From 9b1a6e2beb3f6d8a71bd54595b5ebcc75ac192b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicol=C3=A1s=20Reynolds?= Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2013 00:57:18 -0300 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?Separaci=C3=B3n=20en=20p=C3=A1rrafos?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- _queue/parodia_de_los_comunes.markdown | 812 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 432 insertions(+), 380 deletions(-) diff --git a/_queue/parodia_de_los_comunes.markdown b/_queue/parodia_de_los_comunes.markdown index 0e3240b..31223c1 100644 --- a/_queue/parodia_de_los_comunes.markdown +++ b/_queue/parodia_de_los_comunes.markdown @@ -487,90 +487,97 @@ cuáles medios técnicos pueden ser considerados buenas prácticas. Hardin's (1968) position about salvation through privatisation has been claimed for forests. If forests get privatised, the manager's best interest would be to protect the wood from fire and the uncontrolled -work of woodcutters. What we have here is a category error. What -the managers protect is their fenced area rather than the forest -itself. In front of the “sacred” ownership rights there is no legal -document to guarantee that the area will remain a forest. Nowadays, -the destruction of natural environment does not occur because the -environment is a common resource. It is arguably happening because the -applied policies are designed to support means of production of private -appropriation, which exploit the common resource unconditionally. To -that point, Hardin's and Ostrom's approaches are equally unhelpful, -since their difference is related solely to the composition of the -mixture. For Hardin, more privatisation is required, whereas according -to Ostrom it should be constrained. Benkler (2006, 378) explains that -traditionally the tragedy of the Commons is described by (i) the absence -of incentives, i.e., nobody invests resources in a project since no -privatisation follows; (ii) the absence of leadership, i.e., nobody has -the appropriate authority to guide and accomplish such a project. What -Benkler says is this: Let's assume that Hardin's proposition is true: -Privatisation secures the sustainability of a resource. But how do we -get there? To begin with, what is our incentive to assume ownership or -management of a common resource, if we do not charge for its use? And -suppose that the incentive has been found: Are we capable of achieving -the sustainability goal when this capability is part of collective -intelligence? The difficulty to meet both conditions means inadequacy -of assuming responsibility, hence, the common resource has no future, -according to Hardin. Benkler (2006) states that this does not apply in -peer production: Commons-based communities manage to find their own ways. -However, counter-examples can be found against the cases Benkler brings -to the fore to support his argument. For instance, see the software -development in traditional corporate environments on projects released -under permissive free software licenses (examples include the MIT license -and the BSD licenses), which allow privatising code modifications and, -thus, do not take action against patent “treachery” (see Peren -1999; GNU 2013; Fitzgerald 2006). In that way software misses its free -component and its quality becomes questionable, since the distribution -of code's changes depends on the personal stance of the entrepreneur -who can package them up under restrictive terms. That is to say, the -programmer or the entrepreneur can shift from a permissive license to -an “end-user license agreement”. In addition, production shifts to -the terms with which the non-free, proprietary software is produced. -Thereby the software community experiences higher pressure and the rights -of the end users are eventually reduced. In other words, permissive free -software licenses can lead to a “tragedy” or rather a “parody -of the Commons” because of free software's allegedly emancipatory -promise. In such a scenario maximising individual freedom away from -society needs would have worse total consequences than would have resulted -by applying regulation to maximise societal freedom instead. One might -claim that code is in abundance, as an informational good with almost -zero marginal costs; however it needs improvement and maintenance, i.e., -labour hours. Hence, investing free labour hours in dead-end projects, -permissive free software licenses may trigger a parody of the Commons, -by slowing down the overall adoption pace of free software. By contrast -the copyleft licenses (for example the GPL, General Public License) -guarantee end users the freedoms to use, study, share (copy), and modify -the software. Copyleft is a method of social production as well as a -process of knowledge sharing, which makes a program or other work free, and requires all modified and +work of woodcutters. What we have here is a category error. What the +managers protect is their fenced area rather than the forest itself. In +front of the “sacred” ownership rights there is no legal document to +guarantee that the area will remain a forest. Nowadays, the destruction +of natural environment does not occur because the environment is a +common resource. It is arguably happening because the applied policies +are designed to support means of production of private appropriation, +which exploit the common resource unconditionally. To that point, +Hardin's and Ostrom's approaches are equally unhelpful, since their +difference is related solely to the composition of the mixture. For +Hardin, more privatisation is required, whereas according to Ostrom it +should be constrained. + +Benkler (2006, 378) explains that traditionally the tragedy of the +Commons is described by (i) the absence of incentives, i.e., nobody +invests resources in a project since no privatisation follows; (ii) the +absence of leadership, i.e., nobody has the appropriate authority to +guide and accomplish such a project. What Benkler says is this: Let's +assume that Hardin's proposition is true: Privatisation secures +the sustainability of a resource. But how do we get there? To begin +with, what is our incentive to assume ownership or management of a +common resource, if we do not charge for its use? And suppose that the +incentive has been found: Are we capable of achieving the sustainability +goal when this capability is part of collective intelligence? The +difficulty to meet both conditions means inadequacy of assuming +responsibility, hence, the common resource has no future, according +to Hardin. Benkler (2006) states that this does not apply in peer +production: Commons-based communities manage to find their own ways. + +However, counter-examples can be found against the cases Benkler +brings to the fore to support his argument. For instance, see the +software development in traditional corporate environments on projects +released under permissive free software licenses (examples include +the MIT license and the BSD licenses), which allow privatising code +modifications and, thus, do not take action against patent “treachery” +(see Peren 1999; GNU 2013; Fitzgerald 2006). In that way software misses +its free component and its quality becomes questionable, since the +distribution of code's changes depends on the personal stance of the +entrepreneur who can package them up under restrictive terms. That is +to say, the programmer or the entrepreneur can shift from a permissive +license to an “end-user license agreement”. In addition, production +shifts to the terms with which the non-free, proprietary software is +produced. Thereby the software community experiences higher pressure +and the rights of the end users are eventually reduced. In other +words, permissive free software licenses can lead to a “tragedy” or +rather a “parody of the Commons” because of free software's allegedly +emancipatory promise. In such a scenario maximising individual freedom +away from society needs would have worse total consequences than would +have resulted by applying regulation to maximise societal freedom +instead. One might claim that code is in abundance, as an informational +good with almost zero marginal costs; however it needs improvement and +maintenance, i.e., labour hours. Hence, investing free labour hours +in dead-end projects, permissive free software licenses may trigger +a parody of the Commons, by slowing down the overall adoption pace +of free software. By contrast the copyleft licenses (for example the +GPL, General Public License) guarantee end users the freedoms to use, +study, share (copy), and modify the software. Copyleft is a method of +social production as well as a process of knowledge sharing, which +makes a program or other work free, and requires all modified and extended versions of the program to be free as well (GNU 2012). Hence, copyleft licenses define the relations amongst the members of software communities and in that sense they create ecologies outside or rather in the interstices of the capitalist market. To ensure there is no misunderstanding, we need to clarify the meaning of free software. The -“free” in free software, unlike “free” in free labour, does not -mean gratis. Free software is defined by the four freedoms the user -of that software has in order to use, study, share copies, and share -modified versions of the software. - -2. Defining the Parody of the Commons We name “parody of the Commons” -the introduction of privatisation in the management of the common -resources realised either by the assignment of ownership to individuals or -by the interference of state regulation, when capital is the prevailing -force as well as the appropriation of the financial results. Both -routes rely on the assumption of owning better information pools, -which is challenged by the current developments of liberal-democratic -societies. If Commons-based peer production does not become the dominant -mode of production, the conditions for a tragedy will be arguably met -and then the emancipatory promise of the Commons will be torn apart. It -can be claimed that the state policies have to be considered as a -parameter. We argue that the state intervention – when it legislates -enforcing or facilitating measures – actually applies Hardin's schema -following other routes. The state perceives as “public” all goods and -resources of some value and then intervenes introducing regulations for -the “common good”. However, this intervention is an attack to the -public sphere and subverts communities. If a community starts to grow, -inspectors from above turn up to define specifications, procedures, -financial constraints, setting the direction for the future of the common +“free” in free software, unlike “free” in free labour, does not mean +gratis. Free software is defined by the four freedoms the user of that +software has in order to use, study, share copies, and share modified +versions of the software. + +Defining the Parody of the Commons + +We name “parody of the Commons” the introduction of privatisation in the +management of the common resources realised either by the assignment of +ownership to individuals or by the interference of state regulation, +when capital is the prevailing force as well as the appropriation of the +financial results. Both routes rely on the assumption of owning better +information pools, which is challenged by the current developments of +liberal-democratic societies. If Commons-based peer production does not +become the dominant mode of production, the conditions for a tragedy +will be arguably met and then the emancipatory promise of the Commons +will be torn apart. It can be claimed that the state policies have to +be considered as a parameter. We argue that the state intervention – +when it legislates enforcing or facilitating measures – actually applies +Hardin's schema following other routes. The state perceives as “public” +all goods and resources of some value and then intervenes introducing +regulations for the “common good”. + +However, this intervention is an attack to the public sphere and +subverts communities. If a community starts to grow, inspectors +from above turn up to define specifications, procedures, financial +constraints, setting the direction for the future of the common resource. Also they set aside the immediate interests of those who now must obey rules set by bodies irrelevant to the local needs. The basic idea originating to the bounded rationality principle is that regulation @@ -578,50 +585,55 @@ cannot stop the abuse and eventually the depletion of the Commons occurs. This approach does not adopt the position that the state is incapable by nature or due to its size. The state policies are, most of the times, what they are because of commitments and facilitations by the -political system to the financial sector. We define two main features -of the parody of the Commons. The first feature is the institutional -integration, which is the absorption of the proportional dividend of -every individual by a mandatory private appropriation enforced through -legislation. The applied policies cannot affect free software communities -in large scale, but they directly harm other forms of Commons as much -as any other type of industrial unit involved with the production of -any material. Individuals enter the Commons to enjoy the participatory -nature of a productive and/or creative endeavour carrying the belief -that the involvement of other members alongside with theirs builds a -sum that belongs to all and from which all benefit from. In that sum, -every contributor to a Commons-based community expects a contributory -return plus a reward for nonvoluntary work. The capital markets seriously -challenge this belief by pursuing their own agenda, based on onerous -and illegal, concerning the international law, debts that stifle the -real economy. The central or local administrations in an attempt to -fulfil financial obligations to creditors, apply policies that oblige -a whole society to transfer a large part of the national income toward -payments to creditors. Instead of re-investments for the local needs, -the society is deprived from valuable resources and assets. The state -treats Commons-based communities as any other business unit and applies -heavy non-contributory taxation. Any ambitious activity is finally -ceased and one of the first victims is the voluntary work done by the -members of peer communities. This is not an imaginary situation; it is -the reality in the Eurozone today, where the banking sector is allowed -to have an unprecedented concentration of power. The link, which makes -this situation unbearable for all, is arguably the iron fist of the -common currency. Even Germany, the most powerful economy in the Eurozone, -is turning slowly into recession (Indexmundi 2013; The Economist 2011) +political system to the financial sector. + +We define two main features of the parody of the Commons. The first +feature is the institutional integration, which is the absorption of +the proportional dividend of every individual by a mandatory private +appropriation