

# Uneven Wage Growth and Public Goods

## The Case of US Public Education

Ebba Mark

### Abstract

Explores the effect of uneven industrial growth on public education expenditure through its effect on local property values in the US. The work aims to illuminate the elasticity of public education expenditure to changes in local livelihoods and economic conditions with implications for the delivery of public services in a political economy defined by an uneven industrial landscape and greater income and wealth inequality. Employing various methods to account for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in state-level tax regimes, income, and economic growth rates we find that this heterogeneity almost entirely determines the elasticity of public education expenditure to uneven wage growth....[These results provide insight into region- and state-specific adjustments that can be made to ensure that uneven economic development and structural transformation does not exacerbate existing inequalities in public service delivery in the United States...]

## Table of contents

<b>1 Working Notes</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2 Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
2.1 Uneven Wage Growth . . . . .	3
2.2 Uneven Public Goods Expenditure . . . . .	3
2.3 Public Education Expenditure . . . . .	3
<b>3 Data</b>	<b>4</b>
3.1 Summary statistics . . . . .	5
<b>4 Analysis</b>	<b>6</b>
4.1 Descriptive Regressions . . . . .	6
4.1.1 Baseline . . . . .	6
4.2 Approaching Causal Identification . . . . .	11
4.3 Accounting for Heterogeneity . . . . .	20
4.3.1 Declining vs. Growing Regions . . . . .	20
4.3.2 Baseline Models . . . . .	27
4.3.3 IV Models . . . . .	27
4.3.4 High-income Outliers . . . . .	30
4.3.5 State-by-state estimation . . . . .	32
4.3.6 Industry by Industry: . . . . .	35
4.3.7 Quantile Regression . . . . .	38
<b>5 Results</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>6 Discussion</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>7 Conclusion</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>Appendices</b>	<b>38</b>

<b>A Potential Methodological Challenges</b>	<b>38</b>
A.1 Structure of Financing for Local Public Education . . . . .	39
A.2 Trends over time . . . . .	39
A.3 Historical efforts to “equalise” US public education . . . . .	41
A.4 Availability of varying local-level outcomes . . . . .	41
A.5 Structural and policy heterogeneity . . . . .	41
A.6 Cross-Sectional Dependence . . . . .	41
<b>B Descriptive Regression Results</b>	<b>43</b>
B.1 Property Tax ~ GDP . . . . .	43
B.2 Education Expenditure ~ Revenue Sources . . . . .	44
B.3 Education Expenditure ~ GDP . . . . .	45
<b>C Key Relationships between Economic Variables</b>	<b>46</b>
C.1 Baseline Regressions with State Fixed Effects . . . . .	47
C.2 SS Construction . . . . .	49
C.3 Panel VAR Specification . . . . .	51

## 1 Working Notes

The following are notes to keep in mind while the project is still underway.

The following document summarises the progress made thus far on Chapter 1: Local Fiscal Risks of Decarbonisation of my DPhil. The work aims to pursue a better understanding of how industrial transformation impacts local well-being. From an original interest in looking at all aspects of local public finance, the project has narrowed to focus on expenditure on public education and its connection to industrial prosperity and transformation.

Current strategy/research plan:

1. Outcome: Educational Expenditure
2. Treatment (endogenous): Wages, Economic Growth, Property Values, Property Taxes
3. Instrument: Industry Shares of Employment in high vs. low wage growth industries/sectors

Items to be adjusted:

- AR(1) bias correction to account for fixed effect interaction.
- Include additional control variables (migration, poverty, race, rurality, home ownership rates, private school enrollment)
- Local CPI. Do I need to correct for local price levels?
- Spatial autocorrelation term
- Run gets on central model with CFESIS (preliminary testing indicates coefficient breaks in 2006 and 2013 which neatly bookends the financial crisis/housing market collapse - interesting?)
- Separate shift-share on more granular industrial categories (ie. high and low-wage areas correcting for local CPI)

Note: Any warnings about “missing observations” or “NA being removed” relates to the lags incorporated, except in the Bartik estimations.

## 2 Introduction

Though considerable debate has recently been stoked in the United States regarding the inherent value of public goods provision, majority of developed economies around the world agree on the importance of securing a reasonable standard of living for all as well as the reiteration of education as a human right.

## 2.1 Uneven Wage Growth

### 2.2 Uneven Public Goods Expenditure

**One channel through which such challenges will present themselves is the potential hollowing out of local public revenues.** In many parts of the United States, local well-being is heavily cointegrated with industrial prosperity and stability, not least through the channel of public expenditure. US revenues from fossil fuels generated about \$138 billion annually for US localities, states, tribes, and the federal government Raimi et al. (2022) . This amount is forecast to decline by 2050 even in a business-as-usual scenario (assuming no changes in climate policy stringency). Wyoming, North Dakota, Alaska, and New Mexico are the states most dependent on fossil fuel revenues with at least 14% of state and local revenues generated from the fossil fuel industry (Wyoming's dependence is above 50%). The work makes a demonstrative statement about the link between this revenue stream and essential services like schools, public health, and infrastructure, but stops short of an empirical analysis into the impact of fossil fuel decline on revenues and associated expenditure, even at the state level.

**Furthermore, (adding insult to injury) community well-being and public expenditure in the US is already characterised by a high degree of spatial heterogeneity.** Not only does the US consistently rank among the top five most unequal OECD countries <sup>1</sup>, but evidence of how income and wealth inequality perpetuate other forms of inequality (opportunity, health, infrastructure quality, and broader well-being) is steadily compounding.

Economic history and trajectories of industrial development have heterogeneously impacted the development trajectories of US regions.

### 2.3 Public Education Expenditure

Boustan et al. (2013) find that greater income inequality leads to higher public expenditure across all public goods indicating that a presence of higher-earners in a local area contributes to higher levels of expenditure. Though this does not support an unambiguous denunciation of inequality as such, it provides additional evidence for the fact that local incomes affect public expenditure raising the potential for “superstar” and “left behind” regions to emerge absent significant and even income growth.

**One public service that has particularly important ties to ensuring generational resilience to economic decline is education.** Public schools around the US are responsible for educating over 80% of school-age children. In 2019, governments around the US (including the federal government) spent a total of \$870 billion on public education, roughly \$17,013 per pupil National Center for Education Statistics (2023) . However, the quality of services delivered varies widely across the country. <sup>2</sup>

The quality of public education, especially at an early age, can have long-lasting consequences for personal and economic well-being over an individual's lifetime as well as generations following them Alfonso and DuPaul (2020) . Therefore, ensuring that local or regional economic decline does not disrupt or worsen the

---

<sup>1</sup>The US consistently ranks among the top 5 most unequal countries in the OECD alongside Turkey, Mexico, Chile, and Costa Rica across all relevant indicators reported by the OECD: Gini coefficient, three interdecile income ratios (P50/P10; P90/P10; P90/P50), Palma ratio, S80/S20 quintile share.}, this inequality is further reflected in uneven and unequal quality of infrastructure, education, healthcare leading to real consequences for particular people and places Chetty et al. (2016), Logan, Minca, and Adar (2012), Semuels (2016), Avanceña et al. (2021), Flavin et al. (2009) .

<sup>2</sup>In 2016, for example, the Connecticut State Department of Education reported that the town of Greenwich, one of the highest-income towns in the country, spent \\$8,000 more per pupil than Bridgeport (\\$21.9k versus \\$13.7k per pupil), despite both towns being part of the same county, located less than 40 kilometers apart Semuels (2016) .

quality of education delivered is of paramount importance to ensure greater equality in the long-run.<sup>3</sup> <sup>4</sup>

Altogether, this evidence points to the value of identifying the extent to which expenditure on public education is reliant on local economic health across the country. In other words, this work aims to answer the following research questions:

*RQ1:* How has uneven industrial wage growth affected public education expenditure?

*RQ2:* Do intergovernmental transfers alleviate wealth-driven inequalities in public education expenditure?

*RQ3:* Can accounting for non-constant relationships between explanatory variables improve our understanding of the relationship between public goods and uneven economic growth?

In the sections that follow, I outline in Section 3 the data to be used in the analysis; Section 4 the proposed methods;

### 3 Data

This work employs Willamette University's Annual Government Finance Database at the commuting zone (CZ) level. This resource is a harmonised repository of the data collected annually as part of the US Census Bureau's Annual Survey of State & Local Government Finances, the 'only comprehensive source of information on the finances of local governments in the United States' Pierson, Hand, and Thompson (n.d.) . I aggregate school district measures up to the commuting zone-level to ensure the availability of adequate control and treatment variables.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup>Perhaps the most prominent and often-cited relationship between education and extractive industries is through the lens of the 'resource curse.' The validity and empirical existence of a 'resource curse' has been tested since its conception with disparate results Wiens, Poast, and Clark (2014). The literature is divided into two strands focusing on either political (the relationship between resource wealth and governance) Deacon (2011) or economic (the relationship between resource wealth and economic growth or human capital) resource curses. Empirical investigation of the economic resource curse has explored the effect of resource dependence on economic growth, public health and education expenditure and outcomes, mainly at a national level Sincovich et al. (2018). In the case of education, the distinct outcome measured is level of educational attainment, in other words, whether the presence of a booming resource extraction economy provides disincentives to education for young people. It is worth noting that this literature has been repeatedly questioned on theoretical and conceptual grounds as institutional context often dictates whether a resource curse exists and empirical analyses seem to be very sensitive to methodological choices Dialga and Ouoba (2022). Although awareness of this strand of literature is of relevance to this work, the unresolved nature of the 'debate' surrounding its existence requires caution if eventually utilised as a theoretical framework for answering the research question.

<sup>4</sup>Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten (2020) find that for 30 countries in Africa, the presence of gold mines during adolescence have a significant effect on educational attainment. Badeeb, Lean, and Clark (2017) investigates whether resource dependence slows economic growth with no explicit mention of education. Blanco and Grier (2012) find that in Latin America, petroleum export has a significant long-run negative relationships with human capital. Borge, Parmer, and Torvik (2015) find support for the paradox of plenty hypothesis in Norway - that higher local public revenue negatively affects the efficiency of local public good provision. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) critically evaluate 'the empirical basis for the so-called resource curse and find that, despite the topic's popularity in economics and political science research, this apparent paradox may be a red herring. The most commonly used measure of "resource abundance" can be more usefully interpreted as a proxy for "resource dependence"—endogenous to underlying structural factors. In multiple estimations that combine resource abundance and dependence, institutional, and constitutional variables, we find that (i) resource abundance, constitutions, and institutions determine resource dependence, (ii) resource dependence does not affect growth, and (iii) resource abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality.' Cockx and Francken (2014) use a panel on 140 countries from 1995-2009 and find an inverse relationship between resource dependence and and public health spending over time. Cockx and Francken (2016) investigate a panel of 140 countries from 1995-2009 to find an adverse effect of resource dependence on public education expenditures relative to GDP. Dialga and Ouoba (2022) find disparate results for health and education controlling for institutional quality. Douglas and Walker (2017) "measure the effect of resource-sector dependence on long-run income growth using the natural experiment of coal mining in 409 Appalachian counties selected for homogeneity. Using a panel data set (1970–2010), we find a one standard deviation increase in resource dependence is associated with 0.5–1 percentage point long-run and a 0.2 percentage point short-run decline in the annual growth rate of per capita personal income. We also measure the extent to which the resource curse operates through disincentives to education, and find significant effects, but this "education channel" explains less than 15 percent of the apparent curse.' Haber (n.d.) focus on authoritarian regimes. Menaldo (2016) argues again that this is an institutions curse and not a resource curse issue. Sincovich et al. (2018) provide a literature review of resource curse investigations in the Australian context.

<sup>5</sup>The database is provided for six different levels of government: state, county, municipal, township, special district, and school district. Reporting is only mandated in Census years (every five years), and even then missing data remains a challenge. This means that data provided at any other level of government suffers from significant levels of missing data, with a high level of selection bias correlated with administrative capacity. However, strengthened by a partnership with the National Center for

Thus, this dataset provides estimates in current \$USD on total public school revenue disaggregated by source (federal, state, local intergovernmental versus own local sources) and expenditure disaggregated by item (level of schooling, teacher salaries, debt, etc.). Finally, I gather GDP control variables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This BEA data is only available after 2001, therefore the panel reported and used below is restricted to 2001-2021. This results in a complete and balanced panel of 636 US commuting zones between 2001-2021.<sup>6</sup> <sup>7</sup>

```
[1] "Running analysis on CZs (cz_id)."
```

All data used is reported annually at the commuting zone level.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, no time-invariant variables are included (apart from the state in which a commuting zone is in). Finally, our data represents 636 commuting zones in 40 states between 2001-2021.

