

# One-click report : United Kingdom

May 29th 2020

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# **Briefing sheet**

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#### Political and economic outlook

- The December 2019 election gave the government of Boris Johnson, the prime minister, a secure majority and a strong mandate to pursue an interventionist economic policy, and The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the coronavirus crisis to reinforce this orientation.
- On January 31st the UK left the EU after 47 years of membership. The UK is currently in a transition period lasting until December 31st 2020, during which time it will remain in the single market and customs union.
- The future UK-EU relationship remains highly uncertain. The coronavirus outbreak has slowed the progress of talks on the future relationship, making a comprehensive deal unlikely by December 2020. We do not expect the government to request an extension.
- The Treasury will provide £350bn (US\$440bn) in loans to support business and to cover 80% of workers' wages. Falling revenue and increased government spending will result in a fiscal deficit exceeding 14% of GDP and public debt of 105% of GDP.
- The Bank of England (BoE, the central bank) has cut rates to historic lows of 0.1% and created a £200bn bond-buying programme. The BoE will directly finance government spending temporarily via the Ways and Means

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
• The outbreak of the novel coronavirus has caused all non-essential retail activities to be suspended. Owing to this and the global spread of the virus we expect real GDP to decline by 8.7% in 2020, before rebounding by 6.7% in 2021.


#### **Key indicators**


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	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Real GDP growth (%)	1.4	-8.7	6.7	1.5	1.9	1.6
Consumer price inflation (av; %)	1.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.1	1.5
Government balance (% of GDP) <sup>c</sup>	-2.1 <sup>d</sup>	-14.1	-5.7	-2.9	-1.1	-1.0
Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-3.8 <sup>d</sup>	-2.1	-2.2	-2.3	-2.2	-2.7
Money market rate (av; %)	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.8	1.0
Unemployment rate (%)	3.8	9.2	7.0	6.1	5.3	4.8
Exchange rate £:US\$ (av)	0.78	0.79	0.78	0.75	0.73	0.71


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> General government. <sup>d</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

### Market opportunities









## Key changes since April 9th

- Mr Johnson has recovered after being hospitalised with coronavirus and returned to work on April 27th. The risk of delay in the decision-making process has been removed.
- The government will exercise caution in reopening the economy and some social distancing will persist throughout 2020. Meanwhile preliminary retail sales data for March point to a decline in the sector of more than 25% during the lockdown.
- As a result, we have revised down our real GDP forecast for 2020 to -8.7% for 2020, and expect fourth-quarter real GDP to be about 5% below its year-earlier level.
- The Treasury has expanded its support schemes, backstopping 100% of the value of loans for the smallest businesses, and extended furlough schemes to end- June. We forecast that public debt will reach more than 105% of GDP by end-2020.

#### The month ahead

- May 7th—Meeting of the monetary policy committee (MPC) of the BoE: This will be the first MPC meeting since the BoE cut rates to 0.1% in March. We expect the BoE to maintain current ultra-low rates, and it may review its bond-buying programme if liquidity becomes an issue.
- May 11th-15th—UK/EU trade talks: The first round of UK/EU trade negotiations talks since the coronavirus failed to make meaningful progress on the issues of fishing or regulatory equivalence. We do not expect substantial progress in this round, as the issue has been deprioritised by both parties, with a final round still to come in June.
- May 12th—GDP (Q1): We expect first-quarter real GDP to contract by 3.7%. Social distancing measures introduced in March, culminating in the lockdown implemented on March 23rd, will more than wipe out any first-quarter

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growth accrued by that date.

• May 19th—Unemployment claimant count (April): March unemployment figures were sampled prior to the lockdown, so these figures will be the first post-lockdown monthly data. We expect official unemployment to rise only slightly, but expect the number of participants in the job retention scheme to represent up to one-fifth of workers.

## Major risks to our forecast

Scenarios, Q2 2020	Probability	Impact	Intensity
The UK leaves the transition period on December 31st 2020 without a deal, exacerbating the recession	Very high	High	20
The coronavirus recession leads to a wave of corporate failures	High	High	16
The labour market cannot bounce back from lockdowns	High	High	16
The new UK-EU relationship fails to resolve legal uncertainty created by Brexit	Very high	Moderate	15
An uncontrolled second wave of coronavirus causes another lockdown in the autumn	Moderate	Very high	15

Note. Scenarios and scores are taken from our Risk Briefing product. Risk scenarios are potential developments that might substantially change the business operating environment over the coming two years. Risk intensity is a product of probability and impact, on a 25-point scale.

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

# **Forecast summary**

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Forecast summary

May 6th 2020

#### **Forecast summary**

(% unless otherwise indicated)						
	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Real GDP (% change)	1.4	-8.7	6.7	1.5	1.9	1.6
Industrial production (% change)	-1.5	-9.8	8.3	1.3	1.0	1.2
Unemployment rate (av; EU/OECD harmonised measure)	3.8	9.2	7.0	6.1	5.3	4.8
Consumer price inflation (av; CPIH measure)	1.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.1	1.5
3-month £-LIBOR rate (av)	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.8	1.0
Bank of England base rate (end-period)	0.75	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.75	1.25
Government budget balance (% of GDP) <sup>c</sup>	-2.1 <sup>d</sup>	-14.1	-5.7	-2.9	-1.1	-1.0
Exports of goods fob (US\$ bn)	475.7 <sup>d</sup>	345.8	414.6	459.8	501.8	537.9
Imports of goods fob (US\$ bn)	-641.6 <sup>d</sup>	-453.4	-552.9	-638.0	-703.6	-766.9
Current-account balance (US\$ bn)	-106.9 <sup>d</sup>	-55.1	-61.9	-68.4	-70.6	-90.6
Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-3.8 <sup>d</sup>	-2.1	-2.2	-2.3	-2.2	-2.7
Exchange rate US\$:£ (av)	1.28	1.26	1.29	1.34	1.37	1.41
Exchange rate ¥:£ (av)	139.3	136.8	139.1	139.1	140.5	138.3

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Exchange rate €:£ (av) 1.14 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.14

# **Political stability**

United Kingdom | Politics | Forecast | Political stability

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Following a general election on December 12th 2019 the Conservative Party, under the prime minister, Boris Johnson, won an 81-seat majority. On January 31st 2020 Mr Johnson fulfilled his campaign promise to take the UK out of the EU, ending 47 years of EU membership and three and a half years of political deadlock on the issue. Despite the challenges posed by the coronavirus crisis, The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the government to last a full term, with the UK's institutional capacity and policy flexibility allowing it to mount a significant response.

The government had expected to spend 2020 focusing on negotiating a free-trade relationship with the EU and commencing a spending and investment programme to increase British productivity. However, the spread of the novel coronavirus has moved the government to a crisis-management footing that we expect to last throughout 2020. The government's first aim has been to slow the spread of the disease and expand the capacity of the National Health Service (NHS) to prevent it from becoming overwhelmed. To this end, on March 23rd the government directed all residents to stay at home, leaving only for a limited number of essential reasons. This followed an earlier order mandating all non-essential shops and entertainment venues to close. The government put together an economic support package worth more than £350bn (US\$440bn) to protect businesses and workers affected by these closures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> General government. <sup>d</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

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New deaths from the virus have been subsiding since a peak around April 8th, although the total number of cases remains high. We expect caseloads to continue to decline, and expect that from late May the government will gradually transition out of the lockdown and restart economic activity while maintaining sufficiently stringent publichealth measures to prevent a second major outbreak later in the year.

The coronavirus crisis has resulted in Brexit implementation falling far behind schedule. Progress on negotiations with the EU, the development of a new immigration system and the establishment of checks outlined in the Northern Irish protocol are unlikely to be completed by the end of the year. Political events such as local elections scheduled for May 1st and the UN climate change conference, COP26, which the UK was scheduled to host in November, have been pushed back until 2021.

Brexit continues to pose a medium-term risk to the integrity of the UK. Nicola Sturgeon, the leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), has argued that Brexit represents a material change in the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK since the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014, which resulted in a majority favouring the union. Ms Sturgeon may seek to dramatise the issue through legal battles or other disruptive means, particularly if her party wins a majority in the 2021 Scottish parliament elections. Brexit has also inflamed tensions in Northern Ireland, where the Northern Irish protocol in the withdrawal agreement is unpopular among Northern Ireland's Unionists, as well as among nationalists, and polling has shown a small but significant swing in favour of Irish reunification in the North.

## **Election watch**

United Kingdom | Politics | Forecast | Election watch

May 6th 2020

We expect the government to last a full term. Under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (FTPA) that governs elections, the next general election is scheduled for May 2nd 2024. The Conservative manifesto pledged to repeal the FTPA. However, even if this takes place, general elections must be held by the fifth year of a parliament, usually taking place in May to coincide with local elections.

After its defeat in the 2019 election, when it won its lowest seat total since 1935, the opposition Labour Party replaced its leader, Jeremy Corbyn, with Keir Starmer, the former shadow Brexit secretary. Mr Starmer is more moderate than Mr Corbyn, but has maintained Mr Corbyn's anti-austerity position, which will make it challenging for the government to cut day-to-day spending in the second half of our forecast period should public finances deteriorate. For Labour to gain a majority, it would require a gain of over 120 seats, a feat that has occurred only once since the second world war. However, for the Conservatives to lose their majority and enter a hung parliament, they would have to lose only 41 seats, a swing that has occurred in ten of the 20 post-war elections.

## International relations

United Kingdom | Politics | Forecast | International relations

May 6th 2020

Despite leaving the EU on January 31st, the UK-EU relationship remains unsettled. The UK is currently scheduled to exit the transition period with the EU on December 31st. This deadline can be extended by the EU and the UK by mutual agreement, but the UK has set the December 31st 2020 exit date in law and has resisted attempts to amend it. The UK and EU governments had set out a timetable for negotiations that envisaged a comprehensive free-trade agreement (FTA). The major area of disagreement concerns the degree to which the UK would have to update its labour, environmental and state-aid provisions to maintain deep access to the EU market without undercutting EU standards. However, talks have been delayed and deprioritised by governments owing to the pandemic. Only three week-long discussion rounds via video-conference were scheduled between April and the June 30th deadline for an extension. No significant progress was made in the April talks. As a result, we do not believe that it is possible to agree a comprehensive FTA on the existing timetable.

The government is under pressure to extend the transition period before the deadline in order to minimise economic disruption. However, we expect it to resist this, as its flagship manifesto promise was to leave the EU institutions by the end of 2020, and it relies on the support of many of the most steadfast advocates of a complete break with the EU for its majority in parliament.

This will pose significant risks at the end of 2020. The government had previously been willing to impose additional compliance costs on business with the expectation that in a growing economy they would innovate and adapt to less preferential terms of trade. However, the coronavirus outbreak and the risk of an outright collapse of the business sector have increased the risk of burdening export-oriented businesses with new compliance costs, while immigration

policy changes risk creating NHS staff shortages. A bill to overhaul the UK's existing immigration system to favour skilled workers has been shelved, and the government and businesses are unlikely to have the bandwidth to implement a new policy by the end of the year.