enforced through legislation. The applied policies cannot +affect free software communities in large scale, but they directly +harm other forms of Commons as much as any other type of industrial +unit involved with the production of any material. Individuals enter +the Commons to enjoy the participatory nature of a productive and/or +creative endeavour carrying the belief that the involvement of other +members alongside with theirs builds a sum that belongs to all and +from which all benefit from. In that sum, every contributor to a +Commons-based community expects a contributory return plus a reward for +nonvoluntary work. The capital markets seriously challenge this belief +by pursuing their own agenda, based on onerous and illegal, concerning +the international law, debts that stifle the real economy. The +central or local administrations in an attempt to fulfil financial +obligations to creditors, apply policies that oblige a whole society +to transfer a large part of the national income toward payments to +creditors. Instead of re-investments for the local needs, the society +is deprived from valuable resources and assets. The state treats +Commons-based communities as any other business unit and applies heavy +non-contributory taxation. Any ambitious activity is finally ceased and +one of the first victims is the voluntary work done by the members of +peer communities. This is not an imaginary situation; it is the reality +in the Eurozone today, where the banking sector is allowed to have +an unprecedented concentration of power. The link, which makes this +situation unbearable for all, is arguably the iron fist of the common +currency. Even Germany, the most powerful economy in the Eurozone, is +turning slowly into recession (Indexmundi 2013; The Economist 2011) while most of the cities and towns there now belong to the banks rather -than the federal state (Czuczka 2012). For the European south, there are many examples of structural reforms taking -place that damaged equally the industrial and agricultural sector in -the last 40 years. This is arguably a path to a dead-end. The second -feature is the external outsourcing, according to which, regardless of -the partners’ intentions and plans, the project is converted into a -mode of crowdsourcing/aggregation economy. In the aforementioned scenario -the peer produced use value serves certain for-profit interests no matter -if peer producers are aware of it. The owners/administrators of the web -platforms/network, i.e., the “netarchists” such as Facebook or Google -(for an overview of the concept see Bauwens 2007, 2013; Kostakis 2012) -can be considered as the web capitalists, who renounce their dependence on -information accumulation through intellectual property and become enablers -of social participation (Bauwens 2007, 2013; Kostakis 2012). They combine -open and closed elements in the architecture of their platforms to ensure +than the federal state (Czuczka 2012). For the European south, there are +many examples of structural reforms taking place that damaged equally +the industrial and agricultural sector in the last 40 years. This is +arguably a path to a dead-end. + +The second feature is the external outsourcing, according to which, +regardless of the partners’ intentions and plans, the project is +converted into a mode of crowdsourcing/aggregation economy. In +the aforementioned scenario the peer produced use value serves +certain for-profit interests no matter if peer producers are aware +of it. The owners/administrators of the web platforms/network, i.e., +the “netarchists” such as Facebook or Google (for an overview of the +concept see Bauwens 2007, 2013; Kostakis 2012) can be considered as +the web capitalists, who renounce their dependence on information +accumulation through intellectual property and become enablers of social +participation (Bauwens 2007, 2013; Kostakis 2012). They combine open +and closed elements in the architecture of their platforms to ensure a measure of profit and control by expanding the reach of neoliberal economy through cognitive capitalism (see Aytes 2013; Andrejevic 2013; Bauwens 2007, 2013; Kostakis 2012). Fuchs (2013, 219-220) notes that @@ -635,274 +647,307 @@ free labour is social, so should be the mode of its return”. Hence, she concludes, “social networking platforms should be deprivatized – that is, that ownership of users’ data should be returned to their rightful owners as the freedom to access and modify the protocols and diagrams -that structure their participation”. So, free labour is voluntary. In -peer production projects, the knowledge worker owns the final artefact -(which is always open to further development) of the productive process -and gains experience, knowledge, relations and/or even money (however, -monetary profit is not the key motivating factor) through it. In states -of privatisation (according to the aforementioned categorisation that -would be in the crowdsourcing/aggregation economies) free labour implies -exploitation. In addition to the