Supplementary Materials to "Partners in Crime"

Averell Schmidt and Kathryn Sikkink

July 5, 2018

Contents

1 Summary

This document elaborates upon statistical tests referred to in the text and footnotes of the article. It also describes in detail the data used in our analysis. In addition to the Fariss Latent Variable Model and the CIRI physical integrity, disappearance, and political imprisonment scores, we also analyzed the Political Terror Scale's (PTS) Amnesty International and State Department scores as well as the CIRI extrajudicial killing and torture scores. While interperting the analyses in this appendix please be careful to note that we inverted the normal scale of Political Terror Scores so that it is in the same direction as the CIRI and Fariss indicators: for all indicators presented here, higher scores means more, not less, respect of human rights. We found similar statistically significant results while using the PTS scores, but did not find statistical support for the claim that participation in the RDI program was correlated with a worsening in either the CIRI torture or extrajudicial killing scores. We also present two statistical tests not presented in the main article and, in conclusion, note some additional considerations.

In addition to this summary, this appendix consists of six sections: (1) a presentation of the data and variables used in our study along with a discussion and analysis of the model we used to impute missing data; (2) the statistical tests used to assess whether or not global human rights practices changed following the beginning of the RDI program; (3) a discussion of our data on participation in the RDI program as well as a statistical comparison of states that participated in the program to those that did not; (4) a reproduction of our core statistical analysis, along with an analysis of the CIRI torture and extrajudicial killing scores and PTS State Department and Amnesty International scores using the same models; (5) two additional tests not presented in the article, specifically (a) a re-analysis using treatment year as the time-series index and (b) a replication of the data after dropping country-years in which the human rights reports of Amnesty International or State Department name one or more of the prisoners listed in the Open Society Justice

Initiative report; and (6) we conclude by noting some additional considerations, suggesting the true relatonship between participation in the RDI program and a worsening in state human rights practices may well be greater than the correlation uncovered by our statistical analysis.

2 Data and Imputation Model

This section describes in detail how we construct and impute our dataset for analysis. First, we provide a brief description of each variable in our main dataset. Second, we present descriptive statistics for each variable other than indexing variables (e.g. year, country-year, country name, ect.) in our initial dataset and discuss issues that might arise due to patterns of missingness in this data. Third, we describe our model of imputation to address these missing values, impute our data, present updated descriptive statistics and a number of diagnostic plots to assess the performance of our imputation model. These imputed datasets are used in all of our analyses.

2.1 Description of Variables in Dataset

Altogether there are 35 variables in used in our analysis. This section lists and describes these variables. Note that, unlike in the article, some figures in the supplementary materials are presented using these variable names.

- **cyear** is a country-year ID number, which is constructed with the year and the Correlates of War country code (COW*10000 + YEAR).

- **YEAR** is the year of the country-year.

- **COW** is the Correlates of War country code for the given country.

- **country** is the country name.

- **t** is a treatment-year time-series index. For countries that participated in the RDI program, it is 0 the year before their participation began. For countries that did not participate in the RDI program, it is 0 in 2000, the year before the attacks of 9/11.

2

- **active_d** is a dichotomous variable noting whether or not the state is one of the 40 states listed in the Open Society Justice Initiative report that *participated actively* with the RDI program. If a state participated actively with the RDI program, this variable is 1 for all years; if a state did not participate actively with the program, it is 0 for all years.

- **active_t** is a dichotomous variable noting whether or not the country is one of the 40 actively participating states listed in the Open Society Justice Initiative report. This variable is 1 for all years *after a country first participated* with the RDI program; if the state never participated actively with the program, it is 0 for all years. For ease of interpretation this variable is referred to as **Participation** in the statistical tables presented in the article.

- **above_polity** is a dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 if average polity score during the 1992-2011 period is greater than or equal to 7, otherwise it is zero.

- **below_polity** is a dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 if average polity score during the 1992-2011 period is less than 7, otherwise it is 0.

- **Dem_Part** is a dichotomous interaction variable noting democratic participation in the RDI program. It is equal to **active_t** ∗ **above_polity**

- **Auto_Part** is a dichotomous interaction variable noting non-democratic participation in the RDI program. It is equal to **active_t** ∗ **below_polity**

- **latentmean** is the value of the states' latent variable model score in the given year provided by Fariss.

- **lag_latentmean** is the value of the states' latent variable model score lagged one year.

- **Amnesty** is the states' Amnesty International score from the Political Terror Scale in the given year. Note that unlike the Fariss and CIRI measurements, high scores on the PTS scale signify more abuse of human rights.

- **lag_amnesty** is the states' Amnesty International score from the Political Terror Scale lagged one year.

- **State** is the states' US State Department score from the Political Terror Scale in the given year. Note that unlike the Fariss and CIRI measurements, high scores on the PTS scale signify more abuse of human rights.

- **lag_state** is the states' US State Department score from the Political Terror Scale lagged one year.

- **DISAP** is the CIRI disappearance score for the given country-year. Higher scores represent more respect for human rights; lower scores represent more abuse.

- **lag_disap** is the CIRI disappearance score for the country-year lagged one year.

- **KILL** is the CIRI extrajudicial killing score for the given country-year. Higher scores represent more respect for human rights; lower scores represent more abuse.

- **lag_kill** is the CIRI extrajudicial killing score for the country-year lagged one year.

- **TORT** is the CIRI torture score for the given country-year. Higher scores represent more respect for human rights; lower scores represent more abuse.

- **lag_tort** is the CIRI torture score for the country-year lagged one year.

- **POLPRIS** is the CIRI political imprisonment score for the given country-year. Higher scores represent more respect for human rights; lower scores represent more abuse.

- **lag_polpris** is the CIRI political imprisonment score for the country-year lagged one year.

- **PHYSINT** is the CIRI physical integrity score for the given country-year. Note that the CIRI physical integrity score is the summation of the CIRI disappearance, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and torture scores. This variable was computed after multiple imputation and is therefore excluded from the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 and Table 2.

- **lag_physint** is the CIRI physical integrity score for the country-year lagged one year.

- **ucdp_type3** is a continuous variable noting the number of internal armed conflics in a given country-year. This is also coded from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

- **gtd** this is a continuous variable counting the number of terrorist incidents recorded by the Global Terrorism Database in a given country-year.

- **trans** is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if a country is undergoing a political transition, otherwise it is 0. We categorize a country as in a political transition if its political regime has been in existence for fewer than six years according to the "durable" variable in the PolityIV dataset.