In its withdrawal agreement from the EU the UK agreed to a separate protocol for Northern Ireland, to avoid the presence of physical border checks with the Republic of Ireland. Under this agreement Northern Ireland will remain within a regulatory union with the EU for most goods. Although it will remain in the UK customs and value-added tax (VAT) areas, customs and VAT checks will be conducted by the UK on the EU's behalf at ports in the Irish Sea for any goods bound for the EU. Checkpoints and a border infrastructure between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK will need to be constructed. This task was unlikely to be completed by end-2020 regardless of the pandemic, and now presents a major implementation risk. If the Northern Ireland agreement is not implemented fully, the UK will lose credibility in trade negotiations with third countries, particularly the US.

As a result of these risks, we believe that short-term accommodation with the EU will be necessary to limit the scale of disruption, but that it will fall well short of a comprehensive agreement. This will not occur until the end of 2020, and the risk of significant disruption remains high.

# **Policy trends**

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Policy trends

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Even prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the UK faced significant economic policy challenges—including low public investment, significant regional disparities, high housing costs and chronically low productivity growth—and these have been allowed to build up, as Brexit has dominated the government's agenda. However, the scale of the

disruption caused by the coronavirus is likely to dominate the government's policy agenda throughout 2020. Large sections of the economy are currently shut down, and even once they are reopened both domestic and global demand will remain supressed. We do not expect the UK to reach its pre-crisis GDP before 2023. Managing the recovery will therefore become the government's primary priority.

Mr Johnson moved his party away from the austerity policies advocated by his predecessors and planned to pursue significant increases in public-sector investment, including in infrastructure and additional current spending on the NHS, education and the police. He also planned to reform the UK's immigration system to emphasise skilled labour. Long-term social care is an area of health spending that Mr Johnson's manifesto pledged to address, although the particulars remain vague. We expect the government to incorporate these priorities into its recovery strategy, and although we do not expect a return to austerity, the government will face increased fiscal constraints once the crisis passes.

# **Fiscal policy**

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Fiscal policy outlook

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The chancellor of the exchequer, Rishi Sunak, has developed a series of eco-nomic support packages designed to give financial aid to workers and businesses affected by the coronavirus and associated shutdowns until the situation normalises. These include over £330bn in government-backstopped loans; a commitment to pay salaried and self-employed workers up to 80% of their previous earnings, to a maximum of £2,500 (US\$3,100) a month for the duration of the crisis; several business tax deferments and holidays; and more targeted aid to the worst-affected sectors, such as travel and retail. The govern-ment has shown willingness to expand and adjust these programmes as

needed, most recently increasing the government guarantee for small businesses from 80% of loans to 100% and extending its wage-support package to end-June. As a result, we expect government spending to reach 47.6% of GDP in 2020, up from 41% in 2019, with the fiscal deficit widening to 14.1% of GDP and total debt reaching 105.4% of GDP. We expect the deficit to stabilise from 2021 and debt to begin to decline, falling back to 100% of GDP by the end of our forecast period in 2024. We expect the government to undertake some fiscal consolidation, but given the political unpopularity of the previous period of austerity, we believe that this is likely to take the form of tax increases rather than spending cuts. We forecast modest annual real increases in public-sector consumption.

# **Monetary policy**

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Monetary policy outlook

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On March 19th the Bank of England (BoE, the central bank) cut its main rate to 0.1%, the lowest level in its history. It has also unveiled a £200bn bond-buying programme covering both corporate and government debt, which it developed in collaboration with the Treasury to facilitate the smooth functioning of government and private debt markets. On April 9th the BoE announced that it would directly finance extra government spending to allow government departments to finance the day-to-day costs of fighting the coronavirus. The BoE said that both its bond-buying programmes and monetary financing of government spending are temporary and expected to be paid back, the latter by the end of the year. However, we expect that the BoE will continue to facilitate transactions that will allow the government to borrow at favourable rates throughout the forecast period. We expect that the BoE will gradually raise rates from 2022.

# Global forecast data

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | International assumptions

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	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Economic growth (%)						
US GDP	2.3	-2.9	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.2
OECD GDP	1.6	-3.6	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.9
EU27 GDP	1.5	-5.6	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.7
World GDP	2.2	-2.5	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.8
World trade	0.9	-15.3	22.8	3.6	3.7	3.7
Inflation indicators (% unless otherwise indicated)						
US CPI	1.8	0.1	1.3	1.7	2.0	1.9
OECD CPI	1.9	1.0	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.0
EU27 CPI	1.4	1.0	1.4	1.7	1.8	1.9
Manufactures (measured in US\$)	-1.2	0.1	3.6	3.8	3.5	3.1
Oil (Brent; US\$/b)	64.0	36.0	40.0	58.5	65.0	62.5
Non-oil commodities (measured in US\$)	-6.2	-1.9	4.5	3.5	1.1	1.3
Financial variables						
US\$ 3-month commercial paper rate (av; %)	2.2	1.5	0.7	0.5	0.9	1.4

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€ 3-month interbank rate (av; %)	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3	-0.2	-0.1
US\$:£ (av)	1.28	1.26	1.29	1.34	1.37	1.41
US\$:€ (av)	1.12	1.10	1.12	1.17	1.21	1.24

# **Economic growth**

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Economic growth

May 6th 2020

## The impact of the coronavirus

The novel coronavirus (Covid-19) that originated in December 2019 in Wuhan, central China, is now a global pandemic. The Economist Intelligence Unit assumes that the virus will affect about 50% of the world population, including asymptomatic cases. Of the symptomatic cases, about 20% will experience severe symptoms and about 1% will not recover. Death ratios will depend on the capacity of countries to detect, track and contain the epidemic, and on the capacity of national health systems. We believe that a mass vaccine will be available at end-2021 (at the earliest) and that the coronavirus will become a seasonal disease, with another outbreak in winter 2020/21. Quarantine measures will be effective in limiting the spread of the disease, but they will have severe negative economic consequences. In addition, disruptions to global supply chains will be severe.

Overall, we forecast that global output will contract by 2.5% in 2020, and that global trade will drop by 15.3%. All G7 countries and almost all G20 countries will experience a full-year recession. We forecast real GDP growth in China of only 1% in 2020 and a full-year recession in the US, with a contraction of 2.9%. We assume that oil prices will decline

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by more than 40% this year, to average US\$36/barrel. Most countries have responded with huge fiscal expansion to support businesses and households, raising the risk of sovereign debt crises in the medium term. Central banks have cut interest rates and, more importantly, have stepped up as buyers of last resort for government and corporate debt.

As the economic fallout from the coronavirus mounts and the infection rate flattens in most countries, European governments have started planning how to ease lockdown measures. In formulating exit strategies, governments are drawing on all the data available on the progression of the pandemic. Their challenge is to get the timing and phasing right, so that the numbers of coronavirus cases and deaths remain under control, health services can cope, public confidence in the handling of the crisis remains strong and the economy can recover. Exit strategies will be implemented gradually and reviewed on a regular basis. There is a risk that even a gradual and phased easing will expose countries to a second wave of infections (as has happened in Singapore and South Korea).

The coronavirus epidemic will have a severe economic impact. We forecast a euro zone recession in 2020, with a contraction of 6%, as output in all of the bloc's economies will contract. Quarantine measures will result in a sharp supply-side shock, hitting working hours and productivity. Manufacturers will suffer a disruption to global supply chains after Chinese exports contracted by more than 17% in the first two months of the year. Supply-side disruptions will be short-lived, but demand effects will be long-lasting. A decline in confidence is likely to persist after quarantine measures are lifted. For fear of contagion, people may continue to avoid public spaces, and tourism may not resume immediately. Households will limit their consumption in response to a loss of income, and businesses will delay investment.

The political and geopolitical impact could be seismic. The pandemic has resulted in an extraordinary expansion of executive powers, with limited parliamentary oversight. Elections have been cancelled in some countries. Afterwards, governments will face intense scrutiny about how they responded to the epidemic. A failure to address the humanitarian crisis triggered by the coronavirus could further erode trust in national institutions. A severe global economic crisis, followed by renewed fiscal austerity, would fuel a new wave of popular protest. The crisis may

encourage support for the nation state and a backlash against globalisation and open borders. The competition for global leadership between China and the US will intensify as a result of the crisis, and a realignment of traditional geopolitical allegiances may ensue as China dispenses aid on a large scale in Europe, Africa and elsewhere.

## **Economic growth**

UK growth in 2018 and 2019 was slow, at 1.3% and 1.4% respectively, owing to softening global demand and Brexit-related political turmoil. However, the coronavirus pandemic and ensuing public-health measures will cause a severe contraction in 2020. The exact degree of economic disruption is subject to significant uncertainty and will depend on the progress of the disease, the effectiveness of the public-health measures, and the likelihood and intensity of further outbreaks. We forecast that real GDP will contract by 8.7% in 2020, concentrated in the first two quarters of the year. We expect that fourth-quarter real GDP will be about 5% below its year-earlier level. In 2021 we forecast a rebound in real GDP of 6.7%, but most of this will be due to base effects, as the 2020 reference year will have been supressed by the lockdown. We do not expect the level of real GDP to exceed its 2019 peak until 2023.

Growth since the EU referendum has been driven by private consumption—supported by real wage growth, which reached post-financial-crisis highs in 2019, and a 2019 unemployment rate of 3.8%. However, even with the government's wage-support initiatives in place, we expect unemployment to spike significantly this year, reaching 9.2%. We also expect wage growth to decline, as the wage-support scheme will cover only 80% of workers' salaries in affected sectors. These trends will be partly reversed once the pandemic abates, and we expect unemployment to fall to 7% in 2021 and to continue to decline thereafter.

We also expect gross capital formation to decline sharply as the highly uncertain business environment depresses investment. We expect a bounce-back in 2021 and 2022 owing to pent-up demand, and expect the government to

revive its plans to encourage greater investment once the pandemic is resolved. Investment growth should stabilise in 2023-24 at an annual average of 3.4%.

We forecast that export and import growth will turn sharply negative in 2020 as global demand collapses and coronavirus-related travel restrictions persist. The collapse in overall demand will improve the UK's current-account balance as imports decline, with the deficit shrinking to a forecast 2.1% of GDP in 2020 from an estimated 3.8% in 2019, before gradually expanding again from 2021.

#### **Economic growth**

•						
%	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
GDP	1.4	-8.7	6.7	1.5	1.9	1.6
Private consumption	1.1	-12.3	8.0	2.0	2.4	2.5
Government consumption	3.5	8.0	-6.5	2.1	2.0	2.0
Gross fixed investment	0.6	-24.3	25.0	5.0	3.4	3.4
Exports of goods & services	4.8	-16.1	12.0	2.8	3.5	3.0
Imports of goods & services	4.6	-20.5	13.4	6.1	5.4	5.8
Domestic demand	1.6	-10.1	7.0	2.4	2.5	2.6
Agriculture	-1.2	-5.0	2.0	3.0	0.5	0.5
Industry	-0.2	-6.0	3.0	1.8	1.0	1.2
Services	1.8	-9.4	7.6	1.4	2.1	1.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

## Inflation

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Inflation

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We expect price pressures to decline sharply in 2020 and 2021 after inflation averaged 1.7% in 2019, although the weakness of the pound will provide some inflationary pressure. The impact of the coronavirus is expected to depress demand sharply in many sectors of the economy, and global competition between Russia and Saudi Arabia will keep oil prices subdued. These conditions will improve after early 2021, and we expect demand to increase steadily as uncertainty declines, lifting inflation to an average of 1.5% by the end of the forecast period in 2024.