social media monopolies, the development -of Apple's MacOS X is another example of external outsourcing. In short, -MacOS X is based on UNIX, software that begun as a free-shared product to -later become proprietary under different brand names and then free again -(for example, FreeBSD and NetBSD). Parts of the latter free software -components along with the mach kernel developed at Carnegie Mellon -University were included into NeXTSTEP operating system, which was -finally renamed into OS X. Hence, we argue that the Commons firstly -emerge as a tragedy due to long-term inertia and then evolve to a -farce or a parody. As soon as the gradual destruction is perceived -(tragedy) everybody agrees to privatise the management and in case -they do not agree, the state may force agreement in order to implement -the assignment. The common resource remains common by its name only -(parody). We argue that, unfortunately, this is a likely scenario. To -put it in software terminology, this constitutes a security hole in the -ecology of peer production, and, for the moment, no patch (i.e., solution) -has been proposed. The question, therefore, is whether the peer producers -will actually benefit from the development of P2P relations and the -production of commonly produced use value, or whether the Commonsbased -peer production phenomenon will just constitute a part of a neoliberal -Plan B, put in Caffentzis' terms (2010). Supposing peer production will -be progressively emerging as a dominant productive model upon which will -rely the prosperity of the people (see Hardt and Negri 2011; Rigi 2012; -Bauwens and Kostakis in press; Kostakis 2013), then the transcendence -of the parody is not just a theoretical issue to be dealt with. It is -rather a practical, political issue that will determine the success of the -Commons-based communities in general. Hence, it is necessary to approach -the Commons concept within the ongoing socio-economic context that is -blooming and discuss how it affects the function of the real economy. +that structure their participation”. + +So, free labour is voluntary. In peer production projects, the +knowledge worker owns the final artefact (which is always open to +further development) of the productive process and gains experience, +knowledge, relations and/or even money (however, monetary profit is +not the key motivating factor) through it. In states of privatisation +(according to the aforementioned categorisation that would be +in the crowdsourcing/aggregation economies) free labour implies +exploitation. In addition to the social media monopolies, the +development of Apple's MacOS X is another example of external +outsourcing. In short, MacOS X is based on UNIX, software that begun as +a free-shared product to later become proprietary under different brand +names and then free again (for example, FreeBSD and NetBSD). Parts of +the latter free software components along with the mach kernel developed +at Carnegie Mellon University were included into NeXTSTEP operating +system, which was finally renamed into OS X. + +Hence, we argue that the Commons firstly emerge as a tragedy due to +long-term inertia and then evolve to a farce or a parody. As soon as the +gradual destruction is perceived (tragedy) everybody agrees to privatise +the management and in case they do not agree, the state may force +agreement in order to implement the assignment. The common resource +remains common by its name only (parody). We argue that, unfortunately, +this is a likely scenario. To put it in software terminology, this +constitutes a security hole in the ecology of peer production, and, for +the moment, no patch (i.e., solution) has been proposed. The question, +therefore, is whether the peer producers will actually benefit from the +development of P2P relations and the production of commonly produced +use value, or whether the Commonsbased peer production phenomenon will +just constitute a part of a neoliberal Plan B, put in Caffentzis' terms +(2010). Supposing peer production will be progressively emerging as a +dominant productive model upon which will rely the prosperity of the +people (see Hardt and Negri 2011; Rigi 2012; Bauwens and Kostakis in +press; Kostakis 2013), then the transcendence of the parody is not +just a theoretical issue to be dealt with. It is rather a practical, +political issue that will determine the success of the Commons-based +communities in general. Hence, it is necessary to approach the Commons +concept within the ongoing socio-economic context that is blooming and +discuss how it affects the function of the real economy. + While the triggering event of its burst was the failure of subprime -mortgages, many opinions have been voiced concerning the causes of the -2008 financial bubble. Some of technoeconomic nature (for example Perez -2009a, 2009b) and others (for instance Sowell 2010; Krugman 2009, 2012; -Stiglitz 2010), which focus more on the symptoms rather than on the inherent contradictory characteristics of the capitalist system. According -to