

Deposit Withdrawals^{*}

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Abstract

This paper develops a new approach to identify and quantify different rationales for deposit withdrawals. Exploiting variation in the cost of withdrawal induced by the maturity expiration of time-deposits, the approach can distinguish between withdrawals due to liquidity needs, exposure to fundamental uncertainty, or expectations about how other depositors will behave. Using daily micro-data from a large Greek bank we show that early deposit withdrawal probability quadruples in response to a policy uncertainty shock that doubled the short-run CDS price of Greek sovereign bonds. About two-thirds of this increase is driven by direct exposure to policy uncertainty with the remainder due to changes in expectations of behavior of other depositors. We estimate depositors' willingness to pay to avoid uncertainty to quantify the effects and find that depositors would have had to be offered annualized returns exceeding 50% to prevent withdrawals during high-uncertainty periods.

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1 Introduction

The global financial crisis saw runs on several prominent banks and financial intermediaries. It reopened fundamental old debates on the rationale of a banking system with run-prone deposits (e.g., [Diamond & Dybvig 1983](#), [Goldstein & Pauzner 2005](#)) as well as on policies that provide stability in the wake of uncertainty (e.g., [Drechsler et al. 2018](#); [Egan et al. 2017](#)).¹ Banking regulation that seeks to tackle these issues relies on some assessment of motives driving depositor withdrawals during uncertain and quiet times. Theoretical work has broadly categorized depositor withdrawal motives into reasons related to depositor liquidity needs (idiosyncratic uncertainty), reasons related to the fundamental value of deposits due to bank solvency or currency risk (fundamental uncertainty), or the expected withdrawal behavior of other depositors (strategic uncertainty). Empirical work that isolates and quantifies these motives during periods of heightened uncertainty has been very limited because, in theory, poor fundamentals not only affect depositor behavior directly, but also indirectly by changing expectations about how other depositors will behave (see, for example, [Morris & Shin 2004](#) and [He & Manela 2016](#)). The lack of a credible research design that can distinguish between these motivations remains an obstacle in characterizing and quantifying the drivers of deposit withdrawals in aggregate uncertainty environments. The present paper aims to fill this important gap.

We develop a new approach to measure the extent to which deposit withdrawals are due to liquidity, fundamental, or strategic motives. Our approach is based on tracking, at the individual level and at a daily frequency, early withdrawals of time-deposits. Time-deposit micro-data analysis provides three key tools for characterizing and quantifying deposit withdrawal motivations. First, early withdrawals of time-deposits (withdrawals before maturity) carry a measurable monetary penalty, which can be used to quantify depositors’ willingness to pay to withdraw. Second, the monetary cost of withdrawing a time-deposit drops discontinuously at the maturity date. This implies that any surprise announcement of a *dated* future fundamental uncertainty resolution event (e.g., a contested election in which one candidate threatens to nationalize the banking sector and the other does not) creates a natural experiment in which, otherwise similar, depositors face differential costs of avoiding fundamental uncertainty (e.g., depending on whether deposits mature before or after the election date). And third, early withdrawals of deposits that mature before the known date of fundamental uncertainty resolution are an ideal testing ground for measuring the strategic motive for withdrawals, because the holders of these deposits can avoid fundamental uncertainty at no cost by waiting to maturity. Provided the appropriate counterfactuals, which we discuss below, we can use these features of time-deposits to quantify separately depositors’ willingness to

¹Several theories have also been proposed on advantages that such deposits provide to the financial system during quiet and “sleepy” periods (e.g., [Hanson et al. 2015](#)).

pay to avoid fundamental and strategic uncertainty.

We implement our approach using daily deposit-level data with detailed contract characteristics on the entire universe of time-deposit accounts for retail customers of a large Greek bank (The Bank henceforth). The data spans the 2014-2015 period, during which the surprise announcement of an election that increased the risk of radical left-wing policies was followed by a 30% decline of deposits in the banking system. Time-deposits are an economically relevant source of funding in Greece, representing 62% of all Greek bank deposits by households.² This high prevalence of time-deposits is not unique to Greece. In Euro area country banks, close to 50% of domestic private non-financial deposits are time-deposits with a maturity over one year.³

We start by establishing new stylized facts on time-deposit withdrawal behavior in *quiet times*, the earlier period of our sample period when uncertainty (measured as the default risk of the The Bank and of Greek sovereign bonds) was at its lowest. We use this period as a benchmark for depositor behavior when fundamental uncertainty is negligible. Also, aggregate banking sector deposits and deposits at The Bank were growing during this period, which allows assuming that early withdrawals due to strategic uncertainty were also negligible. We use early withdrawals during this period to characterize withdrawal behavior motivated by depositors' idiosyncratic liquidity needs. We find that, on average, about 0.04% of depositors withdraw time deposits early on a daily basis. Aggregating this average over a year implies that 14.6% of time-deposits are withdrawn early due to liquidity reasons. The cost paid by depositors for early withdrawals during quiet times, measured as a forgone annualized return over the deposit amount, is on average 17% and can be as high as 65% for some depositors. These magnitudes imply that depositors exhibit a high willingness to pay to withdraw deposits for liquidity reasons.

Next we use the surprise announcement of a large policy uncertainty event in the second half of our sample to measure deposit withdrawal responses to strategic and fundamental uncertainty. The announcement of a Presidential election in Parliament occurred on December 8, 2014, and increased the likelihood of the opposition party taking control of government and implementing radical left-wing policies. The impact of the increased risk on the financial system was large, with the price of the 6-month CDS on Greek sovereign bonds increasing by 136% and the stock market dropping by 12%.

The policies included in the opposition party's agenda implied a substantial fundamental uncertainty regarding the value of deposits (e.g., Greece leaving the Euro zone and the conversion of deposits from Euros to a new Greek currency, the nationalization of the banking

²See Bank of Greece report on deposit markets, available at https://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/rates_markets/deposits.aspx

³See, for example, ECB report on Changes in Bank Financing Patterns, available at: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/changesinbankfinancingpatterns201204en.pdf?3afe7cf6dc78e23e1c8b5201d0dc51ae>

sector). However, these policies could only be implemented when (and if) the opposition party came to power. Due parliamentary process implied that the earliest the opposition party could take control of government was on late January 2015, six weeks after the announcement. Thus, the announcement was followed by six-week interim period during which none of the policies affecting the fundamental value of deposits could take place. Our empirical strategy to disentangle deposit withdrawals sensitivities to fundamental and strategic uncertainty exploits this heterogeneity of the impact of the announcement on withdrawal behavior across borrowers.

The announcement contains information that affects depositors' perceived exposure of time-deposits to future fundamental uncertainty, but its effect was heterogeneous across deposits of different maturity dates. Deposits that matured during the interim period faced no additional fundamental uncertainty after the announcement. These deposits could be held to maturity and withdrawn without penalty before new policies could take place. Deposits maturing after the interim period, on the other hand, could only avoid fundamental uncertainty by withdrawing before maturity. Thus, fundamental uncertainty induces *early* withdrawals of deposits that mature after the interim period, but does not induce early withdrawals for deposits that mature within it. Once fundamental uncertainty induces withdrawals by some depositors, all deposits become exposed to strategic uncertainty: the possibility that a large enough number of *other* deposits are withdrawn and the bank fails.⁴ Deposits that mature in the interim period can avoid fundamental uncertainty at no cost by waiting to maturity, but to avoid strategic uncertainty the deposit must be withdrawn as early as possible. Thus, strategic uncertainty induces early withdrawals of all deposits, independently of their maturity date.

To identify withdrawals due to strategic uncertainty we measure changes in withdrawal probabilities during the three weeks before and after the announcement of future potential policy changes, on the subsample of deposits maturing in the interim period (before policy changes can take place). We implement this test as a difference-in-difference specification where we account for time-series patterns in liquidity-driven withdrawals using depositor behavior in quiet times. The identifying assumption is that liquidity-driven withdrawals and bank fundamentals do not change during the three-week period after the announcement, for which we provide supporting evidence.

Our estimates imply that strategic uncertainty following the announcement increased depositors' propensity withdraw early by 70% relative to the quiet times baseline. The magnitude of the effect of strategic uncertainty on withdrawals varies little in the cross

⁴Theoretically, all deposits are exposed to strategic uncertainty all the time (including quiet times) because pure Diamond-Dybvig coordination runs can be driven by *sunspots*. In our empirical setting, as in any real world scenario with aggregate uncertainty, changes in fundamentals are driving the withdrawal behavior of a fraction of depositors. Our analysis distinguishes between withdrawals that are driven by the direct effect of fundamentals on deposit value, from the indirect effect through strategic withdrawals.

section of depositors or contract characteristics, relative to its average level. We do find a strong spatial autocorrelation in withdrawal behavior of depositors across nearby branches in the Northern region of Greece after the announcement. Before that event there is no evidence of depositor withdrawal behavior being correlated across space. After the event, we observe clusters across branches in particular areas in the country, which are not explained by depositors political views, income or demographics. Since strategic withdrawals can be fueled by observing the withdrawal behavior of other depositors (e.g., observing depositor queues in the local bank branch), it is reasonable for them to be spatially correlated. However, the overall evidence indicates that the observed heterogeneity in the magnitude of strategic withdrawals is difficult to predict ex-ante using observable characteristics of the borrower base.

To identify withdrawals due to fundamental uncertainty, we measure the change in withdrawal probability around the announcement of the general election date, on two subsamples: 1) deposits that matured after the new policies could be implemented (exposed to fundamental and strategic uncertainty), and 2) deposits that matured during the interim period (exposed to strategic uncertainty only). Differencing across the two subsamples identifies the change in withdrawal probability due to fundamental uncertainty alone. We implement this estimation as a triple-difference to account for time patterns of liquidity withdrawals using a counterfactual set of depositors during the quiet period. Our estimates imply that the increase in fundamental uncertainty induced depositors to increase by 200% the probability of early withdrawal, relative to the quiet times baseline, almost three times the effect on withdrawals of the increase in strategic uncertainty. In contrast to withdrawals induced by strategic motivations, fundamental withdrawals do not vary significantly in the cross section of borrowers or geography. This finding is reassuring of our fundamental-strategic withdrawal decomposition, since there is no a priori rationale to expect fundamental uncertainty to have a heterogeneous effect on withdrawal behavior. All the cross sectional heterogeneity in our setting is due to strategic withdrawals.

We next turn to quantifying depositors' willingness to pay to avoid uncertainty by withdrawing early. To back out a willingness to pay, we first estimate a cost-elasticity of withdrawals in quiet times, using the discontinuity around interest repayment dates for identification (around these dates the cost of early withdrawal drops to zero). We estimate a cost-elasticity of withdrawing deposits early of 1.54. The estimate implies that a decline in the penalty for early withdrawal equivalent to 1% of the deposit amount, increases the early withdrawal probability by 120%. Using this figure we ask the question: how much would The Bank have to pay depositors to prevent the withdrawal probability from increasing during the high uncertainty period (relative to quiet times)? We find that preventing withdrawal probabilities from increasing for a three-week period would have cost The Bank 2.38% of the value of deposits, which would have implied a cost of capital (at an annualized rate) exceeding

50%. This estimate is likely to be a lower bound on the cost of stabilizing deposits through prices, given that deposit interest increases can signal trouble to depositors and trigger further withdrawals. Thus, the cost of deposit stabilization through prices during periods of high policy uncertainty is very high, even in the absence of a panic-induced deposit run.⁵

All our estimates are short-run deposit withdrawal elasticities. The fundamental and strategic motives for withdrawals plausibly increase as bank deposits shrink. Moreover, our estimates pertain the early withdrawal of time-deposits, which entail an all-or-nothing decision that carries a monetary penalty. Regular deposits, in contrast, can be partially withdrawn with no penalty. Thus, our estimates are likely a lower bound on the withdrawal elasticity of regular deposits over longer horizons. To gauge external relevance of our estimates as well as to assess their plausibility, we perform two exercises. First, we compare the deposits demand elasticity implied by our quiet-times estimates to those obtained in other settings. Our estimates imply a interest rate-demand elasticity of time-deposits of 0.48, very close to the insured-deposit demand elasticity of 0.56 obtained in [Egan et al. \(2017\)](#) using US deposit data. Second, we consider how well our characterization of depositor behavior under aggregate uncertainty extrapolates to other settings. We scale the magnitude of withdrawals to other high-uncertainty events using sovereign bond CDS prices. Our estimates imply that a 1% increase in the 6-month sovereign default risk is associated with a 0.5% increase in withdrawal probability due to strategic motives, and a 7.1% increase in withdrawal probability for fundamental motives. Using these elasticities we find that our estimates predict a significant fraction of deposit withdrawals in other high-uncertainty episodes in Greece during our analysis period, in a prominent episode of policy uncertainty in Italy (spring and summer of 2018), and in well-known episodes high uncertainty over bank fundamentals in other countries (e.g., Northern Rock in UK and Washington Mutual in US).