# **Exchange rates**

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Exchange rates

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The value of the pound has been volatile in recent years owing to the UK's large current-account deficit, which requires massive international capital investment to support sterling. Since 2016 this has manifested itself in increased volatility around political events, as investors saw the UK's relationship with the EU as a proxy for its investment prospects. Similar behaviour is likely to continue throughout the coronavirus crisis. Sterling saw a sharp decrease against the dollar in March, reaching a 35-year low of US\$1.15:£1, as investors engaged in a flight to safety as firms faced a dollar liquidity shortage. The establishment of swap lines between the Federal Reserve (the US central bank) and other central banks, including the BoE, reversed this trend to some degree, and sterling recovered

to US\$1.25:£1 by end-April. However, we expect sterling to remain volatile throughout the crisis period. Looking ahead, we expect sterling to appreciate gradually from 2021 as the crisis abates, reaching US\$1.41:£1 by the end of the forecast period.

# **External sector**

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | External sector

May 6th 2020

The outbreak of coronavirus is expected to cause global trade to contract in 2020 as demand declines, travel is disrupted and global supply chains are compromised by national lockdowns. The UK is no exception, and we expect that both imports and exports will decline sharply in 2020. This will cause the UK's current-account deficit to narrow from an estimated 3.8% of GDP in 2019 to a forecast 2.1% in 2020. Brexit-related disruption will also weigh on imports and exports. From 2021 we expect trade to rebound, but we do not expect the value of total imports to return to pre-crisis levels before 2023 or the value of total exports to do so before 2024.

# Country forecast overview: Business environment rankings

United Kingdom | Business | Business environment | Rankings overview

May 6th 2020

Value of index <sup>a</sup>		Global rank <sup>b</sup>		Regional rank <sup>c</sup>			
2015-19	2020-24	2015-19	2020-24	2015-19	2020-24		
7.80	7.84	17	19	11	11		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Out of 10. <sup>b</sup> Out of 82 countries. <sup>c</sup> Out of 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK.

• The UK's business environment score improves in the forecast period (2020-24) compared with 2015-19. The UK remains in 11th place in the regional rankings but declines by two places in the global rankings. Brexit introduces policy uncertainty, but the country's strengths—including a pro-business policy stance, a welcoming attitude to foreign investment, and flexible labour and product markets—will continue.

# Business environment at a glance

United Kingdom | Business | Business environment | Business environment at a glance

May 6th 2020

## Policy towards private enterprise and competition

2020-21: Coronavirus shuts down large segment of retail. Public support for renationalisation of rail sector and utilities.

2022-24: Revamp of regulatory and competition frameworks. Continued state support underpins house prices.

## Policy towards foreign investment

2020-21: Coronavirus and Brexit uncertainty limits investment opportunities.

2022-24: Infrastructure plans offer investment opportunities. Possible changes in tax policies to bolster inward investment.

## Foreign trade and exchange controls

2020-21: Brexit transition and coronavirus create significant trade uncertainty. New Northern Irish protocol implemented. Talks continue on UK-EU free-trade agreement. Significant risk of "cliff edge" transition for businesses.

2022-24: Expected decline in UK-EU crossborder trade. New trade agreements with other countries, including US, possible.

#### **Taxes**

2020-21: Tax holidays and deferments throughout the duration of the crisis. Depressed revenue due to decreased activity.

2022-24: Ongoing efforts to reduce revenue lost to growing tax avoidance and evasion. Possible changes to the value-added tax (VAT) framework if the UK leaves the EU's VAT regime after 2020.

## **Financing**

2020-21: Monetary policy remains highly accommodative. "Ring-fencing" bank reforms and ongoing capital strengthening. Steady growth in alternative forms of debt financing.

2022-24: Loss of "passporting" rights and restrictions on EU services trade. Modest decline in City of London's status.

#### The labour market

2020-21: Spike in unemployment from coronavirus. Phased increase in compulsory national living wage.

2022-24: End to free movement of labour from EU after Brexit, but greater liberalisation overall

#### Infrastructure

2020-21: Modest rise in spending on housing, roads and digital infrastructure. Crossrail service in London begins operation.

#### One-click report: United Kingdom, March 21st 2024

2022-24: Increased infrastructure investment, emphasis on "levelling up" regional infrastructure and competitiveness.

## **Technological readiness**


2020-21: High e-commerce penetration and strong research base, but UK research and development (R&D) spending below EU average and limited provision of e-government services. Continued high threat from cybercrime and cyber-espionage.

2022-24: Possible weakening of research and innovation framework owing to exit from—or more restricted access to —EU structural programmes (such as "Horizon 2020") and project financing schemes. Modest rise in public R&D spending.

# **Global position**


United Kingdom | Regulation | Global position


December 1st 2019



The outlook for the UK has become much more uncertain following the 2016 referendum vote to leave the EU. The UK began the formal process of exiting the bloc in March 2017 when it triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. This provided for a two-year exit time frame, although the UK has since asked for three Article 50 extensions, with departure now expected on or by January 31st 2020. A general election takes place in the meantime, on December 12th 2019. The UK and EU have negotiated a withdrawal agreement that allows for a transition period lasting until end-2020 (with an extension possible), during which the UK would retain most aspects of EU membership. Looking beyond the transition period, the UK and EU intend to work towards a free-trade agreement, with the degree of regulatory alignment between the two parties still to be determined. Real GDP growth is expected to be relatively

subdued during the next few years, reflecting Brexit-related uncertainties. The UK still has much to offer as an investment destination. Existing clusters and economies of scale in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, software development and financial services will remain powerful magnets for foreign entrants, while significant potential exists for large-scale, long-term investments in the energy and transport sectors.





# Regulatory/market assessment

United Kingdom | Regulation | Regulatory/market assessment

December 1st 2019

• In October 2019 the government stated its intention to implement legislation expanding its powers to block business transactions that can pose national security risks. Development of the reform was halted after the calling

- of a general election scheduled for mid-December 2019. Discussions were also cut short on a proposed digital sales tax targeting foreign companies that do substantial business in the UK but pay relatively little tax there.
- In November 2019 the government declared a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing (fracking), which took immediate effect. The move follows the publication of a report from the Oil and Gas Authority, an industry regulator, on the difficulties of predicting the environmental and safety impacts of the practice.
- A March 2019 reform ends the so-called Swedish derogation, which excludes agency workers from the right to pay parity with permanent employees in the company where they are assigned if they are paid between work assignments. The measure takes effect in April 2020.

# Regulatory/market watch

United Kingdom | Regulation | Regulatory/market watch

December 1st 2019

- Negotiated in October 2019, the most recent withdrawal agreement between the UK and EU sets a new Brexit deadline at January 31st 2020, following three extensions from the initial target of March 29th 2019. The agreement allows for a transition period lasting until end-2020 (with a possible two-year extension), during which the UK retains most aspects of EU membership including participation in the single market and customs union.
- The withdrawal agreement states that the UK and EU will work towards a free-trade agreement that will clarify their future relationship following the conclusion of the transition period. It envisages that the UK will leave the EU single market and customs union (with special arrangements for Northern Ireland), leaving it free to negotiate trade deals with non-EU countries.

#### One-click report: United Kingdom, March 21st 2024

- The withdrawal agreement still requires ratification by the UK and EU to take effect. Results from the UK's general election scheduled for mid-December 2019 will determine how and whether the country passes the agreement in its current form.
- Brexit has put into question the privileged access that nationals from the European Economic Area (the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and Switzerland currently enjoy to the UK's labour market. While workers already in the UK can apply for "settled status", the direction of policies targeting new labour migrants remains in flux and inevitably will reflect the composition of government following the December 2019 election.
- Brexit has also compromised the UK's continued access to EU development funding, which will end following the conclusion of the proposed transition period. The Conservative government has proposed the development of a UK Shared Prosperity Fund to replace the EU programmes, but this had not been finalised as of end-November 2019.
- Brexit will mean that the European Court of Justice no longer has broad powers to challenge UK tax law—a particularly contentious area in the past. After leaving the EU, the UK will likely have to balance its new abilities to reform EU laws and overturn precedent with the need to maintain a competitive business environment.
- In November 2019 Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced the Conservative Party would scrap a planned reduction in the corporate income tax rate from 19% to 17% in April 2020, if it wins the upcoming general election. The move aims to support spending on public services.
- Brexit raises the possibility of divergence between UK and EU competition law. The exact outcome will depend on the model the UK adopts in its future relationship with the EU and will likely involve a slow process. EU competition rules would continue to apply to UK companies conducting business within EU member states after the UK leaves the bloc.

• The recent withdrawal agreement proposes that Northern Ireland would stay within a regulatory union with the EU for most goods, remaining in the UK customs and value-added tax (VAT) areas and with checks conducted by the UK on the EU's behalf for any goods bound for the EU across the Irish Sea. The arrangement would be subject to revision every four years by a majority vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly.

## **Automotive**

United Kingdom | Automotive | Overview

April 10th 2020

- The UK is the world's 13th-largest automotive manufacturer and sixth-largest vehicle market, according to the International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA). Output expanded steadily between 2010 and 2016, but has since fallen sharply amid political uncertainty, weaker domestic and export demand, regulatory changes and a structural shift away from diesel. Total vehicle production in 2019 declined by 14% to a decade-low level.
- The coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic and the severe quarantine restrictions will result in an unprecedented collapse in global economic activity in 2020 and significant supply-side disruption across the automotive industry. The economic fallout will place financial strain on carmakers, lead to job losses, further consolidation, delays in investment and perhaps bankruptcies. As at early April 2020, virtually the entire automotive sector was in shutdown.
- In the UK, the process of exiting the EU (Brexit) will add to risks. There is likely to be a permanent (and possibly large) negative hit to the capacity of the auto sector, which was already struggling amid falling demand, the need

for large-scale investment in electric vehicle (EV) technology and competition from lower-cost manufacturing locations.

