

Rutgers University Press

Chapter Title: Abundance in a Sea of Poverty: Quality and Quantity of Life

Book Title: The Malthusian Moment

Book Subtitle: Global Population Growth and the Birth of American Environmentalism

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Published by: Rutgers University Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hjdm1.9>

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Abundance in a Sea of Poverty

Quality and Quantity of Life

"Abundance and scarcity both have derived a part of their meaning and significance from the existence of the other."

—Robert M. Collins, *Reviews in American History*, 1988

Paul Ehrlich opened *The Population Bomb* (1968), the most famous of the environmental Malthusian books of the late 1960s, with a memorable line: "The battle to feed all humanity is over." Then, drawing upon carrying capacity, the idea that Aldo Leopold had refined and William Vogt and Fairfield Osborn had globalized, he predicted that "nothing can be done to prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate." Less well remembered, but equally important was the vision of America's role in the world that Ehrlich built this view upon. "Nothing could be more misleading to our children than our present affluent society," he wrote. "As the most powerful nation in the world today, *and its largest consumer*, the United States cannot stand isolated. . . . We are today involved in the events leading to famine; tomorrow we may be destroyed by its consequences."¹

With these lines, Ehrlich evoked several themes central to environmental Malthusian thinking about population growth in the two decades after Osborn and Vogt published their classic books: the gap between American prosperity and a world of poverty, the centrality of consumption to American life and the nation's foreign relations, and, because of these, the impossibility of isolation in an interconnected world. To Ehrlich, the United States was a consuming island of affluence surrounded by and connected to a sea of poverty and famine. "We, of course, cannot remain affluent and isolated," he wrote. "At the moment the United States uses well over half of all the [planet's] raw materials consumed each year." Ehrlich left no doubt that he was alarmed by the situation, but less clear was his judgment of American consumption: was he saying that the United States consumed too much, or that in order to protect America's high level of consumption, it needed to act?²

Unlike earlier Malthusians, who worried as much about European famine and political instability as problems in other parts of the world, the Malthusians of the 1950s and 1960s worried primarily about the poverty and politics of a region newly prominent in world affairs and American foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s: the “third world.” These were the impoverished former colonial areas that won their independence after World War II: India, Pakistan, Burma, Korea, and Indonesia in the late 1940s; Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1954; and forty more countries, mostly in Africa, in the late 1950s and 1960s. Not since the dissolution of Spain’s Latin American empire in the nineteenth century (creating a group of countries also considered part of the third world because of their economic and political dependence) had the world gained so many new nations. For Americans, this wave of decolonization put a spotlight on issues such as imperialism, racial discrimination, nationalism, and especially poverty. “Roughly 500,000,000 people in the underdeveloped countries have won their national independence since the end of the last war,” a Truman administration task force explained in 1951. “In all these countries the pent-up discontents of past generations are breaking through in demands for better living.” American newspapers described the struggles of new nations, philanthropic organizations began to take up their cause, and new academic fields of study such as development economics emerged. “No economic subject more quickly captured the attention of so many,” economist John Kenneth Galbraith noted, “as the rescue of the people of the poor countries from their poverty.”³

As Ehrlich’s opening to *The Population Bomb* suggests yet historians sometimes forget, natural resources formed an increasingly important part of U.S.–third world relations and the concern about population growth. In 1952, the Paley Commission emphasized that the United States had become a net importer of many resources, which it needed for its large and expanding consumer economy and military. Possessing a wealth of seemingly underused resources, the third world seemed a new global frontier: Southeast Asia had tin and lumber; India had manganese; the Middle East had oil; Africa had aluminum, diamonds, gold, and cobalt; Latin America had copper and oil. Many countries had productive lands and forests. The postwar years saw a global scramble for these resources, abetted by Cold War competition. “Our own ever growing needs for raw materials,” geographer Carl Sauer noted in 1955, “have driven the search for metals and petroleum to the ends of the Earth.” But who would control these resources, and were there enough for local use and for the international system?⁴

Anticipating Ehrlich, some experts in the 1950s predicted that a great age of resource abundance was coming to a close. In the 1952 book *The Great Frontier*, historian Walter Prescott Webb argued that the age of discovery that had opened a world frontier and prompted “a sudden, continuing, and ever-increasing flood of wealth” since the days of Columbus had now come to an end. The year before, he had published an article entitled “Ended: Four Hundred Year Boom.” But




FIGURE 6 *Resources for Freedom*, the 1952 report of the President's Commission on Materials Policy, also known as the Paley Commission, warned that the United States was growing increasingly dependent upon the rest of the world for resources. From *President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom: vol. 1, Foundation for Growth and Security* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952).

others, such as Yale historian David Potter, professed optimism. In his unusually influential 1954 book *People of Plenty*, Potter argued that Webb, like the famous American historian Frederick Jackson Turner before him, had fundamentally misunderstood the spreading frontier, both in the United States and globally.




FIGURE 7 Many of the military materials the United States—and its strategic partners—needed came from underdeveloped nations.

From *Partners in Progress: A Report to President Truman by the International Development Advisory Board* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), 44.

Picking up where early twentieth-century conservationists, Paul Hoffman, the Paley Commission, and Julius Krug left off, Potter argued that American abundance had not been created so much by land resources as by “an advancing technology.” He wrote, “The American standard of living is resultant much less of natural resources than of the increase in capacity to produce.” Other kinds of frontiers awaited, each with its own form of abundance: “Science has its frontiers, industry its frontiers, technology its frontiers.” Indeed, Potter believed that America’s “mission” in the world was to spread the technologies that created abundance and thereby promote democracy.⁵

During the same years these resource questions percolated, unexpectedly large population growth in the third world exceeded expectations. In *Our Plundered Planet*, Fairfield Osborn had been aghast that the globe’s population might reach three billion by 2000. By the early 1960s, demographers were predicting that by that year the global population would reach five billion and possibly seven billion. (The actual population in 2000 was 6.1 billion.) Most of the increase came in the third world. During the 1950s and 1960s, in large part because of advances in personal hygiene, improved sanitation, antibiotics, and public health programs such as malaria eradication using DDT, many

third-world populations skyrocketed. An American born in 1950 shared the planet with roughly 2.5 billion others. By 1990, he or she had 5.3 billion neighbors. The world grew as much during the 1960s as between 1800 and 1900.⁶

