




**The Art and Science
of
The Process of Intelligence Analysis**

**Case Study #4
(The Sign of the Crescent)**

ANALYSIS



Professor F. J. Hughes

Joint Military Intelligence College

EVIDENCE MARSHALING AND ARGUMENT CONSTRUCTION

CASE STUDY #4 **THE SIGN OF THE CRESCENT** **(ANALYSIS)**

May 2003

**JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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THE SIGN OF THE CRESCENT: COUNTERTERRORISM INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS

I. CASE STUDY # 4: INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE

Some General Words about this Fourth Assignment

This evidence-based Case Study # 4 has many of the same objectives as those forming the underpinnings of the first three assignments. We wish to give our JMIC students meaningful and challenging assignments that give them practice in applying the methods discussed in the course for marshaling thought and evidence and for constructing defensible and persuasive arguments. The marshaling methods we have discussed are helpful to the students in "connecting the dots" as they attempt to generate hypotheses about what is happening, or what will happen, in the simulated situations we ask them to face. A major part of their task, of course, involves determining what these connections might mean; this calls for imaginative reasoning. The argument construction methods we present in the course allow the students to see just what is necessary in order to justify some hypothesis that they believe to be favored by the evidence we provide. Such arguments form the basis for establishing the relevance, credibility, and inferential force or weight of the evidence. Here is where critical reasoning becomes so important in addition to imaginative reasoning.

But this fourth case study differs in some significant ways from the first three. First, in the earlier assignments we tried to keep matters fairly simple because of the newness to the students of these kinds of assignments. One simplification device we employed in constructing the first three assignments was to present intelligence reports to students whose dots, details or trifles were nearly all relevant to the major hypothesis existing in the minds of the persons who constructed the scenarios upon which the assignments were based. In short, the intelligence reports in the first three assignments contained little or no "noise" in the form of irrelevant details, dots, or trifles. In this fourth assignment however, the relevant dots, details, or trifles are embedded in an array of irrelevant dots that exist in intelligence reports that will lead the students nowhere as far as the hypothesis that is suggested by the relevant dots. In short, the students will face the very necessary task of trying to decide which dots they should be trying to connect. We have provided for you a listing of the 24 intelligence reports the students will receive that contain relevant dots, details or trifles. We also provide you with a listing of the 17 intelligence reports whose dots, details or trifles are irrelevant to the hypothesis actually favored by the evidence in this assignment. These 17 intelligence reports contain what might be called "distracters" since their contents will not lead the students to the major hypothesis favored by the relevant reports. These separate listings are not, of course, to be given to the students.

Second, this fourth assignment also attempts to capture, in a limited way, an important feature of actual intelligence analysis tasks, namely their dynamic nature. In the first three assignments all the intelligence reports were given altogether to the students in a single "lump". Thus, we can say that these first three assignments were static, as far as the presentation of intelligence information was concerned. In actual practice, however, intelligence information arrives over time and continues to arrive even during the time at which conclusions are required. Hypotheses being strongly entertained are frequently overtaken by information about recent events. In such cases analysts must often revise their hypotheses. In other cases, recent evidence may strengthen their beliefs about some hypothesis being entertained. We are limited of course in the extent to which we can capture, in training exercises, this dynamic element of actual intelligence analyses. The reason of course is that the students will have just a short period of time [probably a week] to digest information about events that will be taking place over a much longer time. Following is an account of the manner in which this fourth assignment incorporates a dynamic element.

At the start of the assignment the students will be given a list of 37 intelligence reports containing a mixture of relevant and irrelevant reports. At the ending of three days of work on this assignment, during which time the students should have formed some hypotheses about what will be happening, we will present them with 4 new intelligence reports "that have just come in". We call these four reports Task Alerts. We have provided you with separate listings of the 37 original intelligence reports to be given the

students and a listing of the 4 Task Alerts to be presented later on. Our present intention is to make these 4 Task Alerts available to students on a web site devoted to this course. They will of course be instructed to check this web site as they proceed with this assignment. The 4 Task Alerts we provide all turn out to be highly relevant to the hypothesis the students will be generating [we hope]. If they have generated the hypothesis that is favored by the relevant reports we have provided, these four Task Alerts will certainly strengthen this hypothesis.

Third, in this fourth assignment the major hypothesis suggested by the relevant intelligence reports and "dots" is not as simple as the ones suggested by the evidence in the first three assignments. What the students should be trying to uncover are simultaneous and coordinated terrorist activities involving three actions planned for Boston Harbor, the AMTRAK station in Atlanta, and the New York Stock Exchange. We have provided for you the scenario that describes exactly what the terrorists have in mind at each of these locations. So, you [but not the students] will know exactly what the terrorists have in mind. Naturally, we hope that the student analyst teams will infer these intentions from the assorted relevant dots we provide for them. So, this fourth assignment involves the inference of more complex terrorist activities. There's one remaining additional difficulty for the students in this fourth assignment

Fourth, unlike the three preceding assignments, the students will have to do a bit of detective work in uncovering the significance of some of the relevant dots we provide for them. We emphasize this fact in the instructions given to the students concerning this fourth assignment [which you should read very carefully yourself]. For example, in the action involving the planting of a bomb aboard an AMTRAK train, that is to be set off in the AMTRAK station in Atlanta, we provide the students with the number of the train [AMTRAK # 19] the terrorists will board. Later, one of the terrorist's phone messages is intercepted and the terrorist makes mention of "a crescent". In order to connect these two important dots, the students will have to consult the AMTRAK schedules on the Internet to see that Train # 19 is in fact called "The Crescent". There are other instances in which the students will have to consult various documents and maps to appreciate the significance of the "dots" we provide for them. This, we strongly believe, is a most important element of imaginative and productive intelligence analysis in real life. Not all intelligence information comes to us with all of its meanings already attached. Analysts must often determine for themselves exactly what some "dot" is telling them.

Evaluation and "The School Solution"

The task requirements for this fourth assignment are spelled out in the assignment document to be given to the students. As we have told students repeatedly, different persons will generate different hypotheses from the same body of evidence. Thus, it is difficult to say that we have "the correct answer key" for any of these assignments. However, after you read the scenario on which this assignment is based, you may also come to the conclusion that existed in the minds of the persons who constructed this scenario. In the next section of this Instructor Guide, you will see the arguments constructed by the writers of this scenario based on the relevant dots provided in this assignment. These arguments have been constructed using the very same Wigmorean methods presented to the students in class. A total of nine sets of evidence charts and key lists are provided for you [but not to be shown the students until they finish the assignment]. The first chart shows the major hypothesis and its three major sub-hypotheses. Each of these sub-hypotheses refers to a separate terrorist action. The major hypothesis simply refers to the coordinated and synchronized nature of these separate actions. Subsequent charts labeled A, B, and C concern main lines of argument on Action A₁ [the attack in Boston]. Charts D, E, and F concern main lines of argument on Action A₂ [the attack in Atlanta]. Charts G and H concern main lines of argument on Action A₃ [the attack at the New York Stock Exchange]. All of these lines of argument are based on the relevant dots, details or trifles in the relevant intelligence reports provided for the students. A separate listing of these relevant dots, that result from parsing the relevant intelligence reports, has also been provided for you.

A WORD ABOUT THIS CASE STUDY

The story you are about to read forms the basis for the fourth in a series of training assignments to be given to students at JMIC on intelligence analysis. This course concerns the marshaling of thoughts and evidence during the process of discovery and the construction of defensible and persuasive arguments from evidence. We have all heard much about how our failure to "connect the dots" was a major reason for our inability to predict the tragedy of September 11, 2001. All of us involved in the training of intelligence analysts hope that our efforts will help to prevent any recurrence of such tragedies. The course for which these training assignments are intended is precisely concerned with "connecting the dots", a task, incidentally, for which most of us have had very little training, especially when we are confronted with very large masses of "dots". As we will observe, there are several different kinds of "dots" that need to be connected.

Given some mass of items of information, or one form of "dots", we must decide which ones of these dots to connect and then to decide what these connections may mean. Speaking of items of information that are gathered, Sherlock Holmes used the word "trifles" instead of the word "dot". As he told Dr. Watson: "You know my method. It is based on the observance of trifles". Deciding which dots to connect is the first element in establishing the relevance of any dot as evidence in our analytic task. In other words, it is from these marshaled or organized "dots" that we first begin to generate hypotheses about what is happening now or about what might happen in the future. No dot, datum, or trifle is useful unless it can be shown to bear upon some hypothesis that might be taken seriously. As new "dots" emerge, we may have to revise our hypotheses in light of new information we receive. But generating imaginative, plausible, and productive hypotheses is only the first step in the analytic process. This vital first step concerns the process of discovery in which we attempt to generate possible explanations for the "dots" we are observing. Considered separately, some dots may seem to tell us very little. But when we consider them jointly they may tell us something very important. The importance of detecting evidential syncretisms is a topic upon which we dwell in our course for intelligence analysts.

Deciding which one of several possible hypotheses deserves our most careful attention is an exercise in constructing arguments that are defensible and persuasive. As we construct our arguments to establish the relevance, credibility and force of our evidence we quickly observe that there are other kinds of "dots" we must connect. These "dots" concern sources of doubt that we imagine as we try to construct defensible arguments from our evidence to hypotheses we are entertaining. Each of these dots will suggest new items of evidence we should try to gather. So, the process of argument construction is bound together with the process of discovery since such construction always raises new questions we should try to answer. Indeed, the process of inquiry, the asking of questions, is absolutely vital in productive intelligence analysis. The evidence marshaling strategies we offer our students are designed to enhance the process of inquiry. One criticism frequently made of intelligence analyst training is that it focuses more on the production of finished intelligence than it does on the process of intelligence analysis itself. All the attractive PowerPoint slides in the world will not save us unless they are based on imaginative and productive discovery and the construction of defensible and persuasive arguments.

The following story or scenario simply records what might happen if our analysts do not do a suitable job of connecting the dots that we will give them. The students will not, of course, be given access to this scenario itself. What they will be given are "dots" representing various forms of information that, in various ways, bear upon the activities described in this scenario. Their task will be to generate hypotheses based on the dots we give them. This task will not be an easy one since some of the dots we will provide students are quite irrelevant to the events in the following scenario. Remember that deciding which "dots" to connect is vital in intelligence analysis.

THE STORY: THE SIGN OF THE CRESCENT

The essential story behind this fourth, and most challenging assignment, involves a coordinated terrorist assault in three US cities: Boston, New York and Atlanta. Persons directly involved in any one of these three terrorist actions have no awareness of the other actions that are being planned. All they will know is when their own terrorist action will take place. The three assaults being planned involve the activities of several terrorist organizations, each of which has demonstrated great hostility to the USA for various reasons. The terrorist organizations are: Al Qaeda, HAMAS, and Al-Jihad. The latter two organizations are known to have links to Al Qaeda. Here are the terrorist actions being planned. The names given to terrorists in this scenario are fictitious. Students will be instructed to assume that the date on which their assignment takes place is toward the end of April, 2003.

First Action

The first action involves an attempt to set off a dirty bomb aboard a container ship called the Holland Queen, which is registered in The Netherlands. This container ship is being loaded in Amsterdam and will depart on 24 April, 2003. The destination of the Holland Queen is Boston's Inner Harbor, where the bomb will be detonated. Persons familiar with Boston will know that the Inner Harbor is directly adjacent to a heavily populated area and is also close to both the Callahan and Sumner tunnels. As we know, radiological and nuclear materials of various sorts can be stolen from carelessly guarded storage facilities in various parts of the world, especially in Eastern Europe. A lead-shielded canister containing about 2500 curies of powdered cesium 137 has been obtained by Al Qaeda and Al-Jihad members who are operating in Hamburg, Germany. Just few ounces of this powdered material delivered in a dirty bomb could contaminate an entire city for decades. The original source of this cesium 137 is not known for certain, but most probably it was obtained in Georgia. It is known that cesium 137 was used by the Soviets to bombard wheat and other seeds with radiation to see if this would produce more abundant crops. It is also known that the Chechen mujahidin placed a canister of cesium in a Moscow park in hopes of spreading radiation in this city. Large numbers of canisters of cesium 137 are stored in facilities having weak or non-existent security measures. Two of the Al Qaeda and Al-Jihad operatives in Hamburg are known to be Tawfiq al Adel [an Egyptian] and Saeed Khallad [a Saudi]. So far, they have never been apprehended. This cesium 137 powder was purchased by these two terrorists from an unknown source operating in Lublin, Poland.

The canister containing cesium 137 powder was picked up in Lublin, Poland by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad and delivered in a rented truck to Haarlem, The Netherlands, which is just 15 miles west of Amsterdam. A Dutch citizen named Jelte Nijboer owns a small apartment complex in Haarlem. He has rented a basement apartment to two persons from the Middle East named Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash. These two persons came to The Netherlands from Saudi Arabia seven years ago and now hold Dutch passports. They are both employed by *Sealink* Container Corp. whose headquarters office is in Amsterdam. The *Sealink* Corp. owns a large fleet of containers of the sort that can be carried by train or by truck. *Sealink* is also responsible for loading, in Amsterdam, some of the containers that will subsequently be placed aboard cargo vessels in Amsterdam for shipment to various parts of the world. The containers that are loaded in Amsterdam contain products of many Dutch companies. Other already loaded containers arrive in Amsterdam from many places in Europe. Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash work as container loaders for the *Sealink* Corp. Their major job is to load Dutch products aboard containers. Unknown to Nijboer, or to anyone else locally, is that Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash are members of Al Qaeda. Also unknown is that they both obtained training in the construction of explosive devices of various sorts during their stay in Afghanistan four years ago.