#### **Income and demographics**

	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Nominal GDP (US\$ bn)	2,930.0 <sup>c</sup>	2,703.7 <sup>c</sup>	2,670.7 <sup>c</sup>	2,864.2 <sup>c</sup>	2,829.2 <sup>c</sup>	2,731.7	2,876.2	3,058.6	3,208.3	3,394.4
Population (m)	65.4 <sup>c</sup>	65.8 <sup>c</sup>	66.7 <sup>c</sup>	67.1	67.5	67.9	68.2	68.5	68.8	69.0
GDP per head (US\$ at PPP)	42,334 <sup>c</sup>	44,042 <sup>c</sup>	45,516 <sup>c</sup>	46,481	47,596	45,958	48,029	49,258	50,155	51,436
Private consumption per head (US\$)	28,886 <sup>c</sup>	26,754 <sup>c</sup>	26,021 <sup>c</sup>	27,931	27,193	26,145	27,376	28,538	29,570	30,720
No. of households ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
No. of households with annual earnings above US\$5,000 ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
No. of households with annual earnings above US\$10,000 ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
No. of households with annual earnings above US\$50,000 ('000)	18,132	16,237	15,725	17,387	17,109	16,074	17,130	18,207	18,968	19,959
No. of households with net wealth over US\$1m ('000)	982	851	1,036	932	1,010	1,054	1,182	1,235	1,403	1,490

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> Actual.

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

• The unclear progression of the disease means that there is huge uncertainty over The Economist Intelligence Unit's forecast. Based on an assumption of a gradual return to economic activity in late 2020, we forecast a 20% annual drop in new-car sales and a 25% decline in commercial vehicle (CV) sales this year.

• We expect that new state-funded stimulus measures will be announced later in 2020 to support a recovery in sales. These may include a vehicle scrappage scheme similar to that in 2009 after the financial crisis. This would encourage a partial bounce-back in sales, but a surge in unemployment, reduced household incomes and greater consumer caution will weigh on underlying demand. We expect new-car sales to rise at a compound annual growth rate of just 0.2% in 2020-24, while new-CV sales will rise at a faster rate of 4%.

# Consumer goods

United Kingdom | Consumer goods | Overview

May 29th 2020

- Retail sales volume growth in the UK was fairly resilient in 2016-19, supported by employment gains, low inflation, consumer borrowing and extensive retail discounting. However, momentum weakened in 2019 amid a slowing labour market, subdued real-income growth and the economically damaging Brexit process. Annual volume growth averaged 1.7% in 2016-18, but slowed to 0.9% in 2019, according to Ascential, a provider of global retail intelligence. Official retail data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) showed annual sales volume growth in the three months to February 2020 at a seven-year low.
- Since late March the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic and severe quarantine restrictions have resulted in a dramatic slump in economic activity (and retail spending). Many non-essential retail stores have been closed since March 23rd, when the government imposed tighter social-distancing measures, which had previously been more relaxed than in many advanced economies.
- Amid pockets of growth (such as for groceries and home office equipment), preliminary data point to a decline in the retail sector of over 30% during the lockdown. The relatively slow and lax response of the government to the

#### One-click report: United Kingdom, March 21st 2024

crisis has resulted in the UK experiencing one of the highest levels of coronavirus-related deaths in the world, with a high risk of renewed waves of the virus as the government seeks to reopen the economy. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects a gradual relaxing of lockdown provisions from June onwards, but social distancing measures will remain in place (and will be periodically tightened if future outbreaks occur). A degree of consumer caution will persist until a vaccine is available (late 2021 at the earliest), constraining retail footfall and in-store spending. This will accelerate the existing trend towards online shopping, with a large number of retail store closures likely in 2020-21.


- Our current forecast is for annual real GDP to fall by 8.7% in 2020, followed by a partial rebound to growth of 6.7% in 2021 and sluggish growth in 2022-24. We expect a deeper slump, of 9.7%, in retail sales volumes in 2020, amid a spike in unemployment, a fall in aggregate income and sharply reduced tourism. There is huge uncertainty over the progression of the virus and thus on the duration of lockdown measures and the post-crisis impact on con-sumer behaviour. A temporary uplift in retail spending is likely at some point, reflecting pent-up demand, but household finances will be in a weakened state over 2020-24 (our forecast period).
- The economy will also face disruption related to Brexit when the existing UK-EU transition period expires (scheduled at the end of 2020) and the UK leaves the single market and customs union. This implies a "hard Brexit"—irrespective of whether a future-relationship deal is agreed this year—with increased non-tariff barriers and unresolved regulatory issues from 2021 that will further disrupt supply chains in the retail and food manufacturing sectors.
- The UK is Europe's biggest online retail market, but robust internet sales have gone hand in hand with a steady fall in the number of high-street stores and retail employment. These trends will intensify as a response to the pandemic, amid rising mobile e-commerce (m-commerce) and ongoing social distancing. The UK implemented a new digital services tax in April 2020, targeting multi-national technology groups such as Amazon, Google and Apple (all US).

## **Income and demographics**

<u> </u>										
	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Nominal GDP (US\$ bn)	2,930.0 <sup>c</sup>	2,703.7 <sup>c</sup>	2,670.7 <sup>c</sup>	2,864.2 <sup>c</sup>	2,829.2 <sup>c</sup>	2,598.6	2,817.6	2,992.9	3,144.2	3,341.0
Population (m)	65.4 <sup>c</sup>	65.8 <sup>c</sup>	66.7 <sup>c</sup>	67.1	67.5	67.9	68.2	68.5	68.8	69.0
GDP per head (US\$ at PPP)	42,334 <sup>c</sup>	44,042 <sup>c</sup>	45,516 <sup>c</sup>	46,481	47,596	44,010	47,608	48,679	49,786	51,123
Private consumption per head (US\$)	28,886 <sup>c</sup>	26,754 <sup>c</sup>	26,021 <sup>c</sup>	27,931	27,193	24,214	25,498	26,808	27,870	29,430
No. of households ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
No. of households with annual earnings above US\$5,000 ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
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No. of households with annual earnings above US\$50,000 ('000)	18,132	16,237	15,725	17,387	17,109	15,367	16,390	17,383	18,184	19,237
No. of households with net wealth over US\$1m ('000)	982	851	1,036	932	1,048	945	1,024	1,050	1,220	1,301
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> Actual.

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.



# **Energy**

### United Kingdom | Energy | Overview

March 25th 2020

- Total UK energy consumption has trended gradually lower since the mid-1990s, but was fairly stable in 2019 at an estimated 176m tonnes of oil equivalent (toe). This compares with 196m toe a decade earlier. Together, natural gas and oil account for nearly three-quarters of the energy mix. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects total consumption to fall gradually over the next decade, amid subdued economic growth and improving energy efficiency.
- The UK retains significant supplies of coal, oil and natural gas, but production is not sufficient to meet domestic demand. Given reliance on imports (for about 35% of primary energy demand), exposure to volatility in global

- energy prices will persist. Unusually cold weather in early 2018, which boosted demand, highlighted the UK's dependence on gas imports and its limited gas storage facilities (less than 2% of annual consumption).
- Consumption data for 2018 published by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) indicated a further decline in coal usage, alongside a modest fall in demand for oil and an uptick in consumption of natural gas. Electricity consumption declined slightly, within which solid growth in renewables (mainly wind power and biomass) offset a fall in nuclear.
- UK carbon emissions fell for a sixth consecutive year in 2018, by 2%. Driven primarily by the shift from coal for electricity generation towards gas and renewables, the UK has already achieved its EU-mandated target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from 1990 levels by 2020—emissions in 2018 were an estimated 43% lower. However, total transport emissions have changed little over the past 30 years.
- The UK's exit from the EU in early 2020 means that it is no longer required to meet EU-mandated climate targets (such as a 40% cut in emissions from 1990 levels). However, the UK's 2008 Climate Change Act still mandates a medium-term reduction of the country's carbon footprint by 2050. This was amended by the previous Conservative government in mid-2019, replacing an existing target of lowering emissions by 80% from 1990 levels with a tougher objective of "net zero" emissions by 2050.
- There is more limited scope to reduce emissions via decarbonising the energy supply, so progress will rely increasingly on behavioural shifts by households and firms, which may not be popular and would probably push up energy costs. There are also doubts over the "green credentials" of the new hard-right Conservative government elected in December 2019. In the short term, however, both energy consumption and emissions are expected to fall as a result of the coronavirus outbreak, which was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation in March 2020.

- Until a post-Brexit UK-EU trade deal is finalised—potentially by end-2020 but more realistically some years later, especially as the coronavirus pandemic could cause talks to be postponed—uncertainty will persist over many elements of energy policy. This includes the UK's future level of participation in the EU's internal energy market (IEM), the emissions trading system (ETS), the Euratom Treaty for nuclear regulation, interconnector projects to the continent, and various EU research funding schemes. Changes could have implications for energy prices, security of supply and new capacity expansion. Brexit will impose new non-tariff restrictions on trade and is likely to reduce availability of skilled foreign labour. The risk of a highly disruptive "no-deal" Brexit in early 2021 will persist, and early indications from UK officials suggest that the country will seek to avoid any future alignment obligations with the EU.
- All of the six big energy suppliers in the UK—British Gas, EDF Energy (France), E.ON (Germany), Npower (Germany), Scottish Power and SSE (domestic producers)—have raised energy prices in recent years, citing higher wholesale energy costs and government policies—including renewables subsidies and smart-meter installation—for the increases in end-user bills.
- The dominance of the "big six" energy suppliers is declining, amid market and regulatory pressure. Smaller players now account for almost 30% of the market.

### **Energy: key indicators**

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	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>b</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>	2029 <sup>b</sup>
GDP (US\$ bn at market exchange rates)	2,864	2,813	2,915	3,034	3,273	3,471	3,654	4,188
Real GDP (% change, year on year)	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.7
Population (m)	67.1	67.5	67.9	68.2	68.5	68.8	69.0	70.3
Population (% change, year on year)	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3
Gross domestic energy consumption (ktoe)	176,884	176,357	175,485	173,804	174,153	173,562	173,672	171,376

Gross domestic energy consumption (% change, year on year) 0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.7

Note. Forecasts for 2025-28 are available via The Economist Intelligence Unit's data tool.

Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit; © OECD/IEA 2018 IEA statistics, www.iea.org/statistics, licence: www.iea.org/t&c.

## **Financial services**

United Kingdom | Finance | Overview | Financial services | Overview

April 29th 2020

- The UK has one of the world's best developed financial industries, but it faces two major challenges in the coming years: coping with the novel coronavirus (Covid-19) and managing the country's departure from the EU. The first will deliver a sharp, but hopefully short shock to the sector. By contrast, the second is likely to require a long-term shift in trading relationships and may contribute to an on-going shrinkage of the industry.
- London is currently one of the two leading global financial centres (along with New York) and has the largest share of many international markets. The UK financial sector—banking, insurance, fund management, securities and alternative investment—plays a significant role in the economy. In 2019 it accounted for 5.9% of GDP, down from 6.8% five years earlier, according to Eurostat. It employed slightly over 1m residents or 3.2% of the workforce, down from 3.5% five years before. The industry makes a substantial contribution to the balance of payments and tax revenue.
- The outbreak of the novel coronavirus caused all non-essential retail activities to be suspended in March 2020. Owing to this, and the global spread of the virus, The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the UK's real GDP to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

decline by 4.7% in 2020, before rebounding by 3% in 2021. Large sections of the economy are currently shut down, and even once they are reopened both domestic and global demand are likely to remain supressed. We do not expect the UK to reach its pre-crisis GDP before 2023. Managing the recovery will therefore become a key priority of the recently re-elected Conservative government.

