1 Overview

With this proposal, I seek to assemble a diverse team including ethnographers, a network modeller, and an experimental psychologist to undertake a cross-cultural study of the micro-dynamics of social inequality. This project grows out of my earlier ethnography in South India and takes advantage of an ongoing collaboration that I lead, but is new in scope and ambition: the proposed work takes a regional and cross-cultural comparative focus and employs a new analytical tool combining social network data with experimental games. This unique combination of ethnographic, experimental, and network methods has the potential to combine the rich specificity of in-depth qualitative research with broader cross-cultural generalisation, and the messy complexity of actual social relations with the clarity of experimental control.

At its core, my research is about the co-constitution of individual behaviour and social structure. In the past, I studied how people's actions shape their reputations and relationships. Now, I am interested in the reverse: how people's reputations and relationships shape the actions they undertake and the responses these actions generate. This cycle of action building reputation shaping action constitutes a feedback loop with the potential to reinforce and even exacerbate existing inequalities through its cumulative effects. Ultimately, then, I aim to advance our understanding of the dynamics of social inequality. By describing, testing and modelling the central role of reputation in these dynamics, I seek to develop new insights into why and how social inequality is reproduced over time.

So far, my ethnographic focus has been on two villages in Tamil Nadu, India, where I have worked for over a decade. Villagers there are acutely aware of their position in the community and actively seek to maintain their "good name." They are especially concerned about the gossip and social censure that might ensue, and the reputational loss they might incur, if they were to be seen as having taken a misstep. Of course, what counts as a "misstep" differs from person to person, and in this context is crucially shaped not only by a person's current position in the community, but also their gender, caste, and class. While those already seen in a good light may be able to build and maintain their position, those of lower standing – in this context, often women and Dalits ("the oppressed," those formerly considered untouchable) – may have their attempts to improve their standing dismissed or disregarded, or simply choose not to even risk attempting it, leaving them in what I am calling a "reputational poverty trap."

This, of course, is one particular context, but these are likely to be common dynamics, and consequential ones where a person's social standing is foundational to their work and livelihood. My focus for this project will therefore be not just on India, but also elsewhere in the region and the world, to see how these dynamics play out across a range of sociocultural contexts. I will explore how people (differentially) evaluate others and their actions, and how people act to protect and improve their own standing, in light of their perceived social exposure. I will also trace out the consequences of these (in)actions and the reactions to them, to assess the role of reputational concern in reasserting social norms and perpetuating existing inequalities.

I will accomplish this with a novel combination of ethnographic fieldwork, survey and experimental work, and agent-based modelling, carried out with a team of four postdoctoral fellows. We will gather social network data so that people's perspectives, actions, and reputations can be meaningfully situated. We will use experimental approaches to be able to speak of causal effects. And, as social norms, the nature and structure of interpersonal relations, and political and economic histories will shape these dynamics, we will take a comparative perspective: we will undertake a focused comparison of three South Asian communities as well as a larger comparison to ten more communities arrayed across the globe.

2 Theoretical Framework

Ample theoretical and empirical evidence shows that people's evaluations of others are not straightforward. Often, we base our judgements not solely on a person's actions, but also on what we think *others* think of the person. This reliance on social information (what we could

often call *gossip*), however, can readily lead to misapprehensions. Indeed, sociologists have long called attention to the ease with which status differentials can result from processes of cumulative advantage, which fail to track any inherent underlying differences between individuals (e.g., Gould, 2002; Merton, 1968). Recently, I have suggested a corollary to these rich-get-richer effects, what could be called a "reputational poverty trap," where those without sufficient social standing are unable to reap much reputational reward from their actions (Dumas et al., 2021). In short, if a person is already overlooked or even maligned by others, their attempts to better their reputation may not be sufficient to alter the collective impression of them.

Crucially, these imperfect processes can readily burden (advantage) already-disadvantaged (advantaged) groups as normative expectations, categorisations, and stereotypes further colour people's perceptions. For example, the readiness with which people are put within a gender frame helps explain the persistence of gender inequality (Ridgeway, 2011), and so too for race and racial inequality (Loury, 2002). In South Asia, people's actions are read through the intersections of their various identities, most importantly their caste and gender (Velaskar, 2016), contributing to the persistence of caste- and gender-based inequality (Gorringe et al., 2017).