Both Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash know that their mission is to assemble and then plant a dirty bomb aboard the Holland Queen, prior to its departure for Boston on 24 April, 2003. When they receive notice that the cesium 137 canister has arrived in Haarlem, they immediately place it in a rented storage facility in their apartment complex in Haarlem. This storage facility is also owned and operated by Jelte Nijboer. They then proceed to prepare other components of the bomb. The explosive core of the bomb is to be a large quantity of TNT. They then rig a detonator for the bomb that can be activated by a

remote radio-triggering device. They have been supplied with this detonator by another member of Al Qaeda. Neither Saleh al Ahdal nor Riduan bin Attash know who will operate the remote triggering device to detonate the bomb they are constructing. They do know that the Holland Queen is scheduled to leave Amsterdam for Boston on 24 April, 2003. Three days prior to this departure date, they proceed to their rented storage room and complete the assembly of the dirty bomb in this storage room. Wearing lead gloves and other protective shielding, they attach the cesium 137 canister to TNT cylinders and the detonator and then enclose the bomb in a metal container; this will intensify the blast effects of the bomb. Finally, they pack the bomb in a large carton that carries the prominent label: "Norelco Shavers". Norelco is a company located in The Netherlands that manufactures a variety of appliances such as electric shavers. Finally, they attach a shipping label to this carton that contains the name of a fictitious supply company in Hartford, Connecticut.

Very early the next day Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash proceed to work at *Sealink* Container Corp. in Amsterdam in a borrowed panel truck carrying the dirty bomb. Their only remaining task is to see that the bomb they have constructed is placed in a *Sealink* container that will be loaded onto the Holland Queen, whose destination is Boston Inner Harbor. This they do without difficulty and, in the process, they make sure that the bomb is loaded in a container that will be placed at or near the top of containers the Holland Queen will carry. This will prevent the blast effects of the bomb from being localized. They observe that the container in which they placed the bomb is actually hoisted on top of several other containers aboard the Holland Queen. The container in which they have placed the bomb carries a bar code, whose translation is the number: 717326579291. Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash later, by phone, pass this bar code number to a person whom they have never met. The number they call is a local phone number in Amsterdam. The person to whom this call is made immediately passes this information along to another person, Muhammed bin Harazi, whom we will meet in the next two actions.

The rest of the job belongs to a Holland Queen crewmember who carries a [forged] Dutch passport under the name: Hans Pakes. Pakes, however, is not the person his passport represents him to be. His given name is Abu al Masri, a Yemeni, who has been a member of Al Qaeda for at least six years. Pakesal Masri has lived in The Netherlands for nearly eight years; his home is in Amsterdam. Pakesal Masri speaks Dutch fluently and has a very light complexion. He has been married for three years to a Dutch woman who has believed that her husband has lived in The Netherlands all of his life. Pakesal Masri works in the ship's galley and has been employed on the Holland Queen for four years.

It is Pakesal Masri who carries the remote triggering device that will detonate the dirty bomb after the Holland Queen docks at the Inner Harbor in Boston. Pakesal Masri has received instructions from another Al Qaeda member whom he has never met personally. This person is Muhammed bin Harazi [mentioned above], who turns out to be an Al Qaeda planner and coordinator whose exact location has never been revealed to any of the terrorists in The Netherlands. Pakesal Masri's instructions are quite specific with respect to time. He is to detonate the bomb at 0900hrs on the morning of 30 April, 2003, the day after the Holland Queen is scheduled to arrive at 1930 hrs on 29 April, 2003 in Boston's Inner Harbor. Pakesal Masri must know when the dirty bomb has in fact been loaded aboard the Holland Queen. He carries a cell phone and will receive a message when the bomb is loaded. A short time after the bomb is loaded by Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash. Pakesal Masri receives a cell phone call during which the caller simply reads out the numbers: 717326579291, the bar code for the container in which the dirty bomb has been placed. This call is sent from a location in Amsterdam.

Knowing the bar code of the container carrying the dirty bomb, Pakesal Masri can locate it aboard the Holland Queen while the ship is en route to Boston. He has been instructed to trigger the bomb on the morning of 30 April, 2003, at precisely 0900 for reasons made clear in the next terrorist action being contemplated.

Second Action

The second action involves the terrorists' knowledge that our railroads are quite vulnerable to terrorist actions of various sorts. Several members of HAMAS and Al Qaeda have noted, with particular

interest, that there is an AMTRAK passenger train called "The Crescent" that travels between New York and New Orleans. One of the Al Qaeda members is none other than the planner and coordinator **Muhammed bin Harazi**, whom we introduced above. As we know, a crescent is a symbol that appears on the flags of several Islamic countries and on other symbolic displays having significance in the Islamic world. The terrorists behind these three coordinated actions believe that there would be no more appropriate instrument than a Crescent to deliver death, destruction and terror to American citizens. Here are some actual arrival and departure times for the Crescent [Train # 19], which leaves daily at 1455 from Penn Station in New York City. It arrives Washington DC at 1838 and departs at 1910. It arrives in Charlottesville, Virginia at 2127 and departs at 2132. This train then arrives in Atlanta the next day at 0858 and departs at 0918.

What is being planned by **Muhammed bin Harazi** and his associates is to bring aboard components of a bomb, which will be assembled in a sleeping compartment on the Crescent during the night. They understand the difficulties that would be involved if they tried to bring a large and completely constructed bomb aboard a train. The bomb they will construct will have a timing device set to go off at precisely 0905 in the train station in Atlanta on the same day as the dirty bomb is set off in Boston. This gives the terrorists exactly seven minutes to clear the station after the train arrives and the bomb goes off. However, one of the three terrorists has agreed to remain in the sleeping compartment to keep the door locked **so** that no one discovers the bomb aboard the Crescent while it is stopped in Atlanta. In short, this person will be a suicide bomber.

We know that **HAMAS** has maintained a widespread presence in the USA including Virginia. Planners of this coordinated terrorist action, headed by **Muhammed bin Harazi**, have contacted two members of **HAMAS** and one Al Jihad member, all of whom live in Virginia. Knowing that security is likely to be much tighter in Washington DC than in Charlottesville, these terrorists are instructed to board the Crescent in Charlottesville, Virginia. Each one of these terrorists will carry components of the bomb in large suitcases. One of the terrorists is to reserve a sleeping compartment where the three terrorists will meet to assemble the bomb as the Crescent makes its way to Atlanta. The two **HAMAS** participants are Mukhtar Galab and Yasein Mosed, both of whom have lived in the USA for several years and who hold valid student visas. They are both masters' level students at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. Their passports say that their country of origin is Jordan. The Al Jihad member is Faysal Goba, who managed to obtain a travel visa to the USA in January 2003. In spite of heightened security since the events of 9/11/01, someone was careless in granting this travel visa. Goba happens to be an explosives expert, having been trained in an Al Qaeda training facility in the Sudan in 1994. Goba is the one who has volunteered to remain in the sleeping compartment containing the bomb.

Galab, Mosed, and Goba are instructed to meet in Charlottesville to coordinate their activities, which they do a week before the planned bombing. Goba will reserve the sleeping compartment and purchase three one-way tickets for travel between Charlottesville and Atlanta. They are instructed by the planners that a stock of C-4 plastic explosive, together with bomb timing devices, are being maintained at a rented storage facility in the town of Keswick, Virginia, just five miles east of Charlottesville. A key to this storage facility is sent to Mukhtar Galab. These terrorists reckon that they can each bring about 50 pounds of C-4 aboard the Crescent in their luggage. The C-4 plastic explosive they will use has been stolen from the Powhatan Company, a manufacturer of explosives for the military. This company is located just outside Keswick, Virginia.

Third Action

The third action being planned by **Muhammed bin Harazi** and his associates has a more enhanced objective than the first two actions just described. The first two actions are designed to generate loss of life, destruction and the wave of terror that will follow. The third objective, apart from generating more terror and loss of life, is to bring the American economy to a halt, at least as far as it concerns the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE]. The planners know that there are elaborate security measures in effect as far as personal entry to the NYSE is concerned. Entry of a suicide bomber into the NYSE was contemplated, but ruled out because of these elaborate security measures. However, the planners know that a very large organization such as NYSE requires daily shipments of all sorts of things:

office supplies, toilet paper, furniture, and, of course, consumables such as coffee, tea, and soft drinks. Perhaps only a few of the items in these daily shipments are carefully screened by NYSE security personnel. What the Al Qaeda planners have in mind is the delivery to the NYSE of a coffee/tea hot chocolate dispenser that contains a very powerful explosive device. This device will be timed to go off in the NYSE on 30 April, 2003 at the same time [0900] as the bombs in Boston and Atlanta. The planners of course know about "sleepers" in the USA who could carry out this action.

Sahim Albakri is employed by a supplier of various consumables and vending machines under contract to the NYSE. This supplier goes under the name: Empire State Vending Services [ESVS]. The company supplies all manner of beverages, candies, cookies, as well as vending machines for their sale, to a number of companies and agencies in the New York City area. Albakri has been employed by ESVS for seven years and is in charge of the Shipping Department at ESVS. But ESVS does not know Sahim Albakri by this name. Albakri entered the USA in 1994 using an Indian passport in the name Bagwant Dhaliwal. Albakri/Dhaliwal became an American citizen in 1998. He began work at ESVS in 1995 as a shipping clerk but was rapidly promoted because of his intelligence and work ethic. He is looked upon at ESVS as a model employee and has won several awards from ESVS for his devoted service. Albakri/Dhaliwal is in fact a Pakistani who served with the Taliban in Afghanistan, from 1990 to 1992. He has been trained in many activities now associated with terrorism, including the construction and installation of explosive devices. He speaks fluent English and has also been thoroughly trained regarding customs and habits commonly associated with Americans. Albakri/Dhaliwal's mother is in fact Indian and still lives in Delhi. She was divorced from his father, a Pakistani and also a Taliban member, who was killed during the recent military confrontations in Afghanistan. Albakri/Dhaliwal has been told that his father was killed by an American bomb, which is not true. Actually, he died when a truck in which he was riding ran over a land mine planted by the Taliban itself. In the past, Albakri/Dhaliwal frequently visited his mother in India and on one of his early visits in 1993 he had no trouble obtaining a valid Indian passport in the name Bagwant Dhaliwal. The Al Qaeda regards Albakri/Dhaliwal as a model "sleeper" in much the same way as ESVS regards him as a model employee.

According to the scheme fashioned by the Al Qaeda planners, Albakri/Dhaliwal and another person will install a very powerful C-4 explosive device, with a timer, into a large coffee/tea hot chocolate vending machine to be delivered to the NYSE building. Part of Albakri/Dhaliwal's task at ESVS is to certify that all vending machines to be installed in their customers' buildings are in perfect working order before they are shipped. He is assisted in this task by a person whom Albakri/Dhaliwal hired personally about two years ago to work as a technician at ESVS. This person's name is Hamid Alwan, alias Mark Davis. Alwan and Albakri/Dhaliwal have been sharing an apartment in Queens, NYC for about three years. Alwan/Davis's major responsibilities have included the repair and servicing of vending machines. He has an enclosed work area in the Shipping Department at ESVS in which he performs these tasks. Alwan came into this country from Canada about three years ago. Alwan holds a forged birth certificate stating that his name is Mark Davis. In 1999 he applied for a Social Security card using this forged birth certificate. This social security card and his birth certificate allowed him to obtain a New York state driver's license. This license lists his home address as: 2462 Myrtle Ave., Apt. 307, Queens, NYC. His actual country of origin is believed to be Saudi Arabia. In any case, Alwan/Davis is an explosives expert with experience gained in many operations conducted by the Taliban and the Al Qaeda. He is believed to have been associated with several assassinations in various parts of the Middle East when explosive devices were used. Alwan will obtain the C-4 explosives and the timing device from a source named Hani al Hallak who manages a carpet store in North Bergen, New Jersey.

Before the vending machine bomb has been constructed, Albakri/Dhaliwal has been told to wait for further instructions about when it must be delivered to the NYSE. He receives these instructions stating that the vending machine bomb must be delivered to the NYSE on 29 April, 2003, the day before the two other bombs are to be set off in Boston and Atlanta. The timing device of this bomb must be set to 0900 on 30 April, 2003. As this delivery day approaches, Albakri/Dhaliwal selects the vending machine in which the explosives are to be placed. Alwan proceeds to "service" this machine by installing nearly 150 pounds of C-4 inside this machine together with a timing device. He very cleverly places this C-4 in the vending machine without major disruption of this machine. All he must do to accommodate the C-4 is to remove the elements of this vending machine that dispense hot chocolate, which he does. On 29 April,

2003, Alwan sets the timing device to go off at 0900 the next day. But, he adds a perverse hedge on the functioning of the timing device. If the timer does not go off at 0900, as planned, the first person who puts in 50 cents for a cup of coffee [black] after 0900 will get a very nasty surprise, along with many other innocent persons in the NYSE.

Albakrildhaliwal has several problems he must solve before this terrorist plan can be successful. First, he must make it necessary for a vending machine in a rest area of the NYSE to be replaced. It happens that Hamid Alwan also makes rounds of ESVS's customers to see that their vending machines are in working order. The persons who actually fill these machines also do this. Occasionally Alwan is called upon to fill vending machines at customer locations. Several days before the delivery of the vending machine containing the bomb, Alwan goes to the NYSE to fill a coffee1 teal hot chocolate machine and, in the process, disrupts its functioning. He tells the NYSE person in charge of rest areas and vending machines that this machine cannot be repaired at the NYSE and must be replaced. It is disconnected and removed. Of course Alwan, as well as all other vendors, require security screening before they are permitted access to the NYSE. In Alwan's case, this screening must have been very cursory because he holds a valid vendor's ID in the name Mark Davis that allows him access to the NYSE, provided that he is accompanied by a NYSE guard. Albakrildhaliwal must also make certain that Alwan/Davis is the one who will accompany the truckdriver who delivers the vending machine bomb to the NYSE. This delivery will be accomplished late in the day on 29 April, 2003. Alwan will of course be the one who installs and fills this vending machine in the rest area of the NYSE. The machine will function perfectly except that no one will be able to obtain any hot chocolate. The vending machine is of course locked by a key held only by ESVS employees.