Potter was undaunted by this population growth. “No doubt, it is true that in many societies the level of living will be controlled by the scarcity of resources (e.g. by lack of soil fertility),” but ultimately, “it was the limited productivity of the worker rather than the absolute lack of resources in the environment which fixed the maximum level for the standard of living.” Potter rejected the idea of limited resources: “If abundance is to be properly understood, it must not be visualized in terms of a storehouse of fixed and universally recognizable assets, reposing on shelves until humanity, by a process of removal, strips all the shelves bare.”⁷

During the 1950s and 1960s, as the world shrank and its population expanded, a diverse but increasingly well-organized and well-funded population limitation movement emerged. The movement consisted of groups that have been well studied by historians—philanthropists, demographers, birth-control activists—but also some less well examined, such as naturalists, biologists, and conservationists. This movement reinvigorated old organizations such as Planned Parenthood, created new ones such as the International Federation of Planned Parenthood and the Population Council, and recast academic fields of study such as biology and conservation.⁸

These Malthusians had a complicated relationship to the debate about scarce resources and the closing of the global frontier. Compared to Potter, they placed much more emphasis on the problems posed by population growth. Indeed, what defined the movement was a belief that population growth was a much bigger problem than most policymakers acknowledged, and that better birth control needed to be developed and spread more broadly. That said, though, population groups differed among themselves over the question of resource limits. Many focused more on resource imbalances than ultimate limits, and even shared Potter’s faith in spreading technology and industrialization around the world, especially if modern birth control was one of the technologies. But others, especially biologists and conservationists who drew from Edward Murray East, Raymond Pearl, Aldo Leopold, Fairfield Osborn, and William Vogt in their concern about overconsumption and their skepticism of technology, warned of environmental degradation and hard environmental “limits to growth.” This fault line did not matter much as long as the movement was small and of limited influence, but it became crucial during the 1960s, especially as the environmental movement was coalescing.

In the conversation about resources and growing populations in the 1950s and 1960s, the idea of “quality of life” took on increasing importance. Suggesting that life should be about more than just subsistence, the quality-of-life idea first gained prominence in the international context in contrast

to quantity-of-life concerns. Eventually, it became a central part of Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" and a driving interest, as historians such as Samuel Hays have noted, of the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Americans pursued environmental protections as a way to improve their own quality of life. As with Ehrlich's warning about America's island of consumption in a sea of famine, however, quality-of-life concerns contained a political ambivalence: they could be framed as a self-interested defense of class and national privilege, or they could be deployed altruistically, as part of an attempt to improve all of humanity's standard of living. The larger environmental movement shared this ambivalence.

Rationalizing Reproduction

The Population Council, one of the leading population limitation organizations of the postwar decades, got its start in 1952, when—after the dismissal of population issues by the Paley Commission, as well as the Rockefeller Foundation and the World Health Organization—John D. Rockefeller III brought together a group of like-minded experts in Williamsburg, Virginia, to discuss global and domestic population growth. The grandson of the oil baron John D. Rockefeller and son of John D. Rockefeller Jr., Rockefeller (1906–1978) had come to the population issue through an interest in birth control and Asia. As a member of various governmental planning boards during World War II, he learned of the population growth expected in Asia after the war and of the worries that such growth might undermine hard-won advances in public health, for which his family's philanthropies had worked for decades. Rockefeller adopted a two-pronged attack. The first was to increase food production around the world, especially through hybrid grains, in what would become known as the "green revolution." In this effort, he worked closely with the Rockefeller Foundation, of which he was a trustee. But because of the social and political sensitivity of the second issue, population planning, he ventured out on his own. "The population field," he declared at the end of the war, "is a logical broadening of my interest in the birth control problem." During the late 1940s and 1950s, Rockefeller helped fund most of the major population organizations, including Princeton's Office for Population Research, the Conservation Foundation, the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, International Planned Parenthood, and the Population Council. During the 1950s, he gave the Population Council roughly \$250,000 each year. Twenty years later, he would chair two presidential study groups on population. Rockefeller had the resources and talents to turn a personal interest into an influential social cause.⁹

Rockefeller wanted the Population Council to take a scientific, research-based approach to population issues, and to advance the relatively new academic discipline of demography. In the early 1950s, the population field barely

existed. The United States had three small demographic organizations—the Office of Population Research at Princeton, which Rockefeller help fund, the Scripps Foundation, and the Milbank Memorial Fund. It also had one prominent reformed eugenics organization, the American Eugenics Society. Nationwide only seven professors researched and taught demography, almost all of whom specialized in very local interests.¹⁰

The attendees at the Williamsburg Conference included a number of physicians, natural scientists, social scientists, and conservationists who would become fixtures of the population movement in ensuing decades: Pascal Whelpton, Roger Revelle, Kingsley Davis, Marshall Balfour, Irene Taeuber, Fairfield Osborn, Frederick Osborn (cousin of Fairfield Osborn), Frank Notestein, and William Vogt, among others. Many had extensive experience in international public health, especially in Asia. Explaining his interest in population, Dr. R. R. Williams, a chemist, pointed to “the accident of [his] birth in India, and the accident of residence in the Philippines, as well as a number of visits to the Orient, where some of the world’s worst population problems present themselves.” What bound this diverse group together, according to the official convener of the meeting, Dr. Detlev Bronk, was a common concern about rapid population growth—“a problem in which most of us, at least, had to become deeply concerned because of impressions which we had gathered in Japan and in the European Theatre during and following the war.”¹¹

Despite its ostensibly scientific approach, many of the Williamsburg participants displayed racist and elitist views. These views cropped up in the discussion at the Williamsburg Inn, a whites-only establishment. Bronk spoke of “the potential degradation of the genetic quality of the human race.” Warren Weaver worried that foreign aid to India would increase the number of poor, incompetent people, making the country “nigger rich.” Frederick Osborn, the man who would oversee the daily activities of the Population Council for much of the 1950s, believed that population growth had to be curtailed because “the little groups of three or four hundred people, who produce most of the freedom of the human mind . . . may be engulfed by a great mass of people to whom these conceptions are largely alien.” The legacy of eugenics also informed the first draft of the Population Council’s mission statement, which called for creating conditions such that “parents who are above the average in intelligence, quality of personality and affection will tend to have larger than average families.” But not all those associated with the Population Council held such views. At least one trustee objected, for both political and intellectual reasons, to the language about parents of above-average intelligence. In the end, the final statement was ambiguous, calling for research “in both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of population in the United States.”¹²

