ECE 382N-Sec (FA25):

L6: TEE Overview and Attestation

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
Before We Start

- Building Trusted-Execution Environments often involves various crypto tools
- This course focuses on general crypto primitives instead of specific algorithms and their implementations
 - These primitives are nice "hammers" to system builders
 - How these hammers are built is fascinating, but it's out-of-scope for this course
- Our discussion simplifies certain aspects of these crypto primitives. It is good for building an intuitive understanding, but please do consult and follow various crypto standards for anything serious. Don't re-invent the hammer!
- A good reference: "Serious Cryptography: A Practical Introduction to Modern Encryption" by Jean-Philippe Aumasson

Different Isolation Techniques


Your program VMs Browser Containers Proc sandboxes Proc Website Processes Guest Container OS Proc Browser RT SW Host OS HWMemory CPU

Trusted Computing Base (TCB)



The only components that can betray us, are the ones we trust

Trusted-Execution Environments (TEE)¹




¹TEE is a somewhat overloaded term. We focus on hardware-based TEEs

²The process may be divided into trusted and untrusted parts


³Depending on the memory type and threat model, it may or may not be trusted

TEE Use Cases


Copyright Protection



Minimizing TCB



Outsourcing Computation




(Common*) Security Goals of TEEs

			Example Attacks	
			Software Attack	Physical Attack
~	Confidentiality	Attacker cannot directly access my private program states (Side channel? Spectre?)	OS reads my pages	Bus snooping
~	Integrity	Attacker cannot tamper with my program states (Freshness: Program state is up-to-date)	OS writes my pages	? Bus spoofing
×	Availability	Attacker refuses to execute or give enough resources to my program	OS allocates no CPU time	Pull the plug


Note: Availability of the host is protected from my program in TEE---the OS can always terminate my program without my cooperation

^{*}Many variants exist

Establishing Trust?



Hammer 1: Cryptographic Hash Functions



Avalanche effect (example uses SHA-256):


"44 students are registered for ECE-382N" \rightarrow "f1246dddd902aa8de27ddce24bd24031..." "43 students are registered for ECE-382N" \rightarrow "4bb1db3619a8442661fc9107b1767483..."

Security properties:


- Preimage resistance: For any random hash value h, it's practically impossible to find a message M such that Hash(M) = h in practice
- Collision resistance: Despite the inevitability of collision, it's practically impossible find two distinct messages that hash to the same value

Note: Not all hash functions are cryptographic hash functions! E.g., Cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs) are not cryptographic hashes

Idea: "Measure" the Program State Using Crypto Hash




Hammer 2: Digital Signature



How to achieve this?


Hammer 3: Asymmetric Crypto



Examples: RSA, elliptic-curve cryptography, ...

Property: Messages encrypted with K_{priv} can only be decrypted with K_{pub} and vice versa

Hammer 3: Asymmetric Crypto




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
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
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Digital Signature




Actual schemes are more complex than this

Software Attestation




Public Key Infrastructure




A Certificate is Like an ID Card

It binds the subject's identity to their public key (or appearance)



Certificate








Illustration from "Intel SGX Explained" by Costan et al.

It's a proof of identity-pubkey binding, not proof of identity

Validating a Certificate



I'm Alice, here's my certificate. It contains my public key



Certificate

Subject Identity = Alice

Subject's Public Key = K_{pub}

Valid From/Until = ...

Certificate Usage = ...

•••

Issuer's Public Key = K_{pub}'

Certificate Signature

Validate the certificate:

- Does it say "Alice"?
- Expired?
- Valid signature?
- Does the issuer's public key belong to a trustworthy signer/CA

• ...

down the road?


Kicking the can

Lenovo Superfish Adware




https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2015/02/20/lenovo-superfish-adware-vulnerable-https-spoofing

Putting All the Pieces Together



Putting All the Pieces Together



Attestation in Practice (E.g., Legacy Intel SGX)

- Attestation report also contains hardware information
 - Is debug mode enabled?
 - Secure version numbers (for checking whether the TCB is up-to-date)
- Intel enhanced privacy ID (EPID) uses a group-signature scheme
 - Each processor belongs to an EPID group
 - Each processor creates signatures using its own private key
 - Signatures can be verified using the public key of the group that the processor belongs to
- Revocation list