

One-click report: United Kingdom

October 21st 2022

https://viewpoint.eiu.com

©Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

Saved on: March 21st 2024

Content

1. Summary

1.1 Briefing sheet

2. Medium-term forecast

- 2.1 Outlook for 2023-27: Forecast summary
- 2.2 Political stability
- 2.3 Election watch
- 2.4 International relations
- 2.5 Policy trends
- 2.6 Fiscal policy
- 2.7 Monetary policy
- 2.8 Global forecast data
- 2.9 Economic growth
- 2.10 Inflation
- 2.11 Exchange rates
- 2.12 External sector

3. Business and policy environment

- 3.1 Country forecast overview: Business environment rankings
- 3.2 Business environment at a glance
- 3.3 Market opportunities: Social indicators and living standards
- 3.4 Global position
- 3.5 Regulatory/market assessment
- 3.6 Regulatory/market watch
- 3.7 Long-term outlook: The long-term outlook

4. Industry outlook

- 4.1 Automotive
- 4.2 Consumer goods
- 4.3 Energy
- 4.4 Financial services
- 4.5 Healthcare
- 4.6 Telecommunications

5. Data and charts

- 5.1 Data and charts: Annual trends charts
- 5.2 Data and charts: Quarterly trends charts
- 5.3 Data and charts: Monthly trends charts
- 5.4 Data summary: Gross domestic product, current market prices

- 5.5 Data summary: Gross domestic product, at constant prices
- 5.6 Data summary: Gross domestic product by sector of origin
- 5.7 Data summary: Growth and productivity
- 5.8 Data summary: Economic structure, income and market size
- 5.9 Data summary: Fiscal indicators
- 5.10 Data summary: Monetary indicators
- 5.11 Data summary: Employment, wages and prices
- 5.12 Data summary: Current account and terms of trade
- 5.13 Data summary: Foreign direct investment

6. Basic Information

- 6.1 Political structure
- 6.2 Basic data

One-click report : United Kingdom

Briefing sheet

United Kingdom | Summary | Briefing sheet

October 17th 2022

Political and economic outlook

- In 2022 the UK economy is the sixth largest in the world. Services make up more than 40% of total exports and 80% of GDP. Having left the EU single market and customs union, the UK is seeking to rebalance trading relations towards markets outside the EU.
- On September 6th Liz Truss became prime minister. Her leadership election provided her with a weak mandate, and policy errors since taking office have caused financial-market instability and eroded her position. The Conservative Party is likely to remain divided and demoralised going into the next election, in 2025, which they are likely to lose.
- Notwithstanding the partial U-turn on the mini-budget, the fiscal deficit is still likely to widen in 2023 owing to a freezing of household energy prices for two years with the government covering the costs. This is likely to provoke greater monetary tightening and higher borrowing costs. The deficit will fall slowly from 2024.
- GDP is unlikely to return to its pre-pandemic level until mid-2024. Growth is likely to contract from the third quarter of 2022 as higher energy costs erode consumer and industrial confidence and spending power. This will persist into 2023, for which EIU expects a contraction.


- The UK-EU trade agreement reached in 2020 has created non-tariff barriers, causing dissatisfaction in Northern Ireland and aggravating relations with the EU. We expect a slight thawing of relations as economic and energy issues return to the fore.
- The UK is one of eight European countries with a public debt/GDP ratio above 100%. Borrowing costs are likely to rise amid fiscal expansion and rising interest rates, but the UK benefits from the ability to borrow in sterling and long average debt maturity.
- Volatile energy costs and supplies are risks to the UK over the 2022/23 winter as the cut-off of Russian gas supplies raises the cost of gas across Europe, and a reduction of French nuclear power production threatens a major source of UK electricity imports.


Key indicators


	2022 ^a	2023 ^b	2024 ^b	2025 ^b	2026 ^b	2027 ^b
Real GDP growth (%)	4.4	-0.8	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.6
Consumer price inflation (av; %)	8.4	7.9	3.4	2.0	1.9	1.9
Government balance (% of GDP)	-6.9	-8.4	-7.0	-5.3	-4.2	-3.2
Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-6.2	-4.0	-3.3	-2.9	-3.2	-3.3
Short-term interest rate (av; %)	2.2	3.6	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.0
Unemployment rate (%)	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.0	3.7
Exchange rate £:US\$ (av)	0.82	0.86	0.80	0.76	0.72	0.70


^a EIU estimates. ^b EIU forecasts.

Market opportunities









Key changes since September 14th

- On September 23rd the chancellor at the time, Kwasi Kwarteng, unveiled a mini-budget that loosens fiscal policy drastically, funded by large-scale debt issuance. Markets reacted badly, with sterling weakening sharply and bond yields on UK gilts rising.
- Despite the subsequent U-turn, cancelling a cut to the 45% top rate of income tax and reinstating a rise in corporation tax from April 2023, fiscal loosening will still result in higher and faster policy tightening from the Bank of England (the central bank).
- We have raised our policy interest-rate forecast: we now expect rates to peak at 5% in the second quarter of 2023, and the central bank is likely to keep rates on hold thereafter, assuming the economy is in recession and that inflationary pressures begin to recede.
- We also expect a weaker sterling against the US dollar than previously forecast, with sterling set to depreciate to an average of US\$1.12:£1 in the fourth quarter of 2022. We expect sterling to appreciate slightly over the course of 2023, averaging US\$1.16:£1.

The month ahead

- October 31st—Fiscal plan: The newly appointed chancellor, Jeremy Hunt, will provide full details of the medium-term fiscal plan, with a greater emphasis on fiscal consolidation, in an attempt to prevent further bouts of financial-market instability.
- November 3rd—Bank of England policy-rate decision: In the context of rising inflation, we expect the central bank to raise rates more aggressively, by 75 basis points to 3%. Another rate increase of similar magnitude is likely in December.

Major risks to our forecast

Scenarios, Q3 2022	Probability	Impact	Intensity
High energy prices push the UK electricity market into crisis	Very high	High	20
Supply-chain disruptions persist throughout 2023, damaging economic activity	Very high	High	20
The impact of Russian gas cut-offs deepens the UK recession	Very high	High	20
The UK is struck by another major cyber-attack	Very high	Moderate	15
A large budget deficit forces the government to backtrack on investment in infrastructure	High	Moderate	12

Note. Scenarios and scores are taken from our Risk Briefing product. Risk scenarios are potential developments that might substantially change the business operating environment over the coming two years. Risk intensity is a product of probability and impact, on a 25-point scale.

Source: EIU.

Forecast summary

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Forecast summary

October 17th 2022

Forecast summary

2022 ^a	2023 ^b	2024 ^b	2025 ^b	2026 ^b	2027 ^b
4.4	-0.8	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.6
1.4	-4.0	2.2	1.6	1.6	1.6
4.1	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.0	3.7
8.4	7.9	3.4	2.0	1.9	1.9
2.2	3.6	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.0
3.75	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
-6.9	-8.4	-7.0	-5.3	-4.2	-3.2
465.8	443.3	486.0	502.0	542.8	562.2
-814.0	-829.5	-815.1	-855.2	-899.8	-943.6
-187.2	-120.3	-114.7	-108.4	-131.4	-144.9
-6.2	-4.0	-3.3	-2.9	-3.2	-3.3
1.22	1.16	1.25	1.31	1.39	1.42
158.9	153.2	154.3	156.0	163.7	164.0
	4.4 1.4 4.1 8.4 2.2 3.75 -6.9 465.8 -814.0 -187.2 -6.2 1.22	4.4 -0.8 1.4 -4.0 4.1 4.3 8.4 7.9 2.2 3.6 3.75 5.00 -6.9 -8.4 465.8 443.3 -814.0 -829.5 -187.2 -120.3 -6.2 -4.0 1.22 1.16	4.4 -0.8 1.4 1.4 -4.0 2.2 4.1 4.3 4.3 8.4 7.9 3.4 2.2 3.6 3.8 3.75 5.00 5.00 -6.9 -8.4 -7.0 465.8 443.3 486.0 -814.0 -829.5 -815.1 -187.2 -120.3 -114.7 -6.2 -4.0 -3.3 1.22 1.16 1.25	4.4 -0.8 1.4 1.6 1.4 -4.0 2.2 1.6 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.2 8.4 7.9 3.4 2.0 2.2 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.75 5.00 5.00 5.00 -6.9 -8.4 -7.0 -5.3 465.8 443.3 486.0 502.0 -814.0 -829.5 -815.1 -855.2 -187.2 -120.3 -114.7 -108.4 -6.2 -4.0 -3.3 -2.9 1.22 1.16 1.25 1.31	4.4 -0.8 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.4 -4.0 2.2 1.6 1.6 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.0 8.4 7.9 3.4 2.0 1.9 2.2 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.75 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 -6.9 -8.4 -7.0 -5.3 -4.2 465.8 443.3 486.0 502.0 542.8 -814.0 -829.5 -815.1 -855.2 -899.8 -187.2 -120.3 -114.7 -108.4 -131.4 -6.2 -4.0 -3.3 -2.9 -3.2 1.22 1.16 1.25 1.31 1.39

https://viewpoint.eiu.com

© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

Exchange rate €:£ (av) 1.16 1.11 1.09 1.08 1.13 1.15

Political stability

United Kingdom | Politics | Forecast | Political stability

October 17th 2022

Liz Truss became prime minister on September 6th, but she has not enjoyed any form of a honeymoon period. Immediate policy announcements to loosen fiscal policy have caused significant financial-market volatility, forcing the government to backtrack on some promised tax cuts. The episode was politically embarrassing for Ms Truss, prompting a sharp slide in the government's approval ratings (the main opposition, the centre-left Labour Party, now leads in opinion polls by 19-33 points over the Conservative Party), as well as the sacking of Kwasi Kwarteng as chancellor.

Ms Truss's mandate within the Conservative Party will remain weak. Her cabinet mainly comprises loyalists who also favour a smaller state and low taxes, but many senior Conservatives with other views have moved to the backbenches, where they are likely to oppose her initiatives more vocally. Many Conservative members of parliament (MPs) have already openly criticised policy announcements, reinforcing the deep divisions within the party. Our baseline forecast is that Ms Truss will remain in office, as another leadership contest would be highly damaging and there is no obvious candidate to restore the party's popularity. However, there is a high risk that if financial-market instability persists into 2023, if the government cannot implement its policy agenda or if the Conservatives' extremely poor polling persists, Conservative MPs might seek to remove Ms Truss as party leader and prime minister.

^a EIU estimates. ^b EIU forecasts. ^c General government.

There are medium-term risks to the union of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, but the dissolution of the UK is not EIU's core forecast for 2023-27. Pro-independence parties, led by the Scottish National Party (SNP), hold a majority in the Scottish parliament, and have introduced legislation in Scotland to hold a referendum on independence in 2023 unsanctioned by the UK parliament. The government has dismissed the possibility of granting a binding second referendum during this parliamentary term. Even if it were forced to grant one by court order, the poll would take several years to organise. Opinion polling on Scottish independence has generally shown a consistent —if narrow—lead for remaining in the union, except during a period in 2020 when the devolved government's pandemic-related public health powers were abnormally relevant to voters. We do not expect Scotland to achieve independence in 2023-27, but the issue may return to prominence if the SNP becomes the swing party in a hung parliament after the next election.

Brexit has inflamed tensions in Northern Ireland, which remains within a regulatory union with the EU for most goods to avoid border checks on the island of Ireland. This requires checks between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK for goods deemed to be "at risk" of passing into the EU. The arrangement has been difficult to implement and is disliked by Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland for, in effect, creating a border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Following elections in May, the largest Unionist party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), has refused to join the power-sharing executive unless the Northern Ireland protocol is changed radically. Constitutionally, this has prevented an executive from being formed. To appease the DUP, the government has introduced legislation to allow the UK to override parts of the protocol. Overriding the protocol would risk provoking a trade war with the EU and at the very least would further sour relations. Given Ms Truss's weak position, she is unlikely to risk generating further sources of instability. Even if the government were to seek to override the protocol, it would meet opposition in parliament, and such legislation would be highly unlikely to be passed by the House of Lords (the upper chamber).