Coordination of these Three Actions

From bitter experience with the 911 terrorist actions we know that considerable planning and coordination must have taken place. We also know that this planning was indeed clever. In the three terrorist actions just described we have identified Muhammed bin Harazi as being the key Al Qaeda planner and coordinator. It was very tempting to assume that he is located somewhere in the Middle East, Africa, or perhaps in Europe. But we have chosen to locate him here in the USA. It is not necessary to suppose that Muhammed bin Harazi planned all of these three terrorist actions himself. It has been suggested that terrorist "cells" in various parts of the world, including the USA, might generate their own possible actions that will in fact be carried out without any central direction. For example, Albakrildhaliwal and Alwan might have been planning to destroy or disrupt the NYSE for quite some time, given only that they can obtain the necessary materials they need to carry out this action. In coordinated terrorist activity, such as the one in this training exercise, we have to suppose that there are some central planning agents, such as Muhammed bin Harazi, who will at least help finance and synchronize the planned terrorist actions. We do know that Al Qaeda has demonstrated a preference for simultaneous and coordinated terrorist activities.

As far as Muhammed bin Harazi is concerned, we need only suppose that he has been associated with Al Qaeda or some other terrorist organization for a long time and is highly respected among terrorist groups. He holds seemingly valid credentials including an American passport, a Virginia driver's license, and a Social Security card, all of which identify him as Abdul Ramazi, birthplace/date: Chicago, Illinois, 1952. For purposes of this training scenario we have chosen to locate him here in the Washington DC area, right under the noses of the FBI and CIA. At present, he owns and operates a gourmet food importing business located in the Springfield Mall in Springfield, Virginia. He travels frequently in connection with this business, providing him with cover as he moves from place to place both here and abroad. His passport shows frequent trips to Pakistan, France, The Netherlands, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. He has recently made trips here in the USA to New York City; North Bergen, New Jersey; Charlottesville, Virginia; and Boston. How he communicates with the three terrorist groups that will participate in the three actions described above will be apparent from the evidence generated for this training scenario. Ramazi/Harazi will be the major source of funds for this coordinated action as well as the main synchronizer of these actions.

EVIDENCE GENERATION

The construction of this training exercise brings home an important fact about the detection of coordinated terrorist activities both here and abroad. What we should like to have, of course, are "nuggets" in the form of information directly obtained from credible informers planted within terrorist organizations themselves. Such nuggets are usually difficult or impossible to obtain. Timely indicators of actions, such as those in the present training assignment, are absolutely vital. It will not save us to detect these forthcoming activities just shortly before they are planned to occur. Finding out just now that there is a dirty bomb aboard the Holland Queen, that docked yesterday, may not save the residents of Boston. It seems that what is necessary is for us to be able to generate plausible hypotheses about possible forthcoming terrorist activities as they are being planned and/or prepared. Such generation involves connecting lots of dots, many of which may seem unrelated at the time they are revealed to us. But this is exactly what our training programs at JMIC are designed to accomplish. Deciding which dots to connect, and discovering what these connections may mean, is vitally necessary if we are to have any hope of advance warning of disasters such as the ones we have already experienced. Our task in generating plausible advance evidence about the three coordinated terrorist actions described above is to provide some dots that must be connected if these actions are to be detected in time to ensure that they could be prevented. In another document we will give an account of this evidence and the manner in which it will be presented to our students.

The collections of evidence given to our students in the three prior assignments were made simpler because we included very few irrelevant or distracter items that did not bear upon the hypotheses that could be generated or suggested by the other relevant evidence we provided. Another way of saying this is to say that virtually all the "dots" we provided our students in these three prior assignments were ones that should have been connected. However, as noted above, a major element of the difficulty of actual intelligence analyses involves deciding which dots to connect among the many that are available. In this fourth assignment we have included a variety of irrelevant or distracter items. In fact, the actual collection of evidence we provide in this fourth assignment contains 26 relevant intelligence reports and 15 irrelevant or distracter reports that have nothing to do with the three coordinated terrorist actions described above. Each report contains several or many "dots", or "trifles", as Sheriack Holmes called them. So, a major element of the students' task in this fourth assignment is to judge which dots are relevant and need to be connected in generating hypotheses about these three coordinated terrorist activities.

Finally, it cannot be expected that our students will discover all of the details described above in this fourth training assignment. Some of the dots we will give students do serve as relevant but, in most cases, indirect or circumstantial indicators of the three coordinated actions described above, provided that they use some imagination and do a bit of sleuthing work. For example, one report we give students is a dot referring to a reservation made on AMTRAK Train # 19. They will have to consult an actual AMTRAK train schedule in order to connect this train to the word "Crescent", which will appear as a dot in another report we give them. We cannot expect our intelligence analysts to exercise their imaginations unless they are encouraged to do so and are supported when they do exercise their imaginations. Such encouragement and support are major features of our analyst-training course at JMIC.

II. COUNTERTERRORISM INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS: SETTING THE STAGE

In this assignment your intelligence analyst team has been tasked to provide indications and warnings of potential terrorist actions here in the United States. We were surprised once during the 9/11 disasters; we all hope to be able to prevent similar disasters from occurring in the future. As we now know, we face many skillful terrorist adversaries who are unflinching in their efforts to bring ruin to our country and to our allies. These adversaries, many of whom have never been identified, are scattered all around the globe and are members of different but often linked organizations. An unknown number of them reside here in the USA and can be called upon at any time to unleash acts of terrorism of many different sorts. No American, regardless of age, sex or race, is exempt from the activities of present day terrorists. In your I & W team's meeting today one of you remarks that it is almost as if some very large Mafia-like organization has put out a contract on the lives of every living American.

One of our most important bulwarks against these terrorist threats is your own imaginative and critical reasoning ability as intelligence analysts. The task of generating imaginative and productive hypotheses regarding possible terrorist threats is not an easy one. Using a current phrase with which we are now all familiar, you are faced with lots of "dots" in the form of intelligence data that come from many different sources. Your first task is to decide which dots you should be trying to connect and then to make inferences about what these connections may mean. This is the basic step in generating hypotheses about what these connected "dots" might mean. You may of course generate more than one hypothesis concerning possible threats. Deciding which hypothesis seems most favored by the "dots" you have connected involves another important task. This task involves constructing defensible and persuasive arguments in establishing the relevance, credibility and inferential force of the "dots" you are offering as evidence on your possible hypotheses. Your favored hypothesis may indeed be imaginative. But no one will act on it if your arguments in justification of this hypothesis are not defensible and persuasive. As we have explained to you, the act of constructing defensible arguments also aids in the generation of new lines of inquiry and evidence and possibly entirely new hypotheses. In short, hypothesis generation and argument construction go hand in hand.

As your I & W team has repeatedly discussed, intelligence analysts have been the objects of criticism for failure to predict the events of 9/11. One of you argues that there is a sense in which much of this criticism is not justified. The argument is that few of us, especially intelligence analysts, ever receive any specific formal training in the basic analytic tasks of generating novel and productive hypotheses and in the construction of defensible and persuasive arguments based on masses of evidence. But these two major requirements are exactly what your present intelligence analysis course has involved. Many of the evidence marshaling, hypothesis generation, and argument construction methods to which you have been exposed in this course have been borrowed from the field of law in which these methods have proven so useful. The various methods of evidence marshaling we told you about are very useful devices for "connecting the dots". No course or instructor can teach you how to be imaginative or creative in the generation of hypotheses. Nor can any present computational device generate, based on a mass of "dots", new ideas in the form of productive and imaginative hypotheses. But what we can do is to provide you with challenging and meaningful assignments in which you are encouraged and supported as you practice using the imagination with which we have all been endowed by nature. The trick is to be able to apply your imaginative reasoning in productive and defensible ways.

The assignment we will describe momentarily involves a situation in which terrorists are embarking upon another diabolical scheme that, if successful, will bring about certain terror, great destruction, and considerable loss of life here in the USA. Your basic task is to predict the nature of the terrorists' threat including when and where this threat will be carried out. What we would like to have, of course, are "nuggets" in the form of direct evidence from persons inside terrorist organizations who alert us to the specifics of the terrorist actions that are being planned. As you know, we are usually not in possession of "nuggets" of this sort. What we must rely upon are many "dots" in the form of "lower grade evidential ore" which, when imaginatively and plausibly connected, may allow us to infer the capabilities and intentions of terrorist groups. In this present assignment you will be provided with a variety of "dots" for you to try to connect in generating hypotheses concerning what action or actions the terrorists have in mind.

SOME IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS ASSIGNMENT

Please read the following comments before you begin to work on this assignment. This fourth assignment has some important characteristics that make it different from the other assignments you have already been given.

A Word about the "Dots" to be Connected

An intelligence report of any sort may contain lots of "dots" or details, any one of which may be inferentially important in different ways. In this assignment we will provide you with a total of 41 intelligence reports. The manner in which we will provide you with these reports is discussed below. As you see below in the section entitled The Intelligence Reports at Hand, we have sorted reports for you according to the sources from which the reports have come. First notice that each report carries a date that identifies the day on which this report was filed and transmitted to you by a particular source. In any of the three source folders the intelligence reports are arranged in chronological order according to when you received them.

To illustrate what we mean by "dots", details, or "trifles" [as Sherlock Holmes called them], consider the first report in the FBI folder, the one dated 1 April, 2003. This report contains a variety of dots or trifles, each of which may or may not be important. Here are the specific dots or trifles in this report:

- A man named Abdui Ramazi owns the Select Gourmet Foods shop in Springfield Mall in Springfield, VA.
- The phone number at Ramazi's shop is 703-659-2317
- Ramazi's shop has account number 1070173749003 at First Union Bank.
- Six checks totaling \$35,000, drawn on accounts at the Pyramid Bank of Cairo, Egypt and the Central Bank of Dubai, UAI, have been deposited in the above account during the past six months.
- The two foreign banks in Egypt and the UAI are possible conduits in money laundering schemes.

An important fact is that any one of these dots or trifles may not seem important at all until they are connected with dots or trifles in other intelligence reports you receive. What we must learn to do is to carefully parse each intelligence report to observe the particular trifles each report reveals. Considered separately or independently, individual dots may have little meaning. Taken together, however, some combination of dots or trifles may allow you to generate some very productive hypotheses as well as new lines of inquiry or questioning.

Deciding Which Dots to Connect

One rather unrealistic characteristic of the previous assignments you have already been given is that almost all of the intelligence reports, and the dots or trifles they revealed, were inferentially important. We structured these early assignments in this way to simplify the hypothesis generation and argument construction tasks for you, given that assignments like these were perhaps the very first you have ever experienced. But in actual episodes of intelligence analysis not every report that you receive has relevance and value to you. As an experienced intelligence analyst might say: "There is lots of noise in my intelligence traffic and a most important part of my task is to detect important signals in this background of noise". In this present assignment there is considerable "noise" in the sense that some of the intelligence reports, and the dots or trifles they reveal, will lead you nowhere as far as the terrorists' true intentions are concerned. Deciding which reports and dots or trifles on which to focus your attention is a most important part of your task. Even when you have focused attention on dots you believe are relevant and important you still have the problem of determining which combinations of them will be most productive in allowing you to generate hypotheses and new lines of inquiry and evidence. The various

evidence-marshaling strategies we discussed in this course have been designed to help you decide which combinations of dots or trifles you might best be considering.

On the Presentation of Intelligence Reports

Another unrealistic characteristic of your previous assignments is that we presented all the intelligence reports to you at a single time, or in a single "lump". As you know, in actual intelligence analysis tasks intelligence reports arrive over time and continue to do so even when you are prepared or required to draw definite conclusions. In short, your previous assignments have all been static as far as the presentation of intelligence information is concerned. In this present assignment we have taken a small step toward making your task more dynamic and realistic. There is a limit, however, to which we can make this assignment truly dynamic. The problem involves time. It is anticipated that you will work on this assignment over a week's time. However, the events described in the reports we provide will have taken place over a much longer period of time. The intelligence reports you will see below are to be given to you all at once at the start of this assignment. As you work on this assignment during the week you can expect to be given additional new intelligence reports "that have just come in". The manner in which these additional reports will be provided for you will be announced at the start of this assignment. This new information may cause you to revise your hypotheses or it might allow you to be more confident that the major hypothesis you have generated deserves to be taken seriously.

More about Time

There are several different time lines to be aware of in this assignment. First, there is what we will call assignment time. This timing refers to the reports and the events they describe in the situation being represented in this assignment. Real time, on the other hand, refers to what your calendar and watch now say as you are working on this assignment. The problem is that assignment time moves much more rapidly than real time. Again, the events described in this assignment will have taken place over several months in the past. But we have to compress them because you will have just one week of real time in order to infer what is happening and what may happen. What we shall ask you to do is to assume that you are now nearing the end of the month of April in the year 2003. Some of the reports listed below refer to events that have already taken place. Other reports will refer to events in assignment time that will occur as this time moves swiftly relative to your real time; here are two examples. First, look at the first report in your CIA folder. This report came to you on 1 April, 2003 but it mentions an event that took place on 30 March, 2003. So, this report refers to events that have already taken place before the assignment time you are now assuming. But now look at Report 10 in the CIA folder. This report has come to you on 27 April, 2003. You have to suppose that assignment time has moved rapidly and that you are now at 27 April, 2003 in assignment time. The best thing to do in working this assignment is simply to forget about what your calendar or watch now tells you. In other words, just forget about real time and focus on assignment time.

Finally, there are different time lines in what we have called assignment time that you should keep in mind. What is important to you is to keep track of the timing of the dots or trifles in the intelligence reports with which you are provided. The report dates are less important to you. They simply have given us some basis for a chronological ordering of the information you received. In most cases what is important is the timing of the dots or trifles in a report and not the timing of when you received information about these dots or trifles.

Intelligence Analysts and Detectives

In the analysis task you face in this assignment it will not be enough for you just to consider the intelligence reports with which you are provided and nothing else. In criminal investigations, for example, the skillful detective not only observes traces, clues and other indicators, but also considers the contexts in which these traces or clues have been observed and asks a variety of questions about what these traces or clues might mean. Some of the dots or trifles revealed in the intelligence reports below refer to specific objects, events, and locations. To arrive at the meaning of these dots, trifles, or clues, you may



have to consult a variety of reference sources in the form of maps and documents of various kinds. Some of the information you will need is to be found easily on the Internet. In short, skillful and thorough intelligence analysis requires that you carefully find out about what some dot or trifle is telling you. Such knowledge is not always, perhaps only rarely, revealed in the reports in which these dots or trifles are given to you.

