Police Department 2013.

The effect of this move would be the recapture 19 officers, plus 2 sergeants, and 3 corporals (24 positions). This restructure would require two lieutenant positions to provide oversight of the HEAT units. One lieutenant position would be a promotion from sergeant, with the associated salary costs. The other lieutenant position will come from the consolidation of District 5, see below.

Short Recommendation: Improve Relationship between the Police Department and City Officials

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

The relationship between the DPD and government officials requires improvement. We expect that this will occur naturally with the hiring of a new police chief, but it is important that both sides commit to relationship and trust building. Some suggestions that the department could engage to improve perspectives include:

1. Set up a program where council members can participate in some training scenarios so they have an idea of what police officers face.
2. Establish a ride along program so council members can witness how police receive and handle calls for service.
3. Explore a similar process for officers, so they can understand community perspectives from the other side of the discussion.
4. Establish a police department workgroup to discuss issues and concerns. This group could consist of police officials, city council members, and community members. This would contribute to a greater understanding of the issues by all involved, and it would help establish relationships.

Short Recommendation: Create a Community Resources Division for Non-Sworn

Uniformed Personnel

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

We recommend that the department create a Community Resource Officer division. This is an unarmed, uniformed civilian position. There are various operational aspects that sworn officers currently handle, which non-sworn personnel could manage. These include funeral escorts, staffing of the Telephone Response Unit (TRU), courthouse transports (W-Units), security at city hall, performing standby services at motor vehicle crashes, and routing squad cars for vehicle maintenance. The department can hire these individuals at 60-70% of the cost of sworn officers, which creates a tremendous fiscal benefit. In addition to providing these services, CROs provide a ready pool of applicants for police officer positions, which will contribute to the recruitment efforts of the department.

We also recommend the following deployment of personnel for this new division:

- 4 - Motors
- 2 - City Hall Coverage
- 4 – for:
 - TRU Staffing
 - Courthouse Transports (W-Units)
 - Vehicle Maintenance
 - Standby on Crashes

Adding these personnel would also require the addition of four marked police patrol units. We would recommend striping/marketing that indicates these personnel are CROs, in order to distinguish them from sworn officers. IACP recognizes that there may be legal issues that affect how DPD can use CROs in the field. Any consideration of implementing this recommendation will require close analysis and recognition of these issues.

Short Recommendation: Repurpose Traffic Services/Motors Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

There is a significant need to provide additional resources for traffic enforcement and response to motor vehicle crashes. Due to high demand, the main responsibility of the motors unit, which comprises six officers, is funeral escorts. Utilizing these resources in this manner for non-enforcement activities is inefficient and creates a tremendous financial cost to the city. We recommend transferring four of these officers to the TACT unit, and replacing them with CRO positions (described above). The TACT unit would maintain its current role, but would also respond to motor vehicle crashes, as time permits. This will help reduce the burden of this work on the patrol division.

In this configuration, the two remaining motors officers would work collaboratively with the CROs to provide funeral escorts. CROs can also provide standby assistance on crashes, and assist with other standby activities. In the unlikely event that CROs had free time, the city could authorize them to issue parking tickets, as well.

Short Recommendation: Reduce Staffing to Organized Crime Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

This unit contains fourteen officers, which includes one sergeant. At fourteen, this unit is larger than any other investigative unit within the department is. It represents nearly 14% of the total compliment of officers assigned to the special operations and criminal investigations bureaus. We recommend reducing this unit by three officers, and repurposing those positions. The department can use these recaptured positions to staff the Public Housing Unit, see below.

Short Recommendation: Establish a Public Housing Unit**Section: III Operations****Priority (1-3): 2****Details:**

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that there are significant trust issues between those in the DHA communities and the police department. Those interviewed described the positive nature of the community/police interaction when the department had assigned officers to these areas, and we see a direct need to rebuild public trust with this segment of the community. We recommend that the department establish a public housing unit, with one sergeant and three officers. The department can redeploy the sergeant from the District 5 consolidation, and the three officers would come from the recapture of three officers from the organized crime unit (OCU). We would recommend careful selection of officers for this unit, choosing those officers who are willing to engage the community proactively, with the intent of building trust and relationships.

Short Recommendation: Improve Communication and Engagement with the District Attorney**Section: III: Operations****Priority (1-3): 2****Details:**

Based on our discussion with District Attorney Echols, it appears that there are significant quality control and operational issues, which require attention between the DAs office and the police department. We recommend the following:

1. The police chief of his or her designee should meet with DA Echols to identify the immediate action items requiring attention. An in-depth discussion of these items should occur, and the two offices should establish an action plan to correct them.
2. The police chief or his or her designee should provide clear direction and expectations that training in report writing and attention to detail is critical, and that the academy trainers, command staff, and supervisors, must prioritize this.
3. The police chief should assign a liaison to the DAs office, to meet with them on an ongoing basis to address any concerns.

Short Recommendation: Develop a Support Plan for Non-Sworn Staff**Section: III: Operations****Priority (1-3): 2****Details:**

Having a support staff that functions well is a key factor in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of a police agency. Many of these personnel have significant skills, but due to the make-up of organizations, leadership often fails to maximize these. To ensure that non-sworn staff can contribute effectively to the organization, and to aid them in their professional development and growth, the department should place an overall greater

emphasis on the input, training, and well-being and support of non-sworn members, that the department take steps to improve communication and feedback. We recommend the following steps:

1. Establish regular roundtable sessions with the various non-sworn units and solicit input on problem solving and innovative ideas to improve efficiency and delivery of customer service.
2. Establish a feedback loop to improve the overall communication between non-sworn and command, to ensure they have a voice in decision-making processes, and to help them recognize that their contributions are valued.
3. Emphasize training of non-sworn employees and establish a professional development plan specifically for non-sworn members that will prepare them for their required duties, as well as for advancement in the department. In our assessment, non-sworn staff would benefit greatly from *group dynamics* and *leadership* training.
4. Improve communications with the Crime Analysis Unit. Staff indicated that they have feedback to provide command staff, with no outlet or path that enables them to do so. Indications suggested that this feedback is focused on how they could do things better.

Short Recommendation: Increase Staffing in the Records Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

We have two recommendations in this section.

1. The records unit will experience a significant increase in workload, commensurate with the shift from UCR to NIBRS. Accordingly, we recommend adding two personnel to this unit to account for the additional workload.
2. The telephone-reporting unit (TRU) used to have four employees, but now only has one. We expect the workload of this unit to increase, due to NIBRS compliance issue, and due to our recommendations (elsewhere in this report) to encourage alternate methods of reporting. We recommend staffing this unit full-time.

Short Recommendation: Improve Effectiveness of Public Affairs Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

We have two recommendations in this section.

1. The department should encourage the PAU to exercise all opportunities to provide positive stories about the work of the DPD. The PAU can accomplish this via numerous social media outlets, and even through the mainstream media, as

relationships improve, and those in the mainstream media are more open to covering such stories. We also feel that it is incumbent upon leadership within the DPD to encourage officers to provide positive stories to the PAU, so that they can highlight these. We see this as an important aspect of improving the public image of the department, because without officer interaction, the PAU may be unaware of many opportunities to promote the good work of the agency.

2. As noted, we believe the addition of a captain between the police chief and the PAU may be an unnecessary or inefficient use of resources. We note that there may be some value in eliminating the captain position and recapturing it. Even if there is a concern that the PAU should report to another supervisor, and not directly to the police chief, we believe a deputy chief could easily serve in this capacity, saving a command staff position. Our recommendation here may not account for all of the overlapping responsibilities of the captain overseeing the PAU. Accordingly, we suggest a review of the oversight of the PAU, to include whether the department needs a captain position to provide oversight. (Note: we did not adjust our hiring recommendation numbers based on the elimination of this position).

Short Recommendation: Reduce Senior Command Staff by merging two Senior Command Staff Positions, or Revise Organizational Oversight

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Eliminate one Command Position.

Based on our review of the organizational chart and the associated responsibilities, it appears that there is an imbalance of command-level supervision with respect to the Operations Support Section Deputy Chief, and the Administrative Services Bureau Assistant Chief. We recommend merging these positions and eliminating the Assistant Chief position, or at a minimum, reviewing and revising the organizational chart to provide an appropriate balance of oversight at each level.

Short Recommendation: Examine Salary of Non-Sworn Staff and Implement a Recognition Strategy

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

We have two recommendations in this section.

Non-sworn staff are a critical element to the success of any police agency, and attrition or loss of non-sworn personnel can have a dramatic effect on operational efficiency. Accordingly, it is important that non-sworn staff members feel valued within the organization, and that leaders recognize their efforts.

1. We recommend that DPD conduct a study of the compensation and benefit packages for non-sworn staff, and if justified and reasonable, present a plan to the city to correct any deficiencies.
2. We recommend that DPD improve and emphasize the system for recognizing important contributions or accomplishments by non-sworn individuals or units. Although the department already has a recognition system in place, we feel there is a need to re-emphasize this process for supervisors at all levels, so that non-sworn personnel feel valued and recognized for their notable contributions to the department.

Short Recommendation: Examine Pay Structure of Durham Crime Information Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Staff in the Durham Crime Information Center receive overtime each pay period, due to the nature and structure of their work schedule. This appears to be a financially inefficient process. We do not recommend the use of overtime to maintain general operations, and accordingly, we suggest a review of this practice for possible revision.

Short Recommendation: Augment Staffing in the Crime Lab Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Based on Forensic Accreditation Standards, there should be a minimum of three people assigned to each discipline within the CLU. The unit currently has one supervisor and five employees (authorized for six). We recommend adding one staff member to each of the disciplines to increase the authorized totals to one supervisor and nine employees. If this unit ever fails accreditation, it will cost the city significantly more money to staff it properly and to reestablish accreditation.

Short Recommendation: Repurpose the Bike Patrol Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

It is evident that the bike patrol performs a vital role within the community, including significant citizen contact, as well as patrolling various areas, not conducive to motorized patrol efforts. We believe the unit is under-utilized in several aspects, and that revisions in practice would be helpful.

1. The use of a sworn officer to provide security at city hall is inefficient. The department can hire non-sworn uniformed personnel to perform this function at a fraction of the cost, and we recommend this (we outline this recommendation in another section).

2. Although the total activity of this unit is impressive, the number of CFS answered is minimal (627). There are many CFS that this unit could handle and manage, which would support patrol, and relieve some of their burden. Handling CFS, particularly in the primary areas of assignment, also contributes to the ambassadorial role of this unit. We recommend encouraging bike patrol units to take CFS that are within immediate proximity (3-5 minutes of biking time) of their geographical location.
3. We also note here that one of our other recommendations involves elimination of District 5, and staffing those beats with patrol officers. Accordingly, the bike patrol will not have primary responsibility for these areas. This will allow for expansion of their use to other areas of the city, on an as-needed basis.

Short Recommendation: Merge Major Crimes and Interdiction Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

The Major Crimes Unit (MCU) and Interdiction Unit (INT) have a very similar mission. Both of these units focus their efforts squarely on narcotics. We believe that merging these units would likely improve functionality, such that they would not need additional personnel.

CHAPTER IV: PATROL STAFFING AND OPERATIONS

SECTION I: DISTRICTS/BEATS AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

For functional purposes, DPD separates the city into five districts, each of which contains several sub-sections, or beats. Within each district, there are multiple beats. Districts 1 and 2 each have nine beats, Districts 3 and 4 each have eight beats and District 5 has two beats.

DPD assigns officers to each of these beats, and policy dictates that officers remain in their respective beat unless called away. Although this is the current policy, in practice, this is not the typical case. Based on our interviews and observations, and our study of the CAD data, we learned that it is more typical that officers handle calls outside of their assigned shift beat. This occurs for a variety of reasons, which we will expand upon later in this report.

Figure 4 below depicts each of the districts and beats. In Table 28, below, we provide an overview of the sworn personnel assigned to the patrol division.

FIGURE 4: District and Beat Map




TABLE 28: Authorized Patrol Sworn Staffing

	Deputy Chief	Captain	Lieutenant	Sergeant	Corporal	CPO/CRU	Admin.	Officer or Detective
Patrol Operations	4							
District 1		1	1	4	8	1	1	40
District 2		1	1	4	8	1	1	40
District 3		1	1	4	8	1	1	36
District 4		1	1	4	8	1	1	36
District 5		1	1	4	0	1	1	12
Sub-Total	5	5		20	32	5	5	164
Heat Dist. 1				1	1			8
Heat Dist. 2				1	1			5
Heat Dist. 3				1	1			6
Heat Dist. 4				1	1			8
Sub-Total	0	0		4	4	0	0	27
(Dist. 5)								
Bike Patrol				3	0			18
Traffic Services				1	2			11
K-9				1	1			7
(Dist. 4)								
COP								2
Sub-Total	0	0		5	3	0	0	38
Invest. Dist. 1				1	1			6
Invest. Dist. 2				1	1			6
Invest. Dist. 3				1	1			6
Invest. Dist. 4				1	1			6
Invest. Dist. 5				1	0			2
Sub-Total	0	0		5	4	0	0	26
Reserve Unit			1					
Court Liaison				1				
Watch Command			4					
Desk Unit								4
Sub-Total	0	5		1	0	0	0	4
TOTAL	4	5	10	35	43	5	5	259

Source: Durham PD

The patrol division has two shifts, a dayshift and a nightshift. The shifts start at 0600 and 1800 daily. Table 29 below outlines the shifts within the patrol division.

TABLE 29: Patrol Watch Shift Hours

SHIFT	BEGINS	ENDS	HOURS
Dayshift	600	1800	12
Nightshift	1800	600	12

Source: Durham PD

Based on our interviews, observations, and a review of the CAD data, the officers assigned to patrol within the districts are primarily responsible for handling calls for service. There are numerous officers assigned to patrol operations, the investigative services bureau, and the operations support bureau, who do not routinely take calls for service. This is also true for the supervisors (sergeants and above) within the patrol division.

Table 30 below shows a partial list of allocated work hours captured by CAD (we have provided a full list in a later table). We have separated these into categories that indicate patrol functions, and non-patrol functions. Arguably, some of the time allocated in the patrol category does not relate to calls for service within patrol. Similarly, some of the time within the non-patrol category may be in support of a call that patrol handled. However, without a case-by-case breakdown, we believe these allocations accurately reflect obligated patrol response and that variations within the categories would not significantly affect the categorical totals.

Work effort by patrol, corporals, patrol sergeants (and other supervisors), and K-9 and other officers, combine for 89,500 hours of obligated time. Time recorded in CAD for non-patrol functions is roughly 3,800 hours, the bulk of which (3,670 hours) relates to crime scene investigations. Based on this analysis, it is evident that patrol officers and patrol corporals are responsible for nearly all of the obligated time associated with calls for service, with sergeants and other supervisors comprising less than one fulltime person.

TABLE 30: Primary Patrol Unit and Supplemental Patrol Unit Hours

Primary Unit Category	Count of CFS Events	(Time) HH:MM:SS
Patrol	115769	76093:52:24
Corporal	14509	10663:23:07
Sergeants and Up	3776	1605:34:33
Special/Other	2230	1201:40:20
Grand Total	136284	89564:30:24
Non-Patrol Data		
TRU	1352	132:00:00
Report Only	400	3:00:00
Crime Scene Inv.	1673	3670:00:00
Total Non-Patrol	3425	3805:00:00
Grand Total	139709	93369:30:24

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

It is also worth mentioning that the time allocated in the non-patrol category is work volume, too. Accordingly, the department must allocate personnel to manage this work. However, it appears that these data are not part of the primary obligated workload of the patrol division. For that reason, we have excluded these data from workload calculations (we discuss this methodology below in detail).

SECTION II: PATROL CALL LOAD AND DISTRIBUTION

We examine workload data in several places in this report, most notably those that relate to patrol/field staffing requirements and investigations demand. We use calls for service (CFS) as a means to calculate obligated workload within the patrol division. CFS data are also critical in analyzing timeliness of police response, geographic demands for service, and scheduling and personnel allocations. For analysis purposes, we will provide numerous tables and figures that outline various aspects related to CFS.

Methodology

The project team obtained a comprehensive CAD data set for calendar year 2014 from DPD. The data set contained more than 373,000 records totaling more than 142,000 hours of work effort. This total number of hours reflected actual workload hours within CAD, but there were three primary issues inflating these numbers, specifically as they relate to obligated patrol workload. First, numerous data did not appear to represent primary response to CFS within patrol. These data belonged to various units with the department,

including investigations, the organized crime unit, major crimes unit, and administration, to name a few. The sum-total of these hours, shown in Table 30 above, was 3,805. We removed these hours from the total.

The second issue involved officer-initiated, as opposed to citizen-initiated activity. The IACP workload model relies upon a separation of these activities, and accordingly, we split these data. The total number of obligated citizen-initiated workload hours for patrol was approximately 89,564, and the number of officer-initiated workload hours was approximately 52,978.

The third issue relates to the inclusion of report writing time within the CAD data. We learned that the DPD policy directs officers to remain checked out on a call with dispatch, for the duration of the CFS; this includes the time they spend writing their reports. This issue presented two problems. First, the IACP workload model relies upon the separation of these hours from the obligated CFS time, as we reflect them in different segments of the staffing model. Second, we learned there was inconsistency in the application of this practice, meaning that some CFS data contained time associated with report writing, and some did not.

To calculate the total hours within the dataset attributed to report writing, we examined the data more closely. We found that the average cumulative time recorded for CFS involving reports (all units) was 1 hour and 22 minutes. This is significantly greater than the cumulative time associated with non-report calls, which averaged just over 26 minutes (see Table 31 below).

TABLE 31: Average Cumulative Times: Report and No-Report CFS

Incident Type	Number of Incidents	Sum of Call Duration HH:MM:SS	Avg. Per Call
Report (Accident, Arrest, Incident, Property)	31464	43319:55:57	1:22:37
Resolved w/o Report	73426	36371:54:12	0:29:43
Other	13112	4288:38:20	0:19:37
False Alarm	12048	3534:33:42	0:17:36
Assist/Backup Unit	5789	1838:06:00	0:19:03
Citation	199	132:24:19	0:39:55
Warning	114	44:16:21	0:23:18
Referred	81	25:59:40	0:19:15
Cancelled	36	6:30:01	0:10:50
Duplicate	15	2:11:52	0:08:47
*Non-Report CFS Sub-Total	104820	46244:34:27	0:26:00
Grand Total	136284	89564:30:24	0:39:26

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

*Average shown is the total average of non-report CFS from base CAD Dataset

Table 31 also shows the total number of report calls, which is 31,464, and it includes the cumulative length of time associated with those incidents, which is 43,319 hours.

After determining this number, we turned our focus to quantifying the time associated with report writing for these calls. During the course of our study, we provided officers with a worksheet to record certain workload items. One of the items recorded on the worksheet was the amount of time officers spent writing reports. We received 135 responses from officers, detailing their efforts on 390 reports. Based on these data, we determined that the average report writing time was 34 minutes (see Table 32 below).

TABLE 32: Officer Workload Survey Results - Reports

Title	Number
Number of Responses	135
Number of Written Reports	390
Average Reports per Shift	2.88
Average Minutes per Report	34

Source: Durham PD Self-Report Survey

We then turned our attention to the number of report calls that were longer in duration. Using the time associated with a non-report call (26 minutes), and doubling this amount (52 minutes) to account for the complexities associated with report CFS, we then added the self-reported report writing time of 34 minutes, for a total of 86 minutes. We found this number to be consistent with the average time on a report CFS, which totaled 86 minutes. We then searched CAD to determine the number of report CFS that recorded more cumulative time than this amount. Our search indicated that 9,954 report CFS met this standard. The cumulative total hours associated with these incidents was 25,068, or roughly 2 hours and 31 minutes per incident. We concluded that these incidents likely included a minimum amount of report writing time equivalent to the 34-minute self-reported average.

Using this number as a baseline, we multiplied 86 minutes times 9,954 reports, which resulted in a total of 5,640 hours. We concluded that this amount was a fair estimate of the minimum report writing time included in CAD. It is important to note that this number only reflects one report per CFS, and it is highly likely that the CAD data contains report-writing time from more than one officer on numerous CFS. Based on these calculations, we removed 5,640 hours from the patrol workload in CAD. Table 33 below outlines the baseline CAD hours, and the removal of the non-patrol hours.

TABLE 33: Obligated Patrol Workload

Patrol Workload Calculation	Hours
Total 2014 CAD Hours	93,369
TRU incidents with a report	-98
TRU incidents without a report	-34
RPTO - Report Only	-3
Not Assigned (no duration)	0
Crime Scene Investigation	-3,670
Removal of Report Writing Time	-5,640
Adjusted patrol workload, excluding reports	83,924

We will discuss workload to staffing ratios later in this report, but the above information provides a brief description of the methodology used to arrive at the obligated workload total.

SECTION III: CALLS FOR SERVICE (CFS) ANALYSIS

Figure 5 below provides an overview of the total CFS for DPD from 2010 through 2014, including officer-initiated activity.

FIGURE 5: Service and Proactive/Officer-Initiated CFS 2010-2014



As Figure 5 above shows, CFS volume increased between 2010 and 2012, for both citizen-initiated activity (5.8%) and officer-initiated activity (7%). However, citizen-initiated CFS declined in 2014 by 8.13% from the peak in 2012, and officer-initiated CFS declined 7.5% in 2014, as opposed to the peak in 2013.

Table 34 below, reflects the most frequent officer-initiated activities, and Table 35 depicts the amount of time spent on various officer-initiated activities.

TABLE 34: Most Frequent Officer-Initiated Activity

Event Type	Count of Events	% of Total
DIRECTED PATROL	82202	57.6%
VEHICLE STOP	23202	16.2%
FOLLOW UP	7480	5.2%
ASSIST PERSON	2758	1.9%
WARRANT OR SUBPOENA SERVICE	2618	1.8%
PROPERTY CHECK	2617	1.8%
WANTED PERSON	2141	1.5%
KNOCK AND TALK	1996	1.4%
PARKING VIOLATION	1,930	1.4%
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	1,234	0.9%
Grand Total	142812	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

TABLE 35: Time Spent on Officer-Initiated Activity

Event Type	Sum of On Call Time	% of Total
DIRECTED PATROL	24309:27:23	45.89%
VEHICLE STOP	4899:53:58	9.25%
FOLLOW UP	4247:14:47	8.02%
WANTED PERSON	2398:49:44	4.53%
DRUGS	2086:22:46	3.94%
PROPERTY CHECK	1075:20:11	2.03%
ASSIST PERSON	1059:22:04	2.00%
ASSIST OTHER AGENCY	1016:28:36	1.92%
WARRANT OR SUBPOENA SERVICE	957:56:17	1.81%
INTOXICATED DRIVER	902:56:59	1.70%
Grand Total	52978:47:28	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Tables 34 and 35 show that the most frequent officer-initiated activity is directed patrol, with more than 82,000 events recorded in 2014. The amount of time exhausted in these directed patrols was approximately 24,300 hours. Notably, traffic stops, which are second

in frequency and time spent, comprise only 9.25% of the officer's time engaged in discretionary activities. Additionally, vehicle stops account for only about 20% of the time officers spend conducting directed patrols.

In addition to looking at the CFS totals for officer-initiated and citizen-initiated CFS, we examined these based on type, frequency, and distribution. For analytical purposes, we grouped CFS into three categories:

- Crime – calls related to criminal activity
- Service – calls of a non-criminal nature, e.g., providing assistance, directed patrols
- Traffic – calls related to vehicle crashes, reckless driving, and other traffic infractions

We have provided the breakdown of these totals in Tables 36 and 37 below. The tables below summarize the frequency of CFS within these categories, as well as the time spent responding to them. Again, these data reflect the CFS totals after removing non-patrol responses.

TABLE 36: Citizen Call Volume and Duration by Category

Call Category	Count of Calls	% of Total Calls	Sum of Time Spent (H:M:S)	% of Total Time Spent
Crime	95,561	70.12%	63566:56:36	70.97%
Service	25,037	18.37%	12926:27:04	14.43%
Traffic	15,685	11.51%	13071:06:44	14.59%
Grand Total	136,283	100.00%	89564:30:24	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

TABLE 37: Officer-Initiated Call Volume and Duration by Category

Call Category	Count of Calls	% of Total Calls	Sum of Time Spent (H:M:S)	% of Total Time Spent
Crime	13,815	9.67%	11698:41:08	22.08%
Service	100,372	70.28%	34352:41:16	64.84%
Traffic	28,625	20.04%	6927:25:04	13.08%
Grand Total	142,812	100.00%	52978:47:28	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Table 38 below also breaks down the CFS for DPD in roughly 50 categories. This includes both criminal and non-criminal incidents.

TABLE 38: Agency CFS Totals

Call Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	% Change 2013-2014
Abandoned Auto	1,312	1,161	1,075	1,055	1,101	4.36%
Abduction/Kidnapping	33	30	19	53	77	45.28%
Accident	10,237	10,273	10,753	10,836	11,107	2.50%
Alarm	19,602	19,035	19,306	19,493	19,881	1.99%
Ambulance/Fire	3,038	3,520	4,029	3,964	4,146	4.59%
Animal Case	253	309	255	192	928	383.33%
Assault	1,060	1,171	1,141	1,202	1,011	-15.89%
Assist Other Agency	1,054	1,154	1,201	1,278	1,261	-1.33%
Auto Theft	173	130	113	102	77	-24.51%
Auto Theft Recovery	350	273	318	399	320	-19.80%
Bomb Threat	8	13	9	15	5	-66.67%
Burglary	7,373	6,694	5,683	4,500	3,927	-12.73%
Child Abuse/Neglect	406	415	357	337	187	-44.51%
Citizen Assist	15,266	14,733	15,974	14,877	12,898	-13.30%
Disorderly/Disturbance	14,600	14,229	14,523	13,365	12,765	-4.49%
Domestic Trouble	5,025	4,958	4,366	4,312	4,031	-6.52%
Driving Impaired	632	536	557	488	597	22.34%
Drugs	3,337	3,077	3,528	3,219	2,783	-13.54%
Drunk\Alcohol\Liquor Violation	1,260	1,228	1,116	1,108	1,063	-4.06%
E911 Hang-up Calls	9,333	11,784	17,348	8,288	4,164	-49.76%
Escort	984	1,007	1,029	1,021	1,009	-1.18%
Fight	722	811	694	524	400	-23.66%
Fraud	1,930	2,008	2,105	2,059	2,378	15.49%
Harassment	673	627	607	669	567	-15.25%
Hit and Run	2,031	2,093	2,053	2,192	2,225	1.51%
Homicide	23	27	21	27	22	-18.52%
Indecent	193	218	221	215	205	-4.65%
Larceny	6,797	6,770	6,488	7,865	7,789	-0.97%
Mental Health/Suicidal	1,978	2,232	2,177	2,172	2,416	11.23%
Missing Person/Runaway	1,316	1,329	1,198	1,235	1,063	-13.93%
Noise Complaint	4,964	5,111	5,206	4,488	4,000	-10.87%
Other	2,276	2,554	3,356	5,839	6,403	9.66%
Panhandling/Solicitation	895	970	1,199	1,272	1,016	-20.13%
Parking	2,088	2,283	2,610	2,969	2,989	0.67%
Property Lost / Found	1,373	1,276	1,444	1,456	1,556	6.87%
Prostitution	299	238	248	239	223	-6.69%
Prowler	138	59	32	21	0	-100.00%
Robbery	727	759	645	670	657	-1.94%

TABLE 38 (continued): Agency CFS Totals

Call Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	% Change 2013-2014
Sex Offense	125	155	188	159	265	66.67%
Shoplifter	1,186	1,294	115	1,143	1,095	-4.20%
Sound of Shots	1,769	1,938	1,857	1,673	1,924	15.00%
Suspicious Event	12,435	12,236	12,728	13,313	12,445	-6.52%
Threats	834	811	828	809	849	4.94%
Traffic Hazard	0	0	0	266	3,313	1145.49%
Traffic Problem	288	295	300	250	348	39.20%
Trespass	2,008	1,925	1,792	2,085	2,486	19.23%
Trouble Unknown	3,843	3,981	4,370	5,186	2,416	-53.41%
Vandalism	3,017	2,933	2,624	2,469	2,586	4.74%
Weapon	88	162	215	197	196	-0.51%
Sub-Total	149,352	150,825	158,021	151,566	145,170	-4.22%

Attempt to Locate	13,817	13,196	12,704	12,972	9,485	-26.88%
Crime Scene Investigation	3,102	3,005	1,920	1,694	1,572	-7.20%
Direct Traffic	327	237	255	233	326	39.91%
Directed Patrol	56,982	57,587	70,793	83,580	82,195	-1.66%
Flag Downs	332	318	376	411	425	3.41%
Follow-Up	7,875	9,270	11,470	11,880	10,890	-8.33%
Foot Patrol	0	0	0	0	1,094	0.00%
Knock and Talk	1,025	988	1,542	2,184	2,006	-8.15%
Property Check	2,269	2,004	2,988	3,422	3,002	-12.27%
Raid	134	139	145	118	110	-6.78%
Traffic Stops	35,629	29,511	26,075	30,532	23,438	-23.23%
Wanted Person	3,116	3,877	3,762	3,544	3,287	-7.25%
Warrant or Subpoena Service	3,924	4,713	5,497	3,362	3,274	-2.62%
Welfare Check	0	0	0	125	1,400	1020.00%
Sub-Total	128,532	124,845	137,527	154,057	142,504	-7.50%
Totals	277,884	275,670	295,548	305,623	287,674	-5.87%

Source: Durham PD

*We consolidated some of the data provided into similar categories for this table.

Most of the individual CFS categories have not changed significantly over the five-year period. Notable exceptions include child abuse/neglect, burglary, drug offenses, and fights, all of which show significant decreases. Other areas have gone up over the past five years, including animal cases, abduction/kidnapping, sexual offenses, and mental health cases, which are up more than 22% since 2010. Generally, the totals for CFS remain similar over the five-year period. In essence, as some categories of workload have increased, others have decreased, presenting a similar total of CFS.

The vast majority of the department's efforts are dedicated to citizen-initiated CFS involving crime and crime-related activities. This suggests that a significant amount of an officer's time involves these types of CFS, which also include additional workload such as report writing and the collection of evidence. Taken as a percentage of the citizen-initiated work volume, service and traffic volumes are small. However, both of these categories account for more than 13,000 hours of work effort.

In table 39 below, we list the most frequent activities for the DPD, including the catchall category of *other*.

TABLE 39: Agency Most Frequent Activities – Citizen-Initiated

Call Type	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2014 % of Total CFS
Alarm	19,602	19,035	19,306	19,493	19,881	13.69%
Citizen Assist	15,266	14,733	15,974	14,877	12,898	8.88%
Disorderly/Disturbance	14,600	14,229	14,523	13,365	12,765	8.79%
Suspicious Event	12,435	12,236	12,728	13,313	12,445	8.57%
Accident	10,237	10,273	10,753	10,836	11,107	7.65%
Larceny	6,797	6,770	6,488	7,865	7,789	5.37%
Other	2,276	2,554	3,356	5,839	6,403	4.41%
E911 Hang-up Calls	9,333	11,784	17,348	8,288	4,164	2.87%
Ambulance/Fire	3,038	3,520	4,029	3,964	4,146	2.86%
Domestic Trouble	5,025	4,958	4,366	4,312	4,031	2.78%
Noise Complaint	4,964	5,111	5,206	4,488	4,000	2.76%
Burglary	7,373	6,694	5,683	4,500	3,927	2.71%
Traffic Hazard	0	0	0	266	3,313	2.28%
Parking	2,088	2,283	2,610	2,969	2,989	2.06%
Drugs	3,337	3,077	3,528	3,219	2,783	1.92%
Vandalism	3,017	2,933	2,624	2,469	2,586	1.78%
Trespass	2,008	1,925	1,792	2,085	2,486	1.71%
Mental Health/Suicidal	1,978	2,232	2,177	2,172	2,416	1.66%
Trouble Unknown	3,843	3,981	4,370	5,186	2,416	1.66%
Fraud	1,930	2,008	2,105	2,059	2,378	1.64%
Hit and Run	2,031	2,093	2,053	2,192	2,225	1.53%
Sound of Shots	1,769	1,938	1,857	1,673	1,924	1.33%
Property Lost / Found	1,373	1,276	1,444	1,456	1,556	1.07%
Sub-Totals	134,320	135,643	144,320	136,886	130,628	89.98%
CFS Grand Totals (See Table D-10)	149,352	150,825	158,021	151,566	145,170	

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

These 23 categories account for 89.98% of the department's activity. What is remarkable is that motor vehicle crashes and alarms combined, account for 30,988 incidents, which translates into nearly 21.34% of the department's CFS activity. Table 39 lists all CFS types that comprise at least 1% of the total citizen-initiated volume for the DPD. The top six CFS make up roughly 53% of all activity.