Election watch

United Kingdom | Politics | Forecast | Election watch

October 17th 2022

Parliament must be dissolved within five years of the previous election (December 12th 2019) with an election to follow within 25 days, making the latest possible date January 24th 2025. The prime minister has the authority to decide the date of the election unilaterally, and despite her lack of a personal mandate, Ms Truss is unlikely to call an election before 2024, owing to the Conservatives' poor polling and to deteriorating economic conditions. Although elections are usually held in May, if economic conditions remain depressed, Ms Truss may delay the election for as long as possible, until the autumn of 2024 (an election in December before Christmas would be highly unpopular and probably be avoided).

Our baseline forecast is that the Conservatives will lose the next general election, with a Labour government the most probable outcome. Given that the economy is set to deteriorate further and Ms Truss has so far shown few signs of being able to heal the deep divisions within her party, the Conservatives will struggle to regain ground before the next election. On current polling, support for Labour is sufficiently far ahead of the Conservatives to win seats outside its core support in metropolitan areas, particularly in poorer constituencies that swung to the Conservatives in the 2019 election and have been disproportionately affected by the cost-of-living crisis (and where "levelling up" have not materialised). However, it remains unclear at this early stage whether the Conservatives can recover sufficient support to deny Labour an outright majority.

International relations

United Kingdom | Politics | Forecast | International relations

October 17th 2022

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, all European countries have adopted severe sanctions against Russia, preventing the Central Bank of Russia from accessing international reserves, cutting Russian banks off from the SWIFT international bank messaging system and severely curtailing most trade with Russia. The UK also passed legislation providing greater scrutiny of foreign ownership of UK assets.

Serious tensions remain between the EU and the UK related to the UK's departure from the bloc. The EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement came into force in May 2021, allowing zero-tariff, zero-quota trade between the UK and the EU. However, leaving the single market and customs union has created a variety of non-tariff trade barriers. The Northern Ireland protocol is by far the main source of UK-EU friction. The government is seeking changes to the protocol to reduce trade blockages and political tensions in Northern Ireland, and has introduced legislation that would allow it to override parts of the protocol unilaterally. The EU has offered limited concessions on the implementation of the protocol, but has said that it will launch infringement proceedings against the UK if the UK reneges on the protocol. The new UK government and the EU have agreed to extend a series of grace periods that waive border checks, effective September 15th, heading off an immediate crisis. A UK-EU trade war is not our baseline forecast, especially given the war in Ukraine, but it remains a risk.

Policy trends

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Policy trends

October 17th 2022

Economic policy has shifted under the new government, with Ms Truss initially unveiling massive fiscal expansion in the form of spending pledges to cap household energy prices for two years to address the spectre of crippling household energy costs, as well as a mini-budget (so-called because it was not subject to an independent fiscal assessment) containing unfunded tax cuts that were promoted to boost medium-term growth. The announcement of the mini-budget was badly mismanaged, with the uncosted and permanent nature of the tax cuts (coming so soon after the uncosted energy price package estimated at over £150bn or US\$169bn) shaking financial markets and causing sterling to weaken and UK bond yields to rise. This forced the Bank of England (BoE, the central bank) to intervene to steady the markets. The government has since announced a partial U-turn on policy, cancelling a promised cut to the top rate of personal income tax and reinstating an increase in corporation tax from April 2023.

Despite this, the government will seek to identify areas in which they can trim expenditure, to demonstrate a medium-term commitment to fiscal consolidation, which they intend to do in an accelerated fiscal statement in late October. However, this will compromise its ability to fulfil previous pledges to increase public spending—particularly on the National Health Service, education and the police—and "level up" deprived regions outside London and the south-east.

Fiscal policy

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Fiscal policy outlook

October 17th 2022

The winding down of pandemic-related spending has narrowed the fiscal deficit this year, to an estimated 6.9% of GDP. We expect a widening of the deficit in 2023, to 8.4% of GDP. This is due to Ms Truss's plan to freeze household energy bills at £2,500 (US\$2,800) for a typical household, with the government covering the difference. As a share of GDP, revenue is likely to fall in 2023, reflecting the fact that the economy is set to register a full-year contraction, which will affect tax revenue. As an advanced economy that borrows exclusively in its own currency, with an exceptionally long bond maturity, the UK has significant scope to borrow. However, borrowing costs will rise and market appetite for UK debt could diminish to the extent that Ms Truss will have to scale back plans for future expansion, either as a result of rising debt-service costs or a failed gilt auction.

We expect the fiscal deficit to narrow gradually over 2024-27 as the European gas crisis eases and energy-related expenditure is withdrawn. As the economy recovers, we forecast that revenue will rise as a share of GDP, and fiscal consolidation efforts will lead to a gradual fall in spending. However, the fiscal deficit will remain large at the end of the forecast period (3.2% of GDP in 2027).

We forecast that public debt as a share of GDP will rise for the remainder of the parliament as the government attempts to head off the energy crisis and boost the economy ahead of the 2024 election. We expect public debt to peak at about 109% of GDP in 2025, before easing moderately in 2026-27.

Monetary policy

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Monetary policy outlook

October 17th 2022

At its meeting on September 21st, the BoE raised its key policy interest rate by 50 basis points to 2.25%, its seventh consecutive rise. The new government's fiscal policy will reduce inflationary pressure through capping household energy costs, but increase it through tax cuts elsewhere (which will lift demand). On balance, we believe that the impact will be expansionary, requiring faster tightening by the BoE to compensate. We expect 75-basis-point rate rises at the BoE's next meetings, in November and December, taking the policy rate to 3.75% by end-2022. We expect the BoE to slow the pace of monetary policy tightening in early 2023 to increments of 50 basis points at both its February and March meetings, before a final 25-basis-point increase, taking the policy rate to 5%. We expect monetary policy to remain on hold thereafter. Inflation is likely to remain well above the BoE's 2% target well into 2024, limiting the ability to cut rates within the price stability mandate.

Global forecast data

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | International assumptions

October 17th 2022

	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
Economic growth (%)						
US GDP	1.5	0.5	1.7	1.9	2.1	1.8
OECD GDP	2.3	0.5	1.7	1.9	2.0	1.8
EU27 GDP	2.7	-0.1	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.6
World GDP	2.6	1.7	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.5
World trade	3.7	2.5	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7
Inflation indicators (% unless otherwise indicated)						
US CPI	7.9	3.7	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.1
OECD CPI	8.8	5.1	2.7	2.3	2.2	2.1
EU27 CPI	8.8	5.7	2.4	2.0	1.9	2.0
Manufactures (measured in US\$)	1.9	4.9	4.5	3.2	1.9	3.5
Oil (Brent; US\$/b)	101.2	89.6	83.4	75.8	69.1	64.3
Non-oil commodities (measured in US\$)	14.9	-10.7	-3.4	-2.3	-3.3	-3.2
Financial variables						
US\$ 3-month commercial paper rate (av; %)	1.9	3.9	3.6	2.7	2.4	2.4

https://viewpoint.eiu.com

© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

€ 3-month interbank rate (av; %)	0.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
US\$:£ (av)	1.22	1.16	1.25	1.31	1.39	1.42
US\$:€ (av)	1.05	1.05	1.14	1.21	1.23	1.24

Economic growth

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Economic growth

October 17th 2022

We estimate real GDP growth of 4.4% in 2022, but the headline figure is flattered by strong carry-over effect from 2021, when many lockdown restrictions were still in place. Real GDP is likely to have contracted on a quarterly basis in the third quarter of 2022, and is set to continue to fall until the third quarter of 2023. Rebased GDP data indicate that the economy has failed to recover all of its 2020-21 pandemic-induced losses in 2022. With a forecast contraction in late 2022 and early 2023, we do not expect the UK economy to return to its pre-pandemic (fourth-quarter 2019) size until mid-2024.

The downturn will be driven by falling real wage growth, in turn explained by elevated inflation (as the European energy crisis and the Ukraine conflict keep gas prices high), as well as monetary tightening. Continued supply-chain disruption and rising overheads will also increase caution among businesses, affecting fixed investment. The introduction of new trade barriers after Brexit has exacerbated the supply shocks, affecting countries across western Europe and making the UK particularly vulnerable to trade-related disruption. Coupled with a much weaker external backdrop, as demand eases from the UK's main trading partners, exports are forecast to contract. We expect these factors to contribute to a 0.8% contraction in real GDP in 2023.

Growth will rebound thereafter, at 1.4% in 2024, and stabilise at about 1.6% in 2025-27. Structural limitations such as low investment and poor productivity, significant skills gaps, high regional inequalities and a reliance on consumerfacing services to drive growth, alongside the creation of new trade barriers by Brexit, will undermine the medium-term growth potential.

Economic growth

Private consumption 4.6 -2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3 1 Government consumption 2.0 5.0 1.4 1.4 1.3 1 Gross fixed investment 5.2 -1.2 1.3 3.1 3.0 3 Exports of goods & services 3.5 -1.8 2.6 2.2 3.3 2 Imports of goods & services 6.7 -4.1 2.5 2.5 3.1 2 Domestic demand 5.1 -1.4 1.3 1.8 1.7 1	2027 ^b
Government consumption 2.0 5.0 1.4 1.4 1.3 1 Gross fixed investment 5.2 -1.2 1.3 3.1 3.0 3 Exports of goods & services 3.5 -1.8 2.6 2.2 3.3 2 Imports of goods & services 6.7 -4.1 2.5 2.5 3.1 2 Domestic demand 5.1 -1.4 1.3 1.8 1.7 1	1.6
Gross fixed investment 5.2 -1.2 1.3 3.1 3.0 3 Exports of goods & services 3.5 -1.8 2.6 2.2 3.3 2 Imports of goods & services 6.7 -4.1 2.5 2.5 3.1 2 Domestic demand 5.1 -1.4 1.3 1.8 1.7 1	1.6
Exports of goods & services 3.5 -1.8 2.6 2.2 3.3 2 Imports of goods & services 6.7 -4.1 2.5 2.5 3.1 2 Domestic demand 5.1 -1.4 1.3 1.8 1.7 1	1.3
Imports of goods & services 6.7 -4.1 2.5 2.5 3.1 2 Domestic demand 5.1 -1.4 1.3 1.8 1.7 1	3.0
Domestic demand 5.1 -1.4 1.3 1.8 1.7 1	2.0
	2.6
	1.8
Agriculture -3.6 -0.9 1.5 1.6 1.8 1	1.6
Industry -6.4 -0.8 1.4 1.6 1.7 1	1.6
Services 7.5 -0.7 1.4 1.6 1.7 1	1.6

^a EIU estimates. ^b EIU forecasts.

Inflation

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Inflation

October 17th 2022

Inflation began to spike sharply from mid-2021 as energy and commodity import costs began rising—a trend that accelerated in 2022 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The government's policy to cap household energy prices will slow growth in utility prices in late 2022 and 2023, but the combination of higher input costs and a tight labour market has led to inflationary trends across other products and services. The government's expansionary fiscal policy is likely to provide greater inflationary pressure as household and corporate incomes rise, averaging 8.4% in 2022 and peaking at 10.7% in the first quarter of 2023. From then, the combination of stabilising global energy prices, negative economic growth and capped energy costs will start to erode inflation, which will average 7.9% in 2023 and decline to 3.4% in 2024, after which energy markets will begin to stabilise, reducing inflation to about 2% in 2025-27.

Exchange rates

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | Exchange rates

October 17th 2022

Sterling has been volatile following the unveiling of the government's mini-budget in late September. The UK currency had already weakened steadily over the course of 2022, from US\$1.35:£1 at the start of the year to US\$1.13:£1 in mid-September, reflecting an aggressive tightening cycle by the Federal Reserve (Fed, the US central bank). It depreciated to US\$1.03:£1 on September 26th, before intervention by the BoE helped to steady the markets and strengthen the currency to US\$1.14:£1 in early October. However, with the prospect of BoE intervention ending in mid-October, sterling has weakened again. We expect further bouts of volatility in the coming months, with sterling set to average US\$1.12:£1 in the fourth quarter of 2022. Although some limited appreciation against the

dollar is likely over the course of next year as the Fed begins to slow its tightening cycle, sterling will average a still-weak US\$1.16:£1 in 2023 (compared with an average of US\$1.22:£1 in 2022). We expect more marked appreciation once inflation eases and the "flight to safety" abates, which is unlikely until 2024.