Our paper is related, but distinct, from recent empirical work using micro-data to characterize runs on banks ([Iyer & Puri 2012](#), [Iyer et al. 2016](#)) and other financial institutions ([Schmidt et al. 2016](#)).⁶ Although the strategic motive for withdrawals is the main driver of run episodes, our analysis is novel in that we characterize depositors' strategic motivations before a full-scale panic run or coordination failure occurs. Doing so is important because, as emphasized in recent work (see, e.g., [He & Manela 2016](#), [Ahnert & Kakhbod 2017](#) and [Schliephake & Shapiro 2018](#)), real-life bank run episodes have a dynamic dimension to deposit flows that is typically ignored in academic work.⁷ Our work is also unique in that we not rely

⁵There is recent evidence indicating that banks do attempt to prevent deposit withdrawals by changing deposit rates ([Acharya & Mora 2015](#), [Chavaz & Slutzky 2018](#)). In our setting such attempts either did not occur or were insufficient: six months after our analysis period the newly elected government imposed a €60-per-day withdrawal limit to slow down deposit outflows.

⁶Runs on repo and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) for shadow banks have also been documented (see, e.g., [Gorton & Metrick 2012](#), [Acharya et al. 2013](#), [Covitz et al. 2013](#), and [Schroth et al. 2014](#)).

⁷Outside bank runs, [Lorenzoni & Werning \(Forthcoming\)](#) theoretically rationalize the slow-moving dynamics commonly observed around debt crises. With counted exceptions (e.g., [Angeletos et al. 2007](#)) most of

on taking an ex ante stance on whether withdrawals are driven by fundamental or strategic uncertainty. On the contrary, our empirical approach allows distinguish the motivations behind depositor withdrawals from the data.

Our paper also contributes to the empirical literature on economic and policy uncertainty. Recent empirical papers show negative real and financial effects of uncertainty on firm incentives (Bloom et al. 2007, Bloom 2009, Bachmann et al. 2013, and Bloom et al. 2018, with a review in Bloom 2014). Households also react to uncertainty. When exposed to greater uncertainty, households increase their savings and work more hours (see, e.g., Giavazzi & McMahon 2012). Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing depositors reactions to policy uncertainty. There is also a strand of work measuring policy uncertainty through different indexes (see, e.g., Jurado et al. 2015, Baker et al. 2016), fiscal uncertainty using time-varying volatility of tax and spending processes (see, e.g., Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2015) and economic uncertainty measured by differences in implied volatility between short- and long-maturity options (Dew-Becker et al. 2018). Our main specifications differ from these approaches in that we do not attempt to measure the magnitude of the increase in policy uncertainty. Instead we consider our exposure measure to be a dummy variable, that is, depositors are either exposed to strategic or fundamental uncertainty or both. Moreover, in our setting, depositors are uncertain about which policy will the government implement if elected.⁸ In the final part of the paper, where we evaluate whether our estimates extrapolate to other bank-run episodes we use changes in CDS prices to measure uncertainty,

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the institutional setting for both quiet and uncertain times. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy to estimate fundamental and strategic withdrawal motives. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 extrapolates our estimates to other risk episodes. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2 Data, Institutional Setting, and Descriptive Statistics

2.1 Data

Our dataset consists of time deposit accounts for the universe of retail customers of a large Greek bank. Standard contracts for time deposits are characterized by a fixed maturity period over which depositors cannot withdraw funds without incurring a monetary penalty. Time deposit contracts in our bank do not allow for the possibility of partial withdrawals.

the literature on bank runs and coordination failures ignores the time dimension. For some salient examples of a theoretical discussion of information-based runs, see Bryant (1980), Diamond & Dybvig (1983), Postlewaite & Vives (1987), Rochet & Vives (2004), and Goldstein & Pauzner (2005). For examples of a theoretical analysis of runs based on coordination problems, see, Jacklin & Bhattacharya (1988), Chari & Jagannathan (1988), Calomiris & Kahn (1991), Chen (1999), and Diamond & Rajan (2001)).

⁸Other papers have considered political uncertainty as uncertainty about which political party will be elected (e.g., for the options market, Kelly et al. 2016).

Each day, a time depositor faces two choices: do nothing (and keep waiting until maturity) or withdraw the entire deposit amount before maturity. In case of an early withdrawal, depositors lose all accrued interests since the last interest payment. This forgone income is deposit-specific and varies over time, being a function of interest rates, account amounts and the number of days left to maturity.

We observe each time deposit at a daily level from January 1, 2014, to March 31, 2015. Each observation has information on account features (interest rate, currency, origination and maturity dates) and depositor characteristics (gender, age, relationship with the bank, income, education). There are additional details on the branch that originated each deposit (postcode, branch ID). Table 1 shows summary statistics describing the key variables in our data. The average deposit amount is €57,281 and the average interest rate is almost 2%. Time deposits in our sample have an average maturity of almost six months, with the most popular contracts having a maturity length of one, three, six and twelve months. 77% of accounts are denominated in Euros.

Time depositors have an average age of 65 years and are 45% female.⁹ The average income of time depositors (as declared in their tax return) is \$25,363, while the average income in Greece in 2013 was \$8,879 for individuals and \$17,270 for households (ELSTAT). Thus, time depositors tend to be among the high earners. Almost one-third of time depositors have at least another credit product with the bank, mainly a mortgage, a consumer loan or a credit card. Depositors tend to hold their time deposits for over two years, renewing them an average of five times. Finally, our bank operates at a national level and has an extensive branch network, which is heterogeneous in size and density across regions.

2.2 Deposit Withdrawals in Quiet Times

Our analysis sample period includes periods of (relative) tranquility and turmoil in Greek financial markets. In this subsection we present stylized facts from depositor withdrawal behavior when policy uncertainty is low, between January and November 2014. The decline in economic uncertainty in Greece, which had been high since the financial crisis, led to the country's return to international markets during 2014. Figure 1 in Appendix D shows the CDS prices on sovereign bonds and the sovereign bond spreads from 2008 to 2015. Spreads during early and mid 2014 were at their lowest since the financial crisis. We take this period as benchmark to characterize depositor behavior in *quiet times*.

⁹We do not observe whether the account has multiple depositors. All depositor characteristics in our data correspond to those of the main account holder. Given the average age of depositors and the large presence of our bank in rural areas, it seems likely that, when there is a couple owning the time deposit, the main holder is male.

2.2.1 General Withdrawal Patterns (Quiet Times)

Despite the monetary cost associated with early withdrawal, in Table 2 we observe that, on average, 0.03% of time deposits are withdrawn early per day, an annualized rate of 15%.¹⁰ The forgone annualized return from these early withdrawals is on average 17% and can be as high as 65% for withdrawals that occur close to the maturity date (for an example of forgone return calculation see next subsection). The high incidence of early withdrawals and depositors' high willingness to pay to break time deposits are new stylized facts to both academics and regulators. For example, under Basel III it is common to exclude term deposits from cash outflow calculations for Liquidity Coverage Ratios because it is presumed that depositors are unwilling to pay the associated penalty to withdraw. These stylized facts suggest that deposits are less slow-moving than commonly assumed.

Withdrawal behavior is also heterogeneous across depositors and account characteristics. Figure 1 plots 1) the distribution of time deposits in our sample across subgroups based on deposit and depositor characteristics, and 2) the fraction of early withdrawals over the same subgroups. Early withdrawals are more common in accounts with lower interest rates and longer maturity length. Depositors with more products with the bank (for example, mortgages, loans and credit cards) are also more likely to withdraw. We do not find a differential effect in withdrawal behavior across education and age groups. Female and male depositors also have the same fraction of early withdrawals. We also do not observe patterns across origination and maturity dates. Panels A and B in Figure 2 plot the total number of time deposits originated in a given week and the total number of time deposits maturing during the same period. Depositor behavior related to choosing when to open a time deposit and when this deposit matures does not seem to be strategic, on average.

2.2.2 Withdrawals around Maturity Expiration (Quiet Times)

Deposit withdrawals exhibit a non-monotonic behavior over the duration of the contract. Figure 3 shows the fraction of early withdrawals as a function of days to maturity for the most common maturity lengths: six and twelve months. We observe that the relationship between early withdrawals and time to maturity has an inverted-U shape. Depositors are less likely to withdraw at the beginning and end of their maturity period. The non-monotonic withdrawal behavior over the life of the deposit reflects the benefits and costs of liquidity-motivated deposit withdrawals. A depositor will make a time deposit if she does not foresee having a need for the cash in the very short run, which explains why withdrawals are very infrequent early in the life of a deposit. The probability of unexpected liquidity needs increases

¹⁰We classify as early withdrawals those withdrawals that occur at least five days before maturity. This gap of at least five days is because whenever a time deposit matures on a day that is weekend or holiday, the withdrawal is recorded on the earliest business day close to the maturity day.

over time, consistent with the withdrawal probability increasing over the initial life of the deposit.

The opportunity cost of withdrawing a time deposit, on the other hand, increases as the maturity date approaches. Withdrawing a deposit early is equivalent to taking a loan for the remaining maturity of the deposit, at a monetary cost equal to the promised interest. For example, suppose a depositor makes a six-month term deposit of €100 at a 2% annualized interest rate. If she holds the deposit until maturity, in six months she receives €101. Withdrawing the deposit two weeks before maturity is equivalent to paying €1 of interest to borrow €100 for two weeks, or borrowing at an annualized rate close to 30%. If the depositor withdraws one week before maturity, the implied interest rate of the loan approaches 70%. It is thus expected that the probability of early withdrawals drops as the deposit approaches maturity.

As the example illustrates, withdrawals within the last couple of weeks of the deposit maturity date can only be rationalized if depositors exhibit very high discount rates. Interest rates exceeding 50% are not uncommon in pawnbrokers, payday lenders or other high-cost lenders that serve liquidity constrained borrowers. The difference is that, while typical high-cost loans are for small amounts usually below €1,000, the average time deposit in our sample exceeds €50,000. This implies that the opportunity cost of on early withdrawals can be substantial, especially when the withdrawal occurs during the last month of the deposit maturity.

2.2.3 Withdrawals around Biannual Interest Payments (Quiet Times)

Aside from paying time-deposit interest at maturity, The Bank also pays accrued interests at two calendar dates in the year: January 1 and July 1. On these dates, all accounts receive all the interest accrued up to that date. Suppose depositor makes a one-year time deposit in March 1 on year t and holds it to maturity until February 28 on year $t + 1$. During the length of her contract the depositor will receive three interest payments. The first will consist of all accrued interests between March and June and will be paid on July 1 of year t . The second payment, on January 1 of year $t + 1$, will account for all accrued interest between July and December of year t . Finally, at maturity on February 28 on year $t + 1$, the depositor will receive accrued interests for January and February of year $t + 1$, plus the principal.