In Table 40 below, we have provided a breakdown of the five most frequent citizen-initiated CFS within each of the categories.

TABLE 40: Agency Most Frequent Activities – Citizen-Initiated

	Count of Calls	% of Total
Crime		
ALARM	18,441	13.53%
DISTURBANCE	11,475	8.42%
LARCENY	4,997	3.67%
HANG UP	3,778	2.77%
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	3,645	2.67%
Service		
ASSIST PERSON	8,998	6.60%
NOISE COMPLAINT	3,938	2.89%
ASSIST EMS	3121	2.29%
FOLLOW UP	3120	2.29%
WELFARE CHECK	1355	0.99%
Traffic		
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT	8505	6.24%
TRAFFIC HAZARD	2532	1.86%
MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISION FIRE	1,306	0.96%
PARKING VIOLATION	1059	0.78%
ABANDONED VEHICLE	818	0.60%
Grand Total	136284	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

These numbers, which we display in Table 41 below, change slightly, compared to Table 40, when we examine which CFS require the most time. CFS of particular interest include alarms and motor vehicle crashes. Put into perspective, alarms, which account for 4,500 hours of work effort, effectively absorb all of the available obligated work hours for roughly 10 patrol officers, while motor vehicle crashes absorb the available work volume of nearly 16 officers. Taken in sum, these two categories are consuming the available workload for 26 patrol officers, which is more than 13% of the patrol division.

TABLE 41: Top Five Calls by Category – Citizen-Initiated; Time Spent

	Total Time Spent	% of Total
Crime		
DISTURBANCE	5320:01:28	5.94%
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	4891:07:15	5.46%
LARCENY	4842:37:01	5.41%
BREAK IN	4724:40:28	5.28%
ALARM	4491:40:50	5.02%
Service		
ASSIST PERSON	4798:08:19	5.36%
FOLLOW UP	1843:49:54	2.06%
NOISE COMPLAINT	1474:53:19	1.65%
ASSIST EMS	1256:07:49	1.40%
OFFICER STAND BY	738:06:19	0.82%
Traffic		
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT	7794:23:47	8.70%
MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISION FIRE	1938:29:33	2.16%
TRAFFIC HAZARD	1160:39:21	1.30%
PARKING VIOLATION	512:54:27	0.57%
ABANDONED VEHICLE	458:00:58	0.51%
Grand Total	89564:30:24	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

In Table 42 below, we provide a list of the most frequent officer-initiated activities. Three officer-initiated activities comprise most of the effort, directed patrols, vehicle stops, and follow-up. These three activities combine for 112,884 of the 142,812 events recorded, or about 79% of the volume.

TABLE 42: Agency Most Frequent Activities – Officer-Initiated

	Count of Calls	% of Total
Crime		
WARRANT OR SUBPOENA SERVICE	2,618	1.83%
WANTED PERSON	2,141	1.50%
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	1,234	0.86%
SUSPICIOUS VEHICLE	1,224	0.86%
DRUGS	1,085	0.76%
Service		
DIRECTED PATROL	82,202	57.56%
FOLLOW UP	7,480	5.24%
ASSIST PERSON	2758	1.93%
PROPERTY CHECK	2617	1.83%
KNOCK AND TALK	1996	1.40%
Traffic		
VEHICLE STOP	23202	16.25%
PARKING VIOLATION	1930	1.35%
LICENSE CHECK	1,192	0.83%
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT	863	0.60%
SCHOOL CROSSING	386	0.27%
Grand Total	142812	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

In Table 43 below, we provide the top five officer-initiated activities, along with the time associated for each activity area. As expected, directed patrols, vehicle stops, and follow-up, were the most common. These three activities accounted for 33,455 hours of officer time, or about 63% of the officer-initiated activity.


TABLE 43: Top Five Calls by Category – Officer-Initiated; Time Spent

	Total Time Spent	% of Total
Crime		
WANTED PERSON	2398:49:44	4.53%
DRUGS	2086:22:46	3.94%
WARRANT OR SUBPOENA SERVICE	957:56:17	1.81%
INTOXICATED DRIVER	902:56:59	1.70%
RAID	492:30:00	0.93%
Service		
DIRECTED PATROL	24309:27:23	45.89%
FOLLOW UP	4247:14:47	8.02%
PROPERTY CHECK	1075:20:11	2.03%
ASSIST PERSON	1059:22:04	2.00%
ASSIST OTHER AGENCY	1016:28:36	1.92%
Traffic		
VEHICLE STOP	4899:53:58	9.25%
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT	876:08:03	1.65%
LICENSE CHECK	322:56:47	0.61%
SCHOOL CROSSING	219:56:00	0.42%
PARKING VIOLATION	158:19:18	0.30%
Grand Total	52978:47:28	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

We also analyzed CFS distribution from several perspectives, including time of day, day of the week, and by district and beat. Figure 6 below shows the overall CFS distribution within DPD across the entire department. Figure 6 also shows both citizen-initiated and officer-initiated volume.


FIGURE 6: Citizen vs. Officer Activity by Day of Week



The distribution of CFS across days of the week is typical, and mirrors other police agencies. The lowest CFS day is Sunday, which is normal. Agencies typically have higher volumes on Friday and Saturday, but for DPD, the distribution of CFS is fairly even, except for Sunday. In looking at Figure 6 above, we note that officer-initiated activity is at a similar volume to citizen-initiated activity, each day of the week.

Figure 7 below shows the distribution of CFS by time of day across the city. Like the daily distribution, this hourly distribution is typical for law enforcement agencies. This figure shows significant increases in CFS starting at about 7:00 AM and climbing throughout the day. CFS demands increase dramatically in the late afternoon. CFS volume peaks at about 5:00 PM. Call volumes at this time of the day are more than double the CFS volumes at 7:00 AM.

FIGURE 7: Citizen vs. Officer Activity by Time of Day



The distribution of CFS by hour of the day is an important analysis point, because it provides an understanding of how call volume relates to shift coverage and personnel allocations. As identified in Table 29, the patrol dayshifts start at 6:00 AM, and patrol overnight shifts start at 6:00 PM. There are no overlaps between the shifts.

In looking at Figure 7 above, hourly CFS, decline significantly by midnight, dipping to 4,350. Between 1:00 AM and 6:00 AM, CFS totals average 2,480. The 7:00 AM CFS total is 4,074, which is similar to the total at midnight, and CFS per hour climb steadily from there. Hourly CFS totals reach 7,000 by noon, and remain over 7,000 per hour until 9:00 PM.

To determine the extent to which personnel allocations in the department respond to service demands, we began by looking at the distribution of personnel within patrol, against these totals. In Table 44 below, we show the assignments of patrol personnel by

shift and by district. Each of the squads rotates between dayshift and nightshift, and each has an equal distribution of personnel. Based on this analysis, there is not a proper distribution of personnel by shift, based on demand. These distributions are equal, but they do not overlap or otherwise account for peak CFS volumes, or low activity periods.

TABLE 44: Patrol Allocations by District

	District 1	District 2	District 3	District 4	District 5	Totals
Squad A	12	12	11	11	3	49
Squad B	12	12	11	11	3	49
Squad C	12	12	11	11	3	49
Squad D	12	12	11	11	3	49
Totals	48	48	44	44	12	196
Pct. of Officers	24.49%	24.49%	22.45%	22.45%	6.12%	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

*Excludes sergeants and above.

In addition to examining personnel allocations by shift and hour, we also examined the distribution of personnel based on the needs within each district. To make this determination, we first calculated the percentage of patrol personnel assigned to each district, which we outline in Table 44 above. We then looked at the distribution of citizen-initiated CFS by sector; we have provided these totals in Table 45 below.

TABLE 45: Total Count of CFS by District; Citizen-Initiated

District	CFS Number	Pct. of CFS	Pct. of Personnel
D1	27,645	20.28%	24.49%
D2	34,194	25.09%	24.49%
D3	30,872	22.65%	22.45%
D4	33,497	24.58%	22.45%
D5	9,759	7.16%	6.12%
DSO	12	0.01%	N/A
Unknown	305	0.22%	N/A
Grand Total	136,284	100.00%	

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Based on these calculations, the distribution of personnel by district appears appropriate. Each of the primary districts has between 22-24% of the personnel allocated to it, and the percentage of CFS for each of the districts is within an acceptable range. District 5, which is much smaller, has a very similar allocation of personnel (6%) in relation to the CFS demands (7%).

For reference, we have also included a breakdown of the officer-initiated activity by district, shown below in Table 46.


TABLE 46: Total Count of CFS by District; Officer-Initiated

District	CFS Number	Pct. of CFS
D1	28,672	20.08%
D2	28,131	19.70%
D3	30,101	21.08%
D4	32,987	23.10%
D5	17,689	12.39%
DSO	74	0.05%
Unknown	5,158	3.61%
Grand Total	142,812	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Figure 8 below shows the combined activity by district. Again, this figure shows a similar CFS volume and level of officer-initiated activity within each district.


FIGURE 8: All CFS Activity by District



Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data


Although these personnel allocations seem appropriate from a proportional perspective, they do not account for variances within the beats within each of the sectors. In addition, they do not demonstrate the capability of each district to manage workload demand in the most effective and efficient manner. Figures 9-13 below show the distribution of CFS by district, broken down by the different beats within each district.

FIGURE 9: Citizen CFS Activity by Beat - District 1




Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

FIGURE 10: Citizen CFS Activity by Beat - District 2




Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

FIGURE 11: Citizen CFS Activity by Beat - District 3




Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

FIGURE 12: Citizen CFS Activity by Beat - District 4



Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

FIGURE 13: Citizen CFS Activity by Beat - District 5



Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

In looking at Figures 9-13 above, it is evident that CFS distribution within the beats, within each district, is unequal. In Table 47 below, we provide a breakdown of the total CFS per district, and the average CFS per beat. This table also includes the low and high beat CFS totals for each district.

The average number of CFS by beat is 3,959, and this number is consistent with other communities we have studied. However, there are some beats that are significantly lower than this amount (492 in District 2), and others that are much higher (6,657 in District 2). These types of variances suggest one of two approaches. Either the department should redesign the beats so that the CFS totals are more balanced, or the distribution of personnel should change. In other words, it would not make sense to schedule one officer to handle beat 225 in District 2, with 492 annual CFS, and one officer in beat 223 in District 2, with 6,657 CFS.

TABLE 47: Average/Low/High Count of CFS by Beat

District	# of Beats	Total CFS	Average	Low	High
1	9	27,645	3,072	1,376	4,271
2	9	34,194	3,799	492	6,657
3	8	30,872	3,859	2,655	5,891
4	8	33,497	4,187	2,393	5,427
5	2	9,759	4,880	3,448	6,311

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Beat structures provide police agencies with a means to track activity in geographical sections, and they provide an understanding of how to deploy personnel. The current system at DPD does not appear to utilize these data for deployment of personnel.

From a community-policing perspective, using a beat system contributes to continuity of personnel within a geographical area. This provides officers with an opportunity to learn the intimate details of their patrol area, including any significant issues or problems. In addition, because of their ongoing presence, officers tend to encounter the same individuals with regularity, adding to their familiarity with those in the area. This improves the officer's ability to recognize criminal activity, and it contributes to relationship building.

The current beat structure at DPD is not in use as intended. Further, distribution of personnel within the districts and beats does not intentionally respond to demands, based on CFS needs. Part of the issue with using the beat structure as currently designed, involves the availability of personnel, or the lack thereof. When the number of personnel assigned to a district within a given shift is at the minimal staffing level (or below), officers will routinely need to respond to another beat, to ensure they meet service demands from the public.

We looked this phenomenon in our study, to determine the frequency in which officers respond to CFS within their assigned beat. We provide these data in Table 48 below. Based on our analysis, we found that officers respond to CFS within their assigned beat only 34% of the time. This table provides significant insight into several issues, including staffing, CFS response times, and community policing efforts.

It is our assessment that these numbers reflect a lack of proper staffing overall and ineffective staffing within the beats, and/or improper beat structure (with respect to balancing call load). It is also important to understand that the current personnel deployments and staff shortages are compounding the problem.

TABLE 48: Total Response Time In vs. Out of Beat

	Incidents	Total Time Dispatch to Arrival	% of Total CFS In vs. Out of Beat	Avg. Response Time
In Beat	39417	6739:17:09	34%	0:10:16
Out Beat	75568	13066:39:25	66%	0:10:22
Grand Total	*114985	19805:56:34	100%	

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

*The number of incidents reported here (114,985) is different from what appears in other areas of this report, because for this analysis, we only considered primary patrol units, specifically, those assigned to a beat.

The average response time, both in beat, and out of beat, is roughly 10 minutes. This is irrespective of the type of CFS. Taken as an average; this is a relatively high number. What is more important to consider is why it is this high, and how this contributes to staffing issues. CAD data will capture travel time from the point of dispatch, to the time the officer arrives on the scene. What it will not do (without intentionally collecting this information) is capture the amount of time that it takes officers to return to their beat after leaving it to take a call. *Return time*, which is the time it takes to get back to an assigned beat, is essentially lost time. Theoretically, if it takes an officer five minutes to respond from one beat to another, it will take another five minutes to get back.

When officers must respond out of beat most of the time, three things happen. First, when an officer leaves his or her beat to take a CFS, and another CFS occurs in the original beat, another officer must leave his or her beat to take it. This creates a cascading effect, which ultimately affects multiple officers/beats. Second, because of return time, 66% of the CFS for DPD also include lost time; this is significant. Third, this process elongates overall response times, because officers often respond to a CFS in their assigned beat, from another beat.

We feel it is vitally important for DPD to utilize and maintain a beat structure. This is important from a staffing, availability, and response time perspective, but also with respect to community policy. To ensure proper beat staffing and integrity, we recommend that DPD adjust the districts and beat areas. As we have already recommended, we suggest the elimination of District 5. The department would then absorb the District 5 beats. We recommend using a four-district structure, with seven beats in each. This represents a reduction from 36 to 28 beats.

Reducing the number of beats in each of the districts would serve three primary purposes. First, it would allow for the assignment of multiple personnel to each beat

(especially with additional patrol resources). This would help ensure that the same officers are patrolling the same area with some regularity, contributing to officer effectiveness and community policing objectives. It will also contribute to the AVL system, locating officers within their designated area at the time of a serious CFS. Second, it would allow the department to restructure the beats in a way that balances CFS demands against the resources available. This will help to balance personnel deployments across the districts and beats. Third, with personnel deployed appropriately within these geographic areas, response times will reduce. Navigating traffic within the city is difficult, even with emergency lights and siren, and locating officers within specified geographic areas will reduce travel time to CFS.

We will discuss staffing totals and allocations later in this section, but our recommendation for beat alignment and restructuring uses the following model:

Beat/District Deployments

- Reduce beats to 28, which include seven per district, eliminating District 5
 - Total CFS = 136,000
 - Divided by 4 districts = 34,000 CFS for each district
 - Divided by 7 beats each = 4,857 CFS/beat annually
 - Divided by 365 days = 13.3 CFS/beat daily.
- 7 officers each district per shift $28 \times 2 = 56$
- 4 power shifts (daily – each district) = 16
- 2 Corporals per district per shift $8 \times 2 = 16$
- Total = 88 Shifts/Day

Determining the number of beats should not be arbitrary. The department should base these on CFS demands and the resources available. The current allocation of personnel to patrol is insufficient to distribute officers into the beats within the districts as proposed. However, if the department adds personnel to patrol (as recommended), restructuring of the beats as outlined could occur.

Our recommendation here is but one possibility for balancing CFS demands against available resources. In any case, we recommend that the department balance the CFS demands within the beat boundaries, and then deploy personnel accordingly, regardless of whether the department adopts our proposed model.

Like most police departments, DPD call takers prioritize calls based on the criticality of the call, in accordance with department policy and procedures. We received three sets of different and conflicting information with regard to CFS priorities. During interviews, staff informed us that DPD uses four priorities for CFS:

- Priority 1 – Immediately dispatched

- Priority 2 – Dispatched within 2 minutes
- Priority 3 – Dispatched within 10 minutes
- Priority 4 – Dispatched within 30 minutes

DPD General Order 4001 R-1 describes Response Priorities for CFS. Within this policy, there are three priorities. This include Priority 1 – Red, Priority 2 – Yellow, and Priority 3 – Green.

Within the CAD data, we found 10 different CFS priorities, ranging from P, to categories 1-9. From these data, it appears that P and Category 1 CFS relate to Priority 1 CFS, while Categories 2-4 relate to Priorities 2-4. We attempted to clarify these data, but were unable to refine these categories further.

Table 49 below shows the number of CFS in each of the four categories. Although there are 10 categories of CFS (and a blank category), nearly all fall into Category P or Categories 1-4. As Table 49 shows, priority calls (P CFS) make up about 6% of all CFS. The second tier of CFS, Categories 1, 2, and 3, comprise roughly 60% of the total volume.

TABLE 49: Calls by Priority

Call Priority	Count of Calls	% of Totals
P	7,977	5.85%
1	7,412	5.44%
2	44,812	32.88%
3	29,477	21.63%
4	42,969	31.53%
5	544	0.40%
6	62	0.05%
7	6	0.00%
8	5	0.00%
9	2,921	2.14%
(blank)	99	0.07%
Grand Total	136,284	100.00%

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Table 50 below shows the average response times to each of the call priorities, separated by district, and shown overall for the department.

TABLE 50: Response Time by Priority – Call Receipt to Call Arrival by District

Call Priority	Unknown District	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	DSO	Grand Total
P	0:08:57	0:06:44	0:07:32	0:08:34	0:07:45	0:06:19	0:05:40	0:07:33
1	0:11:59	0:10:29	0:11:55	0:12:11	0:12:08	0:08:20		0:11:30
2	0:11:41	0:10:43	0:13:01	0:14:11	0:13:10	0:09:45	0:05:35	0:12:37
3	0:24:15	0:16:56	0:20:57	0:21:33	0:21:31	0:16:48	0:17:17	0:20:12
4	0:12:31	0:22:02	0:28:17	0:26:31	0:27:08	0:24:52	0:14:23	0:26:01
5	0:00:45	0:17:41	0:22:06	0:28:54	0:20:58	0:17:33	0:06:21	0:21:27
6	0:05:14	0:18:47	0:18:06	0:29:59	0:38:20	0:59:39		0:29:38
7		0:11:30		0:38:01	0:15:39			0:18:00
8		0:10:38	0:14:48		3:29:59	0:12:46		0:52:36
9	0:25:29	0:29:27	0:37:26	0:29:39	0:33:09	0:29:43	0:00:57	0:32:02
Unknown	0:25:19	0:15:47	0:15:00	0:17:51	0:18:44	0:11:08	0:18:56	0:17:47
Grand Total	0:15:41	0:15:36	0:19:48	0:19:50	0:19:13	0:17:30	0:09:07	0:18:38

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

It is important to understand that calculating response times can occur in two different manners. Table 50 above, and all of the associated response-time tables in this report, calculate response time from the point dispatch received the call, to the time the first officer arrived on the scene. This represents the actual time from the point the citizen placed the call, to the time the first officer arrived. However, when conducting a *workload analysis*, we calculate obligated workload time from the point the officer received the call, to the time the officer finishes the call.

When departments calculate response times, they generally do so considering the first assigned time, to the time the first officer arrived on the scene. Departments use this metric, because this aspect of response time is the one over which they have the most control. The department-established response policies remove the lag time between the time a dispatcher received the phone call, and the time the dispatcher assigned that call to an officer. In short, when the department considers response time to CFS, they ignore the time it takes for the dispatcher to collect and dispatch the CFS. From the perspective of the department, this is an accurate measure. However, from the citizen's perspective, response time includes the point in which they actually placed the call, until an officer arrives or handles their request.

In Table 51 below, we provide a breakdown of the average CFS response times, reporting the response time averages with the inclusion and exclusion of dispatch lag time.

TABLE 51: Total Average Response Time by Priority

Call Priority	Avg. Call Time to First Arrive	Avg. First Dispatched to First Arrive
P	0:07:33	0:05:46
1	0:11:30	0:08:34
2	0:12:37	0:08:41
3	0:20:12	0:13:07
4	0:26:01	0:14:33
5	0:21:27	0:08:57
6	0:29:38	0:15:54
7	0:18:00	0:08:11
8	0:52:36	0:45:38
9	0:32:02	0:09:52
Unknown	0:17:47	0:10:21
Grand Total	0:18:38	0:11:25

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Again, in our analysis and representation of these data, we examine call for service response times inclusive of the time between the initial call, and the time dispatch assigned it to an officer. Although both perspectives have value, we provide our analysis here using the full response time from point of call receipt, until the arrival of the first officer. For this reason, our response times may vary from response times reported elsewhere from the agency.

Overall, for CFS categorized as a priority, the department appears to be meeting objectives. Average response times are about 7.5 minutes, including lag time in dispatch. However, for immediate CFS, the department is averaging about 11-12 minutes for response. As noted previously, we attribute much of this response time to lack of staffing, and unbalanced personnel deployments.

The average response time for priority CFS among the benchmark cities, from point of dispatch to first officer arrival, is 5.36 minutes.¹⁰ The DPD response time for priority CFS from first dispatched to first arrived, as depicted in Table 51, is 5 minutes and 46 seconds, which is consistent with the benchmark averages. This number may vary slightly from other internal calculations, due to our methodology, and the manner in which we refined the data in CAD, from which we made these determinations.

To understand response times better, we also looked at response times by district and beat, by category, and by hour of the day. There are numerous figures associated with this analysis, which for space purposes we have included in Appendix A; see Figures A-1 through A-15. We summarize a few of the notable observations below:

¹⁰ <http://www.opkansas.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/benchmark-city-survey-section-b-general.pdf>

Figures A-1 through A-5 provide a breakdown of the number of CFS per hour, per district. The nature of CFS by time of day between the districts is not distinctive. As with data provided previously, CFS peak in the late afternoon to early evening hours (4:00 PM to 7:00 PM), declining sharply after midnight, and gradually increasing starting at about 7:00 AM.

We provide two sets of data for each district in Figures A-6 through A-15. The first figure for each district shows response times to priority CFS by hour, and the second figure shows all other response times to CFS by hour. In each of the districts, and for each of the figures, there is a noticeable increase in CFS response times that correspond to shift changes at 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM. We also note that response times overall average between 15 to 19 minutes, response times over 20 minutes for non-priority CFS occur with some regularity.

In examining the response times by district and beat, by priority, and by hour, it is apparent that there is incongruity between personnel allocations and work demand, particularly during certain times of the day. It is also evident that the longer response times mirror the CFS demands expressed by hour of the day, shown in Figure 7. However, simply put, the longer response times suggest that staffing is not keeping up with CFS demands. These data also suggest the need for allocation of additional personnel, shifts to personnel assignments in terms of time of day, and changes to personnel assignments within the districts.

Cover Cars

Part of our data analysis included looking at the amount of time spent on calls by the primary unit, and the cumulative amount of time spent on the call by additional units; we have presented these data in Table 52 below.

TABLE 52: Back-Up Response

Origin Type	Number of Incidents	Sum of Primary Unit Hours	Back-Up Pct.	Sum of Back-Up Unit(s) Hours	Work Effort in Hours
Citizen	136,284	83,924	38%	31,891	115,815
Officer	142,812	52,978	62%	32,846	85,824
Grand Total	279,096	136,902	100%	64,737	201,639

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

*Primary unit hours exclude report-writing time

In addition to looking at the amount of time spent on CFS between primary and backup units, we also looked at which CFS included multiple-unit responses; we have included these data in Table 53 below.

TABLE 53: Call Types Averaging More than Two Responding Units

Event Type	Count of Events	Average # Responding Units
BANK ROBBERY	1	19.0
GUNSHOT WOUND	45	15.4
STABBING	16	11.4
VEHICLE FIRE SUBJECT TRAPPED	2	11.0
BOMB THREAT	1	10.0
HOSTAGE	2	9.5
HOME INVASION	10	8.6
STABBED	3	8.3
BREAK IN IN PROGRESS	158	8.1
LOJACK	2	8.0
TRAIN OR RAIL COLLISON	1	8.0
ARMED ROBBERY	187	7.6
CARJACKING	3	7.3
DROWNING	1	7.0
BREAK IN VEHICLE IN PROGRESS	23	6.5
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT EXTRICA	30	6.3
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT EX	12	6.2
VEHICLE OVERTURNED	16	5.8
GUNSHOT WOUND NO EMS	15	5.6
DECEASED PERSON PD	88	5.5
ATTEMPTED SUICIDE	13	5.5
EXPLOSION	6	5.5
CARDIAC OR RESP ARREST	71	5.4
MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISION FIRE	527	4.9
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT	203	4.8
CRASH NOTIFICATION	3	4.7
WEAPONS VIOLATION	25	4.5
DOMESTIC WITH A WEAPON	142	4.5
ABDUCTION OR KIDNAPPING	8	4.5
DISTURBANCE WITH WEAPON	440	4.2
RAPE NO EMS	17	4.1
VEHICLE STOP	4	4.0
SUSPICIOUS PERSON WITH WEAPON	135	4.0
COMMON LAW ROBBERY	79	3.9
SEXUAL ASSAULT	57	3.9

TABLE 53 (continued): Call Types Averaging More than Two Responding Units

Event Type	Count of Events	Average # Responding Units
SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE	19	3.8
ASSAULT EMS	42	3.6
STRUCTURE FIRE	11	3.5
OVERDOSE	2	3.5
SUICIDE THREAT	209	3.4
INTOXICATED DRIVER	149	3.3
FIGHT	178	3.2
ASSAULT	398	3.2
STABBING NO EMS	5	3.2
STOLEN VEHICLE	18	3.2
FOOT PURSUIT	1	3.0
OVERDOSE OR POISONING	50	2.9
PSYCHIATRIC	61	2.9
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT	504	2.9
HAZMAT	8	2.9
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	1796	2.9
KNOCK AND TALK	9	2.8
DISTURBANCE	5805	2.7
CRISIS	298	2.6
WANTED PERSON	527	2.6
ASSIST FIRE	159	2.6
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY	1561	2.5
UNKNOWN PROBLEM	133	2.5
HOLD UP ALARM	262	2.4
DRUGS	788	2.4
UNKNOWN PROBLEM EMS	75	2.4
UNKNOWN FIRE	6	2.3
ASSIST EMS	1555	2.3
BANK ALARM	119	2.2
INTOXICATED PERSON	351	2.2
UNKNOWN PROBLEM POLICE	1052	2.2
BANK ALARM ATM	83	2.2
RECOVERED VEHICLE	76	2.2
PARENTAL OR CUSTODIAL ABDUCTIO	24	2.2
ASSIST OTHER AGENCY	380	2.1
ABUSE	76	2.1
BREAK IN	1599	2.1

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Based on the data from Tables 52 and 53, we noted that officers use backup for roughly 27.5% of all citizen-initiated CFS, and 38.3% of officer-initiated CFS. From our perspective, these numbers are not a cause for concern. Many of the CFS listed here warrant multiple-unit response. However, backup efforts accounted for nearly 65,000 hours of work in 2014, and this is a substantial number. It is also worth mentioning that our team heard that over-response to CFS is an issue with some officers, and that some supervisors do not monitor this closely. Indeed, while visiting the communications center, our team witnessed a cardiac arrest CFS, in which there were five officers on scene, even though dispatch only sent two. Of those on the scene, two were supervisors. At the time of this event, there were no officers available to respond to pending CFS in District 3 and District 4. We observed this situation for several minutes, noting that no officers cleared during that period.

There is a lack of data available for us to conclude that officers are over-responding routinely, or that supervisors are not managing resources properly in this regard. However, based on our observations throughout the study, and the feedback provided to us, it appears overresponse to CFS may be an issue in need of additional focus and effort at DPD. Accordingly, we recommend continued monitoring of this issue and a reemphasis for supervisors of their role in monitoring officer response.

SECTION IV: PATROL WORKLOAD VS. OFFICER AVAILABILITY

Police patrol staffing requirements are determined by evaluating the total workload in hours, against hours of officer availability. Officers are not able to work for a variety of reasons including days off, vacation, sick leave, holiday time, and training obligations. To define staffing needs, deploy officers properly, and evaluate productivity, it is necessary to calculate the actual amount of time officers are available to work. We obtained leave data from DPD (average hours used by patrol and investigations in 2014). Using these data, we constructed Table 54 below, which outlines average leave times, and shows the amount of available hours per patrol officer per year.

TABLE 54: Patrol Availability (Hours)

Annual hours worked	2080
Leave Category	
PTO/Vacation	-74
Extended Sick	-54
Holiday	-110
Leave Without Pay	-2
Military	-11
Injury	-10
Comp Time	-113
FMLA/Parental	-21
Funeral	-5
Mgt./Admin	0
Stand-By	-31
Vol. School	-2
Other Training	-60
Sub-total	-494
Average Annual Availability (hours)	1586

Source: Leave time source – Durham Human Resources

In summary, this table shows that patrol officers have 1,586 hours of available work time each year. This figure is very important in terms of determining staffing needs, because it represents the actual time available, as opposed to 2,080 hours of paid time per person, which managers often use as a benchmark for scheduling purposes.

There are some other aspects of this total that are worthy of mention. The training hours we have shown here total 60 hours (cumulative of mandatory and other training). We learned that although the department records attendance of all officer training, the department does not track total training hours. DPD staff told us that the department only tracks the 36 hours required by the state. Each patrol officer also receives 24 hours of in-service training during his or her shifts, and combined, these reflect the 60-hour total listed above. However, officers also attend other various training, and the department does not collect and record the hours attended (of course, we recommend a revision to this practice). This is a concern for two reasons. First, the training records for the officers are incomplete and inaccurate, which could present legal problems later. Second, the hours above likely do not represent an accurate total average, which makes accurate assessments of available time difficult. To illustrate the potential shortage of training hours reflected in Table 54, among the benchmark cities, the total average for 2014 is 110.2 training hours.¹¹

¹¹ <http://www.opkansas.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/benchmark-city-survey-section-b-general.pdf>

For purposes of our calculations, we used the 60-hour number, which is verifiable. However, DPD staff estimate that the average annual training for each patrol officer is closer to 80 hours. Again, we did not use this number as a benchmark, but it is significant, as it potentially reduces the overall availability for patrol officers.

In addition to questions regarding the total training hours, Table 54 also outlines COMP time usage at an average of 113 hours per officer. During our interviews, staff told us that officers use COMP in lieu of overtime. It is unclear where the overtime/COMP time emanates from, but this number is significant, and it represents more than 22,000 hours of COMP time. It is likely that this practice is exacerbating staffing issues within patrol, since patrol officers are the ones earning and using the COMP time.

We also point out that research shows that 12-hour schedules have a higher level of overtime and sick leave use associated with them. We also noted that the nature of the current work schedule does not provide for any overlaps between the shifts, and schedules of this nature frequently contribute to overtime. It is our assessment that the staffing issues we have identified, are likely contributing to a variety of issues, including overtime/COMP accrual, and that adjustments to staffing and scheduling, will improve these issues.

Shift Relief Factor

To calculate the shift relief factor, we used the average availability for each officer displayed in Table 54. The shift relief factor is the number of officers required to staff one shift position every day of the year. For the patrol division, one position requires 4,380 hours per year to staff ($12 \text{ hours} \times 365 \text{ days} = 4,380 \text{ hours}$). Therefore, the shift relief factor is calculated to be 2.76 ($4,380 / 1586 = 2.76$). To determine the shift relief factor for one position over a 24-hour period, we multiplied this number times two. Therefore, the daily shift relief factor is 5.52 for each position. It is important to note that this calculation represents the number of personnel needed to staff one position. It does not represent the number of personnel needed to respond adequately to workload demands.