Indeed, a model that rejected racial explanations in favor of sociological factors came to dominate Population Council thinking. As part of the attempt

to modernize their field, two demographers who became associated with the Population Council, Frank Notestein and Kingsley Davis, advanced the “demographic transition theory,” a meta-narrative of population growth and decline that would dominate population planning for much of the next three decades. Echoing the resurgence of evolutionary thinking across the social sciences, the theory held that all societies—regardless of race—pass through three stages: a traditional stage of high fertility and high mortality, a transitional phase of high fertility and low mortality, and a final “advanced” phase of both low fertility and low mortality. According to the model, population levels remained stable in the first and third stages, yet expanded, sometimes threefold, during the transitional phase. By the mid-twentieth century, most Western nations had reached the stable “advanced” phase. Most underdeveloped nations, on the other hand, stood on the edge of the transitional stage of quick population growth. Such dramatic growth threatened “efficient” population replacement around the world.¹³

Although demographer Warren Thompson had articulated a very similar model in 1929, it failed to earn wide acceptance until Notestein and Davis repackaged it for postwar planners during World War II. According to demographic historian Simon Szreter, three reasons explain why. First, by the end of the war, Americans were much more willing to accept governmental economic and social planning, and those planners needed solid demographic information. Second, Keynesian concern about aggregate demand had created a new interest in the economic implications of demographic change. And finally, diplomats and strategists urgently needed to understand the social forces shaping the third world. For those interested in these areas, the demographic transition theory was, according to Szreter, “something of a philosopher’s stone”: it allowed planners to place a wide diversity of societies into a straightforward, ranked typology based on available data and simple concepts.¹⁴

On the basis of the transition model, demographers such as Notestein and Davis began to warn about demographic catastrophes. “A sober consideration of the existing situation,” Notestein declared in 1948, “leads one to expect that catastrophes will in fact check rapid growth.” In 1950, he predicted that high population growth could lead to “a period of disorganization” characterized by “catastrophic losses from time to time and from place to place.” Kingsley Davis wrote that only a period of “strife and turmoil,” which reduced the “existing demographic glut,” would end the circle of poverty caused by overpopulation. During the 1950s and 1960s, the potential for such problems was never far from the minds of most demographers.¹⁵

As originally conceived, the demographic transition model saw little space for birth-control and population-limitation programs. Because fertility was so dependent upon the entire socioeconomic system, a single technology alone could not bring about change. But several developments helped convince policy planners otherwise: the growth of faith in technological transfer programs, the

development of new birth-control technologies, and the example of Japan. During the American occupation of Japan after World War II, the Japanese were able to sharply reduce their population growth rate within just a few years through widespread abortions and condoms. Moreover, a sense emerged that the transition would simply take too long. As Frederick Osborn explained in 1958, "The process of industrialization should of itself reduce the birth rate if we are to judge by Western experience. But Asia cannot afford the time this transition took in the West."¹⁶

An intellectual shift in economics during the late 1950s, partially sparked by a book funded by the Population Council, encouraged this idea. Before Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover's *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low Income Countries: A Case Study of India's Prospects* (1958), development economists and policymakers subscribed to Keynesian models holding that population growth spurred economic growth. In their study, though, Coale, a demographer at Princeton's Office of Population Research, and Hoover, a Duke University economist, concluded that population growth actually impeded economic development. Using some of the earliest simulations of future trends, Coale and Hoover predicted that average income per adult would increase about 40 percent if the rate of childbearing were to fall by 50 percent in twenty-five years. Even a small fertility drop could yield an economic windfall—an idea that development funders with an eye on cost-benefit analyses found hard to resist. They said little about hard resource limits.¹⁷

During the 1950s, the Population Council devoted most of its roughly one-million-dollar annual budget to conducting demographic research and training hundreds of officials from around the world. Through this global network of trainees, historian John Sharpless has noted, "the American vision of population studies became the global vision." The Population Council stressed top-down training of experts because, as Frederick Osborn put it in 1958, the intellectual authority of elites was greater "in areas of low literacy and education" than in the West, where "more of the people are able to deal with intellectual concepts on their own." This view meshed with their own elitist view of themselves as the most important movers and shakers within American and global society. But it was also good public relations, at least in the short term. By relying on scholars from around the world, rather than only Americans, the Population Council could appear less imperial, not as a Western power imposing its will but as a benevolent friend lending a helping hand. Population programs, Frederick Osborn wrote, were best conducted by insiders because the programs are so "heavily loaded with emotion."¹⁸

Although the Population Council did a great deal to spread concern about population growth, generally it focused on economic development and political stability, not environmental degradation. At the Williamsburg conference, Fairfield Osborn and William Vogt had voiced their concerns about resource

depletion and environmental degradation. Their presence suggests some support for their positions, and indeed, a full one-third of the hefty conference workbook addressed natural resource topics, including issues such as “carrying capacity” and the “ravages of erosion.” But a strong majority of the participants rejected their ideas about limiting the spread of industrial development to other parts of the world. Most believed that population limitation must be accompanied by the spread of modernization and industrialization. Reflecting these sentiments, the final resolution of the conference called for further studying “the populations of the world and the resources, cultural and material, available to give such populations a progressively improving standard of living,” to consider the “relations of population to these resources and ways in which such relation can be improved in the near and more distant future,” and to examine “how such balance can be secured and maintained on a short and long range basis.” Kingsley Davis, a bit of an outlier in demographic circles because of his interest in ecology, complained at the time that “demographers do not know enough about resources.”¹⁹

Indeed, many within the Population Council ultimately shared David Potter’s faith that the right application of American know-how could solve third-world problems, including rapid population growth. If more people had access to modern contraception, unwanted births and poverty could be reduced or eliminated. Moreover, they held little animosity toward industrial growth, both on its own merits and also because they thought that, as the demographic transition suggested, it would slow population growth. They mostly worried about imbalances of population and resources, not aggregate numbers, overconsumption, and environmental quality.