If a time depositor decides to withdraw her balance before maturity, she will lose all the interest accrued since the latest of three dates: deposit origination date, January 1, or July 1. Accrued interest is calculated using a non-linear formula that depends positively on interest rates, Euribor rates and deposit amounts, and positively with time since origination or last repayment (whichever date happened last). Since the only penalty from withdrawing early a time deposit is the forgone interest, the interest payment schedule implies that the cost of

early deposit withdrawals drops to zero on January 1 and July 1 of every year. Consider a time deposit that has accumulated €100 as accrued interests by June 30. If the depositor decides to withdraw on that day, she would receive only the principal. If she withdraws a day later, on July 1, she receives the principal plus €100.

The fundamental hypothesis behind the empirical research design in this paper is that depositors' withdrawal behavior is sensitive to the monetary penalty associated with early withdrawals. If this hypothesis is true, then deposit withdrawals should change discontinuously around interest payments dates. Panel A in Figure 4 illustrates the discontinuity by plotting accrued interests (in Euros) and the fraction of outstanding time deposits that are withdrawn early by week, during the four weeks before and after interest payments on July 1, 2014. We observe that the cost of early withdrawal drops from an average of €500 during the week before the interest repayment date, to zero the day after. Deposit withdrawals exhibit a similar discontinuous pattern: the probability of early withdrawal, which is relatively stable during the four weeks prior to the interest payment date, increases by 40% during the week following the interest payment date. Panel B in Figure 4 plots the cost of early withdrawal expressed as a forgone annualized rate of return, calculated as in the example in the previous subsection. The plot shows that the forgone return due to early withdrawal increases exponentially as the interest payment date approaches, and drops to zero after the date. The magnitude of the drop is large: the average forgone return falls from 50% to zero on July 1, which provides depositors with an incentive to postpone early withdrawals until after accrued interests are paid. Aside from validating our working hypothesis, we use this discontinuity below to evaluate depositors' willingness to pay to withdraw.

2.3 Policy Uncertainty Events

The analysis that follows focuses on depositor behavior in response to the policy uncertainty surrounding the election of the anti-austerity, left-wing party Syriza to the Greek Presidency on January 2015. Leading up to the election, the incumbent and challenging political parties had radically different stances regarding the bailout conditions imposed on Greece by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The incumbent conservative party, New Democracy, argued in favor of continuing austerity measures and Greece's continuation in the European Union. The opposition party, Syriza, supported the renegotiation of Greece's debt and, if better conditions were not agreed upon, proposed the Nationalization of the banking sector and Greece leaving the European Union (the prospective occurrence of this event was labeled *Grexit* in the press).¹¹

¹¹Syriza's *Radical Left Manifesto* supported the nationalization of banks, and promised "an audit of the public debt and renegotiation of interest due and suspension of payments until the economy has revived and growth and employment return".

We exploit two events that occurred in relatively rapid succession in the six weeks preceding the election of the left-wing party President. The first event was the surprise announcement by the incumbent Prime Minister to bring forward by two months the Presidential election. The announcement occurred on December 8, 2014, hereafter t_0 . This announcement was unprecedented, as it was the first time a Presidential election in Greece had taken place before the end of the incumbent's term.¹²

The announcement at t_0 initiated a period during which Parliament would attempt to elect a new President and, if failed to form a majority, Parliament would be dissolved and a snap election would be called. During the six-week period that followed t_0 , a government without the backing of a majority in Parliament had no capacity or authority to make new policy. This period would end on January 25, 2015 (hereafter t_1), with the majority of a newly elected Parliament selecting Alexis Tsipras, leader of Syriza, for President. Thus, during the period between t_0 and t_1 there was absolute certainty that no new policy could be implemented before t_1 , but there was substantial uncertainty about the type of policy that would be implemented after t_1 .

The second event occurred on December 30 2005 (hereafter t_a), 22 days after t_0 and 26 before t_1 , when the incumbent Prime Minister announced that the elections to select the members of the new Parliament would occur in t_1 . Both the timing of t_a and the selected date for the polls (t_1) were earlier than expected. The Prime Minister had 10 days after the Parliament failed to form a government to call the election date, and instead call the date a day after. And the poll had to take place within 30 days of the announcement and instead the poll was called for 26 days later. As a result, the announcement at t_a implied that the election would occur at a date that was two weeks before expected. Figure 6 summarizes the key events taking place during this period and their political consequences.

The timing and close proximity of the events provide useful variation in exposure of time-deposits to strategic uncertainty and fundamental (policy) uncertainty. A time-deposit that matured before t_1 could avoid policy uncertainty at no cost. A depositor could simply wait until maturity and withdraw her deposit with no penalty before the new set of policies could be implemented. A time-deposit maturing after t_1 could only avoid this policy uncertainty by withdrawing early and paying the penalty. On the other hand, deposits maturing before t_1 did face strategic uncertainty: the possibility that enough depositors withdrew before t_1 to make the bank fail. The only way to avoid strategic uncertainty was to withdraw as early as

¹²In Greece, the President is elected for a five-year term by the Parliament. The nominated candidate must achieve a supermajority (200 out of 300 votes) during the first and second rounds. If these were to fail, then the candidate would only need 180 votes in the third, and final, round. From 1974 to 2008, all Presidential elections were successful with at least the two largest parties reaching a consensus. In 2009, however, the opposition party threatened to challenge the government's Presidential candidate, and early elections were announced before even the Presidential vote had taken place. In December 2014, tensions continued between the government and the opposition party, and for the first time a Presidential election was announced before the end of the incumbent's term.

possible (before maturity) at a penalty. In the next section we describe in detail how we use the timing of the announcements and the maturity dates of deposits to construct a research design to differentiate fundamental and strategic motives for deposit withdrawals. But before we provide some stylized facts around the policy uncertainty events.

2.4 Stylized Facts around Uncertainty Events

The surprise announcement and the failed Presidential election led to significant political turmoil in Greece.¹³ Depositor withdrawal behavior changed significantly after the surprise announcement at t_0 . Figure 7 plots the daily fraction of early withdrawals over our sample period. Before t_0 , early withdrawals account for an average of 0.04% of total time deposits per day. After t_0 , the percentage of early withdrawals rises steadily, and average daily withdrawal rates reach 0.28% of total accounts, seven times the rate during the quiet period before the announcement. The flight of time-deposits was not exclusive to our bank. Figure 8 plots the relative decline in the level of deposits of our bank and of the entire Greek banking sector. Both series follow the same trend, indicating that system-wide deposit withdrawals followed the announcement. The plot for the banking system deposits is always below the plot for the bank in our analysis, indicating that the rest of the banking system lost deposits at a rate faster than our bank after t_0 .

The news that triggered the decline in deposits were also a surprise to other market participants. The 6-month CDS price on Greek sovereign bonds increased by 136% after the announcement at t_0 (see Figure 5, Panel A). CDS prices rose even further three weeks later, at t_a , when the Presidential election failed and the election date was announced. The Athens stock exchange dropped 13% on t_0 , being its biggest one-day fall since December 1987.¹⁴ Figure 5, Panel B, plots the cumulative abnormal returns for Athens Stock Exchange when compared to FTSE Euro 100 during this period. As expected there was a significant drop on the day of the announcement and a subsequent decline in Greek returns afterwards.

The characteristics of deposits and depositors withdrawing early also changed after t_0 . Table 2 summarizes depositor characteristics and account features for the average early withdrawal before and after t_0 (Panels A and B, respectively). Deposits that are withdrawn early are for larger amounts, lower rates, and a higher proportion are denominated in Euros during the uncertainty period after t_0 . After t_0 depositors withdrawing early have, on average, a longer relationship with the bank and a larger fraction of them are bank employees.

These changes suggest that the large increase in policy uncertainty increased depositors' willingness to pay for the cost of withdrawing early. In the next section we present our

¹³See, for example: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30495578>

¹⁴See, for example: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/09/stock-markets-tumble-as-greece-calls-election>

empirical approach to identify the different motives driving early withdrawals during this period of policy uncertainty in Greece.

3 Strategic and Fundamental Withdrawal Motives

Our empirical approach uses the staggered maturity date of time deposits to disentangle the different motivations for deposit withdrawals during the uncertainty period that followed the events described in the previous section. The goal is to distinguish empirically how policy uncertainty affects deposit withdrawals through strategic motives (triggered by expectations about how other depositors will respond to policy uncertainty) and by fundamental motives (triggered by increased direct exposure to policy uncertainty), from early withdrawals due to idiosyncratic liquidity needs by depositors. Figure 9 maps the events to the different exposures and motives depositors face. We discuss each in turn below.

The research design also relies on building an appropriate *quiet times* counterfactual for depositor behavior. We showed in subsection 2.2 that depositors' willingness to pay to withdraw deposits is high even when aggregate uncertainty is low. Our design captures how the willingness to pay increases when policy uncertainty is high relative to a quiet times benchmark. We also showed in subsection 2.2 that depositor withdrawal behavior follows an inverted U-shape with deposit maturity and that withdrawals jump discontinuously semiannually on interest payment dates. To account for these patterns, we select the quiet times benchmark to have the same time-to-maturity and time-to-interest-payment than the deposits affected by policy uncertainty. We describe the details of how we construct these counterfactuals below.

3.1 Identification of Strategic Motives

The surprise announcement at t_0 and the election date of t_1 exposed depositors to different types of uncertainty, as described in Section 2.3. Since the new policies (Grexit, deposit freezes, nationalization of the banking sector) could only take place after t_1 , deposits that matured before t_1 , were not exposed to changes in fundamentals due to policy uncertainty. Depositors could wait until maturity to withdraw their deposit with no penalty before any of the new policies could be implemented. These deposits were exposed to the risk that, in anticipation of the policy changes, a large enough amount of deposits were withdrawn to put the bank's liquidity in peril and trigger its failure. As we argued in the introduction, the expectation that the policy announcement would trigger early withdrawals by some depositors before t_1 was rational. In particular, deposits that mature after t_1 , which can only avoid policy uncertainty by withdrawing early (with a penalty) before t_1 . We show in the next subsection that this expectation was correct.

Thus, our empirical approach to identify the effect of strategic uncertainty builds on calculating the change in the early-withdrawal probability during the three weeks before and after the date of the policy uncertainty announcement (t_0), for the subsample of time-deposits that mature three weeks before t_1 . Restricting the analysis to withdrawals that occur three weeks after the announcement ensures that bank fundamentals (e.g., asset quality) or determinants of depositors liquidity demand (e.g., employment) did not change relative to the pre-announcement period (we provide evidence consistent with this in the results section). And conditioning on the subsample of deposits that mature between three weeks before t_1 ensures that these deposits could be withdrawn at no cost before any new policy could be implemented and thus were not exposed to fundamental uncertainty. Even though date t_1 was uncertain at t_0 , we showed in Section 2.3 that t_1 occurred two weeks before it was expected to occur. This implies that depositors at t_0 would have correctly inferred that they could withdraw deposits with no penalty before the policies were implemented. The upper panel in Figure 10 shows the time periods and maturity dates that we use to select the sample of deposits affected by strategic uncertainty.

Our research design must also account for time series patterns of early withdrawals that would occur in the absence of aggregate uncertainty (due to liquidity needs). We showed in Section 2.2.2 that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between days to maturity and withdrawal behavior. We also showed in Section 2.2.3 that early withdrawals decline sharply before days when accrued interests are paid. One of such days, January 1, falls between t_0 and t_1 . To account for the time series variation induced by time-to-maturity and time-to-interest-payment we construct a counterfactual group of deposits around the interest payment date on July 1 2014, when there were no abnormal levels of policy uncertainty. We select the counterfactual deposit group around a placebo date $t_0^{StratCounterf}$, in using the same criteria the sample of deposits exposed to strategic uncertainty is selected around t_0 . Since t_0 occurs three weeks before an interest payment date (January 1 2015), the placebo date is set three weeks before July 1 2014. The lower panel in Figure 10 shows the time periods and maturity dates used to select the counterfactual deposit subsample.

