

# Wireshark – RDP Decryption

The given capture file is opened.

The capture is filtered for RDP for easier inspection.

4	0.002562	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	97 Cookie: msthash=ucky, Negotiate Request
5	0.006406	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	73 Negotiate Response
19	8.843397	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	97 Cookie: msthash=ucky, Negotiate Request
20	8.847171	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	73 Negotiate Response

Due to RDP using TLS to encrypt data, not much can be gathered from the capture.

Filtering the capture using “tcp.port == 3389” confirms that several packets were sent using RDP but can’t be investigated due to encryption.

1	0.000000	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TCP	66 50674 → 3389 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
2	0.000231	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	TCP	66 3389 → 50674 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64000 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=1 SACK_PERM
3	0.000521	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TCP	60 50674 → 3389 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=262656 Len=0
4	0.002562	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	97 Cookie: msthash=ucky, Negotiate Request
5	0.006406	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	73 Negotiate Response
6	0.050370	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TCP	60 50674 → 3389 [ACK] Seq=44 Ack=20 Win=262656 Len=0
7	6.256391	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TPKT	185 Continuation
8	6.257006	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	TPKT	896 Continuation
9	6.258365	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TPKT	372 Continuation
10	6.260974	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	TPKT	105 Continuation
11	6.261843	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TPKT	140 Continuation
12	6.262246	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	TPKT	324 Continuation
13	6.263994	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TPKT	710 Continuation
14	6.265122	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	TPKT	142 Continuation
15	6.265690	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TCP	60 50674 → 3389 [RST, ACK] Seq=1235 Ack=1271 Win=0 Len=0
16	8.842069	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TCP	66 50675 → 3389 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
17	8.842195	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	TCP	66 3389 → 50675 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64000 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=1 SACK_PERM
18	8.842471	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TCP	60 50675 → 3389 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=2102272 Len=0
19	8.843397	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	97 Cookie: msthash=ucky, Negotiate Request
20	8.847171	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	73 Negotiate Response
21	8.850426	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	TPKT	185 Continuation

Under the Preferences section of Wireshark, the the given key can be added for decryption when the TLS protocol is used.

TLS Decrypt				
IP address	Port	Protocol	Key File	Password
10.129.43.29	3389	tpkt	C:/Users/edkjr/Downloads/RDP-analysis/server.key	

After refreshing the capture, the contents of the RDP packets can now be viewed in plaintext.

31	8.858325	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	545 ClientData
32	8.859099	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	209 ServerData Encryption: None (None)
51	8.865852	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	698 ClientInfo
52	8.869677	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	117 Error Alert
53	8.870064	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	125 MultiTransportRequest
55	8.888062	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	109 MultiTransport response
56	8.927121	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	555 Demand Active PDU
57	8.931705	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	762 Confirm Active PDU
58	8.931849	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	119 RDP PDU Type: Synchronize
60	8.931918	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	119 RDP PDU Type: Synchronize
61	8.931925	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	123 RDP PDU Type: Control, Action: Cooperate
62	8.931975	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	123 RDP PDU Type: Control, Action: Cooperate
63	8.931997	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	123 RDP PDU Type: Control, Action: Request control
65	8.932186	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	123 RDP PDU Type: Control, Action: Granted control
66	8.932849	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	118 Fast-Path PDU,QoE timestamp,Scancode,Sync,Scancode
67	8.932959	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	139 RDP PDU Type: BitmapCache Persistent List
69	8.933005	10.129.43.27	10.129.43.29	RDP	123 RDP PDU Type: FontList
70	8.933101	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	RDP	123 RDP PDU Type: FontMap
71	8.933257	10.129.43.29	10.129.43.27	DRDYNC	117 Capabilities request

When inspecting the details of the ClientInfo packet, we find communication with this server was made using the account with username “bucky”

```
domain:  
userName: bucky  
password: Welcome1  
alternateShell:  
workingDir:
```