Replication 3

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# Figure 2

Table 1

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−0.217***	−0.127***	−0.145***	0.463***	36.125***
	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.139)	(9.244)
Level	County	County	County	County	Individual
1860 Covariates		✓	✓	✓	
State Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓	✓
State-Year Fixed Effects					✓
Clustered SEs					✓
N	1,242	1,152	1,152	1,027	1,489
R^2	0.065	0.203	0.101	0.143	0.183

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note. Models 1–4 are weighted least squares at the county level, with within-county sample sizes, adjusted by sampling weights, as weights. Model 5 is weighted least squares at the individual level with state-year fixed effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the county level in model 5. There are 50 counties in model 5.

Table 2

This table isn't quite right. The data contain missing values. CEM will match on them; see the manual for other options.

	Prop Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−0.202***		−0.149***		0.450**	
	(0.068)		(0.056)		(0.228)	
Slave State		0.015		0.017		−0.068
		(0.030)		(0.029)		(0.103)
State Fixed Effects	✓		✓		✓	
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
50% Threshold Match	✓		✓		✓	
North-South Match		✓		✓		✓
N	444	384	444	384	393	354
R^2	0.248	0.118	0.156	0.077	0.195	0.106

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note. Model 1 is the first-stage relationship. Models 2–5 are weighted two-stage least-squares models, with weights as given in table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 3

| | Prop Democrat | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, Direct Effect	−0.150***	−0.130**	−0.153***	−0.130***	0.514***	0.472**
	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.140)	(0.184)
Prop. Black, 2000	0.172***		0.062		−0.416***	
	(0.043)		(0.037)		(0.140)	
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bootstrapped SEs		✓		✓		✓
Model	WLS	Seq. g-est.	WLS	Seq. g-est.	WLS	Seq. g-est.
N	1,152	1,152	1,152	1,152	1,027	1,027
R^2	0.214	0.209	0.103	0.095	0.151	0.144

*$p < .1$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$

Note. Columns 1, 3, and 5 simply include proportion black in the year 2000 as an additional control to the baseline specification from table 1. Columns 2, 4, and 6 use sequential g-estimation (Seq, g-est) of Vansteelandt (2009). WLS = weighted least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Figure 4

Presidential Elections

Effect of proportion slave on vote for Democratic presidential candidate in the South over time. Each point is the effect of a 25 percentage point increase in proportion slave from separate IV models of county-level Democratic share of the presidential vote on proportion slave. Results for Obama in 2008 are from white respondents in the CCES.

Figure 5

Georgia Gubernatorial Election, 1851

Mississippi Gubernatorial Election, 1851

Within-state relationship between proportion slave in 1850 in a county and percentage voting for Unionist candidates in 1851 in that county. Both Howell Cobb and Henry Foote were running against strong States' Rights supporters in the aftermath of the Compromise of 1850. Higher values on each y-axis indicate more moderate voting with regard to slavery and secession.

Table 6

	Prop Democrat logistic (1)	Affirm. Action logistic (2)	Racial Resentment OLS (3)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−1.113*** (0.365)	−0.840** (0.358)	0.672** (0.265)
State-Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓
N	9,551	9,528	3,350
R²			0.059

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note. All models are at the individual level, with standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on county and weighted by CCES survey weights.