Planned Parenthood, the other leading organization in the population movement in the 1950s, grew out of the birth-control clinic that Margaret Sanger opened in the late 1910s to provide women with greater access to birth-control information and technology. Haunted by her own mother’s premature death from poverty and frequent childbirth, and outraged that the poor lacked the access to contraception that the middle class enjoyed, Sanger (1879–1966) launched a campaign in the tenements of Manhattan and Brooklyn to spread knowledge and contraception technology. Because her actions struck conservatives as immoral, she was forced into temporary exile in England. But Sanger’s efforts eventually led to a string of birth-control clinics around the United States, as well as a network of supporters who pushed for more acceptance of sexuality and more liberal birth-control laws.²⁰

After World War II, Planned Parenthood combined its hopes for improving women’s health with other goals, especially the alleviation of overpopulation, both overseas and at home. Sanger led these Malthusian efforts. A Malthusian since her exile in Europe, Sanger grew even more concerned about overpopulation after World War II, which she blamed on overpopulation. “There is just

about enough time before total chaos sets in for the world to do something about its overpopulation,” she declared in 1948. “Instead of trying to feed the world without restraint, we should be devising ways of checking the growth of population.” As demographic historians Dennis Hodgson and Susan Watkins have put it, Sanger’s “Malthusianism spanned many decades and is difficult to doubt.”²¹

In 1952, realizing the global dimension of the population problem, Sanger and international allies such as Sweden’s Elise Ottesen-Jensen organized the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), an umbrella organization for raising money, sharing knowledge, and establishing clinics around the globe. Sanger first gathered supporters to organize such a group in Cheltenham, England, in 1948, but the IPPF didn’t get off the ground until a 1952 meeting in India. Sanger directed the organization until 1959, when she was almost eighty. Like Planned Parenthood, IPPF was driven by a variety of concerns, including worry about overpopulation. The organization’s primary goal, according to its 1953 bylaws, was “to advance through education and scientific research the universal acceptance of family planning and responsible parenthood in the interests of family welfare, community well being, and international good will.” Such broad language could entail both early feminist inclinations but also, as the phrase “responsible parenthood” suggests, eugenics-style paternalism.²²

Raising money for itself and IPPF within the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, Planned Parenthood spread a Malthusian vision of the postwar world. The organization and its affiliates organized public talks, distributed literature and films, and gave interviews to local TV, radio, and newspapers. Stories of overpopulated countries around the world laced their local, national, and international publications. “Think of it,” one Planned Parenthood brochure implored in 1953, “over 85 million babies born each year on this troubled planet—over one half of them doomed to starvation, disease, miserable lives and early graves.” The local newsletter of Planned Parenthood’s Chicago chapter had a section during the 1950s called “Vox Population: Expressions of Opinion from Those Who Link Planned Parenthood to World Problems.” “The International ‘Population Explosion’ is of course in all of our minds always,” the newsletter explained in 1960. “Board and Staff are constantly being asked to speak to groups on the many phases of the ‘population explosion’ and we fill these requests gladly.”²³

More than the Population Council, Planned Parenthood and International Planned Parenthood stressed natural resource depletion and conservation. The theme of IPPF’s 1953 international conference was “Population and World Resources in Relation to the Family.” Although the title was possibly just public relations, the evidence suggests otherwise. In her introduction to the very first issue of its national newsletter in 1952, Planned Parenthood President Eleanor Pillsbury spoke of the “pressure of expanding population upon depleted

resources.” But perhaps nothing showed Planned Parenthood’s ecological sensibility better than the organization’s choice of national director in 1951: William Vogt.²⁴

As national director from 1951 to 1961, Vogt mixed ecological messages about scarcity and degradation into Planned Parenthood publications and speeches. One brochure, for instance, stated, “With each turn of the earth around the sun, the world takes on 85,775,000 new babies while it loses soil, forests, food, and water. Half of the world’s people go to bed hungry every night. This tidal drift of birth and depletion, new life and destruction—causing personal suffering, national unrest, international tension—must be stopped before it’s too late.”²⁵

Reaching Limits on the Global Frontier: Biologists, Conservationists, and Population Growth

Conservationists, naturalists, and biologists did not leave all the population work to Planned Parenthood and the Population Council. They pushed a brand of environmental Malthusianism, emphasizing overconsumption, resource depletion, limits, the drawbacks of industrialization, and environmental degradation, often drawing from ideas of carrying capacity developed by Pearl, East, Chapman, and Leopold, and extended by Vogt and Osborn. But not all environmental Malthusians thought alike; a great diversity of opinions swirled around. Some envisioned a catastrophic crisis, others were less worried. Some called for authoritarian solutions; others, even though they saw large problems approaching, insisted that voluntary measures would suffice. In general, compared with later in the 1960s, there was less alarmism and fewer extreme remedies.

Fairfield Osborn’s Conservation Foundation promoted population awareness and research, although nothing on the scale of the Population Council. The organization, which Osborn founded in March 1948, adopted a different approach than earlier conservation organizations such as the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and the Wilderness Society. In addition to wildlife concerns, it promoted ecologically informed research about issues such as pesticides and population growth, issues that would eventually dominate the new environmental agenda. A 1956 mission statement, for instance, included “To assess population trends and their effect upon environment.” The Conservation Foundation sponsored studies by demographers Kingsley Davis, George Roberts, Judith Blake Davis, and J. Mayone Stycos. Osborn also wrote and gave talks frequently about population. As time went by, his concern about population grew. “The inordinately rapid increase of populations in this world,” he wrote in *Our Crowded Planet*, a 1962 collection of essays he assembled on population, “is the most essential problem that faces everybody everywhere.” The Conservation Foundation became a think tank and advocacy organization

involving many environmentalists who would play key roles in the late 1960s environmental policy, such as the political scientist Lynton Caldwell, architect of the National Environmental Policy Act, and Russell Train, President Nixon's director of the Environmental Protection Agency.²⁶

In *Fundamentals of Ecology* (1953), the standard ecology textbook for several decades, Eugene Odum argued that ecology was an increasingly important, holistic form of biology, and that within ecology, population was a crucial unit of analysis. In fact, Odum used human population growth to frame the entire book. Humanity had entered a dangerous new stage due to population growth, he emphasized in the book's first paragraph, and thus a much more ecologically sophisticated understanding of the "environment" was needed: "It is more necessary than ever for mankind as a whole to have an intelligent knowledge of the environment if our complex civilization is to survive, since the basic 'laws of nature' have not been repealed; only their complexion and quantitative relations have changed, as the world's human population has increased."²⁷