MAJOR TASK REQUIREMENTS

Here is a list of what we shall ask you to provide as a result of your work on this assignment.

1) From the accumulated intelligence reports provided below, and using the various evidence marshaling methods and argument construction methods we have described, generate some alternative hypotheses about what action or actions the terrorists are planning to take in the near future. The near future means after assignment time 27 April, 2003, which will be the date of the final reports you will receive. Keep in mind the dynamic element of this assignment. At some times during the week in which you work on this assignment you will receive new intelligence reports containing dots or trifles that may cause you to alter your initial hypotheses or revise the strength which you can argue in favor of the hypothesis you believe is most likely. As you proceed, keep a record of the questions you are prompted to ask as you examine the intelligence reports we provide. Remember that the process of inquiry, the asking of questions, is so important in intelligence analysis.

2) Using the argument construction methods we have described for you, construct arguments you believe to be defensible in showing why the hypothesis you advocate should be taken more seriously than others that are possible.

3) We will suppose in this assignment that your efforts are of vital importance to the new Office of Homeland Security. If you believe that the indicators or evidence you have now analyzed is indicating a serious threat, you must be prepared to issue a warning notice to this office and to any other offices of interest. To do this effectively, you must prepare a defensible and persuasive briefing that describes exactly what your conclusions are, based on the mass of dots or trifles you have connected. Your conclusions must state what action or actions the terrorists are planning, where they will occur, and when they will occur.

III. THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AT HAND

Here are the three folders you now have that contain the intelligence reports that will be of interest to you in your analysis. Keep in mind that there will be a few more reports to come during the time you are working on your analysis.

FBI FOLDER:

1) Report Date: 1 April, 2003. FBI: Abdul Ramazi is the owner of the Select Gourmet Foods shop in Springfield Mall, Springfield, VA. [Phone number 703-659-2317]. First Union National Bank lists Select Gourmet Foods as holding account number 1070173749003. Six checks totaling \$35,000 have been deposited in this account in the past four months and are recorded as having been drawn on accounts at the Pyramid Bank of Cairo, Egypt and the Central Bank of Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Both of these banks have just been listed as possible conduits in money laundering schemes.

2) Report Date: 5 April, 2003. FBI: Passport control at Dulles Airport in Wash DC records that Abdul Ramazi, holder of US passport # 177183634 [issued by Passport Agency, Wash. DC on 12 Feb. 1997] has made three trips to Amsterdam, two trips to Hamburg, Germany, and three trips to Cairo, Egypt in the last five months. The address given by Ramazi on his passport is 1176 Floyd Ave., Springfield, VA. Phone number at this address is 703-734-0104.

3) Report Date: 8 April, 2003. FBI: On 7 April, 2003 at 0600 hrs. Police began tailing a panel truck rented from Ryder Truck Rental in Culver City, California. According to Ryder, this truck was rented on 1 April, 2003 by a man who gave the name Karim Bensaïd. Bensaïd showed a California drivers' license and gave his home address as 452 Huobard St. in Culver City. Bensaïd told the Ryder sales agent that he would need a small truck for two days to move some items of furniture from Culver City to San Gabriel, California. When the truck was still not returned on 6 April, the Ryder agent notified Los Angeles police who, in turn, notified the FBI. On 6 April, 2003 an alert LA police officer noticed the truck parked in front of an apartment complex on Greenlawn Ave. in Culver City. On 7 April, two men were observed to enter this rental truck. They drove south on US 405 and exited right at Imperial Highway. They then turned left on Sheldon St. and stopped at the City Park in El Segundo, California. At this point the two men were apprehended by police and FBI agents. In the truck were found two pairs of binoculars, maps of the Los Angeles area, and flight schedules to and from LAX.

4) Report Date: 13 April, 2003. FBI from Army CID: A man who gave his name as Wallace Wilson was arrested at 1730hrs on 10 April, 2003 at Camp George West Military Reservation in Denver, Colorado. Wilson was able to obtain access to this military reservation using personal identification in the form of a Colorado driver's license and a Social Security card. He also used identification for the truck he was driving that is owned by his employer, the Apex Paper Products Company in Denver, Colorado. This company has a contract to supply paper products to Camp George West. A man by the name Wallace Wilson is known to be a member of a domestic militia group known as Aryan Nations. Wilson was arrested by MPs when he was seen loading boxes on his Apex truck. The boxes were being taken from an apparently unlocked storage facility at Camp George West. The boxes contained 50 Cal. ammunition and several land mines.

5) Report Date: 13 April, 2003. FBI from Border Patrol in El Paso, Texas: Border patrol agents in Hudspeth County, Texas reported that on the night of 10 April, 2003, they apprehended two men, whom they first believed to be Mexicans, crossing the Rio Grande river near McNary, Texas. As they were being interrogated at the McNary police station, it was discovered that each man carried \$20,000 in cash. The two men, when interrogated, spoke no Spanish but had Texas drivers' licenses made out in the names Vincent Cortez and Arnaldo Gueterrez. The address given on both licenses was: 1212 McRae Blvd, El Paso, Texas. They also had one-way tickets on an American Airlines flight from El Paso to Houston, Texas, scheduled to leave El Paso on 16 April, 2003. An investigation made of the residence at 1212

McRae Blvd. in El Paso revealed that it was occupied by two men named Ben Hassine and Ahmed Yassin, both of whom claim to be students at the University of Texas at El Paso.

6) ~~Report Date 15 April, 2003.~~ FBI Special report: Dr. Clark Adams, a Middle Eastern expert whose office is at the Pentagon, was last seen on 13 April, 2003 after he left his home at 1830hrs for the Home Depot store on Lee Highway in Merrifield, VA. Dr. Adams's family could give no explanation for his disappearance. The FBI is treating his disappearance as a possible case of abduction.

7) ~~Report Date 15 April, 2003.~~ FBI: The Powhatan Company is a manufacturer of military explosives of various types, including C-4. It is located just outside of Keswick, Virginia. On 11 April, 2003 this company reported that 200 pounds of C-4 could not be accounted for during a recent inventory.

8) ~~Report Date 15 April, 2003.~~ FBI from INS: Two men were arrested on 14 April, 2003 at Bush intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas. They are identified as Jamal Kalifa and Abul Hassan Salman. They both attempted to purchase airline tickets using Dutch passports that are believed to have been forged in Paris, France. The tickets they attempted to purchase were on Continental Airlines flight #458 from Bush Intercontinental in Houston to Reagan National Airport in Washington, DC.

9) ~~Report Date 16 April, 2003.~~ FBI Special Report: In Seattle, Washington on 15 April, 2003 a US Post Office on Howell St. reported that six identical packages, each marked "Home Made Candies", were sent to state government officials in Seattle. Each one had the return address: 1635 Alder St, Seattle, Washington. A check by an alert postal employee revealed that there is no such address in Seattle. This employee also stated that she believed the sender was a Middle Eastern man who paid in cash for the postage. The packages were given to the Seattle police who treated them as if they might be package bombs, which indeed they were. They were set off in a vacant field managed by the police for such purposes.

10) ~~Report Date April 18, 2003.~~ FBI: A routine check of security at the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE] reveals some anomalies in background checks of several persons who now hold vendor's IDs that allow them access to the NYSE provided that they are accompanied by security guards. (i) A man named Steven Clark, employed by the City Computer Services Corp. failed, in his application for a NYSE vendor's ID, to report his arrest and conviction [12 December, 2001] on a charge of assault and battery. He served six months in jail and is now out on probation. (ii) Shiela Watson, employed by the Clark & Co. Office Supplies Co., gave her current home address on her application for a vendor's ID as: 1631 Webster Ave., The Bronx, NYC. There is no one by the name Shiela Watson at this residence. (iii) A man named Mark Davis, reported age 32 years, obtained a social security card and a New York State Driver's license in 1999 using a birth certificate now believed to have been forged. He is employed by Empire State Vending Services in Manhattan and he services vending machines such as coffee, soft drink, and candy machines. He lists his home address as: 2462 Myrtle Ave. Apt. 307, Queens, NYC.

11) ~~Report Date 18 April, 2003.~~ FBI: An INS check of expired student visas reveals the names Mukhtar Galab and Yasein Mosed. They have been enrolled at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. Checks with the University of Virginia reveal that these two persons have not attended any classes for the past two semesters. The address they both gave to the University of Virginia is 2932 University Drive, Charlottesville, VA. There is presently no one living at this address. A check with mobile phone providers shows that a Sprint cell phone # 804- 774-8920 is registered in the name Mukhtar Galab.

12) ~~Report Date 19 April, 2003.~~ FBI: In an interview with Shiela Watson, she said she simply made a mistake in listing her home address on her NYSE vendors' ID application. She had recently moved and gave her earlier address by mistake.

13) ~~Report Date 20 April, 2003.~~ FBI: Also listing 2462 Myrtle Ave. Apt. 307, Queens, NYC as his home address is Bagwant Dhaliwal, who is also employed by Empire State Vending Services in Manhattan.

14) ~~Report Date 20 April, 2003.~~ FBI: Security officers at O'Hare airport in Chicago, Illinois arrested two American Airlines baggage handlers named Omar Clark and Joseph Nizar. They were observed opening

luggage that was about to be transferred from a United Connector flight from Green Bay, Wisconsin to a United flight into New York City. Their backgrounds are now being investigated by the FBI.

15) Report Date 20 April, 2003. FBI: Mukhtar Galab has an account at the Virginia National Bank in Charlottesville, VA. Bank records say he has deposited several checks in the last three months, totaling \$13,000, drawn on account number 1070173749003 held by Abdul Ramazi at the First Union Bank in Springfield, VA.

16) Report Date 22 April, 2003. FBI: Hani al Hallak, of North Bergen NJ, has deposited checks in his bank account that were drawn on First Union Bank account number 1070173749003 in Springfield VA in the name Abdul Ramazi. The latest check is dated 16 April, 2003 and was in the amount of \$8500.

17) Report Date 22 April, 2003. FBI: There is no residence with address 1631 Capitol Ave. in Richmond, Virginia. The phone number given for this address [804-759-6302] is in fact a Sprint cell phone registered in the name Faysai Goba.

18) ~~Report dated 25 April, 2003.~~ FBI: A U-Haul truck was found abandoned on Colfax Avenue in Denver, Colorado not far from the Camp George West Military Reservation. The truck had two blown front tires. Examination of the truck's contents revealed 16 land mines. The U-haul rental Agency in Denver was contacted and they reported that this truck had been rented in Denver on 20 April, 2003 by a man who used, as identification, a Colorado driver's license in the name Masood Yaser. The address on this license is: 1660 Coal Mine Road, Apartment 206. The owner of this apartment complex stated on 22 April, 2003 that Masood Yaser had rented Apartment # 206, but had left one week ago and did not leave a forwarding address.

19) Report Date 25 April, 2003. FBI: A report from AMTRAK reveals a reservation, paid in cash in Charlottesville, and made by Faysal Goba on 23 April, 2003. Reservation is for three one-way first class tickets and one sleeping compartment from Charlottesville, VA to Atlanta, GA on 29 April, 2003. Reservation is on AMTRAK Train # 19, which runs between Penn Station NYC and New Orleans, LA. Reservations are in the names: Faysal Goba, Mukhtar Galab and Yasein Mosed.

20) Report Date 26 April, 2003. FBI: A check of rented storage facilities in the Richmond and Charlottesville areas reveals that a man giving his name as Abdulla Ramzi rented storage unit # 174 on 10 April, 2003 at the Budget Storage Units in Keswick, VA. Ramzi gave his address as 2932 University Drive, Charlottesville, VA. Ramzi paid in cash for a month's rental.

21) Report Date 26 April, 2003. Coast Guard intelligence to FBI and CIA: A routine reporting of ships bound for the USA. This report contains departure date/place, destination, cargo manifest and crew roster and is required 96 hours before arrival in ports in the USA. Report from Amsterdam on 25 April, 2003 lists one container ship bound for the US, the Holland Queen, which is bound for Boston. Arrival time in Boston of the Holland Queen is 29 April, 1930hrs.

22) Report Date 27 April, 2003. FBI: A photo of the man using the name Mark Davis was examined by a representative of the Canadian police in NYC. The Canadian police investigator identified the man in the photo to be Hamid Alwan, a Saudi who overstayed a travel visa and is wanted by the police in Canada. It is now known that Alwan received explosives training in the Sudan and in Afghanistan.

23) ~~Report Date 27 April, 2003.~~ FBI: A man named Carl Louis, whose residence is at 3410 Van Dyke Avenue in Detroit Michigan, was arrested by Detroit police for helping foreigners obtain Michigan drivers' licenses using forged documents. Carl Louis is specifically charged with providing forged documents for a Lebanese national named Abdelhak Kherbane, who was arrested in connection with the attempted bombing on 2 April of the Beth Israel synagogue in Detroit, Michigan.

24) Report Date 27 April, 2003. FBI: In an examination of storage unit #174 at the Budget Storage Units in Keswick, VA, fifty pounds of C-4 plastic explosive were found along with some fusing devices.

CIA FOLDER:

1) ~~Report Date: 1 April, 2003.~~ CIA [From **MI5**]: On 30 March, 2003 the British Special Branch arrested Omar Bakri Qatada at his home at #11 St. Mary's Terrace, Paddington, London. Found in Qatada's bedroom was a small carton holding 10 ounces of Pentaerythritol[PETN] and Triacetone Triperoxide [TATP]. This is the same explosive that Richard Reid attempted to use on American Airlines #63 from Paris to Miami on 22 December, 2001. The BSB were alerted to follow and detain Qatada on the basis of information obtained from a respected moderate Moslem cleric in London, whose name was not provided in this report from MI5.

2) ~~Report Date: 9 April, 2003.~~ CIA [From a detainee at Guantanamo, Cuba who has given the name Abdul **al** Hada]: During an interview with CIA officers in March of 2003, **al** Hada is reported to have said: "In April 2003 there is not such good weather for flying". Asked what he meant by this statement, the detainee said: "That's for you to figure out". The detainee would not elaborate further.