**Expenditure and Revenue:** The dependent variables of interest come from [Willamette University's Government Finance Database](#). The data includes commuting-zone level revenue and expenditure on public education including disaggregated values by revenue source (federal, state, or other intergovernmental revenue) and expenditure item (lunches, wages, debt). All values are reported in real US dollars. The data for property taxes collected used in regressions below also come from this dataset. Expenditure on vocational training and from Educational Service Agencies (ESAs) are also sourced from this dataset.

**GDP Controls:** US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Values are also reported in current US dollars (real GDP values exist). The controls used in the below are commuting zone-level private industry GDP. We decide to use private industry GDP as a control variable given the remaining portion of GDP is government expenditure which includes education expenditure.

**Population controls:** US Census Bureau.

**Property Prices:** The US Federal Housing Finance Agency provides a geographically linked data on single-family house prices called the Housing Price Index. HPI is a broad measure of the movement of single-family house prices. The FHFA HPI is a weighted, repeat-sales index, meaning that it measures average price changes in repeat sales or refinancings on the same properties. This information is obtained by reviewing repeat mortgage transactions on single-family properties whose mortgages have been purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since January 1975 [Source](#). It is reported at the county level at an annual frequency. We aggregate to the commuting zone level via a mean. **should do a population weighted average!**

### 3.1 Summary statistics

All dollar values are reported in real 2017-chained thousands.

Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max

		Enrollment	13,356	62	170	0	3,170	Population	13,356	405	1,078
1	18,733	Elem. Expenditure per pupil	13,356	11	3	6	58				
		Property Tax per pupil	13,356	4	2	0	33				

Education Statistics, observations for US school districts exhibit near-complete coverage between 1997-2021 Pierson, Hand, and Thompson (n.d.) . I choose to conduct the analysis on the commuting zone level because (1) it is a more accurate picture of a local labor market area ( Carpenter, Lotspeich-Yadao, and Tolbert (2022)) and (2) a lack of availability of control variables at a school district level.

<sup>6</sup>The reason 13% of CZs are missing from the dataset is because of (1) the exclusion criteria already outlined; (2) Hawaii and Alaska have been excluded due to the methodological challenge of incorporating their school districts into spatial econometric work; and (3) Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia have been excluded due to unconventional or incomplete public school district reporting. I aim to resolve this, especially in the case of Virginia given its relatively high rates of employment in the coal sector.

<sup>7</sup>Given the work's intent to rely on data on property taxes collected, any CZ that reports more than five 0 values for property taxes collected is excluded.

<sup>8</sup>In line with similar work on US economic geography, commuting zones were chosen as the unit of analysis as they are a far less arbitrary and more accurate representation of local labour market areas/economies [#Local%20Labor%20Market%20Geography](https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm){David Dorn's Resource Page}, [Fowler et al. 2024}](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41597-024-03829-5)

IG Revenue per pupil	13,356	7	2	1	28
State IG Revenue per pupil	13,356	7	2	1	26
GDP per capita	13,356	45	25	15	389
GDP pc - Private Industry	13,356	38	25	6	383
House Price Index	12,717	255	156	86	1,948

## 4 Analysis

Given the high degree of both structural (state-specific tax, regulatory, and legislative regimes) and evolved heterogeneity (industrial activity, income, inequality, economic diversity) the following analysis only briefly explores the potential to arrive at national-level average treatment effects using various pooled estimation strategies. These serve to establish foundational relationships between local economic conditions that seem to reasonably generalise across the country.

However, considerable investigation uncovered the need for a regional or state-by-state estimation strategy to truly account for the heterogeneity across the units of observation. Therefore, the body of the analysis is dedicated to state-by-state and industry-by-industry estimation of the relevant econometric specifications. We dedicate majority of this manuscript to discussion of this latter exploration of heterogeneity. Wherever possible, we include information about the uncertainty surrounding our results.

### 4.1 Descriptive Regressions

#### 4.1.1 Baseline

First, I employ a two-way fixed effects ordinary least-squares panel model with standard errors clustered by commuting zone. I outline the model specification immediately below:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_x X_{it} + \delta_1 Enrollment_{it} + \delta_2 IGR_{it} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_x X_{it} + \delta_1 Enrollment_{it} + \delta_2 IGR_{it} + \lambda Y_{it-1} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

$Y_{it}$  is the natural logarithm of elementary (serving ages 6-12) education expenditure per pupil for CZ  $i$  in year  $t$ .  $\alpha_i$  and  $\gamma_t$  represent CZ- and year-fixed effects, respectively, and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  represents the error term. We control for enrollment to account for scaling factors in education expenditure and intergovernmental transfers to account for the significant role of such transfers in funding education expenditure. Additionally, we optionally include a lagged dependent variable to account for the persistence of education expenditure.  $X_{it}$  takes three forms represented by Equation 3, Equation 4, Equation 5 where  $h = [0, 2]$  represents  $h$ -year time lags. We estimate all equations in levels and growth rates.

$$X_{it}^{GDP} = \sum_{h=0}^2 \beta_k^{GDP} \log(GDP_{i,t-h}) \quad (3)$$

$$X_{it}^{Wage} = \sum_{h=0}^2 \beta_k^{Wage} \log(Wage_{i,t-h}) \quad (4)$$

$$X_{it}^{HPI} = \sum_{h=0}^2 \beta_k^{HPI} \log(HPI_{i,t-h}) \quad (5)$$

As demonstrated in Table X, education expenditure has a highly relevant time dependence. The effect of increases in GDP two years prior has the greatest effect on current education expenditure, implying a delayed effect of commuting zone-level economic growth on public education expenditure. Across all specifications,

the results underscore two important facts: the central role of intergovernmental transfers and broader local economic fundamentals in shaping patterns of education spending.

Intergovernmental revenue per pupil emerges as the strongest and most consistent predictor of education expenditure. A 1% increase in intergovernmental transfers is associated with approximately a 0.2–0.35% increase in per-pupil education spending, controlling for unit and year fixed effects. This finding highlights the importance of state and federal aid in sustaining local education budgets. Lagged economic indicators, particularly private industry GDP and average weekly wages, are also positively and significantly associated with education spending. The magnitude of the coefficients increases with the number of lags, suggesting a gradual adjustment process by which local economic growth translates into higher public investment in education over time. For example, a 1% increase in lagged ( $t-2$ ) real private GDP per capita is associated with a 0.14% increase in per-pupil spending.

The house price index also enters positively and significantly in contemporaneous and short-lag specifications (up to  $t-3$ ) underscoring the fundamental relationship between community asset wealth and public education expenditure.

The growth rate regressions, while explaining less variance overall (as expected), largely confirm the patterns observed in the level specifications. Intergovernmental revenue growth remains a strong and highly significant determinant of education expenditure growth, with coefficients  $>0.3\%$ . Lagged wage and GDP growth also emerge as important predictors, particularly at longer lags. Notably, wage growth two years prior is associated with a 0.31% increase in education spending growth, suggesting that labor market improvements take at least a year to materialize in local education budgets. Growth in house prices is also associated with increases in education spending which hints at the relevance of our primary identifying relationship.

Taken together, these results offer three key insights. First, public education investment is strongly mediated by external fiscal flows, reaffirming the role of intergovernmental transfers in equalizing local education finance. Second, local labor market conditions—captured through wages and GDP—exert lagged, cumulative effects on education spending consistent with lagged effects of local economic conditions to industrial change. Third, local housing markets play a significant role shaping education budgets, reflecting the link between property values and tax revenues.

We also estimate these regressions using state rather than commuting-zone level fixed effects to account for the relevance of state-level tax regimes and policies that govern education.

Dependent Variable:	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Variables</i>						
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0130 (0.0187)	0.0132 (0.0152)				
(log,l1) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0691*** (0.0135)	0.0520*** (0.0155)				
(log,l2) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.1457*** (0.0231)	0.0583*** (0.0138)				
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.3512*** (0.0295)	0.2361*** (0.0205)	0.3220*** (0.0328)	0.2103*** (0.0230)	0.3287*** (0.0318)	0.2135*** (0.0221)
(log) Enrollment	-0.2936*** (0.0241)	-0.1796*** (0.0142)	-0.3022*** (0.0247)	-0.1925*** (0.0142)	-0.3297*** (0.0270)	-0.2066*** (0.0155)
(l1, log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp		0.5071*** (0.0142)		0.5282*** (0.0177)		0.5301*** (0.0181)
(log) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.1706*** (0.0600)	0.0624 (0.0493)		
(log, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage				0.1767*** (0.0459)	0.1936*** (0.0548)	
(log, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage				0.3169*** (0.0796)	0.0544 (0.0480)	
(log) House Price Index					0.1450*** (0.0256)	0.1113*** (0.0211)
(log, l1) House Price Index					0.0557** (0.0263)	0.0315 (0.0340)
(log, l2) House Price Index					0.0481** (0.0208)	0.0049 (0.0277)
(log, l3) House Price Index					0.0447** (0.0210)	-0.0155 (0.0236)
(log, l4) House Price Index					0.0024 (0.0215)	0.0111 (0.0199)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	12,084	12,084	13,356	12,720	12,588	12,029
R <sup>2</sup>	0.86608	0.90687	0.86135	0.90573	0.86500	0.90945
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.31070	0.52065	0.30255	0.52306	0.29461	0.52418

*Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses  
Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

Dependent Variable:	(GR) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Variables</i>						
(GR) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0048 (0.0138)	0.0030 (0.0135)				
(GR,l1) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0509*** (0.0148)	0.0510*** (0.0148)				
(GR,l2) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0191*** (0.0070)	0.0199*** (0.0070)				
(GR) IG Revenue pp	0.3061*** (0.0321)	0.3044*** (0.0325)	0.3266*** (0.0224)	0.3033*** (0.0317)	0.3286*** (0.0228)	0.3058*** (0.0309)
(GR) Enrollment	-0.5990*** (0.0420)	-0.5897*** (0.0432)	-0.0144** (0.0064)	-0.5899*** (0.0430)	-0.0060 (0.0069)	-0.5995*** (0.0461)
(GR, l1) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp		-0.0604*** (0.0149)		-0.0394*** (0.0098)		-0.0460*** (0.0094)
(GR) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			-0.0269 (0.0547)	0.0233 (0.0459)		
(GR, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.2065*** (0.0500)	0.1815*** (0.0441)		
(GR, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.3108*** (0.0600)	0.3066*** (0.0557)		
(GR) House Price Index					0.0631*** (0.0240)	0.1044*** (0.0197)
(GR, l1) House Price Index					0.1074*** (0.0289)	0.0772*** (0.0245)
(GR, l2) House Price Index					0.0586*** (0.0205)	0.0590*** (0.0186)
(GR, l3) House Price Index					0.0207 (0.0256)	0.0276 (0.0199)
(GR, l4) House Price Index					0.0325 (0.0211)	0.0209 (0.0172)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	12,083	12,083	13,355	12,719	12,535	11,978
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26799	0.27126	0.35113	0.27420	0.36048	0.28754
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.22090	0.22438	0.15363	0.22691	0.14768	0.23367

*Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses*

*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

Furthermore, given the heterogeneity in reliance on intergovernmental transfers (largely coming from the state), we interact all economic predictors above with a variable that represents the share of total elementary education expenditure coming from state-level funding.

I need help interpreting the below...?


