

# Analysis of risks associated with Foreign Terrorist Fighters returning home

Utilizing various analysis methods

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## Timeline

**1980-90**

Recruitment of potential Jihadists begins, coinciding with the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet Russia

**2001**

AQ attacks the World Trade Center, increases number of American FTFs

**2007**

Somalia becomes top destination for FTFs

**2013**

UN inspectors conclude chemical weapons used in attack in Damascus

**2019**

US announces plans to withdraw from Syria

**1990-2000**

FTFs recruited earlier stay on to fight for Islam in the Bosnian civil war

**2001-2002**


US army presence in Afghanistan leads AQ to move to Pakistan; Syria listed on "list of states that make up 'axis of evil'"

**2011**

Arab Spring erupts, creating a desire for FTFs to migrate to Syria and other surrounding countries

**2014**


ISIS militants (including FTFs) declare "caliphate" in Aleppo to eastern Iraqi province of Diyala




# Event Matrix - Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Event	Outcome	Benefit	Risk	Implication/Indication
FTF joins terrorist group, stays and fights	FTF forced to stay or fully committed to group	FTF circle of influence smaller than returning FTF	Propaganda, instigating terrorist attack	Combat on front line, condemn propaganda
FTF joins terrorist group, fights and returns to home country	FTF became disillusioned or is planning attack	Opportunity to deprogram/debrief FTF	Recruiting others, risk of terrorist attack	Identify, intercept, debrief and deprogram
FTF joins terrorist group, does not fight, returns to home country	FTF became disillusioned or has been sent back to recruit	Opportunity to deprogram/debrief FTF	Recruiting others to become FTFs	Identify, intercept, debrief and deprogram
FTF intercepted before joining terrorist group	FTF fails to reach combat zone due to lack of commitment or imprudence	Opportunity to deprogram/debrief FTF (especially about recruitment)	Increased state of radicalization due to frustration of attempt to reach combat zone	Identify, intercept, debrief and deprogram
FTF radicalized in home country	FTF (not really FTF, as they did not reach combat zone) supports terrorist group from home country	Low risk of instigating terrorist attack	Recruiting others to become FTFs	Identify, debrief and deprogram

# Event Tree



# Event Mapping - Formation of Splinter Groups



# Weight Ranking - FTF Risk Factors

FTF	Age (18-34)	Lack of Economic Opportunity	Lack of Education Opportunity	Radicalization	Alienation (political/social/family)	Total
FTF1	20 IIII (5) (10)	II (2) (6)	IIII (4) (4)	II (2) (8)	IIII (4) (16)	44
FTF2	29 IIII (5) (10)	I (1) (3)	II (2) (2)	III (3) (12)	II (2) (8)	35
FTF3	17 III (3) (6)	III (3) (9)	IIII (4) (4)	IIII (4) (16)	III (3) (12)	47
FTF4	37 III (3) (6)	IIII (4) (12)	IIII (5) (5)	I (1) (4)	I (1) (4)	31

## Weighting

Age - II (2)

Economic Opportunity - III (3)

Education Opportunity - I (1)

Radicalization - IIII (4)

Alienation - IIII (4)

# Link Analysis

blue - allies, red - enemies

