Daughters

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Table 1

party	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Number of Children											
Democrats	12	13	33	24	15	4	-	1	-	1	103
Republicans	13	8	44	30	15	7	3	-	1	-	121
Number of Girls											
Democrats	26	35	29	10	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
Republicans	36	43	31	9	2	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 2

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Women	Men
Mean No. Children	2.47	2.40	2.54	1.58	2.66
Mean No. Girls	1.24	1.33	1.16	0.71	1.34
Proportion who have 0 children	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.29	0.08
1 children	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.21	0.07
2 children	0.34	0.32	0.36	0.26	0.36
3 children	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.13	0.26
4 children	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.08	0.15
5 Children	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.05
6 Children or More	0.03	0.02	0.03		0.03
Proportion Female	0.17	0.26	0.09	1.00	0.00
Proportion Republican	0.54	0.00	1.00	0.29	0.59
Proportion White	0.91	0.78	0.99	0.93	0.91
Mean Year Born	1932.55	1931.23	1933.43	1938.57	1931.49
N	224.00	103.00	121.00	38.00	186.00

Table 1: Demographics of U.S. Court of Appeal Judges who voted on gender-related cases (1996-2002)



Table 3

	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
All Judges	1.00	5.00	8.00	11.10	14.00	46.00
Democrats	1.00	5.00	7.00	10.12	13.00	39.00
Republicans	1.00	5.00	9.00	11.94	14.00	46.00

Table 2: Distribution of the number of gender-related cases heard per judge, 1996-2002.

"Weighted least squares results, gender cases only. Outcome is proportion of feminist votes. Models 1–4 are for all judges, while Models 5–8 are for judges with 1–4 children. (No judge among those with 1–4 children had four girls.) All models include fixed effects for number of children and use weights based on the number of cases heard by each judge."

Table 4

Table 3:

	lib_vote_share							
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**	**Model 7**	**Model 8**
1 Girl	0.09**				0.09**			
	(0.04)				(0.04)			
2 Girls	0.05				0.05			
	(0.04)				(0.04)			
3 Girls	0.06				0.08			
	(0.06)				(0.07)			
4 Girls	−0.35							
	(0.46)							
5 Girls	0.27							
	(0.17)							
At Least 1 Girl		0.07**	0.09**	0.07*		0.07**	0.09**	0.07*
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
1 Child	−0.08	−0.07	−0.07	−0.05				
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)				
2 Children	−0.04	−0.05	−0.11*	−0.07	0.04	0.03	−0.04	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
3 Children	−0.04	−0.05	−0.10*	−0.11*	0.04	0.02	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
4 Children	−0.04	−0.06	−0.14*	−0.09	0.04	0.02	−0.06	−0.04
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
5 Children	−0.04	−0.03	−0.09	−0.02				
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)				
6 Children	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.10				
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)				
7 Children	0.43	0.01	−0.11	−0.06				
	(0.48)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)				
8 Children	0.13	−0.30	−0.25	−0.33				
	(0.53)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.23)				
9 Children	−0.17	0.04	−0.14	−0.02				
	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.15)				
Republican			−0.15***	−0.17***			−0.15***	−0.17***
			(0.04)	(0.03)			(0.04)	(0.04)
Age at Investiture			0.01**	0.004			0.004	0.004
			(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Catholic			−0.08**	−0.08**			−0.06	−0.05
			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.04)	(0.03)
Woman			−0.08*	−0.07*			−0.05	−0.04
			(0.05)	(0.04)			(0.05)	(0.05)
African American			−0.06	−0.06			−0.04	−0.05
			(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.08)	(0.08)
Hispanic			−0.11	−0.10			−0.17	−0.17
			(0.11)	(0.10)			(0.12)	(0.11)
Constant	0.39***	0.39***	0.30**	0.54***	0.31***	0.32***	0.29*	0.43**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.17)
N	224	224	161	161	182	182	130	130
R-squared	0.06	0.04	0.21	0.42	0.04	0.03	0.19	0.39
Adj. R-squared	−0.01	−0.01	0.12	0.30	0.01	0.01	0.13	0.28

