

This mine is mine!, how minerals fuel conflicts in africa!

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content

- 1 Conceptual Framework
- 2 Data
- 3 Empirical Analysis
- 4 Feasibility and diffusion of Violence
- 5 Breaking the Resource Curse: The Role of Mining Companies
- 6 Conclusion

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Existing Evidence and Conceptual Framework

- Civil wars have positive correlation with natural resources
- Resources increase feasibility
- Weak state capacity
- Impact of higher local income
- Role of foreign companies

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Data

1. Data

1.1 Conflict data

1.2 Mines data

1.3 Other data

2. Descriptive statistics

Conflict Data

- Armed Conflict Location Events Data
- Dummy variable= 1 when at least one event of conflict has occurred inside the given cell
- Bias due to coverage of conflict

Mines Data

- Raw Material Data
- $Mkt = 1$ when at least one mine is active inside the given cell during a given year
- Mkt : proxy to extraction area of a certain mineral
- Bias due to lack of data on small mines

Other Data

- World Bank Commodities
- Excluding diamonds
- Include:

cell-specific variables

country-specific variables

mineral-specific variables

Descriptive Statistics

TABLE 1—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: CELL LEVEL

	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Median
Pr(Conflict > 0)				
all cells	144,690	0.06	0.23	0
if mines > 0	2,798	0.14	0.35	0
if mines = 0	141,892	0.05	0.22	0
battles	144,690	0.03	0.17	0
viol. against. civ.	144,690	0.03	0.17	0
riots and protests	144,690	0.02	0.12	0
Number of conflicts				
all cells	144,690	0.25	3.41	0
if > 0	7,980	4.61	13.79	2
Pr(Mine > 0)				
only cell	144,594	0.02	0.14	0
incl. 1st surrounding cells	144,690	0.09	0.29	0
incl. 1st and 2nd surrounding cells	144,687	0.17	0.38	0
Number of mines				
all cells	144,594	0.05	0.60	0
if > 0	2,702	2.57	3.55	1
Pr(number of mines > 2)				
all cells	144,690	0.01	0.09	0
if mine > 0	2,798	0.40	0.49	0

Descriptive Statistics

- 52 countries, 14 minerals
- Main minerals
- The conflict probability is much higher in cells with active mines, around 14 percent
- The presence of active mines is positively correlated with conflict incidence, both across and within cells

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Empirical Analysis

1. Methodological Issues
2. Baseline Results
3. Sensitivity Analysis
4. Country Characteristics and Mining-Induced Violence
5. Mineral Characteristics
6. The Nature of Mining-Induced Violence
7. Quantification

Methodological Issues

More valuable mines increase the search for local rents, leading to a higher probability of violence.

$$CONFLICT_{kt} = \alpha_1 M_{kt} + \alpha_2 \ln P_{kt}^w + \alpha_3 (M_{kt} \times \ln P_{kt}^w) + FE_k + FE_{it} + \epsilon_{kt}$$

- FE_{kt} are cell fixed effects
- FE_{it} is an additional battery of fixed effects
- $Conflict_{kt}$ is the dependent variable
- M_{kt} is the main explanatory variable
- p_{kt}^w is the variable corresponds to the world price in year t

Methodological Issues: Significant Factors

1. Exogeneity of Prices:

- Some mines may be large enough to affect world prices; if a conflict were to occur in mining areas, prices could be affected.
- Omitted variables that vary over time could determine world prices and local violence in mining areas.

2. Endogenous Mining Activity.

$$CONFLICT_{kt} = \alpha_3(M_{kt} \times \ln P_{kt}^w) + FE_k + FE_{it} + \epsilon_{kt}$$

Methodological Issues: Significant Factors

3. Estimation Issues: Equations (1) and (2) were estimated using a Linear Probability Model in the reference specifications.

4. Spatial Correlation: Given the high spatial resolution of the data, it is important to take spatial correlation into account since both conflict and mines are clustered in space.

Baseline Results

TABLE 2—CONFLICTS AND MINERAL PRICES

Estimator Dependent variable Sample	LPM					
	Conflict incidence					
	All	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$		All	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
mine > 0	0.112 (0.065)					0.048 (0.065)
ln price main mineral	-0.029 (0.032)					0.028 (0.019)
ln price × mines > 0	0.086 (0.034)	0.072 (0.020)	0.060 (0.021)		0.085 (0.024)	0.108 (0.041)
ln price × mines > 0 (neighboring cells)			0.021 (0.006)			
ln price × mines > 0 (ever)				0.045 (0.014)		
Country × year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Neighborhood fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	143,768	142,296	127,974	143,864	142,296	17,360

Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity controls

- Mining Activity
- Main Mineral and Mineral Prices
- Alternative Definitions of Violence
- Other Robustness Checks