Just as different actors can be viewed differently, so too can different actions. Social psychologists have noted that "bad is stronger than good" (Baumeister et al., 2001; Knobe, 2003), with actions damaging one's reputation given more attention than those improving it. Perceived norm violation can readily engender not just negative gossip but also sanctioning and punishment (Molho et al., 2020). This, too, may fall unevenly: if we have different expectations for people's actions, what may be deemed a "misstep" for one person may not be so for another. Indeed, while people may generally try to conform to normative expectations of their behaviour, prominent individuals may have greater leeway in their actions (Hollander, 1958). Ethnographers of South Asia have chronicled a politics of visibility of who can and cannot aspire to markers of status – for whom it is (in)appropriate or (in)decent – played out in gossip and ridicule (e.g., Dean, 2013). Here again, these expectations are shaped by a person's gender, caste, and class, as well as the standing they have achieved in their community (Mines, 1994).

My interlocutors, at least, are well aware of the biases in how their actions are judged by others. How, then, do people act, in light of their expectation of others' reactions? Experimental games show that people do indeed respond to the threat of punishment and the prospect of reputational reward (Balliet et al., 2011). But how might this attentiveness differ between people? If those who are socially marginalised both reap less of a reputational benefit from any "good" behaviour and have their actions more readily seen as "bad," then they may be particularly attuned to their risk of social exposure (Piff and Robinson, 2017). Experimental work has shown, for example, that people with greater social anxiety alter their behaviour to conform more to others and elect *not* to distinguish themselves (Zaatri et al., 2022). Ethnographers of South Asia have also documented such concern and restraint, as when upwardly mobile Dalit women carefully avoid any risk of scandal to maintain their family honour (Still, 2011).

Understanding the individual and collective outcomes of these efforts to anticipate and evaluate the actions of others matters, as this ultimately forms the substance of how we relate to one another. Those relationships, in turn, are fundamental to people's social and material well-being. Because of the importance of a person's reputation and social standing to their ability to get by in life, what I have here been calling a "*reputational* poverty trap" may trap people in material poverty, as well. By studying these dynamics in detail, we can hope to see both what keeps people constrained, and what is necessary to break out.

3 Proposed Methodology

3.1 Ethnographic Work

A core aim of this project is to understand the situated nature of people's perceptions, decisions, and actions. Ethnographic fieldwork is therefore a key element of this study. Alongside my own continued work in Tamil Nadu, two postdoctoral fellows will conduct comparable ethno-



Figure 1: The social support networks of the two Tamil villages of "A̲lakāpuram" (left, N = 440) and "Teṉpaṭṭi" (right, N = 344) in 2017. Nodes (individuals) are coloured by caste. Edges are directed (arrows point to the person asked for support) and weighted (number of types of support).

graphic fieldwork in two other communities in South Asia, providing us with a comparative perspective on the interpersonal dynamics that shape people's reputation and well-being. Caste, for example, is present across South Asia, with differences in the meaning for untouchability, but commonalities of experience for Dalits (Jodhka and Shah, 2010).

The ethnographers will particularly observe those social arenas where this politics of visibility may play out, where there is some prospect of distinguishing oneself or exercising restraint. These arenas may vary from place to place, but I anticipate that they could include village meetings, microfinance or self-help groups, temple committee meetings, and religious festivals. The ethnographers will be attentive to both action and *in*action (cf. Rao and Sanyal, 2010) and what characterises the exceptions (e.g., who are the women or Dalit residents who *do* command attention? who are the higher caste men who remain in the background?).

The ethnographers will interview residents about what they think makes a "good person," their views on village gossip, and moments when they have been concerned about others talking about their family and what they did as a result. These will be used to generate vignettes that we will use to more systematically study how people ascribe meaning and moral value to the actions of others. These vignettes will help us establish the extent to which people's judgements of others are contingent: we will subtly vary the identity (most importantly cuing gender and caste) of characters who undertake morally ambiguous acts that potentially violate some social norm (cf. Barrett et al., 2016). The aim will be not only to see how people's judgements differ on the basis of the character's identities, but also how those judgements differ between observers. For example, I expect higher caste residents to be more severe in apportioning moral culpability than lower caste residents (cf. Dugar and Bhattacharya, 2019).

To further situate people's assessments, and to be able to more generally characterise social relations in the communities, the two ethnographers will gather social network data, in a way similar to the work I have done in Tamil Nadu (Figure 1). This will entail conducting surveys with all adult residents, asking them who they turn to for different types of assistance and who they see as having different desirable reputational qualities.

