# Replication of Partners in Crime: An Empirical Evaluation of the CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program

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In (Schmidt and Sikkink (2018b)).

Figure 1






Figure 2



— Active Participants --- Other States

Figure 3



— Active Participants --- Other States

## Tables

Table 1: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011

|                            | Physical Integrity Score (CIRI) |         |                | Latent Variable Model Score (Fariss) |         |               |               |               |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|----------------|--------------------------------------|---------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|                            | (1)                             | (2)     | (3)            | (4)                                  | (5)     | (6)           | (7)           | (8)           |
| Participation              | $-0.207^*$                      |         | -0.238**       |                                      | -0.032  |               | -0.036**      |               |
| -                          | (0.125)                         |         | (0.111)        |                                      | (0.020) |               | (0.018)       |               |
| Democratic participation   | ,                               | -0.127  | ,              | -0.127                               | ,       | 0.004         | , ,           | -0.002        |
|                            |                                 | (0.112) |                | (0.129)                              |         | (0.023)       |               | (0.022)       |
| Autocratic participation   |                                 | -0.244  |                | -0.290**                             |         | $-0.049^{**}$ |               | -0.052**      |
|                            |                                 | (0.166) |                | (0.146)                              |         | (0.025)       |               | (0.023)       |
| Internal conflicts         |                                 |         | $-0.277^{***}$ | $-0.277^{***}$                       |         |               | -0.028***     | -0.028***     |
|                            |                                 |         | (0.080)        | (0.080)                              |         |               | (0.010)       | (0.010)       |
| Terrorist attacks          |                                 |         | $-0.001^*$     | $-0.001^*$                           |         |               | -0.0002       | -0.0002       |
|                            |                                 |         | (0.001)        | (0.001)                              |         |               | (0.0001)      | (0.0001)      |
| Transitional state         |                                 |         | -0.090         | -0.088                               |         |               | 0.016         | 0.016         |
|                            |                                 |         | (0.077)        | (0.077)                              |         |               | (0.014)       | (0.014)       |
| Polity score               |                                 |         | 0.086***       | $0.086^{***}$                        |         |               | $0.010^{***}$ | $0.010^{***}$ |
|                            |                                 |         | (0.014)        | (0.014)                              |         |               | (0.003)       | (0.003)       |
| Log population             |                                 |         | 0.279          | 0.319                                |         |               | -0.058        | -0.046        |
|                            |                                 |         | (0.323)        | (0.345)                              |         |               | (0.067)       | (0.069)       |
| Log GDP per capita         |                                 |         | 0.123          | 0.123                                |         |               | -0.003        | -0.003        |
|                            |                                 |         | (0.143)        | (0.143)                              |         |               | (0.028)       | (0.028)       |
| Log US trade               |                                 |         | 0.002          | 0.002                                |         |               | -0.0004       | -0.0002       |
|                            |                                 |         | (0.024)        | (0.025)                              |         |               | (0.002)       | (0.002)       |
| Log US military assistance |                                 |         | -0.013         | -0.012                               |         |               | -0.004        | -0.004        |
|                            |                                 |         | (0.022)        | (0.022)                              |         |               | (0.003)       | (0.003)       |
| Fixed effects              | Yes                             | Yes     | Yes            | Yes                                  | Yes     | Yes           | Yes           | Yes           |
| N                          | 3,198                           | 3,198   | 3,198          | 3,198                                | 3,198   | 3,198         | 3,198         | 3,198         |
| $\mathbb{R}^2$             | 0.177                           | 0.177   | 0.223          | 0.223                                | 0.845   | 0.846         | 0.850         | 0.850         |

All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 2: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011