- **polity2** is the Revised Combined Polity Score from the Polity IV dataset. It ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). Note we have dropped all where country-years with values -66 (cases of foreign "interruption"), because such regimes lack the independence necessary to shape autonomously their own human rights practices.

- **log_pop** is the log of total population in a given country-year as recorded by the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The raw data for this variable was downloaded from The Quality of Government Standard Dataset (Version Jan16) using the wdi_pop variable.

- **log_gdppc** is the log of gross domestic product per capita in constant 2005 United States' dollars as recorded by the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The raw data for this variable was downloaded from The Quality of Government Standard Dataset (Version Jan16) using the wdi_gdppccon variable.

- **log_UStrade** is the log of total imports and exports between the United States and a country in the given year. Data for this variable was downloaded from the US Census Bureau website.

- **log_USmilaid** is the log of total US military aid obligations to a country in a given year. The data was downloaded from USAID's Aid Explorer.

2.2 Description of Initial Dataset

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in the initial, non-imputed dataset, except for those used for indexing (**cyear**, **YEAR**, **COW**, **country**, and **t**).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Initial, Non-Imputed Dataset

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
active_d	3,369	0.240	0.427	0	1
active_t	3,369	0.110	0.313	0	1
latentmean	3,359	0.369	1.280	−2.703	4.705
Amnesty	2,913	3.301	1.130	1	5
State	3,318	3.417	1.160	1	5
DISAP	3,207	1.670	0.635	0	2
KILL	3,213	1.248	0.769	0	2
TORT	3,213	0.654	0.691	0	2
POLPRIS	3,211	1.132	0.842	0	2
above_polity	3,369	0.370	0.483	0	1
below_polity	3,369	0.630	0.483	0	1
ucdp_type3	1,015	0.668	0.945	0	7
gtd	1,728	28.991	84.612	1	1,307
trans	3,369	0.307	0.461	0	1
polity2	3,369	2.954	6.643	−10	10
log_pop	3,300	16.042	1.536	12.678	21.019
log_gdppc	3,159	7.838	1.624	4.242	11.383
log_UStrade	3,270	20.355	3.070	0.000	27.121
log_USmilaid	2,292	14.338	2.448	7.124	22.307

These descriptive statistics reveal significant variation in the number of observations across variables. Several key variables are missing a large number of observations, notably **gtd**, **ucdp_type3**, and **Amnesty**, among others. We present a missingness map in Figure 1 to illustrate how patterns of unobserved values correlate across observations. Each row in this map represents a country-year in our initial dataset and each column represents a variable. The map is sorted such that variables with the highest proportion of missing values are on the left hand side. Missing values are marked by the color red and observed values are marked by the color blue.

Several variables exhibit systematic patterns of missingness, which might bias subsequent analysis. For example, data on US military assistance is missing for several industrialized states with which the US has close military alliances, such as South Korea, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, as well as a number of US allies in the developing world, including South Africa, Qatar, and Liberia. Similarly, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, from which we gather data on the number of internal conflicts, excludes "conflicts where information on key variables to the definition of conflict is uncertain or missing" resulting in a bias "against the inclusion of conflicts in the earlier decades and in the less-developed world."[1] These considerations suggest that relying on list-wise deletion might bias our analysis.

2.3 Imputation of Data

We use multiple imputation to deal with missing values in our dataset. Research in statistics and the social sciences has show that multiple imputation is a better practice than either guessing missing values or relying on list-wise deletion, two common practices in quantitative research.[2] In our imputation model we include all variables in our analysis

---

[1]UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2013, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, `www.prio.no/cscw`, pp. 3.

[2]A. P. Dempster, N.M. Laird, and D.B. Rubin (1977) "Maximum Likelihood Estimation from Incomplete Data via the EM Algorithm" *Journal of the Royal Statistical Association* 39(1): 1-38; Gary King, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve (2001) "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative

Figure 1: Each row represents one country-year and each column represents one variable. Observed values are blue and missing values are red. Variable names on are the x-axis.

Missing Values in Initial, Non-Imputed, Dataset

except for index variables (**cyear**, **YEAR**, **COW**, **country**, and **t**) and **active_d**, **above_polity**, **below_polity**, which are derived from **active_t** and **polity**2. We also include data from 1991 (the year before we begin our time series), all variables lagged one year, third-order polynomials of time, interactions between these time polynomials and our cross-section units, and a ridge prior of 5% to aid convergence of the imputation algorithm. Because slightly more than 8% of the values in our initial dataset are missing, we use this model to impute nine different datasets. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the average dataset produced by this model.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Imputed Dataset

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
active_d	3,210	0.240	0.427	0	1
active_t	3,210	0.116	0.320	0	1
latentmean	3,210	0.385	1.278	−2.703	4.705
Amnesty	3,210	3.440	1.138	1.000	5.572
State	3,210	3.418	1.156	1.000	5.410
DISAP	3,210	1.662	0.630	0.000	2.395
KILL	3,210	1.244	0.766	−0.179	2.267
TORT	3,210	0.650	0.685	−0.317	2.000
POLPRIS	3,210	1.136	0.835	−0.284	2.280
above_polity	3,210	0.370	0.483	0	1
below_polity	3,210	0.630	0.483	0	1
ucdp_type3	3,210	0.445	0.610	−0.435	7.000
gtd	3,210	15.735	64.116	−83.021	1,307.000
trans	3,210	0.300	0.458	0	1
polity2	3,210	3.037	6.611	−10	10
log_pop	3,210	16.044	1.524	12.707	21.019
log_gdppc	3,210	7.836	1.598	4.242	11.383
log_UStrade	3,210	20.292	3.113	0.000	27.121
log_USmilaid	3,210	13.749	2.458	7.124	22.307

Several aspects of our imputed dataset merit elaboration. First, all variables now have a total of 3,210 observations.[3] Second, the minimum and maximum of several variables now

[3]Note that when conducting our regression analysis the number of observations drops to 3,198, because

falls outside of natural bounds. For instance, the maximum values for the PTS Amnesty International score now exceeds 5 and the minimum values for the number of terrorist attacks and internal conflicts are now negative. Although this indicates the existence of values in our imputed dataset that are impossible, it is considered best practice not to round these estimates to possible values because they reflect uncertainty in our estimation of missing values.

We run a series of diagnostic tests to check the performance of our imputation model. First, we present time-series cross-section plots for Saudi Arabia and Niger – one participating and one non-participating state in the developing world – for the three variables with the highest proportion of missing data – internal conflicts, terrorist attacks, and US military assistance. The graphs show observed values as black dots and the mean imputed values as red dots with 95% confidence intervals as red bands above and below these red dots. It is a good sign for our imputation model that the imputed values are near to the observed values in each of these plots.