Understanding the shift relief factor is important from a scheduling standpoint. Police agencies tend to complete their work schedule based on the total number of personnel available, as opposed to the workload capacity of those personnel. The result is an imbalance between the structure of the schedule, and the number of hours officers can actually work.

To determine the proper number of officers required for patrol, agencies must first consider how many positions they want to staff at any given time. Once the department determines this number, they can calculate personnel needs. For example, if the DPD chose to staff nine positions in a district for both shifts (AM and PM), this would require

50 (49.68) officers (calculated by multiplying 5.52×9). For four districts, this number shifts to 200. Put another way, DPD currently has 36 beats between the five districts. To staff one person in each beat for each shift (AM and PM), it would require 199 officers (198.72). This amount represents minimum staffing, without adding any supervisors, and it does not account for shift overlaps and responding to peak call volumes.

Table 44: Patrol Allocations by District - Repeated

	District 1	District 2	District 3	District 4	District 5	Totals
Squad A	12	12	11	11	3	49
Squad B	12	12	11	11	3	49
Squad C	12	12	11	11	3	49
Squad D	12	12	11	11	3	49
Totals	48	48	44	44	12	196
Pct. of Officers	24.49%	24.49%	22.45%	22.45%	6.12%	100.00%

*Excludes sergeants and above.

Table 44 above (repeated), provides the current staffing allocations for the DPD. Using the numbers allocated for each district, we can calculate the staffing needs as follows:

The current schedule and allocation of personnel suggests 98 shifts per day. We calculated this number by taking one-half of the above allocation of personnel. Filling 98 shifts per day requires 271 officers ($98 \times 2.76 = 270.48$).

Using these numbers, DPD would require 271 officers assigned to patrol to cover the personnel assignments for the districts. Even if the department was operating at 75% staffing for each district, this would require 203 (202.86) officers.

We are providing these calculations as an example, not as a recommendation. As we have noted, the department must make personnel allocations based on workload and on time of day. In addition, this example presumes equal distribution of personnel, which would likely not serve the peak-call-volume needs of the department.

To contrast the current configuration with the recommended beat structure, our proposed model would include 88 shifts per day. This would require 243 officers ($88 \times 2.76 = 242.88$). This number includes two corporals per district per shift, and four power shifts per day per district.

Table 55 below shows the breakdown of CFS per officer assigned to patrol and it compares DPD to the benchmark cities. The average number of CFS handled in the benchmark cities is approximately 589. For DPD, based on 216 personnel, the number is about 661, which exceeds the benchmark average. However, factoring in the *lost hours* for patrol (-494 per officer), the department has the equivalent of 165 officers staffing the

patrol division (assuming no vacancies). When this number is used, the average CFS per officer at DPD is 867, which is much higher than the average of the benchmark cities.

TABLE 55: Population and CFS – 100,000 to 250,000 Population

Benchmark City	Population	Total Calls for Service	Officers in Patrol	CFS Per Officer in Patrol
Bellevue, WA	134,400	51,493	89	578.57
Boise, ID	217,730	75,613	184	410.94
Boulder, CO	103,163	59,341	117	507.19
Broken Arrow, OK	105,000	33,137	76	436.01
Cedar Rapids, IA	128,642	84,789	121	700.74
Chesapeake, VA	228,513	131,305	224	586.18
Columbia, MO	117,381	77,905	94	828.78
Coral Springs, FL	121,096	72,460	105	690.10
Fort Collins, CO	155,400	60,344	94	641.96
Fremont, CA	220,000	78,497	119	659.64
Garland, TX	233,206	143,028	152	940.97
Grand Prairie, TX	183,816	103,251	144	717.02
Irving, TX	227,030	122,806	162	758.06
Lakewood, CO	147,220	68,130	154	442.40
Naperville, IL	143,289	36,367	100	363.67
Norman, OK	117,520	63,368	113	560.78
Olathe, KS	132,437	40,344	105	384.23
Overland Park, KS	184,706	60,296	108	558.30
Peoria, AZ	164,825	51,478	122	421.95
Richardson, TX	101,820	56,305	85	662.41
San Angelo, TX	100,111	54,029	89	607.07
Springfield, MO	164,560	87,765	180	487.58
Totals	155,994	73,275	124	588.98

Durham, NC	251,893	142,812	216	661.17
*Adjusted Total			165	867.10

Source: Benchmark Cities Data

Excludes officer-initiated CFS. Officer totals do not include operational vacancies.

As noted previously, if we added additional training hours to the calculation, these numbers would be higher. In addition, if we remove the 16 sergeants from this equation, and recalculate the lost hours, there are 150 officers handling CFS, each of which will average 952.08 CFS annually.

Workload Model and Analysis

Measurement standards make it possible to evaluate and define patrol staffing and deployment requirements. The primary standards employed for the DPD study follow:

- Operational labor
- Administrative labor
- Uncommitted time

Operational Labor

Operational labor is the aggregate amount of time consumed by patrol officers to answer calls for service generated by the public and to address on-view situations discovered and encountered by officers. It is the total of criminal, non-criminal, traffic, and back-up activity initiated by a call from the public, or an incident an officer comes upon. When expressed, as a percentage of the total labor in an officer's workday, operational labor of first response patrol officers should not continuously exceed 30%. Table 56 below provides an overview of how the workload obligation is calculated.

TABLE 56: Obligated Workload – Patrol 30% Model

	Literal Explanation and Formula	Model-1	Model-2
A	Total Patrol Unit Obligated Hours - Citizen CFS (includes backup)	115,815	
	Patrol Hours including Out of Beat Response Time (6,739 Hours)		122,554
B	Available Hours per Officer	1,586	1,586
C	Authorized Strength in Patrol	196.00	196.00
D	Current Patrol Hours Available (B*C)	310,856.00	310,856.00
E	Current % Obligated to Citizen CFS (A/D)	37.26%	39.42%
F	Target Obligated Workload (30%)	30.00%	30.00%
G	Officer Workload Hours Available at 30% (B*F)	475.80	475.80
H	Patrol Officers Required to Meet Target Workload (A/G)	243.41	257.57
	Additional Primary CFS Response Officers Needed (H minus C)*	47	62

*Rounded

We have intentionally provided two separate models here. Model 1 is the primary model, and this reflects the obligated patrol work hours and the lost hours as calculated in Table 54. It also calculates available workload based on full staffing, including corporals, or 196 officers. Based on this model, patrol within DPD are operating at 37.26% of obligated time, which is 7.26% over the maximum level desired.

Based on these calculations, DPD would need to add 47 officers to primary CFS responsibilities in patrol (Model 1) to reduce the obligated workload to 30%. It is also important to note that when the obligated workload exceeds 30%, a similar shift typically occurs to the administrative labor calculation. This is because additional obligated workload generally means that the officer will have administrative labor associated with that work.

For illustrative purposes, we have also included a second model of workload calculation in Table 56. This model captures the return time we discussed in the section on officer responses out of beat. For this model, we added these hours to the obligated workload. The result reflects an obligated workload of 39.42%, which would result in the need to add 62 officers to reach a 30% workload obligation rate. We are not advocating for this, and in fact, we are relying on Model 1 for all of our recommendations. However, Model 2 illustrates the disadvantage of responding out of beat on a consistent basis, and if our calculations are accurate, the amount of time lost in out of beat response is equivalent to losing 15 officers.

As part of our study, we asked officers to complete a worksheet and survey related to CFS they handled during two of their work shifts (we did not identify which shifts to record). The results, shown in Table 57 below show that in total, officers handled 1,442 CFS, with an average of 10.8 CFS per shift, each averaging 34 minutes. This self-reported data does not include report-writing time, but only includes on-scene time associated with handling the CFS.

TABLE 57: Officer Workload Survey Results - CFS

Title	Number
Number of Responses	134
Number of CFS Reported	1442
Average CFS per Shift	10.8
Average Minutes per CFS	34

Source: IACP Self-Report Survey Durham PD

These data are important to consider as part of the workload analysis. Based on our analysis of the CFS records in CAD, the average time spent on a non-report CFS was about 29 minutes (see Table 31 above). This is very consistent and suggests reliability in the self-reported data from the officers. Using these data, we calculated 10.8 CFS per shift, with an average of 29 minutes each, resulting in 313.20 minutes of committed time. Using a 12-hour shift as a benchmark, we divided these numbers (720 minutes in a 12-hour shift), and determined that obligated workload accounts for 43.5% of each officer's shift. If accurate and consistent, this number dramatically exceeds the IACP 30% obligated workload model recommendation.


Administrative Labor

Precise information is not available in CAD for many administrative activities, due to variances in officer *call outs* for these activities. Nevertheless, our interviews and field observations suggest that administrative time appears to be at the norm. We estimate that administrative time generally accounts for approximately 25 – 30% of an officer's average day, and such appears to be the case in Durham. This percentage can seem high to those not acquainted with the patrol function. However, a review of patrol activities supports this average.

- Report-writing and case follow up (variable)
- Patrol Briefings - 15 minutes
- Administrative preparation/report checkout – 30 minutes
- Meal and personal care breaks – 30 minutes
- Court attendance (dayshift)
- On duty training, not otherwise captured
- Vehicle maintenance and fueling (15 minutes per day)
- Meetings with supervisors (variable)
- Special administrative assignments (variable)
- Personnel/payroll activities (health fairs, paperwork review and paperwork) training (variable)
- Field Training Officer (FTO) time for both trainee and trainer (variable); on-duty training for officers
- Equipment maintenance (computer, weapons, radio). (variable)

In order to attempt to illustrate allocations of administrative time that are unaccounted for in CAD, we asked the patrol officers to complete a worksheet and survey during two of their patrol shifts. We asked officers to record time spent on certain activities and to report this back to us via an online survey. We received 134 responses, and we have provided the results of the survey data in Figure 14 below.

FIGURE 14: Self-Reported Supplemental Workload



Source: IACP Self-Report Survey Durham PD

The average time reported for supplemental work by each officer, for each shift, was approximately 67 minutes. This does not include reports associated with CFS. It is also noteworthy that this survey spanned only two of the officer's normal shifts (we did not identify which shifts to use). While representative of the supplemental workload, we suspect that it reflects the minimal amount of per shift load, and that a longer period of analysis would demonstrate a higher amount of time on average, allocated in this area. We encourage the DPD to continually survey patrol personnel to monitor this activity.

Uncommitted Time

The cumulative operational and administrative labor that officers must engage, should not be so significant that they are unable to respond to emergencies in a timely fashion or engage in mission-critical elective activities and problem solving efforts. A proportion of the workday must be uncommitted to any other type of labor. Uncommitted time allows officers to do the following:

- To have and initiate public-service contacts
- To participate in elective activities selected by the agency, such as community policing and problem solving
- To make pedestrian and business contacts

- To conduct field interviews
- To engage proactive traffic stops and proactive patrol efforts.

Uncommitted time is the time left over after officers complete the work associated with both obligated/committed time and administrative time.

A general principle for distribution of time for patrol is 30% across the board for administrative, operational, and uncommitted time with a 10% flex factor. Ideally, particularly for service-driven organizations, the remaining 10% becomes uncommitted time, allowing officers more time for proactive community engagement. For a jurisdiction the size of Durham, and with its stated focus on exceptional service and community policing, no less than 40% uncommitted patrol time is ideal.

Patrol Staffing

Augment Patrol Staffing

The current level of obligated workload for patrol officers (37.26%) exceeds the 30% obligated workload target established in the IACP model. In order to achieve a 30% obligated time ratio, DPD should add 47 additional personnel to the patrol function. Adding 47 officers to patrol would result in 47.46% of the current DPD workforce assigned to patrol, which would still be well below the average percentage of officers assigned to patrol (56.48%) among the respondents in the benchmark cities survey, see Table 58 below.¹²

It is important to keep in mind that the above percentages of allocated personnel assume no increase in the sworn strength number of the police department. We are recommending an increase in the operational sworn strength of the department to 532, which would lower this percentage to 45.67%.

In addition, although we are recommending adding 47 positions to the patrol division, we are also recommending the recapture of 28 positions from various other areas within the department.

¹² see <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

TABLE 58: Patrol and Investigation Comparisons to Benchmark City Survey

Benchmark Cities	Total Officers	Assigned to Patrol	Percent of Officers	Assigned to Investigation	Percent of Officers
Bellevue, WA	178	89	50.00%	23	12.92%
Boca Raton, FL	198	120	60.61%	23	11.62%
Boise, ID	301	184	61.13%	37	12.29%
Boulder, CO	178	117	65.73%	21	11.80%
Broken Arrow, OK	130	76	58.46%	13	10.00%
Cedar Rapids, IA	206	121	58.74%	27	13.11%
Chesapeake, VA	387	224	57.88%	44	11.37%
Chula Vista, CA	237	134	56.54%	23	9.70%
Columbia, MO	163	94	57.67%	19	11.66%
Coral Springs, FL	208	105	50.48%	24	11.54%
Edmond, OK	120	68	56.67%	13	10.83%
Fort Collins, CO	198	94	47.47%	34	17.17%
Fremont, CA	188	119	63.30%	23	12.23%
Garland, TX	323	152	47.06%	43	13.31%
Grand Prairie, TX	259	144	55.60%	36	13.90%
Henderson, NV	389	174	44.73%	48	12.34%
Irving, TX	346	162	46.82%	46	13.29%
Lakewood, CO	258	154	59.69%	51	19.77%
Lawrence, KS	154	97	62.99%	19	12.34%
Lincoln, NE	320	211	65.94%	39	12.19%
Naperville, IL	168	100	59.52%	26	15.48%
Norman, OK	175	113	64.57%	22	12.57%
Olathe, KS	173	105	60.69%	17	9.83%
Overland Park, KS	250	108	43.20%	31	12.40%
Peoria, AZ	191	122	63.87%	26	13.61%
Plano, TX	356	192	53.93%	55	15.45%
Richardson, TX	151	85	56.29%	28	18.54%
San Angelo, TX	165	89	53.94%	24	14.55%
Springfield, MO	331	180	54.38%	52	15.71%
Totals	231.07	129	56.48%	31	13.16%

Durham, NC	512	216	42.19%	108	21.09%
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Source for benchmark data: <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

NOTE: Patrol excludes specialty assignments (e.g. K-9, Traffic) and division commanders (Lieutenant and up).

Prioritize Patrol Staffing

The core function of any police agency is the patrol division. Despite this, when vacancies occur, these often result in reductions to the patrol operation. We found this to be the case

in Durham, where the department has filled or maintained officers in specialty positions, even when patrol was working short. This works against the capability of the organization to maintain a stable patrol workforce, resulting in service reductions. It also affects the capacity of patrol personnel to perform supplemental duties and community policing activities. The department should take a position that all patrol assignments are *essential*, backfilling any vacancies in patrol from less-essential roles (as determined by the department) within the organization (excluding investigations – see below).

This recommendation builds upon the first recommendation to augment the patrol division, and though it may seem logical and intuitive to adopt this practice, this is not the case in many police agencies, and it has not been the norm at DPD. The objective in adding personnel to patrol is to ensure proper staffing. The staffing recommendations we have offered represent what we believe to be the minimal staffing to ensure workload obligations remain at or below 30%.

It is our overall assessment that closing the workload to work capacity gap will allow officers to serve the community better. This means that officers will have more time to spend on CFS when warranted (such as D/V cases), and it means that officers will have more time to dedicate to community policing efforts. This is particularly true at this critical juncture in policing in America.

Table 59 below shows the workload, broken down by patrol and non-patrol functions.

TABLE 59: Primary Patrol Unit and Supplemental Patrol Unit Hours (full list)

Primary Unit Category	Count of CFS Events	(Time) HH:MM:SS
Patrol	115769	76093:52:24
Corporal	14509	10663:23:07
Sergeants and Up	3776	1605:34:33
Special/Other		
HEAT	444	312:18:27
BIKE	443	165:10:33
K9	298	91:29:14
CID	216	212:02:55
OFF DUTY	210	92:14:52
MC	190	81:21:02
IU	129	86:26:16
NOTIFY	99	58:58:20
DESK	45	43:46:27
HI	35	17:07:25
#N/A	25	9:03:23
TOW	25	7:45:02
SET	23	6:36:26
OCU	16	0:27:22
MCU	10	0:03:39
BCERT	9	5:06:02
TRAIN	5	0:43:56
MAP	4	6:15:14
COP	3	4:40:23
SIG20	1	0:03:22
Sub-Total	2230	1201:40:20
Grand Total	136284	89564:30:24
Non-Patrol Data		
TRU	1352	132:00:00
Report Only	400	3:00:00
Crime Scene Inv.	1673	3670:00:00
Total Non-Patrol	3425	3805:00:00
Grand Total	139709	93369:30:24

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

The patrol officers, corporals, and patrol sergeants, combine to engage approximately 88,300 hours of work effort. This equates to 98.5% of all the obligated CFS volume for the agency. Several other units purport to assist in the CFS function, and certainly many perform a vital role. However, their combined work effort is minimal (against the obligated workload) in comparison to the burden of the patrol division. Our recommendations would shift portions of that burden, and add personnel to the patrol division to reduce individual obligated workloads.

Establish Minimum Patrol Staffing

A safe and effective patrol workforce is essential to maintaining a safe community. To ensure that officers are safe and effective, and to ensure that service levels are met, the department should establish minimum shift coverages that correlate with the staffing recommendations of this study, and maintain these levels consistently.

As we have discussed, there is a need to supplement staffing in the patrol division, and other efforts to reduce the work burden for patrol will improve the functionality of that division. In addition, we have examined CFS totals by district, beat, day of the week, and by hour. It is evident that the department needs to make adjustments to personnel deployments to meet operational needs. Once the department establishes these minimal levels, they must become a standard. Setting this standard involves a commitment to temporary reassignment of personnel, or using overtime to fill any gaps. This will ensure continuity of patrol operations, and the ability of patrol officers to engage in proactive projects, and not allowing obligated workload time to jeopardize them.

We recommend setting an operational minimum staffing level (which we have identified as 532 officers), and then making sure that the patrol staffing level of 243, does not fall below this number.


Modify the Work Schedule

Based on our observations and feedback from numerous department members, including patrol officers, and mid- and upper-level supervisors, in its current configuration, the DPD work schedule is not providing an appropriate level of functionality. There are significant variances in coverage across the districts and beats, and the deployment of personnel does not adequately cover peak demands in calls for service. The schedule also does not account for low CFS periods, but instead, staffs all positions equally throughout the day. In addition, the current schedule does not appear to account for shift vacancies, at times leaving gaps in districts and beats, and restricting the availability of officers to take leave time.

There are also some unconfirmed indications from our study and analysis that the 12 hour shifts may be contributing to the generation of comp- and overtime (some external schedule research reports that these are commonalities in 12-hour schedules). Of course, this may also simply be an issue of understaffing the patrol division. Our analysis of CFS

response also included an examination of the number of officers on duty, compared the CFS demands. Figure 15 below shows the aggregate totals.

FIGURE 15: Citywide Patrol Staffing and CFS Averages by Hour of Day




Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

At first glance, the average count of officers on duty (shown here at 49), is well above the CFS per hour line. In fact, if the department could staff 49 positions in patrol consistently, there would be little reason to examine this issue at all. In reality, the actual number of officers working during any given shift is somewhere between 40%-75% of the allocated number. This means that there are actually between 20-36 officers working during these times on a daily basis. This is due to attrition, and a lack of a shift relief factor within the work schedule.


Figures 16-19 below show the average patrol staffing by hour of the day, by district, compared to CFS (we intentionally excluded District 5). All of these figures show the *maximum* number of officers scheduled during these times. In reality, the department does not staff at the maximum number of officers, which means that any imbalances reflected here are greater than these figures show.

FIGURE 16: District 1 Patrol Staffing and CFS Averages by Hour of Day




Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

FIGURE 17: District 2 Patrol Staffing and CFS Averages by Hour of Day




Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

FIGURE 18: District 3 Patrol Staffing and CFS Averages by Hour of Day



Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data


FIGURE 19: District 4 Patrol Staffing and CFS Averages by Hour of Day



Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Figure 20 below, shows the annual total of citizen CFS by hour of the day for all of the districts. As noted previously, there is a visible peak and valley to CFS based on time of day.

FIGURE 20: Citizen CFS by Time of Day – All Districts



Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

In addition to the CFS figures we have already referenced, we have also included two *heat maps*. Figure 21 below shows the CFS by hour and day in a heat map format. This heat map progressively highlights times of the day (from green to red) receiving a greater number of CFS. Figure 21 below, provides a similar mapping of CFS, breaking these down by district and type of CFS.

FIGURE 21: CFS by Hour of Day – Heat Map

Hour of Day	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Grand Total
1	673	372	363	396	371	471	636	3282
2	607	309	300	315	293	349	563	2736
3	502	245	255	259	260	306	494	2321
4	346	246	207	210	216	257	328	1810
5	294	227	221	279	220	266	293	1800
6	288	369	371	391	347	406	308	2480
7	350	708	609	630	613	679	485	4074
8	439	927	868	924	817	897	595	5467
9	620	983	921	902	853	984	783	6046
10	707	994	960	960	897	1023	877	6418
11	746	982	1016	1041	922	1030	937	6674
12	834	1094	1094	1078	1005	1042	1017	7164
13	946	1145	1134	1177	1021	1103	1031	7557
14	950	1145	1121	1164	1060	1153	1021	7614
15	963	1232	1198	1166	1175	1282	1089	8105
16	942	1254	1337	1239	1277	1398	1128	8575
17	1017	1289	1354	1418	1305	1337	1097	8817
18	1014	1200	1235	1333	1244	1271	1018	8315
19	967	1087	1064	1103	1045	1093	988	7347
20	880	1025	1026	1046	1031	1030	1009	7047
22	792	795	909	829	828	990	1116	6259
23	608	675	643	683	675	967	1099	5350
Grand Total	15485	18303	18206	18543	17475	19334	17912	125258

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

FIGURE 22: CFS Heat Map by District

Incident Type	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	Grand Total
ALARM	3163	4768	4970	4630	899	18430
DISTURBANCE	2998	2641	2112	3101	616	11468
ASSIST PERSON	1917	2274	2005	1985	792	8973
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT	1052	2055	2489	2214	653	8463
LARCENY	1071	1283	1240	1065	337	4996
NOISE COMPLAINT	791	933	968	1080	165	3937
HANG UP	478	1044	735	1097	422	3776
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	875	866	566	1147	188	3642
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	658	999	814	816	181	3468
BREAK IN	688	891	858	931	84	3452
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY	664	918	714	893	99	3288
ASSIST EMS	737	757	628	800	199	3121
NOTIFY POLICE	497	681	594	609	736	3117
FOLLOW UP	608	815	708	790	191	3112
ATTEMPT TO LOCATE	472	758	562	593	158	2543
TRAFFIC HAZARD	343	676	748	618	132	2517
SUSPICIOUS VEHICLE	429	660	549	636	47	2321
TRESPASS OR UNWANTED	620	539	380	488	275	2302
HIT AND RUN	341	554	533	536	177	2141
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY	511	514	396	564	110	2095
UNKNOWN PROBLEM POLICE	540	432	342	539	128	1981
BREAK IN VEHICLE	429	374	440	481	100	1824
SOUND OF SHOTS	529	503	317	408	42	1799
FRAUD	233	394	426	396	142	1591
DRUGS	574	294	205	423	80	1576
WELFARE CHECK	212	381	367	330	64	1354
MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISION FIRE	220	350	322	329	70	1291
WANTED PERSON	302	215	198	268	158	1141
OFFICER STAND BY	286	313	156	326	38	1119
PARKING VIOLATION	190	241	229	267	131	1058
SHOPLIFTER	227	269	462	40	3	1001
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT	166	312	219	200	81	978
DISTURBANCE WITH WEAPON	321	170	117	249	60	917
LOST OR FOUND PROPERTY	165	242	215	165	105	892
ASSAULT	242	172	126	258	67	865
PANHANDLING OR SOLICITATION	161	208	282	110	96	857
THREATS	196	188	170	215	57	826
ABANDONED VEHICLE	156	238	189	205	29	817
INTOXICATED PERSON	223	216	167	98	94	798
MISSING PERSON	187	215	136	173	60	771

FIGURE 22 (continued): CFS Heat Map by District

Incident Type	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	Grand Total
LARCENY OF VEHICLE	156	176	173	197	51	753
ASSIST OTHER AGENCY	123	171	178	190	74	736
CRISIS	149	153	131	152	117	702
WARRANT OR SUBPOENA SERVICE	34	30	63	34	488	649
HARASSMENT	121	117	120	146	36	540
HOLD UP ALARM	86	138	154	128	17	523
SIGNAL LIGHT MALFUNCTIONING	52	107	157	98	73	487
BARKING DOG	82	196	107	100	2	487
SUICIDE THREAT	93	116	78	101	48	436
ARMED ROBBERY	105	107	95	92	32	431
MEDICAL ALARM	64	156	86	95	13	414
PROPERTY CHECK	95	94	78	110	10	387
FIGHT	118	64	54	82	39	357
ANIMAL PROBLEM	77	98	83	66	23	347
CARELESS AND RECKLESS	74	110	65	81	9	339
HANG UP WIRELESS PHASE 2	105	77	54	84	17	337
INTOXICATED DRIVER	42	92	96	88	12	330
PAPER TRANSPORT ONLY	5	107	112		102	326
ASSIST FIRE	66	82	58	81	21	308
BREAK IN IN PROGRESS	90	71	68	70	8	307
SUSPICIOUS PERSON WITH WEAPON	97	71	38	80	11	297
UNAUTHORIZED USE	93	69	57	59	17	295
VANDALISM	69	82	55	73	13	292
UNKNOWN PROBLEM EMS	63	71	55	70	33	292
DOMESTIC WITH A WEAPON	87	62	41	86	8	284
ESCORT	36	138	22	44	22	262
RUNAWAY	57	77	31	73	13	251
BANK ALARM	15	55	57	32	82	241
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT	40	49	51	46	16	202
Grand Total	27645	34194	30872	33497	9759	135967

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

*Depicts CFS types, which have a total of more than 200 CFS annually.

The department should examine the figures related to staffing, beats, and CFS, and develop plans to make modifications to the work schedule. We recommend a plan that accounts for immediate adjustments, short-term adjustments, and a long-term plan.

Documentation of Officer Activity

Any effort to conduct a workload analysis relies on the use of data, whether existing historical data or data created for that explicit purpose. DPD, like many departments,

must be able to justify all requests for future staffing, and this occurs best through quantification and comparison of workload demand against workforce capacity.

The IACP staffing model relies upon an analysis of obligated work time, which essentially covers the requisite time officers need to respond to a call for service, including the time onsite, but excluding time allocated to report writing and other follow-up (which the IACP model allocates to another segment of workload). The current policy at DPD often combines these times in CAD, making it difficult to perform a workload demand calculation. We recommend adjusting the policies related to documentation of officer activity relative to calls for service, including the generation of additional codes to track report time and other notable actions the department wishes to track (e.g. community policing). These adjustments will provide the department with better data to assess the efforts of its officers, but more importantly, they will serve to assist the department in replicating the IACP analysis in the future, should they wish to do so.

We are aware that officers often resist efforts to monitor and/or track their work efforts. Accordingly, DPD should be intentional about which items are worth tracking, and consider how officers may react to this. If DPD considers additional tracking, we would recommend convening a work group to identify the items worth tracking; this will serve two purposes. First, it will ensure the creating of an intentional list, including those items that are important, and excluding those that are not. Second, a work group of this nature will aid and help create buy-in, and will help ensure that officers (throughout the department) understand the purpose for tracking these items (and that it is not to check up on them).

SECTION V: TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT

The DPD manages traffic enforcement through officers on patrol, and through the traffic services unit, which includes the Traffic and Crash Team (TACT), and the Motors unit. The TACT unit investigates all fatal crashes, and the most serious motor vehicle crashes that occur in the City of Durham. The motors unit consists of six motorcycle officers, whose primary duty is providing funeral escorts throughout the city. Motors officers provided roughly 1,250 funeral escorts in 2015 (these efforts come at a tremendous financial cost to the city). Their secondary function is that of traffic enforcement and assisting TACT with crash investigations. These units conduct roughly 25% of all traffic stops conducted by officers in the DPD. The primary goal of the traffic services unit is to ensure the safe and lawful movement of motor vehicles on the roadways within the City of Durham. The department engages in selective enforcement programs, designed to target high accident locations around the city and respond to citizen complaints concerning dangerous driving. Traffic services currently falls under the command of District 5.

We collected various data concerning traffic enforcement within the City of Durham. Some of these data are incomplete, due to direct reporting to the state court system. However, based on data collected by DPD, district officers conducted nearly 25,000 traffic stops in 2014, engaging nearly 5,000 hours of work.

As part of our analysis, we also looked at motor vehicle crashes, including the total amount of time required to manage them. Table 60 below outlines these data, which indicate that DPD officers in patrol spent nearly 15,100 hours investigating motor vehicle crashes in 2014. This amounts to 17.99% of the obligated workload for patrol.

TABLE 60: Motor Vehicle Crash Response – Time Spent

Crash Type	Time Spent
CRASH NOTIFICATION	7:02:41
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY	1768:13:15
HIT AND RUN	1938:04:43
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT	8670:31:50
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT EXTRICA	211:59:11
MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISION FIRE	2055:00:59
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT	377:33:17
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT EX	20:08:04
VEHICLE FIRE SUBJECT TRAPPED	6:41:37
VEHICLE OVERTURNED	44:33:37
Grand Total	15099:49:14

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Using the available workload for patrol of 475.80 hours, as calculated in Table 33, motor vehicle crashes consume the aggregate time available for 31.5 officers. We have already recommended a shift in the responsibilities of the TACT and Motors units to account for some of this time, and we reiterate that need here. At present, motor vehicle crashes comprise the collective effort of more than 16% of the allocated patrol workforce. Accordingly, DPD should make the recommended adjustments to improve traffic safety, and to provide some relief from the patrol division.

SECTION VI: ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE

We have recommended, and believe there is a need to augment the patrol division and to shift some responsibilities with the Motors and TACT units. However, additional department actions can further reduce the burden on patrol officers, enhancing their effectiveness in the process. These include improvements to the Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU) and encouraging its use by the public, and improving and expanding the use of online reporting. In aggregate, these recommendations will reduce obligated demands on patrol, and the combination of these efforts will improve officer outputs.

Non-Sworn Personnel

One of our prior recommendations includes the addition of 10 Community Resource Officers (CROs). Many departments use these non-sworn, uniformed, but unarmed officers to assist with traffic, work at community events, transport evidence, write parking tickets, and a number of other uses. We are recommending assignment of four of these officers to the Motors unit to assist with funeral escorts (subject to legality). We are also recommending assignment of two of these CROs to assist with security at City Hall.

The department can use the remaining four CROs at their discretion, but we would recommend using these personnel to assist with staffing of the TRU, as well as handling courthouse transports and moving squad cars around for equipment repairs and maintenance.

ALTERNATE REPORTING

There are two primary methods for alternate reporting, TRUs and online reporting. DPD currently does not have an online reporting system, though we understand that the department intends to implement an online system in 2016.

Online Reporting

Many police reports are conducive to online reporting. These can include lost property and minor thefts and vandalism, among others. One additional online reporting area, which may be of value to DPD, is online crash reporting. Some crash reports require that the agency, and the driver, file a report with the state, others do not. In either case, DPD could set up online crash reporting, such that individuals could file their reports online with the police department. If the functionality does not exist already, DPD could engage some minor programming to allow the data to move from the online report to a state crash format. As noted previously, crash reports consume a significant amount of DPD time and effort, so any mechanism to reduce this time would be worth the investment.

Although we advocate for online reporting, we also urge caution in this regard for three reasons. First, many citizens still feel a need to engage the police directly, and an online reporting system may not be agreeable to them. We encourage agencies to make these systems available, but to leave the opportunity open for citizens to make police reports in a traditional fashion. This is particularly true for DPD, as there is a need to build community confidence, trust, and support for the police department.

The second issue involves the types of reports that DPD places online. It is important to consider which reports to place in this queue carefully, keeping in mind that the police department should handle cases with witnesses and evidence in person.