3.2 Lab-in-the-Field: South Asia

If there is indeed bias in people's perceptions of others, then the next question is how people act in the knowledge of this. Our interest is in how people differentially "pull back" when visible to others, for fear of the social risk.

Our key design choice is to manipulate *when a person's decisions are known, and known*

to whom. Economic games typically abstract extraneous things away, often including people's identities. With our focus on the situated, contingent nature of decisions and perceptions, that simply cannot be our starting point. Instead, we will have people play with *known others*. With this, we can, for example, consider people's *actual* group memberships, rather than having to construct artificial groups. And, we can more fully situate people by using their social network position and those of the people they interact with. Our general expectation is that people's response to social exposure will differ based on their social identities and network position.

We will vary the social exposure that people face by altering the centrality of their partners. People who are more centrally positioned in the network should be better able both to spread information about a person's actions and to inflict sanctions (cf. Wu et al., 2016). Work in Karnataka (e.g., Chandrasekhar et al., 2018) has shown that people do indeed respond to being monitored by more central observers. What has not yet been established, however, is whether this response differs based on the social identities and social position of the player.

Practically, we will use our demographic and social network data to select partners who vary most importantly in their network position (likely eigenvector centrality). Rather than playing in person, we will use photos. This will let us play a larger number of games and allow for more control over game set up. Photos have been used successfully before (e.g., Gervais, 2017; Habyarimana et al., 2007), and are made newly convenient by recently-developed automated image processing tools for data collection and entry (Ross and Redhead, 2022).

First, we will look at people's willingness for risky action with varying social exposure, likely using a series of 50/50 gamble choice tasks with varying stakes and the prospect of loss (Binswanger, 1981). This simple approach will be used because of varying degrees of numeracy among players. Alongside rounds played for personal payouts, we will play rounds where the winnings go towards a collectively-decided gift for the community. The expectation is that more socially marginalised players will become relatively more risk and loss averse with increasing social exposure, especially when playing for the community fund.

Next, we will look at people's generosity. People will play a sequence of dictator games, some in which they remain anonymous, and others in which their identity is revealed to the recipient. Players will be presented with photos of co-residents and asked to decide how much of an endowment they wish to give to the recipient. The focus will be on how allocations vary based on attributes of the recipients and players, particularly when revealed. Overall, people's play should more strongly accord with normative expectations of their behaviour with increasing social exposure. We may therefore expect players to give more generously and to more strongly favour in-group members (Balliet et al., 2014), in part because of a stronger expectation that they may be sanctioned if they were not to do so (Habyarimana et al., 2007). However, normative expectations – and the pressure to abide by them – will vary across contexts and players (e.g., Kraus and Callaghan, 2016). How players respond to increasing social exposure with different recipients promises to be complex, but also revealing.

Finally, we will play one-off public goods games (with small groups of four players), where players independently decide how much of their starting endowment to contribute to a collective pot to be multiplied and then redistributed evenly to all players. We will construct social groups with various combinations of gender, caste, and centrality (cf. Waring and Bell, 2013). The tension between immediate personal gain and the reputational exposure that will be brought out when play is revealed will let us again consider how people variably respond to such exposure.

This set of games is meant to be indicative, as I expect revision in light of the ethnographic work. We will be particularly considerate of the ethical implications of these games, both in terms of game play and payout. Payout and revelation of partners will be done in aggregate after everyone has participated, and we will devise ways (likely with probabilistic decisions on which games are paid out, without using deception) to even out the payments.



Figure 2: Locations of the ENDOW fieldsites, with the sixteen potential sites in Table 1 highlighted in blue.

Site	Researcher(s)	Country	N	Site	Researcher(s)	Country	N
BF	Colin West & Alfredo Rojas	Burkina Faso	55	PS	Emily Post	Dominica	71
CP	Kathy Oths	Peru	91	PT	Rafael Morais Chiaravalloti	Brazil	61
CR	Christine Beitl	Ecuador	97	SN	John Ziker	Mozambique	35
EK	Alexandra Alvergne & B. Langstieh	India	47	SP	Larry Sugiyama	Ecuador	32
HE	Gianluca Grimalda	Papua New Guinea	65	SY	Larry Sugiyama	Ecuador	28
KM	Drew Gerkey	Russia	97	TI	Bret Beheim	Bolivia	44
KS	Rodrigo Lazo	Peru	56	WH	Cody Ross	Colombia	26
MG	Bapu Vaitla & Christopher Golden	Madagascar	106	BH	Byamba Ichinkhorloo	Mongolia	80

Table 1: The sixteen ENDOW fieldsites slated to gather their second wave of ENDOW data in 2024/2025, showing the site code (corresponding to Figure 2), primary researcher(s), country, and number of households in wave one.