Sterling has weakened much less noticeably against the euro (trading at about $\in 1.14$:£1 in early October, compared with $\in 1.15$ -1.20:£1 earlier in the year), as Europe has suffered from similar weaknesses against the dollar. We expect sterling to depreciate by 4.2% against the euro in 2023, averaging $\in 1.11$:£1, before rebounding reasonably firmly in 2024-25.

External sector

United Kingdom | Economy | Forecast | External sector

October 17th 2022

The UK has run a persistent current-account deficit since 1985. Like most European countries, we expect the trade balance to deteriorate significantly as energy suppliers are forced to buy imported natural gas on the spot market at prices more than three times their year-earlier levels. Given a dependence on natural gas, we expect this to increase the UK's trade deficit significantly and widen the current-account deficit from 2.6% to 6.2% of GDP in 2022. The deficit will remain elevated at 4% of GDP in 2023, before beginning to decline in 2024 as new domestic supply comes online and international energy prices fall.

Country forecast overview: Business environment rankings

United Kingdom | Business | Business environment | Rankings overview

October 12th 2022

Value of index ^a		Global rank ^b		Regional rank ^c		
2018-22	2023-27	2018-22	2023-27	2018-22	2023-27	
7.80	7.70	15	20	9	11	

^a Out of 10. ^b Out of 82 countries. ^c Out of 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK.

• The UK's global ranking drops by five places and regional ranking by two places. Brexit has worsened the UK's terms of trade, but the country's strengths—a pro-business policy stance, a welcoming attitude to foreign investment, and flexible labour and product markets—will continue.

Business environment at a glance

United Kingdom | Business | Business environment | Business environment at a glance

October 12th 2022

Policy towards private enterprise and competition

2023-24: A 130% "super-deduction" on capital investment expires in April 2023.

2025-27: Elevated state intervention in investment and innovation continues. New state-aid rules are implemented.

Policy towards foreign investment

2023-24: Continued openness to investment, but increased scrutiny in sectors considered sensitive to national security. Crackdown on Russian investment and money-laundering through the property sector.

2025-27: Infrastructure plans offer investment opportunities. Possible changes in tax policies to bolster inward investment.

Foreign trade and exchange controls

2023-24: Increased trade barriers with EU. Negotiations over Northern Ireland protocol. Supply-chain disruptions gradually resolve. Sanctions imposed on Russian exports.

2025-27: Continued UK-EU negotiations probable. New trade agreements with other countries, including potential accession to the trade bloc of Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Taxes

2023-24: Planned corporation tax increase from 19% to 25% in 2023 to be shelved, and the recently introduced 2.5-percentage-point increase in national-insurance contributions reversed.

2025-27: Renewed focus on fiscal consolidation, tax rises are likely to fund public spending, investment and social care.

Financing

2023-24: Monetary policy tightening, with the Bank of England (the central bank) raising interest rates. A loss of "passporting" rights and restrictions on EU services trade. Slow progress in establishing equivalence with the EU.

2025-27: Modest decline in City of London's status. Steady growth in alternative forms of debt-financing.

The labour market

2023-24: Recession leads to modest rise in unemployment but labour market remains tight. Shortages in low-skilled occupations continue. Increased immigration to fill shortage sectors.

2025-27: Increased immigration from Hong Kong. Addition of more low-wage sectors to shortage lists.

Infrastructure

2023-24: Spending on housing, transport and energy. Fracking legalisation and offshore oil and gas exploration expansion.

2025-27: Increased investment with emphasis on boosting competitiveness; new nuclear reactor to come online in 2026.

Technological readiness

2023-24: High e-commerce penetration and strong research base, but spending on research and development (R&D) remains below EU average. Continued high threat from cybercrime and cyber-espionage.

2025-27: Modest rise in public R&D spending. Development of state "blue skies" fund.

Market opportunities: Social indicators and living standards

United Kingdom | Business | Market opportunities | Social indicators and living standards

May 16th 2022

Social indicators and living standards

	2021		2026	
		Western Europe (av)		Western Europe (av)
Health				
Healthcare spending (% of GDP)	12.5	11.3	12.0	11.1
Healthcare spending (US\$ per head)	5,845	5,230	7,522	6,651
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	3.9	3.2	3.7	3.0
Physicians (per 1,000 population)	3.1	4.0	3.3	4.2
Food and beverages				
Food, beverages & tobacco (% of household spending)	12.6	19.1	10.9	17.5
Meat consumption (kg per person)	84.1	89.6	84.0	95.1
Milk consumption (litres per person)	239.0	261.0	248.0	279.0
Coffee & tea consumption (kg per person)	4.6	6.2	5.1	6.7
Consumer goods in use (per 1,000 population)				
Passenger cars	547	552	536	n/a
Telephone main lines	475	415	476	401

Mobile phone subscribers	1,160	1,210	1,160	1,230
Television sets	1,177	837	1,339	935
Personal computers	872	843	878	867
Households				
No. of households (m)	28.0	193.0	28.4	200.9
No. of people per household (av)	2.4	2.2	2.5	2.1
Income and income distribution				
Median household income (US\$)	64,540	52,760	82,720	62,670
Average monthly wage (US\$)	4,500	4,150	5,730	n/a
Gini index	35.1 ^a	-	-	-

^a Latest available year.


Sources: UN Statistical Office; World Bank; Food and Agriculture Organisation; Euromonitor; World Health Organisation; national statistical offices; International Telecommunication Union; EIU estimates and forecasts.

Global position

United Kingdom | Regulation | Global position


December 1st 2021





The outlook for the UK has become much more uncertain following the 2016 referendum vote to leave the EU. The UK departed the bloc on January 31st 2020, entering a transition period that lasted until end-2020, during which the UK retained most aspects of EU membership. An EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) came into force on January 1st 2021. It provides for zero-tariff, zero-quota trade between the UK and the EU. However, leaving the EU single market and customs union has created a variety of nontariff trade barriers. The TCA also leaves many aspects of the relationship between the UK and the 27-member bloc unsettled. The coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic has compounded an already uncertain outlook during 2020 and 2021. Lockdowns and travel restrictions have delivered a severe blow to industries such as hospitality, tourism and aviation, as well as parts of the retail sector. The UK still

has much to offer as an investment destination. Existing clusters and economies of scale in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, software development and financial services will remain powerful magnets for foreign entrants, while significant potential exists for large-scale, long-term investments in the energy, communications and transport sectors.





Regulatory/market assessment

United Kingdom | Regulation | Regulatory/market assessment

December 1st 2021

• The National Security and Investment Act passed into law in April 2021 and comes fully into force from January 4th 2022. The act makes it mandatory for investors (domestic and foreign) in 17 sectors to notify the government in

- advance of any transaction, regardless of size, that might give rise to UK national security risks. The implicated sectors include defence, energy, transport and communications.
- In October 2021 the government unveiled a "net zero" strategy, outlining how the UK will meet its target to effectively eliminate green-house gas emissions by 2050. The following month, while the UK was hosting the UN's COP26 climate talks, lawmakers approved a new Environmental Act that replaces EU legislation and oversight following the UK's departure from the bloc.
- Citizens of the European Economic Area (the EU, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and Switzerland became subject to UK immigration controls from January 1st 2021. A new points-based immigration system now treats EU and non-EU citizens equally.
- In March 2021 the UK government repealed legislation implementing the EU's directive on the taxation of interest and royalty payments. Companies now must rely on arrangements set out in bilateral tax treaties with individual EU member states, which in many cases eliminate withholding tax.
- The EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement came into force in January 2021, outlining the initial terms of trade relations following the UK's departure from the EU. The agreement provides for zero-tariff, zero-quota trade between the UK and the EU, at least in the first instance. However, leaving the single market and customs union have created a variety of nontariff trade barriers in the form of border checks and product certifications.

Regulatory/market watch

United Kingdom | Regulation | Regulatory/market watch

December 1st 2021

- After lifting most coronavirus (Covid-19) restrictions in mid-2021, the government introduced additional measures in early December 2021 following the emergence of the new Omicron variant. The provisions, which fall well short of the full lockdowns from earlier in the pandemic, include orders to work from home, wear face masks in public spaces and use vaccine passes.
- The government launched its coronavirus vaccination programme in December 2020, and nearly 70% of the UK population was fully vaccinated by end-November 2021. The government is encouraging uptake of booster shots following the emergence of Omicron, with just under 28% of the population having received the additional dose.
- The government has wound down most of the relief mechanisms it put in place to support workers and businesses during the pandemic, including the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, which expired in September 2021. A Kickstart scheme remains active; it funds new job placements for young people aged 16–24 and pays 100% of the national minimum wage for 25 hours per week for six months.
- A UK Shared Prosperity Fund is expected to launch in April 2022, with annual spending of around £1.5bn. It will replace the previous EU development funding schemes and will focus on regional development and employment support.
- The corporate income tax rate will increase from 19% to 25% in April 2023, according to an announcement by the government in March 2021. The higher rate will apply to companies with annual profits exceeding £250,000.

- At least in the short term, EIU does not expect the UK to trigger Article 16 of the Northern Ireland protocol, which would override that agreement. However, tensions remain high and a UK-EU trade war remains a notable risk. Checks between the UK and EU are likely to remain unenforced in the meantime as negotiations continue on a less invasive system.
- The government has said it will remove its 2% digital services tax once the OECD's new arrangement on global corporate tax takes effect. The agreement, which was finalised in October 2021, is meant to come into force by 2023 but could be derailed if the US fails to ratify it.

Long-term outlook: The long-term outlook

United Kingdom | Economy | Long-term outlook | Long-term outlook

May 16th 2022

	2022-30	2031-50	2022-50
Population and labour force (% change; annual av)			
Total population	0.37	0.25	0.29
Working-age population	0.08	0.01	0.03
Working-age minus total population	-0.29	-0.24	-0.25
Labour force	0.40	0.16	0.24
Growth and productivity (% change; annual av)			
Growth of real GDP per head	1.6	1.4	1.5
Growth of real GDP	2.0	1.7	1.8

https://viewpoint.eiu.com

© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

Labour productivity growth	1.5	1.5	1.5
Growth of capital stock	3.2	2.7	2.8
Total factor productivity growth	0.4	0.6	0.6

Initial conditions: From the early 1990s to 2019, with the exception of the 2008 crisis period, the economic performance of the UK improved relative to that of many regional peers, owing in part to a sharp rise in labour utilisation, with strong employment growth fuelling strong overall expansion. The pace of economic growth began to soften in 2019, and the economy contracted sharply in 2020 amid the coronavirus pandemic. A firm rebound left the UK 0.4% below its 2019 level. Prospects for 2022-23 are weak as private consumption is hit by soaring inflation, corporates face rising debt from the coronavirus crisis (hampering investment), and trade frictions from Brexit and supply-chain disruption depress export-oriented industries. Despite securing the Trade and Co-operation Agreement with the EU, the UK's relationship with the bloc remains unsettled. The UK is likely to diverge in some areas of regulation, particularly in technology and life sciences, while non-tariff barriers put UK firms at a competitive disadvantage within the single market.

The UK's prospects for growth in the medium term will be highly dependent on government policy formulation in response to these challenges. Both major parties have signalled a willingness to pursue a more interventionist strategy in the economy and provide more public investment, in an effort to address the UK's regional inequality and weak productivity growth. The current government has increased its threshold for borrowing for investment from 2% of GDP to 3%, established a national infrastructure bank in addition to the pre-existing British Business Bank, and invested £800m (US\$1.1bn) into a "blue skies" fund to support innovative research.

The UK's structural advantages have traditionally included a comparatively low regulatory burden, a flexible labour market and a business environment that is conducive to foreign investment, which we expect to persist. On the negative side, factors that tend to constrain the UK's long-term outlook include an over-reliance on wealth effects

generated by the volatile financial and real estate sectors, high levels of private-sector debt and a deficit in "intermediate" labour market skills, which are skewed by significant geographical inequalities. These have contributed to the development of an unbalanced economy. Levels of productivity in the UK, in terms of output per hour worked, lag well behind those in the US, Germany and France. This weak trend is worrying and will weigh on medium- and long-term growth if not reversed, as well as playing an increasing role in policy debates.