In addition to other subjects, *Fundamentals* described population-level analysis, Royal Chapman's conception of carrying capacity, and the Kaibab deer irruption. Odum devoted his final chapter to "human ecology," the application of ecology to human society, and especially to population growth, "perhaps the most 'violent' topic in human ecology." He noted that human populations usually followed the same "S" curve that Raymond Pearl sketched thirty years earlier. True, because of its adaptability, culture, and dominance, humanity could raise the carrying capacity. But no firm predictions could be made about the future. Citing Malthus and William Vogt, Odum pointed out that rapid collapse was equally possible: "We cannot be sure that human populations will not exceed the carrying capacity, as did the Kaibab deer when adequate checks were removed." Industrial societies had been able to reduce population because of voluntary birth control, but "in China and India—perhaps a more 'simple ecosystem'?—such action seems less effective; density continually rises to or above the carrying capacity of the environment, food chains become shorter, and such progressive philosophies as democracy mean little to the hungry people!" Reiterating the impossibility of reliable predictions, he called for more study.²⁸

Harrison Brown's more pessimistic book, *The Challenge of Man's Future* (1954), shows the lengths to which some scientists feared societies had to go to combat overpopulation. A Manhattan Project geochemist who wrote of the dangers of nuclear weapons (and later a leader of the Pugwash disarmament movement), Brown argued that humanity was in a "very precarious position" because of population growth, which he had seen firsthand during lengthy stays in Jamaica, and massive and growing resource consumption. He devoted most of the book to innovative and rigorous data-filled analyses of these subjects.²⁹

Brown also mused about possible solutions, including world government and regulating population size with artificial inseminations and forced abortions.

He recognized the potential costs to individual liberty, but reminded readers of the status quo, where “abortions must be obtained frequently on kitchen tables, usually at great expense and under circumstances where the victims have the ‘freedom’ to choose between giving birth to unwanted children and endangering their lives by subjecting themselves to illegal operations under insanitary conditions.” Regulating births, he added, would have a eugenic effect: it could prevent the “deterioration of the species.” He admitted the possibility of “individual fluctuations,” but he worried that “the feeble-minded, the morons, the dull and backward, and the lower-than-average persons in our society are outbreeding the superior ones at the present time.” Indeed, the average intelligence quotient of Western populations “is probably decreasing significantly with each succeeding generation.” Although “pruning” was not feasible because genetic knowledge was not precise enough, he believed that priority for births “could be given to healthy women of high intelligence whose ancestors possessed no dangerous genetic defects.” Conversely, he said, priorities for abortions could be given to “less intelligent persons of biologically unsound stock.”³⁰

Concern about population growth in more moderate form was conspicuous at the June 1955 conference “Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth,” which historians often credit for laying a foundation for the 1960s environmental movement because of its global, ecological focus on human beings as a dominant force. “Human population growth occupied, understandably, a large share in the symposium,” observers for *Geographical Review* noted. Indeed, a sense that population growth had made the modern day unlike any seen before helped spark the idea for the conference in the first place. “With more people on the earth than at any time in the past,” wrote Dr. William Thomas, the chief planner at the Wenner Gren Foundation, the conference sponsor, “this is really a most extraordinary period in which to be living.” Noting humanity’s capacity for “vigorous reproduction,” geographer and conference chairman Carl Sauer identified the “growth of population” as one of the main factors determining human impact on nature.³¹

Many of the participants were well-known Malthusians: Marston Bates, F. Fraser Darling, Charles Galton Darwin, Alan Gregg, Lewis Mumford, Samuel H. Ordway, and Warren Thompson. Population growth came up in almost every discussion, in part because of the global focus of the meetings. Sauer believed that conservation had grown on the American frontier “where the depletion of lately virgin lands gave warning that we were drawing recklessly on a diminishing natural capital” and, following Leopold, Vogt, and Osborn, warned of the spread of industrialization into the new global frontier. “We present and recommend to the world a blueprint of what works well with us at the moment, heedless that we may be destroying wise and durable native systems of living with the land.” To this, Harrison Brown added, “if industrialization spreads, and populations continue to grow, denudation will take place on a scale which

is difficult for us to comprehend.” But the United States also figured into the discussion, with Fairfield Osborn wondering how the country would deal with “250 to 300 million people . . . with their tremendous demands for raw materials, social amenities, and education.” (The U.S. population in 2010 was over 310 million.) Paul Sears noted that “American culture is inclined to value continual expansion: some is good, more is better; more and more are both bigger and better.” Osborn called for a harmless, effective, simple, and inexpensive check to human fertility. There was little or no talk of eugenics and coercion.³²

Although most conference participants seemed concerned about population, some dissented. Fritz Heichelheim stressed that capital resources, not population, drove environmental change. Pierre Gourou favored studying local changes and local conditions, arguing that it was not “scientifically practicable to be preoccupied with world populations.” Historian James Malin argued that “Malthusian doom might be postponed or even canceled out without conscious intervention of human planning.”³³ At the end of a discussion called “Limits of the Earth,” the economist and environmentalist Kenneth Boulding summarized his ambivalence with a poem jotted down while listening to the discussion:

A CONSERVATIONIST’S LAMENT

The world is finite, resources are scarce,
 Things are bad and will be worse.
 Coal is burned and gas exploded,
 Forests cut and soils eroded.
 Wells are dry and air’s polluted,
 Dust is blowing, trees uprooted.
 Oil is going, ores depleted,
 Drains receive what is excreted.
 Land is sinking, seas are rising,
 Man is far too enterprising.
 Fire will rage with Man to fan it,
 Soon we’ll have a plundered planet.
 People breed like fertile rabbits,
 People have disgusting habits.

Moral:

The evolutionary plan
 Went astray by evolving Man.

THE TECHNOLOGIST’S REPLY

Man’s potential is quite terrific,
 You can’t go back to the Neolithic.
 The cream is there for us to skim it,

Knowledge is power, and the sky's the limit.
 Every mouth has hands to feed it,
 Food is found when people need it.
 All we need is found in granite,
 Once we have the men to plan it.
 Yeast and algae give us meat,
 Soil is almost obsolete.
 Men can grow to pastures greener,
 Till all the earth is Pasadena.

Moral:

Man's a nuisance, Man's a crackpot,
 But only Man can hit the jackpot.