The final item involves secondary contact and follow-up. It is important that no case fall between the cracks, so the department should ensure that there is an error-free mechanism in place to double-check any reports that come into the agency through an online portal. This system should also involve a follow-up contact with the victim in some fashion, whether by email or phone so that the citizen knows the police department received their report. It also adds a personal touch that demonstrates a focus on customer service.

Telephone Response Unit

Although DPD currently has a Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU), the department does not fully staff it. We recommend increasing the staffing of this unit to ensure that it is available for day and evening CFS needs. Staffing could come from non-sworn personnel, such as CROs, or from volunteers. Despite ready access to officers on light duty, we would recommend staffing the TRU with other personnel for two reasons. First, the department needs to staff fully the TRU, regardless of the availability of officers on light duty. Second, using sworn personnel for this unit works against the concept of the cost-savings associated with a TRU.

The TRU already handles a modest number of calls, but DPD should expand the current activity of the TRU to include more cold crime and property damage (crash) reporting, and other calls that do not require officer response to a scene. DPD could create additional efficiency in patrol by more aggressively diverting qualified calls to the TRU.

In addition to expanding the use and functionality of the TRU, DPD should consider more intentional efforts to steer callers toward online reporting (these initiatives may require collaboration with the communications center, and additional training). Like the TRU, online reporting can remove a portion of the work burden from the patrol division, freeing them to handle calls for service that are more pressing, and allowing officers to engage in more proactive community service efforts.

Table 61 below reflects the data for CFS handled by the TRU between 2010 and 2014. The number of CFS shown here is significant, and if added to the patrol workload, it would be burdensome. In other words, the TRU is already performing an important function. However, there are many CFS listed below for which the TRU could expand its role. Doing so would further reduce the workload burden on patrol.

TABLE 61: Telephone Response Unit (TRU) Data

Primary Offense	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Totals
ALL OTHER - HARASSING PHONE CALLS	20	1	1	8	11	13	54
ALL OTHER CRIMINAL OFFENSES	2	1	1	12	4	3	23
ALL OTHER OFFENSES-CITY ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS	1						1
ALL OTHER OFFENSES-TRESPASSING					1		1
BURGLARY - FORCIBLE ENTRY	32	14	16	8	5	2	77
BURGLARY - NON-FORCED ENTRY	17	15	15	9	3	3	62
CALLS FOR SERVICE (NO CRIME)	19	4	5	15	12	10	65
COUNTERFEITING - USING	5	1					6
DV INFO REPORT (NO CRIME)		1					1
EMBEZZLEMENT	12	10	4	4	12	2	44
FORGERY - USING/UTTERING	43	24	50		3	1	121
FRAUD - CONFIDENCE GAMES/TRICKERY	3		1	3			7
FRAUD - CREDIT CARD/ATM	171	71	68	43	20	46	419
FRAUD - FALSE PRETENSE	20	1		166	261	137	585
FRAUD - IMPERSONATION	156	75	106	76	89	103	605
FRAUD - OTHER	41	36	40	27	7	3	154
FRAUD - UNAUTHORIZED USE OF CONVEYANCE				2			2
FRAUD - WIRE/COMPUTER/OTHER ELECTRONIC	2			2	4		8
FRAUD - WORTHLESS CHECKS	14	6	4	9	6	7	46
LARCENY - ALL OTHER	214	79	43	61	104	84	585
LARCENY - AUTOMOBILE PARTS OR ACCESSORIES	104	60	39	31	45	33	312
LARCENY - FROM BUILDING	182	85	64	95	109	107	642
LARCENY - FROM COIN-OPERATED DEVICE	1						1
LARCENY - FROM MOTOR VEHICLE	72	31	27	49	49	44	272
LARCENY - GAS	1			1			2
LARCENY - POCKET-PICKING	1	3	3	3	2	3	15
LARCENY - PURSESNATCHING	2				1		3
LARCENY - SHOPLIFTING	5	6	7	6	10	6	40
LOST PROPERTY	125	59	40	51	61	67	403
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT - AUTOMOBILE					2		2
OFFENSES AGAINST FAMILY - CHILD ABUSE					1		1
ROBBERY - INDIVIDUAL				2			2
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY					3	9	12
VANDALISM TO AUTO (NOT ACCIDENTAL)		6	4	6	4	5	25
VANDALISM TO PROP (NOT ACCIDENTAL)		3	3	9	7	5	27
VANDALISM/DAMAGE TO PROPERTY (NOT AUTO)	16	7					23
VANDALISM/DAMAGE TO PROPERTY (TO AUTO)	23	8					31
Grand Total	1304	607	541	698	836	693	4679

Source: Durham Analytical Services

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: Augment Patrol Staffing

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

Add personnel and reallocate personnel within the department.

Our analysis suggests the need to add 47 officers to the patrol division, bringing the total allocation of patrol officers (those taking calls as primary officers, including corporals) to 243. (Note that this is an increase of nine positions from our initial estimate). This is in addition to ensuring zero operational vacancies. At present, the annual attrition rate in the police department is 36. Allowing these operational vacancies to continue at this authorized staffing level, will force the department to continue to operate in arrears with regard to minimum staffing needs, and it will affect officer availability and overtime expenditures. It is important to understand that 243 is the baseline minimum required to adequately staff patrol. We have calculated this based on workload, and validated this number, based on shift staffing of the beats within the districts. Based on the recapture of twenty-four officers from the HEAT, VIRT, and SET units, and an additional recapture of four other officers, there is a need to hire an additional 19 officers to bring patrol up to minimum coverage. We are also recommending maintaining minimum operational sworn staffing at 532. This means hiring sufficiently above this number, in advance of attrition, in order to maintain 532 as an operational minimum. We recommend adjusting the authorized sworn strength to 563, to accommodate the attrition rate, and hiring to this amount. Essentially, these are permanent over-hires, with a newly established operational minimum of 532, and a newly established sworn strength of 563.

We provide the following information to detail the positions changes and additions.

- 47 additional positions in patrol
- 51-officer increase in authorized sworn strength (563) to maintain operational minimum of 532.
 - 24 positions recaptured from HEAT, VIRT, and SET
 - 2 sworn position recaptured from eliminating district 5; lieutenant and CPO/CRU.
 - 1 position recaptured from restructuring command deputy chief position
 - 1 captain position recaptured from the public affairs unit

Action	Command	Captain	Lieutenant	Inv. Sgt.	Invest.	Sgt.	Cpl.	Officer	CPO/CRU
Command Position Elimination	-1								
Merge HEAT, VIRT, SET			Promote 2			-2	-3	-19	
Organized Crime Unit					-3				
Public Housing						1		3	
Eliminate District 5		-1	-1	-1	-2				-1
Homicide Unit					2				
TACT Unit							4		
Motors Unit								-4	
Create Special Services Division		1							
Public Affairs Unit		-1							
Total	-1	-1	-1	-1	-3	-1	-3	-16	-1

Grand Total **-28**

Additional Hires to Patrol **19**

Sworn Strength Increase **Total** **51**

Other Non-Sworn	CROs	Other
CROs - Motors	4	
CROs for Other Duties	6	
Crime Lab Unit		3
Total	10	3

Short Recommendation: Prioritize Patrol Staffing

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): **1**

Details:

The core function of any police agency is the patrol division. Despite this, when vacancies occur, they often result in reductions to the patrol operation. This works against the capability of the organization to maintain a stable patrol workforce, resulting in service reductions. It also affects the capacity of patrol personnel to perform supplemental duties and community policing activities.

The DPD should make the patrol function a priority as part of the overall strategy to restore public trust and improve relationships. This requires a restructuring and refocusing of the entire organization to support the function of patrol as the core element of police service delivery. The department should take a position that all patrol assignments are *essential*, backfilling any vacancies in patrol from less-essential roles (as determined by the department) within the organization.

Short Recommendation: Establish Minimum Patrol and Operational Staffing

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

A safe and effective patrol workforce is essential to maintaining a safe community. To ensure that officers are safe and effective, and to ensure that service levels are met, the department should establish minimum shift coverages that correlate with the staffing recommendations of this study, and maintain these levels consistently.

We have observed that patrol-staffing levels have been well below recommended levels, reaching 40-50% of targeted levels. This interferes with consistent policing practices, and it leads to other issues such as overtime, officer fatigue, and morale problems. We recommend setting the operational level of the police department at 532, and the minimum patrol allocation at 243. With the minimum patrol allocation at 243, the department will have a shift relief factor that is sufficient to absorb routine leave time, while maintaining staffing levels sufficient for maintaining operations.

Short Recommendation: Modify the Work Schedule

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

Adjust work schedule to accommodate proper staffing of beats, and for appropriate distribution of CFS.

- Immediate Fix (within 30-45 days)
 - Examine IACP recommendations for personnel reassignment and assign these personnel to patrol.
 - Ensure filling of other patrol vacancies as much as possible.
 - Absorb District 5 and staff these like any other beat
 - Establish over-staffing slots within each district. This involves adding personnel over the minimum schedule requirements, so that supervisors can remove personnel from the schedule for leave time, etc.
- Short-term fix (within 90-120 days)
 - Reduce beats to 7 per district (28 officers per shift)
 - This will recover 8 officers per shift (moving from 36 to 28 beats)
 - That is 16 shifts/day that are available
 - Assign 2 corporals per shift/district
 - New Schedule
 - AM Shift: 28 officers (beats), 8 corporals = 36 Total
 - PM Shift: 28 officers (beats), 8 corporals = 36 Total
 - MID Shift (Float Cars 1400-0200): 4 each district = 16 Total
 - NOTE: These are emergency out of beat cars. There are only 7,500 Priority CFS per year, which is about 20 per day.

- Over-Staffing:
 - The current number of staff allocated for the patrol division is 196. The new model here requires 176. This leaves 20 personnel (about 5 per district) available to be over-scheduled. Supervisors will move over-staffed personnel into vacant spots, as officers submit leave requests.
- Long-term fix
 - Consider other schedules. New schedules should:
 - Reduce/Eliminate Overtime
 - Eliminate Peaks and Valleys in Scheduling
 - Have flexibility to cover leave and training requests
 - Ensure appropriate staffing of all beats
 - Include supplemental staff to manage multiple CFS occurring in one beat, and to assist with emergency/priority CFS.

Short Recommendation: Ensure Proper Beat Deployment and Integrity

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

We recommend reemphasizing beat deployment and integrity, and changes to the beat structure and staffing, so that officer deployments will allow for continuity within the assigned beats. The DPD has stated and demonstrated its commitment to a community oriented policing strategy. Such a philosophy requires that officers have sufficient time to engage in community policing in a meaningful way, and it requires that officers have a connection to the community they are serving.

We advocate the use of a beat deployment system that encourages and emphasizes geographically structured policing and dispatching, such that officers can develop familiarity with their particular beat, allowing them to establish relationships and to develop collaborative community partnerships and community policing actions. We believe that AVL systems have significant utility. With adjustments to the beat structure, including size, geographic boundaries, and proper staffing, we believe that the AVL system will more often than not, locate personnel available for assignment to CFS within their designated patrol area. We propose the following model.

Beat/District Deployments

- Reduce beats to 28, which include seven per district, eliminating District 5
 - Total CFS = 136,000
 - Divided by 4 districts = 34,000 CFS for each district
 - Divided by 7 beats each = 4,857 CFS/beat annually
 - Divided by 365 days = 13.3 CFS/beat daily.
- 7 officers each district per shift $28 \times 2 = 56$

- 4 power shifts (daily - each district) = 16
- 2 Corporals per district per shift $8 \times 2 = 16$
- Total = 88 Shifts/Day

Short Recommendation: Improve the Documentation of Officer Activity

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Conducting a workload analysis for patrol requires data that can inform those calculations. The current practices or recording officer time at DPD do not account for a variety of officer actions, including things such as community policing, on-duty training, and report writing. We recommend the department identify the various metrics that would be helpful in conducting future workload studies, and then implement a strategy to engage those practices.

We recommend engaging a work group to do this, so that those involved can shape the process, and ensure that capturing the right information occurs, without creating a burdensome bureaucratic process.

Short Recommendation: Improve the Use of Alternative Reporting Strategies, including Crash Reporting

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Although DPD currently has a Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU), the department does not fully staff it. We encourage and recommend that DPD fully staff the TRU, and that the department moves forward with plans to engage an online reporting system.

We also recommend that the department work directly with the communications center and other personnel responsible for taking incoming phone calls during business hours, to route callers to the TRU or online reporting system, if that is appropriate. This will require some training of personnel, and establishing systems for oversight and follow up.

CHAPTER V: COMMUNITY POLICING AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Community Policing

Officers within the DPD know that community policing is an organizational philosophy, however, lack of available time has been a convenient and understandable excuse for patrol personnel to conduct minimal, if any, meaningful community policing work. Numerous officers told us that they did not have time to engage in community policing, and based on our complete assessment, this is largely true. The recommendations in this section (and others within the report), if carried out, will distribute obligated patrol work in such a way that officers will have sufficient time to engage the community-policing model. However, the department will need to reemphasize its expectations for officers in this regard, that community policing is an organizational philosophy, not one relegated to a particular unit (e.g. COPS or CRU unit), and then implement strategies to ensure this philosophy translates into practice.

During the course of our interviews, we learned that the DPD places a strong emphasis on community policing at the academy level. This emphasis extends into the field-training period for new recruits, during which time they are responsible for identifying a community-based problem, and implementing a solution. We applaud this approach, and believe it provides new officers with a strong foundation in understanding and applying community-policing principles. However, we found no evidence of ongoing community policing training for officers following academy training. We are aware that efforts are under way to correct this.

One issue raised by department members concerns holding officers accountable in performance reviews for *Community Involvement*. Most within the organization, including first-line supervisors, recognize that officers cannot meet this objective reasonably and consistently. This sets up a scenario where supervisors must hold officers accountable for a standard that they cannot meet, and in turn, this interferes with the concept of building relationships between leaders and officers. Accordingly, leadership needs to communicate a clear direction on how officers can accomplish the mission of community policing in the current environment, and in the new environment that emerges.

Some officers also indicated that although on the surface, the DPD embraces community policing (e.g., PTO program, evaluations, expectations, etc.), in reality, some of the actions of the command staff do not consistently convey the importance of this philosophy. Officer noted that many commanders at headquarters do not attend PAC meetings and that their level of communication with the community needs improvement. Several officers noted, that top commanders, need to act as role models, and push the philosophy out to the other commanders. The sentiment from the officers is that accountability for

community policing from the top is not happening, and this is effectively sabotaging the community policing effort.

Community-Based Programs and Partnerships

The DPD has a robust set of policies and procedures that relate to community-based partnerships and community safety programs. Within the DPD, the Community Resource Unit manages these functions. Programs within the community resource unit include:

- Neighborhood Watch
- Business Security
- Personal Protection Program
- Police Athletic League
- Police Facility Tours
- Citizens Observer Patrol
- Citizens Police Academy
- Explorer Program
- Partners Against Crime (PAC)

Each district has a Community Resource Unit (CRU) officer assigned to it. These officers report to the CRU Sergeant. District CRUs work directly with the community, and schedule programs and projects that support the various programs within the CRU.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS UNIT

The public affairs unit (PAU) has three non-sworn personnel and a captain oversees it. All three of the non-sworn personnel assigned to this unit have significant experience in media relations. As we have noted elsewhere in this report, we feel the supervision by the captain is unnecessary, and the department could recapture this position. We make this recommendation in Section III.

Negative media have plagued the department recently, and by many accounts, the prior police chief was not responsive to or sensitive to media inquiries and criticism. A key goal for the PAU is to correct this issue, and we feel that they are making strong progress through their strategy in engaging social media and other outlets. As we noted in Section III of this report, we feel the entire department can be useful in this regard, and that feeding positive stories to the PAU for distribution, will contribute to a more positive image for the police department.

Community Surveys/Feedback

We are aware that ancillary to this study, the City of Durham is conducting a community survey that will address police issues. We encourage this process, and feel that the DPD could benefit from the information gathered. However, as with the internal survey conducted for this study, it is incumbent upon organizational leaders to use the information gleaned from the study to make positive changes. In addition, the department should conduct subsequent studies to analyze any perceived changes in public perception, and gauge the community's response to changes the department makes.

In addition to community surveys, we encourage DPD to consider other mechanisms for regular community feedback, including holding community meetings. Another process the department could use would be to set up an online survey for community members that have contact with the police department. DPD could print the link to the survey on the back of business cards the officers can give out to those whom they contact as part of their regular duties.

We recognize that not everyone who responds to surveys or who takes the time to fill out a comment card will provide positive information. Despite this, there are two primary objectives in establishing an ongoing process of this nature. First, the community has an opportunity to share their experiences. This type of feedback is important to build community relations and trust. Second, feedback of this nature can provide the DPD with an opportunity to watch for patterns of criticism, which may point to issues requiring attention. This is not a formal recommendation of this study, but we suggest that the DPD consider these options.

Community Perceptions

In order to gauge citizen perceptions regarding the DPD, our staff conducted a series of meetings to gather information from citizens, citizen groups, businesses, and governmental officials, regarding the service delivery and day-to-day operations of the DPD. Some meetings were individual, and some involved groups with shared interests, such as community groups, business owners, and elected officials. Approximately 75-100 persons participated in these meetings.

Much of the information conveyed was positive; many expressed support for the police department, and applauded their efforts. Although they expressed some frustration over a perceived negative shift in relationships, the business community, crime prevention groups, faith community, and individual community members, expressed that they would enthusiastically engage in a proactive partnership and collaboration with the DPD, given the opportunity. Additional comments included:

- The five District PAC (Partners Against Crime) groups are viewed as being a vital, effective, and positive way to interact with community members and engage in collaborative problem solving.
- National Night Out is a success and many want this to be the mindset all the time.
- There is substantial support for additional officer positions. Many believe the majority of officers are good, hard working people who try to do things right, yet they are concerned that some cultural aspects of the agency may require revision.
- Many praised the Police Athletic League for its interaction with and influence on youth.
- The prevailing attitude is that with a return to community policing, once officers get out of their cars and into the community, more residents will be willing to participate in Neighborhood Watch and similar crime prevention programs.
- Increases in the training and visibility of crime prevention efforts like Citizens Police Academy, Neighborhood Watch, PAC, List-serves, Crime Stoppers, etc., would contribute greatly to building community support and trust.
- DurhamTRY - Together for Resilient Youth (a statewide program), is an excellent program with some good DPD participation. More DPD participation would be better.

Despite these positive aspects, others were more critical, and several general themes emerged from these discussions.

- Deteriorating Relationships Between DPD and Durham Community - Lack of Public Trust
- Perception of Racism and Discriminatory Practices by Durham Police Officers
- Call for a Return to Community Policing
- Increase the Number of Police officers on Patrol

The following information expands on these general themes.

Deteriorating Relationships Between DPD and Durham Community - Lack of Public Trust:

The common theme that emerged from interviews with a wide cross-section of members of the Durham community focused on the poor relationship and lack of public trust between the Durham Police Department and the community. The majority of community members stated that the relationship with their police department has deteriorated over recent years and it has negatively affected the public's trust in the DPD. Several business community members expressed that their efforts to collaborate with the police in crime prevention no longer seem to be a priority, nor does DPD seem interested in embracing these overtures. This deterioration of their once proactive relationship has manifested itself in great frustration among private business owners and the various community crime-watch groups. The free flow of information from the DPD that had fostered a

positive and proactive collaboration to reduce fear and crime has reportedly evaporated. Those community members, who previously felt engaged with the DPD to protect their neighborhoods, were seeing the actual results of their efforts. Those same business members now have a sense of abandonment, and that the DPD is no longer interested in collaborating with them.

- A member of the Hispanic community stated that the relationship with the DPD could be better if there were more bilingual officers, greater outreach to the Hispanic community, and an effort by the DPD to get accurate information to the people on important topics, such as U-Visas. There is an elevated level of fear and mistrust of police based on cultural issues that could be resolved through commitment to a consistent and engaged relationship.
- A prominent member of the black faith community called for a commitment by the DPD to embrace fully the philosophy of community policing to address the poor relationship that currently exists between the DPD and the community. He acknowledges the significant social issues that drive criminal behavior, but has an expectation that the DPD will engage in an active partnership with community members in problem solving.
- A professional bondsman and member of the black community has had a long time relationship with the DPD. He related a negative personal experience with the police department. He states that the community has significant trust issues and a very low level of confidence in the DPD.

Several of the individual community members interviewed and many who spoke at a community meeting at City Hall stated that the current relationship between the DPD and residents of Durham is poor and is progressively getting worse. They stated that there is little to no public trust between the two entities. Members of the black community believe that some officers are good and practice community policing when they can, but perceive that too many of the officers engage in disparate police practices that leadership seems to condone. Most believe the DPD is understaffed, focuses only on criminal enforcement and not the community as a whole, and that the DPD treats the black community with little respect.

Perception of Racism and Discriminatory Practices by Durham Police Officers

Many of the citizens we interviewed, and many who spoke at the community meeting, feel that the DPD engages in discriminatory practices. Some prominent events have contributed to these sentiments, including the in-custody suicide of a Hispanic man. Several of those we interviewed conveyed personal experiences and observations, which if accurate, would be evidence of discrimination by the DPD. These incidents and others, and the national media, have combined to create significant perceptions in the public, and by some city officials, of racism and discrimination by the DPD.

In addition, in two formal research studies and reports, the authors conveyed information that appears to support citizen claims of discriminatory practices by the DPD. One report, released by Professor Frank Baumgartner of University of North Carolina (UNC) in 2012, suggests that there are “extensive disparities by race,” and that “these differences carry over into the eventual outcome of the police stop. Whites are more likely to receive a warning and minority drivers are more likely to be arrested after a stop.”¹³

Various community groups such as the Southern Coalition for Social Justice (SCSJ), NAACP, Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People (DCABP), Fostering Alternative Drug Enforcement (FADE), and People’s Alliance, called for action against the DPD based on the traffic study, and submitted a report to the Mayor and City Council. Subsequent mandates from the city council to the police department included:

- Written consent forms required to search any vehicles or residences
- Making possession of marijuana a low-level enforcement priority
- Mandatory review of traffic stop data for racial trends
- Training for police officers in biased policing

In 2014, Durham (NC) Mayor Bill Bell reached out to the Office of Justice Programs Diagnostic Center following a spike in homicides and strained police-community relations. The recommendations from the diagnostic center for improvement include developing a communications strategy, enhancing community collaboration and revitalization, as well as participating in peer exchanges with other police agencies that have proven approaches to addressing violent crime.¹⁴

In a recent report issued by RTI International, authors engaged a *veil of darkness* approach, and concluded that the DPD disproportionately stopped black males, as opposed to non-black drivers.¹⁵

Call for a Return to Community Policing

During our interviews with citizens, there was an urgent and consistent call for the DPD to return to the philosophy of community policing, and specifically for police officers to get out of their cars and establish relationships with the people they serve. This was of particular emphasis in black neighborhoods, the public housing communities (there are 14), and with the youth in all parts of the city. Many identified former Chief Lopez as being ultimately responsible for the current, more traditional approach to policing in their city, and for not implementing community-policing practices consistently. All felt

¹³ North Carolina Traffic Stop Statistics Analysis - <https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/papers/Baumgartner-Traffic-Stops-Statistics-1-Feb-2012.pdf>

¹⁴ Diagnostic Analysis for the City of Durham - https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/custom_content/documents/engagement_documents/durham_diagnostic_analysis_20150416.pdf

¹⁵ RTI International Study of the Durham PD - http://www.rti.org/pubs/vod_durham_final.pdf

that there should be transparency and accountability on the part of the leadership as they address community problems.

In furtherance of the success of community policing and improving relationships, many suggested there should be a residency requirement for officers, or at least some financial incentives to draw officers back into homes located inside the city. Many believed that the city should provide take-home cars for officers who reside within the city limits. There was a perception that the visibility and presence of more patrol vehicles in the neighborhoods would help deter crime somewhat. All felt that this *personal investment* of owning a home in the community they serve, would go a long way to improving the accessibility and attitudes of officers toward the residents, and a more true form of community policing.

Increase the Number of Police officers on Patrol

Every person specifically interviewed, and most who spoke at the community meeting, thought the police department would benefit from additional police officers and that the current force was overworked. For the most part, this stemmed from what was visible to the public and that which they learned through city council meetings, etc. Some examples include problems with response times they may have experienced, the visible lack of community policing activities, which we have already explained, the visibly increasing incidents of violent crime in the city, and the high volume of calls for service.

Co-Production Police Model

There is ample evidence to suggest that there is a significant community-trust gap with respect to the DPD. Correcting this requires intentional relationship building and connection with the community. Although community policing is an effective strategy, and true community policing involves the entire organization, these efforts often focus on individual issues or problems, leaving out the broader scope of community involvement.

Traditionally, police agencies have set the course for policing priorities within the community, and arguably, police officials have the best vantage point from which to form these strategies. However, making these decisions independently, and without community input and involvement, works against the notion of transparency, and it can foster mistrust and damage relationships.

The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing report addresses the co-production of policing directly. Within the section of the report that involves community-policing (pillar four), the authors appropriately point out, "Community policing emphasizes working with neighborhood residents to co-produce public safety." The report suggests further, "Neighborhood policing provides an opportunity for police departments to do

thing with residents in the co-production of public safety rather than doing things to or for them.”¹⁶

We believe that although the DPD has been effective and intentional with respect to data-driven and intelligence-led policing efforts, these processes have not engaged the public, and consequently, there is a perception of a lack of transparency. Further, without engaging the public in these decisions, the department has not created any community buy-in to the strategies engaged. Accordingly, in keeping with the President’s report, we recommend that the DPD fully engage a co-production policing model.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: Reemphasize Community Policing as a Department Strategy

Section: V Community Policing

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

The DPD needs to reemphasize and revitalize their commitment to a Community Oriented Policing (COP) philosophy. This renewed emphasis must include clear direction for staff, and a culture of accountability. The infrastructure of the COP approach presently exists within the Durham PD, as indicated by the Police Training Officer Program (PTO), performance appraisals that evaluate officers on their level of community involvement, and most importantly, as demonstrated by individual officers who care about their community and want to establish positive relationships with the citizens. To accomplish this, leaders should do the following:

- Communicate clear expectations to all command staff as to the purpose and mission of the agency, and that the community policing philosophy is mandatory for all command staff.
- Hold commanders accountable for their actions and behavior toward accomplishing short and long-term goals of the agency, particularly with respect to community policing efforts.
- Articulate and clearly communicate the vision for the DPD to those within the department, to include the importance of community policing in repairing community relationships and restoring public trust.
- Emphasize the core values and expectations of the agency, and communicate to officers how they can demonstrate these through community policing.
- Perform a SWOT or similar exercise to form the basis of a strategic plan for the agency moving forward within the context of community policing.

¹⁶ Final Report of The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing - http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf

- Within the strategic plan, outline some short-term goals focused on community policing that can be accomplished and recognized to sustain momentum in accomplishing the long-term goals. Make these short-term successes public within the department and in the community.
- Prioritize non-criminal interaction with youth as part of the community policing philosophy and embrace the many programs that integrate youth into police interactions.

Short Recommendation: Acknowledge and Address Public Perceptions of Racism and Discriminatory Policing by DPD

Section: V Community Policing

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

Durham PD leadership must accept that the root cause of the poor relationships and lack of public trust in the community is the widespread perception of racism on the part of police officers and the agency as a whole. DPD leadership must develop a strategy to correct that perception, identify current practices that feed this perception, and immediately modify/eliminate those practices.

Although we acknowledge that some officers may engage in disparate or discriminatory practices, in our assessment, racism is not an institutional problem within the DPD. However, this perception has become a reality for many citizens, and they view all actions by all officers through this prism. Effective communication at multiple levels must be a key element of any strategy.

The executive leadership team must acknowledge that there is a severe deficit of public trust in many districts and among a large segment of the population of the city. This acknowledgement must be accompanied by a shared resolve to do whatever it takes to restore the public trust, starting with personal accountability at all levels of the organization.

Suggested action steps for the executive team include:

1. Set up a meeting with every member of the DPD in appropriately subdivided groups, and articulate the uncompromising agency core values, to include fair and impartial policing for everyone.
2. Provide a vision, both short-term and long-term, for the future operation of the DPD. Discuss what accountability will look like from this point on, and solicit feedback and promise to provide feedback at every opportunity.
3. Emphasize the great work of the majority of officers, including what behavior is expected, and clearly state that executive leadership will not tolerate staff behaviors that violate agency core values.

4. Use the very best communication and change-management strategies, and anticipate resistance and establish a plan to manage it.
5. Issue all members of DPD personalized business cards to give out during all interactions, to encourage a personal connection with the residents and future positive interactions. (This could include a survey comment link as described).
6. As soon as possible after meeting with DPD personnel, schedule a press conference to communicate with the public about the core issues facing the agency and its relationship with the community. Acknowledge the perception of racism, articulate the core values of the agency, and provide elements of the strategic plan going forward intended to address the concerns of the community directly. The plan should identify specific measurable goals and the actions the department will take to accomplish those goals, including measures to assess progress and accomplishment of those goals.
7. Assure the community that the department will provide continuing feedback on the progress of the agency toward meeting these objectives.

Short Recommendation: Engage a Co-Production Police Model

Section: V Community Policing

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

There is a need for the community to have a greater level of involvement in the decision-making processes that drive much of the policing strategies that affect them directly. Engaging a co-production policing model will contribute to community involvement, add to transparency, and build relationships and public trust. We make the following recommendations, which emanate directly from the report of The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing:¹⁷

- Schedule regular forums and meetings where all community members can interact with police and help influence programs and policy.
- Engage youth and communities in joint training with law enforcement, citizen academies, ride-alongs, problem-solving teams, community action teams, and quality of life teams.
- Establish formal community/citizen advisory committees to assist in developing crime prevention strategies and agency policies as well as provide input on policing issues.

¹⁷ The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing - http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf

CHAPTER VI: JUVENILES

As noted in other sections within this report, agency interactions with juveniles are an important element of policing. Positive police interactions with juveniles contribute to improved relationships and trust between the police and youth. Further, programs and projects that contribute to engaging youth in decision-making, problem solving, and collaborative efforts (such as restorative justice, youth courts, and peer interventions), lead to a sense of citizenship and contribute to reducing juvenile crime.

Programs

The DPD has various programs in place to work directly with youth. These include the Police Athletic League, and the Explorer program. In addition, DPD has a Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program, offered through the school system.

Policies

DPD has two policies that relate directly to juveniles, including a policy related to the GREAT program, and General Order 4036 R-6, which covers Juvenile Handling Procedures.

General Order 4036 R-6 on handling juveniles includes guiding language for officers related to preliminary investigations, interviewing, charging juveniles, information disclosure, taking juveniles into protective custody, or detention for a criminal offense.

The DPD policy on juveniles also includes a section relating to diversion. We were pleased to see the inclusion of this language, which is in keeping with modern policing standards that encourage alternative dispositions and diversions of juveniles, where warranted. Despite some public comments to the contrary, we did not find a propensity on the part of the DPD to charge/arrest juveniles. In fact, for 2014, juvenile arrests were down more than 16% from the five-year average, and juvenile arrests in 2014 were less than half the total in 2010.

School Resource - GREAT Officers

As noted above, the DPD has a GREAT program, along with a policy governing the actions of the GREAT officers. Within the Goals and Objectives section of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), GREAT officers are encouraged to problem-solve and work collaboratively with students, teachers, and administrators. Further, the SOP encourages GREAT officers to be innovative in developing their own ideas and to work directly with the school concerning youth issues such as conflict resolution, mediation and truancy, and in other programs, that support community oriented policing strategies.

Based on our analysis, we feel that the GREAT policy conforms significantly to the recommendations in The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing report. The report calls for agencies to engage programs that encourage youth to develop decision-making skills, including restorative justice, youth courts, and peer intervention, and working with schools to develop alternatives to suspension and expulsion through restorative justice, diversion, counseling, and family interventions.¹⁸

One item that we did not see in our evaluation of materials related to the GREAT officers, was a memorandum of understanding with the school system, which outlines the involvement of GREAT officers in school discipline matters, and other functions. We would encourage the DPD to create such a document, and to identify and clarify roles of the officers while operating within the schools.

