

$$1a \quad E \ln(w_i^U | x_i) - E \ln(w_i^M | x_i) =$$

$$E \ln(w_i^U | U_i^* > 0) - E \ln(w_i^M | U_i^* > 0)$$

$$U_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 (\ln w_i^U - \ln w_i^M) + x_i' \delta_2 + z_i' \delta_3 - v_i$$

$$E \ln(w_i^U | U_i > 0) = E(x_i' \beta + U_i^U | U_i > 0)$$

$$E(x_i' \beta + U_i^U) \delta_0 + \delta_1 (\ln w_i^U - \ln w_i^M) + x_i' \delta_2 + z_i' \delta_3 - v_i \\ x_i' \beta^U + E(U_i^U | \delta_0 + \delta_1 (x_i \beta^U - x_i \beta^M - U_i^U - U_i^M) + x_i' \delta_2 + z_i' \delta_3 - v_i > 0) \\ x_i' \beta^U + E(U_i^U | \delta_1 (U_i^U - U_i^M) - v_i > -\delta_0 - \delta_1 (x_i \beta^U - x_i \beta^M) - x_i' \delta_2 - z_i' \delta_3) = c$$

regress U_i^U on $\delta_1 (U_i^U - U_i^M) - v_i$ (probit)

$$U_i^U = \alpha_1 (\delta_1 (U_i^U - U_i^M) - v_i) + \varepsilon$$

$$\alpha_1 = \frac{\text{Cov}(U_i^U, \delta_1 (U_i^U - U_i^M) - v_i)}{\text{Var}(\delta_1 (U_i^U - U_i^M) - v_i)}$$

$$\alpha_1 = \frac{\sigma_{U^2}}{\sigma^2 (\sigma_U^2 + \sigma_v^2) + \sigma_v^2}$$

B) The estimator can not be obtained
because of selection bias

C) Take 3 equations

$$\log(w_i) = \theta_{00} + x_{0i} \theta_{01} + z_{0i} \theta_{02} + \varepsilon_{0i}$$

$$\log(w_{ni}) = \theta_{n0} + x_{ni} \theta_{n1} + z_{ni} \theta_{n2} + \varepsilon_{ni}$$

$$l_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 (\log(w_i) - \log(w_{ni})) + \delta_2 x_i + \delta_3 \varepsilon_i - \varepsilon_i$$

1c) ~~3~~ 3 equations

$$\ln w_i^u = x_i \beta^u + u_i^u$$

$$\ln w_i^w = x_i \beta^w + u_i^w$$

and dummy

$$i=1 \text{ if } \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 (h w_i^u - \ln w_i^u) + x_i \sigma_2 + z_i \sigma_3$$

$\xrightarrow{\sigma_1 z_i}$

where u_i^u, u_i^w and u_i are trivariate normal with mean zero and

$$\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & \sigma_{12} & \sigma_{10} \\ & \sigma_2^2 & \sigma_{20} \\ & & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

\uparrow

Normal \rightarrow parameter identifiable up to scale

likelihood is $L(\beta_1^u, \beta_2^w, \sigma_1^2, \sigma_2^2, \sigma_{10}, \sigma_{20})$

$$\pi \left[\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(y_i - \beta_1^u x_i, u_i) du_i \right]^{I_i} \left[\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(y_i - \beta_2^w x_i, u_i) du_i \right]^{1-I_i}$$

\uparrow \uparrow

Bivariate normal density of (u_i^u, u_i) a

Bivariate normal of (u_i^w, u_i)

One can take log of L and estimate
coefficients of $\beta^0, \beta^1, \sigma_{12}$ and σ_{20}
by MLE.

⑧ two stage Heckman estimation

→ Run probit model of being member of a union on C (defined as before) to estimate corresponding coefficients.

→ Use these ¹estimates to find inverse Mills ratio $\left(\frac{\phi(c)}{1 - \Phi(c)} \right) = \lambda(c)$

Run OLS regression of wages on x_i and $\lambda(c)$ ¹ to get consistent coefficients for β^0 and β^N

Use predicted values for $\ln \hat{C}_i^0$ and $\ln \hat{C}_i^N$ to run probit regression for $P(U_i > 0)$ on $\delta_0 + \delta_1 (\ln \hat{C}_i^0 - \ln \hat{C}_i^N) + x_i \delta_2 + \varepsilon_i \delta_j$ to get consistent estimates for δ .

f) The reference value for education
is ~~9-11~~ ⁹⁻¹¹ years of education grades combined

One can see that returns to education
is higher for union members with low
level of education (level 1 and 2)
and higher for non union members with
high level of education

Experience has a more positive effect
for union members

Gender has less negative effect for
non unions

and race has less of an influence
when being a union member

g)

$$\frac{-f(\psi_1)}{f(\psi_1)}$$

is negative and therefore the
effect of selectivity variable

still positive in the union equation

For both union and Non union equation

the selectivity bias positive associated with wage so the confirms that individuals indeed self select in to lpr wages.

R) keep in mind that ^{marginal effects} ~~coefficients~~ β are non linear in probit model

$$\frac{\partial P(y_i=1 | X_{1i}, \dots, X_{Ki}, \beta_0, \dots, \beta_K)}{\partial X_{Ki}} = \beta_K \phi\left(\beta_0 + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k X_{ki}\right)$$

\nearrow

nonlinear

but relative effects of these

are constant

$$\frac{\frac{\partial P}{\partial X_{Ki}}}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial X_{Ki}}} = \frac{\beta_K}{\beta_K}$$

Table 6) The wage difference is ~~by~~ statistically significant and ^{as} lpr relative magnitude,

→ very important

Table 6 gives result of profit estimation on wage differences and other control variables

Table 7 reduced form so the wage difference is replaced by the underlying equation for the wage process

→ Table 7 gives net effects

Union firms tend to select more highly educated workers but the higher rate of return on education in the non-union sector will induce higher educated workers in to the non-union sector

non-whites might be discriminated but benefits would attract non-whites

for all β

$$Pr(inlf=1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{wiefinc} + \beta_2 \text{educ} + \beta_3 \text{exper} \\ + \beta_4 \text{experq} \\ + \beta_5 \text{age} \\ + \varepsilon_1$$

$$Pr(ChildES=1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{wifin} + \beta_2 \text{educ} + \beta_3 \text{exper} \\ + \beta_4 \text{experq} \\ + \beta_5 \text{age} \\ + \varepsilon_2$$

a bivariate probit allows for ε_1 and ε_2 being jointly distributed and ~~correlated~~ does not assume independence

$$\begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon_1 \\ \varepsilon_2 \end{pmatrix} \sim N \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & \rho \\ 0 & \rho & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

If $\rho \neq 0$ this model is a better fit because it

takes into account the right distribution
the data is drawn from

you ensure that the error term associated
to bids has an additional impact on
the probability of being in the labor force
that the error associated to labor force
participation does not impact the likelihood
of having bids.

d) In the paper they basically simulate how
~~so~~ robust the results are to the introduction
to some unobservable effect. ϵ for different
magnitudes of the correlation among the error term.
Applied to our scenario this means what it
would be the effects of not controlling for
likelihood of having bids on the likelihood
of being in the labor force.

If there is a correlation of -0.15 of unobserved in c_0 and the error related to labor force participation then the coefficient of having kids on labor force participation becomes insignificant. ~~It should~~

There is expected an ~~if there~~ strong negative correlation of the unobserved in having kids that influence the decision of being labor in the labor force dominates the relationship and now it seems like having kids is insignificant.