Daughters


Enxhi Buxheli and John La Velle 2/2/2019

party	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Number of Children											
Democrats	12	13	33	24	15	4	-	1	-	1	103
Republicans	13	8	44	30	15	7	3	-	1	-	121
Number of Girls											
Democrats	26	35	29	10	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
Republicans	36	43	31	9	2	-	-	-	-	-	-

% latex table generated in R 3.5.2 by x table 1.8-3 package % Tue Feb 5 19:45:47 2019

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Women	Men
Mean No. Children	2.47	2.40	2.54	1.58	2.66
Mean No. Girls	1.24	1.33	1.16	0.71	1.34
Proportion who have 0 children	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.29	0.08
1 children	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.21	0.07
2 children	0.34	0.32	0.36	0.26	0.36
3 children	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.13	0.26
4 children	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.08	0.15
5 Children	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.05
6 Children or More	0.03	0.02	0.03		0.03
Proportion Female	0.17	0.26	0.09	1.00	0.00
Proportion Republican	0.54	0.00	1.00	0.29	0.59
Proportion White	0.91	0.78	0.99	0.93	0.91
Mean Year Born	1932.55	1931.23	1933.43	1938.57	1931.49
N	224.00	103.00	121.00	38.00	186.00

Table 1: Demographics of U.S. Court of Appeal Judges who voted on gender-related cases (1996-2002)



 $_{\left[1
ight]}$ 2674 Proportion of Cases Decided in a Feminist Direction

% latex table generated in R 3.5.2 by x table 1.8-3 package % Tue Feb 5 19:45:48 2019

	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
All Judges	1.00	5.00	8.00	11.10	14.00	46.00
Democrats	1.00	5.00	7.00	10.12	13.00	39.00
Republicans	1.00	5.00	9.00	11.94	14.00	46.00

Table 2: Distribution of the number of gender-related cases heard per judge, 1996-2002.

% latex table generated in R 3.5.2 by x table 1.8-3 package % Tue Feb 5 19:45:51 2019

Table 3:

	O	least square	, 0				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
1 Girl	0.09**				0.09**		
	(0.04)				(0.04)		
2 Girls	0.05				0.05		
	(0.04)				(0.04)		
3 Girls	0.06				0.08		
	(0.06)				(0.07)		
l Girls	-0.35						
	(0.46)						
6 Girls	0.27						
	(0.17)						
At Least 1 Girl		0.07^{**}	0.09**	0.07^{*}		0.07^{**}	0.09**
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Child	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07	-0.05			
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	_	_	
2 Children	-0.04	-0.05	-0.11^*	-0.07	0.04	0.03	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
3 Children	-0.04	-0.05	-0.10^*	-0.11^*	0.04	0.02	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Children	-0.04	-0.06	-0.14^{*}	-0.09	0.04	0.02	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
6 Children	-0.04	-0.03	-0.09	-0.02			
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)			
6 Children	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.10			
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)			
Children	0.43	0.01	-0.11	-0.06			
	(0.48)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)			
3 Children	0.13	-0.30	-0.25	-0.33			
	(0.53)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.23)			
Children	-0.17	0.04	-0.14	-0.02			
	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.15)			
Republican			-0.15***	-0.17^{***}			-0.15***
			(0.04)	(0.03)			(0.04)
Age at Investiture			0.01**	0.004			0.004
			(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.003)
Catholic			-0.08**	-0.08**			-0.06
			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.04)
Woman			-0.08*	-0.07^{*}			-0.05
			(0.05)	(0.04)			(0.05)
African American			-0.06	-0.06			-0.04
			(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.08)
Hispanic			-0.11	-0.10			-0.17
			(0.11)	(0.10)			(0.12)
Constant	0.39***	0.39***	0.30**	0.54^{***}	0.31***	0.32^{***}	0.29^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.16)
V	224	224	161	161	182	182	130
R-squared	0.06	0.04	0.21	0.42	0.04	0.03	0.19
Adj. R-squared	-0.01	-0.01	0.12	0.30	0.01	0.01	0.13

 $^{^{***}}p < .01; ^{**}p < .05; ^{*}p < .1$

Table 4:

		Dep	endent varial	ole:	
		pro	ogressive_vot	e	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1 Girl	0.38*** (0.13)				
2 Girls	0.20 (0.14)				
3 Girls	0.35 (0.23)				
At Least 1 Girl		0.32*** (0.12)	0.40** (0.16)	0.42** (0.17)	0.42** (0.17)
2 Children	0.16 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	$0.06 \\ (0.22)$	$0.06 \\ (0.23)$	0.06 (0.23)
3 Children	0.17 (0.17)	0.11 (0.16)	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.06 (0.23)	-0.06 (0.23)
4 Children	0.16 (0.21)	$0.07 \\ (0.19)$	-0.17 (0.26)	-0.18 (0.26)	-0.18 (0.26)
Republican			-0.70^{***} (0.15)	-0.68^{***} (0.15)	-0.68^{***} (0.15)
Age at Investiture			$0.02 \\ (0.01)$	$0.02 \\ (0.01)$	0.02 (0.01)
Catholic			-0.19 (0.14)	-0.21 (0.14)	-0.21 (0.14)
Woman			-0.07 (0.21)	-0.10 (0.21)	-0.10 (0.21)
African American			-0.18 (0.31)	-0.20 (0.31)	-0.20 (0.31)
Hispanic			-0.65 (0.45)	-0.65 (0.45)	-0.65 (0.45)
10th Cir			-0.99^{***} (0.29)	-0.99^{***} (0.30)	-0.99^{***} (0.30)
11th Cir			-0.70^{**} (0.33)	-0.72^{**} (0.33)	-0.72^{**} (0.33)
2nd Cir			-0.19 (0.35)	-0.18 (0.35)	-0.18 (0.35)
Brd Cir		4	-0.19 (0.35)	-0.19 (0.35)	-0.19 (0.35)
4th Cir		-	-0.65** (0.33)	-0.72^{**} (0.33)	-0.72^{**} (0.33)

Logit and ordered logit results, gender cases only. Outcome is whether judge in a case votes in a feminist direction (Column

Table 6: Weighted least squares results. Outcome is judges' proportion of feminist votes on gender-related cases. All models include fixed effects for total number of children and use weights based on the number of cases heard by each judge.

	Share of Votes in Feminist Direction								
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5				
At Least 1 Girl	0.07^{*}	0.04	0.08**	0.05	0.08^{*}				
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)				
2 Children	-0.005	0.10^{*}	0.03	0.08	0.02				
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.07)				
3 Children	-0.01	0.08	0.04	-0.01	0.01				
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)				
4 Children	-0.07	0.19**	0.02	0.01	-0.06				
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.08)				
Constant	0.30***	0.35***	0.30***	0.34***	0.28***				
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)				
N	97	85	156	26	90				
R-squared	0.04	0.09	0.03	0.08	0.05				
Adj. R-squared	-0.004	0.05	0.01	-0.09	0.001				

 $^{^{***}}$ p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Table 7:

	$\mathbf{Lib}_{\mathbf{c}}$	eral Judge-V	Vote
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
I(girls >0)	0.161**	0.161**	0.159**
	(0.080)	(0.068)	(0.069)
as.factor(child)1	-0.119^*		
	(0.067)		
I(republican == 1)	, ,		-0.037
,			(0.069)
Constant	0.393***	0.274***	0.292***
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.059)
N	46	21	21
R-squared	0.097	0.230	0.242
Adj. R-squared	0.055	0.189	0.158

^{***}p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

	0 Girls	1 Girl	2 Girls	3 Girls	4 Girls	5 Girls	0 Girls	1 Girl	2 Girls	3 Girls	4 Girls
0	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1	0.46	0.54	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.38	0.62	0.00	0.00	0.00
2	0.15	0.48	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.32	0.50	0.18	0.00	0.00
3	0.08	0.46	0.33	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.37	0.37	0.13	0.00
4	0.07	0.07	0.53	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.27	0.60	0.07	0.00
5	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.50	0.00	0.25	0.14	0.00	0.43	0.29	0.14
7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.67	0.00
9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00