Second, we use overimputation to check how well our model performs at predicting observed values that are sequentially deleted from our dataset. On each graph in Figure 3 the black $x = y$ line represents the point of perfect agreement between the observed and imputed values. The number of confidence intervals that overlap with this line shows the number of accurate predictions of the true value. The color of the point estimate and confidence interval represents the fraction of missing observations in the pattern of missingness for that observation. These plots shows that our model performs quite well when predicting values for US military assistance and the PTS Amnesty International score as well as for country-years with fewer than 3 internal conflicts or fewer than 400 terrorist attacks. Our model appears to preform worse when predicting outliers. Despite these imperfections, our model performs sufficiently well to be a far better choice than either list-wise deletion or the assignment of values in the place of missing values.

---

12 states gain independence during our study period and thus lack an observed lagged dependent variable during their first year of existence.

Figure 2: Time-Series Cross-Section Plots of Imputed Data

Figure 3: Overimputation of Variables with Most Missingness

3 Assessing Global Shifts in Respect for Human Rights

This section explains how we evaluated whether or not human rights practices changed following the implementation of the RDI program and also presents analysis of human rights indicators not presented in the article.

3.1 Data Visualization

First, we plot each human rights indicator in order to assess whether or not there was a change in human rights practices following the implementation of the RDI program by the US. If this were the case, we would observe a worsening in human rights practices in the period following when states began participating in the RDI program, denoted by the shaded region in each figure. The visual evidence shows no sign of a significant global shift. These graphs are reproduced in the figures below.

Figure 4: Global Average Respect for Human Rights, 1992-2011.

Figure 5: Global Average Respect for Human Rights, 1992-2011. Note in this and all graphs below, the PTS Amnesty International and State Department Scores have been inverted so that they are in the same direction as the Fariss and CIRI indicators.

3.2 Comparing Global Human Rights Before/After RDI program

We then conduct a series of difference-of-means tests in order to assess whether or not global human rights practices changed following the implementation of the RDI program. Means were computed for each country's human rights practices as measured by the CIRI, PTS, and Fariss datasets before and after the cut-off years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 (e.g. for a country in the years before 2001 and from 2001 and later). Two-tailed difference-of-means tests with unequal variance were then used to assess whether or not average respect for human rights was different before or after these cut-off years.

All results were statistically insignificant with two exceptions. First, the Fariss Latent Variable is significant for all cut-off years, but the difference suggests human rights practices improved, not worsened, over time. Second, the CIRI torture score is significant at the 10% level when using 2001-2003 as the cut-off year, but not when using 2004 and 2005 as the cut-off year. However, looking at the time-series plots in Figure 5, it is clear that this difference is due to a decrease during the 1992-2000 period and a leveling thereafter. Had US policies shaped the global use of torture, we would observe a worsening at or following the 2001-2005 period, but this is not the case. In short, neither of these two exceptions fit with what we would expect to observe if the RDI program had resulted in a worsening of global human rights practices. The following table presents a sample of these results using the year 2004 as the cut-off year.

Table 3: Difference-of-Means Test Comparing Human Rights Before/After 2004

Variable	Before 2004	2004 and After	t-value	p-value
PHYSINT	4.742	4.617	0.541	0.589
Latent	0.257	0.548	-2.107	0.036
State	3.437	3.370	0.572	0.567
Amnesty	3.413	3.453	-0.353	0.725
KILL	1.260	1.215	0.621	0.535
POLPRIS	1.157	1.107	0.621	0.535
TORT	0.690	0.599	1.452	0.147
DISAP	1.634	1.695	-1.102	0.271

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4 Participation in the RDI Program

4.1 Coding of the OSJI Report

The following table presents the data we coded from the report by the Open Society Justice Initiative including the years we first noted states' participation in the CIA RDI program. Two researchers read through and coded the OSJI report making note of (a) how countries collaborated with the US, specifically whether or not they provided assistance beyond allowing the CIA to use their airports or airspace, and (b) the first year that the OSJI report documented a country collaborating with the CIA program. Differences in coding were then check and resolved. The product of this research is the table below. As noted in the article, although we do not have a clear sense when each country stopped collaborating with the CIA, we do know that the program was formally ended by President Obama on January 22, 2009.

Table 4: States that Participated in the CIA RDI Program

Active Participants		Stopovers Only
1. Afghanistan (2001)	21. Macedonia* (2003)	1. Austria* (2003)
2. Albania (2004)	22. Malawi (2003)	2. Belgium* (2001)
3. Algeria (2004)	23. Malaysia (2004)	3. Croatia (2005)
4. Australia* (2001)	24. Mauritania (2001)	4. Cyprus* (2002)
5. Azerbaijan (2001)	25. Morocco (2002)	5. Czech Republic* (2003)
6. Bosnia-Herzegovina (2001)	26. Pakistan (2001)	6. Denmark* (2003)
7. Canada* (2002)	27. Poland* (2002)	7. Finland* (2002)
8. Djibouti (2003)	28. Romania* (2002)	8. Greece* (2002)
9. Egypt (2001)	29. Saudi Arabia (2003)	9. Iceland* (2001)
10. Ethiopia (2002)	30. Somalia (2002)	10. Ireland* (2002)
11. The Gambia (2002)	31. South Africa* (2003)	12. Portugal* (2001)
12. Georgia (2002)	32. Sweden* (2001)	12. Spain* (2003)
13. Germany* (2001)	33. Syria (2001)	13. Sri Lanka (2003)
14. Indonesia (2002)	34. Thailand (2002)	
15. Iran (2002)	35. Turkey* (2002)	
16. Italy* (2002)	36. United Arab Emirates (2002)	
17. Jordan (2001)	37. United Kingdom* (2001)	
18. Kenya (2003)	38. Uzbekistan (2002)	
19. Libya (2004)	39. Yemen (2005)	
20. Lithuania* (2002)	40. Zimbabwe (2003)	

Note: * denotes states categorized as democracies. The year in parentheses is the first year that the OSJI report documents the country participating in the RDI program. The end of the countries involvement is not always documented, but the program was officially ended by President Obama on January 22, 2009.

4.2 Comparing Active Participants to Non-Participants

This section explains the statistical tests used to evaluate whether or not there were significant differences between countries that did and did not participate actively in the RDI program in the years before the program began. To assess differences between these groups, we conducted two-tailed difference-of-means tests with unequal variance comparing active participants to all other states in the three years before the program began (1998-2000) for each measure of human rights and each control variable. With the exception of log population (for which active participants are a statistically more populous group), the tests show no statistical difference between active participants and other states across these indicators. A table presenting the results of this analysis is below.