Boulding would emphasize limits in later writings but not call much attention to population growth.³⁴

In an essay in *Scientific American* in 1956, former UNESCO director general Julian Huxley combined near apocalyptic worry about population growth with a sense of social justice. Pointing out that the world added the equivalent of a good-sized town, more than 90,000 people, every day, he cautioned, "If nothing is done to bring down the rate of human increase during that time [the next thirty or forty years], mankind will find itself living in a world exposed to disastrous miseries and charged with frustrations more explosive than any we can now envision." Huxley also lamented the "alarming differentials in consumption between different regions and nations," which he found "intolerable" and "grotesque." He called for "a new and more rational view of the population problem" as well as "a large-scale concerted program of research" related to oral contraceptives.³⁵

The biologist Raymond Dasmann distilled many environmental Malthusian ideas in his innovative 1959 textbook, *Environmental Conservation*. Even more than others, Dasmann shows the complicated interplay between the international and the domestic at this time. After seeing combat in the Pacific in World War II, Dasmann (1919–2002) studied zoology at the University of California with Carl Sauer and Starker Leopold, Aldo Leopold's son. His dissertation research examined deer irruptions in northern California. After writing *Environmental Conservation*, Dasmann spent two years as a Fulbright fellow studying range management in Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) before publishing another book on global conservation, *The Last Horizon*, in 1963. In 1965, he published one of the earliest and most influential books on overpopulation within the United States, *The Destruction of California*.³⁶

Dasmann dedicated *Environmental Conservation* to Aldo Leopold. He saw a need, he explained in the preface, for a "text written from a biological standpoint, which would take the long view of conservation problems by considering

the history of human populations in relation to natural resources.” Thanking Carl Sauer, whose inspiration launched the project, he adopted a global approach, drawing heavily upon “Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth,” whose proceedings were published in 1956. Dasmann’s theme was familiar to anyone familiar with *Our Plundered Planet*, *Road to Survival*, or “Man’s Role”: growing world populations, combined with the spread of industrial civilization, threatened human society. The “engulfing flow of western industrial civilization” was destroying both nature and human culture. Society, Dasmann wrote, was engaged in “war with nature.” Population growth posed a “critical problem.” It added to social and political problems and would “intensify all resource conservation problems.”³⁷

Leopold’s influence was clear. Dasmann used the Kaibab deer irruption story to explain not only the concept of carrying capacity but also human population growth. A “spectacular increase in the deer population,” he wrote, “resulted in the carrying capacity of the habitat being surpassed, the food supply being destroyed, and finally in a die-off of the deer to a new low level.” In just six years, starvation had killed 80,000 deer. Human population growth, Dasmann noted, often mushroomed after medical supplies and sanitary techniques spread in agricultural societies, such as India. India’s population had been stable, but after the British introduced Western technology, medicine, and transportation, the population began to grow rapidly. With industrialization “a new balance can be expected,” but how large the population will grow in the meantime “is disturbing to contemplate.”³⁸

Although some Malthusians focused exclusively on the third world, Dasmann also worried about the United States. “Anglo-America” was an “island of prosperity” threatened by a “frontier” faith in inexhaustible resources and unlimited population growth. “In our reproductive rates we have shown an irresponsibility and disregard for the future,” he lamented. “We still believe that more people means more hands to work and more customers to buy. We look forward to an ever-expanding business and industrial economy, often without critically examining the resource base that must support that economy.” He warned about the “catastrophe that unbridled growth must bring.” In *The Last Horizon*, like Brown, he added a concern about “a decrease in the quality” of the population.³⁹

Dasmann called for “the highest level of resource conservation,” and for “more effective, and more generally available and acceptable, methods of birth control.” In *The Last Horizon*, he added an idea that would grow in importance in the ensuing decade, calling for new social roles for women and criticizing conservative traditions that defined them just as mothers. Far too often, education for girls stressed “social development in place of academic achievement,” thus fostering “an early courtship and marriage pattern upon the young.” And those “who do break loose and enter a career,” he lamented, “still incur distrust and dislike from their home-bound sisters.”⁴⁰

Dasmann offers a good point of comparison. Unlike David Potter and even some in the population movement, he had a strong sense of limits and urgency, even applying Leopold's Kaibab model to human populations. Yet unlike some of the more strident Malthusians of the late 1960s, he held hope for voluntary measures. If people understand the problem and have the means, he believed, they will limit their population: "The need must be faced now, the machinery put into operation, the research performed, the education begun which will make voluntary family limitation within the reach of everyone in the near future. When this has been accomplished, there is every reason to believe that the rate of population growth will decline as it has in Europe in recent years." In *The Last Horizon*, Dasmann also pointed to Japan, where an intensive program of public education, the legalization of abortion, and widespread availability of contraceptives had brought about a dramatic fertility decline. He emphasized, "There was no coercion."⁴¹

Quality of Life and the "Environment"

As the population movement of the 1950s strove to change the world, it remade postwar American life in fundamental ways. For instance, driven by concerns about international overpopulation, the population movement during the 1950s and early 1960s created many of the reproductive rights and technologies that later generations would take for granted—including the birth-control pill, the intrauterine device (IUD), and sterilization procedures. All four individuals central to developing the "pill"—Margaret Sanger, philanthropist Katherine McCormick, biologist Gregory Pincus, and physician John Rock—worried deeply about global overpopulation. An oral contraceptive, Rock told a Planned Parenthood audience in 1954, "would serve to help avert Man's self-destruction by starvation and war. If discovered in time, the H-bomb will never fall." Rock also blamed communist aggression in Vietnam on overpopulation: "The frightful pressures on the last few years of French-held Dienbeinhphu can truthfully be said to reflect the pressure of Chinese overpopulation on the resources of its weaker neighbor." Similarly, Malthusian concerns also motivated the Population Council doctors who developed the IUD. Concerns about population growth also appeared in the 1965 Supreme Court case *Griswold v. Connecticut*, which struck down bans on contraception for married people.⁴²

The population movement also helped develop an important concept that changed American life, especially the emerging environmental movement, in a more subtle way: the idea of "quality of life." Thinking about the proper balance of food and people led those in the population movement to the question of existence at what standard: mere survival or something more? Besides food and shelter, what were the characteristics of a good life? The "quality of life" concept first gained wide currency in an international context, but Malthusians

increasingly used it to understand an American population expanding because of the baby boom. Eventually discussion turned toward such things as freedom, creativity, clean air, space, and solitude, all of which were seen to suffer as populations grew. The concept became important to an “environmental” viewpoint, as well as to 1960s liberalism.

