
ECE 382N-Sec (FA25):

L11: RowHammer


Neil Zhao neil.zhao@utexas.edu

DRAM Refresher: A Textbook DRAM Cell



Storing 1 bit. Destructive reads


DRAM Refresher: A Textbook DRAM Cell




Solution*: Periodic refreshing (e.g., read it out and write it back every 64ms)

*Or spray it with liquid nitrogen!


From a Single Cell to a DRAM Array




From a Single Cell to a DRAM Array



From a Single Cell to a DRAM Array



RowHammer



RowHammer*

Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors


Yoongu Kim¹ Ross Daly* Jeremie Kim¹ Chris Fallin* Ji Hye Lee¹ Donghyuk Lee¹ Chris Wilkerson² Konrad Lai Onur Mutlu¹

Carnegie Mellon University ²Intel Labs

Tested 129 DRAM modules from three vendors (A, B, C) 110 out 129 modules are vulnerable

^{*}Based on Kim et al., "Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors," ISCA'14


RowHammer*



*Based on Kim et al., "Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors," ISCA'14


<u>"The Story of RowHammer" by Onur Mutlu</u>

RowHammer – Basic Characteristics*




*Kim et al., "Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors," ISCA '14

RowHammer – Basic Characteristics*



*Kim et al., "Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors," ISCA '14

RowHammer – Basic Characteristics*



^{*}Kim et al., "Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors," ISCA '14

RowHammer – Root Cause

- When activating a row, its adjacent rows are slightly activated
 - Adjacent rows lose a small amount of charge
 - Enough activations ⇒ Lose enough charge ⇒ Bit flip
- But still, why? Hypotheses from Kim et al.:
 - Electromagnetic coupling
 - Bridging
 - Hot-carrier damage

RowHammer – Other Characteristics*

- Bit flips are repeatable
- Bit flip direction:
 - Module A: $1 \to 0$ (49.9%)
 - Module B: $1 \to 0$ (92.8%)
 - Module C: $1 \to 0$ (97.1%)
- Data-dependent pattern:


~Solid
00000
00000
00000
00000

Solid
11111
11111
11111
11111

>10x more bit flips!

^{*}Based on Kim et al., "Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors," ISCA'14

Hammering Sequence




```
while (true) {
  load hammer_row;

  clflush hammer_row;

  mfence;
}
```


Hammering Sequence



```
while (true) {
  load hammer_row;
  load dummy_row;

  clflush hammer_row;
  clflush dummy_row;
  mfence;
}
```


Hammering Sequence




```
while (true) {
  load hammer_row;
  load dummy_row;

  clflush hammer_row;
  clflush dummy_row;
  mfence;
}
```


DRAM Mapping Function



DRAM Mapping Function



Recover the Mapping Function




Method 1 (physical access): Repeated accesses to a known physical address, observe which rank and bank are used through physical probing

Method 2 (software-only): Detect addresses that are mapped to the same bank through row buffer conflicts ⇒ Timing difference

Source: Pessl et al, "DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks," USENIX '16


Finding Aggressor

Observation: Bit flips are repeatable




Finding Aggressor

Observation: Bit flips are repeatable



Is This Bit Flip Useful?


Goal: Corrupt the page-frame number of a page-table entry (PTE)



Page Table Entry (PTE)


^{*}https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

Goal: Corrupt the Page Table Entry




^{*}https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

Goal: Corrupt the Page Table Entry




^{*}https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

Goal: Corrupt the Page Table Entry




^{*}https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html




• Record the aggressor and victim addresses

^{*}https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html




- Record the aggressor and victim addresses
- Un-map all pages except for aggressor and victim pages

^{*}https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html




*https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html





- Record the aggressor and victim addresses
- Un-map all pages except for aggressor and victim pages
- Stuff the physical memory with the PTEs of the attacker process
- Free the victim page

^{*}https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html



*https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html






- Record the aggressor and victim addresses
- Un-map all pages except for aggressor and victim pages
- Stuff the physical memory with the PTEs of the attacker process
- Free the victim page
- Allocate another dummy page
- Hammer with the aggressor
- ⇒ The attacker process can write to its own page table entries
- ⇒ Access arbitrary physical address

Naïve Defenses Against RowHammer


- Build better chips
 - ⇒ Cost
- Error Correction Code (ECC)
 - ⇒ Cannot correct multi-bit errors, storage overhead
- Reduced refresh interval
 - ⇒ Increase the "downtime" due to refreshing
- Removing clflush
 - ⇒ Eviction sets
- •

Probabilistic Adjacent Row Activation (PARA)




Larger $p \Rightarrow$ stronger protection, higher performance overhead

The Trend of RowHammer Threshold




^{*}Saxena et al., "START: Scalable Tracking for Any Rowhammer Threshold," HPCA '24

Counter-Based Mitigation



Counter-Based Mitigation



Activation Counters (SRAM)


10	
1	
480	Exceedir
4	Refresh
9	
2	

Exceeding a threshold T? Refresh victim rows


Ideally:

- Not over-counting
- Know which rows to mitigate

How to Set *T* - Factor 1: Double-Sided RowHammer



How to Set *T* - Factor 2: Refresh and Reset Timing



Graphene: Strong yet Lightweight Row Hammer Protection


Insight: Only track the most activated rows

	Activation		
Row Address	Counters		
0x1210	490		
0x2320	1		
0x3430	480		
0x4540	4		
0x5650	10		
0x6760	3		
0x7870	300		
0x8980	4		
0x9a90	3		

^{*}Park et al., "Graphene: Strong yet Lightweight Row Hammer Protection," MICRO '20

Graphene: Strong yet Lightweight Row Hammer Protection

Insight: Only track the most activated rows



^{*}Park et al., "Graphene: Strong yet Lightweight Row Hammer Protection," MICRO '20

Graphene: Strong yet Lightweight Row Hammer Protection

Misra-Gries algorithm


Row Addr.	Ctrs		Row Addr.	Ctrs		Row Addr.	Ctrs		Row Addr.	Ctrs
0x1210	9		0x1210	10		0x1210	10		0x1210	10
0x3430	8		0x3430	8		0x3430	8		0x3430	8
0x7870	5	ACT	0x7870	5	ACT	0x7870	5	ACT	0x5650	6
		ACT			ACT			ACT		
Spillover	4	0x1210	Spillover	4	0x4540	Spillover	5	0x5650	Spillover	5

Invariant: spillover counter <= smallest count from the table

Can over-count ⇒ Conservative but safe

^{*}Park et al., "Graphene: Strong yet Lightweight Row Hammer Protection," MICRO '20

Number of Counters



Misra-Gries algorithm guarantees:

- With k entries, after N_{act} activations: Row addresses with more than $N_{act}/(k+1)$ counts are tracked in the table (instead of being tracked by the spillover counter)
- We want $N_{act}/(k+1) < T \Rightarrow N_{ctr} > \frac{N_{act}}{T} 1$


 N_{act} between refreshes is 1360k, T = 12.5k, $N_{ctr} = 108$

^{*}Park et al., "Graphene: Strong yet Lightweight Row Hammer Protection," MICRO '20

Hydra: Hybrid Tracking

The maximum number of activations between refreshes is bounded:

- Access many rows few times
- Access few rows many times



^{*}Qureshi et al., "Hydra: Enabling Low-Overhead Mitigation of Row-Hammer at Ultra-Low Thresholds via Hybrid Tracking," ISCA '22