Sensitivity Analysis

• Mining Activity

TABLE 8—ROBUSTNESS: ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF MINING AREAS

Estimator	LPM						
Dependent variable	Conflict incidence						
Def. mining area	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$	Ever 1997–2010	Mine ($t - 1$)	1 from opening onward	Mine in 1997	Mine over 1992–1996	Mine over 1980–1996
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\ln \text{price} \times \text{mines} > 0$	0.072 (0.020)	0.043 (0.014)	0.033 (0.032)	0.050 (0.016)	0.056 (0.019)	0.056 (0.020)	0.050 (0.019)
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country \times year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	142,296	143,768	133,492	143,375	143,768	143,768	143,768

Sensitivity Analysis

- Main Mineral and Mineral Prices
- Other Robustness Checks

Sensitivity Analysis

• Alternative Definitions of Violence

TABLE 11—NUMBER OF EVENTS

Estimator Dependent variable	LPM			PPML			LPM	
				Number of events				
	All	Dropping top 5%	Dropping 2SD	All	Dropping top 5%	Dropping 2SD	$\log(x + 1)$	Inverse hyperbolic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Sample A. $V(M_{kt}) = 0$</i>								
$\ln \text{price} \times \text{mines} > 0$	0.249 (0.240)	0.263 (0.100)	0.256 (0.155)	0.195 (0.283)	0.440 (0.197)	0.301 (0.239)	0.094 (0.032)	0.121 (0.040)
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country \times year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Observations	142,296	141,894	142,163	35,210	34,769	35,064	142,296	142,296
<i>Sample B. All</i>								
$\ln \text{price} \times \text{mines} > 0$ (ever)	0.245 (0.136)	0.216 (0.079)	0.217 (0.100)	0.253 (0.264)	0.395 (0.172)	0.289 (0.194)	0.070 (0.022)	0.089 (0.028)
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country \times year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Observations	143,864	143,361	143,634	35,980	35,472	35,771	143,864	143,864

Country Characteristics and Mining-Induced Violence

Is the abundance of valuable mines always a curse for political stability?

- Inequality and Diversity: How Does the Social Fabric Matter

- (i) The Gini index of gross income distribution

- (ii) Ethnic and religious division or polarization

- (iii) The presence of an indigenous group in the cell

Country Characteristics and Mining-Induced Violence

TABLE 12—HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS: CLEAVAGES

Estimator Dependent variable Sample	LPM							
	Conflict incidence							
	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (1)	All (2)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (3)	All (4)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (5)	All (6)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (7)	All (8)
$\ln \text{price} \times \text{mines} > 0$	0.031 (0.026)		0.024 (0.028)		0.043 (0.032)		0.111 (0.054)	
$\ln \text{price} \times \text{mines} > 0 \text{ (ever)}$		0.027 (0.018)		0.015 (0.020)		0.014 (0.021)		0.095 (0.038)
$\times \text{Gini}$	0.053 (0.043)	0.015 (0.022)						
$\times \text{ethnic frac.}$			0.015 (0.040)	0.002 (0.025)				
$\times \text{religious frac.}$			0.069 (0.038)	0.046 (0.023)				
$\times \text{ethnic pol.}$					-0.017 (0.034)	0.015 (0.022)		
$\times \text{religious pol.}$					0.081 (0.034)	0.042 (0.019)		
$\times \text{indigenous}$							-0.044 (0.058)	-0.060 (0.041)
Country \times year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Country Characteristics and Mining-Induced Violence

• Domestic Institutions: Can Good Governance Stop the Guns?

TABLE 13—HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS: INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY

Estimator Dependent variable Sample	LPM					
	Conflict incidence					
	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (1)	All (2)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (3)	All (4)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (5)	All (6)
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0$	0.077 (0.051)		0.039 (0.036)		0.090 (0.036)	
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0 \text{ (ever)}$		0.032 (0.029)		0.053 (0.028)		0.050 (0.024)
$\times \text{ICRG}$	0.002 (0.059)	0.020 (0.033)				
$\times \text{gov. effectiveness}$			-0.053 (0.046)	0.024 (0.034)		
$\times \text{rule of law}$			0.027 (0.038)	0.030 (0.047)		
$\times \text{voice and account.}$			0.107 (0.048)	0.004 (0.043)		
$\times \text{control of corruption}$			-0.043 (0.040)	-0.064 (0.029)		
$\times \text{polity IV}$					-0.027 (0.045)	-0.008 (0.027)
Country \times year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Mineral Characteristics

- Labor- versus Capital-Intensiveness

TABLE 14—HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS: MINERALS' CAPITAL INTENSITY