John Rockefeller III, founder and funder of the Population Council, was among the first to explicitly articulate quality-of-life ideas. He first described them at the Williamsburg meetings, and in September 1952, not long after the conference, he wrote a lengthy memo on the subject that became the guiding document for the Population Council. Rockefeller felt his approach to population was much more positive than what the terms “birth control” and “population control” connoted. To him, the issue went beyond “the relation of the food supply to the number of mouths to feed.” Physical needs must be met, of course, but “more important still are the needs which differentiate man from animal.” Human beings do not “live by bread alone.” Consideration must also be given to “mental and emotional well-being—to education, religion, art and other forms of expression which enable man to achieve self-realization.”⁴³

Rockefeller was, in effect, redefining the idea of “quality” common in demographic discussions. Whereas in the eugenics movement, the term had referred to maintaining a genetic “quality of the population,” the postwar population movement spoke increasingly about improving “quality of life.” The opening lines of a 1965 in-house history of the Population Council makes this clear: “The world has several great problems: to maintain peace and international order, to extend political freedom, to improve standards of living, to promote health and well-being, to advance literacy and popular education, to spread art and culture. *Underlying all of these* and qualifying as a world problem in its own right is the population problem: to keep the quantity of human life from diminishing the *quality of human life*.”⁴⁴

During the 1950s, quality of life was also a regular theme for conservationists, naturalists, and biologists worried about population growth. “The day is here when we Americans need to clarify,” Fairfield Osborn wrote in 1953, “what we mean by a ‘standard of living’ and in so doing give greater recognition to the immeasurable values of social, and not merely economic, criteria.” Osborn gave a talk called “The Quality of Life” to a Planned Parenthood group the next year. The power of their movement, he said, rests “not so much upon the physical or quantitative needs of human life as upon its social and even spiritual needs. The goal is the betterment of the ‘quality’ of life.” Other conservationists made similar points. In *Road to Survival*, William Vogt had warned about dropping school quality, declining governmental capacity, and reduced services in museums, libraries, and colleges. Discussing overpopulation in *Fundamentals of Ecology*, Eugene Odum symbolically defined quality of life as being able to go fishing and occasionally eat steak. “We must reject the idea that

the quantity of human beings,” Julian Huxley wrote in 1956, “is of value apart from the quality of their lives.” In 1962, naturalist Joseph Wood Krutch asked, “What is the optimum number [of people] from the standpoint of the possibility of a good life?”⁴⁵

Harrison Brown added a political note to quality of life, emphasizing that population growth and overconsumption led to the “collectivization and robotization” of humanity. Vogt and Osborn had hinted at this connection to freedom and individuality in the late 1940s, but it became a regular topic for the environmental Malthusians in the 1950s and 1960s. “The first major penalty man will have to pay for his rapid consumption of the earth’s non-renewable resources,” Brown wrote, “will be that of having to live in a world where his thoughts and actions are ever more strongly limited, where social organization has become all-persuasive, complex, and inflexible, and where the state completely dominates the actions of the individual.” In 1956, Fairfield Osborn warned about a “human anthill,” and a decade later Lynton Caldwell of a “scientifically managed animal farm.” Raymond Dasmann believed that humanity was on a “pathway to a world overpopulated, ground down to a uniformity, constricting of the individual, inimical to liberty.”⁴⁶

Quality-of-life concerns reconfigured postwar environmental politics. As Samuel Hays and others have argued, what separated prewar conservation politics from postwar environmental politics was the latter’s emphasis on quality-of-life issues, especially environmental amenities such as clean streets and parks. “The most widespread source of emerging environmental interest,” Hays wrote in his classic history of the environmental movement, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence*, “was the search for a better life associated with home, community, and leisure.” Explaining the emergence of this new way of thinking, he explained that in the postwar years “a new emphasis on smaller families developed, allowing parents to invest their limited time and income in fewer children.” This idea came despite, or perhaps in reaction to, the great baby boom of the 1950s and early 1960s.⁴⁷

One of the best places to see the importance of the quality-of-life concept to emerging environmental thought is in Dasmann’s *Environmental Conservation* (1959). “Conservation of natural resources,” Dasmann wrote in the introduction, “is here defined as the use of natural resources to provide the *highest quality of living* for mankind. It must aim toward both a material and a spiritual enrichment of life for man on earth, now and in the future.” In each chapter of the book, Dasmann described what quality of life meant in different sectors of American life, including cities, farms, forest and range lands, and wilderness areas. At the end of the book, Dasmann reiterated that the goal of conservation was “improved quality of living for mankind.”⁴⁸

For Dasmann, the idea of quality of life went hand in hand with a concept of environmental quality. This idea, in turn, went back to Aldo Leopold, who

had argued that the overproduction of a single resource such as deer not only reduced the quality of the deer herd's lives but also, because of consumption chains, degraded the surrounding environment, especially soil. Substituting people for deer, Dasmann devised the concept of environmental conservation. "Because the living resources of an area and its human populations are closely tied together," he stressed, "a one-sided approach to conservation which emphasizes one resource and ignores the others will lead to difficulties or failures." For Dasmann, the very concept of environment came from thinking about human population growth. "A broad, environmental approach to conservation is a necessity because physical environment, biotic resources, *and people* form a whole."⁴⁹

The quality-of-life idea had a political ambivalence built into it. Was the idea to spread a higher standard of living to poorer groups and poorer nations or to defensively protect one's own? Were the families, social groups, and nations with high population growth rates some sort of menace, or were they to be helped in improving their lives? Critics have sometimes attacked postwar environmentalists, especially environmental Malthusians, for protecting class privilege with their quality-of-life concerns, for hoarding the best resources—now increasingly defined in terms of quality of life—for themselves. In the Malthusian emphasis on environmental quality, they also see a reincarnation of the eugenic movement's elitist emphasis on genetic quality. In both cases, the objective was to control other people's behaviors, which were defined as unhealthy or environmentally unsound or just inappropriate. Moreover, critics also argue that environmentalists wanted to have their environmental cake and eat it too—that is, they sought "quality" environments for themselves but failed to see how their own reckless consumption contributed to environmental degradation. At its worst, this "not in *my* backyard" attitude ("nimbyism" for short) involved pushing the environmental consequences of consumption—the pollution, the degraded environments—away from wealthy neighborhoods, often onto less powerful poor and nonwhite communities, then blaming those communities for their irresponsibility. Taken together, Malthusian arguments about population growth amounted to a globalized mix of eugenics and nimbyism.⁵⁰

In his exposition of an environmental conservation built around "quality of living," in addition to a brief reference to reform eugenics and his willingness to apply wildlife models to human societies, Dasmann expressed aesthetic views that could be seen as part of a larger nimby approach. Cities, for instance, should no longer be "ugly work centers" but should have more scenic beauty and recreational space. Farming areas should show "rural beauty and attractive home sites" and more opportunities for recreation and culture. Wilderness was important "for people seeking to keep contact with primitive values"—mostly an elite concern—but was threatened by the "recreation-seeking hordes."

