

# Feature Extraction for Side-Channel Attacks

Eleonora Cagli

05/12/2018, Paris

*PhD Supervisor* : Emmanuel Prouff  
(Safran Identity & Security)

*CEA Supervisor* : Cécile Dumas  
(CEA-Leti Grenoble)

## Contents

1. Context
2. State of the Art, Objectives, Contributions

## Secure Component and Embedded Cryptography

**A piece of hardware with security properties.**

**It usually embeds cryptography to provide security services  
(authentication, signature, secure messaging with terminals...)**

- ▶ Sensitive applications: ID cards, credit cards, transport cards, health cards, SIM
- ▶ Pervasive aspect: several billion smartcards sold par year
- ▶ Hard to update
- ▶ Hostile environment

## Secure Component and Embedded Cryptography

**A piece of hardware with security properties.**

**It usually embeds cryptography to provide security services  
(authentication, signature, secure messaging with terminals...)**



- ▶ Sensitive applications: ID cards, credit cards, transport cards, health cards, SIM
- ▶ Pervasive aspect: several billion smartcards sold par year
- ▶ Hard to update
- ▶ Hostile environment

## Secure Component and Embedded Cryptography

**A piece of hardware with security properties.**

**It usually embeds cryptography to provide security services  
(authentication, signature, secure messaging with terminals...)**



- ▶ Sensitive applications: ID cards, credit cards, transport cards, health cards, SIM
- ▶ Pervasive aspect: several billion smartcards sold par year
- ▶ Hard to update
- ▶ Hostile environment

⇒ Requires protection against very high-level attacker

## Security Certification



*French Certification Scheme*

- ▶ Standardized Evaluation (e.g. ISO/IEC 15408 - Common Criteria)
- ▶ Assigns an Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)
- ▶ The evaluator checks the Security Assurance Requirements (SAR), e.g. ADV, ALC, AVA, ...
- ▶ AVA: vulnerability assessment (penetration testing → attack potential rating)

## Side-Channel Attacks on Embedded Cryptography



### Classical Cryptanalysis

- ▶ Black box (input, output)
- ▶ Formal attacker model (oracle, knowledge, ...)
- ▶ Computational complexity to perform the attack (e.g.  $2^{126.1}$  operations to break AES-128 [bogdanov])

### Side-Channel Cryptanalysis

- ▶ White box (input, output, side-channel observations of intermediate computations)
- ▶ Attacker with a certain equipment, expertise, knowledge of the embedded device, ...
- ▶ In Common Criteria: the cotation table of the attack

## Machine Learning



## Contents

1. Context
2. State of the Art, Objectives, Contributions

## Notations

## Template Attack

## Contributions

Objective

## References I