Demographic trends: The working-age population is forecast to rise gradually over the long-term horizon, and the share of the population aged 65 or over will continue to increase. We forecast that by 2050 those aged 65 or older will account for 25.4% of the population (up from 18.7% in 2018). The share of the working-age population peaked at 66% in 2008-09, and we forecast a steady decline to 58.3% by 2050. The labour force participation rate stands at just over 78%—higher than the OECD average. We expect migration to continue to provide a key source of population and human capital growth. Most countries that operate skills-based immigration systems adjust their requirements periodically, a trend that we expect the UK to follow.

The EU is set to remain a key export destination

External conditions: The UK is a highly trade-dependent economy, and thus its departure from the world's largest trading bloc will have implications for its long-term prospects. Despite the UK leaving the single market, the EU is likely to remain the UK's most important export destination, particularly for goods trade, given its proximity and the volume of existing trade. Although the UK's departure from the EU will allow the UK to negotiate trade deals with third countries, the total estimated value of trade deals under negotiation will not make up for the loss of access to the EU market.

The UK is likely to maintain its surplus in services, which is expected to grow as a percentage of total trade value over the course of our long-term forecast period as e-commerce and trade in intangible goods become more prominent globally.

Institutions and policy trends: The UK is a long-established democracy with well-entrenched rule of law (guaranteeing security of contracts), liberalised product markets and a rigorous competition policy regime. Much of the UK's policy around competition, trade, product regulation and other areas of economic policymaking had been informed by its EU membership, as was the governance of its own internal market, much of which is currently being repatriated to domestic equivalent authorities. It remains too early to gauge how effectively policymakers and institutions will manage these competencies on a national level, and whether any benefits can be realised from regaining direct control.

Long-term performance: Since the 2008 financial crisis the UK has suffered from chronically low productivity growth relative to its OECD peer countries, and relied heavily on moving people into work. The UK's ability to increase its productivity will be the determining factor behind long-term growth potential. A number of factors have been cited as possible causes for the UK's persistent productivity gap with its peers. These include a high degree of centralisation of the economy around the capital, London; the UK's relatively low share of spending on research and development (R&D); the dominance of the volatile financial services sector; and reliance on low-skilled immigration. Successive governments have tried to address the productivity issue, including the current government, which has committed to an increase in public investment to stimulate R&D, a shift in emphasis towards skilled immigration and

supporting investment outside London. Whether these plans will boost productivity remains highly uncertain. We forecast that real GDP will grow by an annual average of 2% in 2022-30, and moderate to 1.7% in 2031-50.

Income and market size

	2021	2030	2050
Income and market size			
Population (m)	68.2	70.5	74.1
GDP (US\$ bn at market exchange rates)	3,188.4	5,090.8	11,021.6
GDP per head (US\$ at market exchange rates)	46,750	72,220	148,780
Private consumption (US\$ bn)	1,960.1	3,165.5	7,139.8
Private consumption per head (US\$)	28,740	44,910	96,380
GDP (US\$ bn at PPP)	3,406.0	5,113.3	10,628.7
GDP per head (US\$ at PPP)	49,940	72,540	143,470
Exports of goods & services (US\$ bn)	860.6	1,592.2	4,805.6
Imports of goods & services (US\$ bn)	900.6	1,730.2	5,404.0
Memorandum items			
GDP per head (at PPP; index, US=100)	72.3	74.2	77.2
Share of world population (%)	0.9	0.8	0.8
Share of world GDP (% at market exchange rates)	3.4	3.5	2.9
Share of world GDP (% at PPP)	2.4	2.2	1.9
Share of world exports of goods & services (%)	3.1	3.7	3.8

Automotive

United Kingdom | Automotive | Overview

October 19th 2022

- The UK's automotive sector is in trend decline. Vehicle production and exports have fallen steadily since 2016, reflecting the damaging effects of Brexit on trade and the wider economy, as well as structural global factors linked to overcapacity and environmental pressures. Since 2020 activity has also been badly affected by widespread supply-chain disruption from the pandemic and more recently the broadening ripple effects of the Russia-Ukraine war, which has amplified supply-side frictions (constraining new-car stock), high energy and commodity costs and other input-price pressures. There is a risk of energy shortages for businesses and households this winter. Alongside softer new-car demand, vehicle production will remain subdued over EIU's five-year forecast period to 2026.
- The outlook for the UK economy is poor, against a backdrop of soaring living costs, elevated inflation, sharply rising interest rates and record-low consumer sentiment. Unemployment is low, but is likely to rise gradually. Recent policy decisions have triggered significant volatility in financial markets. We expect a recession over the winter and for economic weakness to persist into 2024. Amid a global slowdown and jittery markets, the outlook is highly uncertain and will remain heavily influenced by the conflict in Ukraine and the related development of energy costs.
- New-car sales slumped by 29.4% in 2020 to 1.63m units, the lowest level since 1992 and the fourth consecutive annual decline. This compares with a recent peak of 2.7m in 2016 and an annual average of 2.3m in 2010-19. Sales remained constrained in 2021, rising by just 1%, and were down by 8% year on year in January-September 2022.

- We forecast that new-car sales will decline by 6.5% in 2022 to a multi-decade low, with another contraction expected in 2023. Thereafter pent-up demand, an easing of supply bottlenecks and stabilising economic conditions should support a moderate upturn in sales, but demand will be subdued. We forecast a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.4% in 2022-26—inflated by the weak 2021 base—with annual sales remaining well below their 2010-19 trend. The share of chargeable electric vehicles (EVs) will continue to rise (from 18.5% of new-car sales in 2021), but significantly wider take-up will be constrained by affordability issues and limited charging infrastructure. The UK is the only major European market not to offer purchase incentives for private EV buyers, having scrapped its subsidy scheme in mid-2022.
- New commercial vehicle (CV) sales fell by 29.6% in 2020, to a seven-year low of 300,400 units. Sales rebounded firmly in 2021, driven by demand for light CVs (vans) in the online and logistics sectors. However, sales in this segment have slumped so far in 2022, down by 20% year on year in January-September.
- In 2021 the UK was the world's 18th-largest automotive producer (and the sixth largest in Europe), according to the International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers. Vehicle production expanded steadily in 2010-16, but has since fallen sharply, declining for five successive years. Following a drop of 8% in 2018 and 14% in 2019, annual production slumped by 29% in 2020 and 5% in 2021 to 933,172 units, the lowest in 40 years and half the level of 2016. Output was down by 9% year on year in January-August 2022.
- The UK left the EU single market and customs union in January 2021, having agreed a limited Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) with the EU. This averted the imposition of immediate tariffs and allowed for quota-free trade, but it still represented a "hard Brexit" with significant new trade frictions and non-tariff barriers, disrupting integrated global supply chains (already under strain from the pandemic). Full customs controls took effect in 2022, introducing tighter import restrictions.
- The UK has five mass producers of vehicles (all foreign-owned) that have primarily used the country as an export base to the EU. Challenges posed by structurally weakened trade and investment links as a result of Brexit will be

amplified by prolonged disruptive effects to supply chains from the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Recent statesubsidised EV-related investments have safeguarded the near-term future of plants operated by Nissan (Japan) and Vauxhall (owned by Netherlands-based Stellantis), but risks of a downsizing of the UK's automotive industry will persist in the coming years. A major factor will be the UK's ability to attract EV battery production facilities (gigafactories) in the face of strong competition from more-established hubs in Europe (such as Germany and Hungary) and Asia.

Consumer goods

United Kingdom | Consumer goods | Overview

August 18th 2022

- The UK's large consumer sector has faced considerable headwinds in recent years, with an economically damaging Brexit process, the coronavirus pandemic and the fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war constraining household demand, hindering business activity and disrupting firms' supply chains. The near-term economic outlook is poor and has materially deteriorated in recent months, with household incomes facing a severe real-term squeeze in 2022-23 from soaring energy and food costs, elevated inflation, increased taxes and higher interest rates. Consumer sentiment has slumped to historical lows, and, although moderate fiscal support for households is expected in the coming months, the scale of the energy-price shock and related economic weakness imply a high likelihood of the UK falling into recession.
- Following an initial pandemic-driven slump, retail sales were fairly resilient in 2020-21, reflecting increased online spending, fiscal support and a shift in consumption from services (affected by movement restrictions) to retail goods. Underlying demand has weakened since mid-2021—retail volumes fell for a fourth successive quarter in

- April-June 2022—and EIU expects volume sales to decline this year, amid the inflationary hit to purchasing power and a post-restrictions transition from goods back to services, particularly travel and hospitality.
- Conditions will remain challenging in 2023-24, and we expect weak average volume growth of just 0.3% per year over our forecast period to 2026. Retail sales in value terms will be boosted by higher prices, but retailers' margins will be squeezed by increased costs of energy, transport, materials and labour.
- The UK will remain Europe's largest online retail market. Robust internet sales have gone hand in hand with falls in retail employment and the number of retail stores, mostly in town centres (traditional department stores have been a notable casualty). Online sellers will continue to thrive, despite increased regulatory scrutiny and plans for new e-commerce taxation. Online grocery retail is more extensive than in most peer countries and will be among the fastest-growing segments of the e-commerce market over the forecast period.
- The retail sector accounts for about 6% of UK GDP and employs about 2.9m people, of which a significant proportion work part-time. The ongoing impact of Brexit and the fallout from the pandemic and the cost-of-living crisis will exacerbate relatively large existing social inequalities across the UK, sustaining more polarised demand in the discount and luxury channels. Usage of credit cards and buy-now-pay-later credit schemes will increase as consumers' purchasing power decreases.
- The UK left the EU single market and customs union on January 1st 2021, after finalising a Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) with the EU. The TCA averted a no-deal fiasco, and in theory allows for tariff- and quota-free UK-EU trade. However, the agreement is limited in scope and the "hard Brexit" has created significant new non-tariff barriers, trade frictions and regulatory compliance issues. Disruption to trade has become more evident since full customs controls took effect in January 2022.
- Brexit has inflamed tensions in Northern Ireland, which remains in a regulatory union with the EU for most goods to avoid border checks on the island of Ireland. This has in effect created a border between Northern Ireland and

the rest of the UK, which is disrupting cross-region post-Brexit trade. This was widely anticipated and there is no easy solution. The UK government has threatened to override parts of the Northern Ireland protocol that it agreed to under the TCA, which the EU has warned would trigger retaliatory action by the bloc, potentially leading to a wider trade war.

Retail sales

	2017 ^a	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^b	2021 ^b	2022 ^c	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c
Retail sales (£ bn)	393.6	408.1	425.1	433.7	462.7	492.5	531.0	551.6	572.3	595.5
Retail sales (US\$ bn)	507.5	545.1	543.0	556.7	636.7	617.7	654.4	693.6	759.7	833.7
Retail sales, volume growth (%)	2.9	1.4	2.4	1.0	4.1	-2.1	-1.0	0.9	1.7	2.1
Retail sales, US\$ value growth (%)	0.4	7.4	-0.4	2.5	14.4	-3.0	5.9	6.0	9.5	9.7
Non-food retail sales (US\$ bn)	269.8	292.9	295.2	295.4 ^a	352.6	344.4	363.0	381.6	418.5	459.5
Food retail sales (US\$ bn)	237.7	252.3	247.7	261.3	284.1	273.3	291.4	312.0	341.2	374.2
Consumer price inflation (av; %)	2.6	2.3	1.7	1.0 ^a	2.5 ^a	8.7	9.0	3.0	2.0	1.9

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Sources: Edge by Ascential; EIU.

• More broadly, Brexit has led to a decline in UK-EU trade in food products and has disrupted large parts of the UK's fisheries, agriculture, and food and drink sectors, which face significant medium-term damage. An exodus of EU labour has contributed to employee shortages in some retail and foodservice sectors.