Durham Public Schools

As part of our onsite visit, we had an opportunity to visit with the Director of Security for the Durham Public Schools. According to Ms. Ingram, from the perspective of the response to actual incidents in the schools, a good relationship currently exists between the schools and the police department. She said this is specific to the level of cooperation they enjoy from an enforcement aspect and that this relationship is consistently good from the officer level to the command staff.

In contrast; however, Ms. Ingram emphasized that they are seeing gang involvement/activity at the elementary level and the best hope to disrupt this dangerous influence is for DPD to collaborate with the school district and make a solid commitment to, prioritize and ultimately expand the number of GREAT officers, as well as SROs throughout the district. The School District experts firmly believe that early intervention by GREAT officers or SROs is critical and that the relationship between the kids and the officers is irreplaceable.

Between the city and the county, there are only seven GREAT officers to cover over 16 elementary schools. The school districts feels that increasing this number would benefit the community, as this would be an affirmative step toward addressing some of the concerns of the black community and young black men.

Current numbers of police officers working in the Durham School District:

- County Sheriff SRO's - 17
- County Sheriff GREAT officers - 3

¹⁸ The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing - http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf

- Durham PD GREAT officers - **4** (rotate between 16 elementary schools)
- Durham PD SRO's - **0**
- Off Duty Officers - **30** per regular school day - *Funded by the Durham School District.*

The Durham School District currently provides no funding for the GREAT officer positions. This is something that officials from the city and the school district have discussed regularly, but it remains unresolved. Based on our understanding of the money the school district currently pays for off-duty officers, we feel there is an opportunity to expand the use of GREAT officers and School Resource Officers (SROs) from DPD, with the district funding a significant portion of these positions. We understand that discussions between the city and school district on this matter are ongoing.

The Durham school district places great value in keeping their schools a safe place for the students, and in helping to prepare them for the future in a sometimes challenging and dangerous environment. Since few would argue that reaching at-risk youth early is strategic, it would seem there is great potential for significant proactive problem solving that could result from an expanded collaboration by DPD, including an unequivocal commitment to have an effective presence in the schools.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: Re-emphasize and focus policing efforts on youth engagement

Section: VI: Juveniles

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

The DPD should regularly conduct analyses of crime data to identify the types and frequency of crimes committed by and upon juveniles with the specific intent to develop programs to prevent them. Youth-police relationship building programs help to reduce victimization, involvement of youth in the juvenile justice system, and affiliation with gangs or gang activity. Positive youth-police relationships can help to build trust and minimize the fear of police. Prevention, intervention, and relationship building programs often enhance recruitment efforts for future police officers.

The IACP maintains an extensive directory of successful intervention programs for juveniles involved in criminal activity, either as a victim, or as a perpetrator, which law enforcement agencies across the United States have implemented. It can be instrumental in identifying and implementing effective programs. The website, IACP Youth Focused Policing Resource Center, is located www.iacpyouth.org.

We also recommend continued discussions with the school district concerning the use of GREAT officers, and SROs within the schools. As noted, the school district is currently

spending a significant amount of money on off-duty officers, which we feel the district could easily redirect to cover a substantial portion of the cost of hiring more DPD officers for assignment to the schools. School district funding would not cover the full cost of adding these officers, but the addition of these staff would likely contribute significantly to public safety within the community, and they would also likely improve relationships and trust between officers and youth in Durham.

CHAPTER VII: EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

The DPD uses the services of the Durham Emergency Communications Center for dispatching police CFS. The emergency communications center is a separate entity from the police department, and accordingly, it operates independently. Because the communications center is not part of the police department, we did not conduct a study of its operations. However, we provide a cursory review of a few items below.

Alternative Response

As previously noted, we recommend that the DPD engage alternative response methods, to include use of the Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU), and online reporting. Although DPD currently uses TRU, this does not appear integrated into the communications center process. Essentially, if a citizen calls the communications center, operators take the requisite information and dispatch an officer.

We recognize that there may be complications in routing callers to the TRU, as opposed to having a communications center operator take the information and dispatch an officer. However, there is significant potential for resource saving if dispatchers can route calls to the TRU appropriately. Accordingly, we recommend that DPD explore this option with communication center staff, and that the responsible parties collaborate on a process for doing this.

Call Routing with Dispatch

In Section IV of this report, we discussed response times to CFS. We provided two models for calculating response times, one that includes the time the dispatcher received the call, and one that excludes this time. We reported these time variations in Table 51, which we have repeated below for reference. In examining Table 51, we can see that there is some lag-time between receipt of the CFS, and the time the dispatcher sends the CFS to an officer. This lag-time varies by priority, with a 1 minute 47 second delay on P CFS, and nearly 3 minutes on priority 1 CFS. We recognize that these times are beyond the control of the DPD, but we would recommend discussions between DPD and communications center staff to determine how to improve and shorten these times.

TABLE 51 (repeated): Total Average Response Time by Priority

Call Priority	Avg. Call Time to First Arrive	Avg. First Dispatched to First Arrive
P	0:07:33	0:05:46
1	0:11:30	0:08:34
2	0:12:37	0:08:41
3	0:20:12	0:13:07
4	0:26:01	0:14:33
5	0:21:27	0:08:57
6	0:29:38	0:15:54
7	0:18:00	0:08:11
8	0:52:36	0:45:38
9	0:32:02	0:09:52
Unknown	0:17:47	0:10:21
Grand Total	0:18:38	0:11:25

Source: Durham PD 2014 CAD Data

Priority Dispatching Protocols

The communications center uses an Auto Vehicle Locator (AVL) system, which relies on GPS to find the closest available unit for priority-level CFS. Based on CAD data, the communications center received approximately 7,900 priority CFS in 2014, all of which would rely upon AVL for dispatching. We are aware that many communication centers using AVL often use it for dispatching non-priority units to CFS, even if this is not the protocol. As we have noted elsewhere in this report, we feel that beat integrity is an important part of the overall strategy for community policing in Durham, and this demands that, to the extent possible, units assigned to particular beats, remain in those beats whenever possible. Accordingly, DPD should discourage the use of AVL for non-priority CFS, unless there is a specific reason for deviating from this practice.

Units Dispatched


Based on our review of communications center practices, there is a functional policy and procedure for determining which officers to dispatch to each CFS, including the number of officers required for each particular CFS. As noted elsewhere, we have concerns related to over-response to CFS, which we feel the DPD should monitor and continue to evaluate.

CHAPTER VIII: INVESTIGATIONS AND STAFFING

Criminal investigations are a shared function in the DPD. Patrol officers conduct preliminary and some follow-up investigations for minor offenses, while the criminal investigations bureau and district investigators are primarily responsible for follow-up investigations of more serious offenses.

An assistant chief commands the Investigative Services Bureau, and there are several divisions and units within the bureau; we depict these divisions and units in Figure 23 below.

FIGURE 23: Investigations Bureau Organizational Structure



We have already detailed the structural layout of the Forensic Services and Special Operations divisions in Section III above. The analysis that follows in this Section, relates to the Criminal Investigations Division.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION (CID)

The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) is comprised of Homicide Unit, Special Victims Unit, Fraud Unit, Domestic Violence Unit, and a District Attorney Investigator.

The Homicide Unit has seven investigators that are assigned about 4-5 homicide investigations a year. They also investigate all missing persons over the age of 18, and all natural deaths. When a homicide occurs, within the city, the entire unit responds. The unit has some cold cases with leads, but reportedly lacks the staffing to follow upon those cases. The following information represents the activity of the Homicide Unit for 2014:

Disposed of 548 cases
298 death investigations

195 missing persons cases
22 misc. cases
42 homicides

The Fraud Unit has eight investigators assigned to the unit. One investigator works strictly on pawnshop activities, and one investigator works with the IRS Task Force. The remaining investigators work on the reported fraud cases. The fraud unit handled 1,738 cases in 2014.

Domestic Violence (DV) has ten investigators assigned to the unit. They do a very good job at maintaining a 30-day turnaround on their cases. Power DMS does an excellent job with helping them track their cases. If a DV investigator is not working, they are available for call out in DV cases if the incident requires a search warrant, if a sexual assault occurred, or there was an aggravated assault. Patrol handles the majority of DV calls for service. The DV unit disposed of 2,288 cases in 2014.

The Special Victims Unit (SVU) has eight investigators assigned to this unit and one of them is assigned to a federal task force for Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC). The SVU handles, rape, sex offences, child abuse, indecent exposure, school assaults not handled by the schools, and felony child assault/abuse. This unit also receives cases from outside Department of Social Services and Child Protective Services. The SVU handled 312 SVU cases and 350 Social Services Cases in 2014.

District Investigations

In addition to CID, DPD assigns investigators to each of the districts. Districts 1-4 each have a sergeant, corporal, and six investigators. District 5 has a sergeant and two investigators. As we have noted previously, we recommend eliminating District 5 and recapturing these resources.

For evaluative purposes, it is important to describe staffing levels for each section and unit within the investigations bureau. Table 62 below shows staffing levels for Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Special Operations Division (SOD), and the Forensic Services Division. This table provides an overview of the allocations for these units, but the department has not consistently staffed all of these positions.

TABLE 62: Investigations Bureau Authorized Staffing

Investigations (CID)	Homicide	Fraud	D.V.	SVU	Dist. Atty.			Total
Captain							1	1
Lieutenant							1	1
Sergeant	1	1	1	1				4
Corporal	1	1	1	1				4
Admin. Asst.							2	2
Investigators	7	8	8	9	1			33
Sub-Total	9	10	10	11	1		4	45
Special Operations	Org. Crime	Interdict.	VIRT	Maj. Crime	SET Team	Warrnt.		Total
Captain							1	1
Lieutenant							1	1
Sergeant	1	1	1	1	1			5
Corporal	1	1	1	1	2	1		7
Admin. Asst.							2	2
Investigators/Officers	12	8	5	6	9	3	1	44
Sub-Total	14	10	7	8	12	4	5	60
Forensic Services	Squads A-D	Digital FSU	Latent	Firearms	Property			Total
Manager							1	1
Supervisor					1		3	4
CSS	4							4
CSI	10							10
Admin. Asst.							1	1
Assigned Staff		2	2	2	4			10
Sub-Total	14	2	2	2	5	0	5	30
Totals	37	22	19	21	18	4	14	135

Source: Durham PD

Table 58, provided previously, shows the average percentage of sworn staff allocated to investigations among the benchmark cities. The average is 13.16%, and DPD has 108 sworn officers, or 21.09% of its workforce allocated to investigations. The following units are included or excluded from this total.

The above total includes:

District Investigators	35
Homicide	9
Fraud	10
Domestic Violence	10
Special Victims	11

District Attorney	1
Organized Crime	14
Interdiction and Highway Interdiction	10
Major Crimes	8

The above total does not include:

VIRT	7
Warrant Squad	4
SET Teams	12
BCERT	1

The percentage of sworn staff assigned to investigations at DPD is slightly higher than the benchmark average, but it is similar to percentages we have observed in other studies, which have also been in the 20% range. We do not believe that the percentage of personnel assigned to investigations at DPD is overly high, but we do recommend some realignment of personnel. Specifically, we recommend removal of three positions from the organized crime unit, and allocation two investigators from District 5 to the Homicide Unit.

During the course of our study, we had an opportunity to talk with several investigators and investigation supervisors. All the investigators we spoke with indicated that if it were adequately staffed, those in the patrol division would have more time to properly conduct an initial investigation, which could help alleviate some of the follow up work that the investigators have to do. As an example, fraud investigators indicated that obtaining good financial information and documenting this in the initial police report, would help investigators dramatically. Currently, many of the investigators believe that patrol is simply understaffed, which often results in officers rushing through their work to get to another call. Unfortunately, this means some officers do not collect sufficient details on some cases.

During our interviews with staff, we heard that investigative personnel effectively use Power DMS to manage and assign cases. However, upon further inquiry, we learned that there is no consistency in case management across the DPD, and that various districts and investigation units handle case management differently. Consequently, data analysis staff told us that the department was unable to produce a complete dataset relating to case assignment, monitoring, supervision, closure times, and clearance rates.

We heard from supervisors and patrol officers that those in the domestic violence (DV) unit regularly send work back to patrol, noting where they expect officers to make corrections. This has created a situation in which many officers feel DV investigators being overly critical of their work. We are aware that with the focus on domestic violence in recent years, many departments have moved to a more thorough process of investigation at the patrol level. This type of process contributes to higher prosecution

rates, and it minimizes the work required by secondary investigators (those in the DV unit). We suggest that DPD examine their DV investigation processes occurring at the patrol level, for possible revision.

Almost all of the investigators we interviewed believe that the department should centralize non-familial aggravated assaults cases within CID, not at the district level. During the interviews, investigators cited incidents in which an aggravated assault stems from an incident that occurred in a different district. It is also common for those involved in aggravated assaults to be involved in homicides. Another complication is that some districts use their aggravated assault detectives to investigate property crimes as well, which splits their focus from these violent crime investigations. By centralizing these crimes back to CID, the DPD will benefit from better communication amongst investigators with a greater focus pertaining to these types of crimes.

Staffing

Determining staffing within the investigations bureau, and particularly staffing for criminal investigations, is complicated. This is because there are no set standards for determining such staffing levels. Each agency is different, and the myriad variables make it impossible to conduct an agency-to-agency analysis. Instead, our assessment relies on workload and work outputs, and we will examine these further below. However, our analysis is somewhat limited, based on the limited data the department produced.

Work Schedules

Sworn personnel assigned to CID work a variety of shifts. Per policy, investigators work either Monday through Friday from 8:00 AM to 4:30 PM, Monday through Thursday 8:00 AM to 6:30 PM, or Tuesday through Saturday from 7:30 PM to 2:00 AM. The lieutenant is responsible for making these shift assignments. Based on our analysis and the lack of expressed concerns by detectives or supervisors, this schedule seems to be meeting agency needs. It appears there is a good balance of days on and off, and there is evening coverage, where needed.

Staffing requirements for investigators are determined, in part, by evaluating workload, in hours, against hours of availability. Investigators are not able to work for a variety of reasons including days off, holiday, vacation, sick leave, FMLA time, and training obligations. We received the actual leave data for from the DPD for investigations personnel for calendar year 2014. We totaled the leave data for all personnel and totaled each category. The data revealed that investigators worked an average of 1684 hours per year in 2014. Table 63 below displays the calculations used in determining this average. As with the patrol availability calculations, the training hours reflected here are inaccurate. As noted previously, although the department records attendance of all officer training, the department does not track total training hours. DPD staff told us that

the department only tracks the 36 hours required by the state. As a result, Table 63 reflects this amount. However, department staff estimated that each investigator receives an average of 80 hours of training annually. For our purposes, we conducted our calculations using the confirmed total of 36 hours for each investigator; however, we included the estimated total in a second model, to illustrate the difference. As with the patrol officers, we reiterate our concern here that the training records do not accurately reflect training hours received by staff, and the department should take steps to rectify this.

TABLE 63: Investigations Availability

Annual hours worked	2080	2080 (2)
Leave Category		
PTO/Vacation	-67	-67
Extended Sick	-28.6	-28.6
Holiday	-86	-86
Leave Without Pay	-0.7	-0.7
Military	-3.5	-3.5
Injury	-12.3	-12.3
Comp Time	-90.9	-90.9
FMLA/Parental	-17.1	-17.1
Funeral	-4.1	-4.1
Mgt./Admin	0	0
Stand-By	-48.3	-48.3
Vol. School	-0.8	-0.8
Other Training	-36	-80
Sub-total	-395.3	-439.3
Average Annual Availability (hours)	1684.7	1640.7

Source: Durham Human Resources

Policies and Procedures

We examined various policies and SOPs from the department that relate to investigations, case management, and case assignment. Despite these policies, staff has informed us of the inconsistencies that exist in these areas across the agency. We see this as a critical issue, and one in need of immediate attention. We note that department policy addresses solvability factors, which we applaud. However, in our interviews, we learned that there is apparently no formal process or measure of consistency in this application.

Workload and Caseloads

We received various data from DPD concerning the workload of investigators relating to case assignment, case clearance, and caseloads. However, as noted previously, we have reason to question the quality and completeness of these data. Accordingly, we provide our report an analysis based on the data provided to us, but with some reservations as to its quality.

Table 47 below, provides a listing of the total number of cases assigned to investigators between 2013 and 2015.

TABLE 64: Cases Assigned to Investigations by Year

Year	Counts	% Change
2013	13899	
2014	12610	-9.27%
2015	12641	0.25%

Source: DPD Analysis Division

The case assignment numbers in Table 64 include CID, SOD, and District Investigators, but no other units. Based on Table 64, case assignments were down dramatically in 2014 and 2015 in comparison to 2013. The reduction in 2015 from 2013 is about 9%, which represents a significant number.

Table 65 below provides a breakdown of the cases assigned from 2013 and 2015, by type. However, the number of *cases* reflected is deceiving, because of how the FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) requires agencies to record aggravated assault cases involving multiple victims. Based on UCR guidelines, when an aggravated assault occurs, where several people were present (such as in a drive-by shooting), each possible victim is counted as a separate incident. We are aware that the City of Durham has experienced several of these types of incidents recently, and to the uninformed, it appears that the number of aggravated assaults has risen dramatically; that is not necessarily the case. We do not intend to minimize the victimization of anyone involved, but merely to point out that the method of reporting these incidents produces the potential for apparent inflation of the numbers. As we noted in Section I, we recommend that the department track and report aggravated assault cases in both manners, so that this information is clearer.

TABLE 65: Cases Assigned to Investigations by Type

Row Labels	2013	2014	2015	% Change 2014 to 2015
Aggravated Assault	610	703	816	16.07%
All Other Offenses	6	27	23	-14.81%
Arson	30	22	30	36.36%
Burglary	3073	3363	2958	-12.04%
Counterfeiting	33	47	110	134.04%
Disorderly Conduct	10	4	3	-25.00%
Driving While Impaired	15	8		-100.00%
Drug Violations	173	119	78	-34.45%
Embezzlement	49	57	48	-15.79%
Forgery	32	39	44	12.82%
Fraud	1446	1436	1393	-2.99%
Homicide	31	25	42	68.00%
Larceny	4725	4095	3800	-7.20%
Liquor Law Violations		2		-100.00%
Motor Vehicle Theft	636	484	563	16.32%
Offenses Against Family	71	79	49	-37.97%
Prostitution	8	2	2	0.00%
Rape	87	96	90	-6.25%
Robbery	601	642	725	12.93%
Sex Offenses	138	183	146	-20.22%
Simple Assault	1283	1293	1356	4.87%
Stolen Property	8	12	15	25.00%
Vandalism	1223	981	735	-25.08%
Weapon Violations	46	50	53	6.00%
Grand Total	14334	13769	13079	-5.01%

Source: DPD Analysis Division

NOTE: Includes CID, SOD, and District Investigators, but no other units.

It is an important point to note that the data in Table 65 represents the number of cases assigned. It does not reflect cases with the potential for successful conclusion that supervisors did not assign to a detective because of a capacity issue. Our assessment relies on the data provided as they relate to actual cases assigned and worked. Accordingly, if supervisors have diverted a substantial amount of cases, due to workload limitations, or inconsistent case management practices, this could negatively skew our data and findings.

Table 66 below provides a breakdown of the cases assigned to the Domestic Violence and Special Victim unit by year for 2013 to 2015. We have included this table separately, to illustrate the significant focus required for DV and SVU cases. We note that DV cases

have increased by 16.46% since 2013. This highlights the need for additional efforts to improve preliminary DV investigations.

TABLE 66: Case Assignments in Domestic Violence and Special Victims

Offense	2013	2014	2015	Total
Domestic Violence	1640	1734	1910	5284
Special Victims	292	378	322	992
Total	1932	2112	2232	6276

Source: DPD Analysis Division

Table 67 below shows case assignments and case clearances from 2013 to 2015. Notably, each of the units within CID experienced a decline in clearance rates from 2013, despite a 9% reduction in case assignments.

TABLE 67: Case Assignment and Clearance Rates by Unit

CID	2013	Cleared	Closed %	2014	Cleared	Closed %	2015	Cleared	Closed %
Homicide	42	28	66.67%	39	25	64.10%	46	28	60.87%
Fraud	1536	242	15.76%	1533	222	14.48%	1567	175	11.17%
D.V.	1640	1379	84.09%	1734	1401	80.80%	1910	1476	77.28%
SVU	292	133	45.55%	378	97	25.66%	322	60	18.63%
Totals	3510	1782	50.77%	3684	1745	47.37%	3845	1739	45.23%

SOD	2013	Cleared	Closed %	2014	Cleared	Closed %	2015	Cleared	Closed %
Org. Crime	4	2	50.00%	8	7	87.50%	1	0	0.00%
Interdiction	28	26	92.86%	41	36	87.80%	41	38	92.68%
VIRT	28	28	100.00%	17	17	100.00%	27	27	100.00%
Major Crimes	81	43	53.09%	52	27	51.92%	43	9	20.93%
SET	39	39	100.00%	22	22	100.00%	16	16	100.00%
Totals	180	138	76.67%	140	109	77.86%	128	90	70.31%

District	2013	Cleared	Closed %	2014	Cleared	Closed %	2015	Cleared	Closed %
District 1	2037	422	20.72%	2574	389	15.11%	2137	257	12.03%
District 2	3358	296	8.81%	1009	123	12.19%	1790	218	12.18%
District 3	2750	362	13.16%	2792	395	14.15%	2619	306	11.68%
District 4	1727	389	22.52%	2051	466	22.72%	1742	433	24.86%
District 5	337	47	13.95%	360	46	12.78%	380	41	10.79%
Totals	10209	1516	14.85%	8786	1419	16.15%	8668	1255	14.48%

Source: DPD Data Analysis Division

NOTE: Excludes “non-reportable” offenses from the dataset. Totals reflect the number of offenses assigned to that division, including multiple crime types (e.g., the Homicide division investigated 42 cases in 2013, not 42 Homicides).

We feel it is important to point out that reductions in clearance rates may occur based on numerous factors. These can include, but are not limited to the quality of the preliminary investigation, deterioration of community trust (and cooperation), assignment of cases that have little chance of being solved, and capacity issues. In our analysis, we found no clear explanation for this downward trend. However, vacancies within the investigations bureau could be a significant contributing factor.

Detective Caseloads

Using staffing information provided in Table 62, we calculated the average caseloads for investigations personnel. Because of the variety of investigative responsibilities by unit and detective, along with the potential complexities of any type of investigation, average caseloads per investigator, by themselves, are not an appropriate metric for measuring performance. However, they do provide insight into the workload. Table 68 below provides insight into this metric, which reflects modest variations in the caseloads per detective in the different categories.

TABLE 68: Average Annual Caseloads per Detective

Assignment Area/Type	2013	Cases Per Invest.	2014	Cases Per Invest.	2015	Cases Per Invest.
Homicide Unit	42	5	39	4	46	5
Fraud	1536	154	1533	153	1567	157
Domestic Violence	1640	164	1734	173	1910	191
Special Victims	292	27	378	34	322	29
Major Crimes	81	10	52	7	43	5
Totals	3591		3736		3888	

*Cases per investigator reflect the nearest whole number.

In Table 69 below, we calculated the average amount of hours each investigator has available for each case. This model engages the workload hours available as calculated in Table 63 above.

As we have mentioned, there are no set standards for case assignments. To illustrate this, in other engagements, the range of monthly case assignments for crimes against persons was 3.3-9.6, and the range for property crimes was 5.5-9.2. Admittedly, these are broad ranges, but they point to the imperfect nature of calculating investigative caseload.

One of the numbers reflected in Table 69 below is the total number of hours available for each investigator for each case. However, this number reflects the total number of work hours available for each investigator, and it presumes that they do nothing else but casework. Accordingly, this number is relative, and based on other non-investigative work they perform it will go down. Despite the fact that these numbers reflect total

available time for investigators, in our analysis, it appears that detectives within CID have sufficient time to investigate the cases assigned to them.

TABLE 69: Investigative Capacity per Detective

Unit	Cases Assigned	Number of Detectives	Annual Cases per Detective	Monthly Average per Detective	Average Available Hours per Year	Average Hours Available per Month	Average Hours Available per Case	Average Hours Available per Case (2)
Homicide	46	9	5.11	0.43	1685	140.42	329.67	321.07
Fraud	1567	10	156.70	13.06	1685	140.42	10.75	10.47
Domestic Violence	1910	10	191.00	15.92	1685	140.42	8.82	8.59
Special Victims	292	10	29.20	2.43	1685	140.42	57.71	56.20
Major Crimes	43	8	5.38	0.45	1685	140.42	313.49	305.30

*Average hours available per case correlate to the two models shown in Table 63.

Another important measure of effectiveness for investigations units involves examining the amount of time that cases are open for investigation. If supervisors monitor cases properly, and investigators must either successfully clear or otherwise close a case, this metric can provide a good benchmark for determining unit capacity.

Put another way, if a unit has 10 investigators and each completes one case every 60 days, whether this involves an arrest/charge, or case closure, the capacity of that unit is 60 (i.e. each investigator completes six cases per year, times 10 investigators).

This information is particularly helpful for those who must evaluate unit capacity and make decisions related to which cases to investigate. As we have already mentioned, a robust case management system is a mandate for this type of monitoring.

TABLE 70: Investigation Duration in days by Category

Type	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average
Aggravated Assault	32.36	26.24	30.47	20.85	27.48
All Other Offenses	27.5	22	35.56	27.33	28.10
Arson	13.12	25.33	15.26	14.52	17.06
Burglary	26.12	29.37	19.08	12.65	21.81
Counterfeiting	41.37	28.14	26.77	42.08	34.59
Disorderly Conduct	6.41	-12.39	0.02	0.52	-1.36
Driving While Impaired	-0.11	-0.08	-0.62	-0.06	-0.22
Drug Violations	1.55	-1.68	1	0.03	0.23
Embezzlement	33.76	5.66	21.42	15.74	19.15
Forgery	46.9	52.42	37.46	26.29	40.77
Fraud	37.14	31.71	27.17	21.61	29.41
Gambling Violations	0				0.00
Homicide	125.37	96.55	56.06	57.21	83.80
Larceny	21.88	30.22	20.3	17.07	22.37
Liquor Law Violations	-0.05	-0.12	-0.41	0	-0.15
Motor Vehicle Theft	32.85	-2.26	1.44	12.01	11.01
Non-Reportable Offenses	15.98	13.02	6.94	5.5	10.36
Offenses Against Family	54.25	25.51	22.79	27.2	32.44
Prostitution	-0.5	0	-0.46	0.21	-0.19
Rape	89.6	37.94	44.93	37.72	52.55
Robbery	43.9	35.81	32.25	22.75	33.68
Sex Offenses	50.55	60.66	43.69	36.84	47.94
Simple Assault	31.33	28.72	27.83	20.46	27.09
Stolen Property	15.29	0.13	1.24	3.39	5.01
Vandalism	24.57	19.09	16.44	15.5	18.90
Weapon Violations	4.32	1.36	4	1.93	2.90
Grand Total	23.14	21.73	17.85	13.84	19.14

Source: DPD Data Analysis Division

In examining the cases and case durations listed in Table 70, we do not see anything concerning. Serious cases such as homicide, rape, sexual offenses, and aggravated assault, have longer open rates, while other less complex cases such as larceny, burglary, and auto theft, have shorter durations.

Other Workload Data

Based on our observations and interviews with detectives and supervisory personnel, we know that other duties, primarily report writing, consume a substantial amount of daily activity. To quantify investigative and non-investigative work efforts, we provided an

Internet-based survey to the detectives; we did not collect any identifiable information in the survey. Table 71 below shows the results of the workload question from the survey.

TABLE 71: Investigations Survey

Category Options	Response Average %
Administrative/Other	9.22
Arrest	2.06
Community Contact	3.75
Crime Lab	0.65
Crime Scene Processing	0.45
Court/Trial Prep	3.05
District Attorney Follow-Up	3.06
Evidence Views/Disposition	1.23
Interviews	5.42
Investigations	20.39
Legal (e.g. Search Warrant, Arrest Warrant)	5.83
Meetings	5.99
Phone Calls/Emails	9.66
Report Writing	9.03
Supervisory Duties	6.84
Surveillance	2.81
Teaching	0.58
Threat Assessment	1.00
Training	3.30
Travel/Driving	4.36
Total*	98.68

Source: IACP Investigations Self-Reported Survey DPD

*Totals do not equal 100% due to rounding.

From this self-reported data, we note that administrative/other, meetings, and phone call/emails, account for nearly 19% of the time available for detectives. Assuming these data are relatively accurate, they would reduce the available time for investigators by about 320 hours annually. Of course, this would also affect the amount of time investigators have available for each case. It is also noteworthy that those queried reported that investigation activities only consume about 20% of their time. Admittedly, some of the other categories of work relate to investigations (e.g. phone calls, report writing, legal), but the breakdown of work, and the limited percentage of time actually spent investigating cases, is remarkable, and worthy of understanding by supervisors evaluating the work and case progress of investigators.

One aspect of work that we did not identify in Table 71 above is community policing. The fact that certain officers work in the investigations unit does not mean they cannot or

should not engage in community policing efforts. Those assigned to investigations tend to include the most tenured and capable officers in police agencies (see Table 22 – Experience Profile above), and accordingly, they have much to contribute from a community policing perspective. Police agencies in general, and DPD in particular, would benefit from engaging detectives in the community policing process. Whether this occurs independently or collaboratively, we encourage this practice. However, doing so will reduce further the available hours detectives have available for investigative work, so integrating detectives into the community policing process should be done with an understanding of how this shifts the work burden, and the need for additional personnel in the investigations bureau.

TABLE 72: Self-Reported Current and Preferred Investigative Caseload

Investigation Area	Current	Preferred
Fraud/Financial Crimes	16	19
General Investigations	23	13
Homicide/Violent Crime	9	5
Other Crimes Against Persons	12	7
Other Specialized Unit	2	1
Property Crimes	33	14
Task Force	10	5
Vice/Narcotics	5	7

Source: IACP Investigations Self-Reported Survey DPD

In the survey that we provided to investigators, we also asked them to identify how many cases they routinely manage, and how many they felt was optimal. Table 72 above outlines these responses. For most of the categories provided, detectives self-reported current caseloads that are significantly higher than they would prefer.

Table 72 also provides some insight into case closure timelines. In Table 68, we provided the average number of monthly cases per detective, based on dividing the number of allocated personnel by the number of cases for each unit. Two aspects of those data are worth mentioning. First, like the patrol division, the detective division has been operating with a shortage of personnel. Accordingly, the averages are inaccurate, and they relate to allocated personnel, not staffed personnel. Second, the average number of cases per detective only establishes how many cases supervisors assign to them; it does not take into account how long it takes to close those cases. As noted earlier, we know that not all cases resolve within 30 days, and Table 70 suggests this, as it contrasts the monthly case assignments listed in Table 68.

In the investigators survey, we also asked a question about case closure expectations in terms of how many days the cases should be active. We have provided the responses to this question in Table 73 below. We are not aware of any policy relating to case closure

expectations in terms of duration, and the investigators we surveyed provides responses that suggest they lack guidance in this area.

TABLE 73: Self-Reported Case Closure Expectations in Days Active

	0-30	31-60	61-90	Over 90	# of Responses
Serious Persons Crimes	19	10	6	17	52
Other Persons Crimes	8	11	10	0	29
Property Crimes	17	7	4	2	30
Fraud/Financial Crimes	9	13	2	5	29

Source: IACP Investigations Self-Reported Survey DPD

These data, along with the self-reported data from our survey, provide additional insight into the regular activities of the detectives. However, these tables do not provide data concerning the amount of time required by investigators to complete each case. Again, each case is different, and variations in cases can cause some cases to take an inordinately long time to complete. Still, tracking case effort in terms of hours spent could be a significant factor in making future staffing determinations. Various data systems have the capacity to track work effort in this regard, and we encourage this going forward.

Staffing of Investigations, including Crime Scene Investigators

The proper functioning of a criminal investigations division within a police agency is vital to its operations, second only in importance to a well-functioning patrol division. However, the investigation function, like uniformed patrol, is susceptible to inefficiency when not properly staffed. Criminal investigations take considerable time, focus, and effort, and when investigators are overwhelmed with a caseload that is prohibitive, it reduces their effectiveness. Accordingly, once appropriate staffing levels in investigations are determined, the department should take appropriate steps to ensure continuous staffing of all positions.