3) ~~Report Date 12 April, 2003.~~ CIA From French Intelligence: Acting on a tip from an unnamed source, French police arrested an Egyptian named Muhammad Shamzai at his home at 16 Rue St. Sebastien in Paris on 8 April, 2002. In his home police found 200 US and 180 British blank passports. In addition, on the hard drive of Shamzi's laptop computer was a record of a US and British passports that Shamzi had apparently forged. One of these passports was made out in the name Masood Yaser, whose address was listed as 1660 Coal Mine Road, Apartment 206, Denver, Colorado, USA. Another US passport forged was in the name Vincent Lozario, 2229 Marshall Avenue. Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA. A third forged US passport was in the name Khalfan **Maulid**, 656 Laurel Avenue, Bowling Green, Kentucky, USA.

4) ~~Report Date 14 April, 2003.~~ CIA: From an interrogation of a cooperative detainee in Guantanamo. Detainee says he trained daily with a man named Ziad **al** Shihb at an Al Qaeda explosives training facility in the Sudan in 1994. From a captured laptop computer in Afghanistan it is learned that Ziad **al** Shihb holds a United Arab Emirates passport in the name Faysal Goba. INS check reveals that a Faysal Goba, from the United Arab Emirates, entered the USA on a travel visa in January of 2003 stating that he would be visiting a person named Clark Webster in Richmond, Va. The contact address given by Goba was: 1631 Capitol Ave., Richmond VA; phone number: 804-759-6302.

5) ~~Report Date 20 April, 2003.~~ CIA: On 19 April, a car bomb was set off near the American Diplomatic Mission Headquarters in Buenos Aires. There were no casualties since the bomb seems to have gone off prematurely. The driver of the car carrying the bomb **survived**. He has been identified as Jamil Musawi, who is known to be a member of Hezbollah. This organization has had a presence in several Latin American countries.

6) ~~Report Date 22 April, 2003.~~ CIA From German Intelligence: On 20 April, 2003, German intelligence reported that a container chosen at random for inspection at the docks in Bremerhaven, Germany contained a crate in which there were four Stinger missiles. The box was addressed to **Marvel** Corporation, 1632 Trenton Avenue, Trenton, New Jersey, USA. The shipper's address was given as: 16 Rhineland **Platz.**, Hamburg, Germany. German intelligence advises that there is no such address in Hamburg. The serial numbers on the four Stinger missiles identifies them as being from among the nearly 400 Stinger missiles, now missing, which were given in the late 1980s to **Taliban** fighters in Afghanistan.

7) ~~Report Date 22 April, 2003.~~ CIA [From Dutch Security]: Two men were arrested on April 20, 2003 by Dutch police in Haarlem, The Netherlands after leaving the scene of an accident in which they were involved. Later on April 21, 2003 these men were identified as Tawfiq **al** Adel and Saeed **Khallad** who have been wanted in Hamburg, Germany in connection with investigations of Al Qaeda operations in Europe. They were driving a panel truck rented in Hamburg, Germany. Radioactive traces were found in bed of this truck.

8) ~~Report Date 24 April, 2003.~~ CIA [From Dutch Security]: An address in Haarlem was found in the truck driven by **Tawfiq al** Adal and Saeed **Khallad**. This address is for an apartment rented in Haarlem by, two Saudi's who hold Dutch passports. Jelte Nijboer [the apartment owner] says they **also** rent storage

unit # 206. The two men al Ahdal and bin Attash are employed as container loaders at Sealink Container Corp. in Amsterdam. This corporation owns a large fleet of containers that are shipped all over the world and subsequently hauled on trains or trucks. Inspection of unit # 206 on 23 April, 2003 reveals radiation traces, one pair of lead gloves, and two sticks of TNT. Also found are pieces of a wooden crate. Pieces of this crate, also revealing radioactive traces, are labeled and identify a company in Lublin, Poland.

9) Report date 25 April, 2003. CIA [From Dutch security]: Analysis of radioactive particles found in truck driven by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad, and in the storage unit rented by Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash, reveals them to be powdered cesium 137. One ounce of this substance could spread radioactive fallout over 60 city blocks.

SANCTIONED INTERCEPTS FOLDER:

1) Report Date ~~10 April, 2003~~. Intercept of a mobile phone message on 6 April, 2003 from 706-437-6673 to 713-556-9213. The first number was traced to a resident of Columbus, Georgia whose address is: 2237 St. Mary's Road. The resident at this address, Ralph Goode, claims that his mobile phone was recently stolen from his car, a matter he says he reported on 30 March, 2003 to the Columbus police. The Columbus police verified this account. The second number was traced to 2339 Little York Rd., Apt 7 in Houston, Texas. The caller from 706-437-6673, speaking in Arabic, said [when translated]: "What you need will be found in the usual place". The second number was listed by Sprint PCS as belonging to a Jamal Kalifa.

2) Report Date 20 April, 2003: Intercept of phone calls made from 718-352-8479 at 2462 Myrtle Ave. Apt. 307, Queens. NYC revealed several calls to a phone 732-455-6392 in North Bergen, New Jersey. listed in the name of Hani al-Hallak, who manages a carpet store. In the latest call, the caller from 2462 Myrtle Ave. Apt. 307, Queens, NYC announced that he would pick up the carpet he ordered on April 25, 2003.

3) Report Date 21 April, 2003: Frequent recent phone calls from 703-659-2317 to the following numbers: 804-759-6302 [Richmond, VA., listed in the name Clark Webster]; 804-774-8920 [Charlottesville, VA, listed in the name Mukhtar Galab]; 718-352-8479 [Queens, NYC, listed in the name Bagwant Dhaliwal. Two overseas calls were made to 011207670734 [Amsterdam, The Netherlands, listed in the name Hans Pakes].

4) Report Date 24 April, 2003. Phone calls on 22 April, 2003 from 703-659-2317 to the following numbers: 804-759-6302; 804-774-8920; 718-352-8479; and 011207670734. The same brief voice message was given in Arabic in each call. A translation of this message reads: "I will be in my office on April 30 at 9:00AM. Try to be on time".

IV. RELEVANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

The following intelligence reports contain the relevant "dots" or "trifles" that will lead to inferences about the true capabilities and intentions of the terrorists whose activities are the subject of this assignment. The following reports are categorized by source, as they will be given to the students. In addition, the numbering of the reports corresponds to the numbering of the reports in the collection of reports to be given the students.

FBI Folder:

1) **Report Date: 1 April, 2003.** FBI: Abdui Ramazi is the owner of the Select Gourmet Foods shop in Springfield Mall, Springfield, VA. [Phone number 703-659-2317]. First Union National Bank lists Select Gourmet Foods as holding account number 1070173749003. Six checks totaling \$35,000 have been deposited in this account in the past four months and are recorded as having been drawn on accounts at the Pyramid Bank of Cairo, Egypt and the Central Bank of Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Both of these banks have just been listed as possible conduits in money laundering schemes.

2) **Report Date: 5 April, 2003.** FBI: Passport control at Dulles Airport in Wash DC records that Abdul Ramazi, holder of US passport # 177183634 [issued by Passport Agency, Wash. DC on 12 Feb. 1997] has made three trips to Amsterdam, two trips to Hamburg, Germany, and three trips to Cairo, Egypt in the last five months. The address given by Ramazi on his passport is 1176 Floyd Ave., Springfield, VA. Phone number at this address is 703-734-0104.

7) **Report Date 15 April, 2003.** FBI: The Powhatan Company is a manufacturer of military explosives of various types, including C-4. It is located just outside of Keswick, Virginia. On 11 April, 2003 this company reported that 200 pounds of C-4 could not be accounted for during a recent inventory.

10) **Report Date April 18, 2003.** FBI: A routine check of security at the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE] reveals some anomalies in background checks of several persons who now hold vendor's IDs that allow them access to the NYSE provided that they are accompanied by security guards. (i) A man named Steven Clark, employed by the City Computer Services Corp. failed, in his application for a NYSE vendor's ID, to report his arrest and conviction [12 December, 2001] on a charge of assault and battery. He served six months in jail and is now out on probation. (ii) Shiela Watson, employed by the Clark & Co. Office Supplies Co., gave her current home address on her application for a vendor's ID as: 1631 Webster Ave., The Bronx, NYC. There is no one by the name Shiela Watson at this residence. (iii) A man named Mark Davis, reported age 32 years, obtained a social security card and a New York State Driver's license in 1999 using a birth certificate now believed to have been forged. He is employed by Empire State Vending Services in Manhattan and he services vending machines such as coffee, soft drink, and candy machines. He lists his home address as: 2462 Myrtle Ave. Apt. 307, Queens, NYC. NOTE: Only item # (iii) is relevant in this report.

11) **Report Date 18 April, 2003.** FBI: An INS check of expired student visas reveals the names Mukhtar Galab and Yasein Mosed. They have been enrolled at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. Checks with the University of Virginia reveal that these two persons have not attended any classes for the past two semesters. The address they both gave to the University of Virginia is 2932 University Drive, Charlottesville, VA. There is presently no one living at this address. A check with mobile phone providers shows that a Sprint cell phone # 804- 774-8920 is registered in the name Mukhtar Galab.

15) **Report Date 20 April, 2003:** FBI: Mukhtar Galab has an account at the Virginia National Bank in Charlottesville, VA. Bank records say he has deposited several checks in the last three months, totaling \$13,000, drawn on account number 1070173749003 held by Abdul Ramazi at the First Union Bank in Springfield, VA.

16) Report Date 22 April, 2003. FBI: Hani al Hallak, of North Bergen NJ, has deposited checks in his bank account that were drawn on First Union Bank account number 1070173749003 in Springfield VA in the name Abdul Ramazi. The latest check is dated 16 April, 2003 and was in the amount of \$8500.

17) Report Date 22 April, 2003. FBI: There is no residence with address 1631 Capitol Ave. in Richmond, Virginia. The phone number given for this address [804-759-6302] is in fact a Sprint cell phone registered in the name Faysal Goba.

19) Report Date 25 April, 2003. FBI: A report from AMTRAK reveals a reservation, paid in cash in Charlottesville, and made by Faysal Goba on 23 April, 2003. Reservation is for three one-way first class tickets and one sleeping compartment from Charlottesville, VA to Atlanta, GA on 29 April, 2003. Reservation is on AMTRAK Train # 19, which runs between Penn Station NYC and New Orleans, LA. Reservations are in the names: Faysal Goba, Mukhtar Galab and Yasein Mosed.

20) Report Date 26 April, 2003. FBI: A check of rented storage facilities in the Richmond and Charlottesville areas reveals that a man giving his name as Abdulla Ramzi rented storage unit # 174 on 10 April, 2003 at the Budget Storage Units in Keswick, VA. Ramzi gave his address as 2932 University Drive, Charlottesville, VA. Ramzi paid in cash for a month's rental.

21) Report Date 26 April, 2003. Coast Guard Intelligence to FBI and CIA: A routine reporting of ships bound for the USA. This report contains departure date/place, destination, cargo manifest and crew roster and is required 96 hours before arrival in ports in the USA. Report from Amsterdam on 25 April, 2003 lists one container ship bound for the US, the Holland Queen, which is bound for Boston. Arrival time in Boston of the Holland Queen is 29 April, 1930hrs.

22) Report Date 27 April, 2003. FBI: A photo of the man using the name Mark Davis was examined by a representative of the Canadian police in NYC. The Canadian police investigator identified the man in the photo to be Hamid Alwan, a Saudi who overstayed a travel visa and is wanted by the police in Canada. It is now known that Alwan received explosives training in the Sudan and in Afghanistan.

24) Report Date 27 April, 2003. In an examination of storage unit #174 at the Budget Storage Units in Keswick, VA, fifty pounds of C-4 plastic explosive were found along with some fusing devices.

25) Report Date 27 April, 2003. FBI [From police in North Bergen, NJ]: In the early morning hours of April 26, 2003 a passerby reported a fire in a carpet shop that is managed by a Hani al Hallak of North Bergen. The fire seems to have been started the night before when someone tossed a cigarette butt into a waste basket in the basement of the shop. While firemen were extinguishing the blaze, they discovered several cartons labeled: PRIVATE: DO NOT OPEN. These cartons contained C-4 explosive. Attempts to reach Hani al Hallak have not been successful. An employee at the carpet shop later told police that al Hallak had just gone on a vacation in Canada and that he had left no address.

CIA Folder:

4) Report Date 14 April, 2003. CIA: From an interrogation of a cooperative detainee in Guantanamo. Detainee says he trained daily with a man named Ziad al Shibh at an Al Qaeda explosives training facility in the Sudan in 1994. From a captured laptop computer in Afghanistan it is learned that Ziad al Shibh holds a United Arab Emirates passport in the name Faysal Goba. INS check reveals that a Faysal Goba, from the United Arab Emirates, entered the USA on a travel visa in January of 2003 stating that he would be visiting a person named Clark Webster in Richmond, Va. The contact address given by Goba was: 1631 Capitol Ave., Richmond VA; phone number: 804-759-6302.

7) Report Date 22 April, 2003. CIA [From Dutch Security]: Two men were arrested on April 20, 2003 by Dutch police in Haarlem, The Netherlands after leaving the scene of an accident in which they were involved. Later on April 21, 2003 these men were identified as Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad who have been wanted in Hamburg, Germany in connection with investigations of Al Qaeda operations in

Europe. They were driving a panel truck rented in Hamburg, Germany. Radioactive traces were found in bed of this truck.

8) Report Date 24 April, 2003. CIA [From Dutch Security]: An address in Haarlem was found in the truck driven by Tawfiq al Adal and Saeed Khallad. This address is for an apartment rented in Haarlem by, two Saudi's who hold Dutch passports. Jelte Nijboer [the apartment owner] says they also rent storage unit # 206. The two men al Ahdal and bin Attash are employed as container loaders at Sealink Container Corp. in Amsterdam. This corporation owns a large fleet of containers that are shipped all over the world and subsequently hauled on trains or trucks. Inspection of unit # 206 on 23 April, 2003 reveals radiation traces, one pair of lead gloves, and two sticks of TNT. Also found are pieces of a wooden crate. Pieces of this crate, also revealing radioactive traces, are labeled and identify a company in Lublin, Poland.