|                            | Disappearance Score (CIRI) |         |            | Political Imprisonment Score (CIRI) |            |          |               |               |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------|------------|-------------------------------------|------------|----------|---------------|---------------|
|                            | (1)                        | (2)     | (3)        | (4)                                 | (5)        | (6)      | (7)           | (8)           |
| Participation              | -0.075                     |         | $-0.086^*$ |                                     | $-0.092^*$ |          | -0.100**      |               |
|                            | (0.053)                    |         | (0.049)    |                                     | (0.051)    |          | (0.049)       |               |
| Democratic participation   |                            | 0.036   |            | 0.038                               |            | -0.079** |               | -0.059        |
|                            |                            | (0.063) |            | (0.067)                             |            | (0.039)  |               | (0.049)       |
| Autocratic participation   |                            | -0.126* |            | -0.144**                            |            | -0.097   |               | $-0.119^*$    |
|                            |                            | (0.068) |            | (0.060)                             |            | (0.069)  |               | (0.066)       |
| Internal conflicts         |                            |         | -0.063**   | -0.063**                            |            |          | -0.073**      | -0.073**      |
|                            |                            |         | (0.030)    | (0.030)                             |            |          | (0.035)       | (0.035)       |
| Terrorist attacks          |                            |         | -0.001     | -0.0005                             |            |          | -0.0002       | -0.0002       |
|                            |                            |         | (0.0003)   | (0.0003)                            |            |          | (0.0002)      | (0.0002)      |
| Transitional state         |                            |         | -0.046     | -0.044                              |            |          | 0.004         | 0.005         |
|                            |                            |         | (0.029)    | (0.029)                             |            |          | (0.031)       | (0.031)       |
| Polity score               |                            |         | 0.023****  | 0.023***                            |            |          | $0.037^{***}$ | $0.037^{***}$ |
|                            |                            |         | (0.005)    | (0.005)                             |            |          | (0.006)       | (0.006)       |
| Log population             |                            |         | 0.031      | 0.075                               |            |          | 0.137         | 0.151         |
|                            |                            |         | (0.107)    | (0.119)                             |            |          | (0.125)       | (0.134)       |
| Log GDP per capita         |                            |         | -0.004     | -0.005                              |            |          | 0.017         | 0.017         |
|                            |                            |         | (0.058)    | (0.057)                             |            |          | (0.061)       | (0.060)       |
| Log US trade               |                            |         | 0.010      | 0.011                               |            |          | -0.003        | -0.002        |
|                            |                            |         | (0.008)    | (0.008)                             |            |          | (0.008)       | (0.008)       |
| Log US military assistance |                            |         | 0.005      | 0.006                               |            |          | -0.004        | -0.003        |
|                            |                            |         | (0.010)    | (0.010)                             |            |          | (0.008)       | (0.008)       |
| Fixed effects              | Yes                        | Yes     | Yes        | Yes                                 | Yes        | Yes      | Yes           | Yes           |
| N                          | 3,198                      | 3,198   | 3,198      | 3,198                               | 3,198      | 3,198    | 3,198         | 3,198         |
| $\mathbb{R}^2$             | 0.162                      | 0.164   | 0.184      | 0.186                               | 0.100      | 0.100    | 0.137         | 0.137         |

All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01


### Extension

The extension is looking at the way that a country's human rights rating would change with the adoption of, participation in, or support of the CIA's RDI program. Using an indicator in the dataset, I was able to construct a profile for each of the different years to compare countries participating in and not participating in the program. An interesting thing to note in the dataset is that once a country was participating in the program, the data indicated that none of the countries backed out. The original paper (Schmidt and Sikkink (2018a)), included a note saying that this data was not readily available in their original dataset. If this data were available, it would be interested to have a better view of what was going on.


### Number of Countries Actively Adopting the RDI Program




Physical Integrity Score by Year for RDI Activated in 2001 RDI: orange, non-RDI: blue




Physical Integrity Score by Year for RDI Activated in 2002 RDI: orange, non-RDI: blue




Physical Integrity Score by Year for RDI Activated in 2003 RDI: orange, non-RDI: blue



Physical Integrity Score by Year for RDI Activated in 2004 RDI: orange, non-RDI: blue



Physical Integrity Score by Year for RDI Activated in 2005 RDI: orange, non-RDI: blue



Physical Integrity Score by Year for RDI v. non-RDI RDI: orange, non-RDI: blue




Table 1: Participation in RDI program and state respect for human rights, 1992-2011

|                            |                | Physical Integrity Score (CIRI) |
|----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|
|                            | (1)            | (2)                             |
| Participation              | $-0.464^{***}$ |                                 |
| •                          | (0.169)        |                                 |
| Democratic participation   | -0.741***      |                                 |
|                            | (0.116)        |                                 |
| Autocratic participation   | -0.926***      | $-0.980^{***}$                  |
|                            | (0.125)        | (0.057)                         |
| Internal conflicts         | $-0.004^{***}$ | $-0.004^{***}$                  |
|                            | (0.001)        | (0.001)                         |
| Terrorist attacks          | $-0.270^{**}$  | $-0.163^{***}$                  |
|                            | (0.121)        | (0.070)                         |
| Transitional state         | 0.116***       | $0.126^{***}$                   |
|                            | (0.009)        | (0.005)                         |
| Polity score               | -0.656***      | $-0.387^{***}$                  |
|                            | (0.048)        | (0.026)                         |
| Log population             | 0.209***       | $0.337^{***}$                   |
|                            | (0.054)        | (0.026)                         |
| Log GDP per capita         | 0.141***       | $-0.024^{*}$                    |
|                            | (0.022)        | (0.013)                         |
| Log US trade               | $-0.059^{***}$ | $-0.136^{***}$                  |
| _                          | (0.020)        | (0.013)                         |
| Log US military assistance | 12.185***      | 10.747***                       |
|                            | (0.824)        | (0.431)                         |
| Fixed effects              | Yes            | Yes                             |
| N                          | 759            | 2,491                           |
| Log Likelihood             | -1,296.139     | -4,446.552                      |
| AIC                        | 2,614.277      | 8,911.104                       |

All models include country and year fixed effects and a dependent variable lagged one year. Country level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### References

Schmidt, Averell, and Kathyrn Sikkink. 2018a. "Partners in Crime: An Empirical Evaluation of the Cia Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program." Perspectives on Politics 16 (4): 1014-33. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592717004224.

——. 2018b. "Replication files for "Partners in Crime: An Empirical Evaluation of the CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program" in Perspectives on Politics." Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CC8VFT.