As with the patrol division, the department should take a position that all investigations assignments are *essential* and backfill any vacancies in investigations from personnel in less-essential roles within the organization.

We have already mentioned that the DPD has an excellent and accredited CSU, with 17 full-time staff, including 12 crime scene investigators, 4 crime scene specialists, and a forensics supervisor. As noted elsewhere in this report, CSIs provide a vital role to the department, and they remove a significant work burden from line-level patrol officers answering CFS. Like the investigations function, CSIs perform an important role, and when they are short-handed, it affects other aspects of the operation. Accordingly, we recommend that DPD also prioritize staffing within the CSI unit.

RECOMMENDATION

Short Recommendation: Examine and Revise Case Management System for Investigations

Section: VIII Investigations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

Based on the information we received from multiple staff, there is no centralized repository for investigations case management, case assignment, and case monitoring. Regardless of the decentralized nature of investigations, ready access to this information is critical in evaluating investigator effectiveness, ensuring prompt delivery of investigative services, and monitoring duplication of effort within the investigative services. In addition, the lack of consistency contributes to the potential for a wide range of judgement on the part of supervisors, responsible for with making case assignments. We recommend that the department take immediate actions to implement a uniform system for case management, assignment, and supervision.

In our survey of the department's investigators, we asked about unit expectations for case closure. The responses by the investigators, which varied greatly, suggested at a minimum, a lack of clarity in understanding those expectations. The lack of consistency in the responses also suggests that monitoring of case closure timelines may need improvement. Accordingly, we recommend that the department incorporate this issue into the case management process.

Short Recommendation: Prioritize Investigations and Crime Scene Investigations Staffing

Section: VIII Investigations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

As noted above, we recommend that DPD prioritize investigations staffing, and CSI staffing. These positions provide mission-critical resources, which we feel require consistent staffing in order to function properly. As with our recommendation regarding prioritization of patrol staffing, we recommend that the department make a commitment to maintain full staffing in investigations, second only in priority to staffing patrol fully. In addition, we recommend that DPD prioritize staffing of CSI, acting swiftly to backfill any open positions.

Short Recommendation: Examine Domestic Violence Investigation Processes for possible revision.

Section: VIII Investigations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Several officers indicated that DV investigators have expressed criticism over the preliminary investigations occurring at the patrol level. We recommend further study of this issue to determine whether preliminary investigations by patrols officers reflect the new and emerging best practices in this area. If the department identifies areas of improvement, DV staff should produce a process to implement them.

Short Recommendation: Move Non-Familial Aggravated Assault Investigations to Homicide Unit

Section: VIII Investigations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Individuals involved in aggravated assaults are often involved in homicides, whether before or after the aggravated assault. The department has a centralized division that investigates homicides, and we feel it is logical for these same investigators to work on the non-familial aggravated assault cases. Centralizing this function will add efficiency to the process, and ensure that investigators will be able to identify individuals who commit multiple aggravated assaults in different districts, quickly.

In addition to recommending that aggravated assault cases move to the homicide division, we are also recommending that the department reallocate the two investigation positions recaptured from the elimination of District 5, to the homicide division. We note that homicide investigators indicate a need for additional staffing to work on cold cases, and we feel that by adding two investigators to this division, there should be adequate staffing for manage the aggravated assault cases, as well as cold case leads.

The department may also wish to consider renaming the unit the Violent Crimes Division, as this is more reflective of the work.

CHAPTER IX: POLICY REVIEW

Critical Policies and Policy Review

As part of the DPD management study, staff of IACPs Law Enforcement Policy Center conducted a general review the department's General Orders Manual. This review focused on three components:

1. The overall organization of the manual, with emphasis on a user's ability to easily locate subject matter;
2. The composition of the manual in terms of its inclusiveness of relevant and contemporary topics, with emphasis on those orders that are critical to officer safety and accountability, and departmental liability; and
3. Whether critical topics provide officers with sufficient guidance and direction to perform their duties in accordance with departmental requirements.

In addition a general review, our team reviewed the manual for inclusion of several policies, which we deem critical, and which cover the types of complaints most commonly subject to litigation. This list, which is not all-inclusive, includes:

- Impartial Policing (Biased Policing)
- Off-Duty Conduct
- Sexual Harassment-Discrimination
- Selection/Hiring
- Internal Affairs
- Special Operations
- Responding to the Mentally Ill
- Use of Force
- Pursuit/EVOC
- Search/Seizure-Arrest
- Care, Custody, Control/Restraint of Prisoners
- Domestic Violence
- Property-Evidence
- Officer Wellness
- LGBTQ Policies

From an overall standpoint, IACP staff found the manual to be excellent. It is a comprehensive document that is well organized and professionally written, and which, upon general review, appears to reflect contemporary practices in the field. Our review revealed only a few suggestions for improvement, which we have included as recommendations.

Policy Advisory Committee

During the course of our interviews, several officers expressed frustration with certain policies of the agency. Officers noted two policies in particular, one that involved TASER use and another that related to requiring written consent for motor vehicle and other searches. Based on our review of the TASER policy, it is appropriate and in line with contemporary police standards. Likewise, the policy requiring written consent for searches is consistent with standards other agencies are using. We did not find any reason to question the nature of these policies; however, based on the comments and feedback from officers, the process of development of these policies was either not inclusive, or leadership did not communicate the level of inclusivity to staff.

We are aware that DPD is an accredited agency and that the accreditation manager often works on policy development. Despite this, we did not find that any other formal process for policy evaluation, policy generation, or policy revision, exists within the department. In the same context that community members wish to be involved in decision-making processes that affect them, police officers have the same desire. Police officers want to engage in processes that affect procedures and operations, and oftentimes, they have a strong vantage point from which to provide meaningful feedback.

We have already recommended that the DPD engage a co-production policing model, which engages the public in policy decisions and policing strategies. We recommend that DPD leaders consider a similar internal process for evaluating and implementing policies and policy revisions, which includes line-level officers and line-level supervisors.

Redundant, Outdated, or Conflicting Policies

We did not find any evidence of outdated or conflicting policies.

Risk Management

We feel that the policies in place by the police department meet or exceed national standards. Many of these policies appropriately target high-risk areas, and they are constructed to mitigate these issues.

Of particular note is General Order 1050 R-1, the Professional Excellence Program. This program provides non-disciplinary assistance to those employees who may require additional guidance. Moreover, it contains a list of behavioral indicators and actions, which will prompt engagement of this policy and the associated plan. The plan also details the warning system for identifying these issues.

Training and Policy Dissemination

The DPD distributes policies via Power DMS, which documents distribution and receipt by officers. We did not find any evidence to suggest that the department engages in regular policy review or training with officers, though it is evident to us that some of these discussions occur at the line level. However, we recommend that DPD consider a more regular system of policy review, and training on critical policies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: Create an Internal Policy Advisory Committee

Section: IX

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

A strong set of guiding rules and procedures is a critical need for the efficient and effective operation of any police agency. Indeed, DPD has an extensive set of guidelines, which we find instructional and functional. However, those governed by the rules have a vested interest in the development of the standards for which they will be held accountable, and expected to follow. These same individuals often possess significant operational knowledge that leaders can call upon in the development of such processes. Accordingly, we recommend that DPD establish an internal policy advisory committee, comprised of line-level officers and supervisors, along with suitable command-level personnel. The purpose of this unit would be to review existing policies for revision, and to assist leadership in developing new policies, as needed.

Short Recommendation: Update the Policy Manual as Outlined

Section: IX

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

We recommend the following revisions and additions to the policy manual:

- We recommend the inclusion of a key word index as an appendix. A key word index allows the reader to more easily access general orders of relevance, since some subject matter appears in more than one order or policy. For example, one policy may address vehicle searches from a legal standpoint with regard to search and seizure, and another order may relate to safe and effective operational practices.
- In terms of topics covered by the manual, our reviewer had several suggestions for inclusion, as follows.
 1. Grooming and Appearance. The G.O. on this topic covers most of the matters necessary with the exception of those situations where the department should make accommodations for employees on religious and similar grounds as protected under EEOC guidelines.

2. Transgender. The review did not locate any protocols for officers when dealing with persons in the community, whether suspects, victims, or witnesses, who are transgender or gender nonconforming persons. Failure to provide guidance on this topic has resulted in numerous issues among police departments around the country, such as complaints of harassment, excessive force, and resultant failure of many such persons to report crimes or otherwise deal effectively with the police. Additionally, no reference could be found with regard to protocols for dealing with police officers and other employees who in the process of transitioning from one gender identity to another. Thought needs to be paid and a G.O. created as to how the department should, or must, respond to employees once they have announced their intention to change their gender identity and appearance.
3. The reviewer could not identify any G.O. that deals specifically with DPD protocols for accommodating pregnancy. In many cases, law enforcement agencies deal with this as a matter of light duty or medical leave, neither of which is sufficient in their entirety. Many women wish to continue working when pregnant until a health care provider determines otherwise, and departments should allow this. A G.O. of this type requires the department to balance the needs of the officer, his or her duty assignment and duration of assignments, and health and safety considerations for the woman, including the wellbeing of her unborn child.
4. The reviewer could find only nominal reference to officers taking police action when off duty or in plain clothes. The issue here is one of officer safety. Officers responding to various scenes have unwittingly killed fellow officers, when mistaken for perpetrators or accomplices to various crimes. Officers need guidance on when they may (or should) intervene in an incident in these cases, to avoid misidentification.
5. Although the department provides training on the requirements enumerated under the U.S. Supreme Court cases of *Brady* and *Giglio*, the reviewer could not identify any G.O. related to these issues.¹⁹ The outcome of these two cases creates an affirmative duty for police and prosecutors to provide any evidence or findings that could potentially prove to be exculpatory for the defendant or serve to mitigate punishment. This means that the defendant need not specifically request such information under disclosure provisions; agencies must provide this information proactively. This includes any factors that could serve to impeach the testimony of a prosecution witness to include that of police officers. This has had detrimental impact in many cases on the ability to

¹⁹ *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)

bring a case to trial or secure a guilty verdict. Police officers whose records reveal such matters as falsification of records or testimony, withholding of relevant case materials from the defense, a pattern of use of excessive force or biased policing, among other matters, pose the potential that the officer may be unable to testify in court for fear that their testimony may be impeached. As such, the usefulness of an officer can be severely limited and in many departments, such officers may lose their ability to serve on the department. The department should clarify all of these factors for officers through a G.O. Furthermore, the DPD should have a system by which the department can readily turn over case material to the prosecution to determine any *Brady* implications.

6. The reviewer was able to locate the DPD G.O. on Unbiased Policing. It was felt that while the G.O. is generally well done, it concentrates on vehicle stops, but does not address the issue of equitable and unbiased delivery of police services to all members of the community. Providing services or privileges to certain members or segments of the community, or failing to do so based on race, class, or similar distinctions are important considerations in a G.O. on unbiased and fair policing.

CHAPTER X: IMPARTIAL POLICING

Policy

General Order 4074 R-3 deals with Bias Based Policing. As noted above, the G.O. focuses mostly on pedestrian and traffic stops, with less emphasis on general citizen contacts. Although the policy is good and it appears effective, it does not specifically address implicit bias, impartial policing, or the components of procedural justice, which include:


- Treating people with dignity and respect
- Giving individuals “voice” during encounters
- Being neutral and transparent in decision-making
- Conveying trustworthy motives

The policy infers or references some of these aspects, but the department may wish to consider providing some clarity and specificity to these items.

Data Collection and Agency Practices

We are aware that the DPD collects race data concerning traffic stops. In fact, we asked for some of these data, which we reflect in Figure 24 below.

FIGURE 24: Traffic Stops by Demographic




Source: DPD Data Analysis Unit

In our review of these data, we observed that there is a high level of consistency with regard to the race of drivers associated with traffic stops. These statistics, which represent traffic stops from 2010-2015, show that the frequency of race related to traffic stops by the DPD includes: whites 37-40%, blacks 58-60%, and Hispanics 11-14% of the time (numbers do not total 100% because Hispanic is not a race). Again, these numbers are very consistent over the six-year period.

Figure 25 below, taken from the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Diagnostic Analysis report for the City of Durham from 2015, shows the breakdown of race within the community of Durham. Based on this figure, whites comprise 48.3% of the population, while blacks make up 40.0%.

FIGURE 25: Population Estimates





On the surface, the percentage of traffic stops by the DPD of white drivers, as opposed to black drivers, does not align with population demographics. If all other things were equal, traffic stop percentages should mirror population statistics. However, reviewing these statistics without context does not provide a complete understanding of what may prompt these disparities.

Like many police agencies in the United States, the DPD uses data-driven policing strategies to deploy resources. This includes using various data analytics related to prior crime, and engaging predictive policing models to determine when and where crime might be likely to occur in the future. Using these data and strategies, DPD intentionally deploys personnel disparately throughout the community. The purpose of this type of deployment relates to suppressing crime and arresting those responsible for it.

In the same OJP study cited above, the authors included a diagram of the City of Durham that depicts the concentrations of gun homicides and gun aggravated assaults in red, overlaid with shading that shows the percentage of black residents residing in those areas, based on the geography of the city, see Figure 26 below.

FIGURE 26: Gun Homicide/Gun Aggravated Assault, Density and Race 2009-2013



Source: 2015 OJP Diagnostic Center Report for City of Durham

Figure 26 clearly shows that these crime instances occur most frequently in the areas within the community that have some of the highest percentages of black residents. We know that the DPD uses these types of data to inform personnel deployments. We are also aware that there are other crime types with similar overlays relating to crimes in areas highly populated with African American residents.

Given the nature of these types of strategic deployments of personnel, we do not find it remarkable that the percentage of traffic stops does not mirror the total population within

the community. In fact, it is likely that the white to black race ratios of the population in the areas with higher concentrations of personnel deployments are significantly greater than what the traffic stop data collected reflects.

RTI International Report – 2016

During the course of our study, RTI International released a report regarding traffic stops by the DPD. The researchers for this report used a *veil of darkness* approach to their analysis of these data. In short, the veil of darkness analysis seeks to determine whether the police stop a greater percentage of black motorists during the day, when officers can more readily identify the race of drivers.

The authors of this study stated they “found evidence of racial disproportionality in traffic stops conducted by the DPD.” We believe this very broad statement is a misrepresentation and overstatement of the facts, and that the approach used by RTI has material flaws, which cast significant doubt upon their findings.

Some notable aspects of the report include the following:

- “No evidence of racial disproportionality was found when the analysis was restricted to traffic stops involving female drivers” (pp. 1).
- “The relationship between lighting and driver race was also conditional upon year” (pp. 2). “Results indicated that the relationship between daylight and the odds of the traffic stop’s involving a Black driver was not statistically significant in 2014 and 2015” (pp. 14).
- They found “driver race was also conditional upon assignment.” They “did not find any evidence of racial bias among traffic stops conducted by dedicated traffic units” (pp. 2).²⁰

There is no evidence within the report to suggest that any analysis occurred as to the race of drivers operating within each geographical area within the city at various times of the day, or in areas of intentionally higher concentrations of police deployments. In fact, the authors make a vague reference to this issue as a limitation of their study. The report indicates:

The overrepresentation of Black motorists during the dark hours may be driven by the natural differences in the driving population, differences in the driving population at risk of being stopped (i.e., differences in driving behaviors), or differences in police deployment strategies that influence risk of being stopped

²⁰ Exploring Racial Disproportionality in Traffic Stops Conducted by the Durham Police Department, 2015, RTI International, Project Number 0290184.003.284.

(e.g., officers being assigned to high-crime areas that correlate with larger minority populations).

Additionally, there is no analysis of the ratio of driver gender, with accompanying race data, associated with geographical distribution. Finally, the report fails to examine the hours of operation by specialized units, relative to their reported activity. Put another way, although the HEAT team reportedly had a disparate percentage of stops of Black motorists as opposed to White motorists during the daylight hours, there is no analysis of which hours the HEAT team worked during the period of analysis, nor a ratio analysis of those hours against these reported statistics.

Finally, the RTI Inc. report cites the North Carolina Traffic Stop Statistics Analysis report from Professor Baumgartner, which does not mention Durham at all, but involves a statistical analysis that covered 13 million stops between 2000 and 2011 in North Carolina. This study is not local, it covers a period during which most police agencies were not accurately collecting race data, and it is not current.

We do not intend to be dismissive of the complaints of residents who believe that the DPD engages in and condones discriminatory behavior. Although we lack specific evidence to support these claims, we acknowledge that it is likely some officers have acted inappropriately in the past. We understand that perspective is a significant factor in these matters, and cannot supplant our own opinions or assumptions for those of the community who share these concerns. We believe that the DPD has a significant need to take steps to rebuild public trust. We believe that the OJP study contains sound recommendations that the DPD can engage in this endeavor, and we encourage the DPD to follow those recommendations, as well as those we identify in this study. To that end, we recommend that the department take steps to engage regular and ongoing training for entry-level and seasoned staff, in the following areas:

- Cultural Sensitivity and Understanding
- Impartial Policing
- Implicit Bias
- Procedural Justice

Despite the concerns raised, and the issues raised in the Baumgartner and RTI Inc. reports, we do not conclude that discriminatory practices within the DPD are common or condoned. On the contrary, those from the DPD with whom we spoke, consistently condemned such behavior, and stated unequivocally that it is not acceptable, nor will leadership tolerate it. However, regardless of our opinion, many community members perceive that racism is a significant problem with the DPD, and it is incumbent upon leaders to acknowledge these concerns and to engage policies and practices that guarantee that officers do not engage in discriminatory behavior.

CHAPTER XI: DATA AND TECHNOLOGY

Information and Technology

During the course of our study, we had the opportunity to observe officers working in the field, as well as in the office setting. We noted that officers had access to various records management and field reporting software typical to police agencies. DPD uses the Power DMS software system, which officers reported was meeting their needs. We found that officers embraced the technology available to them, and in fact, they hoped for system enhancements that could improve their capacity to perform their jobs. Based on our observations and interviews, the department is meeting the IT needs of staff. We did not find any reason for concern regarding a lack of technology.

Data Driven Practices

The DPD is a data rich organization. The depth and volume of information captured is impressive. We had an opportunity to attend a Crime Abatement meeting (DPDs version of COPMSTAT), which included the use of a robust set of data regarding various crime categories. These data included historical data from prior years, and statistical shifts.

During the crime abatement meeting, division and unit commanders provided feedback regarding crime, specific to their area of supervision, and other command staff asked questions relating to trends, and how the commander intended to respond. We found the exchange cordial and informative. It contained a measure of accountability, but more importantly, it involved a strategic discussion concerning deployment of resources and methods to respond to crime trends. As we noted in the previous section, it is evident that the DPD engages these practices consistently to provide responsive and proactive public safety to the city.

Crime Analysis

As we have noted elsewhere in this report, the DPD uses crime analysis for various reasons, including providing information for crime abatement meetings. During our interviews, we also learned that crime analysts receive requests for analysis from various staff, including commanders, detectives, and officers.

We reviewed the 2015-2016 work plan developed for the crime analysis unit, and we noted the following duties, which we have paraphrased here:

- Organizing criminal information, including UCR reporting, interviews, intelligence, media, crime reports, and case files.
- Maintaining a capability to provide pin maps for serious crimes.

- Providing statistical analysis on request, including traffic accidents, injuries, and arrests.
- Maintaining modus operandi (MO) information to assist in identification of suspects.
- Monitoring of local, regional, and national crime trends and patterns.
- Processing special requests from a variety of sources, including city staff, department personnel, other agencies, media, and command staff.
- Coordinate and process information for units in accomplishing specific work assignments, providing charts, graphs, tables, and reports, as necessary.
- Provide weekly Crime Abatement reports, weekly operational activity reports, and an annual report.

We were impressed with this unit and their capabilities, and with the broad scope of duties and assignments, they manage. It is readily apparent that they are an integral part of the decisional processes that drive work assignments and allocations of resources. We observed that this unit provides robust and critical data that informs decision makers, and allows leaders to make intelligent decisions relative to public safety needs.

Despite the positive comments above, staff remarked that they are very busy with requests for data, which all but negates the opportunity to conduct proactive data analysis on a consistent basis. We are not recommending additional staff to this unit, but we encourage supervisors within the analysis unit to monitor demands closely, and to approach leaders with a request for additional staffing, should they feel the need.

CHAPTER XII: TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Academy

During the study, numerous staff commented on the quality of the academy for Durham. This academy far exceeds North Carolina state standards, spanning 26 weeks, as opposed to the 16 weeks the state requires. The extended academy provides for enhanced training of cadets, including better training in officer safety and wellness. Some of the officers we interviewed stated that they came to DPD specifically because of the strong reputation of the academy.

DPD currently holds their academy at Durham Tech. The state subsidizes the use of the facility, so there is a financial benefit to the city to maintain this relationship. The academy has one fulltime sergeant assigned, but also uses numerous guest instructors. Some staff indicated that they feel the department would benefit from having their own academy. We did not explore this issue further, but note that facilities are expensive, and the arrangement with Durham Tech appears to be working.

As we have already noted, the academy does a fine job of preparing new officers for community policing. We believe the PTO model that requires each new officer to complete a problem-solving project during his or her field training, is exemplary and a model for other agencies to follow.

Training

This training unit has seven sworn and one non-sworn staff member. This unit provides both mandated and department required training to all sworn personnel to include in-service. The training division operates two police academies a year. Training division staff plan and facilitate promotional ceremonies and Basic Law Enforcement Training (BLET) graduations. All training personnel have individual responsibilities and are accountable for the efficiency of those programs and adherence to these policies. It is the responsibility of the entire training staff to research new training needs, to provide consistent and comprehensive training to members of this department. The Training captain has the responsibility to review the training curriculum to ensure that it meets the departmental needs at the time of implementation. Final decisions regarding training are the responsibility of the Chief of Police.

We heard from staff consistently that DPD has excellent training, and those making these statements frequently referred to the police academy. We are aware that DPD uses a PTO program for field training, and we heard positive comments about that process. However, several staff we spoke with described possible areas for improvement with respect to training.

Some staff explained that there is no formal basic training (after being hired) on the computer systems they are required to operate as part of their regular duties, i.e. RMS, MUNIS, and CAD Search. Instead, they learn this on the job when their supervisor has time to teach them. Given the serious nature of data privacy, as well as the intricacies involved with the various records systems officers utilize, training of this nature should be a requirement.

Officers also explained that each division used to have access to training funds, but that now, those funds are centralized. If officers submit for training, and it is free, they usually have the opportunity to attend. However, if there is a cost, central command must approve the request. Some officers we spoke with felt that this process discouraged officers to request training that included a fee.

Leadership Development

Several staff we spoke with stated that there is a lack of emphasis within the department on developing personnel for advancement. There is no formal leadership training available to line-level officers, and according to those we spoke with, even line-level supervisors do not receive adequate training. In our discussion with the training unit, we inquired about leadership training for all staff. The training supervisor explained that the training unit has sponsored some leadership training, in which supervisors come in and talk about their jobs and what goes into their work. They have also had a lieutenant come in and speak about what leadership is, and about different styles of leadership. However, the department has not traditionally funded or scheduled training for aspiring leaders.

Although this is an apparent lack of line-level leadership training, we learned that mid- and upper-level supervisors and command staff attend a West-Point style of leadership training. This program, held twice per year, involves supervisors attending a workshop every other Tuesday for 3-4 months. Department executives have the opportunity to attend FBI LEEDA courses, and some have attended the FBI National Academy.

Mentoring

When we inquired about mentoring within the department, staff told us that no formal mentoring program exists, and that the agency does not engage in mentoring. These statements conflicted with the existence of the Individual Development Plan (IDP), which we described in Section II of this report. It is evident that a process exists to mentor and develop staff for promotion or other specialty roles within the organization. It is not apparent, however, whether supervisors recognize their role within this process, and the opportunity to use it to mentor staff.

Records and Required and In-Service Training

As we discussed in the section relating to obligated hours for patrol officers and investigators, the state requires that officers received 36 hours of in-service training per year. DPD ensures that officers receive this training, and training staff document this information in the department training records. However, we are aware that the DPD training records are incomplete, because the department does not track additional training hours beyond the state mandates. As noted, we recommend that the department make sure that all training hours are recorded, not just the mandatory ones.

We also heard that although there is a good distribution of training, not all officers have the same opportunities for specialty training. Those we interviewed suggested a need for the department to do a better job of monitoring training for officers, and in balancing training among staff. Staff also told us that the department has no mechanism for validating whether officers actually take approved classes. We recommend that training staff take appropriate steps to remedy any deficiency in this area.

CHAPTER XIII: RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, SELECTION, AND PROMOTION

Recruitment and Retention

The recruitment unit has one sergeant, one corporal, six police officers and one civilian. Two of the officers are recruiters and the other four are background investigators. The unit works with the city's human resources department to provide quality personnel for the DPD. The personnel services division manager is responsible for the division, with the recruiting sergeant responsible for day-to-day recruiting functions.

This unit has the responsibility to recruit qualified applicants to fill academy seats. To accomplish this, those in the unit attend job fairs and recruit through various job announcements, on-line, the city government website, and at local college job fairs. DPD also has established an internship with a local university.

Those we spoke with indicated that the constant negative media attention has negatively affected numbers of applicants. Since the Ferguson incident, application numbers, which used to average around 400, now are closer to 200. Staff noted that negative local media attention has also affected these numbers. In addition to lower numbers, recruitment staff indicated a decline in the quality of applicants, as well.

Recruitment staff indicated that there is a need to change the public perception of the DPD, and they suggested that improvements might come through the efforts of the public affairs unit. Recruiters also provided other observations and suggestions, including an incentive program for officers who refer a candidate that DPD later hires, and considering lateral hiring programs, which could expedite hiring and save significant background investigation and training costs.

Hiring

The following information describes the minimum selection standards, hiring process and benefits.

Selection

Minimum entry-level requirements include:

- High school diploma or GED
- Age 21 upon completion of the police academy
- U.S. citizen
- No felony, serious misdemeanor, or domestic violence convictions
- No DWI/DUI convictions within the past five years
- No suspension of driving privileges within the past three years

- No use of any illegal drugs within the past 12 months
- Honorable military discharge (if applicable).

In addition to these requirements, recruits must also pass a written exam and a physical agility test.

The selection sequence, which typically takes 4-6 months, consists of:

- Open house
- Physical test
- Written examination
- Application
- Oral board interview
- Background investigation
- Conditional offer, followed by medical and psychological screening
- Successful completion of a polygraph exam and drug screening

Once hired, recruits will attend the 26-week academy, and then participate in a field-training program for 16 weeks.

Benefits

- 11-12 paid holidays per year
- 96 hours of paid vacation per year
- 96 hours of sick leave per year (with a sick leave incentive)
- Educational compensation
- Retirement package
- Uniforms and equipment provided
- Paid training while in the academy
- Flexible spending account

Workforce Diversity

Recruitment staff and others within the DPD indicated that the department has a strong desire to present a workforce that mirrors the population of the community. Table 7 below, which we have repeated for reference, provides an overview of the diversity within the department. Based on various data available, including those provided by OJP in their report, the racial diversity in Durham is about 48% white and 40% black. The diversity within DPD does not reflect these percentages, but the number of non-white officers within the DPD is substantial. It is apparent that the work of the recruiting unit has contributed to this balance, and we encourage their continued efforts.

TABLE 7 (repeated): Diversity Profile

	Asian	African American	Hispanic	Other	White	Grand Total
Chief/Deputy Chief	0	2	0	0	3	5
Captain	0	6	0	0	6	12
Lieutenant	0	9	0	0	5	14
Sergeant	0	18	2	0	31	51
Detective	0	13	6	1	34	54
Corporal	0	16	1		47	64
Officer	0	71	10	4	176	261
Officer Recruit	1	8	7	1	38	55
TOTAL	1	143	26	6	340	516
Percentage	0.19%	27.71%	5.04%	1.16%	65.89%	

Source: Durham Human Resources

Recruitment Plan

We had an opportunity to review the sworn personnel recruitment plan for 2016-2019, drafted by Sgt. English of the recruiting unit. The plan outlines four steps:

- Establish a consistent research and analysis process
- Expand on ambassador recruiter program
- Assess the hiring process
- Increase the number of qualified applicants

We believe the plan provides good steps for assessing and refining current recruiting efforts.

Retention

As we have noted elsewhere, staff in this unit expressed concerns over what they perceived as a lack of support from City Hall concerning recruiting and retention. Although they have received pressure to improve the racial and gender makeup of the agency, leaders have placed little focus on the retention of quality applicants, when the department identifies, and later hires them.

Recruitment staff told our team that in some cases, they are able to go through applications and vet more good candidates than there are positions available in the academy class. When this happens, many of those candidates go elsewhere to gain employment, rather than wait for the next class. Recruiting unit staff indicated that department leaders need to recognize the time and money already invested in those candidates, and consider hiring them in non-sworn positions until the next academy class. We think this is a very good suggestion, and it aligns well with our

recommendation to create non-sworn CRO positions for use as a feeder program for sworn officers.

Many staff, inside and outside of the recruiting unit, also told our team that the department is constantly losing good officers to other agencies, and that this has been occurring for a long time. The three main reasons cited for officers leaving include salary, equipment, and that other agencies that offer a take-home squad car. Staff also stated that many feel that DPD has twice the workload of any other neighboring department, and that this is a retention issue. As we have noted elsewhere in this report, we recommend the department conduct a staffing and benefits study to determine whether the department is competitive with the surrounding agencies.

Promotion

General Order 2010 R-13 governs promotions and appointments for the DPD. The police department employee services unit coordinates promotional processes, with the approval of the Durham human resources department. The department uses different processes for the following positions:

- Deputy Chief, Assistant Chief, and Captain
- Lieutenant, Sergeant, Corporal, and Master Police Officer
- Non-sworn Personnel

Deputy Chief, Assistant Chief, and Captain

The police chief has the authority to make promotional appointments for the ranks of Deputy Chief, Assistant Chief, and Captain. These promotions are non-competitive.

For other ranks, the police chief is responsible for posting openings, including providing staff with the eligibility requirements, and selection criteria. Employee services and human resources are responsible for ensuring that all selection and evaluation elements are job-related and non-discriminatory.

We have summarized the individual requirements for each rank below:

- Master Police Officer
 - Seven years of sworn service, five with the DPD
 - Performance evaluations for the past three years must reflect an overall rating that the employee meets or exceeds expectations.
 - No recent disciplinary actions within the past year
 - Certification in the following courses:
 - The Police Law Institute of North Carolina Justice Academy
 - North Carolina Speed Measurement Instrument Operator

- North Carolina Chemical Analyst
 - DWI Detection
 - Drug Enforcement for Patrol Officers
- Corporal
 - Three years of continuous service as DPD officer
 - Performance evaluations for the past two years must reflect an overall rating that the employee meets or exceeds expectations.
 - No disciplinary disqualification.
- Sergeant
 - Two years of service as a DPD corporal
 - Performance evaluations for the past two years must reflect an overall rating that the employee meets or exceeds expectations.
 - No disciplinary disqualification.
- Lieutenant
 - One year of service as DPD sergeant
 - Performance evaluations for the past two years must reflect an overall rating that the employee meets or exceeds expectations.
 - No disciplinary disqualification.
 - Either an Associate's degree or 60 credit hours from a college or university.
- Captain
 - One year of service as DPD lieutenant
 - Performance evaluations for the past two years must reflect an overall rating that the employee meets or exceeds expectations.
 - No disciplinary disqualification.
 - A Bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university.
- Assistant Chief or Deputy Chief
 - One year of service as DPD captain
 - Performance evaluations for the past two years must reflect an overall rating that the employee meets or exceeds expectations.
 - No disciplinary disqualification.
 - A Bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university.

Lieutenant, Sergeant, and Corporal

General Order 2010 R-13 describes the promotional process for these ranks, including the possible use of assessment centers, which may involve in-basket exercises, group activities, role-plays, employee counseling, problem solving, presentations, written exams, and other requirements. The policy also outlines rating those involved, establishment of an eligibility list, and an appeals process for disputes relating to these processes.

Non-sworn personnel

Employee Services shall coordinate the posting and promotion process with Supervisors, as the Chief of Police approves, and in conjunction with City Human Resources. The process shall comport with City policy.

