

A: The Vance Plan

Editor's Note: The United Nations' plan for dealing with the United Nations Protected and Related Areas in the Republic of Croatia, known as the "Vance Plan", is the basis for peacemaking and peacekeeping activities in the area. The text of the "Vance Plan" is reproduced below.

Concept for a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia, as discussed with Yugoslav leaders by the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General and Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. A United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia would be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. It would not prejudge the outcome of such negotiations.
2. The operation would be established by the United Nations Security Council, acting on a recommendation by the Secretary-General. Before making such a recommendation, the Secretary-General would need to be satisfied that all concerned in the conflict were, in a serious and sustained way, abiding by the arrangements, including an unconditional ceasefire, agreed at Geneva on 23 November 1991. He would also need to receive, through his Personal Envoy, categorical assurances that all the Yugoslav parties concerned in the conflict accepted the concepts which he intended to recommend to the Security Council and that they would provide all necessary assistance and cooperation to enable the peace-keeping operation to carry out its functions.
3. The military and police personnel required for the operation would be contributed, on a voluntary basis in response to a request from the Secretary-General, by the Government of member States of the United Nations. The contributing States would be approved by the Security Council, in the recommendation of the Secretary-General after consultation with the Yugoslav parties.
4. All members of the peace-keeping operation would be under the operational command of the Secretary-General and would not be permitted to receive operational orders for the national authorities. They would be required to be completely impartial between the various parties to the conflict. Those personnel who were armed would have standing instructions to use force to the minimum extent necessary and normally only in self-defence.
5. In accordance with its normal practice, the Security Council would probably establish the operation for an initial period of six months. Subject to the Council's agreement, the operation would remain in Yugoslavia until a negotiated settlement of the conflict was achieved. The Secretary-General would submit regular reports to the Security Council, normally every six months. These reports would contain his recommendations on extension of the operation's mandate.
6. The operation would be financed collectively by the member States of the United Nations. But the various Yugoslav authorities would be expected to make available to the United Nations, free of charge, as much as possible of the accommodation and other facilities and supplies, such as food and fuel, that would be required by the operation. They would also be asked to conclude with the United Nations agreements concerning the privileges, immunities and facilities which the operation and its members would need in order to carry out their functions, especially complete freedom of movement and communications.

BASIC CONCEPT

7. United Nations troops and police monitors would be deployed in certain areas in Croatia, designated as "United Nations Protected Areas". These areas would be demilitarized; all armed forces in them would be either withdrawn or disbanded. The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that the areas remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were

protected from fear of armed attack. The role of the United Nations police monitors would be to ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discrimination against persons of any nationality or abusing anyone's human rights. As the United Nations Force assumed its responsibilities in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), all JNA forces deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated outside that republic. The United Nations Force would also, as appropriated, assist the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations in the return of all displaced persons who so desired to their homes in the UNPAs.

THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTED AREAS

8. The UNPAs would be areas in Croatia in which the Secretary-General judged that special arrangements were required during an interim period to ensure that a lasting ceasefire was maintained. They would be areas in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict in the recent past. As already stated, the special arrangements in these areas would be of an interim nature and would not prejudge the outcome of political negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

9. There would be three UNPAs: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina. They would comprise the following opstina or parts of opstina:

Eastern Slavonia:

Beli Manastir;

Those parts of Osijek which lie east of Osijek City;

Vukovar;

Certain villages in the extreme eastern part of Vinkovci.

Western Slavonia:

Grubisno Polje;

Daruvar;

Pakrac;

The western parts of Nova Gradiska;

The eastern part of Novska.

Krajina:

Kostajnica;

Petrinja;

Dvor;

Glini;

Vrgin Most;

Vojnic;

Slunj;

Titova Korenica;

Donji Lapac;

Gracac;

Obrovac;

Benkovac;

Knin.

Before deployment of the Force began, the exact boundaries of the UNPAs would be decided by an advance party of the United Nations Force, after consulting local leaders.

THE DEPLOYMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE

10. The functions of protecting the inhabitants of the UNPAs would be shared between the United Nations Force's infantry units and its civilian police monitors. The infantry would ensure that the UNPAs remained demilitarized. The police monitors would ensure that the local police carried out their duties without discrimination against any nationality and with full respect for the human rights

of all residents of the UNPAs.

11. The infantry units would be deployed throughout the UNPAs. They would be lightly armed but would use armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. They would control access to the UNPAs by establishing check-points on all roads and principal tracks leading into them and at important junctions inside them. At these check-points they would stop and, if necessary, search vehicles and individuals to ensure that no military formations or armed groups entered the UNPAs and that no weapons, ammunition, explosives or other military equipment were brought into them. They would patrol extensively inside the UNPAs on foot, and by vehicle and helicopter. They would also investigate any complaints made to them about violations of the demilitarized status of the UNPAs. Any confirmed violations would be taken up with the offending party and would, if necessary, be reported by the Secretary-General to the Security Council. If serious tension were to develop between nationalities in a UNPA, the United Nations Force would interpose itself between the two sides in order to prevent hostilities.