Table 5: Comparison of Active Participants to Other States, 1998-2000

Variable	Other States	Active Participants	t-value	p-value
PHYSINT	4.694	4.470	0.556	0.580
Latent	0.361	0.138	1.048	0.298
State	3.463	3.436	0.136	0.892
Amnesty	3.399	3.270	0.633	0.529
KILL	1.237	1.245	-0.057	0.955
POLPRIS	1.179	0.956	1.542	0.128
TORT	0.648	0.666	-0.183	0.855
DISAP	1.630	1.603	0.245	0.807
ucdp_type3	0.462	0.450	0.106	0.916
trans	0.264	0.376	-1.372	0.176
log_pop	15.833	16.619	-3.063	0.003***
log_gdppc	7.737	7.855	-0.408	0.685
polity2	3.121	1.249	1.513	0.136
gtd	7.821	12.763	-0.697	0.491
log_UStrade	20.033	20.314	-0.486	0.629
log_USmilaid	13.638	13.760	-0.246	0.807

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

5 Assessing the Impact of Participation

Like our analysis of shifts in global human rights practices above, our assessment of
the impact of participation in the RDI program is conducted in two parts. First, we
compare graphically the human rights practices of participants to non-participants and
non-democratic participants to non-democratic non-participants. Second, we assess these
relationship statistically, this time using a variety of linear panel models.

5.1 Data Visualization

The following four figures depict the patterns of human rights practices of participants
in the RDI program. The first two figures compare the human rights practices of the 40
active participants in the RDI program to the human rights practices of all other countries
in the world. The third and fourth figures compare the human rights practices of the 28
non-democratic participants to the human rights practices of all other non-democratic
countries in the world.

Figure 6: Average Respect for Human Rights by Participation, 1992-2011.

Figure 7: Average Respect for Human Rights by Participation, 1992-2011.

Figure 8: Respect for Human Rights among Non-Democracies by Participation, 1992-2011.

Figure 9: Respect for Human Rights among Non-Democracies by Participation, 1992-2011.

5.2 Statistical Tests

This section contains that statistical analyses presented in the main article as well as additional analyses of the Political Terror Scale's Amnesty International and State Department indicators and the CIRI torture and extrajudicial killing scores. As noted in the article, we found similar results using the PTS indicators as outcome variables, but not when using the CIRI torture and extrajudicial killing score. To us this suggests that our finding is driven by changes in government use of disappearances and political imprisonment.

Table 6: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011

	Dependent variable:							
	Physical Integrity Score (CIRI)				Latent Variable Model (Fariss)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.207*		−0.238**		−0.032		−0.036**	
	(0.125)		(0.111)		(0.020)		(0.018)	
Democratic participation		−0.127		−0.127		0.004		−0.002
		(0.112)		(0.129)		(0.023)		(0.022)
Autocratic participation		−0.244		−0.290**		−0.049**		−0.052**
		(0.166)		(0.146)		(0.025)		(0.023)
Internal conflicts			−0.277***	−0.277***			−0.028***	−0.028***
			(0.080)	(0.080)			(0.010)	(0.010)
Terrorist attacks			−0.001*	−0.001*			−0.0002	−0.0002
			(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Transitional state			−0.090	−0.088			0.016	0.016
			(0.077)	(0.077)			(0.014)	(0.014)
Polity score			0.086***	0.086***			0.010***	0.010***
			(0.014)	(0.014)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Log population			0.279	0.319			−0.058	−0.046
			(0.323)	(0.345)			(0.067)	(0.069)
Log GDP per capita			0.123	0.123			−0.003	−0.003
			(0.143)	(0.143)			(0.028)	(0.028)
Log US trade			0.002	0.002			−0.0004	−0.0002
			(0.024)	(0.025)			(0.002)	(0.002)
Log US military assistance			−0.013	−0.012			−0.004	−0.004
			(0.022)	(0.022)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198
R^2	0.177	0.177	0.223	0.223	0.845	0.846	0.850	0.850

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
| | Disappearance Score (CIRI) | | | | Political Imprisonment Score (CIRI) | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.075		−0.086*		−0.092*		−0.100**	
	(0.053)		(0.049)		(0.051)		(0.049)	
Democratic participation		0.036		0.038		−0.079**		−0.059
		(0.063)		(0.067)		(0.039)		(0.049)
Autocratic participation		−0.126*		−0.144**		−0.097		−0.119*
		(0.068)		(0.060)		(0.069)		(0.066)
Internal conflicts			−0.063**	−0.063**			−0.073**	−0.073**
			(0.030)	(0.030)			(0.035)	(0.035)
Terrorist attacks			−0.001	−0.0005			−0.0002	−0.0002
			(0.0003)	(0.0003)			(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Transitional state			−0.046	−0.044			0.004	0.005
			(0.029)	(0.029)			(0.031)	(0.031)
Polity score			0.023***	0.023***			0.037***	0.037***
			(0.005)	(0.005)			(0.006)	(0.006)
Log population			0.031	0.075			0.137	0.151
			(0.107)	(0.119)			(0.125)	(0.134)
Log GDP per capita			−0.004	−0.005			0.017	0.017
			(0.058)	(0.057)			(0.061)	(0.060)
Log US trade			0.010	0.011			−0.003	−0.002
			(0.008)	(0.008)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Log US military assistance			0.005	0.006			−0.004	−0.003
			(0.010)	(0.010)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198
R^2	0.162	0.164	0.184	0.186	0.100	0.100	0.137	0.137

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011

	Dependent variable:							
	Amnesty International Score (PTS)				State Department Score (PTS)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.081		−0.095		−0.089		−0.097*	
	(0.065)		(0.060)		(0.054)		(0.053)	
Democratic participation		0.066		0.064		−0.052		−0.042
		(0.087)		(0.084)		(0.074)		(0.080)
Autocratic participation		−0.150*		−0.170**		−0.106		−0.123*
		(0.077)		(0.071)		(0.066)		(0.064)
Internal conflicts			−0.158***	−0.158***			−0.098***	−0.098***
			(0.046)	(0.046)			(0.034)	(0.034)
Terrorist attacks			−0.001***	−0.001***			−0.001	−0.001
			(0.0002)	(0.0002)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Transitional state			−0.040	−0.038			−0.032	−0.031
			(0.045)	(0.045)			(0.037)	(0.037)
Polity score			0.039***	0.039***			0.037***	0.037***
			(0.007)	(0.007)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Log population			0.216	0.273			0.154	0.174
			(0.161)	(0.171)			(0.145)	(0.150)
Log GDP per capita			0.040	0.039			0.131*	0.130*
			(0.074)	(0.074)			(0.067)	(0.067)
Log US trade			0.006	0.007			0.002	0.002
			(0.008)	(0.007)			(0.009)	(0.009)
Log US military assistance			−0.009	−0.008			−0.001	−0.0002
			(0.010)	(0.010)			(0.010)	(0.010)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198
R^2	0.155	0.157	0.188	0.190	0.220	0.221	0.251	0.251