- The government has been continuously tweaking the fiscal relief packages on offer in order to ensure comprehensive coverage for British households and businesses, most recently expanding a government guarantee scheme to cover 100% of loans for the smallest businesses, up from 80%, to allow smaller firms easier and faster access to financing. The UK has advantages vis-à-vis its European peer countries in having the longest average debt maturity by a considerable margin and the ability to borrow in its own currency—bolstered by unprecedented monetary-fiscal policy co-ordination.
- The Bank of England (BoE, the central bank) has extended the use of the "Ways and Means" facility through to the end of 2020, allowing the Treasury to borrow directly from the BoE. The BoE governor, Andrew Bailey, has said that these provisions are temporary, but we do not believe that the BoE can credibly commit to withdrawing them in 2021 if it risks sharply worsening the UK's borrowing position.
- Following a general election on December 12th 2019 the Conservative Party, under the prime minister, Boris Johnson, won an emphatic 81-seat majority. This allowed him to achieve his primary campaign promise to leave the EU, which took place on January 31st, ending 47 years of EU membership and three and a half years of political deadlock on the issue. The future UK-EU relationship remains highly uncertain. The coronavirus outbreak has halted negotiations on the future relationship, after only one round of negotiations, making a comprehensive deal unlikely in 2020.
- The UK is currently scheduled to exit the transition period with the EU on December 31st. Legally, this deadline can be extended by the EU and the UK by mutual agreement, but the government has set the December 31st 2020 exit date in law and has resisted attempts to amend it. The UK and EU governments had set out a timetable for

negotiations that envisaged a comprehensive free-trade agreement (FTA). However, only one round of talks had been held before the UK and EU countries began to implement national lockdowns, and the chief negotiators for both the UK and the EU were forced to self-isolate after developing coronavirus symptoms, effectively stalling the talks. As a result, we no longer believe that it is possible to agree an FTA on the existing timetable.

- We expect London to retain its status as one of the world's main financial centres, especially in the trading of foreign exchange and derivatives, but a loss of influence and post-Brexit restrictions on financial services trade with the EU are inevitable, even in a best-case scenario. Reaching agreement on the many elements of a complex new trading arrangement will be difficult and time-consuming (taking years rather than months) and financial services firms in the UK will almost certainly face restrictions from a loss of "passporting" (the right for UK-regulated financial companies to do business in the EU and vice versa).
- A future trading and regulatory regime for financial services would most likely be based on a so-called enhanced equivalence framework, which would allow firms to retain some access to the bloc, albeit more limited in most areas than is currently the case. A problem of this approach for UK-based companies is that market access could be withdrawn unilaterally by the EU if it deemed that UK regulation had strayed too far from its standards, implying a constant degree of uncertainty.

### **Income and demographics**

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	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Nominal GDP (US\$ bn)	2,930.0 <sup>c</sup>	2,703.7 <sup>c</sup>	2,670.7 <sup>c</sup>	2,864.2 <sup>c</sup>	2,829.2 <sup>c</sup>	2,731.7	2,876.2	3,058.6	3,208.3	3,394.4
Population (m)	65.4 <sup>c</sup>	65.8 <sup>c</sup>	66.7 <sup>c</sup>	67.1	67.5	67.9	68.2	68.5	68.8	69.0
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No. of households ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195

No. of households with annual earnings above										
US\$5,000 ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
No. of households with annual earnings above US\$10,000 ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
No. of households with annual earnings above US\$50,000 ('000)	18,132	16,237	15,725	17,387	17,109	16,074	17,130	18,207	18,968	19,959
No. of households with net wealth over US\$1m ('000)	982	851	1,036	932	1,048	941	1,035	1,134	1,248	1,326

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> Actual.

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

- UK and EU regulators have agreed and implemented a number of temporary arrangements to try to reduce the potential disruption to financial markets of a disorderly "no-deal" Brexit. In the large euro-clearing market, for example, which is dominated by London-based firms, a 12-month window of "equivalence rights" will allow EU-based derivatives traders to continue using UK clearing houses and market infrastructure in the event of a no-deal Brexit. UK regulators have established a temporary permissions regime that would allow EU-based firms passporting into the UK to continue existing regulated business for a limited period after a no-deal Brexit.
- Financial services companies currently serving the EU from the UK will continue to relocate some of their operations and staff to within the bloc, so as to ensure continued passporting provisions of the single market. Although outflows from the UK of financial sector employees (and related tax revenue) have so far been fairly modest, it is likely that this trend will continue as competing financial services hubs, primarily Frankfurt and Paris, gradually increase in size and influence. European policymakers will enhance post-Brexit policy efforts to attract major financial functions away from London. In mid-2019 the European Banking Authority (EBA), the EU's regulatory agency, completed its relocation from London to Paris, in direct response to Brexit.

## Healthcare

United Kingdom | Healthcare | Spending

March 22nd 2020

#### Overview

- A temporary increase in UK healthcare spending is expected in 2020 in response to the global coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19). As of March 21st, there were over 5,000 confirmed cases in the UK, with 233 deaths, but the government's scientific advisers have warned that deaths could total 510,000 without action. Even with the quarantine measures now in place, the UK's National Health Service (NHS) will face considerable strain, amid workforce shortages and with the number of critical care beds in the UK low by OECD standards.
- In its March 2020 budget the government pledged a £5bn (US\$5.8bn) emergency response fund to help the NHS cope with the developing outbreak and the related costs of testing, staff recruitment, stockpiling and containment measures and staff recruitment. This was followed by a £330bn package to mitigate the shock to the UK economy that is likely in 2020, followed by a similar-sized package to support workers and households.
- Nevertheless, quarantine measures will depress GDP, which (combined with the uplift in spending) will inflate the healthcare spending/GDP ratio in 2020 to around 10.1%. By the end of the forecast period, in 2024, we expect total health spending (public and private) to rise to 10.3% of GDP. The UK's ratio in 2018 (latest OECD data) was 9.8% of GDP, lower than in Germany and France (both 11.2%), but above the OECD average of 8.8%.
- Total healthcare expenditure has been constrained over the past decade, during a period of government-imposed fiscal austerity. This has contributed to lengthening waiting times, rising staff shortages and deteriorating finances at NHS providers, with the effect exacerbated by cuts in social care services. Although the NHS has been partly ring-fenced from austerity budgets, funding per head rose by just 0.5% a year in real terms in 2009-16 and declined

- slightly in 2017-18, according to OECD data. This compared with average real-terms growth of 3.7% a year since the NHS was founded in 1948.
- Real-term spending growth is expected to strengthen over the 2020-24 forecast period, as attention focuses on health services. In 2018 the then Conservative government (which was re-elected with a large majority in December 2019) set out a five-year spending plan targeting real-term growth of 3.4% a year, with a focus on new hospital investment and nursing recruitment.
- However, the UK's relatively weak public finances will become weaker still as a result of Covid-19. The Economist Intelligence Unit therefore expects real-term growth in 2020-24 to be lower than the government's target. In nominal terms, total health spending (public and private) will rise at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4% in 2020-24. Pharmaceutical sales are forecast to rise at a CAGR of 3.7% in nominal terms. These forecasts are slightly lower than our previous projections.
- Brexit will also pose a challenge to the healthcare system. The UK formally left the EU at end-January 2020, entering a transition period. The "real" Brexit deadline is end-2020, when the UK is scheduled to leave the single market and customs union. Our core forecast is that a limited "hard Brexit" deal focused on critical sectors will be agreed by end-2020, with negotiations ongoing in other areas. Such a deal would imply a rise in non-tariff barriers, with likely disruption to pharmaceutical supply chains. There is a high risk of no deal at all, with the UK reverting to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules.


### **Income and demographics**

	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Nominal GDP (US\$ bn)	2,930.0 <sup>c</sup>	2,703.7 <sup>c</sup>	2,670.7 <sup>c</sup>	2,864.2 <sup>c</sup>	2,813.2	2,914.9	3,033.9	3,272.7	3,470.9	3,654.0
Population (m)	65.4 <sup>c</sup>	65.8 <sup>c</sup>	66.7 <sup>c</sup>	67.1	67.5	67.9	68.2	68.5	68.8	69.0
GDP per head (US\$ at PPP)	42,334 <sup>c</sup>	44,042 <sup>c</sup>	45,516 <sup>c</sup>	46,481	47,912	49,095	50,261	51,466	52,786	53,975

Private consumption per head (US\$)	28,886 <sup>c</sup>	26,754 <sup>c</sup>	26,021 <sup>c</sup>	27,931	27,260	27,978	28,835	30,264	31,530	32,512
No. of households ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
No. of households with annual earnings above US\$5,000 ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
No. of households with annual earnings above US\$10,000 ('000)	26,994	27,119	27,472	27,607	27,729	27,844	27,947	28,038	28,114	28,195
No. of households with annual earnings above US\$50,000 ('000)	18,132	16,237	15,725	17,387	16,806	17,245	17,848	19,070	19,996	20,792
No. of households with net wealth over US\$1m ('000)	982	851	1,036	932	1,003	1,023	1,221	1,335	1,496	1,581

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> Actual.

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.



Funding sources

- Healthcare provision in the UK is dominated by the NHS, which is financed primarily via general taxation. Public expenditure (including compulsory contributions) accounted for 77% of current health spending in 2018, according to the OECD. This share has fallen slightly over the past decade. It is lower than in Germany (85%) and France (83%), but above the OECD average (74%).
- NHS care is free at point of delivery, but fixed charges are levied (in England) for most prescription medicines and dental care, with some exemptions. Devolution since 1999 means that most NHS funding and commissioning occurs under separate frameworks in the four UK nations, with clear variations in some policy areas.


#### **Healthcare: key indicators**

	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>b</sup>	2019 <sup>b</sup>	2020 <sup>c</sup>	2021 <sup>c</sup>	2022 <sup>c</sup>	2023 <sup>c</sup>	2024 <sup>c</sup>
Life expectancy, average (years)	80.9	80.9	81.0	81.0 <sup>a</sup>	81.1 <sup>a</sup>	81.2	81.3	81.4	81.5	81.6
Life expectancy, male (years)	78.9	79.0	79.1	79.2 <sup>a</sup>	79.3 <sup>a</sup>	79.4	79.5	79.7	79.9	80.0
Life expectancy, female (years)	82.7	82.8	82.8	82.8 <sup>a</sup>	82.9 <sup>a</sup>	82.9	83.0	83.1	83.1	83.2
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	4.4	4.3	4.3 <sup>b</sup>	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0
Healthcare spending (£ bn)	185.7	193.6	199.5	209.5	218.9	229.8	238.4	248.5	259.6	268.7
Healthcare spending (% of GDP)	9.7	9.7	9.6	9.8	9.9	10.1	10.2	10.2	10.3	10.3
Healthcare spending (US\$ bn)	283.9	262.3	257.2	279.8	279.6	294.4	309.5	334.8	358.2	377.5
Healthcare spending (US\$ per head)	4,341	3,986	3,854	4,168	4,141	4,337	4,537	4,888	5,209	5,469
Healthcare (consumer expenditure; US\$ bn)	32.5	31.8	32.1	34.7	34.5	35.9	37.3	39.4	41.4	43.0
Doctors (per 1,000 people)	2.8	2.8	2.9 <sup>b</sup>	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.2
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people)	2.6	2.6 <sup>b</sup>	2.6 <sup>b</sup>	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>c</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

Sources: US Bureau of Census; UN; OECD; World Bank; The Economist Intelligence Unit.