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

“Logit and ordered logit results, gender cases only. Outcome is whether judge in a case votes in a feminist direction (Columns 1–5) or in a conservative, moderate, or liberal direction (Column 6). All models include fixed effects for total number of children and Columns 3–6 include circuit and year fixed effects. Column 5 additionally includes standard errors clustered at the case level

Table 5

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu
% Date and time: Wed, Feb 06, 2019 - 02:06:40

Table 4:

	progressive_vote				
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
1 Girl	0.38***				
	(0.13)				
2 Girls	0.20				
	(0.14)				
3 Girls	0.35				
	(0.23)				
At Least 1 Girl		0.32***	0.40**	0.42**	0.42**
		(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
2 Children	0.16	0.12	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)
3 Children	0.17	0.11	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)
4 Children	0.16	0.07	−0.17	−0.18	−0.18
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Republican			−0.70***	−0.68***	−0.68***
			(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Age at Investiture			0.02	0.02	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Catholic			−0.19	−0.21	−0.21
			(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Woman			−0.07	−0.10	−0.10
			(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
African American			−0.18	−0.20	−0.20
			(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Hispanic			−0.65	−0.65	−0.65
			(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.51)
10th Cir			−0.99***	−0.99***	−0.99**
			(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.48)
11th Cir			−0.70**	−0.72**	−0.72
			(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.52)
2nd Cir			−0.19	−0.18	−0.18
			(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.50)
3rd Cir			−0.19	−0.19	−0.19
			(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.56)
4th Cir			−0.65**	−0.72**	−0.72
			(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.52)
5th Cir			−0.64*	−0.62*	−0.62
			(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.53)
6th Cir			−1.16***	−1.17***	−1.17**
			(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.46)
7th Cir			−0.88***	−0.91***	−0.91**
			(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.44)
8th Cir			−1.14***	−1.19***	−1.19***
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.44)
9th Cir			−0.27	−0.32	−0.32
			(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.47)
DC			0.66	0.66	0.66
			(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.69)
1997			−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
			(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.37)
1998			0.45*	0.47*	0.47
			(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.38)
1999			0.18	0.21	0.21
			(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.40)
2000			0.17	0.17	0.17

Table 6: omitted from results

Table 7

Table 5: Weighted least squares results. Outcome is judges' proportion of feminist votes on gender-related cases. All models include fixed effects for total number of children and use weights based on the number of cases heard by each judge.

	Share of Votes in Feminist Direction				
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
At Least 1 Girl	0.07^{*}	0.04	0.08^{**}	0.05	0.08^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)
2 Children	-0.005	0.10^{*}	0.03	0.08	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.07)
3 Children	-0.01	0.08	0.04	-0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)
4 Children	-0.07	0.19^{**}	0.02	0.01	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Constant	0.30^{***}	0.35^{***}	0.30^{***}	0.34^{***}	0.28^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
N	97	85	156	26	90
R-squared	0.04	0.09	0.03	0.08	0.05
Adj. R-squared	-0.004	0.05	0.01	-0.09	0.001

$^{***}p < .01$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{*}p < .1$

Table 8

Table 6:

	Liberal Judge-Vote		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
I(girls >0)	0.161**	0.161**	0.159**
	(0.080)	(0.068)	(0.069)
as.factor(child)1	−0.119*		
	(0.067)		
I(republican == 1)			−0.037
			(0.069)
Constant	0.393***	0.274***	0.292***
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.059)
N	46	21	21
R-squared	0.097	0.230	0.242
Adj. R-squared	0.055	0.189	0.158

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

	0 Girls	1 Girl	2 Girls	3 Girls	4 Girls	5 Girls	0 Girls	1 Girl	2 Girls	3 Girls	4 Girls
0	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1	0.46	0.54	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.38	0.62	0.00	0.00	0.00
2	0.15	0.48	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.32	0.50	0.18	0.00	0.00
3	0.08	0.46	0.33	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.37	0.37	0.13	0.00
4	0.07	0.07	0.53	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.27	0.60	0.07	0.00
5	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.50	0.00	0.25	0.14	0.00	0.43	0.29	0.14
7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.67	0.00
9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00