9) Report date 25 April, 2003. CIA [From Dutch security]: Analysis of radioactive particles found in truck driven by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad, and in the storage unit rented by Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash, reveals them to be powdered cesium 137. One ounce of this substance could spread radioactive fallout over 60 city blocks.

10) Report Date 27 April, 2003. CIA: The Holland Queen crew roster lists a person named Hans Pakes as being aboard the Holland Queen. Pakes works in the ship's galley. From an Al Qaeda laptop computer captured in Afghanistan there is a roster of trainees in an explosives training unit in Kandahar. 1996. Abu al Masri, a Yemeni's listed on this roster. The record says he left for The Netherlands in January 1996. He is using the alias: Hans Pakes.

11) Report Date 27 April, 2003. CIA: From a laptop computer captured in Afghanistan it was learned that a Pakistani named Sahim Albakri, who fought with the Taliban in 1990 - 1992, travels using an Indian passport in the name Bagwant Dhaliwal. On this same computer was found the name Muhammed bin Harazi, who served with the Taliban from 1987 - 1993. Records on this computer reveal that Muhammed bin Harazi entered the USA in March, 1993 and uses the alias Abdul Ramazi.

Sanctioned Intercepts Folder:

2) Report Date 20 April, 2003: Intercept of phone calls made from 718-352-8479 at 2462 Myrtle Ave. Apt. 307, Queens, NYC revealed several calls to a phone 732-455-6392 in North Bergen, New Jersey, listed in the name of Hani al-Hallak, who manages a carpet store. In the latest call, the caller from 2462 Myrtle Ave. Apt. 307, Queens, NYC announced that he would pick up the carpet he ordered on April 25, 2003.

3) Report Date 21 April, 2003: Frequent recent phone calls from 703-659-2317 to the following numbers: 804-759-6302 [Richmond, VA, listed in the name Clark Webster]; 804-774-8920 [Charlottesville, VA, listed in the name Mukhtar Galab]; 718-352-8479 [Queens, NYC, listed in the name Bagwant Dhaliwal. Two overseas calls were made to 011207670734 [Amsterdam, The Netherlands, listed in the name Hans Pakes].

4) Report Date 24 April, 2003. Phone calls on 22 April, 2003 from 703-659-2317 to the following numbers: 804-759-6302; 804-774-8920; 718-352-8479; and 011207670734. The same brief voice message was given in Arabic in each call. A translation of this message reads: "I will be in my office on April 30 at 9:00AM. Try to be on time".

5) Report Date 27 April, 2003. Intercept of cell phone 804-774-8920. In a very brief call from this number to phone number 703-659-2317 on 26 April, 2003, the caller speaks in Arabic. A translation reads: "We are now prepared to take the crescent to victory".

V. IRRELEVANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS [DETRACTORS]

The following intelligence reports contain the "dots" or "trifles" that will lead us nowhere as far as the true capabilities and intentions of the terrorists whose activities are the subject of this assignment. The following reports are categorized by source, as they will be given to the students. In addition, the numbering of the reports corresponds to the numbering of the reports in the collection of reports to be given the students.

FBI Folder:

3) Report Date: 8 April, 2003. FBI: On 7 April, 2003 at 0600 hrs. Police began tailing a panel truck rented from Ryder Truck Rental in Culver City, California. According to Ryder, this truck was rented on 1 April, 2003 by a man who gave the name Karim Bensaid. Bensaid showed a California drivers' license and gave his home address as 452 Hubbard St. in Culver City. Bensaid told the Ryder sales agent that he would need a small truck for two days to move some items of furniture from Culver City to San Gabriel, California. When the truck was still not returned on 6 April, the Ryder agent notified Los Angeles police who, in turn, notified the FBI. On 6 April, 2003 an alert LA police officer noticed the truck parked in front of an apartment complex on Greenlawn Ave. in Culver City. On 7 April, two men were observed to enter this rental truck. They drove south on US 405 and exited right at Imperial Highway. They then turned left on Sheldon St. and stopped at the City Park in El Segundo, California. At this point the two men were apprehended by police and FBI agents. In the truck were found two pairs of binoculars, maps of the Los Angeles area, and flight schedules to and from LAX.

4) Report Date 13 April, 2003. FBI from Army CID: A man who gave his name as Wallace Wilson was arrested at 1730hrs on 10 April, 2003 at Camp George West Military Reservation in Denver, Colorado. Wilson was able to obtain access to this military reservation using personal identification in the form of a Colorado driver's license and a Social Security card. He also used identification for the truck he was driving that is owned by his employer, the Apex Paper Products Company in Denver, Colorado. This company has a contract to supply paper products to Camp George West. A man by the name Wallace Wilson is known to be a member of a domestic militia group known as Aryan Nations. Wilson was arrested by MPs when he was seen loading boxes on his Apex truck. The boxes were being taken from an apparently unlocked storage facility at Camp George West. The boxes contained 50 Cal ammunition and several land mines.

5) Report Date 13 April, 2003. FBI from Border Patrol in El Paso, Texas: Border patrol agents in Hudspeth County, Texas reported that on the night of 10 Apr 1, 2003, they apprehended two men, whom they first believed to be Mexicans, crossing the Rio Grande river near McNary, Texas. As they were being interrogated at the McNary police station, it was discovered that each man carried \$20,000 in cash. The two men, when interrogated, spoke no Spanish but had Texas drivers' licenses made out in the names Vincent Cortez and Arnaldo Gueterrez. The address given on both licenses was: 1212 McRae Blvd, El Paso, Texas. They also had one-way tickets on an American Airlines flight from El Paso to Houston, Texas, scheduled to leave El Paso on 16 April, 2003. An investigation made of the residence at 1212 McRae Blvd. in El Paso revealed that it was occupied by two men named Ben Hassine and Ahmed Yassin, both of whom claim to be students at the University of Texas at El Paso.

6) Report Date 15 April, 2003. FBI Special report: Dr. Clark Adams, a Middle Eastern expert whose office is at the Pentagon, was last seen on 13 April, 2003 after he left his home at 1830hrs for the Home Depot store on Lee Highway in Merrifield, VA. Dr. Adams's family could give no explanation for his disappearance. The FBI is treating his disappearance as a possible case of abduction.

8) Report Date 15 April, 2003. FBI from INS: Two men were arrested on 14 April, 2003 at Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas. They are identified as Jamal Kalifa and Abul Hassan Salman. They both attempted to purchase airline tickets using Dutch passports that are believed to have been forged in Paris, France. The tickets they attempted to purchase were on Continental Airlines flight #458 from Bush Intercontinental in Houston to Reagan National Airport in Washington, DC.

9) Reort Date 16 April, 2003. FBI Special Report: In Seattle, Washington on 15 April, 2003 a US Post Office on Howell St. reported that six identical packages, each marked "Home Made Candies", were sent to state government officials in Seattle. Each one had the return address: 1635 Alder St, Seattle, Washington. A check by an alert postal employee revealed that there is no such address in Seattle. This employee also stated that she believed the sender was a Middle Eastern man who paid in cash for the postage. The packages were given to the Seattle police who treated them as if they might be package bombs, which indeed they were. They were set off in a vacant field managed by the police for such purposes.

10) Report Date April 18, 2003. FBI: A routine check of security at the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE] reveals some anomalies in background checks of several persons who now hold vendor's IDs that allow them access to the NYSE provided that they are accompanied by security guards. (i) A man named Steven Clark, employed by the City Computer Services Corp. failed, in his application for a NYSE vendor's ID, to report his arrest and conviction [12 December, 2001] on a charge of assault and battery. He served six months in jail and is now out on probation. (ii) Shiela Watson, employed by the Clark & Co. Office Supplies Co., gave her current home address on her application for a vendor's ID as: 1631 Webster Ave., The Bronx, NYC. There is no one by the name Shiela Watson at this residence.

12) Report Date 19 April, 2003. FBI: In an interview with Shiela Watson, she said she simply made a mistake in listing her home address on her NYSE vendors' ID application. She had recently moved and gave her earlier address by mistake.

14) Report Date 20 April, 2003. FBI: Security officers at O'Hare airport in Chicago, Illinois arrested two American Airlines baggage handlers named Omar Clark and Joseph Nizar. They were observed opening luggage that was about to be transferred from a United Connector flight from Green Bay, Wisconsin to a United flight into New York City. Their backgrounds are now being investigated by the FBI.

18) Reort dated 25 April, 2003. FBI: A U-Haul truck was found abandoned on Colfax Avenue in Denver, Colorado not far from the Camp George West Military Reservation. The truck had two blown front tires. Examination of the truck's contents revealed 16 land mines. The U-haul rental Agency in Denver was contacted and they reported that this truck had been rented in Denver on 20 April, 2003 by a man who used, as identification, a Colorado driver's license in the name Masood Yaser. The address on this license is: 1660 Coal Mine Road, Apartment 206. The owner of this apartment complex stated on 22 April, 2003 that Masood Yaser had rented Apartment # 206, but had left one week ago and did not leave a forwarding address.

23) Reort Date 27 April, 2003. FBI: A man named Carl Louis, whose residence is at 3410 Van Dyke Avenue in Detroit Michigan, was arrested by Detroit police for helping foreigners obtain Michigan drivers' licenses using forged documents. Carl Louis is specifically charged with providing forged documents for a Lebanese national named Abdelhak Kherbane, who was arrested in connection with the attempted bombing on 2 April of the Beth Israel synagogue in Detroit, Michigan.

CIA Folder:

1) Reort Date: 1 April, 2003. CIA [From MI5]: On 30 March, 2003 the British Special Branch arrested Omar Bakri Qatada at his home at #11 St. Mary's Terrace, Paddington, London. Found in Qatada's bedroom was a small carton holding 10 ounces of Pentaerythritol [PETN] and Triacetone Triperoxide [TATP]. This is the same explosive that Richard Reid attempted to use on American Airlines #63 from Paris to Miami on 22 December, 2001. The BSB were alerted to follow and detain Qatada on the basis of information obtained from a respected moderate Moslem cleric in London, whose name was not provided in this report from MI5.

2) Report Date: 9 April, 2003. CIA [From a detainee at Guantanamo, Cuba who has given the name Abdul al Hada]: During an interview with CIA officers in March of 2003, al Hada is reported to have said:

"In April 2003 there is not such good weather for flying". Asked what he meant by this statement, the detainee said: "That's for you to figure out". The detainee would not elaborate further.

3) **Report Date 12 April, 2003.** CIA From French Intelligence: Acting on a tip from an unnamed source, French police arrested an Egyptian named Muhammad Shamzai at his home at 16 Rue St. Sebastien in Paris on 8 April, 2002. In his home police found 200 US and 180 British blank passports. In addition, on the hard drive of Shamzi's laptop computer was a record of a US and British passports that Shamzi had apparently forged. One of these passports was made out in the name Masood Yaser, whose address was listed as 1660 Coal Mine Road, Apartment 206, Denver, Colorado, USA. Another US passport forged was in the name Vincent Lozario, 2229 Marshall Avenue, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA. A third forged US passport was in the name Khalfan Maulid, 656 Laurel Avenue, Bowling Green, Kentucky, USA.

5) **Report Date 20 April, 2003.** CIA: On 19 April, a car bomb was set off near the American Diplomatic Mission Headquarters in Buenos Aires. There were no casualties since the bomb seems to have gone off prematurely. The driver of the car carrying the bomb survived. He has been identified as Jamil Musawi, who is known to be a member of Hezbollah. This organization has had a presence in several Latin American countries.

6) **Report Date 22 April, 2003:** CIA From German Intelligence: On 20 April, 2003, German intelligence reported that a container chosen at random for inspection at the docks in Bremerhaven, Germany contained a crate in which there were four Stinger missiles. The box was addressed to Marvel Corporation, 1632 Trenton Avenue, Trenton, New Jersey, USA. The shipper's address was given as: 16 Rhineland Platz., Hamburg, Germany. German intelligence advises that there is no such address in Hamburg. The serial numbers on the four Stinger missiles identifies them as being from among the nearly 400 Stinger missiles, now missing, that were given in the late 1980s to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

Sanctioned Intercepts Folder:

1) **Report Date 10 April, 2003.** Intercept of a mobile phone message on 6 April, 2003 from 706-437-6673 to 713-556-9213. The first number was traced to a resident of Columbus, Georgia whose address is: 2237 St. Mary's Road. The resident at this address, Ralph Goode, claims that his mobile phone was recently stolen from his car, a matter he says he reported on 30 March, 2003 to the Columbus police. This account was verified by the Columbus police. The second number was traced to 2339 Little York Rd., Apt 7 in Houston, Texas. The caller from 706-437-6673, speaking in Arabic, said [when translated]: "What you need will be found in the usual place". The second number was listed by Sprint PCS as belonging to a Jamal Kalifa.

VI. TASK ALERTS

The following intelligence reports, called "Task Alerts" are to be given to the students following their deliberation on the initial set of reports we provide for them. This will constitute the dynamic feature of this Assignment 4. All of these Task Alerts provide relevant "dots" or "trifles" and should either cause the students to revise the hypotheses they have generated or to strengthen the hypothesis we hope they are considering. The following listing includes the source folder in which they should be included.

FBI Folder:

Report Date 27 April, 2003. FBI [From police in North Bergen, NJ]: In the early morning hours of April 26, 2003 a passerby reported a fire in a carpet shop that is managed by a Hani al Hallak of North Bergen. The fire seems to have been started the night before when someone tossed a cigarette butt into a waste basket in the basement of the shop. While firemen were extinguishing the blaze, they discovered several cartons labeled: PRIVATE: DO NOT OPEN. These cartons contained C-4 explosive. Attempts to reach Hani al Hallak have not been successful. An employee at the carpet shop later told police that al Hallak had just gone on a vacation in Canada and that he had left no address.

CIA Folder:

Report Date 27 April, 2003. CIA: The Holland Queen crew roster lists a person named Hans Pakes as being aboard the Holland Queen. Pakes works in the ship's galley. From an Al Qaeda laptop computer captured in Afghanistan there is a roster of trainees in an explosives training unit in Kandahar, 1996. Abu al Masri, a Yemeni is listed on this roster. The record says he left for The Netherlands in January 1996. He is using the alias: Hans Pakes.