Dependent Variable:	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp				
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Variables</i>					
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	-0.2313*** (0.0743)				
(log,l1) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.1026* (0.0590)				
(log,l2) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.3435*** (0.0794)				
Funding Share_state × (log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.4094*** (0.1201)				
Funding Share_state × (log,l1) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	-0.1083 (0.0948)				
Funding Share_state × (log,l2) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	-0.4455*** (0.1203)				
(log) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		-0.0203 (0.2249)		-0.1835 (0.1563)	
(log, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		0.2182 (0.1495)		0.4342** (0.1848)	
(log, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		0.5056** (0.2281)		0.0446 (0.1329)	
Funding Share_state × (log) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		0.4976 (0.3530)		0.5489** (0.2429)	
Funding Share_state × (log, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		-0.0604 (0.2369)		-0.4605 (0.2906)	
Funding Share_state × (log, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		-0.6441* (0.3567)		-0.1731 (0.2149)	
(log) House Price Index			-0.0917 (0.1127)		0.0145 (0.0852)
(log, l1) House Price Index			0.1650 (0.1372)		0.0693 (0.1772)
(log, l2) House Price Index			0.3735*** (0.0988)		0.3195** (0.1547)
(log, l3) House Price Index			0.0167 (0.1131)		-0.1905 (0.1214)
(log, l4) House Price Index			-0.1410 (0.0908)		-0.1228 (0.0993)
(log, l5) House Price Index			-0.0015 (0.0833)		0.0638 (0.0649)
Funding Share_state × (log) House Price Index			0.4886*** (0.1765)		0.2440* (0.1308)
Funding Share_state × (log, l1) House Price Index			-0.1802 (0.2087)		-0.0872 (0.2627)
Funding Share_state × (log, l2) House Price Index			-0.5013*** (0.1499)		-0.4871** (0.2282)
Funding Share_state × (log, l3) House Price Index			0.0058 (0.1765)		0.2786 (0.1863)
Funding Share_state × (log, l4) House Price Index			0.2056 (0.1415)		0.1613 (0.1463)
Funding Share_state × (log, l5) House Price Index			-0.0651 (0.1299)		-0.1146 (0.0983)
Funding Share_state	0.8906 (0.5640)	0.7015 (0.4808)	-0.4236 (0.3661)	0.0852 (0.2881)	-0.4418** (0.2212)
(log) Fed IG Rev. pp	-0.0030 (0.0024)	-0.0014 (0.0020)	-0.0020 (0.0020)	-0.0006 (0.0014)	-0.0014 (0.0013)
(log) Enrollment	-0.3461*** (0.0263)	-0.3498*** (0.0257)	-0.3711*** (0.0265)	-0.2169*** (0.0168)	-0.2334*** (0.0171)
(l1, log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp				0.5339*** (0.0163)	0.5185*** (0.0144)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>					
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>					
Observations	10	12,084	13,356	12,536	12,720
R <sup>2</sup>		0.86083	0.85889	0.86869	0.90725
Within R <sup>2</sup>		0.28372	0.29018	0.31243	0.53074
<i>Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses</i>					

## 4.2 Approaching Causal Identification

Though the descriptive relationship between various economic variables and public education expenditure provides convincing evidence of the reliance of local education expenditure on economic conditions, this relationship has no causal interpretation.

Indeed, there is a significant endogeneity concern in using wages or property prices as a treatment variable given the likely attracting factor of high levels of education expenditure for higher-income families. However, the structure of public financing (described in further detail in Section A of the Supplementary Materials [Will add appropriate reference.](#)) provides an avenue for a causal identification strategy. In brief, revenue for public education comes from a combination of intergovernmental and local sources. Revenue generated from local sources comes almost entirely from property taxes. Given this, we can isolate the channel through which our treatment (industry-specific wage growth) will affect our outcome variable using an instrumental variable approach. We outline the underlying path diagram of this econometric specification in \ref{fig:iv-approach}.

Figure 1: Instrumental Variable Path Diagram



As seen in Figure 1, we hypothesize that property values have an effect on education expenditure. However, there is significant concern of a reverse causal effect as higher income families likely gravitate towards school districts with higher levels of expenditure per pupil, driving up property values.

Shift-share or *Bartik* instruments have gained popularity in empirical work as a method of handling endogeneity issues in panel data [Bartik \(1991\)](#). Effectively, they combine time-variant yet unit-invariant changes in aggregate economic variables (ie., national changes in industry wage levels) with time-invariant yet unit-variant shares in exposure to these macro-level changes (ie., local shares of employment in particular industries). This decomposition of local-level changes via a delocalisation over space and time allows for a defensible ‘de-endogenising’ of the treatment. Notably, the method can also be considered to serve a further purpose, allowing for, by construction, the examination of a macro phenomenon’s effect on more local units.

[9](#) [10](#)

Therefore, we adopt an identification strategy via a shift-share or Bartik instrument. A shift-share instrument interacts local industry shares with national industry-level growth rates to attain a plausibly exogenous local shock. In the context of this work, we construct the instrument by interacting a constant industrial employment share variable with a national industry-level wage.

The literature on Bartik instruments derives plausible exogeneity from two sources. First, authors argue that local industry shares are exogenous by imposing that shares be fixed to a particular base year and are

<sup>9</sup>Autor et al use a shift-share instrument to assess the effect of Chinese import competition on manufacturing employment in US commuting zones [@autor2013](#) . As an extension, [@feler2017](#) use a similar shift-share instrument to assess the effect of the same shock on the size of local government. [@baccini2021](#) employ a shift-share instrument for manufacturing layoffs to tease out the effect of a decline in manufacturing on both economically motivated and racial identity voting patterns in the US.

<sup>10</sup>An additional popular indicator for modelling industrial shocks is \*oil price\* as values are often assumed to be exogenous to local and even national conditions [@scheer2022](#) . Third, separate from specifically green transformation shocks, various indicators for measuring \*deindustrialisation\* have been proposed including the manufacturing share of employment, value added, and GDP [\[@tregenna2009, @tregenna2020\]](#). These deindustrialisation metrics could be used in combination with a shift-share instrument. Finally, in rare instances, exogeneity can be secured due to \*geographical, climatological, or geological factors\*. For example, [@borge2015](#) obtain an exogenous measure of local revenue by “instrumenting the variation in hydropower revenue, and thus total revenue, by topology, average precipitation and meters of river in steep terrain.” Certain authors have argued that the fact that the location of hydrocarbon deposits is dictated by geomorphological processes provides a plausible argument for exogeneity [\[@esposito2021, @chen2022\]](#).

therefore unable to adapt to changes in national-level growth rates. Such a shift-share instrument would look as follows:

$$Z_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^k S_{ij\tau} G_{njt} \quad (6)$$

where  $S_{ij\tau}$  is the local share of unit  $i$ 's economy (potentially measured by metrics like employment, wages, revenue) in industry  $j$  at a fixed base year  $\tau$  and  $G_{njt}$  is the growth rate of industry  $j$  at a national level  $n$  at time  $t$ .

Alternatively, authors may argue that the claim of exogeneity in the national-level growth rates is unlikely to be violated even when allowing the local shares to vary over time. This approach is likely to come at significant expense to instrument exogeneity. It is constructed as follows:

$$Z_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^k S_{ijt} G_{njt}$$

Finally, authors might be concerned about the implausible exogeneity of both shares and national-level growth rates in which case they could construct the instrument as follows where the local shares are fixed at a common base year and industry-specific growth rates  $G$  are derived from data on other similar regions  $o$  rather than national-level changes that are inherently comprised of local-level shifts. This approach likely comes at significant expense to instrument relevance.

$$Z_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^k S_{0jt} G_{ojt}$$

Finally, the authors can make an additional design choice about whether the effect of these instruments should be assumed common to an aggregate local-level wage growth indicator or allowed to vary by industry. In other words, whether to construct the first-stage relationship of the 2SLS as:

$$X_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta \sum_{j=1}^k S_{ijt} G_{njt} + \epsilon_{it}$$

$$X_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{j=1}^k \beta_j S_j G_{jt} + \epsilon_{it}$$

We choose to employ the first of these options, assuming that industry shares are only exogenous at a given base year/period and that national level growth rates are exogenous and therefore allowed to vary with time.

Using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) and Bureau of Economic Analysis, we construct two types of shift-share Bartik instruments at the commuting zone level using local employment shares by industry and national changes in industry-specific wages and real value added. Equation Equation 7 demonstrates the Bartik instrument as outlined in Ferri (2022) and Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift (2020) and defined in Bartik (1991).  $G_{njt}$  represents national-level changes in wages or value added in industry  $j$  in time  $t$  and  $\frac{N_{ij\tau}}{N_{i\tau}}$  represents the “sensitivity” of a CZ to these national shocks proxied by an initial share of local employment in industry  $j$  in a baseline time period  $\tau$ . The product of these two values defines the shift-share indicator  $\tilde{Z}_{i,t,s}$ . In order to construct the share

portion, we compute the total local share of employment in a particular industry  $j$ . Due to challenges with missing data, we compute an average share across 2001-2005 as our ‘base year’. <sup>11</sup>

$$\tilde{Z}_{ijt} = G_{njt} * \frac{N_{ij\tau}}{N_{i\tau}} \quad (7)$$


The below table displays the 2-digit NAICS industrial categories we use to construct our shift-share instrument. The plot immediately following displays the remaining issues with data coverage indicating what proportion of total commuting zone level employment is represented by the industry-specific data points (industry-level disaggregation requires the suppression of certain data). Given the high degree of missingness in the 3-digit categorisation we proceed with the 2-digit NAICS codes in the rest of the work.

% latex table generated in R 4.5.0 by xtable 1.8-4 package % Wed Aug 20 13:55:44 2025

NAICS.Code	Industry
11	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting
21	Mining
23	Construction
31-33	Manufacturing
42	Wholesale Trade
44-45	Retail Trade
48-49	Transportation and Warehousing
22	Utilities
51	Information
52	Finance and Insurance
53	Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
54	Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
55	Management of Companies and Enterprises
56	Administrative and waste management services
61	Educational Services
62	Health Care and Social Assistance
71	Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
72	Accommodation and Food Services
81	Other Services, except government
92	Public Administration

<sup>11</sup>We explore the sensitivity of results to the choice of base period  $\tau$  by constructing the instrument for various base periods as well as a rolling window. I have done this unsystematically so far (testing 2001, 2004, and 2005) but arrived at the decision to compute an average to deal with missing data. Will include a more systematic testing of this in the appendix.

## Data Coverage of Industry–level Employment as Share of Total



Before displaying the regression results using our shift-share instrument we discuss the plausibility of our identification strategy by exploring the relationships between wage and GDP on housing prices. We provide evidence of this relationship below.

### 4.2.0.1 Industry-level Wages

The two regression models show that wage levels and wage growth both play important roles in influencing house prices, but in different ways. The log-level model indicates that increases in average wages have a strong and persistent effect on the level of house prices, with significant positive effects extending up to four years. In contrast, the growth rate model suggests that house price growth responds primarily to contemporaneous wage growth, with little evidence of lagged effects. Together, these findings imply that while higher wages steadily raise housing values over time, short-term changes in wage growth do not affect the growth rate of house prices over time. Together, they suggest that housing markets are more responsive to trends than to transitory shocks in wages.

Dependent Variables:	(log) House Price Index (1)	(log) House Price Index (2)	(GR) House Price Index (3)	(GR) House Price Index (4)
<i>Variables</i>				
(log) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage	0.9365*** (0.0643)	0.7937*** (0.0162)		
(log, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage	0.0544*** (0.0137)	-0.0415*** (0.0039)		
(log, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage	0.0861*** (0.0146)	-0.0936*** (0.0045)		
(log, l3) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage	0.0303* (0.0148)	0.0374*** (0.0063)		
(log, l4) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage	0.0863*** (0.0205)	-0.0269*** (0.0057)		
(log, l5) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage	0.0261 (0.0153)	0.0410*** (0.0025)		
(log, l6) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage	0.0388 (0.0296)	0.0060 (0.0052)		
(log, l7) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage	0.0222 (0.0224)	0.0369*** (0.0047)		
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0710*** (0.0112)	-0.0188*** (0.0046)		
(log) Population	0.4165*** (0.0594)	0.1001*** (0.0020)		
(GR) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.3164*** (0.0635)	0.3236*** (0.0610)
(GR, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.0040 (0.0168)	0.0056 (0.0154)
(GR, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.0242 (0.0157)	0.0252 (0.0149)
(GR, l3) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.0035 (0.0205)	0.0073 (0.0194)
(GR, l4) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.0263 (0.0232)	0.0292 (0.0229)
(GR, l5) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			6.34 × 10 <sup>-5</sup> (0.0199)	0.0002 (0.0183)
(GR, l6) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			-0.0118 (0.0216)	-0.0073 (0.0196)
(GR, l7) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			-0.0093 (0.0234)	-0.0091 (0.0226)
(GR) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc			0.0078 (0.0107)	0.0080 (0.0106)
(GR) Population			0.0063*** (0.0010)	0.0066*** (0.0008)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>				
unit	Yes		Yes	
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state		Yes		Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>				
Observations	12,570	12,570	12,543	12,543
R <sup>2</sup>	0.96815	0.76680	0.39690	0.38516
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.32132	0.49909	0.02349	0.02496

*Clustered (year) standard-errors in parentheses*

Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

Finally, we display the results for a 2SLS estimation using our wage-based shift-share instrument.