We implement the estimation using the following difference-in-differences specification:

$$Withdrawal_{it} = \delta Exposed_i + \lambda Post_t + \beta Exposed_i \times Post_t + \gamma' X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable $Withdrawal_{it}$ is a dummy equal to one if deposit i is withdrawn at day t . Since we only include in the estimation deposits that mature after the six-week sample period around t_0 , any withdrawal during the sample period is an early withdrawal. $Exposed_i$ is an indicator variable equal to one for deposits maturing during the three weeks that the policy changes could take place (three weeks after January 1 2015 and before t_1), and equal to zero for the deposits in the counterfactual group (maturing three weeks after

July 1). $Post_t$ is a dummy equal to one for the period after t_0 for the deposits exposed to strategic uncertainty, and for the period after $t_0^{StratCounterf}$ for the counterfactual group. X_{it} is the set of covariates accounting for depositor and account characteristics. ϵ_{it} is an error term. The coefficient β is difference-in-differences estimate that captures the change in early withdrawal behavior due to strategic motives.

To verify that the behavior of depositors exposed to strategic uncertainty and the counterfactual ones are comparable, Panel A of Table 3 shows the fraction of deposits withdrawn early before t_0 and $t_0^{StratCounterf}$, respectively. Early withdrawals account for 0.40% of deposits for both groups of deposits (over a three-week window). This implies that the pool of depositors and account characteristics in both groups are not significantly different from each other.

Our interpretation of β assumes that any additional withdrawals after t_0 are driven exclusively by changes in depositors' expectations about other depositors' withdrawal behavior. To rule out alternative interpretations we need to test whether during the three weeks following t_0 there are (1) changes in the banks' fundamentals, and (2) changes in factors contributing to idiosyncratic liquidity withdrawals. To test (1), we check that measures of liquidity, maturity mismatch, and funding costs remained constant during our sample period (see Appendix A). To test (2) we verify that unemployment rates and pension payments also remained constant during the analysis period (see Appendix B).

3.2 Identification of Fundamental Motives

Deposits with maturity dates after the election in t_1 faced policy uncertainty, because changes in policies affecting the bank's and the country's fundamentals (e.g., Grexit, capital controls) could be implemented by the new government before the deposits could be withdrawn without penalty. These deposits also faced strategic uncertainty, since the increase in withdrawals could be anticipated and so could the likelihood of a bank failure. To identify changes in withdrawal behavior due exclusively to exposure to policy uncertainty we compare the withdrawal behavior of deposits that mature during the two weeks after t_1 (exposed to fundamental and strategic uncertainty) with the withdrawal behavior of deposits that mature during the two weeks before t_1 (exposed only to strategic uncertainty).

Because the exact date of t_1 was announced three weeks earlier, on t_A , we implement this comparison by estimating the change in early withdrawal probabilities during the three weeks before and after t_A , for deposits that mature after t_1 relative to those that mature before t_1 . Recall that the announced election date t_1 was two weeks earlier than expected. This means that, before t_A , all deposits maturing in the four week window surrounding t_1 were only expected to be exposed to strategic uncertainty. The announcement of the exact date on t_A revealed that deposits maturing after t_1 were also exposed to fundamental policy

uncertainty. Thus, the change in withdrawal behavior for deposits maturing after t_1 around the announcement will capture the effect of fundamental policy uncertainty exposure.

The starting point for our estimation is a difference-in-differences specification around t_A and across groups maturing before and after t_1 . We need to augment this specification to account for time series patterns in early withdrawals driven by time-to-maturity and time-to-interest-payment. As in the previous subsection, we construct a counterfactual by selecting a sample of deposits around another interest payment date, July 1 2014, using the same criteria used to select the deposits around t_A and t_1 . Since t_A occurs the same day as an interest payment date, we set $t_A^{PolicyCounterf}$ to July 1 to construct the counterfactual. And since t_1 occurs three weeks after t_A , we set $t_1^{PolicyCounterf}$ to a date three weeks after $t_A^{PolicyCounterf}$. Figure 11 illustrates the main events and maturity periods that we use to construct the subsamples of deposits that are affected by fundamental (and strategic) uncertainty, affected by strategic uncertainty alone, and the counterfactual.

We implement this research design estimating the following triple-differences specification:

$$\begin{aligned}
Withdrawal_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Exposed_i + \beta_2 ExposedFund_i + \beta_3 Post_t \\
& + \beta_4 Exposed_i \times ExposedFund_i + \beta_5 Exposed_i \times Post_t \\
& + \beta_6 Post_t \times ExposedFund_i + \beta_7 Exposed_i \times ExposedFund_i \times Post_t \\
& + \gamma' X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} ,
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where the dependent variable $Withdrawal_{it}$ is a dummy equal to one if deposit i is withdrawn before maturity in day t . $Exposed_i$ is an indicator variable equal to one for the deposits exposed to policy and/or strategic uncertainty (maturing in the four weeks before and after t_1), and zero for the deposits in the counterfactual group (maturing in the four weeks before and after $t_1^{PolicyCounterf}$). This variable identifies the deposits during the heightened risk period versus those in quiet times. $ExposedFund_i$ is a dummy equal to one if deposit i matures after t_1 in the exposed group, equal to one if deposit t matures after $t_1^{PolicyCounterf}$ in the counterfactual group, and zero otherwise. In the exposed deposit group, this variable distinguishes deposits exposed to fundamental and strategic uncertainty from those only exposed to strategic uncertainty. $Post_t$ is a dummy equal to one for the period after t_A for exposed deposits, and in the period after $t_A^{PolicyCounterf}$ in the counterfactual group. X_{it} is a set of covariates controlling for depositor characteristics and account features. ϵ_{it} is an error term. The coefficient β_7 is the triple-differences estimate of the effect of fundamental policy uncertainty on the probability of early deposit withdrawals.

To evaluate the comparability of the deposits exposed to uncertainty and those in the counterfactual group, Panel A in Table 4 shows the fraction of early withdrawals for both

groups. We show the withdrawal probability separately for three subperiods of the uncertainty exposure period: before t_0 , between t_0 and t_A , and between t_A and t_1 (and the corresponding for the counterfactual period). During the first two subperiods of the uncertainty exposure period, the withdrawal probability moves in tandem for deposits exposed to policy and strategic uncertainty, and deposits exposed to strategic uncertainty only. The same is true for the first two subperiods of the counterfactual deposits. This is akin to a parallel trends test, which demonstrates that there is no unobserved selection bias driving the evolution of withdrawal probabilities of the deposits exposed to policy uncertainty and those that are not. This is expected, since the selection into the two groups is based exclusively on whether the deposits mature before and after t_1 . The maturity of these deposits was decided months in advance, while the date t_1 is only revealed with three weeks in advance.

Remaining identification concerns relate to potential differences in the interest paid in the uncertainty exposure period relative to the counterfactual. Difference in the interest rate would affect the size of the penalty for early withdrawals. Identification requires that the average interest payment to be the same in across the two periods for each subgroup of deposits. Table 4, Panel B shows that the interest payments do not vary across all four group of depositors in the period before t_A . Moreover, as in the estimation of the strategic uncertainty effect, we also need to assume that idiosyncratic withdrawals remain the same before and after t_A and $t_A^{placebo}$. That is, we assume that the three data patterns described in Section 2.1 remain the same before and after the events. Finally, in order to isolate the fundamental policy uncertainty, we need to assume that the strategic uncertainty did not change differentially for depositors whose deposits mature between t_A and t_1 and depositors whose deposits mature after t_1 . The results presented in appendices A and B validate these assumptions.

4 Results

We begin discussing the results on the effect of strategic uncertainty on deposit withdrawal probabilities. Then, we analyze the estimates for exposure to fundamental uncertainty. For both set of results, we perform heterogeneity analysis across account, depositor and geographical characteristics. Finally, we compute depositors' willingness to pay to avoid both uncertainties. We include all detailed tables in Appendix C.

4.1 Strategic and Fundamental Motives

Strategic. The estimation results from specification 1 are presented in Table 5. The point estimates on the difference-in-differences estimate is 0.0027, significant at the 10% level, and robust to the inclusion of controls for observable account (deposit amount, maturity, interest

rate, currency) and depositor (age, gender, bank employee, other products with the bank, previous renewals) characteristics. The estimate captures the change in the probability of withdrawals during three-week periods before and after the announcement of the increased future policy uncertainty, estimated on deposits that mature before the new policies can take place (relative to a quiet times counterfactual). Relative to the baseline three-week withdrawal probability in the pre-period (0.4% from Table 3), the estimate implies that depositors are 68% more likely to pay the penalty and withdraw early to avoid strategic uncertainty (the risk that deposits lose value because other depositors withdraw their deposits).

Fundamentals. Table 6 reports estimates from Equation 3. The triple-differences point estimate is 0.0104, significant at the 1% level, and robust to the inclusion of controls. The coefficient captures the difference in the probability of withdrawal between deposits that face fundamental and strategic uncertainty, and those that face strategic uncertainty only. The magnitude reflects a three-week withdrawal probability, and implies a 192% increase relative to the quiet times baseline.

Magnitudes. Our estimates of the strategic-induced and fundamental-induced increases in withdrawal probability are additive. Their combined effect imply an increase in the three-week withdrawal probability of 1.3 percentage points, or 22.7% of time deposits if it had remained constant over a year. The magnitude of estimates, although inherently partial equilibrium due to the estimation using difference-in-differences, are aligned with the magnitude of the overall decline in The Bank’s deposits during the analysis period. During the six weeks following the announcement, the early withdrawal probability of all The Bank’s time-deposits increased by 300% relative to the quiet times baseline. The combined short-run effect of strategic and fundamental motives for withdrawals captured by our estimates implies a 270% increase in withdrawal probabilities, which explain 90% of the total. Finally, our estimates capture by construction the short-run effect of uncertainty on withdrawal probabilities. This is likely to be an underestimate of the overall effect over a longer period, especially of the strategic effect. As the deposit base deteriorates, the risk of further withdrawals leading to a bank failure increases, which in theory should increase strategic-motivated withdrawals.

Deposit Heterogeneity. Tables C.1 and C.2, Panel A, present estimates for subsamples based on account and depositor characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample by gender. Withdrawal behaviors across men and women are only statistically different when faced with changes in their expectations of other depositors’ behavior. When exposed to such changes, men are, on average, more likely to withdraw their deposits before maturity. Columns (3) and (4) split the sample by deposit size (above or below the median deposit amount of 35,000€). Once again, accounts with greater deposit amounts only react differently from accounts with smaller deposit amounts when affected by changes in expectations of the behavior of others. Columns (5), (6) and (7) divide our sample by maturity length. Six-months deposit contracts are the ones driving the results for strategic motives, while for

changes in policy uncertainty we find that behavior of three-months and six-months contracts are statistically different from the one-year contracts. Finally, Columns (8) and (9) show that in both cases there is no differential effect of deposits in Euros and foreign currencies.

Tables C.1 and C.3, Panel B, show estimates for subsamples defined on the basis of depositor-bank relationships. Columns (1) and (2) compare depositors with other financial products with the bank (mortgages, loans, and credit cards) with depositors with no other products with the bank. This split only has a differential effect after t_A and exposure to policy uncertainty. Depositors with other products are significantly more likely to withdraw than those with no additional products. Columns (3) and (4) look at the number of years the depositor has held at least one time deposit with the bank. Depositors with less than two years relationship with the bank are significantly more likely to withdraw early after both news shocks. Finally, Columns (5) and (6) consider the number of times the time deposit account has been previously renewed. This has no differential effect in any of the specifications.