Report Date 27 April, 2003. CIA: From a laptop computer captured in Afghanistan it was learned that a Pakistani named Sahim Albakri, who fought with the Taliban in 1990 - 1992, travels using an Indian passport in the name Bagwant Dhaliwal. On this same computer was found the name Muhammed bin Harazi, who served with the Taliban from 1987 - 1993. Records on this computer reveal that Muhammed bin Harazi entered the USA in March, 1993 and uses the alias Abdul Ramazi.

Sanctioned Intercepts Folder:

Report Date 27 April, 2003. Intercept of cell phone 804-774-8920. In a very brief call from this number to phone number 703-659-2317 on 26 April, 2003, the caller speaks in Arabic. A translation reads: "We are now prepared to take the crescent to victory".

VII. "DOTS" OR "TRIFLES"

Here is an account of the "dots" or "trifles" that result when the relevant intelligence reports are parsed. One thing to note is that the parsing of any report is an entirely subjective process. Different persons might parse the same report in different ways. In some cases we have combined dots/trifles in the following listing. Another matter concerns the use of these parsed dots or trifles in our Wigmorean argument construction. Even though we have listed the reports from which these dots or trifles come from as being relevant, not every one of the following dots or trifles need to be charted separately. In some cases we simply combined some of these trifles in our charting of the arguments bearing on the major hypothesis in this fourth assignment. Finally, the dots or trifles we have charted form the basic intelligence evidence we have taken as being relevant on the major hypothesis in this assignment.

Action 1 [Boston]

- The container ship, the Holland Queen, left Amsterdam on 25 April, 2003 and is bound for Boston, MA.
- The Holland Queen will arrive Boston, MA on 29 April, 2003 at 1930hrs.
- Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad were arrested by Dutch police in Haarlem, The Netherlands, on 20 April, 2003 for leaving the scene of an accident in which they were involved.
- Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad are involved in Al Qaeda operations in Hamburg, Germany.
- The bed of the panel truck Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad were driving when they were arrested contained radioactive traces.
- An address found in the truck driven by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad was for an apartment in Haarlem rented by Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash.
- Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash are employed as container loaders by the Sealink Container Corp. in Amsterdam.
- Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash have rented storage unit # 206 in their apartment complex.
- Inspection on 23 April, 2003 of the Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash traces of radiation, two sticks of TNT, one pair of lead gloves, and pieces of a wooden crate.
- The pieces of the wooden crate, also revealed radiation traces
- The wooden crate was traced to a company operating in Lublin, Poland.
- Analysis of the radiation traces found in the truck driven by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad reveals them to be powdered cesium 137.
- Analysis of the radiation traces in the storage unit rented by Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash revealed them to be powdered cesium 137.
- The Holland Queen crew roster lists a person named Hans Pakes.
- Hans Pakes works in the galley of the Holland Queen.
- A roster of trainees in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1996 lists the name of a Yemeni named Abu al Masri.
- Abu al Masri received explosives training in Kandahar, Afghanistan in
- Abu al Masri left for The Netherlands in January, 1996 in 1996.
- Abu al Masri uses the alias Hans Pakes.

Action 2 [Atlanta]

- The Powhatan Company, located in Keswick, VA, manufactures explosives for the military.
- On 11 April, 2003 Powhatan reported to FBI that 200 pounds of C-4 could not be accounted for during a recent inventory.
- Mukhtar Galab holds an expired student visa.
- Mukhtar Galab has been enrolled at UVA
- Mukhtar Galab has not attended classes at UVA for the past two semesters.
- Mukhtar Galab lists his home address as 2932 University Drive, Charlottesville VA.
- Mukhtar Galab has a Sprint cell phone having number 804-774-8920.
- Yasein Mosed holds an expired student visa."
- Yasein Mosed has been enrolled at UVA
- Yasein Mosed has not attended classes at UVA for the past two semesters.
- Yasein Mosed lists his home address as 2932 University Drive, Charlottesville VA.
- There is presently no one living at 2932 University Drive, Charlottesville, VA
- Mukhtar Galab has an account at the VA National Bank in Charlottesville. VA.
- In the last three months several checks totaling \$13,000, drawn on account number 1070173749003 held by Abdul Ramazi at the First Union Bank in Springfield, VA., have been deposited in Galab's account.
- A person using the name Faysal Goba holds a UAI passport.
- Goba entered the USA on a travel visa in January 2003.
- Ziad al Shibh trained at an explosives training facility in the Sudan in 1994.
- Ziad al Shibh is using as an alias the name Faysal Goba.
- On his travel visa Goba/alShibh claimed he would be visiting Clark Webster in Richmond, Virginia.
- Clark Webster's Richmond, VA address was given by Goba as 1631 Capitol Ave.
- Clark Webster's phone number was given by Goba as: 804-759-6302.
- There is no residence with address 1631 Capitol Ave. in Richmond, VA.
- The phone number 804-759-6302 is a Sprint cell phone registered in the name Faysal Goba.
- An AMTRAK reservation for three one-way first class tickets and for one sleeping compartment was made in Charlottesville, VA by Faysal Goba on 23 April, 2003.
- Goba paid for this reservation in cash.
- The reservation Goba made was for 29 April, 2003 on Train # 19 that runs between NYC and New Orleans.
- The three one-way reservations Goba made were from Charlottesville VA to Atlanta, GA.
- The three persons listed in Goba's AMTRAK reservation are: Faysal Goba, Mukhtar Galab, and Yasein Mosed.
- A man giving his name as Abdulla Ramzi rented storage unit # 174 on April, 10, 2003 at the Budget Storage Units in Keswick, VA.
- Ramzi paid for a month's rental of storage unit # 206 in cash.
- In this rental transaction Ramzi gave his home address as 2932 University Drive, Charlottesville, VA.
- An examination of storage unit # 174 at the Budget Storage Units in Keswick, VA fifty pounds of C-4 were found along with some fusing devices.
- Phone call on 26 April, 2003 from 804-774-8920 to 703-659-2317. The caller, speaking in Arabic, says: "We are now prepared to ride the Crescent to victory".

Action 3 [NYSE]

- The Empire State Vending Services of Manhattan services vending machines at the NYSE.
- Mark Davis, age 32 and an employee of the ESVS, holds a vendor's ID to the NYSE.
- In 1999 Mark Davis used a birth certificate, believed to have been forged, in order to obtain a Social Security card and a NY driver's license.
- Mark Davis services vending machines at the NYSE.
- Mark Davis lists home address as 2462 Myrtle Ave.. Apt 307, in Queens, NYC.


- Bagwant Dhaliwal is employed by the ESVS.
- Bagwant Dhaliwal's home address is 2462 Myrtle Ave., Apt 307, Queen's, NYC.
- Hani al Halak, of North Bergen, NJ, has deposited checks in his bank account that were drawn on account number 1070173749003 held by Abdul Ramazi at the First Union Bank in Springfield, VA.
- The latest check deposited in al Halak's account on 16 April, 2003 was drawn on the above account held by Abdul Ramazi, was for \$8500.
- Hani al Halek manages a carpet store in North Bergen, NJ.
- The phone number of Hani al Halek's store in North Bergen, NJ is 732-455-6392.
- Several recent calls were made to Hani al Halek's phone from phone number 718-352-8479.
- Phone number 718-352-8479 is listed by the phone company as being located at 2462 Myrtle Ave., Queens, NYC.
- In the most recent call from 718-352-8479 the caller said he would pick up the carpet he ordered on 25 April, 2003.
- Canadian police identified the man using the name Mark Davis as Hamid Alwan, a Saudi national.
- Hamid Alwan received explosives training in the Sudan and in Afghanistan.
- On April 26, 2003, while responding to a fire at Hani al Halek's carpet shop, firemen discovered several cartons of C-4 in the basement of this shop.
- Hani al Halek is not available for questioning, having apparently gone to Canada and leaving no address.
- The name Bagwant Dhaliwal is an alias used by a Pakistani named Sahim Albakri.
- Sahim Albakri fought with the Taliban in 1990-1992

Coordination

- Abdul Ramazi owns the Select Gourmet Foods shop in Springfield Mali
- Shop's phone number is 703-659-2317
- Shop has account # 1070173749003 at First Union bank
- Six checks totaling \$35,000 deposited in above account that were drawn on accounts at Pyramid Bank of Cairo, Egypt and Central Bank of Dubai, UAI.
- Both of the above foreign banks listed as conduits for money laundering schemes.
- Abdul Ramazi has made three trips to Amsterdam, two trips to Hamburg, and three trips to Cairo in the last five months.
- Ramazi listed address is 1176 Floyd Ave., Springfield, VA.
- Ramazi home phone number is 703-734-0104
- The name Abdul Ramazi is an alias used by Muhammed bin Harazi.
- Muhammed bin Harazi served with Taliban forces from 1987 - 1993.
- Muhammed bin Harazi entered the USA in March. 1993.
- Recent phone calls from 703-659-2317 to 804-759-6302 [Richmond, VA., listed in the name Clark Webster
- Recent phone calls from 703-659-2317 to 804-774-8920 [Charlottesville, VA, listed in the name Mukhtar Galab]
- Recent phone calls from 703-659-2317 to 718-352-8479 [Queens, NYC, listed in the name Bagwant Dhaliwal]
- Two recent overseas calls from 703-659-2317 to 011207670734 [Amsterdam, listed in the name Hans Pakes]
- Phone calls on 22 April, 2003 from 703-659-2317 to the above four phone numbers.
- The message, in Arabic, in each of these four calls reads: "I will be in my office on April 30, 2003. Try to be on time".

VIII. INFERENCE NETWORKS (WIGMOREAN CHARTS) AND KEY LISTS

CASE STUDY 4: MAIN LINES OF ARGUMENT



KEY LIST


H: Coordinated terrorist actions are planned to take place at 0900 hrs on 30 April 2003 in Boston Harbor, at the AMTRAK station in Atlanta, Georgia, and at the New York Stock Exchange.

A₁: A dirty bomb aboard the container ship Holland Queen will be detonated in Boston Harbor at 0900 hrs on 30 April 2003.

A₂: A C-4 plastics explosives bomb placed aboard AMTRAK Train #19 ["The Crescent"] will be detonated at 0900 hrs on 30 April 2003 while the train is stopped at the AMTRAK station in Atlanta, Georgia.

A₃: A C-4 plastics explosives bomb placed in a vending machine will be detonated at 0900 hrs on 30 April 2003 at the New York Stock Exchange.

ACTION A₁ [BOSTON] – CHART A




KEY LIST FOR ACTION A₁ - CHART A

A: A dirty bomb aboard the container ship Holland Queen will be detonated in Boston Harbor at 0900hrs on 30 April, 2003

- 1) A dirty bomb composed of cesium 137 and TNT was placed aboard a container ship called the Holland Queen in Amsterdam.
- 2) The container ship Holland Queen is scheduled to arrive in Boston's Inner Harbor at 1930hrs on 29 April, 2003.
- 3) An explosives expert Abu al Masri aboard the Holland Queen carries a bomb-triggering device.
- 4) Abu al Masri will trigger the dirty bomb in Boston Harbor at 0900hrs on 30 April, 2003.
- 5) US Coast Guard evidence of 2) as reported to CIA and FBI
- 6) The crew roster for the Holland Queen lists a man named Hans Pakes.
- 7) US Coast Guard evidence of 6) as reported to CIA and FBI.
- 8) The name Hans Pakes is an alias used by a Yemeni named Abu al Masri
- 9) CIA evidence of 8).
- 10) Abu al Masri received explosives training in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1996.
- 11) CIA evidence of 10).
- 12) A terrorist explosives expert named Abu al Masri is aboard the Holland Queen.
- 13) Abu al Masri knows the kind of bomb that was placed aboard the Holland Queen.

ACTION A₁ [BOSTON] - CHART B




KEY LIST FOR ACTION A₁ - CHART B

- 1) A dirty bomb composed of cesium 137 and TNT was placed aboard a container ship called the *Holland Queen* in Amsterdam.
- 14) On 20 April Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad were arrested following an accident involving the truck they were driving in Haarlem. The Netherlands.
- 15) Dutch Security evidence of 14) given to CIA.
- 16) Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad are suspected Al Qaeda operatives in Hamburg, Germany.
- 17) Evidence of 16) provided by Dutch Security to CIA. [This is ancillary evidence].
- 18) Traces of cesium 137 were found in the truck driven by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad.
- 19) Evidence of 18) provided by Dutch Security to CIA.
- 20) Traces of cesium 137 found on pieces of a wooden crate that was carrying the label of a company in Lublin, Poland.
- 21) Evidence of 20) provided by Dutch Security to CIA.
- 22) The cesium carried by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad was obtained in Eastern Europe.
- 23) The apartment address in Haarlem of two men named Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash was found in the truck driven by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad.
- 24) Evidence of 23) provided by Dutch Security to CIA.
- 25) Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash do live in the apartment whose address was found in the truck driven by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad.
- 26) Evidence of 25) provided Dutch Security by the apartment owner. Evidence passed to CIA.
- 27) A quantity of cesium 137 was delivered to Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash in Haarlem by Tawfiq al Adel and Saeed Khallad.
- 28) Traces of cesium 137 were found in storage unit # 206 in the apartment complex in which Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash live in Haarlem.
- 29) Evidence of 28) provided by Dutch Security to CIA.
- 30) Two sticks of TNT were found in storage unit # 206 in the apartment complex in which Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash live in Haarlem.
- 31) Evidence of 30) provided by Dutch Security to CIA.