• The Health and Social Care Act 2012 reorganised NHS England funding flows in order to give general practitioners (GPs) control over health commissioning. Management of about 70% of funding was passed to 191 clinical com-missioning groups (CCGs). The reforms did not apply in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. The number of CCGs is expected to fall significantly from 2020 under the NHS long-term plan unveiled in January 2019.



- Total NHS spending increased from £124.7bn in the 2017/18 (April-March) financial year to £126.3bn in 2018/19. Of the 2018/19 total, £114bn went to NHS England, with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland sharing the rest under a formula related to population size. The Conservative government's spending plans imply that by 2022/23 the annual budget for NHS England will have risen by £20.5bn (US\$26bn) a year in real terms, with budgets for the other three UK regions (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) rising at the same rate.
- In September 2019 the government unveiled additional spending of £1.5bn in 2020/21 for social care services, which are separate from the NHS budget and fall under the remit of local authorities. This will only partly reverse a

sharp real-term drop in social care spending since 2010, which has exacerbated strains on the wider healthcare system.

#### Private health insurance

- Voluntary (or private) spending on healthcare accounted for 22.9% of the UK's total health expenditure in 2018, according to the OECD. Of this, out-of-pocket (OOP) spending accounted for 16% of total health spending, with 3% coming from private health insurance and the remainder from charitable or company schemes, according to government data.
- The share of OOP spending has risen gradually in recent years, but the private health insurance market has remained broadly flat, reflecting the dominance of the NHS. In 2017 there were 4m private health policies covering 7m people, paying total premiums of £4.8bn, according to LaingBuisson, a consultancy.
- The leading independent healthcare group is Bupa, with 2.2m policyholders in 2018. Other major insurers include AXA PPP, Aviva and VitalityHealth.

## **Telecommunications**

United Kingdom | Telecommunications | Overview

May 20th 2020

• Mobile telephony accounts for a majority of telecommunications connections in the UK. The mobile penetration rate has fallen slightly in recent years, amid a largely saturated market. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects a return to growth, albeit weak, over the forecast period (2020-24), rising to 122% by 2024. The number of mobile subscriptions is forecast to increase at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 0.9%.

- Fixed-line penetration is forecast to decline, falling gradually to 44% in 2024. There were an estimated 40 broadband subscriptions per 100 people in 2019—the eighth-highest rate in the OECD—with total internet penetration at 95.4% of the population. We forecast a rise to 42.6 broadband sub-scriptions per 100 people by 2024, with the impact of the coronavirus crisis likely to accelerate the upward trend in digital adoption. However, a pandemic-related economic slump and ongoing social distancing measures imply greater uncertainty over planned digital investment plans by telecoms firms and the government in 2020-24.
- An updated UK digital strategy was published by the government in March 2017, with seven strands covering areas such as connectivity, digital skills and cyber security. Alongside an aim (which will be unmet) to complete the rollout of fourth-generation (4G) mobile services in 2020, the strategy detailed higher public investment to support the development of fifth-generation (5G) technology, full-fibre broadband and artificial intelligence (AI). In March 2020 the government and Ofcom, the telecoms regulator, agreed a scheme with the UK's four main mobile network operators (MNOs) for a shared rural 4G network to remove most connectivity "not-spots"—a term used to describe the absence of 4G coverage—by 2025. The digital strategy aims for a majority of the population to have 5G mobile coverage by 2027. Since mid-2019 all four main MNOs have launched commercially available 5G services.
- In July 2018 the then Conservative government set targets to achieve "full-fibre broadband coverage" for 15m premises by 2025 and national coverage by 2033. An electioneering pledge by Boris Johnson in July 2019—when he took over as prime minister—to achieve national coverage by 2025 has predictably been watered down since the UK general election in late 2019, with the re-elected Conservative administration committing only to "accelerate the delivery of gigabit-capable broadband". Full-fibre coverage in the UK is among the lowest in Europe, at about 13% in April 2020.

### **Telecoms penetration**

2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>b</sup>	2020 <sup>c</sup>	2021 <sup>c</sup>	2022 <sup>c</sup>	2023 <sup>c</sup>	2024 <sup>c</sup>
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Telephone main lines (m)	33.2	32.6	32.1	31.9	31.5	31.8	30.7	30.5	30.4	30.5
Telephone main lines (per 100 people)	50.8	49.6	48.2	47.5	46.7	46.8	45.0	44.5	44.2	44.2
Mobile subscriptions (m)	79.3	78.9	79.1	79.5	80.3	81.0	83.1	83.6	83.9	84.2
Mobile subscriptions (per 100 people)	121.2	120.0	118.5	118.4	119.0	119.3	121.8	122.0	122.0	121.9


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>c</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

Sources: International Telecommunication Union; The Economist Intelligence Unit.

## Data and charts: Annual trends charts

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Annual trends charts

May 6th 2020




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# Data and charts: Quarterly trends charts

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Quarterly trends charts

May 6th 2020




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# Data and charts: Monthly trends charts

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Monthly trends charts

May 6th 2020



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# Data summary: Gross domestic product, current market prices

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | GDP at current market prices

May 6th 2020

### **Gross domestic product, at current market prices**

•	•									
	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Expenditure on GDP (£ bn at	current ma	rket prices	s)							
GDP	1,916.9	1,995.5	2,071.7	2,144.3	2,214.9	2,058.7	2,186.4	2,241.9	2,290.8	2,377.9
Private consumption	1,235.9	1,299.1	1,346.9	1,404.0	1,437.6	1,302.3	1,349.5	1,375.5	1,396.3	1,445.8
Government consumption	373.7	381.5	386.7	396.2	418.1	443.5	443.6	465.9	480.4	509.4
Gross fixed investment	324.6	343.7	357.1	362.6	377.7	280.1	365.9	395.7	423.4	450.9
Exports of goods & services	530.0	567.5	629.1	656.5	698.6	584.7	662.3	699.6	728.7	757.7
Imports of goods & services	556.5	599.8	654.2	686.3	724.5	556.8	638.9	697.3	740.5	788.4
Stockbuilding	9.2	3.5	6.0	6.1	7.6	5.0	4.0	2.5	2.5	2.5
Domestic demand	1,943.4	2,027.8	2,096.6	2,169.0	2,241.0	2,030.9	2,163.0	2,239.5	2,302.7	2,408.6
Expenditure on GDP (US\$ br	at current	market pri	ces)							
GDP	2,930.0	2,703.7	2,670.7	2,864.2	2,829.2	2,598.6	2,817.6	2,992.9	3,144.2	3,341.0
Private consumption	1,889.1	1,760.1	1,736.3	1,875.4	1,836.4	1,643.8	1,739.2	1,836.3	1,916.5	2,031.3
Government consumption	571.2	516.9	498.5	529.3	534.1	559.8	571.7	621.9	659.4	715.7

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Gross fixed investment	496.2	465.7	460.3	484.4	482.4	353.5	471.5	528.2	581.1	633.5
Exports of goods & services	810.2	768.9	811.0	876.9	892.4	738.0	853.5	934.0	1,000.1	1,064.6
Imports of goods & services	850.6	812.7	843.4	916.7	925.5	702.8	823.4	930.8	1,016.3	1,107.7
Stockbuilding	14.0	4.8	7.7	8.2	9.7	6.3	5.2	3.3	3.4	3.5
Domestic demand	2,970.5	2,747.5	2,702.8	2,897.2	2,862.6	2,563.4	2,787.5	2,989.8	3,160.4	3,384.0
Economic structure (% of GDF	at current	t market pı	rices)							
Household consumption	64.5	65.1	65.0	65.5	64.9	63.3	61.7	61.4	61.0	60.8
Government consumption	19.5	19.1	18.7	18.5	18.9	21.5	20.3	20.8	21.0	21.4
Gross fixed investment	16.9	17.2	17.2	16.9	17.1	13.6	16.7	17.6	18.5	19.0
Stockbuilding	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Exports of goods & services	27.7	28.4	30.4	30.6	31.5	28.4	30.3	31.2	31.8	31.9
Imports of goods & services	29.0	30.1	31.6	32.0	32.7	27.0	29.2	31.1	32.3	33.2
Memorandum item										
National savings ratio (%)	12.5	12.2	14.0	13.3	13.6 <sup>c</sup>	11.7	14.7	15.5	16.3	16.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

# Data summary: Gross domestic product, at constant prices

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | GDP at constant prices

May 6th 2020

### **Gross domestic product, at constant prices**

-										
	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Real expenditure on GDP(£ bn at chained 2	2013 prices	s)								
GDP	1,957.9	1,995.5	2,033.2	2,060.5	2,089.5	1,907.9	2,035.0	2,064.9	2,103.3	2,137.9
Household consumption	1,253.3	1,299.0	1,327.8	1,348.7	1,363.3	1,195.7	1,291.8	1,317.9	1,349.4	1,383.3
Government consumption	377.9	381.5	382.5	384.2	397.7	429.5	401.6	410.0	418.2	426.6
Gross fixed investment	331.6	343.7	349.3	348.5	350.5	265.2	331.5	348.1	359.9	372.1
Exports of goods & services	552.4	567.5	602.1	609.5	639.0	536.2	600.4	617.2	638.5	657.7
Imports of goods & services	574.6	599.8	620.8	633.2	662.2	526.3	597.0	633.4	667.9	706.9
Stockbuilding (% of GDP)	16.1	3.6	-9.0	-5.5	-1.3	5.0	4.0	2.5	2.5	2.5
Domestic demand	1,978.5	2,027.8	2,051.7	2,079.3	2,113.0	1,898.5	2,031.9	2,081.6	2,133.1	2,187.6
Real expenditure on GDP (% change)										
GDP	2.4	1.9	1.9	1.3	1.4	-8.7	6.7	1.5	1.9	1.6
Household consumption	3.0	3.6	2.2	1.6	1.1	-12.3	8.0	2.0	2.4	2.5
Government consumption	1.8	1.0	0.3	0.4	3.5	8.0	-6.5	2.1	2.0	2.0
Gross fixed investment	3.7	3.6	1.6	-0.2	0.6	-24.3	25.0	5.0	3.4	3.4

