

Feature Extraction for Side-Channel Attacks

Eleonora Cagli

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leti

PhD Supervisor : Emmanuel Prouff (Safran Identity & Security) CEA Supervisor : Cécile Dumas (CEA-Leti Grenoble)





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1. Context

2. State of the Art, Objectives, Contributions





Secure Component and Embedded Cryptography

A piece of hardware with security properties. It usually embeds cryptography to provide security services (authentication, signature, secure messaging with terminals...)

- Sensitive applications: ID cards, credit cards, transport cards, health cards, SIM
- Pervasive aspect: several billion smartcards sold par year
- Hard to update
- ▶ Hostile environment





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⇒ Requires protection against very high-level attacker





Security Certification




- ► Standardized Evaluation (e.g. ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria)
- Assigns an Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)
- The evaluator checks the Security Assurance Requirements (SAR), e.g. ADV, ALC, AVA, ...
- AVA: vulnerability assessment (penetration testing → attack potential rating)





Side-Channel Vulnerability of Embedded Cryptography



Classical Cryptanalysis

- ▶ Black box (input, output)
- ► Formal attacker model (oracle, knowledge, ...)
- Computational complexity to perform the attack (e.g. 2^{126.1} operations to break AES-128 [bogdanov])


Side-Channel Cryptanalysis

- White box (input, output, side-channel observations of intermediate computations)
- Attacker with a certain equipment, expertise, knowledge of the embedded device, available time...
- ▶ In Common Criteria: the cotation table of the attack





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Side-Channel Attacks

- ▶ the physical nature of the exploited signals: power consumption, electromagnetic irradiation, time, sound, temperature, . . .
- ▶ the chosen sensitive variable/s Z:
 - ightharpoonup Z = K a secret key chunk
 - Z = f(K, E) a variable depending on a secret key chunk and on a piece of public information
 - ▶ an operation (e.g. $Z \in \{square, multiply, ...\}$)
 - ► a register
 - $Z' = \varphi(Z)$ a non-injective function of any sensitive variable (e.g. f = HW Hamming Weight)
- the strategy family: simple attacks, collision attacks, differential/advanced attacks
- ▶ the shape of the attack: horizontal attacks, vertical attacks
- ▶ the attacker knowledge: profiling, non-profiling attacks





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


Notations





Template Attack







Contributions

Objective





References I