Energy

United Kingdom | Energy | Overview

September 30th 2022

- EIU expects total energy consumption in the UK to decline by 1.4% year on year in 2022, pulled down by elevated energy prices and concerns about gas supplies. Energy demand will also fall in 2023 as the economy declines. Over our forecast period (2022-31), energy demand will continue to fall, at an annual average of 0.7%, as energy-efficiency gains completely offset demand growth driven by economic growth. We forecast that real GDP will grow at an annual rate of 1.6% in that period.
- Despite rebounding by 11.6% year on year in 2021, oil consumption will decline by 1.9% in 2022, mainly pulled down by high crude and refined-product prices. We forecast that the decline will be steeper in 2023, at 2.2%, and continue in 2022-31, during which oil demand will fall at an annual average of 1.2%, mainly owing to the electrification of transport and efficiency gains in new internal combustion vehicles. It is our view that oil demand in the UK will never return to pre-pandemic levels.
- We expect natural gas consumption to increase by only 0.9% in 2022, and it will decline by 0.5% in 2023 as economic activity declines and gas prices in Europe continue to soar. Gas demand will remain flattish over our forecast period. We expect gas demand in the UK to peak in 2027, after which the increase on renewable-based power generation will start to dent gas consumption.
- Although the decline in coal consumption may be softened in the short term by less use of natural gas in the power generation sector, we expect coal demand to decline in 2022 by 4.7% year on year and in 2023 by 1.9%. Thereafter, coal consumption will fall drastically mainly owing to the planned phase-out of coal use in power generation by end-2024. We expect annual coal consumption to fall by an annual average of 13.8% in 2022-31.

- We expect the share of fossil fuels in total energy demand to decline from 78% in 2022 to 73% in 2031. Natural gas will continue to be the main energy source in the UK in our forecast period.
- We forecast that the share of non-hydro renewables (without considering biomass) in power generation will rise from 33% in 2022 to 54% in 2031.

Energy: key indicators

	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^b	2024 ^b	2025 ^b	2026 ^b	2031 ^b
GDP (US\$ bn at market exchange rates)	2,760	3,188	3,120	3,201	3,654	4,045	4,326	5,212
Real GDP (% change, year on year)	-9.3	7.4	4.4	-0.8	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.6
Population (m)	67.1	67.3	67.5	67.7	68.0	68.2	68.4	69.4
Population (% change, year on year)	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Gross domestic energy consumption (ktoe)	156,477	166,732 ^c	164,396	162,735	160,013	159,853	159,628	157,225
Gross domestic energy consumption (% change, year on year)	-8.3	6.6 ^c	-1.4	-1.0	-1.7	-0.1	-0.1	-0.7

Note. Forecasts for all dates are available via EIU's data tool.

Sources: EIU; © OECD/IEA 2018 IEA statistics, www.iea.org/statistics, licence: www.iea.org/t&c.

^a Actual. ^b EIU forecasts. ^c EIU estimates.

Financial services

United Kingdom | Finance | Overview | Financial services | Overview

October 21st 2022

- The UK has one of the world's best-developed financial industries. The coronavirus pandemic delivered a sharp, but short, shock to the sector. Managing the country's departure from the EU may prove to be a greater challenge. It is likely to require a long-term shift in trading relationships and may contribute to an ongoing shrinkage of the sector. The country's financial firms are likely to face more difficult conditions in late 2022 and in 2023 as the economy weakens and inflation remains high. Rising interest rates are set to boost banks' profits but may cause difficulties for some borrowers, particularly in the housing market, and will reduce demand for credit.
- London, the capital, is currently one of the two leading global financial centres (along with New York) and has the largest share of many international markets. The UK financial sector—banking, insurance, fund management, securities and alternative investment—plays a significant role in the economy. In 2021 it accounted for 8.9% of gross value added, down from 9.6% at its peak in 2009, according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS). In 2021 it employed 1.1m people, or 3.2% of the total workforce, down from 3.7% in 2009. The industry makes a substantial contribution to the balance of payments and tax revenue.
- The UK recorded real GDP growth of 7.5% in 2021, following a severe 11% contraction in 2020 amid the pandemic. GDP remained below its pre-pandemic level in the three months to June 2022, according to the ONS, with the UK the only G7 economy still in this position. EIU forecasts growth of 4.4% in 2022, but a contraction of 0.8% in 2023 as high inflation and interest-rate rises weigh on private consumption and investment. Growth is forecast to average 1.6% per year in 2024-26.

- The UK has been gipped by governmental instability in 2022. Boris Johnson had led his Conservative Party to a strong majority in parliament in December 2019, but resigned as prime minister in July 2022 following a series of scandals. His replacement, Liz Truss, took office in September but resigned just 45 days later after an economic programme of tax cuts and energy price caps spooked the financial markets and sparked a sell-off in the pound, resulting in emergency intervention in the bond market by the Bank of England (BoE, the central bank). The party has embarked on a fresh selection process for the next prime minister.
- The BoE has increased its main rate seven times since December 2021, from 0.1% to 2.25%, in the face of growing inflationary pressures. It has also signalled that further rises will be required in the coming months. The BoE is due to start selling government bonds to unwind its quantitative easing programme, which peaked at £895bn, at end-October. However, the sale could be delayed as a consequence of recent market instability. We forecast that inflation will rise significantly in 2022, to an average of 8.4%, and will remain high, at 7.9%, in 2023.
- The UK left the EU on January 31st 2020, and a transition period with the EU ended on December 31st 2020. An EU-UK free-trade agreement was concluded in December 2020, but the pact did not include financial services. The UK and the EU agreed and implemented some temporary arrangements to reduce disruption to financial markets. The UK granted a designation of regulatory equivalence for many EU financial firms, allowing them to continue to operate in the country. However, the EU did not reciprocate for UK financial firms, except for derivatives clearing houses.
- The government is emphasising the benefits of being able to determine its own priorities for the financial sector. It has begun to reform regulations governing UK markets, starting with changes to stockmarket listing rules. Its legislative programme for the year ahead, announced in May 2022, includes the Financial Services and Markets Bill, which proposes to replace some elements of retained EU law applying to the sector.
- We expect London to retain its status as one of the world's main financial centres, especially in the trading of foreign exchange and derivatives, but a loss of influence and post-Brexit restrictions on financial services trade with

- the EU are inevitable. Financial firms in the UK must come to terms with the loss of "passporting" (the right of UK-regulated companies to do business in the EU and vice versa).
- Financial services companies previously serving the EU from the UK will continue to relocate some of their operations and staff to within the bloc. Although outflows of employees (and related tax revenue) from the UK have so far been modest, it is likely that the trend will continue as competing hubs, including Amsterdam (Netherlands), Frankfurt (Germany) and Paris (France), gradually grow in size and influence. European policymakers will strive to attract major financial functions away from London.

Healthcare

United Kingdom | Healthcare | Spending


September 30th 2022

Overview

- In the last two years the UK's healthcare system, already struggling with high demand, has faced three challenges: the covid-19 pandemic, the UK's departure from the EU's single market on January 1st 2021 and a global energy crisis following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in March 2022. The first pushed up death rates, necessitated additional funding and expanded waiting lists for non-covid care. The second has caused recruitment problems and necessitated an overhaul of pharmaceutical supervision. The third has caused high inflation and an economic slowdown; EIU expects real GDP to fall by 0.8% in 2023, pushing down healthcare spending in real terms.
- In addition, the UK's Conservative prime minister resigned in September 2022 and was replaced by Liz Truss, who appointed a new health minister (Thérèse Coffey). This was shortly followed by a controversial government mini-

budget that aims to cut taxes and bolster investment. However, the reaction of markets and the IMF has been damning, causing the currency to plunge. Unless reversed, the budget is likely to lead to cuts in healthcare spending over the first half of our forecast period.

• The UK responded to the pandemic by increasing spending on healthcare to an estimated 12% of GDP in 2020 and 11.9% in 2021, according to the OECD. We forecast that this share will rebound to 12% in 2022 and in 2023 as real GDP growth slows. However, despite strong nominal growth in healthcare spending in local-currency terms over these two years, we expect spending to fall in real terms in 2023.



- Over our full five-year forecast period (2022-26), we expect health spending to rise at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.7%. However, with inflation high, real growth in healthcare spending will average just 1% a year, compared with 2.2% a year in the five years before the pandemic.
- Pharmaceutical sales will grow at a CAGR of 4.9% in nominal local-currency terms in 2022-26, driven partly by covid-19 vaccine sales as well as the higher price of imported medicines as the pound weakens. So far, 86.9% of the

population aged over 12 have received at least two vaccine doses, and over 68% have received three doses, according to government data. A booster (fourth) dose was offered to certain groups from early 2022.

Funding sources

- Healthcare provision in the UK is dominated by the National Health Service (NHS), which is financed primarily via general taxation. NHS care is free at the point of delivery, but fixed charges are levied (in England) for most prescription medicines and dental care, with some exemptions.
- Public expenditure (including compulsory contributions) accounted for 81.7% of current health spending in 2020, according to provisional data from the OECD, above the OECD average of 74%. The public share in the UK has increased from 78.5% in 2019, but remains lower than current shares in Germany (85.1%) and France (83.7%).
- The former government had reaffirmed a pre-pandemic funding deal in 2018, which will cause spending (excluding emergency covid-19 funds) to rise by £33.9bn (US\$42bn) per year by fiscal year 2023/24 (April 6th-March 5th). The new government may be forced to abandon these promises in light of the UK's weak public finances.
- In particular, the government has reversed a new levy that was intended to raise health and social care funding by £12bn a year, in part to pay for elderly care. The levy, which was to become a tax on earned income from 2023, saw

national insurance payments for all working adults increase by 1.25 percentage points and another 1.25 points for employers. However, the levy will now be cancelled with effect from November 2022.

Healthcare: key indicators

	2017 ^a	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^b	2022 ^c	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c
Life expectancy, average (years)	81.0	81.0	81.1	81.2	81.3	81.4	81.5	81.6	81.8	81.9
Life expectancy, male (years)	79.1	79.2	79.3	79.4	79.5	79.7	79.9	80.0	80.2	80.4
Life expectancy, female (years)	82.8	82.8	82.9	82.9	83.0	83.1	83.1	83.2	83.3	83.4
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.7
Healthcare spending (£ bn)	201.1	210.0	222.8	257.6	276.7	301.3	316.7	334.2	350.1	365.5
Healthcare spending (% of GDP)	9.6	9.7	9.9	12.0	11.9	12.0	12.0	11.8	11.9	12.0
Healthcare spending (US\$ bn)	259.3	280.6	284.6	330.7	380.7	374.4	384.2	431.1	481.3	519.1
Healthcare spending (US\$ per head)	3,924	4,223	4,262	4,932	5,658	5,546	5,672	6,344	7,059	7,589
Healthcare (consumer expenditure; US\$ bn)	30.6	32.3	31.0	28.4	32.5	31.3	31.6	33.8	36.5	38.2
Doctors (per 1,000 people)	2.8	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people)	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Sources: US Bureau of Census; UN; OECD; World Bank; EIU.

• Most NHS funding and commissioning occurs under separate frameworks in the four UK nations, with variations in policies. About 86% of funding goes to NHS England, with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland sharing the rest under a formula (the Barnett formula) related to population size.

• The 2021 Health and Care Act has reorganised NHS England funding flows from July 2022. It has transferred management from the 191 clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) set up in 2012 to 42 integrated care systems that will co-ordinate care at regional levels. The reforms do not apply in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland.

Private health insurance

- Voluntary (or private) spending on healthcare accounted for 18.3% (provisional data) of the UK's total health expenditure in 2020, the smallest share since 2010, according to the OECD. By contrast, up until 2018, the share of voluntary spending on healthcare had been gradually rising as a share of overall health expenditure.
- Out-of-pocket (OOP) spending accounted for 13.8% of total health spending, down from 15.9% in 2019. Nevertheless, the amount of spending continued to rise on a per capita basis (current prices; PPP) in 2020.
- The private health insurance market remained broadly flat in the years preceding the pandemic, reflecting the dominance of the NHS. In 2020 private spending on private acute medical care in hospitals and clinics shrank by about 30%, as the private sector provided resources to the NHS (at cost). This was followed by a strong rebound in 2021, as private contractors helped the NHS to reduce the backlog of non-covid care.
- The leading independent healthcare group is Bupa, with 2.3m policyholders and 31m customers at the end of June 2020. It was boosted by an agreement between Bupa UK and a friendly society, CS Healthcare, to transfer the latter's 17,500 members as of January 2021.