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011

	Dependent variable:							
	Torture Score (CIRI)				Extrajudicial Killing Score (CIRI)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.021		−0.017		−0.047		−0.057	
	(0.038)		(0.037)		(0.055)		(0.053)	
Democratic participation		−0.063		−0.062		−0.051		−0.059
		(0.041)		(0.043)		(0.060)		(0.067)
Autocratic participation		−0.001		0.004		−0.045		−0.055
		(0.046)		(0.045)		(0.071)		(0.067)
Internal conflicts			−0.044	−0.044			−0.118***	−0.118***
			(0.035)	(0.035)			(0.029)	(0.029)
Terrorist attacks			−0.0002	−0.0002			−0.0003	−0.0003
			(0.0002)	(0.0002)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Transitional state			0.017	0.016			−0.083***	−0.083***
			(0.028)	(0.028)			(0.030)	(0.030)
Polity score			0.015***	0.015***			0.019***	0.019***
			(0.005)	(0.005)			(0.006)	(0.006)
Log population			0.077	0.061			0.082	0.081
			(0.145)	(0.150)			(0.124)	(0.127)
Log GDP per capita			0.063	0.064			0.049	0.049
			(0.052)	(0.052)			(0.056)	(0.056)
Log US trade			−0.005	−0.005			0.004	0.004
			(0.004)	(0.004)			(0.013)	(0.013)
Log US military assistance			−0.014	−0.014			−0.002	−0.002
			(0.009)	(0.009)			(0.009)	(0.009)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198
R^2	0.085	0.086	0.097	0.098	0.076	0.076	0.107	0.107

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6   Additional Tests Described in Footnotes

We conduct two tests to tease out the robustness of our findings. First, we adjust the time-series to evaluate when exactly divergence between participants and non-participants occurred. We then search the primary sources underlying our datasets – the annual human rights reports from the US State Department and Amnesty International – for references to countries' participation in the RDI program, report any such country-years, and reproduce our analysis in order to ensure that observed shifts in government practices reflect actions independent of the program.

6.1   Analysis Using Treatment Year as Time-Series Index

6.1.1   Data Visualization

First, because countries' initial year of participation is distributed from 2001 to 2005, we adjust the time-series to help clarify the timing of the impact of participation. If participation had a causal impact, we would see divergence in the human rights practices between participants and non-participants occurring in the years following the beginning of participation. The figures below presents these alternative time-series plots for our subset of authoritarian countries. In these plots, year 1 represents the year that countries first began cooperating with the US program; for non-participating countries, year 1 is assigned as the year 2001, the year that the RDI program began. These graphs confirm our main finding. For the Fariss, physical integrity, and disappearance data, the trends are what we would expect if participation did have a causal impact. These graphs are striking. This analysis cast some doubt, however, on our findings concerning political imprisonment. It appears that the observed effect is largely due to improved practices among non-participants, rather than worse behavior from participants. Nonetheless, these plots support our findings.

29

Figure 10: Respect for Human Rights among Non-Democracies by Participation, treatment-year as time-series index.

Figure 11: Respect for Human Rights among Non-Democracies by Participation, treatment-year as time-series index.

6.1.2 Statistical Analysis with Treatment-Year as Time-Series Index

We also conduct the same regression analysis using treatment-year instead of calendar-year as the time-series indicator. For the four variables presented in the article the results are even stronger than we find in our earlier analysis. The same is true of the results of this re-analysis using the PTS Amnesty International and State Department scores. Like before, however, there are still no significant findings when using the CIRI Torture and Extra Judicial Killing scores.

Table 10: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, treatment-year as time-series index

	Dependent variable:							
	Physical Integrity Score (CIRI)				Latent Variable Model (Fariss)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.300**		−0.315***		−0.039*		−0.040**	
	(0.128)		(0.117)		(0.021)		(0.019)	
Democratic participation		−0.194		−0.183		0.001		−0.004
		(0.119)		(0.136)		(0.024)		(0.023)
Autocratic participation		−0.351**		−0.379**		−0.058**		−0.057**
		(0.167)		(0.151)		(0.025)		(0.024)
Internal conflicts			−0.276***	−0.276***			−0.029***	−0.029***
			(0.079)	(0.079)			(0.010)	(0.010)
Terrorist attacks			−0.001*	−0.001*			−0.0002	−0.0002
			(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Transitional state			−0.085	−0.084			0.018	0.019
			(0.077)	(0.077)			(0.014)	(0.014)
Polity score			0.084***	0.084***			0.010***	0.010***
			(0.014)	(0.014)			(0.002)	(0.002)
Log population			0.286	0.335			−0.061	−0.048
			(0.323)	(0.346)			(0.067)	(0.069)
Log GDP per capita			0.115	0.114			−0.008	−0.008
			(0.141)	(0.141)			(0.025)	(0.025)
Log US trade			0.003	0.004			−0.0001	0.0001
			(0.024)	(0.025)			(0.002)	(0.002)
Log US military assistance			−0.014	−0.012			−0.004	−0.004
			(0.022)	(0.022)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198
R^2	0.178	0.178	0.222	0.222	0.851	0.851	0.855	0.855

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, treatment-year as time-series index