Estimator Dependent variable Sample	LPM					
	Conflict incidence					
	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (1)	All (2)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (3)	All (4)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (5)	All (6)
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0$	0.119 (0.119)		0.089 (0.026)		0.069 (0.022)	
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0 \text{ (ever)}$		0.087 (0.048)		0.078 (0.023)		0.041 (0.014)
$\times \text{ open cast}$	0.078 (0.650)	-0.042 (0.119)				
$\times \text{ energy intensity}$			-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)		
$\times \text{ mine age}$					0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Country \times year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	141,344	141,946	141,782	142,192	142,221	143,789

Mineral Characteristics

Rents, Lootability, and Bulkiness

TABLE 15—HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS: MINERALS' LOOTABILITY

Estimator Dependent variable Sample	LPM					
	Conflict incidence					
	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (1)	All (2)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (3)	All (4)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (5)	All (6)
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0$: low price	0.046 (0.027)					
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0$: high price	0.065 (0.025)					
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0$ (ever): low price		0.021 (0.020)				
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0$ (ever): high price		0.044 (0.017)				
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0$			0.117 (0.050)		0.088 (0.024)	
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0$ (ever)				0.027 (0.048)		0.054 (0.017)
\times high rents			-0.061 (0.054)	0.010 (0.050)		
\times ore concentration					-0.174 (0.059)	-0.166 (0.056)
Country \times year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	142,674	144,356	142,674	144,356	142,170	143,262


The Nature of Mining-Induced Violence

TABLE 3—MINERALS PRICE AND TYPES OF CONFLICT EVENTS

Conflict incidence var. Sample	LPM					
	Battles		Violence against civ.		Riots/protests	
	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (1)	All (2)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (3)	All (4)	$V(M_{kt}) = 0$ (5)	All (6)
In price \times mines > 0	0.016 (0.008)		0.040 (0.014)		0.044 (0.018)	
In price \times mines > 0 (ever)		0.002 (0.006)		0.034 (0.010)		0.038 (0.011)
Country \times year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	142,296	143,864	142,296	143,864	142,296	143,864

Quantification

How large is the effect of mineral price variations on the probability of conflict?



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Feasibility and the Diffusion of Violence

- A) Mines located in ethnic homelands
- B) Changes in territory

Mines Located in Ethnic Homelands

- How conflict incidence at the rebel group-country level is affected by mineral prices in the ethnic homeland of the group
- Unit of analysis is a rebel group country of operation year triplet (g, i, t)

Mines Located in Ethnic Homelands

$$\text{CONFLICT}_{git} = \beta_1 \ln p_{gt}^W + \beta_2 \ln p_{gt}^W \times M_g + \mathbf{FE}_{gi} + \mathbf{FE}_{it} + \varepsilon_{gt}$$

- **Conflict** git dummy coding for the incidence of a conflict involving group g in country of operation i during year t
- **ln pw** world price of the main mineral produced by mines located in the homeland of the main ethnicity of rebel group g (the mineral observed in the largest number of cells)
- **Mg** number of mines producing this mineral in the homeland at the beginning of the period
- **B2** proxy for the mining-related financial capacity of the group

Changes in Territory

- The idea is to test whether a change in territory has more effect on future rebel activity elsewhere if the territory is a mining area

$$(3) \text{ ONSET}_{gkt} = \alpha \times \text{BATTLE}_{gt-1}^0 + \beta \times \text{BATTLE}_{gt-1}^m + \mathbf{FE}_{gk} + \mathbf{FE}_{it} + \varepsilon_{gkt},$$

- **ONSET_{gkt}** binary variable equal to 1 if group g is involved in an event in year t in a cell k that was at peace in t - 1; it is 0 if the cell is still in peace in year t
- **BATTLE_{gt-1}^m** total number of battles won by group g in t - 1 in mining areas
- **FE_{it}** country of operation x year xed effects
- **FE_{gk}** group x cell xed effects

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Breaking the Resource Curse: The Role of Mining Companies

- A) Companies' characteristics: Does Mine Ownership Matter?
- B) Promoting Good Practices: Does Transparency Matter?

Companies' Characteristics: Does Mine Ownership Matter?

- Conflict may be escalated by companies propensity to finance
- Colonial ties
- Firms from the ex-colonizing power continue to benefit from privileged relationships with the new rulers after decolonization

Promoting Good Practices: Does Transparency Matter?

- Transparency and traceability
- No hard evidence on conflict diminishing
- Corporate Social Responsibility

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Conclusion

- Impact of mining activities on the probability of conflict incidence
- The sharp increase in mineral prices and the average violence observed in African countries
- The results contradict configurations that claim that natural resources can reduce conflict by generating higher local incomes
- Mines operated by companies that comply with CSR were found to have less risk of fueling violence
- Gaining territorial control of a mining area implications on violence the diffusion by rebel group

References

- [1] Berman Nicolas, Couttenier Mathieu, Rohner Dominic, and Thoenig Mathias. *This Mine is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa*. American Economic Review 2017