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Exports of goods & services	3.8	2.7	6.1	1.2	4.8	-16.1	12.0	2.8	3.5	3.0
Imports of goods & services	5.4	4.4	3.5	2.0	4.6	-20.5	13.4	6.1	5.4	5.8
Stockbuilding (% contribution to GDP growth)	-0.3	-0.6	-0.6	0.2	0.2	0.3	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0
Domestic demand	2.6	2.5	1.2	1.3	1.6	-10.1	7.0	2.4	2.5	2.6
Real contribution to GDP growth (% points)										
Private consumption	1.9	2.3	1.4	1.0	0.7	-8.0	5.0	1.3	1.5	1.6
Government consumption	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.7	1.5	-1.5	0.4	0.4	0.4
Gross fixed investment	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.1	-4.1	3.5	0.8	0.6	0.6
External balance	-0.5	-0.5	0.7	-0.2	0.0	1.6	-0.3	-1.0	-0.6	-0.9
Memorandum items										
Industrial production (% change)	1.0	1.2	1.7	0.8	-1.5	-9.8	8.3	1.3	1.0	1.2
Real personal disposable income (% change)	5.3	0.4	1.3	2.4	1.3	-9.5	7.3	1.6	2.3	2.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

# Data summary: Gross domestic product by sector of origin

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | GDP by sector of origin

May 6th 2020

### Gross domestic product by sector of origin

	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Origin of GDP (£ bn at chained 20	010 prices)									
GDP at factor cost	1,744.2	1,778.1	1,813.5	1,843.5	1,868.7	1,706.3	1,820.0	1,846.7	1,881.0	1,912.0
Agriculture	12.8	12.1	12.8	12.4	12.2	11.6	11.8	12.2	12.3	12.3
Industry	344.0	350.8	362.0	364.0	363.1	341.3	351.5	357.9	361.4	365.8
Services	1,387.5	1,415.2	1,438.7	1,467.1	1,493.4	1,353.4	1,456.6	1,476.6	1,507.3	1,533.9
Origin of GDP (real % change)										
Agriculture	1.0	-5.6	5.8	-3.0	-1.2	-5.0	2.0	3.0	0.5	0.5
Industry	1.9	2.0	3.2	0.5	-0.2	-6.0	3.0	1.8	1.0	1.2
Services	2.2	2.0	1.7	2.0	1.8	-9.4	7.6	1.4	2.1	1.8
Origin of GDP (% of factor cost GI	DP)									
Agriculture	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Industry	20.3	19.7	19.7	19.6	19.5	20.1	19.4	19.4	19.3	19.2

Services	79.0	79.6	79.6	79.7	79.8	79.2	79.9	79.9	80.0	80.1
Memorandum item										
Industrial production (% change)	1.0	1.2	1.7	0.8	-1.5	-9.8	8.3	1.3	1.0	1.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

# Data summary: Growth and productivity

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Growth and productivity

May 6th 2020

## **Growth and productivity**

1 ,										
	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Growth and productivity (%)										
Labour productivity growth	0.6	0.4	0.9	0.1	0.3	-0.8	3.6	0.0	0.5	0.6
Total factor productivity growth	0.4	0.1	0.4	-0.1	0.0	-8.0	7.8	0.9	0.8	0.7
Growth of capital stock	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.0	1.9	-1.5	1.1	1.6	1.8	2.0
Growth of potential GDP	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.7	-10.2	8.6	1.8	1.8	1.7
Growth of real GDP	2.4 <sup>c</sup>	1.9 <sup>c</sup>	1.9 <sup>c</sup>	1.3 <sup>c</sup>	1.4 <sup>c</sup>	-8.7	6.7	1.5	1.9	1.6
Growth of real GDP per head	1.8 <sup>c</sup>	1.3 <sup>c</sup>	0.5 <sup>c</sup>	0.7	0.8	-9.2	6.2	1.0	1.5	1.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> Actual.

# Data summary: Economic structure, income and market size

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Economic structure, income and market size

May 6th 2020

### **Economic structure, income and market size**

	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>b</sup>	2020 <sup>c</sup>	2021 <sup>c</sup>	2022 <sup>c</sup>	2023 <sup>c</sup>	2024 <sup>c</sup>
Population, income and market size										
Population (m)	65.4	65.8	66.7	67.1 <sup>b</sup>	67.5	67.9	68.2	68.5	68.8	69.0
GDP (US\$ bn at market exchange rates)	2,930	2,704	2,671	2,864	2,829 <sup>a</sup>	2,599	2,818	2,993	3,144	3,341
GDP per head (US\$ at market exchange rates)	44,804	41,097	40,024	42,659 <sup>b</sup>	41,895	38,279	41,310	43,694	45,723	48,405
Private consumption (US\$ bn)	1,889	1,760	1,736	1,875	1,836 <sup>a</sup>	1,644	1,739	1,836	1,916	2,031
Private consumption per head (US\$)	28,886	26,754	26,021	27,931 <sup>b</sup>	27,193	24,214	25,498	26,808	27,870	29,430
GDP (US\$ bn at PPP)	2,768	2,897	3,037	3,121	3,214 <sup>a</sup>	2,988	3,247	3,334	3,424	3,529
GDP per head (US\$ at PPP)	42,334	44,042	45,516	46,481 <sup>b</sup>	47,596	44,010	47,608	48,679	49,786	51,123
Personal disposable income (£ bn)	1,323	1,346	1,383	1,453	1,498 <sup>a</sup>	1,393	1,434	1,455	1,476	1,529
Personal disposable income (US\$ bn)	2,022	1,824	1,783	1,940	1,913 <sup>a</sup>	1,758	1,848	1,943	2,026	2,148
Growth of real disposable income (%)	5.3	0.4	1.3	2.4	1.8	-10.0	7.3	1.6	2.3	2.5
Memorandum items										
Share of world population (%)	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89 <sup>b</sup>	0.89	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88
Share of world GDP (% at market exchange rates)	3.94	3.59	3.34	3.38	3.28 <sup>a</sup>	2.92	3.00	3.00	2.96	2.97

Share of world GDP (% at PPP)	2.41	2.41	2.39	2.32	2.28 <sup>a</sup>	2.03	2.10	2.06	2.03	2.04
Share of world exports of goods (%)	2.71	2.58	2.51	2.46	2.57	1.88	2.12	2.19	2.25	2.29

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>c</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

# **Data summary: Fiscal indicators**

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Fiscal indicators

May 6th 2020

#### **Fiscal indicators**

	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>b</sup>	2020 <sup>c</sup>	2021 <sup>c</sup>	2022 <sup>c</sup>	2023 <sup>c</sup>	2024 <sup>c</sup>
Fiscal indicators (% of	GDP)									
Government expenditure	42.3	41.5	41.2	40.9	41.0	47.6	41.7	41.4	41.2	41.1
Interest <sup>d</sup>	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.4	2.2	1.3	0.5	-0.1	-0.4	-0.6
Non-interest <sup>d</sup>	40.0	39.1	38.5	38.5	38.8	46.3	41.2	41.5	41.6	41.7
Government revenue <sup>d</sup>	37.7	38.2	38.7	38.7	38.9	33.5	36.0	38.5	40.1	40.1
Budget balance <sup>d</sup>	-4.6	-3.3	-2.5	-2.2	-2.1	-14.1	-5.7	-2.9	-1.1	-1.0
Primary balance <sup>d</sup>	-2.3	-0.9	0.2	0.2	0.1	-12.8	-5.2	-3.0	-1.4	-1.6
Government debt <sup>e</sup>	86.9	86.8	86.2	85.7	85.4	105.4	104.5	104.4	103.1	100.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>c</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>d</sup> General government. <sup>e</sup> General government, gross public debt (Maastricht definition). Includes impact of financial sector interventions in Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley and compensation

payments to Icelandic bank depositors. Does not include impact of reclassification of Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group as public corporations by the Office for National Statistics. Does not include impact of gilt transactions with the Bank of England. End-period.

# **Data summary: Monetary indicators**

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Monetary indicators

May 6th 2020

### **Monetary indicators**

	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
Monetary indicators										
Exchange rate US\$:£ (av)	1.53	1.35	1.29	1.34	1.28	1.26	1.29	1.34	1.37	1.41
Exchange rate €:£ (av)	1.38	1.22	1.14	1.13	1.14	1.15	1.15	1.15	1.14	1.14
Exchange rate US\$:€ (av)	1.11	1.11	1.13	1.18	1.12	1.10	1.12	1.17	1.21	1.24
Exchange rate €:£ (year-end)	1.35	1.17	1.13	1.12	1.15	1.15	1.15	1.14	1.13	1.14
Real effective exchange rate (av; 2005=100)	113.7	102.4	97.1	98.9	98.4	99.3	99.0	98.9	97.4	97.3
M4 money supply growth (%) <sup>c</sup>	0.6	6.2	4.8	2.3	3.8	-1.2	6.8	4.8	3.1	3.9
Domestic credit growth (%)	0.3	4.2	5.4	3.2	4.9	-1.0	7.0	4.5	2.7	3.5
Purchasing power parity US\$:£ (av)	1.44	1.45	1.47	1.46	1.45	1.45	1.49	1.49	1.49	1.48
3-month £-Libor rate (av; %)	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.8	1.0

10-year government bond yield (av; %)	1.9	1.3	1.2	1.5	0.9	0.6	0.9	1.1	1.5	1.9
Bank of England base rate (%; endperiod)	0.50	0.25	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.75	1.25
Lending rate (%; average mortgage SVR from UK MFIs)	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.5
Deposit rate (av; %)	1.6	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.3	1.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> Headline broad money (M4) figures from Bank of England include deposits of "intermediate other financial corporations" (IOFCs) that specialise in intermediation between banks, giving a distorted measure of underlying M4 growth.

# Data summary: Employment, wages and prices

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Employment, wages and prices

May 6th 2020

### **Employment, wages and prices**

2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>a</sup>	2020 <sup>b</sup>	2021 <sup>b</sup>	2022 <sup>b</sup>	2023 <sup>b</sup>	2024 <sup>b</sup>
33.1	33.4	33.5	33.8	34.1	33.2	33.4	33.6	33.8	33.9
0.9	0.9	0.5	0.9	8.0	-2.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.5
31.3	31.7	32.1	32.4	32.8	30.2	31.1	31.5	32.0	32.3
1.7	1.5	1.0	1.2	1.1	-8.0	3.0	1.5	1.4	1.0
	33.1 0.9 31.3	33.1 33.4 0.9 0.9 31.3 31.7	33.1 33.4 33.5 0.9 0.9 0.5 31.3 31.7 32.1	33.1 33.4 33.5 33.8 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 31.3 31.7 32.1 32.4	33.1 33.4 33.5 33.8 34.1 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.8 31.3 31.7 32.1 32.4 32.8	33.1 33.4 33.5 33.8 34.1 33.2 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.8 -2.6 31.3 31.7 32.1 32.4 32.8 30.2	33.1 33.4 33.5 33.8 34.1 33.2 33.4 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.8 -2.6 0.6 31.3 31.7 32.1 32.4 32.8 30.2 31.1	33.1 33.4 33.5 33.8 34.1 33.2 33.4 33.6 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.8 -2.6 0.6 0.4 31.3 31.7 32.1 32.4 32.8 30.2 31.1 31.5	0.9     0.9     0.5     0.9     0.8     -2.6     0.6     0.4     0.5       31.3     31.7     32.1     32.4     32.8     30.2     31.1     31.5     32.0