3.3 Lab-in-the-Field: ENDOW sites

Our work in South Asia will be complemented by a larger cross-cultural comparison with ten communities. We will take advantage of my leadership role in the "ENDOW project" (Economic Networks and the Dynamics of Wealth inequality), a large US NSF-funded collaboration investigating the economic consequences of social network structure in over fifty communities around the globe (Figure 2). I am a co-Principal Investigator on the NSF grants, alongside anthropologist Monique Borgerhoff Mulder and economists Samuel Bowles and Matthew Jackson, and a co-director of the project with anthropologist Jeremy Koster. ENDOW researchers are gathering two waves of data on residents' demographics, households' material assets, and the kinship and social supportive ties that link individuals and households together. These data will provide the foundation for game play at ten of the ENDOW sites.

We will be able to conduct games at these sites with ease because ENDOW researchers are well established in their communities. Such experience is essential, both practically (the logistics of organising a research team to carry out this work is not trivial) and substantively (understanding how reputational concerns and social identities may influence game play requires extensive ethnographic knowledge). Ideally, the ENDOW data collection and our games will be done in quick succession. So, I will prioritise sites that best fit our planned timeline: the sixteen sites slated to gather the second wave of ENDOW data in 2024 or 2025 (see Table 1).

ENDOW sites have immense diversity in their institutional, cultural, and economic arrangements. It is already clear that there is sizeable diversity in game play cross-culturally, suggesting different norms and expectations of people's behaviour (Henrich et al., 2001). By playing the same experimental games in ten very different settings, we will see if there is similar diversity in people's response to social exposure, or if particular structural positions provide comparable affordances and constraints even in distinct sociocultural settings.

3.4 Modelling

I have already begun to explore how these reputational dynamics can be modelled (Dumas et al., 2021), and will continue this effort more strongly informed by the network and game data at our disposal. There is growing recognition of the potential for network dynamics to exacerbate inequality (DiMaggio and Garip, 2012). Models exploring this can build from different starting assumptions and different modelling foundations (e.g., Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Finneran and Kelly, 2003; Oliveira et al., 2022). Our focus will be on agent-based models, which we will develop based on our ethnographic insights and experimental findings. We will aim for close integration of data and model, using our empirical data as both a source for initial conditions and as a benchmark to evaluate how reasonably our models are capturing empirical patterns. Agents will be situated on a dynamic, evolving network, making decisions about their actions (e.g., dyadic exchanges, sharing information, sanctioning) and updating their perceptions of others based on their observed and reported actions (i.e., reputation). These models will let us better link the micro-level decisions and actions of individuals to their macro-level outcomes, tracing out the aggregate, long-term consequences of these dynamics for social and economic inequality.

4 Potential Contribution

This project aims to contribute to the many conversations on interpersonal relations and social inequality that are being had across a wide range of intellectual communities. This includes (1) the scholarship on caste and casteism, (2) the wider sociological work on discrimination, status hierarchies, and power, and (3) the interdisciplinary study of communication and cooperation.

Recent scholarship throughout India has found that economic inequality systematically maps on to preexisting divisions of caste (e.g., Shah et al., 2018), but it has yet to offer a satisfying explanation for what sustains such inequalities, despite improvements on almost every metric of development or empowerment. By chronicling the seemingly small moments of (mis)perception and (in)action, and tracing how they are situated within the larger social and economic structure of the community, we hope to provide a fuller accounting of how social inequalities are perpetuated. By doing this in multiple communities in South Asia and across multiple lines of evidence (both rich descriptive ethnography and structured survey and experimental work), we hope to bring together work in anthropology, political science, and development economics on South Asia that is typically siloed.

Guinote (2017, pg. 357) concludes her review of "how power affects people" by saying that future work should look not just at the powerful but also "subordinates," establish how power-related processes play out cross-culturally, and use new experimental methods to do so. This project aims to do all of this. If we want to understand human behaviour, we cannot focus exclusively on Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich et al., 2010). Our mix of ethnography and structured survey and experimental work is a promising way forward in this effort (c.f. Weisman and Luhrmann, 2020).