The instrumental variable estimates provide evidence of a robust causal relationship between national wage and GDP fluctuations and public education expenditure. Utilising our wage-based shift-share instrument we see highly significant and relevant first-stage relationships when the shift-share instrument is imposed both in levels and growth rates. Though the growth rate specification is only relevant with at least a 1-year lag. In each case, the first-stage regression yields a statistically significant and economically large coefficient. Varying the time-lag and inclusion of state or commuting zone fixed effects, we see that a 1% increase in the shift-share measure (which can be interpreted as a logarithm) is associated with a 0.05-0.5% increase in the local House Price Index ( $p < 0.01$ ), with an F-statistic between 47-140 - all well above conventional weak instrument thresholds—confirming instrument relevance. However, the second-stage results are only significant in the case in which we include state-fixed effects rather than commuting zone level fixed effects.

In specifications that include year and state fixed effects (Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8), we find a statistically significant and positive effect of wage shocks on education spending. However, once we include commuting zone fixed effects in place of state fixed effects (Columns 1, 2, 5, 6), the second-stage coefficients become statistically insignificant, even though the first-stage remains strong.

This suggests that the estimated effect is driven primarily by cross-sectional variation across commuting zones within states, rather than by within-CZ variation over time. In other words, places with persistently higher wage shocks also tend to have higher education spending, but temporal changes in wage shocks within a given CZ are not reliably associated with changes in spending. These results emphasize that the cross-sectional component of the variation (e.g., differences between CZs in long-run exposure to wage shocks) may be driving the overall effect. If policy relevance hinges on place-based differences, then the specification with state fixed effects may better reflect the real-world variation of interest.

Dependent Variables:	(log) House Price Index	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp	(log) House Price Index	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp	(log) House Price Index	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp	(log) House Price Index	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp
IV stages Model:	First (1)	Second (2)	First (3)	Second (4)	First (5)	Second (6)	First (7)	Second (8)
<i>Variables</i>								
Wage SS (lv1)	0.390*** (0.1005)		0.0525*** (0.0011)					
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.1625*** (0.0101)	0.2852*** (0.0386)	-0.1087*** (0.0442)	0.4166*** (0.0895)	0.1687*** (0.0192)	0.2285*** (0.0683)	-0.1711*** (0.0449)	0.4177*** (0.0006)
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.2563*** (0.0265)	0.0504	0.1067*** (0.0446)	0.0631	0.2554*** (0.0276)	-0.0118 (0.0273)	0.1014*** (0.0911)	0.0633 (0.0277)
(log) Enrollment	0.2498*** (0.0307)	-0.2802*** (0.0531)	0.1329*** (0.0091)	-0.1635*** (0.0552)	0.2726*** (0.0316)	-0.4982*** (0.1106)	0.1227*** (0.0001)	-0.1642*** (0.0547)
(log) House Price Index		0.4890*** (0.1554)		0.9686** (0.3817)		0.7861** (0.3576)		0.9707** (0.3789)
Wage SS (lv1,l1)					0.2925*** (0.1045)		0.0534*** (0.0202)	
<i>Fixed-effects</i>								
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state			Yes	Yes				
<i>Fit statistics</i>								
Observations	12,717	12,717	12,717	12,717	12,122	12,122	12,122	12,122
R <sup>2</sup>	0.96262	0.85437	0.74285	-0.06411	0.96437	0.81823	0.74242	-0.06726
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.20416	0.24258	0.44925	-1.6609	0.20606	0.04756	0.45088	-1.6418
F-test (1st stage)	175.64		142.56		47.378		140.07	
F-test (1st stage), (log) House Price Index		175.64		142.56		47.378		140.07
F-test (1st stage), p-value	$8 \times 10^{-40}$		$1.1 \times 10^{-32}$		$6.14 \times 10^{-12}$		$3.87 \times 10^{-32}$	
F-test (1st stage), p-value, (log) House Price Index		$8 \times 10^{-40}$		$1.1 \times 10^{-32}$		$6.14 \times 10^{-12}$		$3.87 \times 10^{-32}$
F-test (2nd stage)	45.679		472.97		30.389		461.61	
F-test (2nd stage), p-value		$1.45 \times 10^{-11}$		$5.49 \times 10^{-103}$		$3.61 \times 10^{-8}$		$1.62 \times 10^{-100}$
Wu-Hausman	17.914		395.73		17.515		385.52	
Wu-Hausman, p-value		$2.33 \times 10^{-5}$	$9.85 \times 10^{-87}$		$2.87 \times 10^{-5}$		$1.62 \times 10^{-84}$	
Wald (IV only)	28.757	9.8995	6.8250	6.4402	7.8357	4.8314	6.9654	6.5624
Wald (IV only), p-value	$8.35 \times 10^{-8}$	0.00166	0.00900	0.01117	0.00513	0.02797	0.00832	0.01043

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses  
Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

Dependent Variables:	(log) House Price Index First (1)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (2)	(log) House Price Index First (3)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (4)	(log) House Price Index First (5)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (6)	(log) House Price Index First (7)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (8)
<i>Variables</i>								
Wage SS (GR)	0.0907 (0.0587)		0.8346*** (0.2664)					
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.1694** (0.0191)	0.5244*** (0.1916)	-0.1815*** (0.0447)	0.3618*** (0.0586)	0.1725*** (0.0192)	0.3459*** (0.1192)	-0.1841*** (0.0454)	0.3897*** (0.0715)
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.2480*** (0.0260)	0.4096 (0.2751)	0.1120*** (0.0269)	0.0969*** (0.0370)	0.2509*** (0.0269)	0.1589 (0.1632)	0.1129*** (0.0270)	0.0804* (0.0428)
(log) Enrollment	0.2819*** (0.0305)	0.0088 (0.3184)	0.1432*** (0.0079)	-0.1203*** (0.0340)	0.2888*** (0.0310)	-0.3017 (0.1905)	0.1432*** (0.0079)	-0.1425*** (0.0425)
(log) House Price Index	-0.9224 (1.098)		0.6692*** (0.2359)		0.1056 (0.6440)		0.8201*** (0.2923)	
Wage SS (GR,l1)					0.1165* (0.0615)		0.7554*** (0.2549)	
<i>Fixed-effects</i>								
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state								
<i>Fit statistics</i>								
Observations	12,717	12,717	12,717	12,717	12,122	12,122	12,122	12,122
R <sup>2</sup>	0.96210	0.68520	0.74024	0.37874	0.96424	0.58620	0.73967	0.17843
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.19321	-0.63723	0.44366	-0.55352	0.20307	0.30941	0.44502	-1.0336
F-test (1st stage)	1.0676		14.002		1.8710		11.410	
F-test (1st stage), (log) House Price Index	0.10676		14.002		1.8710		11.410	
F-test (1st stage), p-value	0.30151		0.00018		0.17139		0.00073	
F-test (1st stage), p-value, (log) House Price Index	0.30151		0.00018		0.17139		0.00073	
F-test (2nd stage)	0.99781		21.631		0.02168		26.184	
F-test (2nd stage), p-value	0.31786		3.34 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>		0.88295		3.15 × 10 <sup>-7</sup>	
Wo-Hausman	1.4158		16.199		0.01227		20.835	
Wo-Hausman, p-value	0.23412		5.74 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>		0.91179		5.05 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	
Wald (IV only)	2.3893	0.70632	9.8169	8.0483	3.5876	0.02688	8.7808	7.8734
Wald (IV only), p-value	0.12219	0.40069	0.00173	0.00456	0.05824	0.86978	0.00305	0.00502

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses  
Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

#### 4.2.0.2 Industry-level GDP

The first regression tables investigate the relationship between real GDP per capita in the private industry and house prices. In the log-level specification, real GDP (including current and lagged values up to 7 periods) is positively and significantly associated with house prices. The contemporaneous coefficient is large and highly significant, and several lags (especially lags 1, 2, 3, and 5) are also positive and statistically significant, indicating a cumulative and persistent effect of GDP on housing values.

In contrast, the growth-rate specification shows a much weaker relationship. Most coefficients are small and not statistically significant, with the exception of lag 5, which shows a modest but significant positive association (0.0073) though this could likely be a spurious association.

Dependent Variables:	(log) House Price Index (1)	(log) House Price Index (2)	(GR) House Price Index (3)	(GR) House Price Index (4)
<i>Variables</i>				
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.2411*** (0.0209)	0.1438*** (0.0048)		
(l1,log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0276*** (0.0057)	-0.0136*** (0.0010)		
(l2,log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0204*** (0.0034)	-0.0256*** (0.0041)		
(l3,log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0199*** (0.0041)	0.0373*** (0.0011)		
(l4,log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0045 (0.0031)	-0.0078** (0.0036)		
(l5,log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0371*** (0.0052)	-0.0061*** (0.0022)		
(l6,log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0112* (0.0057)	0.0212*** (0.0025)		
(l7,log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0060 (0.0063)	0.0146*** (0.0023)		
(log) Population	0.5459*** (0.0499)	0.1524*** (0.0024)		
(GR) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc			0.0161 (0.0162)	0.0169 (0.0165)
(GR,l1) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc			0.0093 (0.0057)	0.0101 (0.0061)
(GR,l2) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc			0.0062 (0.0043)	0.0063 (0.0045)
(GR,l3) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc			-0.0009 (0.0034)	-0.0010 (0.0033)
(GR,l4) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc			-0.0025 (0.0024)	-0.0027 (0.0024)
(GR,l5) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc			0.0070*** (0.0020)	0.0062*** (0.0019)
(GR,l6) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc			$8.67 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.0043)	0.0010 (0.0041)
(GR,l7) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc			-0.0002 (0.0026)	$-3.7 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.0025)
(GR) Population			0.0060*** (0.0011)	0.0064*** (0.0008)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>				
unit	Yes		Yes	
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state		Yes		Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>				
Observations	12,570	12,570	12,542	12,542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.96261	0.74492	0.38588	0.37331
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.20336	0.45210	0.00564	0.00618

*Clustered (year) standard-errors in parentheses*

*Signif. Codes:* \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

Moving on to investigate the GDP-based shift-share instrument, we find a similar effect as with wages when

estimating level shift-share shocks. The first-stage relationship between GDP shocks and house prices ranges from 0.1-0.7% increase in response to a 1% increase in the shift-share instrument (interpreted as wage levels) with an F-statistic between 110-400. However, we see an even weaker relationship when imposing the shift-share instrument as a growth rate shock where the first-stage relationship are spurious and statistically insignificant.

Together, these findings suggest that levels (rather than short-run changes) in GDP are more systematically and substantially associated with house price dynamics. The stronger fit and significant lag effects in the level regression underscore the longer-term influence of economic fundamentals on housing markets. It also indicates that wage growth is more important for house prices than the more general presence of industry-level GDP growth. This makes intuitive sense in that the link from industrial success (labour) to personal and community wealth creation is mediated via wage and not necessarily the total industrial output which might not be reflected in wages (especially given recent evidence of decoupling of wages from productivity)

**Source here - OECD and FRED Data.**




Figure 2: Wages and Productivity

Table 1: GDP-based Shift-share instrument (Level-Level, varying state and CZ fixed effects and lags.