	Dependent variable:							
	Disappearance Score (CIRI)				Political Imprisonment Score (CIRI)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.085		−0.091*		−0.138***		−0.143***	
	(0.056)		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.050)	
Democratic participation		0.028		0.033		−0.108**		−0.084
		(0.062)		(0.067)		(0.044)		(0.053)
Autocratic participation		−0.139*		−0.150**		−0.152**		−0.171**
		(0.071)		(0.063)		(0.067)		(0.067)
Internal conflicts			−0.063**	−0.063**			−0.073**	−0.073**
			(0.030)	(0.030)			(0.034)	(0.034)
Terrorist attacks			−0.001	−0.0005			−0.0002	−0.0002
			(0.0003)	(0.0003)			(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Transitional state			−0.044	−0.043			0.007	0.008
			(0.029)	(0.029)			(0.031)	(0.031)
Polity score			0.023***	0.023***			0.036***	0.036***
			(0.006)	(0.006)			(0.006)	(0.006)
Log population			0.029	0.074			0.142	0.164
			(0.106)	(0.118)			(0.125)	(0.134)
Log GDP per capita			−0.002	−0.003			0.014	0.013
			(0.057)	(0.056)			(0.061)	(0.061)
Log US trade			0.011	0.011			−0.003	−0.003
			(0.008)	(0.008)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Log US military assistance			0.005	0.006			−0.002	−0.002
			(0.010)	(0.010)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198
R^2	0.163	0.164	0.185	0.187	0.101	0.101	0.137	0.137

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, treatment-year as time-series index

	Dependent variable:							
	Amnesty International Score (PTS)				State Department Score (PTS)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.098		−0.100		−0.091		−0.093*	
	(0.066)		(0.062)		(0.056)		(0.054)	
Democratic participation		0.050		0.054		−0.049		−0.037
		(0.085)		(0.085)		(0.074)		(0.080)
Autocratic participation		−0.168**		−0.173**		−0.111*		−0.120*
		(0.079)		(0.074)		(0.067)		(0.065)
Internal conflicts			−0.160***	−0.160***			−0.099***	−0.099***
			(0.045)	(0.045)			(0.035)	(0.035)
Terrorist attacks			−0.001***	−0.001***			−0.001	−0.001
			(0.0002)	(0.0002)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Transitional state			−0.041	−0.039			−0.027	−0.026
			(0.045)	(0.045)			(0.037)	(0.037)
Polity score			0.039***	0.039***			0.036***	0.036***
			(0.007)	(0.007)			(0.007)	(0.007)
Log population			0.209	0.266			0.149	0.170
			(0.160)	(0.170)			(0.144)	(0.149)
Log GDP per capita			0.032	0.031			0.121*	0.121*
			(0.073)	(0.073)			(0.066)	(0.065)
Log US trade			0.008	0.008			0.002	0.002
			(0.008)	(0.008)			(0.009)	(0.009)
Log US military assistance			−0.009	−0.008			−0.002	−0.002
			(0.010)	(0.010)			(0.010)	(0.010)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198
R^2	0.156	0.157	0.188	0.190	0.219	0.219	0.248	0.248

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, treatment-year as time-series index

	Dependent variable:							
	Torture Score (CIRI)				Extrajudicial Killing Score (CIRI)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.026		−0.021		−0.079		−0.084	
	(0.040)		(0.039)		(0.056)		(0.054)	
Democratic participation		−0.066		−0.063		−0.078		−0.083
		(0.043)		(0.044)		(0.062)		(0.069)
Autocratic participation		−0.008		−0.0002		−0.080		−0.084
		(0.048)		(0.047)		(0.073)		(0.069)
Internal conflicts			−0.044	−0.045			−0.117***	−0.117***
			(0.035)	(0.035)			(0.029)	(0.029)
Terrorist attacks			−0.0002	−0.0002			−0.0003	−0.0003
			(0.0002)	(0.0002)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Transitional state			0.017	0.017			−0.083***	−0.083***
			(0.028)	(0.028)			(0.030)	(0.030)
Polity score			0.014***	0.014***			0.019***	0.019***
			(0.005)	(0.005)			(0.006)	(0.006)
Log population			0.077	0.062			0.087	0.088
			(0.145)	(0.150)			(0.124)	(0.127)
Log GDP per capita			0.062	0.062			0.044	0.044
			(0.051)	(0.052)			(0.055)	(0.056)
Log US trade			−0.005	−0.005			0.005	0.005
			(0.004)	(0.004)			(0.013)	(0.013)
Log US military assistance			−0.013	−0.013			−0.003	−0.003
			(0.009)	(0.009)			(0.009)	(0.009)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198	3,198
R^2	0.085	0.086	0.096	0.097	0.076	0.076	0.107	0.107

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.2 Accounting for Human Rights Texts Referencing of RDI Prisoners

Second, we check to make sure that the act of collaborating in the RDI program itself is not driving the change we observe in government respect for human rights. Logically, it is unlikely this is an issue: the indicators being used to measure government respect for human rights are not updated retroactively and the full extent of states' collaboration in the program was not disclosed until the release of the OSJI report in 2013. Furthermore, the datasets document government abuse of their own citizens and not foreigners.

In order to ensure this is indeed the case, we searched all annual human rights country reports by Amnesty International and the US State Department for the names of the 136 individuals captured by the RDI program documented in the OSJI report. The names of 19 of these individuals (14% of prisoners) do appear somewhere in the State Department and Amnesty International reports. The data underlying 48 country-years contain the name of one or more of these 19 prisoners, suggesting human rights measurements for these country-years might be bias.[4] This is a small number, however; less than 3.1% of the 1,562 country-years in the sample occurring since the RDI program began in 2001. It is also important to note that these reports document disproportionately the involvement of democratic governments in the RDI program. Thirty-six of the 48 (75%) contaminated country-years are from democratic countries, even though democratic countries comprise only 12 of the 40 (30%) active participants. This suggests that if there is a bias in the data it is most likely to overstate the impact of participation on democratic counties. However, our analysis finds no relationship between the human rights practices of democratic governments and participation in the RDI program.

---

[4]The total number of reports mentioning a prisoner is 56 (7 from the State Department 49 from Amnesty International), but in several country-years both the Amnesty International and State Department reports mention prisoners. Only in one country-year (Egypt 2007) does the State Department name a prisoner without Amnesty also mentioning a prisoner.

To check that these country-years are not driving the outcomes of our research, we drop these 48 country-years and reproduce our analysis. Dropping these country years does not have a significant impact on the outcome of our analysis; the results are substantively the same. Below we list the prisoners documented in the OSJI report and note which country-years contained one or more of these names. We then drop these country-years from our analysis, plot this updated data, and reproduce our statistical analysis.

