# Do we have to generate seed and ratchet key? Can't we use the seed as a ratchet key?

# Secure Publish Subscribe Compute System

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#### **ABSTRACT**

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#### **CCS CONCEPTS**

• Security and privacy → Use https://dl.acm.org/ccs.cfm to generate actual concepts section for your paper;

#### **KEYWORDS**

template, formatting, pickling

- 1 INTRODUCTION
- 2 RELATED WORK
- 3 PROTOCOL
- \* We minimize the communication with Garbler, using clever tricks, e.g., we don't need to send labels to Garbler for circuit garbling instead they generate it independently using shared seed.
- \* publishers and subscribers only talk to the broker. The communication between publishers and subscriber is done through Broker using end-to-end encryption. This ensures that
  - \* Does the subscriber seed needs to be computation specific?
  - \* We use ratcheting for forward security if seed is compromised.
  - \* We assume PKI.

Intuition.

#### 3.1 Basic Protocol

Forward Security.

- Generate a truly random key  $K_0$ .
- Generate, using KDF with key K<sub>0</sub>, a pseudorandom seed s<sub>0</sub> and a pseudorandom key for the ratchet round 1. Seed s<sub>0</sub> is used to generate pseudorandom strings during ratchet round 0.
- At round r, using KDF with key  $K_r$ , generate a pseudorandom seed  $s_r$  and key for ratchet round r+1. Seed  $s_r$  is used to generate pseudorandom strings during ratchet round r.

Garbled Circuit XOR Compatibility. \* What if one publisher doesn't send wire labels. After timeout the broker can inform the Garbler and it will use zero for such values in the circuit.

#### 4 SYSTEM

Extending libgarble.

Identity Gates for FreeXOR Compatibility.

- **5 EVALUATION**
- 6 CONCLUSION

#### Figure 1: Basic Protocol

#### Initialization.

- Each new publisher sends Broker a policy specifying allowed computations on its data and generates a truly random seed *s* and send it to Garbler.
- All publishers and subscribers establish an authenticated encrypted channel with Broker and through Broker with Garbler.

### Subscription.

- To subscribe computation C, subscriber sends a subscription request containing C to Broker and requests an output masking seed from Garbler.
- Garbler sends a truly random seed s' for computation C; generating a new seed if this is the first subscription for computation C.

# Publication.

• To publish kth value, publisher generates two pseudorandom wire labels,  $w_0$  and  $w_1$ , using seed s, for each bit of the value.  $w_0$  is ith and  $w_1$  is (i + 1)th numbers in pseudorandom sequence generated using seed s;  $2kL \le i < 2(k + 1)L$ , L being the bit-length of a value.

# Computation.

- Once Broker has wire labels for all publishers' inputs required for computation C, it requests Garbler to garble a circuit for C.
- Garbler independently generates input wire labels using seed *s* from each publisher contributing input and an output mask *m* using seed *s'* for each output bit.
- Garbler generates garbled circuit for M∘C(·), composition
  of masking function M : XOR and computation C, and
  sends it to Broker.
- Broker evaluates the garbled circuit using wire labels sent by publishers, obtains masked output  $o \oplus m$ , and send  $o \oplus m$  to all subscribers of computation C.
- Subscribers generate the mask m using the seed s' and unmask the output o.