Dependent Variables:	(log) House Price Index First (1)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (2)	(log) House Price Index First (3)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (4)	(log) House Price Index First (5)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (6)	(log) House Price Index First (7)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (8)
IV stages Model:								
Variables								
GDP SS (Lvl)	0.6954*** (0.1548)		0.0997*** (0.0216)					
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.1629*** (0.0190)	0.2987*** (0.0410)	-0.1390*** (0.0435)	0.3209*** (0.0384)	0.1659*** (0.0190)	0.2618*** (0.0488)	-0.1412*** (0.0442)	0.3217*** (0.0392)
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.2520*** (0.0260)	0.0792 (0.0523)	0.0906*** (0.0277)	0.1222*** (0.0253)	0.2542*** (0.0272)	0.0366 (0.0633)	0.1221*** (0.0278)	0.1221*** (0.0258)
(log) Enrollment	0.2482*** (0.0309)	-0.3666*** (0.0581)	0.1185*** (0.0101)	-0.0881*** (0.0173)	0.2620*** (0.0314)	-0.4142*** (0.0224)	0.1183*** (0.0101)	-0.0000*** (0.0180)
(log) House Price Index	0.4094*** (0.1821)		0.4456*** (0.1216)		0.6109*** (0.1551)	0.5333*** (0.2263)		0.4537*** (0.1225)
GDP SS (lvl,11)							0.1007*** (0.0218)	
Fixed-effects								
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state								
Fit statistics								
Observations	12,717	12,717	12,717	12,717	12,122	12,122	12,122	12,122
R <sup>2</sup>	0.96255	0.86074	0.74809	0.58914	0.96456	0.84566	0.74773	0.58162
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.20278	0.27571	0.46046	-0.02740	0.21012	0.19129	0.46221	-0.03561
F-test (1st stage)	153.43		408.46		109.88		397.06	
F-test (1st stage), (log) House Price Index		153.43		408.46		109.88		397.06
F-test (1st stage), p-value	$4.92 \times 10^{-35}$		$2.03 \times 10^{-89}$		$1.34 \times 10^{-25}$		$5.99 \times 10^{-87}$	
F-test (1st stage), p-value, (log) House Price Index		$4.92 \times 10^{-35}$		$2.03 \times 10^{-89}$		$1.34 \times 10^{-25}$		$5.99 \times 10^{-87}$
F-test (2nd stage)	37.969		276.75		39.065		375.80	
F-test (2nd stage), p-value		$1.25 \times 10^{-7}$		$1.73 \times 10^{-61}$		$2.68 \times 10^{-10}$		$2.95 \times 10^{-61}$
Wo-Hausman	8.5597		176.20		18.721		176.29	
Wo-Hausman, p-value	0.00344		$6.06 \times 10^{-40}$		$1.53 \times 10^{-5}$		$5.98 \times 10^{-40}$	
Wald (IV only)	20.172	5.0522	21.233	13.423	15.518	6.8699	21.404	13.718
Wald (IV only), p-value	$7.14 \times 10^{-6}$	0.02461	$4.11 \times 10^{-6}$	0.00025	$8.22 \times 10^{-5}$	0.00878	$3.76 \times 10^{-6}$	0.00021

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses  
Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

Table 2: GDP-based Shift-share instrument (Level-GR, varying state and CZ fixed effects and lags.)

Dependent Variables:	(log) House Price Index First (1)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (2)	(log) House Price Index First (3)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (4)	(log) House Price Index First (5)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (6)	(log) House Price Index First (7)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp Second (8)
<i>Variables</i>								
GDP SS (GR)	-0.0032 (0.1038)		1.239*** (0.3979)					
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.1695*** (0.0191)	-35.39 (1.1668)	-0.1819*** (0.0448)	0.1682*** (0.0539)	0.1724*** (0.0192)	-1.014 (5.109)	-0.1856*** (0.0455)	-0.0077 (0.3921)
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.2481*** (0.0260)	-52.16 (1.7068)	0.1118*** (0.0269)	0.2167*** (0.0295)	0.2509*** (0.0269)	-1.820 (7.412)	0.1134*** (0.0270)	0.3241 (0.2340)
(log) Enrollment	0.2821*** (0.0305)	-59.76 (1.9412)	0.1427*** (0.0079)	0.0321 (0.0322)	0.2889*** (0.0310)	-2.580 (8.533)	0.1436*** (0.0079)	0.1657 (0.2990)
(log) House Price Index		211.0 (6,884.5)		-0.3891* (0.2199)		7.993 (29.52)		-1.320 (2.075)
GDP SS (GR,l1)					-0.0435 (0.1618)		0.3658 (0.4994)	
<i>Fixed-effects</i>								
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state								
<i>Fit statistics</i>								
Observations	12,717	12,717	12,717	12,717	12,122	12,122	12,122	12,122
R <sup>2</sup>	0.96210	-6.665.5	0.74020	0.46512	0.96423	-7.7331	0.73944	-1.3699
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.19315	-34.670.9	0.44356	-0.33752	0.20295	-44.759	0.44454	-4.8662
F-test (1st stage)	0.00050		11.711		0.07855		0.81846	
F-test (1st stage), (log) House Price Index		0.00050		11.711		0.07855		0.81846
F-test (1st stage), p-value	0.98217		0.00062		0.77927		0.36565	
F-test (1st stage), p-value, (log) House Price Index		0.98217		0.00062		0.77927		0.36565
F-test (2nd stage)	24.478		6.1087		5.2191		4.8641	
F-test (2nd stage), p-value		7.34 × 10 <sup>-7</sup>	0.00156		0.02236		0.02744	
White-Häusman	2.434		10.029		4.9045		5.8389	
White-Häusman, p-value		9.03 × 10 <sup>-7</sup>	0.00154		0.02081		0.01500	
Wald (IV only)	0.00094	0.00094	9.6888	3.1307	0.07225	0.07331	0.53645	0.40502
Wald (IV only), p-value	0.97555	0.97555	0.00186	0.07685	0.7809	0.78658	0.46392	0.52452

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses  
Signif. Codes: \*\*\*, 0.01, \*\*, 0.05, \*, 0.1

### 4.3 Accounting for Heterogeneity

We suspect that the inability to detect a meaningful relationship between local economic conditions (wages and GDP) and local public services at the national level, barring design and data issues with our shift-share instrument, likely comes from masked heterogeneity across states and commuting zones. Therefore, this next section is dedicated to unpacking this heterogeneity. Below, we explore various metrics of local economic growth and decline to (1) partition our sample according to metrics of economic health, employ (2) state-by-state and (2) industry-by-industry estimations using our baseline descriptive models, wage- and GDP-based shift-share instruments.

#### 4.3.1 Declining vs. Growing Regions

First, we identify declining and growing regions by estimating commuting-zone growth rates conditional on state and national level growth rates and partition our sample after this distribution.


In order to identify declining and growing commuting zones, we estimate time series regressions by commuting zone in which:

$$\Delta(\log) IndustryGDP_t^{CZ} = \alpha + \Delta(\log) IndustryGDP_t^{state} + \Delta(\log) IndustryGDP_t^{national} + \epsilon_t$$


Where each GDP term represents the private industry GDP at the CZ, state, or national level. Effectively, we estimate the commuting zone level growth rate controlling for state and national trends. We then classify commuting zones by the value of  $\alpha$  which represents their deviation from state- and national-level GDP growth rates. We estimate this trend deviation in both gross and per capita values of private industry GDP. Figure X demonstrates the considerable variability in GDP-level growth rates across commuting zones in the US between 2001-2021. Visualising the per capita growth rate deviations by state and region demonstrates heterogeneity in this variability across states and regions. For example, Texas, Montana, Illinois, and Colorado have outstanding positive outliers in the distribution (check which CZ these are: likely Dallas, Chicago, Denver. Montana's outlier is potentially an oil-rich area (indeed the map confirms this)). Whereas, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Louisiana, and Kentucky contain some of the outstanding declining areas (SD, Louisiana, and Kentucky make intuitive sense which is great! Just confirm which these commuting zones are. Might be useful to highlight some examples in the graph itself.)

Include a correlation plot between GDP and Wage trends.


Distribution of CZ GDP Trend Coefficients



Distribution of CZ GDP pc Trend Coefficients



Commuting Zone GDP pc Growth Rate Controlling for National and State Level Trends  
 Calculated as mean of annual growth rate per commuting zone controlling for national and state trends




We perform the same trend deviation calculation for wages where each Wage variable represents the commuting zone, state, and national level growth rate in the weekly average wage as reported in QCEW.


$$\Delta(\log)Wage_t^{CZ} = \alpha + \Delta(\log)Wage_t^{state} + \Delta(\log)Wage_t^{national} + \epsilon_t$$

In Figure X, we see that there is similar variability though the patterns do not consistently indicate the same high- and low-performing outliers across states indicating that GDP and wage growth are not consistently correlated across regions. We demonstrate this fact in Figure X (scatterplot with pink regression linear fit) where, although there is a positive correlation between commuting zone GDP and wage trend deviations, the wage trend deviation represents a nearly inelastic relationship to GDP growth.


Distribution of CZ Wage Trend Coefficients




Commuting Zone Wage Growth Rate Controlling for National and State Level Trends  
 Calculated as mean of annual growth rate per commuting zone controlling for national and state trends




### Relationship Between GDPpc and Wage Trends (per CZ)



Growth Rate of Weekly Wage in Relation to Median (CZ)



Weekly Wage Level (2021) in Relation to Median (CZ)



### 4.3.2 Baseline Models

Table 3: Baseline Regression Applied to Declining GDP vs. Growing GDP Regions

Model:	Dependent Variable:											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Variables</i>												
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0054 (0.0351)			-0.0125 (0.0444)			0.0206 (0.0243)			0.0105 (0.0299)		
(log,l1) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0738*** (0.0242)			0.0756** (0.0295)			0.0622*** (0.0171)			0.0569*** (0.0208)		
(log,l2) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.1024*** (0.0231)			0.1095*** (0.0249)			0.1549*** (0.0323)			0.1697*** (0.0393)		
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.3722*** (0.0548)	0.3729*** (0.0520)	0.3541*** (0.0545)	0.3183*** (0.0681)	0.3276*** (0.0660)	0.2935*** (0.0682)	0.3928*** (0.0359)	0.3532*** (0.0422)	0.3864*** (0.0406)	0.3806*** (0.0567)	0.3171*** (0.0662)	0.3181*** (0.0681)
(log) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		0.0871 (0.0969)			0.0659 (0.1231)			0.2066*** (0.0776)			0.1748 (0.1115)	
(log, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		0.1642** (0.0820)			0.1997* (0.1013)			0.1869*** (0.0582)			0.2536*** (0.0955)	
(log, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		0.2610** (0.0826)			0.2262** (0.0911)			0.2359** (0.1161)			0.2795 (0.1696)	
(log) House Price Index			0.0386 (0.0431)			0.0985* (0.0510)			0.1003*** (0.0309)			0.1090** (0.0473)
(log, l1) House Price Index			0.0745** (0.0319)			0.0896** (0.0408)			0.0578 (0.0364)			0.0844 (0.0525)
(log, l2) House Price Index			0.0239 (0.0318)			-0.0264 (0.0382)			0.0553** (0.0260)			0.0560 (0.0407)
(log, l3) House Price Index			0.1171*** (0.0350)			0.1484*** (0.0430)			0.0145 (0.0255)			-0.0058 (0.0337)
(log, l4) House Price Index			-0.0833** (0.0347)			-0.1263*** (0.0452)			0.0072 (0.0274)			-0.0416 (0.0437)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>												
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>												
Observations	4,883	5,397	5,223	3,021	3,339	3,173	7,201	7,959	7,365	3,021	3,339	2,904
R <sup>2</sup>	0.85785	0.85948	0.86073	0.83249	0.83401	0.83486	0.85734	0.84617	0.85014	0.79061	0.77279	0.77875
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.22345	0.25049	0.22873	0.18513	0.21740	0.19832	0.28656	0.24697	0.23978	0.28823	0.22654	0.16829

*Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses*  
*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

### 4.3.3 IV Models

The following implements an employment based Bartik instrument for various industries available from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. I have not figured out how to suppress the R2 and within R2 of the second-stage regressions. One should only pay attention to the IV diagnostic tests in the second-stage regression.