Geographical Heterogeneity. Table C.5 compares results for Athens with the rest of the country. This split of the data does not show a significant heterogeneity in the probability of early withdrawals for fundamental motives. However, strategic motives for withdrawals show substantial geographical heterogeneity. Most of the effect through strategic motives is driven by depositors outside the Greek capital. Table C.6 differentiates between depositors in large and small branches. Once again, while the fundamental motivation for deposit withdrawals does not vary significantly in the cross section of branches, large branches seem to explain the entirety of the strategic motivation for withdrawals. Although mostly suggestive these heterogeneity results are consistent with the underlying mechanisms driving the two motivations for withdrawals. If all depositors are observing the same fundamentals, there is no reason for the results to vary in the cross section (as long as the cost of withdrawals are constant across locations). However, strategic motives for withdrawals are self-reinforcing and may lead to multiple equilibria. Depositors in large branches may have observed longer lines of fundamental-driven withdrawers, which could have triggered larger numbers of strategic-driven withdrawers to go to the bank.

We consider whether the geographical patterns in the strategic motives may be driven by differences in depositor’s views about the left-wing policies that could be implemented after t_1 . Table C.7 shows results across municipalities that favored Grexit versus those that did not. We find no differential withdrawal behavior across these types of regions. In line with the results on borrower heterogeneity, observable characteristics do not seem to drive the observed differences in the strategic motivation for withdrawals.

To explore whether there is any suggestive evidence of *contagion* we test for the presence of clusters in withdrawal behavior across nearby branches. Figure 12 plots the spatial autocorrelation across branches, measured by local Moran’s I_i and using as weighting matrix the

inverse of the distance between branches. We find that after the surprise announcement at t_0 there was a significant change in spatial autocorrelation in the northern region of Greece. This correlation in withdrawals of nearby branches in this region is exclusive to the period between t_0 and t_A (when depositors with shorter maturity expiration were solely reacting to changes in expectations of other depositors' withdrawals, but were not exposed to policy uncertainty). This spatial autocorrelation disappears after t_A , when depositors with shorter maturity expiration also faced exposure to policy uncertainty.

4.2 Cost-Sensitivity and Willingness to Pay

So far in this section we have not taken advantage of the fact that the monetary cost of withdrawing early a time-deposit is observable. We now combine the reduced form estimates in the previous subsection with an estimate of the cost elasticity of withdrawals to provide estimates of depositors willingness to pay to avoid strategic and fundamental uncertainty. We first estimate an elasticity of withdrawal probabilities to the cost of withdrawing in quiet times. We express the cost of withdrawing either in Euros, or as an annualized forgone return on the deposit amount. To estimate the elasticity we exploit the discontinuity in accrued interests on July 1, 2014, described in subsection 2.2.3. Intuitively, the estimate is obtained from scaling the magnitude of the change in the withdrawal probability around the discontinuity by the size of the drop in the cost of withdrawing. We use the elasticity to produce estimates of depositors' willingness to pay to avoid different types of uncertainties.

4.2.1 Cost-Elasticity Estimation

The cost of withdrawing early time-deposits drops to zero biannually on interest payment dates (see Figure 4, Panel B). We use that discontinuity in time of the cost of withdrawal to estimate the cost-sensitivity of the probability of early withdrawal. We cannot use a simple before-after comparison of withdrawal probabilities (event study) because withdrawals have a non-monotonic relationship with time to maturity (see subsection 2.2.2). To account for these patterns we calculate the change in withdrawal probabilities around an interest payment date relative to the change in withdrawal probability of deposits with the same time-to-maturity in a random date with no interest payment.

We implement this comparison using two subsamples of deposits. The first subsample includes the time deposits maturing in a three-week window starting three-weeks after the interest payment date during quiet times, July 1 2014. In this subsample, any deposit withdrawal that occurs in the three weeks before and after July 1 2014 is an early withdrawal. The second subsample, used to control for the time varying patterns in withdrawal probabilities, is selected the same way around an arbitrary date with no interest payment. For this exercise we used October 1 2014, but the results are robust to this choice. Specifically, the

control subsample includes time deposits maturing in a three-week window starting three-weeks after October 1 2014. By construction, deposits in the control subsample have the same days-to-maturity as those in the subsample around the interest payment date. Figure 13 shows the main dates that we use in this section for both subsamples. Both subsamples contain deposits that mature in quiet times, when fundamental and strategic uncertainty are low.

Panel A of Table 7 shows the fraction of early withdrawals as a percentage of total time deposits for the interest payment and the control subsamples, before and after July 1 and October 1, respectively. We observe that withdrawal behavior is not significantly different across subsamples before July 1 and October 1, with 0.54% depositors withdrawing early in the interest payment subsample and 0.56% in the control subsample. The fraction of early withdrawals in the interest payment subsample increases substantially after July 1. The percentage of withdrawals rises to 0.86% after the interest payment date. In the control subsample the probability of withdrawal drops after October 1 to 0.46%. This fall in the control group matches the inverted U-shape pattern we described in subsection 2.2.2, and it is common across other months when no interest payments were made.

We implement the estimation with the following difference-in-differences specification:

$$Withdrawal_{it} = \delta InterestPay_i + \lambda Post_t + \beta InterestPay_i \times Post_t + \gamma' X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, (3)$$

where the dependent variable *Withdrawal* is a dummy equal to one if deposit *i* is withdrawn at time *t* (all withdrawals are before maturity by construction). *InterestPay* is a dummy equal to one if the deposit is in the subsample constructed around the interest payment date, and zero if the deposit is in the control subsample. *Post* refers to the three weeks after July 1 in the interest payment subsample, and after October 1 for the control subsample. *X_{it}* is a vector of covariates of observable depositor and account characteristics. *ε_{it}* is an error term. The coefficient *β* is a difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of a drop in the monetary cost of withdrawing on the early withdrawal probability.

Results from estimating Equation 3 are reported in Table 7, Panel B. Column (1) shows estimates for the baseline specification without covariates. The estimated coefficient *β* is 0.0088, significant at the 1% level, and robust to the inclusion of controls. It captures the increase in withdrawal probability when the cost of withdrawal drops to zero, and represents an increase of 154% relative to the baseline withdrawal probability. Assuming all deposits have the same size, this estimate implies a demand elasticity of deposits to changes in the cost of withdrawal of 1.5. This figure is inside the very large range of demand elasticity estimates in other settings. For example, Dick (2008), using U.S. Call Report data for the period 1993–1999, finds a demand elasticity of deposits to the interest rate between 2 and 3. Egan et al. (2017), using deposit level data for 16 of the largest US retail banks over the

period 2002–2013, obtain demand elasticity estimates of 0.56 for insured deposits and 0.16 for uninsured deposits.

To gauge the economic magnitude of our estimate, however, it is important to make two considerations. The first is that the baseline probability of withdrawals is high to begin with: the baseline implies that over 14% of time deposits are withdrawn over a year. To obtain a willingness to pay figure, we calculate the monetary cost of withdrawal during the three weeks before the interest payment date to be €494 in accrued interests, or 1.29% of deposit amount. Thus, in quiet times, a reduction of €100 in the cost of withdrawal increases by 30.4% the probability that a depositor withdraws early. A reduction in the cost of withdrawal of 1% of the deposit amount increases by 120% the probability of early withdrawal.

And second, the calculations based exclusively on the size of the penalty tend to understate depositor’s willingness to pay to withdraw for idiosyncratic reasons (or to overstate the sensitivity of withdrawal probabilities to changes in the cost), because they ignore the opportunity cost of waiting. Recall from the discussion in Subsection 2.2.2 that withdrawing shortly before maturity date implies depositors use very large discount rates. For example, withdrawing a deposit of value D one week before maturity for a penalty of 1% of D is equivalent to paying an interest of $0.01 \times D$ to borrow $0.99 \times D$ for a week, which corresponds to an annualized interest rate of 68%. The average cost of early withdrawal during the three weeks before the interest payment date, expressed in terms of forgone returns, is 41%. The cost semi-elasticity using this figure implies that a 10 percentage point drop in the forgone return from withdrawing, induces a 37% increase in the withdrawal probability. Using these figures, the implied demand elasticity of deposits is 0.48, in line with the demand elasticity estimate for insured deposits in Egan et al. (2017).¹⁵

4.2.2 Depositor Willingness to Pay to Avoid Uncertainty

The semi-elasticities are useful to provide estimates of the magnitude of the costs paid by depositors for withdrawing early due to fundamental and strategic uncertainty. Intuitively, we pose question: what change in the cost of withdrawing during quiet times would have induced the observed change in the withdrawal probability observed after the expectation of the policy uncertainty increased? This will give us estimates of depositors willingness to pay to avoid uncertainty, or alternatively, a measure of the additional payment required to keep depositors from withdrawing in response to uncertainty. This latter number is useful to understand the cost of reducing bank fragility in uncertain times.

The exercise delivers the following results. To generate in quiet times the same increase in the withdrawal probability due to strategic motives obtained in Subsection 4.1, the cost of

¹⁵A 75% change in the cost of withdrawal expressed as an annualized rate (a decline of 10 percentage points of a baseline of 41), leads to a 37% decline in deposits.

withdrawal would have had to drop by €293 (0.77% of deposit amount and 26% in forgone return). Similarly, to generate the increase in the withdrawal probability due to fundamental motives, the cost of withdrawal would have had to drop by €612 (1.61% of deposit amount and 72% forgone return). Combined, the figures imply that to prevent withdrawal probabilities from increasing during the three-week period after event that triggered the heightened uncertainty, The Bank would have had to offer depositors a payment of 2.38% of the value of their deposits, or an annualized return exceeding 50%. This rate vastly exceeded The Bank’s marginal cost of funding from the ECB at the time (below 5%).

Note that depositors’ are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay to withdraw. If the bank could identify the marginal borrowers, those that are most willing to withdraw in the presence of aggregate uncertainty, the cost of preventing withdrawals would be substantially reduced by only offering higher returns to them. But our results on heterogeneity suggest that borrowers’ propensity to withdraw in response to uncertainty is difficult to predict using observables. Thus, the cost of preventing withdrawals is very high partly because it entails transferring rents to infra-marginal depositors.

5 Extrapolation using CDS Prices as a Measure for Aggregate Uncertainty

Our approach to separate strategic- and fundamental-driven withdrawals is not specific to Greece. We can potentially implement our methodology when analyzing other bank-run episodes where there is an unexpected event that increases fundamental uncertainty and may cause depositors to withdraw because of strategic and fundamental motives. To assess the plausibility of the magnitude of our estimates and their external validity, we perform a series of extrapolation exercises to other episodes where there was a change in fundamentals after a surprise announcement.

To perform such extrapolation and compare our estimates to other episodes we first need to scale the magnitude of the aggregate uncertainty increase during the Greek episode from where we obtain our estimates. A natural candidate for a measure of the aggregate uncertainty increase is the change in the Greek sovereign bond CDS price. We consider the magnitude of CDS prices changes after events at t_0 and t_A .

For our strategic-driven estimates, we consider the 136% increase in the short-run CDS price in the week after t_0 (used to estimate strategic motivations). We use this change as a basis to scale the estimated 68% increase in strategic-induced withdrawal probability. Thus, when we extrapolate strategic motives to other settings, we assume that the elasticity of strategic-driven withdrawal probabilities to the CDS price to be 0.5 (a 1% increase in CDS price leads to a 0.5% increase in the withdrawal probability).

For our estimates when depositors face fundamental uncertainty, we use that during the week following t_A (used to estimate fundamental motivations), the 6-month sovereign bond CDS price increased 27%. We use this change to scale the estimated 192% increase in fundamental-induced withdrawal probability to other episodes. Thus, we assume that the elasticity of fundamental-driven withdrawal probabilities to the CDS price to be 7.1.

Combined, the two elasticities imply that a 1% increase in the 6-month sovereign default risk is associated with a 7.6% increase in the withdrawal probability, the majority of which is due to fundamentals.

In Appendix E we show that our elasticities can predict almost the entire magnitude of deposit withdrawals in The Bank and in the Greek banking system during our period. We also evaluate whether our estimates, using these elasticities, can predict a significant fraction of deposit withdrawals in three other recent bank-run episodes: the Italian crisis in the summer of 2018, Northern Rock and Washington Mutual. We find that, although we underestimate the magnitude of withdrawals in all three events, our estimates are sensible and within the observed outcomes (see Appendix E for details on our quantification exercise).