Telecommunications

United Kingdom | Telecommunications | Overview

August 11th 2022

- Mobile telephony makes up the majority of telecommunications connections in the UK. The mobile penetration rate has levelled off in recent years amid a saturated market. EIU expects a moderate rise during the five-year forecast period (2022-26), with the rate reaching 117.5%.
- There were an estimated 41.2 broadband subscriptions per 100 people in 2021, with total internet user penetration at 97.1% of the population. We forecast a rise in user penetration to 99.7% by 2026, with the coronavirus pandemic likely to accelerate the upward trend.
- The government published an updated UK Digital Strategy in June 2022, focusing on technology-led economic growth and productivity. A new central digital and data office became operational in April 2021. Its remit includes innovation and transformation strategies related to cyber-security, data and emerging technologies.
- The UK is ahead of many European countries in fifth-generation (5G) deploy-ment, owing largely to a clear policy. The country's largest mobile operators have all launched 5G services, although speed remains below expectations. Operators will focus on boosting revenue from industrial usage of 5G.
- The Telecommunications (Security) Act, aimed at safeguarding the UK's 5G and fibre-broadband infrastructure, became law in November 2021. It provides the state with new powers to impose controls on the use of telecoms goods, services or facilities deemed to be a high risk to national security. Companies that violate these will be subject to a fine of up to 10% of their relevant turnover.

- The digital strategy aims for the majority of the population to have 5G mobile coverage by 2027. In 2020 the government and Ofcom, the telecoms regulator, agreed on a scheme with the UK's four main mobile network operators (MNOs)—O2, EE, Vodafone and Three—for a shared rural 4G network that would remove most connectivity "not spots" (areas without 4G coverage) by 2025.
- A 2018 commitment to achieve "full-fibre broadband coverage" by 2025 has been watered down to a minimum of 85% gigabit-capable broadband by the same year. Most of the network will be built through private investment, with a government budget of £5bn (US\$6.6bn) allocated to the 20% of premises that are hardest to reach. In November 2020 the government announced plans to spend £1.2bn of this funding in 2020-25.

Telecoms penetration

	2017 ^a	2018 ^a	2019 ^b	2020 ^b	2021 ^b	2022 ^c	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c
Telephone main lines (m)	31.8	31.5	32.4 ^a	32.0 ^a	31.5	31.3	31.2	31.1	31.1	31.0
Telephone main lines (per 100 people)	48.1	47.4	48.5	47.8	46.8	46.4	46.0	45.8	45.6	45.3
Mobile subscriptions (m)	79.1	78.9	79.8 ^a	79.0 ^a	79.1	79.5	79.6	79.8	80.1	80.4
Mobile subscriptions (per 100 people)	119.7	118.8	119.6	117.8	117.6	117.8	117.6	117.5	117.5	117.5


^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Sources: International Telecommunication Union; EIU.

Data and charts: Annual trends charts

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Annual trends charts

October 17th 2022




© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

Data and charts: Quarterly trends charts

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Quarterly trends charts

October 17th 2022




© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

Data and charts: Monthly trends charts

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Monthly trends charts

October 17th 2022



© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

Data summary: Gross domestic product, current market prices

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | GDP at current market prices

October 12th 2022

Gross domestic product, at current market prices

•	-		•							
	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c	2027 ^c
Expenditure on GDP (£ bn at	current ma	rket prices	s)							
GDP	2,157.4	2,238.3	2,109.6	2,276.7	2,463.4	2,585.2	2,757.6	2,865.1	2,982.4	3,096.0
Private consumption	1,401.5	1,440.0	1,262.9	1,376.1	1,537.6	1,624.5	1,686.5	1,746.7	1,803.7	1,879.2
Government consumption	398.4	425.6	475.1	509.5	578.5	661.2	699.8	730.8	761.7	793.9
Gross fixed investment	386.1	403.4	365.9	392.7	405.0	400.2	405.4	417.9	430.4	443.2
Exports of goods & services	673.9	699.7	616.8	636.3	757.4	807.7	841.1	860.2	885.2	909.6
Imports of goods & services	706.9	735.8	609.2	653.9	845.0	915.4	877.2	891.5	900.6	931.9
Stockbuilding	4.4	5.5	-1.8	19.2	30.0	7.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0
Domestic demand	2,190.4	2,274.5	2,102.0	2,297.6	2,551.0	2,692.9	2,793.8	2,896.4	2,997.7	3,118.3
Expenditure on GDP (US\$ bn	at current	market pri	ces)							
GDP	2,881.7	2,859.2	2,708.1	3,132.9	3,005.3	3,002.5	3,435.3	3,753.2	4,145.5	4,396.3
Private consumption	1,872.0	1,839.4	1,621.2	1,893.6	1,875.8	1,886.7	2,101.0	2,288.2	2,507.1	2,668.4
Government consumption	532.1	543.6	609.9	701.2	705.8	767.9	871.8	957.4	1,058.8	1,127.3

https://viewpoint.eiu.com

©Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

Gross fixed investment	515.8	515.2	469.7	540.3	494.0	464.8	505.0	547.5	598.2	629.4
Exports of goods & services	900.1	893.7	791.8	875.6	924.0	938.1	1,047.8	1,126.8	1,230.4	1,291.7
Imports of goods & services	944.2	939.9	782.1	899.8	1,030.9	1,063.2	1,092.8	1,167.9	1,251.8	1,323.3
Stockbuilding	5.9	7.0	-2.4	26.5	36.6	8.1	2.5	1.3	2.8	2.8
Domestic demand	2,925.8	2,905.3	2,698.4	3,161.6	3,112.2	3,127.6	3,480.4	3,794.3	4,166.8	4,428.0
Economic structure (% of GDP	at current	market pr	rices)							
Household consumption	65.0	64.3	59.9	60.4	62.4	62.8	61.2	61.0	60.5	60.7
Government consumption	18.5	19.0	22.5	22.4	23.5	25.6	25.4	25.5	25.5	25.6
Gross fixed investment	17.9	18.0	17.3	17.2	16.4	15.5	14.7	14.6	14.4	14.3
Stockbuilding	0.2	0.2	-0.1	0.8	1.2	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
Exports of goods & services	31.2	31.3	29.2	27.9	30.7	31.2	30.5	30.0	29.7	29.4
Imports of goods & services	32.8	32.9	28.9	28.7	34.3	35.4	31.8	31.1	30.2	30.1
Memorandum item										
National savings ratio (%)	14.2	15.6	14.7	15.5	11.4	11.7	11.4	11.7	11.3	11.1

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Data summary: Gross domestic product, at constant prices

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | GDP at constant prices

October 12th 2022

Gross domestic product, at constant prices

	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c	2027 ^c
Real expenditure on GDP(£ bn at 2019 pri	ces)									
GDP	2,203.0	2,238.3	1,991.4	2,141.3	2,236.2	2,219.2	2,249.9	2,286.2	2,325.9	2,363.6
Household consumption	1,424.9	1,440.0	1,250.1	1,327.9	1,389.0	1,360.1	1,384.2	1,405.5	1,424.2	1,447.7
Government consumption	408.6	425.6	394.5	444.3	453.2	475.8	482.5	489.2	495.6	502.0
Gross fixed investment	396.0	403.4	361.0	381.1	401.0	396.3	401.5	413.8	426.2	438.9
Exports of goods & services	687.9	699.7	615.1	613.3	634.5	623.3	639.2	653.0	674.6	687.7
Imports of goods & services	717.1	735.8	617.7	634.9	677.5	649.4	665.4	682.3	703.6	721.6
Stockbuilding (% of GDP)	1.3	2.6	-11.4	6.7	30.0	7.0	2.0	1.0	3.0	3.0
Domestic demand	2,233.9	2,274.4	1,993.8	2,165.7	2,275.8	2,243.5	2,273.6	2,313.4	2,352.7	2,395.4
Real expenditure on GDP (% change)										
GDP	1.7	1.6	-11.0	7.5	4.4	-0.8	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.6
Household consumption	2.5	1.1	-13.2	6.2	4.6	-2.1	1.8	1.5	1.3	1.6
Government consumption	0.3	4.1	-7.3	12.6	2.0	5.0	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
Gross fixed investment	-0.2	1.9	-10.5	5.6	5.2	-1.2	1.3	3.1	3.0	3.0

https://viewpoint.eiu.com

©Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

Exports of goods & services	3.1	1.7	-12.1	-0.3	3.5	-1.8	2.6	2.2	3.3	2.0
Imports of goods & services	3.3	2.6	-16.0	2.8	6.7	-4.1	2.5	2.5	3.1	2.6
Stockbuilding (% contribution to GDP growth)	-0.5	0.1	-0.6	0.9	1.1	-1.0	-0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0
Domestic demand	1.2	1.8	-12.3	8.6	5.1	-1.4	1.3	1.8	1.7	1.8
Real contribution to GDP growth (% points)										
Private consumption	1.6	0.7	-8.5	3.9	2.9	-1.3	1.1	0.9	0.8	1.0
Government consumption	0.1	8.0	-1.4	2.5	0.4	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Gross fixed investment	0.0	0.3	-1.9	1.0	0.9	-0.2	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.5
External balance	-0.1	-0.3	1.5	-1.0	-1.0	0.8	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.2
Memorandum items										
Industrial production (% change)	3.5	3.6	-8.4	5.1	1.4	-4.0	2.2	1.6	1.6	1.6
Real personal disposable income (% change)	2.4	2.1	-1.3	1.1	3.2	-2.3	1.6	1.0	1.3	1.6

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Data summary: Gross domestic product by sector of origin

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | GDP by sector of origin

October 12th 2022

Gross domestic product by sector of origin

	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c	2027 ^c
Origin of GDP (£ bn at constant 2	.018 prices									
GDP at factor cost	1,966.3	2,000.2	1,788.7	1,924.8	2,010.1	1,994.8	2,022.5	2,055.0	2,090.7	2,124.6
Agriculture	11.6	13.5	13.1	13.8	13.3	13.2	13.4	13.6	13.8	14.1
Industry	387.3	395.4	381.8	416.4	389.6	386.5	391.9	398.2	405.2	411.7
Services	1,567.5	1,591.2	1,393.8	1,494.6	1,607.1	1,595.1	1,617.1	1,643.2	1,671.7	1,698.9
Origin of GDP (real % change)										
Agriculture	-12.5	16.9	-3.5	5.9	-3.6	-0.9	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.6
Industry	1.8	2.1	-3.4	9.1	-6.4	-0.8	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.6
Services	1.7	1.5	-12.4	7.2	7.5	-0.7	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.6
Origin of GDP (% of factor cost G	DP)									
Agriculture	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Industry	19.7	19.8	21.3	21.6	19.4	19.4	19.4	19.4	19.4	19.4

Services	79.7	79.6	77.9	77.6	80.0	80.0	80.0	80.0	80.0	80.0
Memorandum item										
Industrial production (% change)	3.5	3.6	-8.4	5.1	1.4	-4.0	2.2	1.6	1.6	1.6

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Data summary: Growth and productivity

