**Questions**

* Does entrance of Revolutionary Leader/Govt lead to decreased polity score?
  + Mean increase/decrease of polity score for revo leaders
* Does # of categories changed influence polity/polity2?
* How many revolutionary leaders did/did not use force?
* For non revo leaders that used force, how did that impact polity?
* How frequently is “democratizing” positive?
  + Which leaders were these?
* What age are revolutionary leaders vs non-revo (Colgan already did this, might as well check)
* What is frequency of each variable from Criterion 1 (Irreg Trans)
  + irregular trans w force,
  + irregular trans w/o force
* What is frequency of each variable from Criterion 2 (RadicalIdeology, also referrd to as “radical policy” in code book)
* Which combination of Criterion 2 variables occur in combination with each other most frequently
* Select by:
  + Transition periods, revo + non-revo
  + All revos not marked as transition
* Were the highly negative revolutions coming from generally more democratic or autocratic regimes?
* Is there a relationship between where polity was *before* transition/revolution?
  + Add pre/post polity on same line showing change 🡪 compact into single data frame, and run scatter plot on where states started vs where they ended up

**Errata**

* chg\_owernship 🡪 chg\_ownership
* Revolutions excluded from Colgan’s paper, but with revolutionary leaders
  1. Albania, Hoxha
  2. Bolivia, Siles Zuazo
  3. Bolivia, Paz Estenssoro (2nd entry into office)
  4. Bulgaria, Popov (puts Mladenov & Popov in single govt)
  5. Egypt, Nasser (puts Naguib and Nasser in single govt)
  6. Egypt, Sadat
  7. El Salvador, Duarte
  8. Ethiopia, Banti
  9. Ethiopia, Mengistu Marriam
  10. Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi (2nd time)
  11. Iran, Rafsanjani
  12. Iraq, Hussein (Al-B Bakr and Hussein in single govt)
  13. Laos, Phounsavanh
  14. Laos, Siphandon
  15. Myanmar, Than Shwe
  16. Spain, Franco
  17. Syria, Al-Hafiz
  18. Thailand, Thanon Kittakachorn
  19. Yemen, Ismail