# Daughters

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## Table 2: Demographics of U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges Who Voted on Gender-Related Cases, 1996-2002

| | All | Democrats | Republicans | Women | Men |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean Number of Children | 2.47 | 2.40 | 2.54 | 1.58 | 2.66 |
| Mean Number of Girls | 1.24 | 1.33 | 1.16 | 0.71 | 1.34 |
| Proportion Who Have 0 Children | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.29 | 0.08 |
| 1 Child | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.21 | 0.07 |
| 2 Children | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.36 | 0.26 | 0.36 |
| 3 Children | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.26 |
| 4 Children | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.15 |
| 5 Children | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| 6 Children or More | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | - | 0.03 |
| Proportion Female | 0.17 | 0.26 | 0.09 | - | - |
| Proportion Republican | 0.54 | - | - | 0.29 | 0.59 |
| Proportion White | 0.91 | 0.78 | 0.99 | 0.93 | 0.91 |
| Mean Year Born | 1932.55 | 1931.23 | 1933.43 | 1938.57 | 1931.49 |
| N | 224.00 | 103.00 | 121.00 | 38.00 | 186.00 |

**Table 3: Distribution of the Number of Gender-Related Cases Heard per Judge, 1996-2002**

| | Min. | 1st Qu. | Median | Mean | 3rd Qu. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Judges | 1 | 5 | 8 | 11.10 | 14 | 46 |
| Democrats | 1 | 5 | 7 | 10.12 | 13 | 39 |
| Republicans | 1 | 5 | 9 | 11.94 | 14 | 46 |

## Table 4: Weighted Least Squares Results, Gender-Related Cases Only

This table deals with a regression of the percent increase in the likelihood of a judge deciding a case in a feminine direction. The weights in the regression are corresponding to the number of cases that have been heard by each judge. This application in the paper makes sense, because it is desireable to assign more significance in our model to the data that we are more sure is correct (in this case defined as having more observed occurences of a judge's behavior).

However, there are concerns with the overall shape of the data. The data set first of all contains a lot of very low numbers of cases in it - 50% of hthe judges have less than or equal to 8 cases that describe them, and 25% have less than or equal to 5 cases. On the low end, that means that there are a lot of judges that have very low numbers of caes thatwe have data on. This means that their proportion of progressive votes decided could be significantly inaccurate for these many judges with very small case files. Because the model underweights these areas of the data, however, the deletion of these potentially incorrect points should not affect the ultimate model, however.

The algorithm also very heavily weights the cases with a significant amount of data. However, because there are very few of these cases, that means that potentially outlying statistical effects can be greatly increased. Their removal does not mean that there is going to be

"Weighted least squares results, gender cases only. Outcome is proportion of feminist votes. Models 1–4 are for all judges, while Models 5–8 are for judges with 1–4 children. (No judge among those with 1–4 children had four girls.) All models include fixed effects for number of children and use weights based on the number of cases heard by each judge."

# Table 4: Weighted Least Squares Results, Gender-Related Cases Only

Table 4:

| | All Judges | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| 1 Girl | $0.09^{**}$ | | | | $0.09^{**}$ | | | |
| | (0.04) | | | | (0.04) | | | |
| 2 Girls | 0.05 | | | | 0.05 | | | |
| | (0.04) | | | | (0.04) | | | |
| 3 Girls | 0.06 | | | | 0.08 | | | |
| | (0.06) | | | | (0.07) | | | |
| 4 Girls | −0.35 | | | | | | | |
| | (0.46) | | | | | | | |
| 5 Girls | 0.27 | | | | | | | |
| | (0.17) | | | | | | | |
| At Least 1 Girl | | $0.07^{**}$ | $0.09^{**}$ | $0.07^{*}$ | | $0.07^{**}$ | $0.09^{**}$ | $0.07^{*}$ |
| | | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Republican | | | $-0.15^{***}$ | $-0.17^{***}$ | | | $-0.15^{***}$ | $-0.17^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.04) | (0.03) | | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Age at Investiture | | | $0.01^{**}$ | 0.004 | | | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| | | | (0.002) | (0.002) | | | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Catholic | | | $-0.08^{**}$ | $-0.08^{**}$ | | | −0.06 | −0.05 |
| | | | (0.03) | (0.03) | | | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Woman | | | $-0.08^{*}$ | $-0.07^{*}$ | | | −0.05 | −0.04 |
| | | | (0.05) | (0.04) | | | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| African American | | | −0.06 | −0.06 | | | −0.04 | −0.05 |
| | | | (0.07) | (0.07) | | | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Hispanic | | | −0.11 | −0.10 | | | −0.17 | −0.17 |
| | | | (0.11) | (0.10) | | | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| N | 224 | 224 | 161 | 161 | 182 | 182 | 130 | 130 |
| $R^2$ | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0.42 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.19 | 0.39 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | −0.01 | −0.01 | 0.12 | 0.30 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 0.28 |

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

"Weighted least squares results, gender cases only. Outcome is proportion of feminist votes. Models 1–4 are for all judges, while Models 5–8 are for judges with 1–4 children. (No judge among those with 1–4 children had four girls.) All models include fixed effects for number of children and use weights based on the number of cases heard by each judge."