Result: The baseline estimate of an l-1 effect on public education expenditure is entirely dominated by declining regions. Interestingly, sample division by GDP growth rates isolates the wage-based SS instrument effect almost entirely indicating that wage changes in declining regions matter most. Potentially an indicator of property price spirals.

Result: Whereas, in the case of the wage-based instrument when applied to growing and declining wage regions, the effect is more widespread across regions.

Result: In the case of the GDP-based instrument, the sub-sampling procedure indicates that GDP growth has an effect on public education expenditure in all but hyper-growing areas indicating the GDP growth translates to changes in public expenditure more directly in all but non-superstar regions.

Table 4: Wage-based Shift-Share Instrument (11) Applied to Declining GDP vs. Growing GDP Regions

Dependent Variable:	All (1)	Declining (GDP) (2)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp (3)	Growing (GDP) (4)	Hyper-Growing (GDP) (5)
Model:					
<i>Variables</i>					
(log) House Price Index	0.9707** (0.3789)	0.9063*** (0.2830)	1.555 (1.174)	1.698 (1.867)	-5.040 (36.37)
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.4177*** (0.0906)	0.3785*** (0.0843)	0.3983** (0.1770)	0.5845 (0.3725)	-0.5816 (5.982)
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0633 (0.0529)	0.0931 (0.0699)	0.0182 (0.1951)	-0.0198 (0.2056)	0.4651 (2.354)
(log) Enrollment	-0.1642*** (0.0547)	-0.1490*** (0.0385)	-0.2690 (0.1783)	-0.2773 (0.2762)	0.7879 (5.880)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>					
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>					
Observations	12,122	4,992	3,033	7,130	2,845
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.06726	0.19395	-1.2580	-1.7150	-24.908
Within R <sup>2</sup>	-1.6418	-1.1592	-4.5252	-5.8114	-50.939
F-test (1st stage), (log) House Price Index	140.07	145.93	29.567	16.654	0.35818
F-test (1st stage), p-value, (log) House Price Index	$3.87 \times 10^{-32}$	$3.94 \times 10^{-33}$	$5.84 \times 10^{-8}$	$4.54 \times 10^{-5}$	0.54957
F-test (2nd stage)	461.61	430.47	245.45	152.30	22.379
F-test (2nd stage), p-value	$1.62 \times 10^{-100}$	$9.67 \times 10^{-92}$	$3.24 \times 10^{-53}$	$1.24 \times 10^{-34}$	$2.35 \times 10^{-6}$
Wu-Hausman	385.52	332.30	226.78	140.73	23.483
Wu-Hausman, p-value	$1.62 \times 10^{-84}$	$6.68 \times 10^{-72}$	$1.92 \times 10^{-49}$	$3.71 \times 10^{-32}$	$1.33 \times 10^{-6}$
Wald (IV only)	6.5624	10.259	1.7553	0.82725	0.01920
Wald (IV only), p-value	0.01043	0.00137	0.18532	0.36310	0.88979

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses

Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

Table 5: Wage-based Shift-Share Instrument (11) Applied to Declining Wage vs. Growing Wage Regions

Dependent Variable:	All (1)	Declining (Wage) (2)	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp (3)	Growing (Wage) (4)	Hyper-Growing (Wage) (5)
Model:					
<i>Variables</i>					
(log) House Price Index	0.9707** (0.3789)	0.7404 (0.4451)	1.169* (0.6305)	0.8769** (0.3641)	0.4162 (0.4671)
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.4177*** (0.0906)	0.3630*** (0.1343)	0.4551*** (0.1654)	0.4119*** (0.0884)	0.2829*** (0.0621)
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0633 (0.0529)	-0.0124 (0.1669)	-0.0335 (0.1910)	0.0861** (0.0436)	0.1094** (0.0544)
(log) Enrollment	-0.1642*** (0.0547)	-0.1246** (0.0603)	-0.1747** (0.0778)	-0.1502*** (0.0509)	-0.1184 (0.0747)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>					
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>					
Observations	12,122	1,520	3,060	10,602	2,822
R <sup>2</sup>	-0.06726	0.60726	-0.16496	0.03176	0.59866
Within R <sup>2</sup>	-1.6418	-0.48644	-2.4209	-1.3083	-0.02148
F-test (1st stage), (log) House Price Index	140.07	47.453	55.276	140.02	41.427
F-test (1st stage), p-value, (log) House Price Index	$3.87 \times 10^{-32}$	$8.33 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.36 \times 10^{-13}$	$4.21 \times 10^{-32}$	$1.44 \times 10^{-10}$
F-test (2nd stage)	461.61	70.621	256.33	383.32	21.828
F-test (2nd stage), p-value	$1.62 \times 10^{-100}$	$1.01 \times 10^{-16}$	$2 \times 10^{-55}$	$7.19 \times 10^{-84}$	$3.12 \times 10^{-6}$
Wu-Hausman	385.52	47.014	210.21	324.43	23.718
Wu-Hausman, p-value	$1.62 \times 10^{-84}$	$1.04 \times 10^{-11}$	$4.31 \times 10^{-46}$	$1.84 \times 10^{-71}$	$1.18 \times 10^{-6}$
Wald (IV only)	6.5624	2.7674	3.4365	5.8010	0.79401
Wald (IV only), p-value	0.01043	0.09642	0.06387	0.01603	0.37297

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses

Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

Table 6: GDP-based Shift-Share Instrument (l1) Applied to Declining Wage vs. Growing Wage Regions

Dependent Variable:	All (1)	Declining (Wage) (2)	Hyper-Declining (Wage) (3)	Growing (Wage) (4)	Hyper-Growing (Wage) (5)
Model:					
<i>Variables</i>					
(log) House Price Index	0.4537*** (0.1225)	0.4421** (0.1987)	0.6652*** (0.2376)	0.3869*** (0.1208)	-0.0710 (0.1747)
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.3217*** (0.0392)	0.2843*** (0.0832)	0.3311*** (0.0794)	0.3261*** (0.0402)	0.2659*** (0.0401)
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.1221*** (0.0258)	0.0806 (0.0891)	0.0835 (0.0973)	0.1297*** (0.0239)	0.1622*** (0.0331)
(log) Enrollment	-0.0897** (0.0180)	-0.0838*** (0.0298)	-0.1109*** (0.0286)	-0.0822*** (0.0171)	-0.0427 (0.0317)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>					
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>					
Observations	12,122	1,520	3,060	10,602	2,822
R <sup>2</sup>	0.58162	0.75465	0.51254	0.60370	0.74149
Within R <sup>2</sup>	-0.03561	0.07142	-0.43143	0.05522	0.34205
F-test (1st stage), (log) House Price Index	397.06	102.81	143.50	379.26	93.045
F-test (1st stage), p-value, (log) House Price Index	5.99 × 10 <sup>-87</sup>	2.13 × 10 <sup>-23</sup>	2.47 × 10 <sup>-32</sup>	5.14 × 10 <sup>-83</sup>	1.12 × 10 <sup>-21</sup>
F-test (2nd stage)	275.80	51.996	206.30	194.26	1.3917
F-test (2nd stage), p-value	2.95 × 10 <sup>-61</sup>	8.87 × 10 <sup>-13</sup>	2.7 × 10 <sup>-45</sup>	9.11 × 10 <sup>-44</sup>	0.23822
Wu-Hausman	176.29	23.467	135.86	126.44	0.91974
Wu-Hausman, p-value	5.98 × 10 <sup>-40</sup>	1.41 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	9.74 × 10 <sup>-31</sup>	3.61 × 10 <sup>-29</sup>	0.33763
Wald (IV only)	13.718	4.9519	7.8373	10.253	0.16524
Wald (IV only), p-value	0.00021	0.02621	0.00515	0.00137	0.68441

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses

Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

Table 7: GDP-based Shift-Share Instrument (l1) Applied to Declining GDP vs. Growing GDP Regions

Dependent Variable:	All (1)	Declining (GDP) (2)	Hyper-Declining (GDP) (3)	Growing (GDP) (4)	Hyper-Growing (GDP) (5)
Model:					
<i>Variables</i>					
(log) House Price Index	0.4537*** (0.1225)	0.6786*** (0.1891)	0.8673** (0.3571)	0.3476* (0.1771)	0.3098 (0.4352)
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.3217*** (0.0392)	0.3415*** (0.0606)	0.3257*** (0.0822)	0.3207*** (0.0522)	0.2884*** (0.0947)
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.1221*** (0.0258)	0.1213** (0.0550)	0.1008 (0.0915)	0.1252*** (0.0323)	0.1151** (0.0560)
(log) Enrollment	-0.0897*** (0.0180)	-0.1185** (0.0256)	-0.1650*** (0.0543)	-0.0780*** (0.0266)	-0.0777 (0.0703)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>					
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>					
Observations	12,122	4,992	3,033	7,130	2,845
R <sup>2</sup>	0.58162	0.47219	0.15677	0.64325	0.55673
Within R <sup>2</sup>	-0.03561	-0.41385	-1.0634	0.10500	0.11134
F-test (1st stage), (log) House Price Index	397.06	189.16	89.405	163.41	21.279
F-test (1st stage), p-value, (log) House Price Index	5.99 × 10 <sup>-87</sup>	2.9 × 10 <sup>-42</sup>	6.31 × 10 <sup>-21</sup>	5.23 × 10 <sup>-37</sup>	4.15 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>
F-test (2nd stage)	275.80	302.79	224.80	60.538	4.9555
F-test (2nd stage), p-value	2.95 × 10 <sup>-61</sup>	7.3 × 10 <sup>-66</sup>	4.81 × 10 <sup>-49</sup>	8.24 × 10 <sup>-15</sup>	0.02609
Wu-Hausman	176.29	207.33	193.79	36.171	2.7658
Wu-Hausman, p-value	5.98 × 10 <sup>-40</sup>	4.48 × 10 <sup>-46</sup>	1.01 × 10 <sup>-42</sup>	1.9 × 10 <sup>-9</sup>	0.09641
Wald (IV only)	13.718	12.877	5.8985	3.8531	0.50675
Wald (IV only), p-value	0.00021	0.00034	0.01521	0.04969	0.47661

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses

Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

#### 4.3.4 High-income Outliers

As you can see in the scatterplot below, there is a somewhat non-linear relationship between property taxes and elementary expenditure as property taxes collected rise. This happens largely as a result of very high-income commuting zones. Therefore, I exclude any commuting zone that spends more than 22k per pupil to avoid any distorting effects. This removes 12 CZs (~2% of the sample). **This could benefit from more robust outlier detection.**




Table 8: Outlier Trimming Results


Dependent Variable:		(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp			
Model:	Baseline 1 (1)	Baseline 2 (2)	Baseline 3 (3)	Wage-based SS (4)	GDP-based SS (5)
<i>Variables</i>					
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0130 (0.0187)			0.0633 (0.0529)	0.1221*** (0.0258)
(log,l1) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0691*** (0.0135)				
(log,l2) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.1457*** (0.0231)				
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.3512*** (0.0295)	0.3220*** (0.0328)	0.3287*** (0.0318)	0.4177*** (0.0906)	0.3217*** (0.0392)
(log) Enrollment	-0.2936*** (0.0241)	-0.3022*** (0.0247)	-0.3297*** (0.0270)	-0.1642*** (0.0547)	-0.0897*** (0.0180)
(log) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		0.1706*** (0.0600)			
(log, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		0.1767*** (0.0459)			
(log, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage		0.3169*** (0.0796)			
(log) House Price Index			0.1450*** (0.0256)	0.9707** (0.3789)	0.4537*** (0.1225)
(log, l1) House Price Index			0.0557** (0.0263)		
(log, l2) House Price Index			0.0481** (0.0208)		
(log, l3) House Price Index			0.0447** (0.0210)		
(log, l4) House Price Index			0.0024 (0.0215)		
<i>Fixed-effects</i>					
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes		
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
state				Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>					
Observations	12,084	13,356	12,588	12,122	12,122
R <sup>2</sup>	0.86608	0.86135	0.86500	-0.06726	0.58162
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.31070	0.30255	0.29461	-1.6418	-0.03561
F-test (1st stage), (log) House Price Index				140.07	397.06
F-test (1st stage), p-value, (log) House Price Index				$3.87 \times 10^{-32}$	$5.99 \times 10^{-87}$
F-test (2nd stage)				461.61	275.80
F-test (2nd stage), p-value				$1.62 \times 10^{-100}$	$2.95 \times 10^{-61}$
Wu-Hausman				385.52	176.29
Wu-Hausman, p-value				$1.62 \times 10^{-84}$	$5.98 \times 10^{-40}$
Wald (IV only)				6.5624	13.718
Wald (IV only), p-value				0.01043	0.00021

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses  
Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1


#### 4.3.5 State-by-state estimation

##### 4.3.5.1 Baseline

## Distribution of Number of Commuting Zones




## Effect of 1% Increase in Wage on Education Expenditure per Pupil




### 4.3.5.2 Shift-share

## Effect of 1% Increase in SS GDP Instrument on Education Expenditure per




Effect of 1% Increase in SS GDP Instrument on Education Expenditure per  
Expenditure controlling for enrollment, GDP, and intergovernmental transfers and AR(1) term.  
Within R<sup>2</sup> of state-level estimation reflected in color of point.