6 Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper we isolate and quantify deposit withdrawals due to three different motives: liquidity, exposure to policy uncertainty, or expectations about how other depositors will behave. Using individual-level, daily frequency time deposit data, we develop a new approach that uses variation induced by maturity expiration of time deposits around the large policy uncertainty events to differentiate between deposit withdrawals due to direct exposure to fundamental policy uncertainty and those due to expectations about behavior of other depositors. After a policy uncertainty shock that doubled the short-run CDS price of Greek sovereign bonds, we find that early deposit withdrawal probability quadrupled. According to our estimates, two-thirds of this increase are due to direct exposure to policy uncertainty, while the remainder is driven by changes in expectations of behavior of other depositors. Moreover, the combined effect of strategic and fundamental motives for withdrawals implied captured by our estimates, explain 90% of the total withdrawals The Bank experienced during the period around the events.

Our estimates provide useful insights on policies to stabilize deposits through prices during periods of high policy uncertainty. Our estimates imply that in order to prevent the increased deposit withdrawals around the three week period around the event, would cost The Bank 2.38% of the value of the deposits, which implies a more than 50% cost of capital (annualized).


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
Figure 1: Distribution of Characteristics and Withdrawals Across Subgroups




Notes: On the left, density plots for distribution of deposits across deposit and depositor characteristics. On the right, fraction of deposits withdrawn before maturity over same characteristics.

Figure 2: Origination and Maturity Dates

PANEL A: Total Deposits Originated Each Week




PANEL B: Total Deposits Maturing Each Week



Notes: Panel A shows total deposits originated each week, and Panel B plots total deposits maturing in a given week. Both graphs consider all time deposits in our sample.


Figure 3: Early Withdrawals as a Function of Days to Maturity




Note: The y-axis shows the percentage of total depositors that withdraw their deposit amounts before maturity. The x-axis is the fraction of maturity length completed at withdrawal. We show this relationship for the two most popular maturity lengths in our sample: three and six months maturities.

Figure 4: CDS Prices and Stock Returns Before and After Surprise Announcement (t_0)

PANEL A: Accrued Interests and Fraction of Early Withdrawals




PANEL B: Foregone Returns from Early Withdrawal




Notes: Panel A shows the cost of early withdrawal measured by total accrued interests (solid line) and the weekly fraction of early withdrawals (scatter plot). On July 1, all time deposits have their accrued interests paid. Panel B plots the foregone rate of return, calculated as $(\text{Interest Forgone} / \text{Interest Received})^{(365 / \text{Days to Maturity})}$. The shaded area represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5: CDS Prices and Stock Returns Before and After Surprise Announcement (t_0)

PANEL A: Price of 6-Month Greek CDS



PANEL B: Evolution of Greek Stock Market



Notes: Panel A shows the price of the Greek, 6-month CDS. The vertical lines correspond to the following events: (1) the surprise announcement (t_0) on December 8, 2014; (2) the election date announcement (t_A) on January 1, 2015; and (3) the national election (t_1) on January 25, 2015. Panel B plots the cumulative abnormal returns calculated for Athens Stock Exchange and FTSE Euro 100, with respect to the days from surprise announcement (t_0) on December 8, 2014.

Figure 6: Main Political Events






Figure 7: Daily Fraction of Early Withdrawals (% of Total Time Deposits)




Note: Plot of the percentage of active deposits that were withdrawn that day and had at least five days until maturity. The red vertical line corresponds to the announcement of presidential elections (t_0).

Figure 8: Time Deposits in Greek Banking System Compared to our Sample




Note: The solid line represents our bank's time deposit index, normalized to 100 for September 2014. The dash line plots the same index for the entire Greek banking system. The red vertical line corresponds to the announcement of presidential elections (t_0).

Figure 9: Changes in Withdrawal Motives for Depositors with Short-Run Maturities



Note: The diagram relates our main three events to the different withdrawal motives faced by depositors with short-run maturities. Before t_0 , withdrawals of these depositors are driven only by idiosyncratic motives. After t_0 , these depositors also have additional strategic motives, driven by changes in their expectations of other depositors' behavior. After t_A , depositors receive news about their exposure to policy uncertainty. Finally, after t_1 they will also face policy uncertainty in the form of new policies being implemented by the new government.


Figure 10: Treatment and Counterfactual Groups for Strategic Uncertainty Analysis




Note: The main event is the surprise announcement at t_0 . The periods to compare are three weeks before and after the event. The deposits to compare are those maturing between three and six weeks after the event.

Figure 11: Treatment, Control and Counterfactual Groups for Policy Uncertainty Analysis


Panel A: Treated Group




Panel B: Counterfactual Treated Group



Panel C: Control Group




Panel D: Counterfactual Control Group




Note: The main event is the election date announcement at t_A . For the counterfactual groups we consider $t_A^{placebo}$. We compare deposit withdrawals three weeks before and after the events. There four groups of depositors depending on their maturity dates: 1) maturing between three and six weeks after t_A , 2) maturing between three and six weeks after $t_A^{placebo}$, 3) maturing in the three weeks after t_A , and 4) maturing in the three weeks after $t_A^{placebo}$.

Figure 12: Spatial Autocorrelation in Deposit Withdrawals across Branches



Note: The red dots correspond to branches with deposit withdrawals exhibiting positive spatial autocorrelation with nearby branches, as measured by local Moran's I_i . Spatial autocorrelation measures the correlation of a variable with itself through space. In this case, withdrawal behavior in one branch relative to nearby branches. Positive spatial autocorrelation occurs when similar values occur near one another. The two maps to the left correspond to the control period with no news shock. The two maps to the right belong to the treatment period with the news shock at t_0 . The two top maps represent the period before the announcement at t_0 , while the two maps at the bottom correspond to the period after the surprise news at t_0 .

Figure 13: Treatment and Counterfactual Groups for Cost Elasticity Analysis



Note: The main event is the interest payment at t_P . The periods to compare are three weeks before and after the event. The deposits to compare are those maturing between three and six weeks after the event.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Entire Sample

	Mean (1)	S.D (2)	Min (3)	Median (4)	Max (5)	N (6)
Panel A: Depositor Characteristics						
Age	65	15	18	66	100	>300,000
Female	0.45	0.5	0	0	1	>300,000
Income	25,363	20,880	1,103	21,137	197,609	>40,000
Education (years)	12	3	0	12	20	>200,000
Other Products	0.3	0.46	0	0	1	>300,000
Years with Deposit Account	2.3	2.7	0.06	1	56	>300,000
Bank Employee	0.04	0.2	0	0	1	>300,000
Athens	0.34	0.47	0	0	1	>300,000
Panel B: Deposit Account Characteristics						
Interest Rate	1.94	0.95	0.01	2.2	8.19	>300,000
Initial Balance	57,281	65,490	687	36,000	500,000	>300,000
TD in Euros	0.77	0.42	0	1	1	>300,000
Length (days)	164	119	21	130	365	>300,000
Account Renewals	6.5	10.6	1	3	1513	>300,000
Panel C: Total Deposits, Depositors and Branches						
Number of Accounts	>100,000	-	-	-	-	-
Number of Depositors	>100,000	-	-	-	-	-
Active TDs per day	>100,000	-	-	-	-	-

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Early Withdrawals

	Mean (1)	S.D (2)	Min (3)	Median (4)	Max (5)
Panel A: Quiet-Times					
Daily % Runners	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.06
Days to maturity	136	104	6	114	364
Length (days)	257	117	21	360	365
Initial Balance	41,188	49,364	2,828	23,500	500,000
Interest Rate	1.86	0.85	0.01	2.1	4
TD in Euros	0.88	0.32	0	1	1
Age	64	16	18	64	100
Female	0.47	0.5	0	0	1
Education (years)	12	3.23	0	12	1 20
Income	24,450	18,678	1,900	20,433	149,569
Bank Employee	0.03	0.18	0	0	1
Years with the Bank	2.2	2.5	0.08	2.7	47
Previous Renewals	3.5	4.7	1	2	97
Other Financial Products	0.34	0.47	0	0	1
Forgone Interest Payment	308	493	0	175	8,180
Panel B: Uncertainty (after t_0)					
Daily % Runners	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.10	0.28
Days to maturity	129	96	6	105	364
Length (days)	240	109	21	183	360
Initial Balance	58,583	63,591	687	37,000	500,000
Interest Rate	1.67	0.49	0.01	1.75	3.25
TD in Euros	0.93	0.26	0	1	1
Age	63	15	20	63	100
Female	0.45	0.5	0	0	1
Education (years)	13	3.17	0	12	1 20
Income	25,697	19,304	1,900	21,748	193,491
Bank Employee	0.07	0.26	0	0	1
Years with the Bank	2.8	3.5	0.08	1.8	56
Previous Renewals	4.9	6.5	1	3	82
Other Financial Products	0.39	0.49	0	0	1
Forgone Interest Payment	385	531	0	211	8,225

Table 3: Identifying Strategic Uncertainty

PANEL A: Fraction of Early Withdrawals in Strategic Uncertainty Sample

	Exposed Group (uncertainty)	Counterfactual Group (quiet times)
Before t_0 (or $t_0^{StratCounterf}$)	0.40 %	0.40 %
After t_0 (or $t_0^{StratCounterf}$)	1.00 %	0.66 %
Observations (N)	>8,000	>8,000

PANEL B: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for Strategic Uncertainty

Early withdrawal (0/1)	(1)	(2)
Exposed	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Post	0.0026*** (0.0009)	0.0027*** (0.0009)
DiD	0.0027* (0.0015)	0.0027* (0.0015)
Account Characteristics	No	Yes
Depositor Characteristics	No	Yes
Observations	>30,000	>30,000

Note: Column (2) in PANEL B includes depositor characteristics (gender, age, bank employee, other products, previous relationship with the bank) and account characteristics (deposit amount, maturity, rate, currency). *Treated* are deposits maturing after t_0 , but before elections at t_1 . *Post* refers to behavior after t_0 for treated and after $t_0^{Placebo}$ for counterfactual deposits. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (** p<0.01, * p<0.05, * p<0.1).

Table 4: Identifying Policy Uncertainty

PANEL A: Fraction of Early Withdrawals in Policy Uncertainty Sample

	Exposed Period (uncertainty)		Counterfactual Period (quiet times)	
	Control Group (No Policy Risk)	Exposed Group (Policy Risk)	Counterfactual Group (No Policy Risky)	Counterfactual Exposed Group (No Policy Risk)
Before t_0 (or $t_0^{FundCounterf}$)	0.40 %	0.49 %	0.40 %	0.41 %
Between t_0 and t_A (or $t_0^{FundCounterf}$ and $t_A^{FundCounterf}$)	1.00 %	1.06 %	0.66 %	0.64 %
Between t_A and t_1 (or $t_A^{FundCounterf}$ and $t_1^{FundCounterf}$)	0.38 %	2.73 %	0.37 %	0.90 %
Observations (N)	>8,000	>8,000	>8,000	>8,000

PANEL B: Interest Payments in Policy Uncertainty Sample

	Exposed Period (uncertainty)		Counterfactual Period (quiet times)	
	Control Group (No Policy Risk)	Exposed Group (Policy Risk)	Counterfactual Group (No Policy Risky)	Counterfactual Exposed Group (No Policy Risk)
Interest Payment	€526 (680)	€478 (602)	€509 (707)	€475 (603)

Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for Strategic Uncertainty

Early withdrawal (0/1)	(1)	(2)
Exposed	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Post	0.0026*** (0.0009)	0.0027*** (0.0009)
DiD	0.0027* (0.0015)	0.0027* (0.0015)
Account Characteristics	No	Yes
Depositor Characteristics	No	Yes
Observations	>30,000	>30,000

Note: Column (2) includes depositor characteristics (gender, age, bank employee, other products, previous relationship with the bank) and account characteristics (deposit amount, maturity, rate, currency). *Treated* are deposits maturing after t_0 , but before elections at t_1 . *Post* refers to behavior after t_0 for treated and after $t_0^{Placebo}$ for counterfactual deposits. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 6: Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences Estimation for Policy Uncertainty