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Unemployment (m)	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	3.0	2.4	2.0	1.8	1.6
Unemployment rate (%; EU/OECD standardised measure)	5.4	4.9	4.4	4.1	3.8	9.2	7.0	6.1	5.3	4.8
Wage and price inflation (% except labour costs per hou	ır)									
GDP deflator	0.6	2.1	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.8	-0.4	1.1	0.3	2.1
Consumer prices (av; CPIH measure)	0.4	1.0	2.6	2.3	1.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.1	1.5
Producer prices (av)	-1.7	0.5	3.4	2.9	1.6	1.2	2.2	2.3	1.7	2.0
GDP deflator (av)	0.6	2.1	1.9	2.1	1.9 <sup>c</sup>	1.8	-0.4	1.1	0.3	2.1
Private consumption deflator (av)	0.0	1.4	1.4	2.6	1.3 <sup>c</sup>	3.3	-4.1	-0.1	-0.9	1.0
Government consumption deflator (av)	-0.5	1.1	1.1	2.0	1.9 <sup>c</sup>	-1.8	7.0	2.9	1.1	4.0
Fixed investment deflator (av)	2.8	2.2	2.2	1.8	3.6 <sup>c</sup>	-2.0	4.5	3.0	3.5	3.0
Average nominal wages (av)	2.4	2.4	2.3	3.0	3.4	-3.3	4.6	2.9	1.5	3.1
Average real wages (av)	2.0	1.4	-0.3	0.7	1.6	-4.2	4.0	2.0	1.4	1.6
Unit labour costs (£-based; av)	0.4	2.1	2.3	2.9	2.7	-1.5	1.5	4.0	2.1	3.5
Unit labour costs (US\$-based)	-6.9	-9.5	-2.6	6.6	-1.8	-2.7	3.6	7.7	4.9	5.9
Labour costs per hour (£)	20.8 <sup>c</sup>	21.3 <sup>c</sup>	22.0 <sup>c</sup>	22.7 <sup>c</sup>	23.5 <sup>c</sup>	22.7	23.8	24.5	24.8	25.6
Labour costs per hour (US\$)	31.7 <sup>c</sup>	28.9 <sup>c</sup>	28.4 <sup>c</sup>	30.3 <sup>c</sup>	30.0 <sup>c</sup>	28.7	30.6	32.7	34.1	36.0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. <sup>c</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

# Data summary: Current account and terms of trade

## United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Current account and terms of trade

May 6th 2020

#### **Current account and terms of trade**

	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>b</sup>	2020 <sup>c</sup>	2021 <sup>c</sup>	2022 <sup>c</sup>	2023 <sup>c</sup>	2024 <sup>c</sup>
Current account (US\$ bn)										
Current-account balance	-143.6	-141.8	-93.0	-110.2	-106.9	-55.1	-61.9	-68.4	-70.6	-90.6
Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-4.9	-5.2	-3.5	-3.8	-3.8	-2.1	-2.2	-2.3	-2.2	-2.7
Goods: exports fob	436.9	402.6	434.8	466.6	475.7	345.8	414.6	459.8	501.8	537.9
Goods: imports fob	-616.6	-583.9	-609.8	-652.4	-641.6	-453.4	-552.9	-638.0	-703.6	-766.9
Trade balance	-179.7	-181.1	-175.1	-185.8	-166.0	-107.6	-138.3	-178.2	-201.8	-229.0
Services: credit	373.0	364.0	376.0	409.2	416.2	374.9	410.8	445.7	470.3	506.9
Services: debit	-233.7	-226.4	-233.3	-263.0	-283.4	-252.4	-282.6	-306.2	-322.4	-341.0
Services balance	139.3	137.6	142.7	146.2	132.8	122.5	128.1	139.4	147.9	165.9
Primary income: credit	207.2	186.4	241.1	291.7	275.1	201.1	214.8	255.5	296.1	317.0
Primary income: debit	-274.0	-252.8	-272.9	-328.1	-313.6	-238.9	-231.6	-248.1	-273.8	-302.9
Primary income balance	-66.8	-66.4	-31.8	-36.4	-38.5	-37.8	-16.8	7.5	22.2	14.0
Secondary income: credit	24.9	22.8	22.7	24.9	23.8	21.9	23.7	25.2	26.4	28.1
Secondary income: debit	-61.1	-55.0	-51.6	-59.0	-58.9	-54.1	-58.7	-62.3	-65.5	-69.6

Secondary income balance	-36.2	-32.2	-28.9	-34.1	-35.1	-32.2	-35.0	-37.1	-39.0	-41.4
Terms of trade										
Export price index (US\$-based; 2010=100)	95.1	89.0	89.9	96.3	92.2	88.2	91.3	99.0	103.0	105.9
Export prices (% change)	-14.2	-6.5	1.1	7.0	-4.2	-4.4	3.5	8.5	4.1	2.8
Import price index (US\$-based; 2010=100)	96.7	88.5	89.6	95.3	89.8	82.3	85.1	91.5	94.9	97.3
Import prices (% change)	-12.9	-8.5	1.2	6.4	-5.8	-8.3	3.4	7.5	3.8	2.5
Terms of trade (2010=100)	98.3	100.5	100.4	101.0	102.7	107.2	107.2	108.2	108.5	108.8
Memorandum item										
Export market growth (%)	5.1	4.0	4.8	4.8	0.6	-7.4	5.0	3.5	3.4	3.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>c</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

# Data summary: Foreign direct investment

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Foreign direct investment

May 6th 2020

## Foreign direct investment

	2015 <sup>a</sup>	2016 <sup>a</sup>	2017 <sup>a</sup>	2018 <sup>a</sup>	2019 <sup>b</sup>	2020 <sup>c</sup>	2021 <sup>c</sup>	2022 <sup>c</sup>	2023 <sup>c</sup>	2024 <sup>c</sup>
Foreign direct investment (US\$ bn)										
Inward direct investment	45.3	324.8	121.3	81.2	27.0	-55.2	1.5	37.6	57.7	75.5
Inward direct investment (% of GDP)	1.5	12.0	4.5	2.8	1.0	-2.1	0.1	1.3	1.8	2.3
Inward direct investment (% of gross fixed investment)	9.1	69.7	26.4	16.8	5.6	-15.6	0.3	7.1	9.9	11.9
Outward direct investment	60.2	-33.0	-138.1	-56.4	-0.2	20.5	-39.0	-46.4	-36.6	-32.0
Net foreign direct investment	105.5	291.8	-16.8	24.8	26.8	-34.7	-37.5	-8.7	21.0	43.5
Stock of foreign direct investment	2,080.0	2,009.0	2,292.0	2,291.0	2,318.0	2,262.8	2,264.4	2,302.0	2,359.6	2,435.1
Stock of foreign direct investment per head (US\$)	31,806	30,537	34,349	34,122	34,325	33,333	33,198	33,607	34,314	35,280
Stock of foreign direct investment (% of GDP)	71.0	74.3	85.8	80.0	81.9	87.1	80.4	76.9	75.0	72.9
Memorandum items										
Share of world inward direct investment flows (%)	1.4	12.3	6.1	11.5	1.9	-4.0	0.1	2.5	3.8	4.7
Share of world inward direct investment stock (%)	7.9	7.1	7.6	7.2	6.8	6.8	6.6	6.5	6.4	6.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Actual. <sup>b</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. <sup>c</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

## **Political structure**

United Kingdom | Summary | Political structure

May 6th 2020

#### Official name

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

#### Form of state

Parliamentary monarchy

## Legal system

Based on statute and common law; no written constitution; Scotland has its own system

## National legislature

Bicameral; the House of Commons (the lower house of parliament) has 650 members directly elected on a first-past-the-post basis; the House of Lords (the upper house, with about 800 members) was reformed in 1999, when most hereditary peers lost their seats

## **Electoral system**

Universal direct suffrage from the age of 18

## **National elections**

Most recent general election: December 12, 2019. Next election scheduled: May 2nd 2024

#### Head of state

Queen Elizabeth II, who acceded to the throne in 1952

## National government

Cabinet headed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the monarch on the basis of ability to form a government with the support of the House of Commons. The centre-right Conservative Party took office as a majority government in December 2019

## Main political parties

Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, UK Independence Party (UKIP), Brexit Party, Green Party, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru (Welsh National Party); Northern Ireland parties: Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Alliance Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), Sinn Fein

Prime minister: Boris Johnson

Attorney general: Suella Braverman

Chancellor of the exchequer: Rishi Sunak

Chief secretary to the Treasury: Stephen Barclay

Leader of the House of Lords & Lord Privy Seal: Baroness Evans

Leader of the House of Commons: Jacob Rees-Mogg

Minister for the Cabinet Office: Michael Gove

Party chair and minister without portfolio: Amanda Milling

Parliamentary secretary to the Treasury & chief whip: Mark Spencer

### Secretaries of state

Business, energy & industrial strategy: Alok Sharma

Defence: Ben Wallace

Digital, culture, media & sport: Oliver Dowden

Education: Gavin Williamson

Environment, food & rural affairs: George Eustice

Foreign & Commonwealth affairs: Dominic Raab

Health & social care: Matt Hancock

Home Office: Priti Patel

Housing, communities & local government: Robert Jenrick

International development: Anne-Marie Trevelyan

International trade: Liz Truss

Justice & Lord Chancellor: Robert Buckland

Northern Ireland: Brandon Lewis

Scotland: Alister Jack

Transport: Grant Shapps

Wales: Simon Hart

Work & pensions: Therese Coffey

## Central bank governor

**Andrew Bailey** 

## **Basic data**

United Kingdom | Summary | Basic data

May 6th 2020

#### Land area

244,100 sq km (including inland water), of which 71% is arable and pasture land, 10% forest and 19% urban and other. England totals 130,400 sq km, Scotland 78,800 sq km, Wales 20,800 sq km and Northern Ireland 14,100 sq km

## **Population**

66m (official mid-year estimate, 2017)

#### Main towns

Population in '000 (official mid-year estimates, 2017)

Greater London (capital): 8,825

Birmingham: 1,137

Leeds: 785

Glasgow: 621

Sheffield: 578

#### **Climate**

**Temperate** 

## Weather in London (altitude 5 metres)

Hottest month, July, 13-22°C; coldest month, January, 2-6°C; driest months, March, April, 37 mm average rainfall; wettest month, November, 64 mm average rainfall

## Language

English. Welsh is also spoken in Wales, and Gaelic in parts of Scotland

### **Measures**

Officially metric system, but the former UK imperial system is still widely used

## Currency

Pound (or pound sterling) = 100 pence

#### **Time**

GMT (summer time, 1 hour ahead)

## Fiscal year

April 1st to March 31st; tax year April 6th to April 5th

## **Public holidays**

January 1st (New Year's Day), April 10th (Good Friday), April 13th (Easter Monday), May 8th (Early May Bank Holiday), May 25th (Spring Bank Holiday), August 31st (Summer Bank Holiday), December 25th and 28th (Christmas Day and Boxing Day\*)

(\*Boxing Day is traditionally celebrated on December 26th. As that day is a Saturday in 2020, the next working day is given as holiday)



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One-click report: United Kingdom, March 21st 2024

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