Effect of 1% Increase in SS Wage Instrument on Education Expenditure per Capita




#### 4.3.6 Industry by Industry:

##### 4.3.6.1 GDP




#### 4.3.6.2 Wage



Effect of 1% increase in Industry-Specific Wage (measured as shift-share instrument) on Education Expenditure controlling for enrollment, GDP, and intergovernmental transfers, AR(1) term, year and state-level fixed effects.  
Within R<sup>2</sup> of estimation reflected in color of point).

#### 4.3.7 Quantile Regression



## 5 Results

## 6 Discussion

## 7 Conclusion

The determinants of inequality in public education delivery in the US are multiple and complex. Significant evidence exists of the role of historically discriminatory policies related to congressional districting, under-investment in low-income areas of color. Though this work does not directly inform this debate, further work could explore the extent to which wage growth interacts with such structural policies.

## Appendices

### A Potential Methodological Challenges

Below, I provide a brief discussion of anticipated methodological challenges and constraints.


## A.1 Structure of Financing for Local Public Education

In order to appropriately make use of the outlined data as well as robustly define the econometric methods to be utilised in this work, an understanding of the funding structure of public school districts in the US is critical. Public school districts in the United States are funded by a combination of federal (8.3% in 2019), state (47% in 2019), and local (44.8% in 2019) revenues ?, with shares varying by county. This variation in public funding structure will need to be incorporated into the modelling efforts, likely through a weighted regression approach based on shares of intergovernmental versus own-source revenues ?. Using the data outlined, Figure 3 displays the share of public education revenue coming from three sources of intergovernmental revenue (federal, state, and local) as well as revenue from own county-level sources by state. The figure demonstrates the clear near-even split between state intergovernmental and own source revenue and the overall small share of revenue coming from federal or other local governments. The larger panel on the top left provides the summarising share at the national level. All plots share the axes as labeled in the top left panel.

## A.2 Trends over time

According to the most recent data available from the US Congressional Research Service, the revenue share has shifted from local to state sources whereas federal funding has remained the same albeit with fluctuations over time ?.

Figure 3: Share of Revenue from Federal, State, Local Sources



### A.3 Historical efforts to “equalise” US public education

Another factor that greatly impacts the data generating process in this study is that increasing recognition of the level of inequality of public education provision in the US has led to the implementation of several efforts to “equalise” public education by aiming for “per pupil” expenditure targets ?. The most significant change in this respect has been the creation of Educational Service Agencies (ESAs). These ESAs are apportioned state funding to serve multiple school districts in sub-regions of each state. Most of these ESAs were established around 2007 and persist to this day. ESAs are listed by state in Table 9. Currently, there are 553 agencies nationwide in 45 states. According to the Association of Educational Service Agencies (AES), ESAs reach over 80% of the public school districts and well over 80% of public and private school students. Annual budgets for ESAs total approximately \$15 billion ?. Because ESA revenue and expenditure is inconsistently reported across years in our dataset, as well as attributed to individual counties despite often serving multiple, there is a significant risk that ESA expenditure is misattributed to counties in our dataset. Therefore, I exclude ESA revenue and expenditure totals from the measures of county-level expenditure and revenue at all levels of aggregation, and retain these values as possible control variables.

Preliminary investigation, both descriptive and using regression models, indicate that public expenditure from ESAs have not acted as a substitute for other revenue sources. In other words, they have not displaced intergovernmental or local school revenue. Although this fact ensures that changes in public spending on education detected in our models are not overestimated due to substitution effects from unmodelled ESA expenditure, it does risk underestimating values of actual expenditure per pupil. This remains to be resolved.

### A.4 Availability of varying local-level outcomes

**Approaching a more “local” analysis of such challenges is often inhibited by data availability.** First, data limitations including infrequent periodicity and missingness due to strained local reporting capacity or low stringency impose a limit on the statistical power in a panel analysis. Furthermore, infrequent periodicity poses the additional challenge to interpretation when assessing the impact of industrial changes that are often subject to within-year cyclicalities.

### A.5 Structural and policy heterogeneity

**County-level analysis of the US poses an inherent trade-off between greater local insight and requisite model complexity.** First, county-level variables are subject to unit- and time-dependent variation, which can be partly, although likely not adequately, dealt with through the incorporation of appropriate control variables and two-way fixed effects. This work will aim to incorporate consideration of spatial auto-correlation between counties to further deal with these estimation challenges. Second, and perhaps most challenging, counties are subject to state-wide regulatory, economic, and social conditions that can vary greatly across states. I aim to control for state-level variation using either an additional state-fixed effect in our regression models or state-level time trends. However, I remain wary of the residual effect of state-level heterogeneity in policy regimes and culture on our estimation results. I remain open to the idea of restricting our analysis to a smaller set of states or even a state-by-state analysis.

### A.6 Cross-Sectional Dependence

**This latter point on state-level heterogeneity points to an additional challenge when modelling more local- or county-level variation: cross-sectional dependence.** Neighboring counties, particularly counties in the same state, will inevitably exhibit high levels of spatial dependence and auto-correlation. Adding further complication, state boundaries implicate any assumption of linearity in spatial dependence at the county level (ie. neighboring counties on either side of a state border will likely be less similar than neighboring counties within the same border).

Table 9: Educational Service Agencies by State

State	ESA Name	#
Alabama		
Alaska	Educational Resource Center (SERRC)	1
Arizona	Office County of School Superintendent	15
Arkansas	Education Service Cooperative	15
California	County Office of Education	58
Colorado	Board of Cooperative Educational Services	21
Connecticut	Regional Education Service Center	6
Delaware		
Florida	Regional Consortium Service Organization	3
Georgia	Regional Education Service Agency	16
Hawaii		
Idaho		
Illinois	Regional Office of Education; Intermediate Service Center	35; 3
Indiana	Educational Service Center	9
Iowa	Area Education Agency	9
Kansas	Interlocal Cooperative - Service Center	7
Kentucky	Education Cooperative	8
Louisiana	Special School District	0
Maine		
Maryland		
Massachusetts	Educational Collaborative	25
Michigan	Intermediate School District	56
Minnesota	Regional Service Cooperative; Intermediate School District	9; 4
Mississippi	Regional Educational Service Agency	6
Missouri	Educational Service Agency	4
Montana	Educational Cooperative	2
Nebraska	Educational Service Unit	17
Nevada		
New Hampshire	Educational Service Center	4
New Jersey	Educational Services Commission	11
New Mexico	Regional Education Cooperative	10
New York	Board of Cooperative Educational Services	37
North Carolina	Regional Educational Service Agency	8
North Dakota	Regional Education Association	7
Ohio	Educational Service Center	51
Oklahoma		
Oregon	Educational Service District	19
Pennsylvania	Intermediate Unit	29
Rhode Island	Educational Collaborative	3
South Carolina	Regional Consortium	6
South Dakota	Educational Service Unit	14
Tennessee	Educational Cooperative	Unknown
Texas	Regional Education Service Center	20
Utah	Regional Education Service Agency	4
Vermont		
Virginia		
Washington	Educational Service District	9
West Virginia	Educational Service Cooperative	3
Wisconsin	Cooperative Educational Service Agency	12
Wyoming	Board of Cooperative Educational Services	3

<sup>a</sup> Source: Association of Educational Service Agencies, State by State ESA Report 2021

## B Descriptive Regression Results

In the following set of results, I report descriptive regressions to establish relationships between property taxes, education expenditure, GDP (total, private industry, O&G&mining), etc. All regression models that follow include TWFE (CZ- and year- fixed effects) and standard errors clustered by commuting zone. All functional forms in the feols() functions below are of the form  $Y \sim X$  In the cases in which multiple estimations are included via sw(Xa, Xb, Xc + Xd), the function will return results for  $Y \sim X_a$ ,  $Y \sim X_b$ ,  $Y \sim X_c + X_d$ .

### B.1 Property Tax ~ GDP

GDP has a highly relevant relationship to property taxes. A 1% increase in GDP (per capita) leads to a 0.38% (0.32%) increase in property taxes collected (per capita).

Dependent Variables: Model:	log_real_Property_Tax (1)	(log) Prop Taxpp (2)	(log) Prop Taxpp (3)	(log) Prop Taxpp (4)
<i>Variables</i>				
(log) Real GDP	0.3854*** (0.0480)	0.1226*** (0.0325)		
l(log_real_gdp_total,1)		0.1193*** (0.0274)		
l(log_real_gdp_total,2)		0.0697** (0.0285)		
l(log_real_gdp_total,3)		0.0790*** (0.0183)		
l(log_real_gdp_total,4)		0.1198*** (0.0384)		
(log) Real GDP pc			0.3151*** (0.0616)	0.1212*** (0.0366)
l(log_real_gdp_total_pc,1)				0.0929*** (0.0271)
l(log_real_gdp_total_pc,2)				0.0677** (0.0328)
l(log_real_gdp_total_pc,3)				0.0731*** (0.0229)
l(log_real_gdp_total_pc,4)				0.0624* (0.0351)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>				
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>				
Observations	13,356	10,812	13,356	10,812
R <sup>2</sup>	0.99175	0.99329	0.93467	0.94256
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.10787	0.15702	0.06308	0.08956

*Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses*

*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

## B.2 Education Expenditure ~ Revenue Sources

The below regressions are included to establish the relationship between education expenditure and its component parts. These regressions simply corroborate what is displayed in the section on Key Relationships in [LINK](#) (ie. that the largest form of IG revenue is state funding and Own Source revenue is largely sourced from Property Taxes).

Dependent Variables:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Model:</i>								
(log) Rev. Own Sources pp	0.3604*** (0.0190)							
(log) IG Revenue pp		0.4469*** (0.0244)		0.4532*** (0.0265)				
(log) Prop Taxpp			0.2266*** (0.0180)	0.2871*** (0.0185)	0.2897*** (0.0181)			
(log) Fed IG Rev. pp					0.0019 (0.0019)			
(log) State IG Rev pp						0.4307** (0.0283)		
log_real_Property_Tax							0.2565*** (0.0195)	0.3014*** (0.0194)
log_real_Total_IG_Revenue								0.3070*** (0.0192)
log_real_Total_Fed_IG_Revenue								0.4853*** (0.0234)
log_real_Total_State_IG_Revenue								0.0005 (0.0007)
log_real_Total_Rev_Own_Sources								0.4823*** (0.0269)
								0.3760*** (0.0191)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>								
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>								
Observations	13,356	13,356	13,356	13,356	13,356	13,356	13,356	13,356
R <sup>2</sup>	0.89075	0.82859	0.88016	0.87791	0.99566	0.99738	0.99732	0.99763
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.45044	0.13778	0.39717	0.38586	0.14427	0.48315	0.47095	0.53223

*Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses*  
*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

### B.3 Education Expenditure ~ GDP

A 1% increase in GDP pc is associated with a 0.19% increase in education expenditure per pupil, dominated by the effect of GDP from private industry (0.16%). I include here also the GDP generated from the oil, gas, mining, and quarrying sector. The effect is small and statistically insignificant.