Summary

Although subjective and anecdotal, several officers questioned the promotion of several department members, indicating that executive leaders have promoted some staff who were not deserving. These comments and sentiments are common within police agencies, and in fact, they may occur regardless of which process the department engages to make promotional selections. However, the use of assessment centers and outside consultants, provides organizational leaders with a level of insulation against such arguments, and accordingly, we encourage the department to make use of these resources in all promotional processes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: Reduce Operational Vacancies and Address Attrition Issues

Section: XIII Recruitment and Retention

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

At present, the annual attrition rate in the police department is 36. Allowing these operational vacancies to continue at this authorized staffing level, will force the department to continue to operate in arrears with regard to minimum staffing needs, and it will affect officer availability and overtime expenditures. As we noted in our recommendations in Section IV of this report, the city needs to hire additional personnel to overcome operational vacancies.

However, more importantly, the city needs to examine why officers are leaving, and consider what the city and the department can do to reduce this occurring. The cost of hiring and training one police officer is significant, with estimates suggesting this number in the \$50,000 to \$60,000 range. At that level, the department and the city is losing roughly \$1,800,000 per year.

We recommend that the department study this issue thoroughly, and give consider addressing any issues identified. We also recommend consideration of various incentives to retention of officers.

CHAPTER XIV: PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

The professional standards division has five sub-units, including internal affairs, accreditation, staff inspection, secondary employment, and towing inspector/alcohol beverage control and application permit.

The purpose of the professional standards unit is to uphold the principle that the ability of the police department to serve the community is dependent on public approval of the actions of its members. The division makes this possible by developing, reviewing, amending, and implementing policies and procedural guidelines, for all personnel to work under to serve the community properly. The unit conducts internal audits and inspections of the agency's divisions and personnel, to ensure operating efficiency, and investigates all complaints against the department and its members, measuring the findings against the highest standards of conduct, behavior and job performance.

Internal Affairs

General Order 1014 R-8 governs the internal affairs process. The department policy identifies internal and external complaints, including guidance on routing of these complaints. Whether originated internally or externally, the department member receiving the complaint will route it to the professional standards commander. The policy directs that the department will investigate all complaints against the department or individuals, even if the complaint is anonymous. The commander of the professional standards division reports directly to the Chief of Police. The professional standards unit maintains all records pertaining to investigations against the department.

The internal affairs unit (IA) has a lieutenant, a sergeant, two Corporals, and a civilian transcriptionist. The department recently added the transcriptionist position to aid investigators by transcribing and compiling all data into a single casefile. The IA unit conducts reviews of department members' use of force (UOF) and firearm discharge. The unit is also responsible for motor vehicle crash review, review of all vehicle pursuits, review of the emergency information systems (EIS) unit, conducting all grievance hearings, and random drug testing.

IA also conducts investigations into criminal and citizen complaints about DPD sworn and non-sworn employees. If a complaint is criminal in nature, IA turns that case over to CID to conduct the criminal investigation. For departmental shootings, the homicide unit investigates the criminal aspect, the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) investigates the officer for possible criminal wrongdoing, and IA investigates the administrative portion of the case. The IA evaluates all citizen complaints, some of which IA investigate, but the IA unit refers some for investigation by an immediate supervisor.

Complaints investigated by IA follow a prescribed pattern for approval, and if sustained, discipline may result. The IA unit classifies completed investigations by several different findings: sustained, not sustained, exonerated, unfounded, and policy failure. There are two additional classifications, which are not findings, but which may result in IA closing the investigation. Those categories are withdrawn and discontinued. We include definitions for each of these categories below:

- Unfounded - The incident did not occur or the officer investigated was not involved.
- Not Sustained - There is insufficient evidence to either prove or disprove the allegation.
- Exonerated - The incident occurred but was lawful and proper.
- Sustained - The allegation is supported by sufficient evidence to indicate the allegation is true.
- Policy Failure - The allegation is true. There is, however, no written policy governing the conduct in question therefore, the officer was not inconsistent with departmental policy. The Division should strive to be aware of changes in policies, procedures, rules and regulations that may prevent future allegations of misconduct, as well as the need to modify or expand training. Without compromising the integrity of any confidential information, the Professional Standards Commander shall notify the Accreditation Manager of the circumstances surrounding any findings of this type, so that any Departmental policy deficiency may be addressed.
- Withdrawn – The complainant withdraws the allegation before conclusion of the investigation or finding of fault.

We reviewed data provided by the professional standards division that quantifies the IA investigations conducted between 2011 and 2015, and we provide these data in Table 74 below. This table provides data for both internal (administrative) and external (citizen) investigations. We noted that the IA division sustained nearly half of the internal complaints they investigated during this period. We think this speaks to the notion of internal accountability.

We also noted that the number of external complaints has increased significantly since 2011, and although there were fewer complaints in 2015 than 2014, the total number is still more than four times what it was in 2011. Although the percentage of sustained citizen complaints is much lower than the internal percentage, these numbers suggest that the department is making efforts to hold staff accountable, when appropriate.

TABLE 74: Internal Affairs Investigations

Admin. Investigation.	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total Allegations	96	51	92	65	64
Sustained	57	29	46	36	32
Not Sustained	12	6	13	13	7
Exonerated	17	6	13	7	4
Unfounded	5	3	2	2	2
Withdrawn	2	5	17	7	3
No Violation	0	0	0	0	3
Policy Violation	0	0	0	0	0
Discontinued	3	0	1	0	5
Policy Failure	0	1	0	0	0
Open Allegations	0	1	0	0	8
Totals	96	51	92	65	64
Citizen Complaints	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total Allegations	30	72	188	220	131
Sustained	11	18	29	29	11
Not Sustained	8	7	30	33	14
Exonerated	6	31	82	84	53
Unfounded	2	13	32	51	27
Withdrawn	0	3	9	0	7
No Violation	0	0	0	16	11
Policy Violation	0	0	0	0	0
Discontinued	3	0	6	7	4
Policy Failure	0	0	0	0	0
Open	0	0	0	0	4
Totals	30	72	188	220	131

Source: DPD Professional Standards

IA staff informed us that although they make a concentrated effort to complete investigations within 30 days of receipt, this has proved difficult, due to increasing demands on the unit. This includes the need to evaluate all use of force incidents.

It is evident to our team that the volume in this unit has increased dramatically, and given the current national climate, and the need for accountability, we do not see these numbers declining any time soon. The IA unit has a small staff, and even when we consider supervisors as active investigators, the investigative burden is nearly 50 cases each, per year. This does not account for the other functions of the IA unit. Accordingly, we recommend consideration of adding one additional investigator to this unit.

Complaint Routing

Once the IA unit completes an investigation, the IA unit forwards the findings to the staff member's chain of command for review. Commanders receiving such reports will review the findings and if applicable, recommend appropriate discipline.

General Order 2001 R-5 outlines the disciplinary procedures for the DPD. This policy acts in accordance with City of Durham human resources policy HIRM-322. These policies outline the progressive discipline process for city employees, including police employees, and they outline grievance and appeals processes. The progressive discipline steps include:

- Verbal Warning
- Suspension
- Reduction in Pay, Rank, or Position
- Dismissal

G.O. 2001 R-5 describes the potential need for counseling or retraining, but it does not address an emerging alternative method to traditional discipline, called education-based discipline.

Education-based discipline involves directing employees who have erred, to research and present substantive content relative to the area of the infraction, with the intent to educate both the offender, and other officers who may require a greater understanding of a topical matter. This method is gaining some momentum in other agencies as a viable alternative to punitive discipline, as it is a multi-purpose process, which benefits the individual and the entire agency. We are not making a specific recommendation in reference to this methodology, but we encourage the department to consider the possible benefits of this type of process.

Civilian Police Review Board

The DPD recently implemented a civilian police review board (CPRB). This board has the responsibility to review cases by complainants who wish to appeal a decision by the professional standards division, which the Chief of Police has ratified. All members appointed to the CPRB must attend the DPD citizen academy prior to appointment.

Following their review of a case, the board may make findings of fact. These findings fall into two categories:

- Was the police department investigation deficient, because of an abuse of its discretion?
- Was (were) the finding(s) of the investigation deficient, because of an abuse of discretion?

Once the board makes a finding, they will submit it to the City Manager and the Chief of Police. Board makes a ruling and submits to City Manager and Chief of Police. The City Manager will make a final decision, which the complainant may not be appeal.

During the course of our study, we heard comments about the CPRB, both from stakeholders and officers. Those we met with expressed concerns about the board and its function, and we heard that the City Council was considering authorizing the board to have subpoena power, which some people felt was inappropriate.

We did not find any reason to be concerned in our review of the procedures manual for the CPRB. We note that members are required to attend the DPD citizen academy, and we think this is wise, and provides positive context for those serving in this capacity. In addition, the board may only present a finding to the City Manager; they do not have any disciplinary authority.

We are keenly aware of the aversion that many police organizations and police officers have to boards of this type. However, on review, we find the construction and purpose of this board to be acceptable. In addition, given the community concerns and perceptions of the DPD, if this process had not been in place at the time of our study, we would have recommended it. We feel this board is one of the pieces of the complicated puzzle that the DPD must construct in order to improve its public image, and to build relationships and trust within the community.

We also heard concerns from staff within the DPD regarding issues of fairness, consistency, and transparency related to IA investigations, and discipline. Comments varied from staff, with some indicating there were instances in which discipline should have occurred, but it did not, and with others suggesting the opposite.

One of the cornerstones of organizational leadership involves building trust internally. As with the issues surrounding community trust, leaders need to be vigilant about building internal trust. With respect to the IA function and the disciplinary process, we believe that the department should consider a form of secondary review for all IA cases. One way of accomplishing this would be to establish a review committee, which could involve internal or external reviewers. To be clear, the purpose of this review would be to ensure fairness and consistency, with the intent of building organizational trust in these processes. Again, we do not offer this as a formal recommendation, but as something for DPD leaders to consider.

Tracking and Early Warning Systems

Of particular note is General Order 1050 R-1, the Professional Excellence Program. This program provides non-disciplinary assistance to those employees who may require additional guidance. Moreover, it contains a list of behavioral indicators and actions, which will prompt engagement of this policy and the associated plan. The plan also

details the warning system for identifying these issues. We feel this is an important component of risk management and employee well-being.

Accreditation

The accreditation unit has one sworn member. This officer is responsible for planning, implementing, and monitoring departmental policies, procedures and practices, and archiving proof of practice and procedure application for accreditation process. This officer drafts, reviews, rewrites, and publishes policies and general orders. This officer also manages the departments Power DMS document-management software system, and conducts training on accreditation and Power DMS. The accreditation officer also assists other divisions with requests for information.

Staff Inspection

This unit has one sergeant who has regular meetings with units to ensure they are following SOPs. The sergeant examines unit efficiency, identifies any problems and deficiencies, identifies facility problems and deficiencies, conducts reviews of traffic-stop report forms, and conducts reviews of the new consent to search form. Although the unit should perform staff inspections regularly, because of staffing issues, staffing inspections only occur when there is a request.

Secondary Employment

The secondary-employment unit has one corporal, who reports to the staff inspection sergeant. The DPD controls and manages all secondary employment for officers within the city. When part-time opportunities come out, officers can sign up for them through a web portal, on a first come, first served basis. There is a fixed pay rate of \$25 an hour. For short notice events and holidays, the pay rate is \$35 an hour. If a location needs four or more officers, one of them has to be a supervisor.

Even though the department controls all part time employment, each location has a coordinator, which is usually the officer that set up the part time opportunity. That coordinator generally has the first opportunity for that part time work, prior to pushing the announcement out to all officers. A website manages most of this work, and accordingly, it requires little effort on the part of the corporal assigned to the unit.

Towing Inspector/Alcohol Beverage Control Application Permit

This unit is responsible for the inspection of all towing companies listed and utilized as *rotation* tow companies with the DPD, and for execution of application of Alcoholic Beverage and Precious Metals Permits.

The inspector is responsible for the inspection of towing vehicles and facilities used by each company, to ensure that the tow companies are operating within the parameters set forth by the rules and regulations, which the companies agree to abide by when providing services to the city. The inspector investigates complaints as they relate to towing companies, and prepares the case for presentation to the chain of command if necessary.

The inspector is responsible for alcoholic beverage permits applied for by businesses and citizens, as well as conducting background investigations on each applicant. The inspector is required to review all information required by North Carolina ABC Commission, and to present the application to the chain of command for approval/denial.

The inspector also completes investigations as they relate to precious metals dealer permits. Applicants may include pawnshops, jewelry dealers and itinerant precious metals buy-back events, conducted at various locations within the City of Durham.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: Augment the Professional Standards IA Unit Staffing

Section: XIV Professional Standards

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

The volume of complaints investigated by the IA unit has increased substantially, and it is unlikely that this volume of activity will decline. The DPD has a need to ensure professional standards, and this need extends to the public, to provide assurances that the police department is addressing improper behavior. Properly conducted IA investigations take time, and with the increases in volume in this unit, there is a risk of losing quality control. The IA division provides a very important function, and accordingly, we recommend consideration of adding one additional investigator to this unit.

CHAPTER XV: ASSET MANAGEMENT

Department Equipment

As part of our assessment, we conducted a cursory examination of the equipment for the agency, including IT equipment, which we have discussed in Section XI. During our review, we asked staff about equipment and any unmet equipment needs. Generally, staff indicated that they have the equipment they need to do their jobs. There were two notable exceptions to this. Staff identified significant fleet issues, which we address below, and the need for digital cameras for officers/squad cars.

Several officers noted that breaking and entering crime scenes take an extensive amount of time to process and photograph. They also stated that the only person on the squad with an assigned camera is the sergeant. Officers indicated that there are times when they must wait for the sergeant to become available to respond to the scene, which is inefficient. Portable digital cameras are inexpensive, and it seems logical to outfit each car with a working camera.

Facilities and Space Utilization

We did not study facility and space utilization, particularly because there are plans to build a new police department. We visited the different district sites and found them functional, and serving their intended purpose. As we have noted, we recommend the elimination of District 5, and moving those resources to the new facility.

Fleet Management

We had extensive discussions with numerous officers regarding access to working squad cars. The patrol officers at DPD do not have assigned vehicles. Instead, officers coming off shift swap their vehicle with the oncoming shift. Switching cars typically takes about 15 minutes, assuming a vehicle is available. Staff told us that it is common that when they arrive at work, there are calls that have been on hold for over an hour. What makes this situation worse is that many times patrol officers come to work and they have to wait up to 1-2 hours for a vehicle because the previous squad is stuck out on a call. In other cases, the car is available, but the oncoming shift officer must wait for the previous vehicle operator to complete his or her report on the computer that belongs in the vehicle. Officers said that there are many times they respond to a call for service and have to explain to the citizen that the reason for the delayed response that they were waiting for a vehicle.

We discussed this issue with the fleet manager, who explained that the department uses a hot squad system. This means that the squad cars operate 24-hours per day. This takes a significant toll on the squad cars in general, but is also creates some additional issues.

First, when a vehicle requires maintenance, the officer on duty must take it in. Officers generally do this while on shift, often waiting for the shop to finish the maintenance on the vehicle. Unfortunately, this often results in extended wait times, as technicians find other issues requiring work, which elongates the duration of the work they must complete. The other issue relates to a shortage of vehicles in general. At present, there are not enough additional vehicles in the fleet to account for shortages associated with maintenance and other issues.

Several staff members suggested take-home cars for all officers, while others advocated for take-home cars for those officers who live within the city. We do not argue against these recommendations, but recognize they may be cost-prohibitive, particularly in the short-term. However, we think it is unreasonable and inefficient to have officers waiting for the completion of squad maintenance or for the prior shift to finish using the squad.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Short Recommendation: Increase Marked Patrol Fleet

Section: XV Asset Management

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

In order ensure availability of a functional marked patrol unit for each patrol officer (including corporals, but excluding sergeants and above, and excluding specialty units), the minimal number of squad cars currently required is sixty. In order to account for cars damaged, or out of service for some other reason, we recommend an additional allocation of five marked patrol units per district, for a total allocation of 80 patrol units. We also recommend adding 4 squad cars for Traffic Services/Motors Unit, to accommodate personnel changes.

There is significant time lost each shift for vehicle maintenance and in officers waiting for their assigned vehicle, which is still in use by the prior shift. Adding these vehicles would dramatically reduce these ineffective practices. As noted elsewhere, we advocate for CROs to manage the movement of squad cars for maintenance.

We also want to note that there are some officers within the HEAT, VIRT, and SET teams, who have take-home cars; this number is unclear. If the department chose to change this policy, and to make squad cars available to the new HEAT team based on the number of officers working, and accounting for spare vehicles, it is likely that the department could recapture several patrol units, resulting in less demand for additional purchases.

Short Recommendation: Acquire Basic Crime Scene Cameras for Squad Cars

Section: XV: Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Officers do not have cameras available to take basic photographs. Although crime scene personnel will manage significant scenes, officers could easily manage some of the easier crime scenes. We recommend purchasing portable digital cameras for each of the squad cars.

CHAPTER XVI: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section contains a complete list of the formal recommendations of this report.

Short Recommendation: Eliminate District 5 and Reallocate Personnel and Resources

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

We believe that maintaining District 5 is inefficient and inconsistent with other personnel deployments within the police department. We recommend eliminating this district, and capturing the existing District 5 patrol beats within the other districts. The bike patrol would continue patrolling, but with additional and full-time patrol support in those beats. We recommend recapturing one sergeant from this action, and repurposing the two investigators assigned to District 5 to the homicide unit; see Section VIII below.

All of the specialty units currently assigned to District 5 would operate from the new headquarters, with oversight from the captain previously assigned to District 5. These units would be part of the new Special Services Division, with the captain reporting to the Northside Operations Bureau Chief.

Short Recommendation: Reorganize and Repurpose HEAT, VIRT, and SET Teams

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

These three units currently include six sergeants, seven corporals, and 41 other sworn line-level officers, totaling 54 personnel. The responsibilities of these units overlap significantly; we recommend merging them and creating a new structure. The HEAT teams would fall within the SOD bureau. All officers would operate within two HEAT teams, each with responsibility to two districts (North and South). Each HEAT team would have 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 10 officers. At the department's discretion, each HEAT team could function as two operational units to allow for deployment during the day and night shifts. This new structure would total 30 officers.

The effect of this move would be the recapture 19 officers, plus 2 sergeants, and 3 corporals (24 positions). This restructure would require two lieutenant positions to provide oversight of the HEAT units. One lieutenant position would be a promotion from sergeant, with the associated salary costs. The other lieutenant position will come from the consolidation of District 5, see below.

Short Recommendation: Improve Relationship between the Police Department and City Officials

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

The relationship between the DPD and government officials requires improvement. We expect that this will occur naturally with the hiring of a new police chief, but it is important that both sides commit to relationship and trust building. Some suggestions that the department could engage to improve perspectives include:

1. Set up a program where council members can participate in some training scenarios so they have an idea of what police officers face.
2. Establish a ride along program so council members can witness how police receive and handle calls for service.
3. Explore a similar process for officers, so they can understand community perspectives from the other side of the discussion.
4. Establish a police department workgroup to discuss issues and concerns. This group could consist of police officials, city council members, and community members. This would contribute to a greater understanding of the issues by all involved, and it would help establish relationships.

Short Recommendation: Prioritize Patrol Staffing

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

The core function of any police agency is the patrol division. Despite this, when vacancies occur, they often result in reductions to the patrol operation. This works against the capability of the organization to maintain a stable patrol workforce, resulting in service reductions. It also affects the capacity of patrol personnel to perform supplemental duties and community policing activities.

The DPD should make the patrol function a priority as part of the overall strategy to restore public trust and improve relationships. This requires a restructuring and refocusing of the entire organization to support the function of patrol as the core element of police service delivery. The department should take a position that all patrol assignments are *essential*, backfilling any vacancies in patrol from less-essential roles (as determined by the department) within the organization.

Short Recommendation: Establish Minimum Patrol and Operational Staffing

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

A safe and effective patrol workforce is essential to maintaining a safe community. To ensure that officers are safe and effective, and to ensure that service levels are met, the

department should establish minimum shift coverages that correlate with the staffing recommendations of this study, and maintain these levels consistently.

We have observed that patrol-staffing levels have been well below recommended levels, reaching 40-50% of targeted levels. This interferes with consistent policing practices, and it leads to other issues such as overtime, officer fatigue, and morale problems. We recommend setting the operational level of the police department at 532, and the minimum patrol allocation at 243. With the minimum patrol allocation at 243, the department will have a shift relief factor that is sufficient to absorb routine leave time, while maintaining staffing levels sufficient for maintaining operations.

Short Recommendation: Augment Patrol Staffing

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

Add personnel and reallocate personnel within the department.

Our analysis suggests the need to add 47 officers to the patrol division, bringing the total allocation of patrol officers (those taking calls as primary officers, including corporals) to 243. (Note that this is an increase of nine positions from our initial estimate). This is in addition to ensuring zero operational vacancies. At present, the annual attrition rate in the police department is 36. Allowing these operational vacancies to continue at this authorized staffing level, will force the department to continue to operate in arrears with regard to minimum staffing needs, and it will affect officer availability and overtime expenditures. It is important to understand that 243 is the baseline minimum required to adequately staff patrol. We have calculated this based on workload, and validated this number, based on shift staffing of the beats within the districts. Based on the recapture of twenty-four officers from the HEAT, VIRT, and SET units, and an additional recapture of four other officers, there is a need to hire an additional 19 officers to bring patrol up to minimum coverage. We are also recommending maintaining minimum operational sworn staffing at 532. This means hiring sufficiently above this number, in advance of attrition, in order to maintain 532 as an operational minimum. We recommend adjusting the authorized sworn strength to 563, to accommodate the attrition rate, and hiring to this amount. Essentially, these are permanent over-hires, with a newly established operational minimum of 532, and a newly established sworn strength of 563.

We provide the following information to detail the positions changes and additions.

- 47 additional positions in patrol
- 51-officer increase in authorized sworn strength (563) to maintain operational minimum of 532.
 - 24 positions recaptured from HEAT, VIRT, and SET
 - 2 sworn position recaptured from eliminating district 5; lieutenant and CPO/CRU.

- 1 position recaptured from restructuring command deputy chief position
- 1 captain position recaptured from the public affairs unit

Action	Command	Captain	Lieutenant	Inv. Sgt.	Invest.	Sgt.	Cpl.	Officer	CPO/CRU
Command Position Elimination	-1								
Merge HEAT, VIRT, SET			Promote 2			-2	-3	-19	
Organized Crime Unit					-3				
Public Housing						1		3	
Eliminate District 5		-1	-1	-1	-2				-1
Homicide Unit					2				
TACT Unit								4	
Motors Unit								-4	
Create Special Services Division		1							
Public Affairs Unit		-1							
Total	-1	-1	-1	-1	-3	-1	-3	-16	-1
							Grand Total		-28
Additional Hires to Patrol									19
Sworn Strength Increase							Total		51

Other Non-Sworn	CROs	Other
CROs - Motors	4	
CROs for Other Duties	6	
Crime Lab Unit		3
Total	10	3

Short Recommendation: Modify the Work Schedule

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

Adjust work schedule to accommodate proper staffing of beats, and for appropriate distribution of CFS.

- Immediate Fix (within 30-45 days)
 - Examine IACP recommendations for personnel reassignment and assign these personnel to patrol.
 - Ensure filling of other patrol vacancies as much as possible.
 - Absorb District 5 and staff these like any other beat
 - Establish over-staffing slots within each district. This involves adding personnel over the minimum schedule requirements, so that supervisors can remove personnel from the schedule for leave time, etc.
- Short-term fix (within 90-120 days)
 - Reduce beats to 7 per district (28 officers per shift)

- This will recover 8 officers per shift (moving from 36 to 28 beats)
 - That is 16 shifts/day that are available
- Assign 2 corporals per shift/district
- New Schedule
 - AM Shift: 28 officers (beats), 8 corporals = 36 Total
 - PM Shift: 28 officers (beats), 8 corporals = 36 Total
 - MID Shift (Float Cars 1400-0200): 4 each district = 16 Total
 - NOTE: These are emergency out of beat cars. There are only 7,500 Priority CFS per year, which is about 20 per day.
 - Over-Staffing:
 - The current number of staff allocated for the patrol division is 196. The new model here requires 176. This leaves 20 personnel (about 5 per district) available to be over-scheduled. Supervisors will move over-staffed personnel into vacant spots, as officers submit leave requests.
- Long-term fix
 - Consider other schedules. New schedules should:
 - Reduce/Eliminate Overtime
 - Eliminate Peaks and Valleys in Scheduling
 - Have flexibility to cover leave and training requests
 - Ensure appropriate staffing of all beats
 - Include supplemental staff to manage multiple CFS occurring in one beat, and to assist with emergency/priority CFS.

Short Recommendation: Ensure Proper Beat Deployment and Integrity

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

We recommend reemphasizing beat deployment and integrity, and changes to the beat structure and staffing, so that officer deployments will allow for continuity within the assigned beats. The DPD has stated and demonstrated its commitment to a community oriented policing strategy. Such a philosophy requires that officers have sufficient time to engage in community policing in a meaningful way, and it requires that officers have a connection to the community they are serving.

We advocate the use of a beat deployment system that encourages and emphasizes geographically structured policing and dispatching, such that officers can develop familiarity with their particular beat, allowing them to establish relationships and to develop collaborative community partnerships and community policing actions. We believe that AVL systems have significant utility. With adjustments to the beat structure, including size, geographic boundaries, and proper staffing, we believe that the AVL

system will more often than not, locate personnel available for assignment to CFS within their designated patrol area. We propose the following model.

Beat/District Deployments

- Reduce beats to 28, which include seven per district, eliminating District 5
 - Total CFS = 136,000
 - Divided by 4 districts = 34,000 CFS for each district
 - Divided by 7 beats each = 4,857 CFS/beat annually
 - Divided by 365 days = 13.3 CFS/beat daily.
- 7 officers each district per shift $28 \times 2 = 56$
- 4 power shifts (daily - each district) = 16
- 2 Corporals per district per shift $8 \times 2 = 16$
- Total = 88 Shifts/Day

Short Recommendation: Reemphasize Community Policing as a Department Strategy

Section: V Community Policing

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

The DPD needs to reemphasize and revitalize their commitment to a Community Oriented Policing (COP) philosophy. This renewed emphasis must include clear direction for staff, and a culture of accountability. The infrastructure of the COP approach presently exists within the Durham PD, as indicated by the Police Training Officer Program (PTO), performance appraisals that evaluate officers on their level of community involvement, and most importantly, as demonstrated by individual officers who care about their community and want to establish positive relationships with the citizens. To accomplish this, leaders should do the following:

- Communicate clear expectations to all command staff as to the purpose and mission of the agency, and that the community policing philosophy is mandatory for all command staff.
- Hold commanders accountable for their actions and behavior toward accomplishing short and long-term goals of the agency, particularly with respect to community policing efforts.
- Articulate and clearly communicate the vision for the DPD to those within the department, to include the importance of community policing in repairing community relationships and restoring public trust.
- Emphasize the core values and expectations of the agency, and communicate to officer how they can demonstrate these through community policing.
- Perform a SWOT or similar exercise to form the basis of a strategic plan for the agency moving forward within the context of community policing.
- Within the strategic plan, outline some short-term goals focused on community policing that can accomplished and recognized to sustain momentum in

accomplishing the long-term goals. Make these short-term successes public within the department in the community.

- Prioritize non-criminal interaction with youth as part of the community policing philosophy and embrace the many programs that integrate youth into police interactions.

Short Recommendation: Acknowledge and Address Public Perceptions of Racism and Discriminatory Policing by DPD

Section: V Community Policing

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

Durham PD leadership must accept that the root cause of the poor relationships and lack of public trust in the community is the widespread perception of racism on the part of police officers and the agency as a whole. DPD leadership must develop a strategy to correct that perception, identify current practices that feed this perception, and immediately modify/eliminate those practices.

Although we acknowledge that some officers may engage in disparate or discriminatory practices, in our assessment, racism is not an institutional problem within the DPD. However, this perception has become a reality for many citizens, and they view all actions by all officers through this prism. Effective communication at multiple levels must be a key element of any strategy.

The executive leadership team must acknowledge that there is a severe deficit of public trust in many districts and among a large segment of the population of the city. This acknowledgement must be accompanied by a shared resolve to do whatever it takes to restore the public trust, starting with personal accountability at all levels of the organization.

Suggested action steps for the executive team include:

1. Set up a meeting with every member of the DPD in appropriately subdivided groups, and articulate the uncompromising agency core values, to include fair and impartial policing for everyone.
2. Provide a vision, both short-term and long-term, for the future operation of the DPD. Discuss what accountability will look like from this point on, and solicit feedback and promise to provide feedback at every opportunity.
3. Emphasize the great work of the majority of officers, including what behavior is expected, and clearly state that executive leadership will not tolerate staff behaviors that violate agency core values.
4. Use the very best communication and change-management strategies, and anticipate resistance and establish a plan to manage it.

5. Issue all members of DPD personalized business cards to give out during all interactions, to encourage a personal connection with the residents and future positive interactions. (This could include a survey comment link as described).
6. As soon as possible after meeting with DPD personnel, schedule a press conference to communicate with the public about the core issues facing the agency and its relationship with the community. Acknowledge the perception of racism, articulate the core values of the agency, and provide elements of the strategic plan going forward intended to address the concerns of the community directly. The plan should identify specific measurable goals and the actions the department will take to accomplish those goals, including measures to assess progress and accomplishment of those goals.
7. Assure the community that the department will provide continuing feedback on the progress of the agency toward meeting these objectives.

Short Recommendation: Engage a Co-Production Police Model

Section: V Community Policing

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

There is a need for the community to have a greater level of involvement in the decision-making processes that drive much of the policing strategies that affect them directly. Engaging a co-production policing model will contribute to community involvement, add to transparency, and build relationships and public trust. We make the following recommendations, which emanate directly from the report of The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing:²¹

- Schedule regular forums and meetings where all community members can interact with police and help influence programs and policy.
- Engage youth and communities in joint training with law enforcement, citizen academies, ride-alongs, problem-solving teams, community action teams, and quality of life teams.
- Establish formal community/citizen advisory committees to assist in developing crime prevention strategies and agency policies as well as provide input on policing issues.

²¹ The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing -
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf

Short Recommendation: Examine and Revise Case Management System for Investigations

Section: VIII Investigations

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

Based on the information we received from multiple staff, there is no centralized repository for investigations case management, case assignment, and case monitoring. Regardless of the decentralized nature of investigations, ready access to this information is critical in evaluating investigator effectiveness, ensuring prompt delivery of investigative services, and monitoring duplication of effort within the investigative services. In addition, the lack of consistency contributes to the potential for a wide range of judgement on the part of supervisors, responsible for making case assignments. We recommend that the department take immediate actions to implement a uniform system for case management, assignment, and supervision.

In our survey of the department's investigators, we asked about unit expectations for case closure. The responses by the investigators, which varied greatly, suggested at a minimum, a lack of clarity in understanding those expectations. The lack of consistency in the responses also suggests that monitoring of case closure timelines may need improvement. Accordingly, we recommend that the department incorporate this issue into the case management process.

Short Recommendation: Increase Marked Patrol Fleet

Section: XV Asset Management

Priority (1-3): 1

Details:

In order ensure availability of a functional marked patrol unit for each patrol officer (including corporals, but excluding sergeants and above, and excluding specialty units), the minimal number of squad cars currently required is sixty. In order to account for cars damaged, or out of service for some other reason, we recommend an additional allocation of five marked patrol units per district, for a total allocation of 80 patrol units. We also recommend adding 4 squad cars for Traffic Services/Motors Unit, to accommodate personnel changes.

There is significant time lost each shift for vehicle maintenance and in officers waiting for their assigned vehicle, which is still in use by the prior shift. Adding these vehicles would dramatically reduce these ineffective practices. As noted elsewhere, we advocate for CROs to manage the movement of squad cars for maintenance.

We also want to note that there are some officers within the HEAT, VIRT, and SET teams, who have take-home cars; this number is unclear. If the department chose to change this policy, and to make squad cars available to the new HEAT team based on the number of officers working, and accounting for spare vehicles, it is likely that the department could

recapture several patrol units, resulting in less demand for additional purchases.