Early withdrawal (0/1)	(1)	(2)
Exposed	0.0030** (0.00122)	0.0028** (0.00126)
Exposed Fund	-0.0016 (0.0010)	-0.0016 (0.0011)
Post	-0.0028*** (0.0009)	-0.0028*** (0.0009)
Exposed \times Post	-0.0033** (0.0015)	-0.0033** (0.0015)
Exposed \times Exposed Fund	0.0023 (0.0019)	0.0025 (0.0019)
Post \times Exposed Fund	0.0104*** (0.0017)	0.0104*** (0.0017)
DDD	0.0127*** (0.0030)	0.0127*** (0.0030)
Account Characteristics	No	Yes
Depositor Characteristics	No	Yes
Observations	>50,000	>50,000

Note: *Exposed* refers to deposit maturing in our uncertainty period. *ExposedFund* refers to deposits maturing after t_A and exposed to policy uncertainty. *Post* refers to the period after t_A . Column (2) includes depositor characteristics (gender, age, bank employee, other products, previous relationship with the bank) and account characteristics (deposit amount, maturity, rate, currency). Robust standard errors are in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 7: Estimating the Elasticity of Depositors to Interest Payments

PANEL A: Fraction of Early Withdrawals

	Treatment Group (interest payments)	Counterfactual Group (no interest payments)
Before Interest Payment	0.54 %	0.56 %
After Interest Payment	0.86 %	0.46 %
Observations (N)	>8,000	>8,000

PANEL B: Difference-in-Differences Estimation

Early withdrawal (0/1)	(1)	(2)
Interest Pay	-0.00024 (0.001)	-0.00016 (0.001)
Post	-0.0016 (0.001)	-0.0016 (0.001)
DiD	0.0088*** (0.002)	0.0088*** (0.002)
Account Characteristics	No	Yes
Depositor Characteristics	No	Yes
Observations	>30,000	>30,000

Note: Column (2) in PANEL B includes depositor characteristics (gender, age, bank employee, other products, previous relationship with the bank) and account characteristics (deposit amount, maturity, rate, currency). Robust standard errors are in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Appendix A No Changes in Idiosyncratic Risk

Identification of our estimates for strategic motives requires that there are no changes in idiosyncratic withdrawals during the weeks following the surprise announcement on December 8, 2014.

One potential concern is unemployment. If major layoffs took place immediately after the announcement, deposit withdrawals might be driven by liquidity motives differing from those in quiet times. Unemployment rates remain stable during December 2014 and January 2015, and had similar magnitudes to the same months the previous year.¹⁶ Moreover, we find no correlation between changes in regional unemployment figures and changes in deposit withdrawals during this period.

Another concern, given the age of a large fraction of our depositors, is that after the announcement there was a change in payment of pensions. We have found no evidence of pension amounts changing during our period or delays/haircuts taking place after the announcement.

Moreover, we have checked the interest rates offered by our bank's competitors before and after the announcement, and they are all similar to those we observed in quiet times. Therefore, there seem to be no changes in competition in the time-deposit market during our period.

¹⁶See Eurostat Database for detailed figures at the NUTS 2 level, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

Appendix B No Changes in Bank Fundamentals

Identification of our estimates for strategic motives requires that there are no changes in bank fundamentals during the weeks following the surprise announcement on December 8, 2014.

B.1 Liquidity Measures

The bank tracks short-term liquidity through an index, the Liquidity Assets Ratio (LAR), defined as:

$$\text{Liquidity Assets Ratio} = \frac{\text{Liquid Assets of up to 30 days maturity}}{\text{Short term borrowing}} \quad (\text{B1})$$

where *Liquid Assets* include cash, interbank placements with maturity up to 30 days, compulsory reserve requirements to Bank of Greece, unencumbered high quality liquid assets, excess collateral pledged to ECB, inflows from installment loans within 30 days and other assets with maturity up to 30 days; and *Short Term Borrowing* considers interbank deposits with maturity up to one year, time deposits with maturity up to one year, wholesale funding with maturity up to one year, and 80% of saving and current accounts.

The LAR index needs to be higher than 20% for the bank to be considered liquid. We have confirmed with The Bank that the ratio was above the minimum threshold during the period for which we perform our strategic uncertainty analysis. At that time, time deposits accounted for more than 15% of The Bank's total liquidity.

The Bank also monitored another liquidity index, the Maturity Mismatch Ratio (MMR), given by:

$$\text{Maturity Mismatch Ratio} = \frac{\text{Assets} - \text{Liabilities of up to 30 days maturity}}{\text{Short term borrowing}} \quad (\text{B2})$$

This index needs to be higher than -20%. It was the case that during our strategic uncertainty period the index was significantly above this threshold.

Both indexes deteriorated soon after the January elections, and this trend intensified in early 2015.

B.2 Funding Costs

Despite the deposit outflow after the surprise announcement, The Bank did not face any funding problems. The Bank was able to borrow from the ECB at similar rates in the weeks

following the announcement (but before the election). Moreover, there were no changes on the interest rates on both time and demand deposits during this period. Finally, there was a slight decline on the value of the bank's collateral during this period. However, this fall did not pose a threat to the banks solvency.

B.3 Loan Repayment

We also check that there were no changes in repayment behavior of The Bank's customers in the six weeks after the surprise announcement in December 2014. To do so, we have information on the entire August 2014 loan portfolio. We observe payment delinquencies for all corporate and household loans. Every month between August 2014 and February 2015, over 80% of all personal loans and mortgages had no delays in their monthly payments. The fraction of corporate loans during these months also remained stable and high.

Appendix C Heterogeneity Across Deposit Withdrawals

Table C.1: Heterogeneity Analysis for Strategic Subsamples

PANEL A: Depositor and Account Characteristics

Early withdrawal (0/1)	Female	Male	Balance <35,000	Balance >35,000	3-month TDs	6-months TDs	1-year TDs	Currency Euros	Foreign Currency
Treatment Group	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)
Post t_0	0.0036*** (0.0013)	0.0019 (0.0012)	0.0014 (0.0015)	0.0037*** (0.0011)	0.0005 (0.0015)	0.0012 (0.0013)	0.0062*** (0.0019)	0.0028*** (0.0010)	0.0008 (0.0024)
DiD	-0.0000 (0.0022)	0.0051** (0.0020)	-0.0000 (0.0022)	0.0053*** (0.0019)	-0.0017 (0.0026)	0.0086*** (0.0025)	-0.0010 (0.0025)	0.0034** (0.0016)	-0.0037 (0.0035)
Depositor Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Account Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	>15,000	>15,000	>15,000	>15,000	>10,000	>10,000	>10,000	>35,000	>5,000
Baseline Prob. of Running	0.36	0.44	0.59	0.24	0.38	0.36	0.47	0.41	0.31
Baseline Cost of Running (% TD)	1.32	1.31	1.17	1.44	0.44	1.00	2.45	1.40	0.57

PANEL B: Depositor-Bank Relationship

Early withdrawal (0/1)	No Other Products	Other Products	Less than 2 years	More than 2 years	3 Renewals or Less	More than 3 Renewals
Treatment	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Post t_0	0.0023** (0.0010)	0.0037* (0.0020)	0.0011 (0.0013)	0.0047*** (0.0013)	0.0011 (0.0013)	0.0044*** (0.0012)
DiD	0.0016 (0.0016)	0.0059* (0.0034)	0.0046** (0.0021)	0.0002 (0.0020)	0.0044** (0.0022)	0.0008 (0.0019)
Depositor Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Account Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	>20,000	>10,000	>15,000	>15,000	>15,000	>15,000
Baseline Prob. of Running	0.19	0.95	0.53	0.23	0.54	0.24
Baseline Cost of Running (% TD)	1.32	1.30	1.17	1.51	1.39	1.23

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B (with *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table C.2: Heterogeneity Analysis for Policy Uncertainty Subsamples (Depositor and Account Characteristics)

Early withdrawal (0/1)	Female	Male	Balance <35,000	Balance >35,000	3-month TDs	6-months TDs	1-year TDs	Currency Euros	Foreign Currency
Treatment	0.001 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)
Maturity (after t_1)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)
Post (after t_A)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
Treatment \times Post (after t_A)	-0.0017 (0.0021)	-0.0046** (0.0021)	-0.0021 (0.0021)	-0.0043** (0.0021)	0.0002 (0.0024)	-0.0091*** (0.0026)	0.0007 (0.0026)	-0.00368** (0.0016)	0.000552 (0.0030)
Treatment \times Maturity (after t_1)	0.0033 (0.0027)	0.0018 (0.0026)	0.0014 (0.0028)	0.0034 (0.0025)	0.0094*** (0.0036)	-0.0090*** (0.0033)	0.0085*** (0.0029)	0.0032 (0.0020)	-0.0030 (0.0037)
Maturity (after t_1) \times Post (after t_A)	0.0107*** (0.0023)	0.0101*** (0.0023)	0.0091*** (0.0027)	0.0116*** (0.0020)	0.0025 (0.0025)	0.0036 (0.0029)	0.0212*** (0.0030)	0.0112*** (0.0018)	0.0035 (0.0045)
DDD	0.0136*** (0.0043)	0.0119*** (0.0042)	0.0106** (0.0044)	0.0148*** (0.0042)	0.0179*** (0.0058)	0.0260*** (0.0051)	-0.0033 (0.0049)	0.0129*** (0.0033)	0.0106 (0.0065)
Depositor Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Account Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	>20,000	>30,000	>25,000	>25,000	>15,000	>15,000	>15,000	>45,000	>5,000
Baseline Prob. of Running	0.71	0.62	0.72	0.61	0.43	0.48	1.08	0.69	0.39
Baseline Cost of Running (% TD)	1.32	1.31	1.17	1.44	0.44	1.00	2.45	1.40	0.58

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B (with *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table C.3: Heterogeneity Analysis for Policy Uncertainty Subsamples (Depositor-Bank Relationship)

Early withdrawal (0/1)	No Other Products	Other Products	Less than 2 years	More than 2 years	3 Renewals or Less	More than 3 Renewals
Treatment	0.001 (0.001)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Maturity (after t_1)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Post (after t_A)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Treatment \times Post (after t_A)	-0.0025 (0.0016)	-0.0053 (0.0035)	-0.0052** (0.0021)	-0.0009 (0.0021)	-0.0056** (0.0022)	-0.0008 (0.0020)
Treatment \times Maturity (after t_1)	0.0036* (0.0020)	-0.0004 (0.0042)	0.0008 (0.0028)	0.0049** (0.0023)	0.0011 (0.0029)	0.0041* (0.0024)
Post (after t_A) \times Maturity (after t_1)	0.0093*** (0.0019)	0.0134*** (0.0035)	0.0090*** (0.0024)	0.0122*** (0.0022)	0.0097*** (0.0025)	0.0111*** (0.0021)
DDD	0.0068** (0.0032)	0.0283*** (0.0070)	0.0197*** (0.0045)	0.0044 (0.0038)	0.0161*** (0.0046)	0.0093** (0.0039)
Depositor Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Account Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	>40,000	>10,000	>30,000	>20,000	>20,000	>30,000
Baseline Prob. of Running	0.59	0.87	0.64	0.70	0.65	0.68
Baseline Cost of Running (% TD)	1.32	1.30	1.17	1.52	1.39	1.23

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B (with *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table C.4: Heterogeneity Analysis for Idiosyncratic Subsamples

