Ece Teoman

Department of Economics
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16801

Email: eceteoman@psu.edu
Phone: +1 (814) 409-8282
www.eceteoman.com

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics	The Pennsylvania State University	2017-2023 (expected)
M.A. in Economics	Bilkent University	2015-2017
B.A. in Economics	Bilkent University	2010-2015

ACADEMIC RESEARCH

INTERESTS: Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Organizational Economics, Industrial Organization

ADVISOR: S. Nageeb Ali

RESEARCH PAPERS:

How to Delegate the Choice of a Project (Job Market Paper) (with Vasundhara Mallick)

Abstract: We study a dynamic Principal-Agent problem where they jointly choose a project to implement where the set of available projects is the private information of Agent. The preferences of Principal and Agent over the possible projects are in perfect conflict. In each period, Agent can propose an available project or stay silent, and Principal can *accept* or *reject* a proposal but he cannot commit to his future responses. We first establish a benchmark in which Principal has commitment power and we compare it to the equilibria of the dynamic game. When there are two possible projects, there is always an equilibrium in which Principal attains his commitment payoff when the players are sufficiently patient. The main reason why Coasian dynamics are not always present here is that Principal lacks proposal power and can provide incentives through off-path beliefs. When there are more than two possible projects, we identify a condition on the parameters under which Principal can still attain his commitment payoff.

Agenda-Setting with Legislative Precommitments

Abstract: I consider an agenda setting environment where the voters commit upfront to the reforms they are willing to pass, and the agenda setter chooses from among the passable reforms or the status quo. I characterize the outcomes that emerge in subgame perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect coalitional equilibrium of this game with unanimity and majority voting rules. In contrast to standard models of agenda setting, the agenda setter's power is significantly reduced in this game.

CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

Women in Economic Theory	2022
Midwest Economic Theory Conference	2022
17th European Meeting on Game Theory (SING17)	2022
23rd ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (EC'22) (Poster)	2022
Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (Poster)	2021, 2022
Penn State Theory and Women's Workshops	2019-2022

Teaching Experience

Instructor, Math Camp for MA Program, *Penn State*	2021
Instructor, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis and Policy, *Penn State (World Campus)*	Summer 2020
Teaching Assistant, Graduate Micro Theory; Graduate Game Theory, *Penn State*	2020-2021
Teaching Assistant, Microeconomic Analysis; Game Theory; Behavioral Economics, *Penn State*	2017-2022
Teaching Assistant, Graduate Micro Theory, *Bilkent University*	2016
Teaching Assistant, Labor Market Economics; Principles of Microeconomics, *Bilkent University*	2015-2017

Projects and Work Experience

Graduate Research Assistant (S. Nageeb Ali), *Penn State*	2022-2023
Alfred Galichon's 'math+econ+code' Masterclass on optimal transport and applications	2022
Graduate Research Assistant (S. Nageeb Ali and Keisuke Hirano), *Penn State*	Summer 2021

Honors and Awards

High Honor and Honor list, *Bilkent University*	2010-2015
Comprehensive Scholarship, *Bilkent University*	2010-2015

Professional Activities

Organizer, Theory Pre-Seminar Series, *Penn State*	2021-2022
Organizer, Theory Reading Group, *Penn State*	2021
Co-organizer, Women's Workshop, *Penn State*	2019
Organizer, Theory Reading Group, *Bilkent University*	2016
Referee for International Journal of Game Theory, WINE Conference	

Other

Languages: Turkish (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate)
Programming: Matlab, Mathematica, Python, R, Stata, LaTeX