Finally, this work engages with the interdisciplinary study of cooperation, communication, and reputation (Számadó et al., 2021). We join other recent efforts to move beyond the laboratory and draw more on the richness of actual life (e.g., Balliet et al., 2022). By adding new realism to experimental games and our models of them, we can add needed complexity to our models (Giardini et al., 2022) and do a better job of disentangling the complex motivations behind human behaviour (Pisor et al., 2020). Further, by linking play with our detailed knowledge not just of social relations but also of economic well-being, we will be able to use our modelling work to point to the potential long-term consequences of these actions for livelihoods.

In sum, this project combines the analytical control offered by experimental approaches with the rich contextualisation possible only through extensive ethnographic work. I aim to take the "lab-in-the-field" approach to a new level, using comprehensive network data to situate people in their social context. Our work in South Asia will examine the durability of caste- and

gender-based discrimination in its more subtle but pernicious forms. And, our cross-cultural comparative work will reveal whether the "reputational poverty trap" is inevitable, or specific to particular sociocultural settings. The findings will be of broad interest across the social sciences and stand to have important policy implications: by studying the micro-dynamics of social inequality, I hope to provide some suggestion of what is required to dismantle it.

5 Structure and Activities of the Research Team



Figure 3: Gantt chart showing the timeline of work for the research team. Blue = desk-based work, Orange = ethnographic fieldwork, Yellow = experimental games, Red = social network survey, Green = writing up

I will hire four postdocs for the four-year project, working alongside the ENDOW team members and many locally hired research assistants who will assist with data collection (Figure 3).

I will hire three postdoctoral fellows at the start of the grant, on three-year contracts: two with established expertise in other regions of South Asia and one with expertise in experimental games. The first months of their posts will be spent at LSE onboarding and collectively developing plans for the vignette study and experimental games.

The two **ethnographers** will each conduct a year of fieldwork in a South Asian community over two trips. The particular setting will be based on the proficiencies of the ethnographers (e.g., prior fieldwork, language skills) and the suitability of the site (e.g., size of community, mix of caste groups, openness to research being conducted, complementarity to the Tamil communities). Their first trip will be focused on conducting interviews, a community census, and the vignette study. Once back at LSE, they will begin to write up their findings and receive training in social network analysis, by auditing the postgraduate course I teach. The second trip will entail gathering the social network data, to be followed soon after by the games (with the presence and guidance of the experimentalist). I will also conduct short fieldtrips, conducting interviews and most importantly being the first to pilot and fully run the games.

We will work to find early opportunities to connect with and get input from colleagues in South Asia, at places such as the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, the National Council of Applied Economic Research, the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, and J-PAL South Asia. We will also engage with Dalit networks, such as the Bahujan Economists group and Equality Labs. We will attend the British Association for South Asian Studies conference after the first bout of fieldwork, providing early feedback from area studies scholars.

The ethnographers will each write solo- or first-authored ethnographic pieces on their own fieldwork, targeted at outlets they deem best for advancing their career interests. We will collectively write comparative pieces on the three South Asian sites, drawing on the ethnographic, demographic, vignette, and social network data. For this, we will target *Economic and Political Weekly*, a leading Indian journal covering South Asia that is widely read not just by academics, but also policy-makers and members of the public, and *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, which covers all of South Asia. I expect to lead on a publication drawing on the social network data, for publication in a sociological or networks journal (e.g., *Social Networks*).

The **experimentalist** will first join me to pilot and then conduct the games in the two Tamil villages. They will then accompany the ten ENDOW team members to visit the communities they work with to do the same, as well as the two South Asian ethnographers. This will entail a series of roughly month-long trips to many countries over the course of two years. This postdoc will lead on the comparative games papers, which we will start to draft in the third year of the project. One comparative paper will focus on the risk preference games, and one (if not more) will focus on the dictator and public goods games. These papers will be targeted at high impact

interdisciplinary journals such as *Science*, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science*, or *Nature Human Behaviour*. I will also aim to organise a special issue, with contributions from each of the South Asian and ENDOW sites, potentially in *Current Anthropology*.

Finally, the **modeller** will have a two-year contract at the end of the project timeline. They should be experienced with analytical, agent-based, and network models. The modeller will collaborate closely with the other postdocs and myself to develop models that show the aggregate outcomes of individual decision-making, based on our ethnographic findings and initialised with data coming from our fieldwork. Publications led by the modeller will be targeted at interdisciplinary or sociological journals, and perhaps conference proceedings.