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Growth and productivity

October 12th 2022

Growth and productivity

2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^a	2023 ^b	2024 ^b	2025 ^b	2026 ^b	2027 ^b
0.5	0.5	-10.2	7.9	3.6	-1.2	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.1
0.0	0.0	-10.7	1.3	-0.3	-1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.1
2.6	2.5	0.7	1.3	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.0
2.0	1.8	-0.5	-1.1	0.5	-0.3	2.0	2.0	2.2	1.9
1.7 ^c	1.6 ^c	-11.0 ^c	7.5 ^c	4.4	-0.8	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.6
1.1 ^c	1.1 ^c	-11.4 ^c	7.2 ^c	4.1	-1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.3
	0.5 0.0 2.6 2.0 1.7 ^c	0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.7 ^c 1.6 ^c	0.5 0.5 -10.2 0.0 0.0 -10.7 2.6 2.5 0.7 2.0 1.8 -0.5 1.7 ^c 1.6 ^c -11.0 ^c	0.5 0.5 -10.2 7.9 0.0 0.0 -10.7 1.3 2.6 2.5 0.7 1.3 2.0 1.8 -0.5 -1.1 1.7 ^c 1.6 ^c -11.0 ^c 7.5 ^c	0.5 0.5 -10.2 7.9 3.6 0.0 0.0 -10.7 1.3 -0.3 2.6 2.5 0.7 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.8 -0.5 -1.1 0.5 1.7 ^c 1.6 ^c -11.0 ^c 7.5 ^c 4.4	0.5 0.5 -10.2 7.9 3.6 -1.2 0.0 0.0 -10.7 1.3 -0.3 -1.0 2.6 2.5 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.8 -0.5 -1.1 0.5 -0.3 1.7 ^c 1.6 ^c -11.0 ^c 7.5 ^c 4.4 -0.8	0.5 0.5 -10.2 7.9 3.6 -1.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 -10.7 1.3 -0.3 -1.0 1.1 2.6 2.5 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.0 1.8 -0.5 -1.1 0.5 -0.3 2.0 1.7 ^c 1.6 ^c -11.0 ^c 7.5 ^c 4.4 -0.8 1.4	0.5 0.5 -10.2 7.9 3.6 -1.2 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 -10.7 1.3 -0.3 -1.0 1.1 1.2 2.6 2.5 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.6 2.0 1.8 -0.5 -1.1 0.5 -0.3 2.0 2.0 1.7 ^c 1.6 ^c -11.0 ^c 7.5 ^c 4.4 -0.8 1.4 1.6	0.5 0.5 -10.2 7.9 3.6 -1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 -10.7 1.3 -0.3 -1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.6 2.5 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.8 -0.5 -1.1 0.5 -0.3 2.0 2.0 2.2 1.7 ^c 1.6 ^c -11.0 ^c 7.5 ^c 4.4 -0.8 1.4 1.6 1.7

^a EIU estimates. ^b EIU forecasts. ^c Actual.

Data summary: Economic structure, income and market size

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Economic structure, income and market size

October 12th 2022

Economic structure, income and market size

	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c	2027 ^c
Population, income and market size										
Population (m)	66.4	66.8	67.1	67.3	67.5	67.7	68.0	68.2	68.4	68.6
GDP (US\$ bn at market exchange rates)	2,882	2,859	2,708	3,133	3,005	3,003	3,435	3,753	4,145	4,396
GDP per head (US\$ at market exchange rates)	43,377	42,816	40,384	46,565	44,517	44,326	50,548	55,049	60,612	64,085
Private consumption (US\$ bn)	1,872	1,839	1,621	1,894	1,876	1,887	2,101	2,288	2,507	2,668
Private consumption per head (US\$)	28,179	27,545	24,175	28,145	27,785	27,854	30,915	33,561	36,657	38,898
GDP (US\$ bn at PPP)	3,140	3,290	2,962	3,317	3,683	3,786	3,900	4,046	4,207	4,365
GDP per head (US\$ at PPP)	47,264	49,264	44,172	49,306	54,550	55,895	57,387	59,345	61,511	63,629
Personal disposable income (£ bn)	1,448	1,487	1,499	1,556	1,666	1,755	1,819	1,873	1,935	2,016
Personal disposable income (US\$ bn)	1,935	1,900	1,924	2,141	2,032	2,039	2,266	2,454	2,689	2,862
Growth of real disposable income (%)	3.1	1.0	-0.2	1.2	0.3	-2.3	1.6	1.0	1.3	1.6
Memorandum items										
Share of world population (%)	0.88	0.88	0.87	0.87	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.85	0.84
Share of world GDP (% at market exchange rates)	3.38	3.31	3.22	3.30	3.05	2.88	3.09	3.18	3.40	3.41

Share of world GDP (% at PPP)	2.46	2.47	2.25	2.29	2.33	2.26	2.22	2.18	2.20	2.17
Share of world exports of goods (%)	2.47	2.58	2.32	2.05	1.86	1.70	1.77	1.74	2.01	1.96

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Data summary: Fiscal indicators

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Fiscal indicators

October 12th 2022

Fiscal indicators

2018a 2019a 2020a 2021a 2022b 2023c 2024c 2025c 2026c Fiscal indicators (% of GDP) Government expenditure 37.3 37.1 49.0 45.3 44.4 46.2 44.9 44.1 43.1 Interest ^d 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.8 3.4 4.2 5.0 5.5 5.3 Non-interest ^d 34.8 34.9 47.0 42.5 41.0 42.0 39.9 38.7 37.8 Government revenue ^d 35.4 35.1 35.7 37.0 37.5 37.8 38.0 38.8 38.9 Budget balance ^d -1.9 -2.0 -13.3 -8.3 -6.9 -8.4 -7.0 -5.3 -4.2 Primary balance ^d 0.5 0.2 -11.3 -5.5 -3.6 -4.2 -2.0 0.1 1.1 Government debt ^e 85.1 84.5 104.5 104.7 103.7 107.5 108.1 109.4											
Government expenditure 37.3 37.1 49.0 45.3 44.4 46.2 44.9 44.1 43.1 Interest ^d 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.8 3.4 4.2 5.0 5.5 5.3 Non-interest ^d 34.8 34.9 47.0 42.5 41.0 42.0 39.9 38.7 37.8 Government revenue ^d 35.4 35.1 35.7 37.0 37.5 37.8 38.0 38.8 38.9 Budget balance ^d -1.9 -2.0 -13.3 -8.3 -6.9 -8.4 -7.0 -5.3 -4.2 Primary balance ^d 0.5 0.2 -11.3 -5.5 -3.6 -4.2 -2.0 0.1 1.1		2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c	2027 ^c
expenditure 37.3 37.1 49.0 45.3 44.4 46.2 44.9 44.1 43.1 Interest ^d 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.8 3.4 4.2 5.0 5.5 5.3 Non-interest ^d 34.8 34.9 47.0 42.5 41.0 42.0 39.9 38.7 37.8 Government revenue ^d 35.4 35.1 35.7 37.0 37.5 37.8 38.0 38.8 38.9 Budget balance ^d -1.9 -2.0 -13.3 -8.3 -6.9 -8.4 -7.0 -5.3 -4.2 Primary balance ^d 0.5 0.2 -11.3 -5.5 -3.6 -4.2 -2.0 0.1 1.1	scal indicators (% of C	GDP)									
Non-interest ^d 34.8 34.9 47.0 42.5 41.0 42.0 39.9 38.7 37.8 Government revenue ^d 35.4 35.1 35.7 37.0 37.5 37.8 38.0 38.8 38.9 Budget balance ^d -1.9 -2.0 -13.3 -8.3 -6.9 -8.4 -7.0 -5.3 -4.2 Primary balance ^d 0.5 0.2 -11.3 -5.5 -3.6 -4.2 -2.0 0.1 1.1		37.3	37.1	49.0	45.3	44.4	46.2	44.9	44.1	43.1	42.2
Government revenue ^d 35.4 35.1 35.7 37.0 37.5 37.8 38.0 38.8 38.9 Budget balance ^d -1.9 -2.0 -13.3 -8.3 -6.9 -8.4 -7.0 -5.3 -4.2 Primary balance ^d 0.5 0.2 -11.3 -5.5 -3.6 -4.2 -2.0 0.1 1.1	terest ^d	2.5	2.2	2.0	2.8	3.4	4.2	5.0	5.5	5.3	5.0
Budget balance ^d -1.9 -2.0 -13.3 -8.3 -6.9 -8.4 -7.0 -5.3 -4.2 Primary balance ^d 0.5 0.2 -11.3 -5.5 -3.6 -4.2 -2.0 0.1 1.1	on-interest ^d	34.8	34.9	47.0	42.5	41.0	42.0	39.9	38.7	37.8	37.2
Primary balance ^d 0.5 0.2 -11.3 -5.5 -3.6 -4.2 -2.0 0.1 1.1	overnment revenue ^d	35.4	35.1	35.7	37.0	37.5	37.8	38.0	38.8	38.9	39.0
	udget balance ^d	-1.9	-2.0	-13.3	-8.3	-6.9	-8.4	-7.0	-5.3	-4.2	-3.2
Government deht ^e 85.1 84.5 104.5 104.7 103.7 107.5 108.1 109.4 109.0	imary balance ^d	0.5	0.2	-11.3	-5.5	-3.6	-4.2	-2.0	0.1	1.1	1.8
GOVERNMENT GEST	overnment debt ^e	85.1	84.5	104.5	104.7	103.7	107.5	108.1	109.4	109.0	108.0

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts. ^d General government. ^e General government, gross public debt (Maastricht definition). Includes impact of financial sector interventions in Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley and compensation payments to Icelandic bank depositors. Does

not include impact of reclassification of Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group as public corporations by the Office for National Statistics. Does not include impact of gilt transactions with the Bank of England. End-period.

Data summary: Monetary indicators

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Monetary indicators

October 12th 2022

Monetary indicators

	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c	2027 ^c
Monetary indicators										
Exchange rate US\$:£ (av)	1.34	1.28	1.28	1.38	1.22	1.16	1.25	1.31	1.39	1.42
Exchange rate €:£ (av)	1.13	1.14	1.12	1.16	1.16	1.11	1.09	1.08	1.13	1.15
Exchange rate US\$:€ (av)	1.18	1.12	1.14	1.18	1.05	1.05	1.14	1.21	1.23	1.24
Exchange rate €:£ (year-end)	1.11	1.18	1.11	1.19	1.09	1.08	1.07	1.10	1.15	1.17
Real effective exchange rate (av; 2010=100)	99.0	98.6	98.7	102.5	99.5	95.5	98.9	101.9	107.1	109.1
M4 money supply growth (%) ^d	2.3	3.8	12.6	6.4 ^b	2.5	1.5	6.8	2.8	3.9	4.9
Domestic credit growth (%)	3.2	4.9	3.1	6.4 ^b	2.7	1.5	7.5	3.7	4.8	5.8
Purchasing power parity US\$:£ (av)	1.46	1.47	1.40	1.46	1.49	1.46	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.41
3-month £-Libor rate (av; %)	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.1	2.2	3.6	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.0

10-year government bond yield (av;%)	1.5	0.9	0.4	0.8	2.6	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.5	3.5
Bank of England base rate (%; end- period)	0.75	0.75	0.10	0.25	3.75	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Lending rate (%; average mortgage SVR from UK MFIs)	4.3	4.3	3.8	3.6	4.8	6.5	7.0	7.2	7.3	7.3
Deposit rate (av; %)	0.9	0.9	0.4	0.2	2.2	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts. ^d Headline broad money (M4) figures from Bank of England include deposits of "intermediate other financial corporations" (IOFCs) that specialise in intermediation between banks, giving a distorted measure of underlying M4 growth.