- 32) One pair of lead gloves was found in storage unit # 206 in the apartment complex in which Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash live in Haarlem.
- 33) Evidence of 32) provided by Dutch Security to CIA.
- 34) Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash are the renters of storage unit 206.
- 35) Evidence of 34) provided Dutch Security by the apartment owner. Evidence passed to CIA.
- 36) A dirty bomb composed of cesium 137 and TNT was constructed by Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash in their storage unit in Haarlem.
- 37) Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash are employed as container loaders by the Sealink Container Corp. in Amsterdam.
- 38) Evidence of 37) provided by Dutch Security to CIA.
- 39) The Sealink Corp. owns a fleet of containers that are shipped to various parts of the world, including the USA, where they are subsequently hauled by truck or rail.
- 40) Public information of 39). [Ancillary Evidence].
- 41) Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash load containers on ships that could go to the USA.
- 42) A container ship called the Holland Queen was docked in Amsterdam before its departure.
- 43) Coast Guard intelligence evidence of 42) provided to CIA and FBI.
- 44) The Holland Queen departed Amsterdam for Boston MA. on 25 April, 2003.
- 45) Coast Guard intelligence evidence of 44) provided to CIA and FBI.
- 46) Saleh al Ahdal and Riduan bin Attash loaded containers carried by the Holland Queen.


ACTION A₁ [BOSTON] – CHART C



KEY LIST FOR ACTION A₁ - CHART C

- 4) Abu al Masri will trigger the dirty bomb in Boston Harbor at 0900hrs on 30 April, 2003.
- 47) The name Abdul Ramazi is an alias used by Muhammed bin Harazi.
- 48) CIA evidence of 47).
- 49) Muhammed bin Harazi served with the Taliban from 1987 - 1993.
- 50) CIA evidence of 49).
- 51) Muhammed bin Harazi is an Al Qaeda operative.
- 52) Muhammed bin Harazi made three trips to Amsterdam from the USA in the last five months.
- 53) Evidence of 52) from US Passport Control to FBI.
- 53a) Muhammed bin Harazi met with Abu al Masri on these visits to Amsterdam.
- 54) Muhammed bin Harazi made two overseas phone calls before 22 April, 2003 to Abu al Masri [alias Hans Pakes] in Amsterdam.
- 55) Sanctioned intercept evidence of 54).
- 56) Muhammed bin Harazi directed the activities of Abu al Masri.
- 57) Muhammed bin Harazi directed the activities of the other terrorists.
- 58) Evidence of 57 in charts F and G for Actions A₂ and A₃. [Ancillary evidence]
- 59) Muhammed bin Harazi directed the activities of Abu al Masri concerning the dirty bomb aboard the *Holland Queen*.
- 60) In a phone call made from Muhammed bin Harazi to Abu al Masri on 22 April, 2003 Harazi said: "I will be in my office on 30 April at 9:00 AM. Try to be on time".
- 61) Sanctioned Intercept evidence of 60).
- 62) Exactly the same message given on 22 April, 2003 by Muhammed bin Harazi to the two other terrorist groups.
- 63) Evidence of 62 in charts F and G for Actions A₂ and A₃.
- 64) The message "I will be in my office on 30 April at 9:00 AM. Try to be on time" does not refer to a meeting involving Muhammed bin Harazi and Abu al Masri [Hans Pakes]..
- 65) The message "I will be in my office on 30 April at 9:00 AM. Try to be on time" refers to the time at which terrorist actions will take place.


ACTION A₂ [ATLANTA] – CHART D



KEY LIST FOR ACTION A₂ - CHART D

- A₂: A C-4 plastics explosives bomb placed aboard AMTRAK Train # 19 ["The Crescent"] will be detonated at 0900hrs on 30 April, 2003 while the train is stopped at the AMTRAK station in Atlanta, Georgia.
- 66) Three terrorists will board AMTRAK Train # 19 [The Crescent] in Charlottesville, VA at 2132 hrs on 29 April, 2003.
- 67) The three terrorists will each bring 50 pounds of C-4 aboard Train # 19 in their luggage.
- 68) A bomb containing 150 pounds of C-4 will be assembled in a sleeping compartment of Train # 19 by the three terrorists.
- 69) The bomb will be timed to go off at 0905hrs on 30 April, 2003.
- 70) The Powhatan Company of Keswick, VA [located five miles east of Charlottesville, VA] reported to the FBI on 11 April, 2003 that 200 pounds of C-4 plastic explosives were missing.
- 71) FBI evidence of 70).
- 72) The 200 pounds of C-4 were stolen from the Powhatan Company.
- 73) A man identifying himself as Abdulla Ramzi rented storage unit # 174 on 10 April at the Budget Storage Units in Keswick, VA.
- 74) FBI evidence of 73).
- 75) Abdulla Ramzi is a double alias for Muhammed bin Harazi [who also uses the alias Abdul Ramazi].
- 76) In an investigation of unit 174 at the Budget Storage Units on 26 April, 2003. 50 pounds of C-4 plastic explosive were found.
- 77) FBI evidence of 76).
- 78) The C-4 plastic explosive was stolen by someone associated with Muhammed bin Harazi.
- 79) Recent phone calls from Muhammed bin Harazi to Mukhtar Galab in Charlottesville.
- 80) Sanctioned intercept evidence of 79.
- 81) Muhammed bin Harazi has made 150 pounds of the stolen C-4 plastic explosive available to Mukhtar Galab, Yasein Mosed, and Ziad al Shihb [alias Faysal Goba].
- 82) Ziad al Shihb [alias Faysal Goba] has made a reservation for a single sleeping compartment on AMTRAK Train # 19 for the night of 29 April, 2003.
- 83) AMTRAK records of 82) revealed to the FBI.
- 84) The three terrorists do not intend to sleep in a single sleeping compartment.

ACTION A₂ [ATLANTA] – CHART E




KEY LIST FOR ACTION A₂ - CHART E

- 66) Three terrorists will board AMTRAK Train # 19 ["The Crescent"] in Charlottesville. VA at 2132hrs on 29 April, 2003.
- 85) Mukhtar Galab's student visa for attendance at UVA has expired.
- 86) INS report of 85) to FBI.
- 87) Mukhtar Galab has not attended classes at UVA for two semesters.
- 88) UVA records of 67) to FBI.
- 89) There is no one living at the address Mukhtar Galab supplied to UVA.
- 90) FBI evidence of 89).
- 91) Mukhtar Galab is no longer a student at UVA.
- 92) Yasein Mosed's student visa for attendance at UVA has expired.
- 93) INS report of 92) to FBI.
- 94) Yasein Mosed has not attended classes at UVA for two semesters.
- 95) UVA records of 94) to FBI.
- 96) There is no one living at the address Yasein Mosed supplied to UVA.
- 97) FBI evidence of 96).
- 98) Yasein Mosed is no longer a student at UVA.
- 99) Mukhtar Galab and Yasein Mosed are acting in violation of their student visas.
- 100) Three checks totaling \$13,000, drawn on an account held by Abdul Ramazi [Muhammed bin Harazi] in Springfield, VA, have been deposited in the past three months in a VA National Bank account in Charlottesville in the name of Mukhtar Galab.
- 101) Bank records of 100) supplied to the FBI.
- 102) Muhammed bin Harazi is financially supporting Mukhtar Galab and Yasein Mosed in Charlottesville, VA.
- 103) Mukhtar Galab and Yasein Mosed are involved in terrorist activities.
- 104) A man named Faysal Goba, holding a UAI passport, entered the USA on a travel visa in January,

- 2003.
- 105) INS report of 104) to CIA.
 - 106) Faysal Goba gave a fictitious address in Charlottesville VA on his travel visa.
 - 107) CIA evidence of 106).
 - 108) The name Faysal Goba is an alias used by Ziad al Shibh.
 - 109) CIA evidence of 108).
 - 110) Ziad al Shibh received explosives training at an Al Qaeda training facility in the Sudan in 1994.
 - 111) CIA evidence of 110).
 - 112) Ziad al Shibh is a member of a terrorist organization in the USA.
 - 113) The terrorist group in Charlottesville, VA includes Mukhtar Galab, Yasein Mosed and Ziad al Shibh.
 - 114) On 23 April, 2003, Faysal Goba [Ziad al Shibh] made three one way reservations, in the names Faysal Goba, Mukhtar Galab, and Yasein Mosed, on Train # 19 ["The Crescent"] between Charlottesville, VA and Atlanta, Georgia for the night of 29 April, 2003.
 - 115) AMTRAK record of 114) given to the FBI.


ACTION A₂ [ATLANTA] – CHART F



KEY LIST FOR ACTION A₂ - CHART F

- 69) The bomb will be timed to go off at 0905hrs on 30 April, 2003
- 116) In a phone call on 26 April, 2003 from Mukhtar Galab to Muhammed bin Harazi, Galab says: "We are now prepared to ride the crescent to victory".
- 117) Sanctioned intercept of 116).
- 118) In phone calls made from Muhammed bin Harazi to Mukhtar Galab and Ziad al Shibh [Faysal Goba], bin Harazi says: "I will be in my office at 9:00 AM on 30 April, 2003. Try to be on time".
- 119) Sanctioned intercept of 118).
- 120) Mukhtar Galab and Ziad al Shibh will be on AMTRAK Train # 19 in Atlanta, Georgia at 0900hrs on 30 April, 2003.
- 121) Evidence of 120 from AMTRAK reservations made by Ziad al Shibh.
- 122) The message: "I will be in my office on 30 April, 2003 at 9:00AM. Try to be on time" does not refer to a meeting of Muhammed bin Harazi, Mukhtar Galab, and Ziad al Shibh.
- 123) The message: "I will be in my office on 30 April, 2003 at 9:00AM. Try to be on time" refers to the time at which terrorist actions will take place.
- 124) Train # 19 arrives at the AMTRAK station in Atlanta, Georgia at 0858 on 30 April, 2003.
- 125) AMTRAK schedule evidence of 124) on the Internet.
- 126) Train # 19 is called "The Crescent".
- 127) AMTRAK schedule evidence of 126) on the Internet.

ACTION A₃ [NYSE] – CHART G




KEY LIST FOR ACTION A₃ - CHART G

A₃: A C-4 plastic explosive bomb, placed in a vending machine, will be detonated at 0900hrs on 30 April, 2003 in the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE]

- 128) Terrorists operating in New York City have access to the NYSE building. [See Chart H]
- 129) The terrorists brought the C-4 -plastic explosive to their workplace at the Empire State Vending Company [ESVS]
- 155) A man named Hani al Halak manages a carpet store in North Bergen, New Jersey.
- 156) FBI evidence of 155)
- 157) On 26 April, 2003, while putting out a fire in al Halak's carpet store, firemen discovered a quantity of C-4 plastic explosive in the basement of the store.
- 158) FBI evidence of 157).
- 159) Hani al Halak has left the country for parts unknown.
- 160) FBI evidence of 159) from workers at al Hani's carpet store.
- 161) Hani al Halak is a source of explosives for terrorists.
- 162) In a phone call from Hamid Alwan to Hani al Halak said he would pick up the carpet he ordered on 25 April, 2003.
- 163) Sanctioned intercept evidence of 162)
- 164) A check in the amount of \$8500, drawn on a bank account of Muhammed bin Harazi, was deposited in a bank account held by Hani al Halak on 16 April, 2003.
- 165) Evidence of 164) from the FBI.
- 166) The \$8500 paid by Harazi to al Halak was a payment for C-4 plastic explosive.
- 167) Hamid Alwan picked up a quantity of C-4 plastic explosive from Hani al Halak and not a carpet.
- 168) Hamid Alwan kept the C-4 plastic explosive until he was ready to use it.
- 130) Terrorists will deliver a vending machine, containing a C-4 plastic explosive bomb, to the NYSE on or before 29 April, 2003.

- 169) Hamid Alwan is an explosives expert who received training in the Sudan and in Afghanistan.
- 170) FBI evidence of 169).
- 171) Hamid Alwan will install C-4 plastic explosive and a timing device in a vending machine [such as a coffee/tea/hot chocolate dispenser].
- 131) The C-4 bomb installed in the New York Stock Exchange will be set to go off at 0900hrs on 30 April, 2003.
- 172) In a phone call made on 26 April. 2003 from Muhammed bin Harazi to Hamid Alwan and Sahim Albakri, Harazi says: "I will be in my office on 30 April, 2003 at 9:00AM. Try to be on time".
- 173) NSA intercept evidence of 172).
- 174) The message: "I will be in my office on 30 April. 2003 at 9:00AM. Try to be on time" does not refer to any meeting of Muhammed bin Harazi, Hamid Alwan and Sahim Albakri.
- 175) The message: "I will be in my office on 30 April, 2003 at 9:00AM. Try to be on time" refers to the timing of terrorist actions.
- 176) The same message given to all other terrorists in the three actions.
- 177) See Charts C and F for evidence of 176.

ACTION A₃ [NYSE] – CHART H



KEY LIST FOR ACTION A₃ - CHART H

- 128) Terrorists **operating** in the New York City area have access to the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE]
- 132) The Empire State Vending Services [ESVS] installs and services vending machines at NYSE.
- 133) FBI evidence of 132)
- 134) A man named Mark Davis is employed by ESVS to install and service vending machines.
- 135) FBI evidence of 134).
- 136) Mark Davis has a vendor's ID that allows him access to the NYSE.
- 137) FBI evidence of 136).
- 138) Mark Davis installs and services vending machines at the NYSE.
- 139) Mark Davis used a forged birth certificate to obtain a social security card and a New York driver's license in 1999.
- 140) FBI evidence of 139).
- 141) The name Mark Davis is an alias used by a Saudi national named Hamid Alwan who received explosives training in Sudan and Afghanistan.
- 142) FBI evidence of 141 from Canadian police.
- 143) Hamid Alwan [alias Mark Davis] used false information to obtain a NYSE vendor's ID.
- 144) Hamid Alwan has access to the NYSE.
- 145) A man named Bagwant Dhaliwal is employed at ESVS.
- 146) FBI evidence of 145).
- 147) Bagwant Dhaliwal is an alias used by a Pakistani named Sahim Albakri.
- 148) CIA evidence of 147).
- 149) Sahim Albakri fought with the Taliban in 1990-1992.
- 150) CIA evidence of 149).
- 151) Sahim Albakri belongs to a terrorist organization in the USA.
- 152) Sahim Albakri shares an apartment with Hamid Alwan.
- 153) FBI evidence of 152)
- 154) Sahim Albakri collaborates with Hamid Alwan in terrorist activities.