THIS IS THE ONE WITH THE DATA THAT WE CHANGED UP! SO THIS IS THE CASE WHERE WE ONLY USE THE DATA FOR JUDGES WITH less than 14 CASES IN THE DATA

# Table 4: Weighted Least Squares Results, Gender-Related Cases Only

Table 4:

| | All Judges | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| 1 Girl | 0.03 | | | | 0.03 | | | |
| | (0.05) | | | | (0.05) | | | |
| 2 Girls | 0.03 | | | | 0.03 | | | |
| | (0.06) | | | | (0.06) | | | |
| 3 Girls | 0.09 | | | | 0.02 | | | |
| | (0.09) | | | | (0.10) | | | |
| 4 Girls | −0.49 | | | | | | | |
| | (0.44) | | | | | | | |
| 5 Girls | | 0.03 | 0.001 | −0.03 | | 0.03 | 0.001 | −0.04 |
| | | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.07) | | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| At Least 1 Girl | | | $-0.17^{***}$ | $-0.19^{***}$ | | | $-0.16^{***}$ | $-0.20^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.06) | (0.06) | | | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Republican | | | 0.003 | 0.003 | | | 0.003 | 0.005 |
| | | | (0.004) | (0.003) | | | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Age at Investiture | | | −0.05 | −0.06 | | | −0.05 | −0.03 |
| | | | (0.06) | (0.06) | | | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Catholic | | | −0.04 | −0.09 | | | 0.04 | 0.003 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.08) | | | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Woman | | | −0.14 | −0.09 | | | −0.05 | −0.08 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.11) | | | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| African American | | | −0.14 | −0.15 | | | −0.20 | −0.25 |
| | | | (0.14) | (0.14) | | | (0.18) | (0.17) |
| N | 172 | 172 | 116 | 116 | 141 | 141 | 96 | 96 |
| $R^2$ | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0.36 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 0.36 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | −0.04 | −0.03 | 0.02 | 0.18 | −0.04 | −0.02 | 0.02 | 0.17 |

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

"Weighted least squares results, gender cases only. Outcome is proportion of feminist votes. Models 1–4 are for all judges, while Models 5–8 are for judges with 1–4 children. (No judge among those with 1–4 children had four girls.) All models include fixed effects for number of children and use weights based on the number of cases heard by each judge."

THIS IS THE ONE WITH THE DATA THAT WE CHANGED UP! SO THIS IS THE CASE WHERE WE ONLY USE THE DATA FOR JUDGES WITH MORE THAN 5 CASES IN THE DATA

# Table 4: Weighted Least Squares Results, Gender-Related Cases Only

Table 4:

| | All Judges | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| 1 Girl | $0.08^{*}$ | | | | $0.08^{**}$ | | | |
| | (0.04) | | | | (0.04) | | | |
| 2 Girls | 0.03 | | | | 0.03 | | | |
| | (0.04) | | | | (0.04) | | | |
| 3 Girls | 0.05 | | | | 0.09 | | | |
| | (0.07) | | | | (0.08) | | | |
| 4 Girls | −0.21 | | | | | | | |
| | (0.27) | | | | | | | |
| 5 Girls | 0.28 | | | | | | | |
| | (0.18) | | | | | | | |
| At Least 1 Girl | | 0.06 | $0.10^{**}$ | $0.07^{*}$ | | $0.06^{*}$ | $0.09^{**}$ | $0.08^{*}$ |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Republican | | | $-0.14^{***}$ | $-0.17^{***}$ | | | $-0.15^{***}$ | $-0.18^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.04) | (0.04) | | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Age at Investiture | | | $0.01^{**}$ | $0.005^{*}$ | | | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| | | | (0.003) | (0.002) | | | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Catholic | | | $-0.08^{**}$ | $-0.07^{**}$ | | | −0.05 | −0.05 |
| | | | (0.03) | (0.03) | | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Woman | | | −0.08 | −0.08 | | | −0.06 | −0.07 |
| | | | (0.05) | (0.05) | | | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| African American | | | −0.04 | −0.05 | | | −0.02 | −0.05 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.07) | | | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Hispanic | | | −0.10 | −0.11 | | | −0.17 | $-0.19^{*}$ |
| | | | (0.11) | (0.10) | | | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| N | 160 | 160 | 116 | 116 | 129 | 129 | 91 | 91 |
| $R^2$ | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.24 | 0.48 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.23 | 0.46 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | −0.02 | −0.02 | 0.12 | 0.32 | −0.004 | −0.004 | 0.13 | 0.30 |

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

"Logit and ordered logit results, gender cases only. Outcome is whether judge in a case votes in a feminist direction (Columns 1–5) or in a conservative, moderate, or liberal direction (Column 6). All models include fixed effects for total number of children and Columns 3–6 include circuit and year fixed effects. Column 5 additionally includes standard errors clustered at the case level