Yet those who accuse environmental Malthusians of oversimplification should be careful not to oversimplify them. To Dasmann, those “ugly work centers” were also places where “the economically unfortunate are forced to live a closed and barren life.” In forest and range lands, he also called for maintaining water and soil quality, as well as wildlife diversity. “The environmental approach to forest land and rangeland must consider all the values and potentials of these areas,” he wrote. “They must be regarded, in the future, not just as sources of wood and forage, but as part of living space for all of the people, urban as well as those who work locally.” Wilderness was needed for recreation, but also as a benchmark for scientific comparison and as a refuge for wild plants and animals. Moreover, echoing other environmental Malthusians, Dasmann repeatedly criticized urban overconsumption. Although not without flaws, this was no simple defense of middle-class privilege.⁵¹

During the 1950s, the larger population movement reflected this ambivalence. Many of those in the population movement stressed the threats to their own quality of life. Often the mentality was crisis-driven, the diagnosis oversimplified, the tone defensive, and the remedies repressive. But some saw population limitation as a way to share the benefits of a higher standard of living. “The resources of the world,” Starker Leopold told the Sierra Club in 1959, “should be used to raise the living standards of individuals, rather than to support more individuals.”⁵²

Environmental Quality and 1960s Liberalism

Perhaps the most famous explication of quality-of-life concerns came from Harvard economist and advisor for the Democratic Party John Kenneth Galbraith in his 1958 bestseller, *The Affluent Society*. As with Rockefeller, Osborn, and Dasmann, contemplating abundance in a world of poverty led Galbraith (1906–2006) to novel ideas about the good life. During the mid-1950s, exploring a new book project, Galbraith traveled to India to investigate international poverty, but ultimately decided to write about the United States instead. Visiting India helped him realize that American society faced unique challenges. The poor man, he wrote on *The Affluent Society*’s opening page, “hasn’t enough and he needs more.” The rich man, though, can imagine “a much greater variety of ills.” “Until he learns to live with his wealth,” the rich man will have a tendency “to put it to the wrong purposes.” As with individuals, Galbraith said, so too with nations: American society had reached a stage where, because basic subsistence was rarely a problem, the new challenge of government was to improve the quality of life for each individual from cradle to grave.⁵³

As historian Adam Rome has noted, Galbraith’s arguments helped shape the agenda of the Democratic Party in the 1960s, including that regarding

environmental affairs. One of Galbraith's most famous lines described pollution and open space problems:

The family which takes its mauve and cerise, air-conditioned, power-steered, and power-braked automobile out for a tour passes through cities that are badly paved, made hideous by litter, blighted buildings, billboards, and posts for wires that should long since have been put underground. They pass into a countryside that has been rendered largely invisible by commercial art. . . . They picnic on exquisitely packaged food from a portable icebox by a polluted stream and go on to spend the night at a park which is a menace to public health and morals. Just before dozing off on an air mattress, beneath a nylon tent, amid the stench of decaying refuse, they may reflect vaguely on the curious unevenness of their blessings. Is this, indeed, the American genius?

Galbraith connected these problems to U.S. population growth. Elsewhere in the book, he described the problem "of a burgeoning population and of space in which to live with peace and grace."⁵⁴

In the early 1960s, quality-of-life concerns reached the highest levels of American government. In his well-known 1963 book *The Quiet Crisis*, Stewart Udall, the influential secretary of the interior in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, helped chart an agenda for the emerging environmental movement by describing the problems of increasing pollution, shrinking open space, and disappearing wilderness. He framed these problems in terms of population growth. "The one factor certain to complicate all of our conservation problems," he wrote at the end of his most important chapter, "is the ineluctable pressure of expanding populations." When the U.S. population doubled by 2000, he wrote, there was no guarantee that "life in general—and the good, the true, and the beautiful in particular—will somehow be enhanced at the same time." Indeed, fear of out-of-control population growth helped Udall clarify the core goal of postwar liberalism—improving the quality of life of each individual. "It is obvious," he concluded, "that the best qualities in man must atrophy in a standing-room-only environment. Therefore, if the fulfillment of the individual is our ultimate goal, we must soon determine the proper man-land ratio for our continent."⁵⁵

The juxtaposition of "quantity-of-life" concerns with "quality-of-life" concerns—of ideas about poverty and abundance—also framed in the public statements of President Lyndon Johnson, including his famous State of the Union Address in January 1965. In the first half of the speech, devoted to international affairs, Johnson became the first president to warn directly about population growth and resource scarcity, speaking of "the explosion in world population" and "the growing scarcity in world resources." In its second half, he described in greater detail than ever before his Great Society programs related

to poverty, education, health, civil rights, and conservation. At the heart of this slew of programs was the quality-of-life concept—Johnson used the term “quality of life” at least three times and argued that the first test for a nation is the “quality of its people.” The pairing of international quantity of life with hopes for improving domestic quality of life was more than coincidental. In 1965, a core idea of Johnson’s liberal vision—helping each individual not just survive but live a rich, meaningful life—seemed threatened by overcrowded, unplanned societies around the world and at home. In a time of baby booms around the country and around the world, managing population size became central to Johnson-style liberalism. “So long as we are concerned with the quality of life,” one Johnson administration official wrote in 1965, “we have no choice but to be concerned with the quantity of life.”⁵⁶

American prosperity in a sea of poverty was a theme that engaged not just environmental Malthusians during the 1950s and 1960s. Especially during the Johnson Administration, concern about international and domestic population growth reached new proportions. When they did, they embodied the same ambiguities and ambivalences that characterized the population movement overall.