

Security Vulnerabilities of 0-RTT Data in TLS 1.3


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| TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol


TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol



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
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TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol



TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol


Pre-Shared Key(PSK) only mode



| 0-Round Trip Time


0-Round Trip Time Mode

Round Trip Time, RTT for short




Fewer RTTs result in reduced time overhead.

0-Round Trip Time Mode




0-Round Trip Time Mode



| Forward Secrecy


Forward Secrecy



In general,
adversary dose not know the others session key.

= Forward Secrecy


Forward Secrecy



In PSK only mode,
adversary knows the others session key


=Forward Secrecy

DH + PSK mode




| Replay Attack

Replay Attack



Replay Attack



“ 0-RTT data does not have forward secrecy and is vulnerable to replay attacks. ”

How can we solve this problem?

References

- Rescorla, E. (2018, August). The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 (RFC 8446). RFC Editor. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>
- Günther, F., Hale, B., Jager, T., & Lauer, S. (2017). 0-RTT key exchange with full forward secrecy. In J.-S. Coron & J. B. Nielsen (Eds.), *Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2017* (pp. 519–548). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56617-7_18