Short Recommendation: Increase Staffing in the Records Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

We have two recommendations in this section.

1. The records unit will experience a significant increase in workload, commensurate with the shift from UCR to NIBRS. Accordingly, we recommend adding two personnel to this unit to account for the additional workload.
2. The telephone-reporting unit (TRU) used to have four employees, but now only has one. We expect the workload of this unit to increase, due to NIBRS compliance issue, and due to our recommendations (elsewhere in this report) to encourage alternate methods of reporting. We recommend staffing this unit full-time.

Short Recommendation: Create a Community Resources Division for Non-Sworn Uniformed Personnel

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

We recommend that the department create a Community Resource Officer division. This is an unarmed, uniformed civilian position. There are various operational aspects that sworn officers currently handle, which non-sworn personnel could manage. These include funeral escorts, staffing of the Telephone Response Unit (TRU), courthouse transports (W-Units), security at city hall, performing standby services at motor vehicle crashes, and routing squad cars for vehicle maintenance. The department can hire these individuals at 60-70% of the cost of sworn officers, which creates a tremendous fiscal benefit. In addition to providing these services, CROs provide a ready pool of applicants for police officer positions, which will contribute to the recruitment efforts of the department.

We also recommend the following deployment of personnel for this new division:

- 4 - Motors
- 2 - City Hall Coverage
- 4 - for:
 - TRU Staffing
 - Courthouse Transports (W-Units)
 - Vehicle Maintenance
 - Standby on Crashes

Adding these personnel would also require the addition of four marked police patrol units. We would recommend striping/marking that indicates these personnel are CROs, in order to distinguish them from sworn officers. IACP recognizes that there may be legal

issues that affect how DPD can use CROs in the field. Any consideration of implementing this recommendation will require close analysis and recognition of these issues.

Short Recommendation: Establish a Public Housing Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that there are significant trust issues between those in the DHA communities and the police department. Those interviewed described the positive nature of the community/police interaction when the department had assigned officers to these areas, and we see a direct need to rebuild public trust with this segment of the community. We recommend that the department establish a public housing unit, with one sergeant and three officers. The department can redeploy the sergeant from the District 5 consolidation, and the three officers would come from the recapture of three officers from the organized crime unit (OCU). We would recommend careful selection of officers for this unit, choosing those officers who are willing to engage the community proactively, with the intent of building trust and relationships.

Short Recommendation: Repurpose Traffic Services/Motors Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

There is a significant need to provide additional resources for traffic enforcement and response to motor vehicle crashes. Due to high demand, the main responsibility of the motors unit, which comprises six officers, is funeral escorts. Utilizing these resources in this manner for non-enforcement activities is inefficient and creates a tremendous financial cost to the city. We recommend transferring four of these officers to the TACT unit, and replacing them with CRO positions (described above). The TACT unit would maintain its current role, but would also respond to motor vehicle crashes, as time permits. This will help reduce the burden of this work on the patrol division.

In this configuration, the two remaining motors officers would work collaboratively with the CROs to provide funeral escorts. CROs can also provide standby assistance on crashes, and assist with other standby activities. In the unlikely event that CROs had free time, the city could authorize them to issue parking tickets, as well.

Short Recommendation: Reduce Staffing to Organized Crime Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

This unit contains fourteen officers, which includes one sergeant. At fourteen, this unit is larger than any other investigative unit within the department is. It represents nearly 14% of the total compliment of officers assigned to the special operations and criminal

investigations bureaus. We recommend reducing this unit by three officers, and repurposing those positions. The department can use these recaptured positions to staff the Public Housing Unit, see below.

Short Recommendation: Improve Communication and Engagement with the District Attorney

Section: III: Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

Based on our discussion with District Attorney Echols, it appears that there are significant quality control and operational issues, which require attention between the DAs office and the police department. We recommend the following:

1. The police chief of his or her designee should meet with DA Echols to identify the immediate action items requiring attention. An in-depth discussion of these items should occur, and the two offices should establish an action plan to correct them.
2. The police chief or his or her designee should provide clear direction and expectations that training in report writing and attention to detail is critical, and that the academy trainers, command staff, and supervisors, must prioritize this.
3. The police chief should assign a liaison to the DAs office, to meet with them on an ongoing basis to address any concerns.

Short Recommendation: Develop a Support Plan for Non-Sworn Staff

Section: III: Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

Having a support staff that functions well is a key factor in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of a police agency. Many of these personnel have significant skills, but due to the make-up of organizations, leadership often fails to maximize these. To ensure that non-sworn staff can contribute effectively to the organization, and to aid them in their professional development and growth, the department should place an overall greater emphasis on the input, training, and well-being and support of non-sworn members, that that the department take steps to improve communication and feedback. We recommend the following steps:

1. Establish regular roundtable sessions with the various non-sworn units and solicit input on problem solving and innovative ideas to improve efficiency and delivery of customer service.
2. Establish a feedback loop to improve the overall communication between non-sworn and command, to ensure they have a voice in decision-making processes, and to help them recognize that their contributions are valued.
3. Emphasize training of non-sworn employees and establish a professional development plan specifically for non-sworn members that will prepare them for

their required duties, as well as for advancement in the department. In our assessment, non-sworn staff would benefit greatly from *group dynamics* and *leadership* training.

4. Improve communications with the Crime Analysis Unit. Staff indicated that they have feedback to provide command staff, with no outlet or path that enables them to do so. Indications suggested that this feedback is focused on how they could do things better.

Short Recommendation: Improve Effectiveness of Public Affairs Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

We have two recommendations in this section.

1. The department should encourage the PAU to exercise all opportunities to provide positive stories about the work of the DPD. The PAU can accomplish this via numerous social media outlets, and even through the mainstream media, as relationships improve, and those in the mainstream media are more open to covering such stories. We also feel that it is incumbent upon leadership within the DPD to encourage officers to provide positive stories to the PAU, so that they can highlight these. We see this as an important aspect of improving the public image of the department, because without officer interaction, the PAU may be unaware of many opportunities to promote the good work of the agency.
2. As noted, we believe the addition of a captain between the police chief and the PAU may be an unnecessary or inefficient use of resources. We note that there may be some value in eliminating the captain position and recapturing it. Even if there is a concern that the PAU should report to another supervisor, and not directly to the police chief, we believe a deputy chief could easily serve in this capacity, saving a command staff position. Our recommendation here may not account for all of the overlapping responsibilities of the captain overseeing the PAU. Accordingly, we suggest a review of the oversight of the PAU, to include whether the department needs a captain position to provide oversight. (Note: we did not adjust our hiring recommendation numbers based on the elimination of this position).

Short Recommendation: Re-emphasize and focus policing efforts on Youth Engagement

Section: VI: Juveniles

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

The DPD should regularly conduct analyses of crime data to identify the types and frequency of crimes committed by and upon juveniles with the specific intent to develop programs to prevent them. Youth-police relationship building programs help to reduce

victimization, involvement of youth in the juvenile justice system, and affiliation with gangs or gang activity. Positive youth-police relationships can help to build trust and minimize the fear of police. Prevention, intervention, and relationship building programs often enhance recruitment efforts for future police officers.

The IACP maintains an extensive directory of successful intervention programs for juveniles involved in criminal activity, either as a victim, or as a perpetrator, which law enforcement agencies across the United States have implemented. It can be instrumental in identifying and implementing effective programs. The website, IACP Youth Focused Policing Resource Center, is located www.iacpyouth.org.

We also recommend continued discussions with the school district concerning the use of GREAT officers, and SROs within the schools. As noted, the school district is currently spending a significant amount of money on off-duty officers, which we feel the district could easily redirect to cover a substantial portion of the cost of hiring more DPD officers for assignment to the schools. School district funding would not cover the full cost of adding these officers, but the addition of these staff would likely contribute significantly to public safety within the community, and they would also likely improve relationships and trust between officers and youth in Durham.

Short Recommendation: Prioritize Investigations and Crime Scene Investigations Staffing

Section: VIII Investigations

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

As noted above, we recommend that DPD prioritize investigations staffing, and CSI staffing. These positions provide mission-critical resources, which we feel require consistent staffing in order to function properly. As with our recommendation regarding prioritization of patrol staffing, we recommend that the department make a commitment to maintain full staffing in investigations, second only in priority to staffing patrol fully. In addition, we recommend that DPD prioritize staffing of CSI, acting swiftly to backfill any open positions.

Short Recommendation: Reduce Operational Vacancies and Address Attrition Issues

Section: XIII Recruitment and Retention

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

At present, the annual attrition rate in the police department is 36. Allowing these operational vacancies to continue at this authorized staffing level, will force the department to continue to operate in arrears with regard to minimum staffing needs, and it will affect officer availability and overtime expenditures. As we noted in our recommendations in Section IV of this report, the city needs to hire additional personnel to overcome operational vacancies.

However, more importantly, the city needs to examine why officers are leaving, and consider what the city and the department can do to reduce this occurring. The cost of hiring and training one police officer is significant, with estimates suggesting this number in the \$50,000 to \$60,000 range. At that level, the department and the city is losing roughly \$1,800,000 per year.

We recommend that the department study this issue thoroughly, and give consideration to addressing any issues identified. We also recommend consideration of various incentives to retention of officers.

Short Recommendation: Augment the Professional Standards IA Unit Staffing

Section: XIV Professional Standards

Priority (1-3): 2

Details:

The volume of complaints investigated by the IA unit has increased substantially, and it is unlikely that this volume of activity will decline. The DPD has a need to ensure professional standards, and this need extends to the public, to provide assurances that the police department is addressing improper behavior. Properly conducted IA investigations take time, and with the increases in volume in this unit, there is a risk of losing quality control. The IA division provides a very important function, and accordingly, we recommend consideration of adding one additional investigator to this unit.

Short Recommendation: Track and Count Aggravated Assault Incident Numbers, in addition to Victim Totals

Section I: The Policing Environment

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

As we have noted, aggravated assault totals may include multiple victims from a single incident, which can provide misleading information concerning the number of aggravated assault incidents occurring within the City of Durham. In order to avoid any confusion in this regard, we recommend including an incident total in tracking aggravated assaults, in addition to tracking total victim counts.

Short Recommendation: Monitor Part II Case Reporting Practices

Section I: The Policing Environment

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Significant variances in some reported categories for Part II crimes suggest inaccurate or inconsistent categorization of offenses (see Table 10). We recommend examining these categories to isolate these occurrences, and to work with records staff to identify whether

there are inaccuracies, and if so, how to engage more accurate reporting strategies in the future.

Short Recommendation: Establish Access to Traffic Citation Data from the Courts

Section I: The Policing Environment

Priority (1-3): **3**

Details:

At present, DPD does not have access to citation data related to the number of citations issued by officers, and the types of violations cited. Analyzing these data in relation to crash statistics is an important component in determining strategies to reduce crashes and to improve public safety. These data also provide the department with the opportunity to examine work volume and practices by individual employees. Accordingly, we recommend working with the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Court to gain access, or to determine a mechanism for reporting these data back to the agency.

Short Recommendation: Examine Recruit Attrition Causes

Section I: The Policing Environment

Priority (1-3): **3**

Details:

The cost incurred for hiring and training a police recruit is substantial, and accordingly, when recruits are not successful, the agency loses precious financial resources. Moreover, losing recruits in the midst of the training process also elongates the time required to replace vacancies, which works against operational effectiveness. We recommend that the department examine the reasons for attrition within the recruit ranks, to determine the need for adjustments to the hiring process.

Short Recommendation: Conduct a Pay and Benefits Analysis for Sworn Staff

Section II: Culture and Leadership

Priority (1-3): **3**

Details:

Many officers expressed that pay and benefits for the DPD are low and that this is contributing to officers leaving. Pay is but one factor that prompts employees to leave an organization. However, it is worth exploring this issue in order to answer the fundamental question. If pay and benefits are inequitable with respect to comparable communities, the city should know this, so that they may make informed decisions regarding whether they wish to close any gaps.

Short Recommendation: Strategize Approaches to Improve the Organizational Climate

Section II: Culture and Leadership

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

The cultural survey and organizational climate questionnaire provided significant feedback concerning employee perceptions of the operational culture and leadership at DPD. The nature of the Organizational Climate survey provides leaders with a vantage point to understand both current and desired conditions within the agency, as perceived by staff. Leaders should analyze these responses and identify strategies that contribute to categorical improvements.

Short Recommendation: Communicate Organizational Goals and Establish Internal Goals

Section II: Culture and Leadership

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Although the department has established goals, staff within the organization indicated these goals are not well known, see Table 25. Additionally, as we noted previously, the goals identified in the budget process relate primarily to external (community) goals, with no internal goals established, other than maintaining staffing levels. We recommend a process whereby leaders communicate organizational goals throughout the agency, and the establishment of internal goals related to leadership and other areas identified within this report.

Short Recommendation: Review Performance Appraisal Process

Section II: Culture and Leadership

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Staff indicated that the performance appraisal process has limited utility, due to structural elements that require employees to perform in areas in which they currently cannot (e.g., community engagement). Based on our limited sample, we cannot ascertain whether this is an accurate assessment, however, we recommend that leaders examine this process to identify whether the current appraisal process requires modification.

Short Recommendation: Reduce Senior Command Staff by merging two Senior Command Staff Positions

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Eliminate one Command Position.

Based on our review of the organizational chart and the associated responsibilities, it appears that there is an imbalance of command-level supervision with respect to the Operations Support Section Deputy Chief, and the Administrative Services Bureau

Assistant Chief. We recommend merging these positions and eliminating the Assistant Chief position, or at a minimum, reviewing and revising the organizational chart to provide an appropriate balance of oversight at each level.

Short Recommendation: Augment Staffing in the Crime Lab Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Based on Forensic Accreditation Standards, there should be a minimum of three people assigned to each discipline within the CLU. The unit currently has one supervisor and five employees (authorized for six). We recommend adding one staff member to each of the disciplines to increase the authorized totals to one supervisor and nine employees. If this unit ever fails accreditation, it will cost the city significantly more money to staff it properly and to reestablish accreditation.

Short Recommendation: Examine Salary of Non-Sworn Staff and Implement a Recognition Strategy

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

We have two recommendations in this section.

Non-sworn staff are a critical element to the success of any police agency, and attrition or loss of non-sworn personnel can have a dramatic effect on operational efficiency. Accordingly, it is important that non-sworn staff members feel valued within the organization, and that leaders recognize their efforts.

1. We recommend that DPD conduct a study of the compensation and benefit packages for non-sworn staff, and if justified and reasonable, present a plan to the city to correct any deficiencies.
2. We recommend that DPD improve and emphasize the system for recognizing important contributions or accomplishments by non-sworn individuals or units. Although the department already has a recognition system in place, we feel there is a need to re-emphasize this process for supervisors at all levels, so that non-sworn personnel feel valued and recognized for their notable contributions to the department.

Short Recommendation: Examine Pay Structure of Durham Crime Information Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Staff in the Durham Crime Information Center receive overtime each pay period, due to the nature and structure of their work schedule. This appears to be a financially inefficient

process. We do not recommend the use of overtime to maintain general operations, and accordingly, we suggest a review of this practice for possible revision.

Short Recommendation: Repurpose the Bike Patrol Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

It is evident that the bike patrol performs a vital role within the community, including significant citizen contact, as well as patrolling various areas, not conducive to motorized patrol efforts. We believe the unit is under-utilized in several aspects, and that revisions in practice would be helpful.

1. The use of a sworn officer to provide security at city hall is inefficient. The department can hire non-sworn uniformed personnel to perform this function at a fraction of the cost, and we recommend this (we outline this recommendation in another section).
2. Although the total activity of this unit is impressive, the number of CFS answered is minimal (627). There are many CFS that this unit could handle and manage, which would support patrol, and relieve some of their burden. Handling CFS, particularly in the primary areas of assignment, also contributes to the ambassadorial role of this unit. We recommend encouraging bike patrol units to take CFS that are within immediate proximity (3-5 minutes of biking time) of their geographical location.
3. We also note here that one of our other recommendations involves elimination of District 5, and staffing those beats with patrol officers. Accordingly, the bike patrol will not have primary responsibility for these areas. This will allow for expansion of their use to other areas of the city, on an as-needed basis.

Short Recommendation: Merge Major Crimes and Interdiction Unit

Section: III Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

The Major Crimes Unit (MCU) and Interdiction Unit (INT) have a very similar mission. Both of these units focus their efforts squarely on narcotics. We believe that merging these units would likely improve functionality, such that they would not need additional personnel.

**Short Recommendation: Improve the Use of Alternative Reporting Strategies,
including Crash Reporting**

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Although DPD currently has a Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU), the department does not fully staff it. We encourage and recommend that DPD fully staff the TRU, and that the department moves forward with plans to engage an online reporting system.

We also recommend that the department work directly with the communications center and other personnel responsible for taking incoming phone calls during business hours, to route callers to the TRU or online reporting system, if that is appropriate. This will require some training of personnel, and establishing systems for oversight and follow up.

Short Recommendation: Improve the Documentation of Officer Activity

Section: IV Patrol Staffing and Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Conducting a workload analysis for patrol requires data that can inform those calculations. The current practices of recording officer time at DPD do not account for a variety of officer actions, including things such as community policing, on-duty training, and report writing. We recommend the department identify the various metrics that would be helpful in conducting future workload studies, and then implement a strategy to engage those practices.

We recommend engaging a work group to do this, so that those involved can shape the process, and ensure that capturing the right information occurs, without creating a burdensome bureaucratic process.

**Short Recommendation: Move Non-Familial Aggravated Assault Investigations to
Homicide Unit**

Section: VIII Investigations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Individuals involved in aggravated assaults are often involved in homicides, whether before or after the aggravated assault. The department has a centralized division that investigates homicides, and we feel it is logical for these same investigators to work on the non-familial aggravated assault cases. Centralizing this function will add efficiency to the process, and ensure that investigators will be able to identify individuals who commit multiple aggravated assaults in different districts, quickly.

In addition to recommending that aggravated assault cases move to the homicide division, we are also recommending that the department reallocate the two investigation positions recaptured from the elimination of District 5, to the homicide division. We note

that homicide investigators indicate a need for additional staffing to work on cold cases, and we feel that by adding two investigators to this division, there should be adequate staffing for manage the aggravated assault cases, as well as cold case leads.

The department may also wish to consider renaming the unit the Violent Crimes Division, as this is more reflective of the work.

Short Recommendation: Examine Domestic Violence Investigation Processes for possible revision.

Section: VIII Investigations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Several officers indicated that DV investigators have expressed criticism over the preliminary investigations occurring at the patrol level. We recommend further study of this issue to determine whether preliminary investigations by patrols officers reflect the new and emerging best practices in this area. If the department identifies areas of improvement, DV staff should produce a process to implement them.

Short Recommendation: Create an Internal Policy Advisory Committee

Section: IX

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

A strong set of guiding rules and procedures is a critical need for the efficient and effective operation of any police agency. Indeed, DPD has an extensive set of guidelines, which we find instructional and functional. However, those governed by the rules have a vested interest in the development of the standards for which they will be held accountable, and expected to follow. These same individuals often possess significant operational knowledge that leaders can call upon in the development of such processes. Accordingly, we recommend that DPD establish an internal policy advisory committee, comprised of line-level officers and supervisors, along with suitable command-level personnel. The purpose of this unit would be to review existing policies for revision, and to assist leadership in developing new policies, as needed.

Short Recommendation: Update the Policy Manual as Outlined

Section: IX

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

We recommend the following revisions and additions to the policy manual:

- We recommend the inclusion of a key word index as an appendix. A key word index allows the reader to more easily access general orders of relevance, since some subject matter appears in more than one order or policy. For example, one policy may address vehicle searches from a legal standpoint with regard to search

and seizure, and another order may relate to safe and effective operational practices.

- In terms of topics covered by the manual, our reviewer had several suggestions for inclusion, as follows.
 1. Grooming and Appearance. The G.O. on this topic covers most of the matters necessary with the exception of those situations where the department should make accommodations for employees on religious and similar grounds as protected under EEOC guidelines.
 2. Transgender. The review did not locate any protocols for officers when dealing with persons in the community, whether suspects, victims, or witnesses, who are transgender or gender nonconforming persons. Failure to provide guidance on this topic has resulted in numerous issues among police departments around the country, such as complaints of harassment, excessive force, and resultant failure of many such persons to report crimes or otherwise deal effectively with the police. Additionally, no reference could be found with regard to protocols for dealing with police officers and other employees who in the process of transitioning from one gender identity to another. Thought needs to be paid and a G.O. created as to how the department should, or must, respond to employees once they have announced their intention to change their gender identity and appearance.
 3. The reviewer could not identify any G.O. that deals specifically with DPD protocols for accommodating pregnancy. In many cases, law enforcement agencies deal with this as a matter of light duty or medical leave, neither of which is sufficient in their entirety. Many women wish to continue working when pregnant until a health care provider determines otherwise, and departments should allow this. A G.O. of this type requires the department to balance the needs of the officer, his or her duty assignment and duration of assignments, and health and safety considerations for the woman, including the wellbeing of her unborn child.
 4. The reviewer could find only nominal reference to officers taking police action when off duty or in plain clothes. The issue here is one of officer safety. Officers responding to various scenes have unwittingly killed fellow officers, when mistaken for perpetrators or accomplices to various crimes. Officers need guidance on when they may (or should) intervene in an incident in these cases, to avoid misidentification.
 5. Although the department provides training on the requirements enumerated under the U.S. Supreme Court cases of *Brady* and *Giglio*, the reviewer could not

identify any G.O. related to these issues.²² The outcome of these two cases creates an affirmative duty for police and prosecutors to provide any evidence or findings that could potentially prove to be exculpatory for the defendant or serve to mitigate punishment. This means that the defendant need not specifically request such information under disclosure provisions; agencies must provide this information proactively. This includes any factors that could serve to impeach the testimony of a prosecution witness to include that of police officers. This has had detrimental impact in many cases on the ability to bring a case to trial or secure a guilty verdict. Police officers whose records reveal such matters as falsification of records or testimony, withholding of relevant case materials from the defense, a pattern of use of excessive force or biased policing, among other matters, pose the potential that the officer may be unable to testify in court for fear that their testimony may be impeached. As such, the usefulness of an officer can be severely limited and in many departments, such officers may lose their ability to serve on the department. The department should clarify all of these factors for officers through a G.O. Furthermore, the DPD should have a system by which the department can readily turn over case material to the prosecution to determine any *Brady* implications.

6. The reviewer was able to locate the DPD G.O. on Unbiased Policing. It was felt that while the G.O. is generally well done, it concentrates on vehicle stops, but does not address the issue of equitable and unbiased delivery of police services to all members of the community. Providing services or privileges to certain members or segments of the community, or failing to do so based on race, class, or similar distinctions are important considerations in a G.O. on unbiased and fair policing.

Short Recommendation: Acquire Basic Crime Scene Cameras for Squad Cars

Section: XV: Operations

Priority (1-3): 3

Details:

Officers do not have cameras available to take basic photographs. Although crime scene personnel will manage significant scenes, officers could easily manage some of the easier crime scenes. We recommend purchasing portable digital cameras for each of the squad cars.

²² *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)

CHAPTER XVII: SUMMARY

Our analysis of the Durham Police Department suggests that leaders are consciously engaged in running the department in progressive and positive manner, and that those within the organization, from command to line staff, take great pride in providing exemplary service to the public. In fact, we have noted that the Durham Police Department has been open to external review, engaging OJP, RTI Inc., and the IACP to study department operations. This suggests a strong commitment to improving the organization, and it indicates a willingness to take steps toward making positive changes and improving public safety for the community.

During our interviews, we asked members of the organization to provide feedback concerning the department, both positive and negative. We heard a series of compliments and positive statements about that the department is doing well, and we provide a partial list here:

- Top notch training academy
- Good working relationship between officers and specialty units
- Power DMS is a functional tool
- Commitment by staff to do their jobs and help the community
- Many positive comments by the community related to department programs
- District Attorney investigator is working well
- Strong collaborative partnerships outside the agency
- First-line leaders tend to the needs of their staff

In addition to the things that staff mentioned, we made personal observations of many of these things. We found the officers of the DPD committed to the community and to the vocation, and they had great pride in their agency.

Despite all of the positive aspects of the work environment at DPD, as our recommendations suggest, there are opportunities for improvement. Most notably, in our judgement, the department needs to re-emphasize the importance of the patrol and investigative functions, ensuring that adequate staffing is present in both. For patrol, at present, this includes augmenting the workforce. For investigations, we believe filling the current vacancies is a starting place, and that continued monitoring should occur to determine future staffing needs.

APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES

FIGURE A-1: Citizen CFS by Time of Day - District 1




FIGURE A-2: Citizen CFS by Time of Day - District 2




FIGURE A-3: Citizen CFS by Time of Day - District 3




FIGURE A-4: Citizen CFS by Time of Day - District 14




FIGURE A-5: Citizen CFS by Time of Day - District 5




FIGURE A-6: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 1 - Priority (P)




FIGURE A-7: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 1 - Other Priorities




FIGURE A-8: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 2 - Priority (P)




FIGURE A-9: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 2 - Other Priorities




FIGURE A-10: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 3 - Priority (P)




FIGURE A-11: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 3 – Other Priorities




FIGURE A-12: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 4 – Priority (P)




FIGURE A-13: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 4 – Other Priorities




FIGURE A-14: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 5 – Priority (P)





FIGURE A-15: CFS Response Time by Hour: District 5 – Other Priorities



APPENDIX B: DURHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT STRATEGIC PLAN

Durham Police Department STRATEGIC PLAN

Core Products and Services	Key Customers
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforce Law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Investigate Crime ◦ Make Arrests ◦ Clear Crimes ◦ Records Management • Crime Prevention <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Community engagement, ◦ Personal safety education ◦ Crisis intervention ◦ Potential perpetrator intervention • Community Emergency Response 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • Business and Industry • Visitors • Other Government Entities • Higher Education Institutions

Mission Statement
To minimize crime, promote safety, and enhance the quality of life in partnership with our community.

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel (Quality, Professionalism) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Commitment to the job (enthusiastic, hardworking) • Training (Academy, PTO, continuing ed.) • Cooperation & Relationships in Dept. • Partnerships with other agencies/Outside Agency Outreach and Collaboration • Technology (MDT's, ICC, etc.) • Professional Development (advancement) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Advancement Opportunities • Accreditation • Community involvement, services, and partnerships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequately promoting Department successes and accomplishments • Inter-division information sharing can be enhanced • Message flow from the top of command to line staff needs to be enhanced • Media relations shortcomings

Opportunities	Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ FBI, National Academy of Leadership Development... • Build & strengthen relationships with local & regional Law enforcement agencies • Mental Health Facilities/ Hospitals/Health care agencies • Community Involvement • Grant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Educating the public • Community expectations of 'security' services • Money /Lack of resources • Under-equipped • Deferred Maintenance of buildings is low priority and slow to implement • PD understaffed • Public trust of PD is perceived to be low • Public Perceptions/Misperceptions • Judicial/Court System • Loss of community social service programs

Goals, Objectives, Measures, and Initiatives	
Well Managed City	
Provide professional management that is accountable, efficient, and transparent.	
Objectives and Measures	Initiatives
<p>Objective: Effectively recruit, train and retain well qualified and diverse employees</p> <p>Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of applicants who achieve a "passing" score in each promotion cycle • % of cadets completing Academy and Field Training • % of Sworn Patrol Officers certified in target categories • % of recruit individuals invited to apply each testing cycle • Average sworn vacancy rate • # of officers/employees receiving the City's Language Incentive • % of officers living within the City limits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand training opportunities to provide training in media relations, public relations, diversity training, and mental health issues and crisis intervention • Inventory and evaluate the Training Unit's educational material to ensure that the best training materials and practices are being utilized • Contract for a wage bypass study to determine if the Department provides equitable wages to in order to retain well qualified employees • Educate employees on the many counseling services available to officers and employees of the DPD • Develop a standardized internship program to introduce qualified individuals to the varying aspects of law enforcement • Develop a comprehensive recruitment plan that outlines multiple approaches for officer recruitment, including online and social media recruitment, specified event recruitment, and recruitment within Durham's diverse ethnic and cultural communities • Evaluate best practices for increasing the number of officers living within Durham City Limits

<p>Objective: Increase Departmental transparency through better communication</p> <p>Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of media inquiries acknowledged within 24 hours • % increase in social media followers • # of self-initiated and submitted stories to the news media that highlight Durham PD activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restructure the Public Information Unit to incorporate a full-time Public Information Unit Manager to increase information dissemination and improve media and community relations • Create a Comprehensive Communications Plan that clearly describes the internal, and external, communication policies and practices of the DPD • Educate the public on community services opportunities for engagement with neighborhoods, schools, and youth • Encourage attendance in the Citizens Police Academy (CPA) by placing more emphasis on promoting the CPA via local newspapers, DPD website, social media, etc. • Create a Citizen's digest of all the Community Services programs and outreach activities provided by the Durham Police Department • Improve internal communication by utilizing new software platforms that will monitor and track employee training, improve document management, enhance accreditation compliance, and provide for employee opinion surveys
<p>Objective: Increase the public's trust in the Durham Police Department</p> <p>Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of residents who believe the Durham Police Department is doing a good job protecting and serving Durham Residents • % of residents who believe the Durham Police Department is working closely with the community • % of residents that feel personally safe in Durham • # of community events participated in by the DPD command staff • # of Neighborhoods participating in National Night Out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct a Citizen Satisfaction Survey that focuses exclusively on the DPD including measures related to safety, trust, and community engagement • Review Departmental policies to ensure best practices in complaint procedures • Review traffic stop data to determine if unexplainable statistical disparities exists • Develop procedures for the Neighborhood Watch programs that will help foster lasting participation in this program as well as in the National Night Out Initiative • Implement electronic complaint forms that allow for electronic completion, submission and tracking of complaints • Develop and/or attend training classes on effective outreach and community engagement techniques to help build and maintain community partnerships • Develop and/or attend training classes on racial equity and understanding racial and cultural differences • Utilize state-of-the-art video technology to capture officer/citizen interaction

Goals, Objectives, Measures, and Initiatives	
Safe and Secure Community Provide safe and secure neighborhoods which are fundamental to the quality of life and economic vitality of the city.	
Objectives and Measures	Initiatives
<p>Objective: Meet response time standards to maximize resident and officer safety</p> <p>Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Average response time for Priority 1 calls • % of P1 calls answered in less than 5.8 Minutes • % of beats not meeting the 5.8 minute standard • % of calls with a hold time of less than 90 seconds. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use assessing software analytics to review and determine the appropriateness of the beat structure • Review the shift schedule to ensure the appropriate allocation of resources to match call volume and calls for service • Utilize online crime incident reporting software to enable citizens to report non-priority 1 issues via Police website
<p>Objective: Reduce incident rates</p> <p>Measure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • # of robberies per 100,000 citywide • # of burglaries per 100,000 citywide • # of Vehicle thefts citywide • % of Aggravated Assaults involving a firearm with 2 or more victims • # of Larceny from vehicles citywide • # Repeat call locations • % Change in Burglary and Part 1 crimes in Residential Awareness Program area during the 90 day program • Property Crime Clearance Rates • Violent Crime Clearance Rate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transition the Records Management System of crime data reporting from UCR format to NIBRS format to comply with new Federal standards • Continue to develop and expand targeted patrol operations for specific areas based on recent crime data • Re-evaluate the need for community services in an identified Residential Awareness Program neighborhood (RAP) • Continue to have Violent Incident Response Team (VIRT) develop deployment areas identifying where potential gang retaliation is expected • Develop new, and evaluate existing, educational programs regarding vehicle theft and prevention techniques • Perform a Resource Allocation Study to evaluate if certain operational programs are utilizing resources effectively
<p>Objective: Provide Enhanced Traffic/Pedestrian/Bicycle Safety</p> <p>Measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • # of alcohol related crashes • # of injury crashes • # of total crashes • # of pedestrian injuries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement a pilot program for all citation data to be entered into the Record Management System • Utilize an intersection 'hotspot' list that continually identifies and updates intersection crash data • Develop educational program/materials on pedestrian/bicycle safety • Design and implement enforcement operations for neighborhood crosswalks