Data summary: Employment, wages and prices

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Employment, wages and prices

October 12th 2022

Employment, wages and prices

	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c	2027 ^c
The labour market (av)										
Labour force (m)	33.8	34.1	34.1	33.9	34.0	34.1	34.3	34.5	34.7	34.7
Labour force (% change)	0.9	0.8	-0.1	-0.4	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.2
Employment (m)	32.4	32.8	32.5	32.4	32.7	32.8	32.9	33.1	33.3	33.5
Employment (% change)	1.2	1.1	-0.9	-0.3	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5

https://viewpoint.eiu.com

©Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

Unemployment (m)	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3
Unemployment rate (%; EU/OECD standardised measure)	4.1	3.8	4.6	4.5	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.0	3.7
Wage and price inflation (% except labour costs per hour)										
GDP deflator	1.7	2.1	5.9	0.4	3.6	5.7	5.2	2.2	2.3	2.2
Consumer prices (av; CPIH measure)	2.3	1.7	1.0	2.5	8.4	7.9	3.4	2.0	1.9	1.9
Producer prices (av)	3.4	1.4	-1.0	5.2	16.3	15.7	6.6	2.0	2.0	2.0
GDP deflator (av)	1.7	2.1	5.9	0.4	3.6	5.7	5.2	2.2	2.3	2.2
Private consumption deflator (av)	1.7	1.7	1.0	2.6	6.8	7.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.5
Government consumption deflator (av)	2.3	2.6	20.4	-4.8	11.3	8.8	4.4	3.0	2.9	2.9
Fixed investment deflator (av)	2.3	2.5	1.4	1.7	-2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Average nominal wages (av)	3.0	3.4	1.8	5.9	6.2	5.7	4.2	3.0	3.1	3.1
Average real wages (av)	0.7	1.6	8.0	3.3	-2.0	-2.0	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.2
Unit labour costs (£-based; av)	2.4	3.0	13.4	-1.4	3.5	8.0	4.2	3.0	2.9	3.0
Unit labour costs (US\$-based)	6.1	-1.5	14.0	5.6	-8.2	2.8	11.8	8.3	9.2	5.2
Labour costs per hour (£)	22.7 ^b	23.5 ^b	23.9 ^b	25.3 ^b	26.9	28.4	29.6	30.5	31.5	32.4
Labour costs per hour (US\$)	30.3 ^b	30.0 ^b	30.7 ^b	34.8 ^b	32.8	33.0	36.9	40.0	43.7	46.1

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Data summary: Current account and terms of trade

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Current account and terms of trade

October 12th 2022

Current account and terms of trade

	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c	2027 ^c
Current account (US\$ bn)										
Current-account balance	-112.5	-77.0	-69.9	-82.5	-187.2	-120.3	-114.7	-108.4	-131.4	-144.9
Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-3.9	-2.7	-2.6	-2.6	-6.2	-4.0	-3.3	-2.9	-3.2	-3.3
Goods: exports fob	468.3	474.9	396.8	442.3	465.8	443.3	486.0	502.0	542.8	562.2
Goods: imports fob	-658.0	-651.9	-564.2	-656.8	-814.0	-829.5	-815.1	-855.2	-899.8	-943.6
Trade balance	-189.8	-176.8	-167.3	-214.4	-348.2	-386.2	-329.1	-353.2	-357.0	-381.4
Services: credit	416.7	417.7	386.2	417.4	425.8	457.4	519.5	578.5	648.1	699.5
Services: debit	-264.7	-267.4	-211.9	-242.9	-252.4	-264.5	-293.2	-325.1	-347.8	-368.7
Services balance	152.0	150.3	174.3	174.5	173.5	192.9	226.3	253.4	300.3	330.8
Primary income: credit	291.9	277.8	174.5	249.6	346.3	490.9	473.3	455.0	434.3	458.9
Primary income: debit	-332.6	-294.4	-214.8	-266.1	-329.2	-388.3	-451.0	-425.8	-470.5	-515.8
Primary income balance	-40.7	-16.6	-40.3	-16.5	17.2	102.6	22.4	29.2	-36.3	-56.9
Secondary income: credit	25.0	24.4	26.5	23.2	22.3	22.2	23.8	24.1	26.7	28.3
Secondary income: debit	-59.1	-58.3	-62.8	-49.2	-51.9	-51.9	-58.0	-61.9	-65.1	-65.6

Secondary income balance	-34.1	-33.9	-36.3	-26.0	-29.7	-29.6	-34.2	-37.7	-38.4	-37.3
Terms of trade										
Export price index (US\$-based; 2010=100)	96.5	92.3	89.8	109.8	118.3	122.1	130.4	134.2	138.2	140.3
Export prices (% change)	7.3	-4.3	-2.7	22.2	7.8	3.2	6.7	2.9	3.0	1.5
Import price index (US\$-based; 2010=100)	95.4	89.7	86.4	93.6	104.1	113.9	109.7	113.0	115.6	118.7
Import prices (% change)	6.5	-6.0	-3.7	8.4	11.2	9.4	-3.7	3.0	2.3	2.7
Terms of trade (2010=100)	101.2	103.0	104.0	117.3	113.7	107.3	118.9	118.8	119.5	118.2
Memorandum item										
Export market growth (%)	4.3	1.1 ^b	-4.8 ^b	10.2 ^b	4.6	1.1	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.6

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Data summary: Foreign direct investment

United Kingdom | Economy | Charts and tables | Foreign direct investment

October 12th 2022

Foreign direct investment

	2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^a	2021 ^a	2022 ^b	2023 ^c	2024 ^c	2025 ^c	2026 ^c	2027 ^c
Foreign direct investment (US\$ bn)										
Inward direct investment	-25.2	2.3	31.0	22.6	57.1	39.6	31.2	51.2	80.9	109.0
Inward direct investment (% of GDP)	-0.9	0.1	1.1	0.7	1.9	1.3	0.9	1.4	2.0	2.5
Inward direct investment (% of gross fixed investment)	-4.9	0.4	6.6	4.2	11.6	8.5	6.2	9.3	13.5	17.3
Outward direct investment	28.7	48.2	53.3	-101.5	-18.2	-41.4	-37.8	-47.0	-66.7	-66.6
Net foreign direct investment	3.5	50.5	84.3	-78.9	39.0	-1.8	-6.6	4.2	14.1	42.4
Stock of foreign direct investment	2,226.0	2,317.0	2,548.0	2,562.0	2,619.1	2,658.8	2,689.9	2,741.1	2,822.0	2,931.0
Stock of foreign direct investment per head (US\$)	33,507	34,697	37,996	38,079	38,797	39,251	39,580	40,204	41,261	42,726
Stock of foreign direct investment (% of GDP)	77.2	81.0	94.1	81.8	87.2	88.6	78.3	73.0	68.1	66.7
Memorandum items										
Share of world inward direct investment flows (%)	-6.3	0.2	2.7	1.8	4.1	2.7	2.1	3.3	5.0	6.4
Share of world inward direct investment stock (%)	6.9	6.8	7.6	6.9	6.5	6.3	6.2	6.0	6.0	6.0
- h										

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts.

Political structure

United Kingdom | Summary | Political structure

October 17th 2022

Official name

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Form of state

Parliamentary monarchy

Legal system

Based on statute and common law; no written constitution; Scotland has its own system

National legislature

Bicameral; the House of Commons (the lower house of parliament) has 650 members directly elected on a first-past-the-post basis; the House of Lords (the upper house, with about 775 members) was reformed in 1999, when most hereditary peers lost their seats

Electoral system

Universal direct suffrage from the age of 18

National elections

The last general election was held on December 12th 2019; the next election must be held before January 2025

Head of state

King Charles III, who acceded to the throne on September 8th 2022

National government

Cabinet headed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the monarch on the basis of ability to form a government with the support of the House of Commons. The centre-right Conservative Party took office as a majority government in December 2019

Main political parties

Conservative Party; Labour Party; Liberal Democrats; Reform UK (formerly Brexit Party); Green Party; Scottish National Party (SNP); Plaid Cymru (Welsh National Party); Northern Ireland parties: Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Alliance Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), Sinn Fein

Prime minister: Liz Truss

Chancellor of the exchequer: Jeremy Hunt

Leader of the House of Commons: Penny Mordaunt

Leader of the House of Lords & Lord Privy Seal: Lord True

Minister for Intergovernmental Relations: Nadhim Zahawi

Parliamentary secretary to the Treasury & chief whip: Chris Heaton-Harris

Party chair & minister without portfolio: Jake Berry

President for COP26: Alok Sharma

Secretaries of state

Business, energy & industrial strategy: Jacob Rees-Mogg

Defence: Ben Wallace

Digital, culture, media & sport: Michelle Donelan

Education: Kit Malthouse

Environment, food & rural affairs: Ranil Jayawardena

Foreign, commonwealth & development: James Cleverly

Health & social care (also deputy prime minister): Thérèse Coffey

Home Office: Suella Braverman

International trade: Kemi Badenoch

Justice & lord chancellor: Brandon Lewis

Levelling up, housing & communities: Simon Clarke

Northern Ireland: Chris Heaton-Harris

Scotland: Alister Jack

Transport: Anne-Marie Trevelyan

Wales: Robert Buckland

Work & pensions: Chloe Smith

Central bank governor

Andrew Bailey

Basic data

United Kingdom | Summary | Basic data

October 17th 2022

Land area

244,100 sq km (including inland water), of which 71% is arable and pasture land, 10% forest and 19% urban and other. England totals 130,400 sq km, Scotland 78,800 sq km, Wales 20,800 sq km and Northern Ireland 14,100 sq km

Population

67.1m (official mid-year estimate, 2020)

Main urban areas

Population in '000 (official mid-year estimates, 2020)

Greater London (capital): 9,304

Greater Manchester: 2,730

West Midlands: 2,607

West Yorkshire: 1,889

Glasgow: 1,673

Climate

Temperate

Weather in London (altitude 5 metres)

Hottest month, July, 13-22°C; coldest month, January, 2-6°C; driest months, March and April, 37 mm average rainfall; wettest month, November, 64 mm average rainfall

Language

English. Welsh is also spoken in Wales, and Gaelic in parts of Scotland

Measures

Officially metric system, but the former UK imperial system is still widely used

Currency

Pound (or pound sterling) = 100 pence

Time

GMT (summer time, 1 hour ahead)


Fiscal year

April 1st to March 31st; tax year April 6th to April 5th

Public holidays

January 3rd (New Year's Day*), April 15th (Good Friday), April 18th (Easter Monday), May 2nd (Early May Bank Holiday), June 2nd (Spring Bank Holiday), June 3rd (Platinum Jubilee Bank Holiday), August 29th (Summer Bank Holiday), September 19th (Funeral of Queen Elizabeth II) December 26th and 27th (Christmas Day and Boxing Day*)

*New Year's Day is traditionally celebrated on January 1st, and Christmas Day and Boxing Day are traditionally celebrated on December 25th and 26th. As those days fall on weekends in 2022, the next two working days are given as holiday



©Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

One-click report: United Kingdom, March 21st 2024

OCEAN

Truro
Prymouth

Penzance

Stee of Soily

FRANCE

Intelligence that moves you forward

EIU is the research and analysis division of The Economist Group, a leading source of international business and world affairs information. It provides accurate and impartial intelligence for corporations, governments, financial institutions and academic organisations, inspiring business leaders to identify opportunities and manage risks with confidence since 1946.

Our solutions

Country analysis—access detailed economic and political analysis, data and forecasts for nearly 200 countries, as well as assessments of the business environment.

Risk analysis—identify operational and financial threats around the world and understand the implications for your business Industry analysis—gain insight into key market trends with five-year forecasts and in-depth analysis for six industries in 70 major economies.

Custom briefings and presentations—inform your strategy, develop executive knowledge and engage audiences. Our team is available to book for boardroom briefings, conferences and other professional events.

Contact us for more information

To find out more about our solutions and the different ways we can help you, please get in touch or visit www.eiu.com.

London	New York

Economist Intelligence The Adelphi 1-11 John Adam Street London, WC2N 6HT United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 20 7576 8181 E-mail: london@eiu.com Economist Intelligence 900 Third Avenue 16th Floor New York, NY 10022 United States Tel:+1 212 541 0500 E-mail: americas@eiu.com

Hong Kong Gurugram

Economist Intelligence Economist Intelligence

https://viewpoint.eiu.com

© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023

E-mail: asia@eiu.com

One-click report: United Kingdom, March 21st 2024

1301 Cityplaza Four 12 Taikoo Wan Road Taikoo Shing Hong Kong Tel: +852 2585 3888 E-mail: asia@eiu.com Skootr Spaces, Unit No. 1, 12th Floor, Tower B, Building No. 9 DLF Cyber City, Phase - III Gurugram - 122002 Haryana India Tel: +91 124 6409486

Dubai

Economist Intelligence PO Box No - 450056 Office No - 1301A Aurora Tower Dubai Media City Dubai United Arab Emirates Tel: +971 4 463 147 E-mail: mea@eiu.com

Copyright

© 2024 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, by photocopy, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited.

All information in this report is verified to the best of the author's and the publisher's ability. However, The EIU does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it. ISSN 0269-7106

Symbols for tables

"o or o.o" means nil or negligible; "n/a" means not available; "-" means not applicable

The Economist Group © 2024 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All rights reserved.

https://viewpoint.eiu.com

© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2023