6.2.1 List of Prisoners Documented in OSJI Report

The OSJI report documents 136 prisoners in the CIA RDI program. They are: Shaker Aamer; Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman; Muhammad Rahim al-Afghani; Ahmed Agiza; Qari Saifullah Akhtar; Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali; Hussein Salem Muhammed Almerfedi; Mohamad Farik bin Amin; Maher Arar; Mohammed al-Asad; Hassan bin Attash; Waleed Mohammed bin Attash; Mustafa Faraj al-Azibi; Walid bin Azmi; Ghairat Baheer; Fahad al Bahli; Amin Mohammad Abdallah al Bakri; Jamil el-Banna; Nashwan abd al-Razzaq abd al-Baqi; Samer Helmi al-Barq; Jawad al-Bashar; Muhammad Farag Ahmed Bashmilah; Abdul Basit; Masaad Omer Behari; Tawfiq al-Bihani; Fatima Bouchar; Jamaldi Boudra; Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti; Abou Elkassim Britel; Abdul Halim Dalak; Ahmed Muhammed Haza al-Darbi; Wesam Abdulrahman Ahmed al-Deemawi; Noor al-Deen; Saleh Hadiyah Abu Abdullah Di'iki; Gouled Hassan Dourad; Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil; Ali Muhammed Abdul Aziz al-Fakhiri; Omar al-Faruq; Mouad al Fizani; Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani; Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi; Omar Ghramesh; Speen Ghul; Hassan Ghul; Janat Gul; Ibrahim Habaci; Mamdouh Habib; Mullah Habibullah; Rafiq al-Hami; Safwan al-Hasham; Khalifa Abdi Hassan; Omar bin Hassan; Mustafa al-Hawsawi; Abdulsalam al-Hela; Abou Hudeifa; Soufian al-Huwari; Abdel Aziz Inayatullah; Riduan Isamuddin; Mahmud Sardar Issa; Mohammed Ali Isse; Marwan Jabour; Bahaa Mustafa Jaghel; Abu Yousef al-Jaza'eri; Khayr al-Din al-Jaza'eri; Adil al-Jazeeri; Ibrahim Abu Mu'ath al-Jeddawi; Sanad al-Kazimi; Majid Khan; Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan; Haji Wazir Khougiani;

Mohammad Nasir Yahya Khusruf; Barah Abdul Latif; Mohammed Nazir bin Lep; Ayoub al-Libi; Mustafa Salim Ali el-Madaghi; Muhammed Saad Iqbal Madni; Majid Mokhtar Sasy al-Maghrebi; Khaled al-Makhtari; Fadi al-Maqaleh; Jamal al-Mar'i; Bashir Nasir Ali Al Marwalah; Khaled El-Masri; Saif al-Aslam el-Masry; Sharif al-Masri; Hail Aziz Ahmed al-Maythali; Abdul Karim Mehmood; Saud Memon; Amir Hussein Abdullah al-Misri; Binyam Mohamed; Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani; Redha al-Najar; Abd al Rahim al Nashiri; Mustafa Setmariam Nassar; Osama Nazir; Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr; Saifullah Paracha; Walid Muhammad Shahir al-Qadasi; Salah Nasir Salim Ali Qaru; Abdul al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani; Mohammed Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani; Hassan Rabi'i; Gul Rahman; Omar Muhammad Ali al-Rammah; Ahmed Abdul Rashid; Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul; Bisher al-Rawi; Abdullah Ahmad Salih al-Rimi; Al-Rubaia; Sami al-Saadi; Abu Bakr Saddiqi; Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq; Laid Saidi; Sheikh Ahmed Salim; Suleiman Abdallah Salim; Khaled al-Sharif; Abdu Ali al-Hajj Sharqawi; Ramzi bin al-Shibh; Aafia Siddiqui; Mohamedou Ould Slahi; Ibad al Yaquti al Sheikh al-Soufiyan; Abu Hassan al-Suri; Abu Hamza al-Tabuki; Yasser Tinawi; Aminullah Baryalai Tukhi; Arif Ulusam; Khalil al-Uzbeki; Amin al-Yafi; Majid Abu Yasser; Osama bin Yousaf; Hassan Zamiri; Mohammad Haydar Zammar; Khalid al-Zawahiri; Muhammed al-Zery; Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn.

6.2.2 Country-Years Where Human Rights Texts Refer to Prisoners

We search the corpus of annual human rights reports by Amnesty International and the US Department State for the names listed above.[5] The country-years in which the texts underlying the CIRI, Fariss, and PTS datasets mention one or more of the prisoners above include: United Kingdom (2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); Egypt (2007); Sweden (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011); Canada (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007);

---

[5]These texts are available at: Christopher J. Fariss; Fridolin J. Linder; Zachary M. Jones; Charles D. Crabtree; Megan A. Biek; Ana-Sophia M. Ross; Taranamol Kaur; Michael Tsai , 2015, "Human Rights Texts: Converting Human Rights Primary Source Documents into Data", doi:10.7910/DVN/IAH8OY, Harvard Dataverse, V3

Jordan (2003, 2007, 2008); Syria (2003, 2005); Pakistan (2004, 2007, 2008); Italy (2007); Australia (2004, 2005); Bandgladesh (2006); Germany (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011); Macedonia (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011); Morocco (2009); Poland (2010); Yemen (2004).

6.2.3 Prisoners Mentioned in Human Rights Reports

The prisoners we found named in the human rights reports are: Shaker Aamer; Ahmed Agiza; Maher Arar; Samer Helmi al-Barq; Abdul Basit; Abou Elkassim Britel; Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani; Mamdouh Habib; Majid Khan; Khaled El-Masri; Saud Memon; Binyam Mohamed; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; Abd al Rahim al Nashiri; Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr; Walid Muhammad Shahir al-Qadasi; Bisher al-Rawi; Ramzi bin al-Shibh; Aafia Siddiqui.

6.2.4 Data Visualization

Figure 12: Respect for Human Rights among Non-Democracies by Participation, 1992-2011, excluding country-years with human rights reports containing one or more detainee names

Figure 13: Respect for Human Rights among Non-Democracies by Participation, 1992-2011, excluding country-years with human rights reports containing one or more detainee names

6.2.5 Statistical Analysis

Table 14: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011, excluding country-years with human rights reports containing one or more detainee names