Later in the project, we will present our findings at a variety of conferences to make sure that we draw upon and speak to the many different disciplines that the project seeks to engage with. The full team will attend an anthropology conference (e.g., the American Anthropological Association annual meeting or the European Human Behaviour and Evolution Association conference). I will also attend a sociology conference (e.g., the annual meeting of the International Network of Analytical Sociology), and an economics conference (e.g., a large conference like the Allied Social Science Assoc. meetings or a smaller one like the Conference on Behavioral Economics and Development). The modeller and I will attend a conference focused on networks and computational social science (e.g., NetSci or the International Conference on Computational Social Science). Finally, to ensure that each of the postdoctoral researchers is able to advance their own career aims, they will each attend a conference of their choosing, perhaps area studies conferences, disciplinary meetings, or smaller workshops.

6 Group Leader

In both my research and my teaching, I straddle disciplinary and methodological divides. My professional academic career to date reflects this broad-minded orientation. I was an Omidyar Postdoctoral Fellow at the Santa Fe Institute, a multidisciplinary research centre focused on the study of complex systems. Now, as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Methodology at the LSE, my colleagues and students come from every corner of the social sciences.

I have conducted ethnographic fieldwork in two villages in Tamil Nadu, India since 2011, residing there for over two years in that time (most recently visiting in April 2022). In that capacity, I do participant observation and conduct interviews (in Tamil). Alongside this, I conduct social network surveys and analyse the results with advanced network modelling tools (see e.g., Power, 2017, 2018; Power and Ready, 2018, 2019). I see this combination of approaches as essential. Close knowledge of a sociocultural setting informs and strengthens survey design and statistical analyses. Conversely, those analyses provide a different type of insight into what may otherwise be mistakenly dismissed as "mere observations."

I also bridge disparate fields in my collaborations. For example, I co-organised a workshop at the Lorentz Centre and co-edited a resulting theme issue of the *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B* on "The Language of Cooperation: Reputation and Honest Signaling" that brought together psychologists, sociologists, biologists, and anthropologists (Számadó et al., 2021), helping to identify common open questions (Giardini et al., 2022), some of which this project seeks to answer. Venturing yet further afield, I have worked with statistical physicists to develop new network analysis tools that better capture the complexity of the social worlds we study (e.g., Contisciani et al., 2020; De Bacco et al., 2017). This is an ongoing collaboration, thanks to a UKRI Economic and Social Research Council grant that I lead, based at the LSE.

I am a supportive colleague, advisor, and manager. I have helped my two former postdoctoral students onto promising new roles: one a career-developing teaching fellowship and the other a tenure-track assistant professorial post. My role in the ENDOW project also means that I have helped over forty anthropologists undertake fieldwork and gather extensive demographic, economic, and social network data. My experience supporting these researchers means that I am confident in my ability to support the postdocs of this project.

I am well positioned to carry out my part of the fieldwork. The residents and panchayat presidents of both villages are happy for me to continue to work there. I have connections to regional research centres (Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madurai Kamaraj University, and the Chella Meenakshi Centre), which will help in the arrangement and dissemination of our work. I have a good sense of the logistics of running games thanks to my involvement in a project combining social network data and prisoner's dilemma games in Papua New Guinea (led by Gianluca Grimalda; we are writing up now).

Finally, I want to highlight my ability to tackle the ethical issues this project raises. I am cognisant that extra care must be taken with this project, given the extensive relational data we are collecting, the nature of the experimental games, and the extra complexities of working with so many different communities. I am a member of LSE's Research Ethics Committee and have participated in workshops on the topic of ethics and big data.

7 Fit to LSE

The London School of Economics and Political Science is a natural home for this project. The interdisciplinarity of the Department of Methodology means that it will be a supportive base for the full research team: the department submitted to five different Units of Assessment in the Research Excellence Framework that were ranked in the top ten, including Anthropology (ranked first), which I personally contributed to. Beyond the department, the International Inequalities Institute (where I am an associate), the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, and the Psychology and Economics Programme at STICERD will provide valuable sounding boards for our work. There are also particular strengths in South Asia at the LSE, as seen with the South Asia Centre and the India Observatory, as well as the many faculty across the School (especially in the Anthropology Department). My past experiences with LSE's Research Division and HR makes me confident that the management of the grant and staff will be exemplary.

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