Dependent Variable:	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Variables</i>			
(log) Real GDP pc	0.1926*** (0.0210)		
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc		0.1674*** (0.0182)	
log_real_gdp_o_g_mining_quarr_21_pc			0.0155*** (0.0032)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>			
unit	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>			
Observations	13,356	13,356	13,356
R <sup>2</sup>	0.81378	0.81283	0.80330
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.06328	0.05847	0.01055

Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses


Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1

## C Key Relationships between Economic Variables


Below we display key relationships between several of the economic variables in our study.

### Key Relationships Between Economic Variables

at the Commuting Zone Level, 2001–2020.



IG Transfers (pp) vs. GDP pc



### C.1 Baseline Regressions with State Fixed Effects

Regressions establishing baseline relationships between local economic variables and elementary education expenditure using state-fixed effects rather than commuting-zone level effects.

Dependent Variable:	(log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Variables</i>						
(log) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	-0.0043 (0.0199)	0.0076 (0.0147)				
(log,l1) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0642*** (0.0132)	0.0397** (0.0187)				
(log,l2) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.1335*** (0.0226)	0.0053 (0.0134)				
(log) IG Revenue pp	0.2827*** (0.0274)	0.0940*** (0.0089)	0.2259*** (0.0243)	0.0732*** (0.0079)	0.2072*** (0.0276)	0.0712*** (0.0081)
(log) Enrollment	-0.0329*** (0.0043)	-0.0079*** (0.0012)	-0.0644*** (0.0064)	-0.0141*** (0.0013)	-0.0341*** (0.0050)	-0.0078*** (0.0012)
(l1, log) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp		0.7696*** (0.0118)		0.7922*** (0.0144)		0.8011*** (0.0118)
(log) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.2275*** (0.0784)	0.0459 (0.0488)		
(log, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.2106*** (0.0487)	0.2030*** (0.0621)		
(log, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.0748 (0.0687)	-0.1302*** (0.0404)		
(log) House Price Index					0.0385 (0.0325)	0.0931*** (0.0219)
(log, l1) House Price Index					0.1013*** (0.0301)	0.0053 (0.0395)
(log, l2) House Price Index					0.0780*** (0.0245)	-0.0033 (0.0332)
(log, l3) House Price Index					0.0570*** (0.0220)	-0.0299 (0.0273)
(log, l4) House Price Index					-0.1416*** (0.0255)	-0.0305 (0.0198)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
state	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	12,084	12,084	13,356	12,720	12,588	12,029
R <sup>2</sup>	0.68861	0.88123	0.67088	0.88105	0.66621	0.88481
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.32932	0.74418	0.28070	0.74264	0.16006	0.71338

*Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses  
Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

Dependent Variable:	(GR) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Variables</i>						
(GR) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0087 (0.0134)	0.0074 (0.0130)				
(GR,l1) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0544*** (0.0149)	0.0548*** (0.0149)				
(GR,l2) Real GDP Priv. Industry pc	0.0198*** (0.0070)	0.0206*** (0.0070)				
(GR) IG Revenue pp	0.3088*** (0.0317)	0.3072*** (0.0320)	0.3259*** (0.0223)	0.3066*** (0.0313)	0.3271*** (0.0228)	0.3085*** (0.0305)
(GR) Enrollment	-0.5741*** (0.0397)	-0.5662*** (0.0407)	-0.0144** (0.0063)	-0.5649*** (0.0408)	-0.0063 (0.0068)	-0.5768*** (0.0440)
(GR, l1) Elem.Ed.Exp.pp		-0.0580*** (0.0149)		-0.0381*** (0.0097)		-0.0443*** (0.0093)
(GR) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			-0.0263 (0.0544)	0.0240 (0.0445)		
(GR, l1) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.2079*** (0.0494)	0.1823*** (0.0439)		
(GR, l2) Annual Avg. Wkly. Wage			0.3101*** (0.0591)	0.3061*** (0.0563)		
(GR) House Price Index					0.0614** (0.0239)	0.1045*** (0.0195)
(GR, l1) House Price Index					0.1069*** (0.0290)	0.0769*** (0.0246)
(GR, l2) House Price Index					0.0592*** (0.0205)	0.0601*** (0.0186)
(GR, l3) House Price Index					0.0204 (0.0257)	0.0288 (0.0198)
(GR, l4) House Price Index					0.0328 (0.0211)	0.0216 (0.0171)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
state	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	12,083	12,083	13,355	12,719	12,535	11,978
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26154	0.26458	0.34055	0.26778	0.34934	0.28087
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.21898	0.22219	0.15384	0.22431	0.14687	0.23107


*Clustered (unit) standard-errors in parentheses*


*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

## C.2 SS Construction

Plots of the data inputs to the shift-share instrument.

## National Wage and Employment (Levels & Growth Rates by





### C.3 Panel VAR Specification

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{k=1}^4 \gamma_k A_{i,t-k} + \beta X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where we approach a level and per capita value expression of the relationship between total education expenditure, intergovernmental revenue, house prices conditioned on GDP and wage levels.

$$Y_{it} = \begin{bmatrix} \log(\text{real Total Educ. Exp.})_{it} \\ \log(\text{real Total IG Revenue})_{it} \\ \log(\text{HPI})_{it} \end{bmatrix}, \quad X_{it} = \begin{bmatrix} \log(\text{real GDP})_{it} \\ \log(\text{wage})_{it} \end{bmatrix}$$


- $A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4$  are  $3 \times 3$  coefficient matrices
- $\beta$  is a  $3 \times 2$  matrix of coefficients on the exogenous variables
- $\alpha_i$  is a vector of unit fixed effects
- $\varepsilon_{it}$  is the error term

Where


$$Y_{it} = \begin{bmatrix} \log(\text{real Own Source Rev. per person})_{it} \\ \log(\text{real IG Revenue per person})_{it} \\ \log(\text{wage})_{it} \\ \log(\text{HPI})_{it} \end{bmatrix}, \quad X_{it} = [\log(\text{real GDP per capita})_{it}]$$

- $A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4$  are  $4 \times 4$  coefficient matrices
- $B$  is a  $4 \times 1$  coefficient matrix
- $\alpha_i$  unit fixed effects
- $\varepsilon_{it}$  error term

## Generalized impulse response function



## Generalized impulse response function



Ahlerup, Pelle, Thushyanthan Baskaran, and Arne Bigsten. 2020. “Gold Mining and Education: A Long-Run Resource Curse in Africa?” *The Journal of Development Studies* 56 (9): 1745–62. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2019.1696959>.

Alfonso, Vincent C., and George J. DuPaul. 2020. “Introduction: The Importance of Early Childhood Development, Education, and Intervention.” In, 3–10. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0000197-001>.

Avanceña, Anton L. V., Ellen Kim DeLuca, Bradley Iott, Amanda Mauri, Nicholas Miller, Daniel Eisenberg, and David W. Hutton. 2021. “Income and Income Inequality Are a Matter of Life and Death. What Can Policymakers Do about It?” *American Journal of Public Health* 111 (8): 1404–8. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306301>.

Badeeb, Ramez Abubakr, Hooi Hooi Lean, and Jeremy Clark. 2017. “The Evolution of the Natural Resource Curse Thesis: A Critical Literature Survey.” *Resources Policy* 51 (March): 123–34. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.03.001>.

- 1016/j.resourpol.2016.10.015.
- Bartik, Timothy J. 1991. *Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?* W.E. Upjohn Institute. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvh4zh1q>.
- Blanco, Luisa, and Robin Grier. 2012. "Natural Resource Dependence and the Accumulation of Physical and Human Capital in Latin America." *Resources Policy* 37 (3): 281–95. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2012.01.005>.
- Borge, Lars-Erik, Pernille Parmer, and Ragnar Torvik. 2015. "Local Natural Resource Curse?" *Journal of Public Economics* 131 (November): 101–14. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.002>.
- Boustan, Leah, Fernando Ferreira, Hernan Winkler, and Eric M. Zolt. 2013. "The Effect of Rising Income Inequality on Taxation and Public Expenditures: Evidence from U.S. Municipalities and School Districts, 1970–2000." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 95 (4): 1291–1302. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43554828>.
- Brunnschweiler, Christa N., and Erwin H. Bulte. 2008. "The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 55 (3): 248–64. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2007.08.004>.
- Carpenter, Craig Wesley, Michael C. Lotspeich-Yadao, and Charles M. Tolbert. 2022. "When to Use Commuting Zones? An Empirical Description of Spatial Autocorrelation in U.S. Counties Versus Commuting Zones." *PLOS ONE* 17 (7): e0270303. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0270303>.
- Chetty, Raj, Michael Stepner, Sarah Abraham, Shelby Lin, Benjamin Scuderi, Nicholas Turner, Augustin Bergeron, and David Cutler. 2016. "The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001–2014: Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States." *JAMA* 315 (16): 1750. <https://doi.org/10.1001/JAMA.2016.4226>.
- Cockx, Lara, and Nathalie Francken. 2014. "Extending the Concept of the Resource Curse: Natural Resources and Public Spending on Health." *Ecological Economics* 108 (December): 136–49. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.10.013>.
- . 2016. "Natural Resources: A Curse on Education Spending?" *Energy Policy* 92 (May): 394–408. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENPOL.2016.02.027>.
- Deacon, Robert T. 2011. "The Political Economy of the Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Theory and Evidence." *Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics* 7 (2): 111–208. <https://ideas.repec.org//a/now/fntmic/0700000042.html>.
- Dialga, Issaka, and Youmanli Ouoba. 2022. "How Do Extractive Resources Affect Human Development? Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis." *Resources, Environment and Sustainability* 7 (March): 100046. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resenv.2022.100046>.
- Douglas, Stratford, and Anne Walker. 2017. "COAL MINING AND THE RESOURCE CURSE IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES." *Journal of Regional Science* 57 (4): 568–90. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jors.12310>.
- Ferri, Benjamin. 2022. "Novel Shift-Share Instruments and Their Applications." *Boston College Working Papers in Economics*, Boston College Working Papers in Economics, September. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/boc/bocoec/1053.html>.
- Flavin, Patrick, Benjamin Radcliff, P Flavin, Á B Radcliff, and B Radcliff. 2009. "Public Policies and Suicide Rates in the American States." *Social Indicator Research* 90: 195–209. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-008-9252-5>.
- Goldsmith-Pinkham, Paul, Isaac Sorkin, and Henry Swift. 2020. "Bartik Instruments: What, When, Why, and How." *American Economic Review* 110 (8): 2586–2624. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181047>.
- Haber, Stephen. n.d. "The Rise and Fall of the Resource Curse." <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4558080>.
- Logan, John R., Elisabeta Minca, and Sinem Adar. 2012. "The Geography of Inequality: Why Separate Means Unequal in American Public Schools." *Sociology of Education* 85 (3): 287–301. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038040711431588>.
- Menaldo, Victor. 2016. *The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development*. Business and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316481530>.
- National Center for Education Statistics. 2023. "Public School Expenditures." <https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/cmb>.
- Pierson, Kawika, Michael Hand, and Fred Thompson. n.d. "The Government Finance Database: A Common Resource for Quantitative Research in Public Financial Analysis | PLOS ONE." *PLoS ONE*. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0270303>.

- org/10.1371/journal.pone.0130119.
- Raiimi, Daniel, Emily Grubert, Jake Higdon, Gilbert Metcalf, Sophie Pesek, and Devyani Singh. 2022. "The Fiscal Implications of the US Transition Away from Fossil Fuels." <https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/the-fiscal-implications-of-the-us-transition-away-from-fossil-fuels/>.
- Ross, Michael L. 2015. "What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (1): 239–59. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359>.
- . 2018. "The Politics of the Resource Curse: A Review." In, edited by Carol Lancaster and Nicolas van de Walle. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199845156.013.42>.
- Semuels, Alana. 2016. "Why America's Public Schools Are so Unequal." <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/property-taxes-and-unequal-schools/497333/>.
- Sincovich, Alanna, Tess Gregory, Ashleigh Wilson, and Sally Brinkman. 2018. "The Social Impacts of Mining on Local Communities in Australia." *Rural Society* 27 (1): 18–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10371656.2018.1443725>.
- Wiens, David, Paul Poast, and William Roberts Clark. 2014. "The Political Resource Curse: An Empirical Re-Evaluation." *Political Research Quarterly* 67 (4): 783–94. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914543836>.