	Dependent variable:							
	Physical Integrity Score (CIRI)				Latent Variable Model (Fariss)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.198		−0.236**		−0.037*		−0.040**	
	(0.133)		(0.119)		(0.021)		(0.019)	
Democratic participation		−0.072		−0.069		−0.002		−0.005
		(0.131)		(0.151)		(0.025)		(0.023)
Autocratic participation		−0.247		−0.301**		−0.051**		−0.054**
		(0.169)		(0.149)		(0.026)		(0.024)
Internal conflicts			−0.278***	−0.279***			−0.029***	−0.029***
			(0.081)	(0.081)			(0.010)	(0.010)
Terrorist attacks			−0.001*	−0.001*			−0.0002	−0.0002
			(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Transitional state			−0.088	−0.086			0.015	0.016
			(0.078)	(0.078)			(0.014)	(0.014)
Polity score			0.086***	0.086***			0.010***	0.010***
			(0.014)	(0.014)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Log population			0.279	0.325			−0.052	−0.042
			(0.326)	(0.345)			(0.067)	(0.069)
Log GDP per capita			0.125	0.123			−0.001	−0.001
			(0.144)	(0.143)			(0.028)	(0.027)
Log US trade			0.001	0.001			−0.0004	−0.0003
			(0.024)	(0.024)			(0.002)	(0.002)
Log US military assistance			−0.012	−0.011			−0.004	−0.003
			(0.022)	(0.022)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150
R^2	0.176	0.177	0.222	0.222	0.845	0.846	0.850	0.850

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

Table 15: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011, excluding country-years with human rights reports containing one or more detainee names

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
| | Disappearance Score (CIRI) | | | | Political Imprisonment Score (CIRI) | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.076		−0.089*		−0.092*		−0.104**	
	(0.056)		(0.052)		(0.054)		(0.052)	
Democratic participation		0.055		0.056		−0.078*		−0.055
		(0.076)		(0.080)		(0.043)		(0.051)
Autocratic participation		−0.126*		−0.145**		−0.098		−0.123*
		(0.068)		(0.061)		(0.070)		(0.067)
Internal conflicts			−0.060**	−0.061**			−0.075**	−0.075**
			(0.030)	(0.030)			(0.035)	(0.035)
Terrorist attacks			−0.0005	−0.0005			−0.0002	−0.0002
			(0.0003)	(0.0003)			(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Transitional state			−0.045	−0.044			0.003	0.004
			(0.029)	(0.029)			(0.031)	(0.031)
Polity score			0.023***	0.023***			0.037***	0.037***
			(0.006)	(0.006)			(0.006)	(0.006)
Log population			0.035	0.075			0.137	0.150
			(0.109)	(0.119)			(0.127)	(0.134)
Log GDP per capita			−0.003	−0.005			0.017	0.016
			(0.058)	(0.058)			(0.061)	(0.060)
Log US trade			0.010	0.011			−0.003	−0.003
			(0.008)	(0.008)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Log US military assistance			0.005	0.006			−0.002	−0.002
			(0.010)	(0.010)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150
R^2	0.158	0.160	0.180	0.182	0.099	0.099	0.137	0.137

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011, excluding country-years with human rights reports containing one or more detainee names

	Dependent variable:							
	Amnesty International Score (PTS)				State Department Score (PTS)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.092		−0.108*		−0.099*		−0.111**	
	(0.069)		(0.063)		(0.057)		(0.055)	
Democratic participation		0.090		0.091		−0.057		−0.049
		(0.097)		(0.090)		(0.081)		(0.087)
Autocratic participation		−0.161**		−0.185**		−0.115*		−0.135**
		(0.080)		(0.072)		(0.067)		(0.064)
Internal conflicts			−0.162***	−0.163***			−0.100***	−0.101***
			(0.045)	(0.045)			(0.034)	(0.034)
Terrorist attacks			−0.001***	−0.001***			−0.001	−0.001
			(0.0002)	(0.0002)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Transitional state			−0.042	−0.040			−0.036	−0.035
			(0.045)	(0.045)			(0.037)	(0.037)
Polity score			0.039***	0.040***			0.037***	0.037***
			(0.007)	(0.007)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Log population			0.228	0.283*			0.166	0.183
			(0.163)	(0.172)			(0.146)	(0.150)
Log GDP per capita			0.043	0.041			0.133**	0.133**
			(0.074)	(0.074)			(0.067)	(0.067)
Log US trade			0.006	0.006			0.002	0.002
			(0.008)	(0.007)			(0.009)	(0.009)
Log US military assistance			−0.010	−0.009			0.0003	0.001
			(0.010)	(0.010)			(0.010)	(0.010)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150
R^2	0.155	0.157	0.189	0.191	0.221	0.221	0.253	0.253

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

Table 17: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011, excluding country-years with human rights reports containing one or more detainee names

	Dependent variable:							
	Torture Score (CIRI)				Extrajudicial Killing Score (CIRI)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Participation	−0.012 (0.040)		−0.008 (0.038)		−0.046 (0.057)		−0.059 (0.055)	
Democratic participation		−0.036 (0.049)		−0.030 (0.050)		−0.046 (0.063)		−0.059 (0.074)
Autocratic participation		−0.003 (0.046)		0.001 (0.045)		−0.046 (0.072)		−0.060 (0.068)
Internal conflicts			−0.046 (0.036)	−0.046 (0.036)			−0.120*** (0.029)	−0.120*** (0.029)
Terrorist attacks			−0.0002 (0.0002)	−0.0002 (0.0002)			−0.0003 (0.0003)	−0.0003 (0.0003)
Transitional state			0.021 (0.028)	0.020 (0.028)			−0.085*** (0.031)	−0.085*** (0.031)
Polity score			0.015*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)			0.019*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)
Log population			0.074 (0.146)	0.068 (0.150)			0.085 (0.125)	0.085 (0.128)
Log GDP per capita			0.066 (0.052)	0.066 (0.052)			0.048 (0.057)	0.048 (0.057)
Log US trade			−0.006 (0.004)	−0.006 (0.004)			0.004 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)
Log US military assistance			−0.014 (0.009)	−0.014 (0.009)			−0.001 (0.009)	−0.001 (0.009)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150	3,150
R^2	0.083	0.083	0.095	0.095	0.075	0.075	0.107	0.107

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

7 Additional Considerations

We believe there are at least two additional reasons to suspect that the true relationship between participation in the RDI program and the worsening of states' human rights practices is greater than what has been uncovered by this analysis.

First, the datasets employed provided standards-based measures of human rights practices. The CIRI component scores, for instance, categorize countries without any recorded abuses in one group, those with a few violations in another, and those with many (or systematic) violations in a third. As a result, the measurement is insensitive to increasing abuses among those already categorized in the worst category. If the impact of participation is greater among those that are already in the worst category, then this change will not be reflected quantitatively in the data.

Second, the datasets are also derived in whole or part form the annual human rights reports produced by the US Department of State. If the State Department writes more favorable reports for its allies than its adversaries and if the US systematically cooperated in its RDI program with its allies, then there is a bias in the data against states cooperating in the program having worsening human rights practices. This is yet another reason to suspect that the relationships uncovered in this study are understatements of the true impact. The RDI program may have had even more severe consequences on other states' human rights practices than we currently observe.