PANEL A: Depositor and Account Characteristics

Early withdrawal (0/1)	Female	Male	Balance <35,000	Balance >35,000	3-month TDs	6-months TDs	1-year TDs	Currency Euros	Foreign Currency
Treatment	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.004)
Post Interest	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.006* (0.003)
DiD	0.0082*** (0.0024)	0.0093*** (0.0024)	0.0105*** (0.0030)	0.0073*** (0.0019)	0.0026 (0.0028)	0.0035 (0.0030)	0.0166*** (0.0031)	0.0091*** (0.0019)	0.0066 (0.0047)
Depositor Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Account Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	>15,000	>15,000	>15,000	>15,000	>8,000	>10,000	>12,000	>27,000	>3,000
Baseline Prob. of Running	0.56	0.58	1.00	0.18	0.55	0.45	0.71	0.55	0.69
Baseline Cost of Running (% TD)	1.32	1.29	1.18	1.42	0.42	1.02	2.15	1.39	0.59

PANEL B: Depositor-Bank Relationship

Early withdrawal (0/1)	No Other Products	Other Products	Less than 2 years	More than 2 years	3 Renewals or Less	More than 3 Renewals
Treatment Group	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Post Interests	-0.0003 (0.00115)	-0.0051** (0.00241)	-0.0028* (0.0016)	0.0000 (0.0013)	-0.0025 (0.0016)	-0.0005 (0.0013)
DiD	0.0067*** (0.0019)	0.0144*** (0.0038)	0.0092*** (0.0026)	0.0083*** (0.0021)	0.0103*** (0.0027)	0.0070*** (0.0021)
Depositor Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Account Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	>25,000	>5,000	>20,000	>20,000	>15,000	>15,000
Baseline Prob. of Running	0.42	0.94	0.78	0.28	0.75	0.34
Baseline Cost of Running (% TD)	1.29	1.35	1.25	1.39	1.42	1.17

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B (with *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table C.5: Heterogeneity Analysis for City of Athens

Runner (0/1)	(Coordination) City of Athens	(Coordination) Not Athens	(Idiosyncratic) City of Athens	(Idiosyncratic) Not Athens	(Policy) City of Athens	(Policy) Not Athens
Treatment	0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Post Period	0.005*** (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Treatment \times Period (DD)	-0.0014 (0.0027)	0.0048*** (0.0017)	0.0060* (0.0032)	0.0101*** (0.0021)	0.0022 (0.0034)	0.0035 (0.0023)
Post t_A					-0.0029 (0.0019)	-0.0029*** (0.0010)
Treatment \times Post t_A					-0.0035 (0.0027)	-0.0030* (0.0018)
Post $t_A \times$ Post t_1					0.0104*** (0.0033)	0.0105*** (0.0019)
DDD					0.0175*** (0.0056)	0.0107*** (0.0036)
Depositor characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Account characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	>10,000	>20,000	>10,000	>20,000	>15,000	>30,000
Baseline Prob. of Running	0.38	0.40	0.29	0.70	0.66	0.67
Baseline Cost of Running (% TD)	1.22	1.37	1.30	1.32	1.35	1.31

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B (with *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table C.6: Heterogeneity Analysis for Small and Large Branches

Early Withdrawal (0/1)	(Coordination) Small Branches	(Coordination) Large Branches	(Idiosyncratic) Small Branches	(Idiosyncratic) Large Branches	(Policy) Small Branches	(Policy) Large Branches
Treatment	0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)
Post Period	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)
Treatment \times Post Period (DD)	-0.0021 (0.0036)	0.0037** (0.0016)	0.0091*** (0.0046)	0.0060* (0.0019)	0.0031 (0.0043)	0.0022 (0.0021)
Post t_A					-0.0020 (0.0022)	-0.0030*** (0.0010)
Treatment \times Post t_A					-0.0017 (0.0033)	-0.0036** (0.0017)
Post $t_A \times$ Post t_1					0.0071* (0.0039)	0.0112*** (0.0018)
DDD					0.0137** (0.0070)	0.0125*** (0.0034)
Depositor characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Account characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	>7,000	>23,000	>7,000	>23,000	>10,000	>40,000
Baseline Prob. of Running	0.49	0.38	0.70	0.53	0.66	0.67
Baseline Cost of Running (% TD)	1.35	1.31	1.34	1.30	1.35	1.31

Note: Branch size is defined as those below and above the median in their number of time deposit accounts. Small branches are those with 200 or less daily TD accounts on average, and large branches are those with more than 200 daily TD accounts on average. Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B (with *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table C.7: Heterogeneity Analysis on Political Views


Early withdrawal (0/1)	(Coordination) Against Grexit (<50%)	(Coordination) Pro-Grexit (>50%)	(Idiosyncratic) Against Grexit (<50%)	(Idiosyncratic) Pro-Grexit (>50%)	(Policy) Against Grexit (<50%)	(Policy) Pro-Grexit (>50%)
Treatment	0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
Post Period	0.002* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.003** (0.001)
Treatment \times Post Period (DD)	0.0019 (0.0024)	0.0032* (0.0018)	0.0094*** (0.0029)	0.0086*** (0.0022)	0.0028 (0.0032)	0.0022 (0.0023)
Post t_A					-0.0028** (0.0014)	-0.0028** (0.0012)
Treatment \times Post t_A					-0.0041* (0.0023)	-0.0028 (0.0019)
Post $t_A \times$ Post t_1					0.0090*** (0.0026)	0.0113*** (0.0021)
DDD					0.0167*** (0.0051)	0.0103*** (0.0038)
Depositor characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Account characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	>10,000	>20,000	>10,000	>20,000	>15,000	>35,000
Baseline Prob. of Running	0.32	0.45	0.75	0.46	0.55	0.73
Baseline Cost of Running (% TD)	1.34	1.31	1.32	1.30	1.34	1.30

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B (with *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Appendix D Greek CDS Index and Sovereign Bonds Spreads

Figure 1: Greek CDS Index and 10-Year Bond

Panel A: Greek CDS for Different Maturities (2010-2015)



Panel B: Greek Bond Spread with respect to German Bond (2010-2015)



Note: Panel A plots the Credit Default Swap Index for Greece, normalized to 100 for June 2008. The shaded area represents the sample period between March and November 2014. Panel B shows the 10-year Greek bond spread relative to the German 10-year bond.

Appendix E Extrapolation to Other Uncertainty Episodes

E.1 Extrapolation to all Bank and all Greek deposits

We evaluate whether our estimates can explain the overall decline of deposits at The Bank and at the Greek banking sector during the time period. The combined increase in CDS prices between t_0 and t_1 (6-weeks) was 219%. Our estimates predict that during the same period there should be: 1) 1.68% of depositors withdrawing because of idiosyncratic reasons (0.04% daily \times 42 days); 2) 1.14% of depositors withdrawing because of strategic motives (baseline of 1.68% withdrawals \times 68% estimate); 3) 3.23% of depositors withdrawing because of fundamental motives (baseline of 1.68% withdrawals \times 192% estimate); and 4) 1.68% of depositors withdrawing because of interest payments on January 1st (using the elasticity, a lower cost of 0.83% leads to a 100% higher probability of withdrawal w.r.t the baseline of 1.68%).

Our estimates predict that an increase in CDS of 219% resulting in both strategic and fundamental uncertainty will lead 7.73% of depositors to withdraw their time-deposits. In the data, we observe that total time-deposits at The Bank dropped by 8%, and total time-deposits in the Greek banking sector declined by 10%. Thus, the magnitude of our estimates of deposit-withdrawal sensitivities aligns well with the magnitude of the aggregate decline in deposits in Greece during the same time period.

E.2 Other Episode Where Country Fundamentals Changed

In this subsection we calibrate our estimates to changes in CDS prices taking place after events that indicated the (possible) exit of Italy from the Eurozone ('Italexit', 'Italeave', or—domestically—'Euroscita') in 2018. During this period there was an increase in aggregate policy uncertainty after an unexpected coalition to form government between two anti-Europe parties (populist Five Star Movement, the right-wing League). Prior to the March 2018 elections, both parties had antagonized each other and expressed no intention of cooperating when in government. Coalition negotiations between both parties became public in May, when a draft for a coalition agreement was leaked in the media. This draft reclaimed radical changes to the Stability and Growth Pact, along with €250 billion from the ECB. It also supported "the introduction of specific technical procedures for single states to leave the Eurozone and regain monetary sovereignty." These news increased policy uncertainty in the country.

When comparing the Italian episode to our analysis of the Greek elections, we can distinguish between two key events. The first event took place on May 15, 2018, when the draft for a coalition agreement was leaked. The second event is the formation of a new government on May 29, 2018. The first event can be compared to our shock at t_0 , since it created policy

uncertainty for depositors with long-run maturity expiration, but not for short-run maturity deposits (since policies could not be implemented until after the appointment of government). Depositors with shorter maturity expiration only faced a change in their expectations on how other depositors will behave. The second event is comparable to our shock at t_1 , when a new government is appointed and all depositors are exposed to policy uncertainty.

Over this 2-week period the CDS price on Italian sovereign bonds increased by 177% during this period of policy uncertainty. During that quarter, almost 4% of time deposits held by households with maturities shorter than two years were withdrawn.¹⁷ As in Greece, there were no bankruns, only a progressive leakage of depositors out of the system during that period. For an equivalent increase in CDS prices, our estimates predict that, in the month following the election, 5.31% of total time deposits with maturities shorter than one year will be withdrawn for an equivalent CDS change.

E.3 Other Episodes Where Bank Fundamentals Changed

We end by evaluating how our estimates predict deposit withdrawals in recent episodes of bank runs.

E.3.1 Northern Rock

The first is the bank run on Northern Rock in 2007. On September 14, 2007, Northern Rock sought and received a liquidity support facility from the Bank of England. The motive for such an emergency measure was the run on deposits of Northern Rock that took place Friday 14 and Monday 17 September, 2007. It all started in August 9, 2007, when interbank and other financial markets froze. Because of Northern Rock's funding model (requiring mortgage securitization), markets anticipated that there was a probability that the bank will run into trouble because of its next securitization being scheduled for September 2007. During August 10 and mid-September Northern Rock and the British government and regulators tried to find a solution to the liquidity crisis. The main three options under discussion were: 1) Northern Rock finding a solution to its liquidity crisis on its own by means of short-term money markets and securitization; 2) Northern Rock being taken over by another major retail bank; and 3) Northern Rock receiving a support liquidity facility from the Bank of England and guaranteed by the Government.¹⁸

After Northern Rock unexpectedly asked for liquidity to the Bank of England, its 5-year CDS price increased 180%. Northern Rock lost £10 billion of its £30 billion savings book (33% loss), with £4.4 billion in deposits withdrawn on September 14 (21% of total deposit

¹⁷See Bank of Italy's sectoral breakdown of MFI deposits as reported by the ECB

¹⁸For details, see: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/5607.htm>

amount).¹⁹ Our model predicts that such an increase in the CDS will result in 11% of time depositors leaving the bank.²⁰

E.3.2 Washington Mutual

We also consider deposit withdrawals during the bank-runs on Washington Mutual (WaMu). WaMu's first bank run took place on July 12, 2008, centered in Southern California after the federal government seized IndyMac following a \$1.3 billion bank run. The second run started on September 11, 2008, when Moody's rated WaMu's financial strength at D+ and downgraded the company's debt rating to junk status. These news and Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, sparked another bank run.

On September 26, 2008, Washington Mutual filed for bankruptcy. In the month prior to the first bank run, the 5-year CDS of WaMu increased by almost 100%. In September 16, 2008 (last day WaMu was traded on CDS markets), the CDS premium increased by more than 100%. Our estimates predict that such increases in CDS will result in 6% withdrawals of total deposits. During these episodes, WaMu depositors withdrew \$16.7 billion out of their savings and checking accounts over the next 10 days after the bankruptcy announcement. These withdrawals accounted for 9% of WaMu's total deposits.

¹⁹See, e.g., Financial Times "Northern Rock fall sees outflow of savings," <https://www.ft.com/content/2e3bc984-9a07-11dc-ad70-0000779fd2ac>

²⁰One key difference between Greek and British deposits is the level of insurance. While Greek retail deposits are insured up to €100,000, the UK government only guarantees 100% of the first £2,000 and 90% of the next £33,000. That is, in the UK only £31,700 are insured per deposit.