12. The civilian police monitors would also be deployed throughout the UNPAs. They would be unarmed. They would have no executive responsibility for the maintenance of public order but they would closely monitor the work of the local police forces. To this end, they would be re-located with police headquarters in each region and opstina and would accompany the local police on their patrols and in their performance of their other duties. They would investigate any complaints of discrimination or other abuse of human rights and would report to the Chief of the United Nations Force any confirmed cases of discrimination or abuses. They would require free and immediate access to all premises and facilities of, or under the control of, the local police forces.

13. The United Nations Force would also include a group of military observers. They would be unarmed, in accordance with normal United Nations practice. They would initially be deployed in the UNPAs to verify the demilitarization of those areas. As soon as demilitarization had been effected, the military observers would be transferred to parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina adjacent to Croatia. Their functions there would be to patrol extensively, to liaise with the local authorities and to warn the Chief of the United Nations Force if inter-communal tension threatened to disturb the peace and tranquillity established by the Force in the UNPAs. Their good offices would be available to help to resolve local difficulties and to investigate allegations of inter-communal tension or aggression. The exact locations in which the military observers would operate would be decided by the advance party of the United Nations Force, after consulting local authorities. There would also be a small detachment of military observers at Dubrovnik.

14. The military and police personnel of the United Nations Force would arrive in Yugoslavia as soon as possible after the Security Council decided to establish the Force. They would be deployed simultaneously in all three UNPAs. The Force's assumption of responsibility for the protection of these areas would be synchronized with the demilitarization process. To this end, close coordination would be required with the commanders of the forces currently deployed in each of the UNPAs and agreed timetables would be established in order to link deployment of the United Nations Force with the demilitarization of each area.

DEMILITARIZATION OF THE UNPAS

15. On the basis of the agreed timetables, demilitarization of the UNPAs would be implemented as rapidly as possible, in the following way:

(a) All units and personnel of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the Croatian National Guard, as well as any Territorial Defence units or personnel not based in the UNPAs, would be withdrawn from them.

(b) All Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the UNPAs would be disbanded and demobilized. Disbandment would involve the temporary dissolution of the units' command structures. Demobilization would mean that the personnel involved would cease to wear any uniform or carry weapons, though they could continue to be paid by the local authorities.

(c) The weapons of the Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the UNPAs would be handed over to units of JNA or the Croatian National Guard, as the case might be, before those units withdrew from the UNPAs.

Alternatively, they could be handed over to the United Nations Force for safe custody during the interim period, if that arrangement was preferred by the units concerned.

(d) All paramilitary, irregular or volunteer units or personnel would either be withdrawn from the UNPAs or, if resident in them, be disbanded and demobilized.

16. It would be the responsibility of each unit, before it withdrew or was disbanded, to remove any mines which it had laid while deployed in the UNPAs.

17. The implementation of the above arrangements for demilitarization of the UNPAs would be verified by the United Nations Force.

DECLARATION OF THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ARMY

18. In parallel with the assumption by the United Nations Force of its protective functions in the UNPAs, any JNA units deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated to places outside that republic. A timetable for this relocation would be agreed between the Chief of the United Nations Force and the Federal Secretary for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All Serbian territory, paramilitary, irregular and volunteer units (other than those disbanded and demobilized in the UNPAs) would similarly withdraw from Croatia. These withdrawals would be verified by the military observers of the United Nations Force.

LOCAL POLICE FORCES

19. The maintenance of public order in the UNPAs would be the responsibility of local police forces who would carry only side-arms. Each of these forces would be formed from residents of the UNPA in question, in proportions reflecting the national composition of the population which lived in it before the recent hostilities. The local police forces would be responsible to the existing opstina councils in the UNPAs. Any existing regional police structures would remain in place, provided that they were consistent with the principle described above concerning the national composition of the local police forces.

RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR HOMES

20. In accordance with established international principles, the United Nations policy is to facilitate the return to their homes of all persons displaced by the recent hostilities who so desire. The lead in this matter is being taken by the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations. If a United Nations Force were established in Yugoslavia, it would provide all appropriate support to this effort in the UNPAs. The United Nations police monitors would have an especially important role in this regard.

ORGANISATION OF A UNITED NATIONS FORCE

21. If peace-keeping operation were established to carry out the above-described functions, it would be commanded by a civilian Chief of Mission who would receive his instructions from, and report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. As already stated, the Secretary-General would himself report regularly to the Security Council whose guidance he would seek if any difficulties arose in implementation of the Force's mandate. Under the authority of the Chief of Mission, there would be a Force Commander, with the rank of Major General, who would command the military elements, and a Police Commissioner, who would command the police monitors. The headquarters of the Force would be located at Banja Luka, with sub-offices at Belgrade and Zagreb.

22. To carry out the functions described above, the Force would require approximately 10 infantry battalions, 100 military observers and 500 police monitors, together with the necessary civilians and military support personnel. This would indicate a strength of somewhat over 10,000 persons.