# Table 5: Logit and Ordered Logit Results, Gender-Related Cases Only

Table 5:

| | progressive_vote | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| 1 Girl | $0.38^{***}$ | | | | |
| | (0.13) | | | | |
| 2 Girls | 0.20 | | | | |
| | (0.14) | | | | |
| 3 Girls | 0.35 | | | | |
| | (0.23) | | | | |
| At Least 1 Girl | | $0.32^{***}$ | $0.40^{**}$ | $0.42^{**}$ | $0.42^{**}$ |
| | | (0.12) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| Republican | | | $-0.70^{***}$ | $-0.68^{***}$ | $-0.68^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.16) |
| Age at Investiture | | | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | | | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Catholic | | | −0.19 | −0.21 | −0.21 |
| | | | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Woman | | | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.10 |
| | | | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.21) |
| African American | | | −0.18 | −0.20 | −0.20 |
| | | | (0.31) | (0.31) | (0.32) |
| Hispanic | | | −0.65 | −0.65 | −0.65 |
| | | | (0.45) | (0.45) | (0.51) |
| Employment | | | | $-1.54^{***}$ | −1.54 |
| | | | | (0.50) | (1.10) |
| Pregnancy | | | | $-1.73^{***}$ | −1.73 |
| | | | | (0.55) | (1.16) |
| Reproductive | | | | −1.43 | −1.43 |
| | | | | (1.16) | (10.56) |
| Title IX | | | | −0.29 | −0.29 |
| | | | | (0.69) | (2.46) |
| N | 1,974 | 1,974 | 1,507 | 1,507 | 1,507 |
| Log Likelihood | −1,319.68 | −1,320.98 | −941.41 | −932.03 | −932.03 |
| AIC | 2,653.37 | 2,651.97 | 1,938.81 | 1,928.06 | 1,928.06 |

$^{*}$p < .1; $^{**}$p < .05; $^{***}$p < .01

## Table 6: omitted from results

## Table 7: Weighted Least Squares Results

Table 7: Weighted least squares results. Outcome is judges' proportion of feminist votes on gender-related cases. All models include fixed effects for total number of children and use weights based on the number of cases heard by each judge.

| | **Share of Votes in Feminist Direction** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** |
| At Least 1 Girl | 0.07* | 0.04 | 0.08** | 0.05 | 0.08* |
| | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.08) | (0.04) |
| 2 Children | −0.005 | 0.10* | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.02 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.07) |
| 3 Children | −0.01 | 0.08 | 0.04 | −0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.10) | (0.07) |
| 4 Children | −0.07 | 0.19** | 0.02 | 0.01 | −0.06 |
| | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.13) | (0.08) |
| Constant | 0.30*** | 0.35*** | 0.30*** | 0.34*** | 0.28*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| N | 97 | 85 | 156 | 26 | 90 |
| R-squared | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.05 |
| Adj. R-squared | −0.004 | 0.05 | 0.01 | −0.09 | 0.001 |

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

# Table 8

Table 8:

| | Liberal Judge-Vote | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
| 1 Girl | 0.161** | 0.161** | 0.159** |
| | (0.080) | (0.068) | (0.069) |
| 1 Child | −0.119* | | |
| | (0.067) | | |
| Republican | | | −0.037 |
| | | | (0.069) |
| Constant | 0.393*** | 0.274*** | 0.292*** |
| | (0.037) | (0.047) | (0.059) |
| N | 46 | 21 | 21 |
| R-squared | 0.097 | 0.230 | 0.242 |
| Adj. R-squared | 0.055 | 0.189 | 0.158 |

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

## Table 9: Proportion of Girls (Conditional on Number of Children) for U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges Participating in Gender-Related Cases, 1996-2002

| | 0 Girls | 1 Girl | 2 Girls | 3 Girls | 4 Girls | 5 Girls | 0 Girls | 1 Girl | 2 Girls | 3 Girls | 4 Girls |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 1 | 0.46 | 0.54 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.62 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 2 | 0.15 | 0.48 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.32 | 0.50 | 0.18 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 3 | 0.08 | 0.46 | 0.33 | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.37 | 0.37 | 0.13 | 0.00 |
| 4 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.53 | 0.33 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.27 | 0.60 | 0.07 | 0.00 |
| 5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.43 | 0.29 | 0.14 |
| 7 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.33 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 0.00 |
| 9 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |

## REMOVED TABLES:

## Table 1: Number of Children and Girls for U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges Participating in Gender-Related Cases, 1996-2002

| **Count** | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Number of Children** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Democrats** | 12 | 13 | 33 | 24 | 15 | 4 | - | 1 | - | 1 | 103 |
| **Republicans** | 13 | 8 | 44 | 30 | 15 | 7 | 3 | - | 1 | - | 121 |
| **Number of Girls** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Democrats** | 26 | 35 | 29 | 10 | 1 | 2 | - | - | - | - | 103 |
| **Republicans** | 36 | 43 | 31 | 9 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | 121 |

**Figure 1: Distribution of the Proportion of Cases Decided in a Feminist Direction out of All Gender-Related Cases Decided, 1996-2002**