Karl Marx (1992/1885, 1993/1983), the general pattern of the capitalist -system, which makes economic crises inevitable, is created by the combined -action of two laws of capitalist integration. The first law concerns the -tendency of profit's quota to decrease whereas the second law describes -the need for an increasing capital concentration and accumulation. These -two laws contradict each other leading the system to collapses and -crises: Capital cannot be invested when the declining rate of profit's -quota is faster than the increasing rate of capital accumulation. In -Marx's analysis, capitalism is inherently built on a Sisyphean logic -reaching always a dead-end in which the escapable policy often concerns -the partial destruction of the total capital. For a certain period of -time, capitalism –a process of “creative destruction”, to remember -Schumpeter (1975/1942, 1982/1939) who shares many views with Marx in the -analysis of the capitalist dynamics– may seem sustainable, introducing -innovative products and services. Williamson (1995, 1998), also, from -a different perspective reaches a similar conclusion: Every firm will -stop developing once its organisational costs surpass the organisational -costs of a smaller firm. The partial transformation of the stagnant -capital into loan capital is used as a pressure valve for overcoming -the dead-end (Marx 1992/1885; Harvey 2007, 2010; Lapavitsas 2012). -The overflow of loan capital with compound interest into international -markets along with the shift of policy decision-making from democratically -elected state governments to the banking sector firms and institutions -preserves a global debt crisis. Once the loanable capital secures its -dominant position in the market, the debt crisis becomes permanent -and is reinforced regardless of the progress in the annual economic -indices. Even a prosperous economy will start declining in the course of -time if the annual surplus is being used to serve external debts. Serving -the external debt does not necessarily mean that the debt is reduced, -it may as well increase if the interest is accumulated into capital, -thus neutralising not only the benefit of the local producers, but also -any advantage on innovation achieved by their talent and effort. This -situation occurs when the creditor and the debtor sign an unbalanced -agreement, the interest rates and spreads are unfairly high and there -is no flexibility in monetary policy. In that case, and especially in -bankrupting economies, the individuals who participate in Commons-oriented -communities may fall into the trap of a parody of the Commons. The peer -producer participates to satisfy his/her inner positive motives, interests -and needs (for instance, the need to create, learn, communicate and share) -on a voluntary basis (Benkler 2006; Hertel, Niedner and Herrmann 2003; -Lakhani and Wolf 2005). As Hertel, Niedner and Herrmann (2003, 1174) -point out, the Linux kernel community participants are driven “by -similar motives as voluntary action within social movements such as the -civil rights movement, the labour movement, or the peace movement”. On -the other hand, the peer producer has no idea that his/her voluntary -inputs contribute to the retention of the average profit quota's decrease, -offering the chance to capital to develop, appropriate, expand and grow. -Therefore, we argue that those who have a competitive advantage over the -P2P relations of production will benefit from the appropriation of the -commonly peer produced use value. The aforementioned is a typical case of -the transformation of the tragedy into parody, once the lack of authority, -observed in several Commons-based peer projects, gives the chance to -extra-economic means to take advantage of creative communities' inertia. - -3. The Parody of Free Software? For the economic system the accumulation -of means of production is both a functional necessity and cause for -deadlock. In the area of information sciences, computers and other -digital devices, the technical capacity of using all those devices as -means of production is at the hands of the majority. The private property -in the means of production at this economic sector for the first time is -universal and the amount of means that people own decisively influences -their potential. Today, free software, due to its technical excellence, -is being widely used by organisations that compete against the philosophy -and practice of peer communities. One of the causes is the division of -the developers' community to those who use the term “free software”, -thus, contributing to an increasing power of software communities and -to those who prefer constructs like “open source” or “shared -source” arguing in favour of the ease of free software penetration into -the world of business. The latter removed from all users, individuals or -legal entities, the ability to understand that their political freedom -that depends on the use of digital media is far more important than the -technical superiority of the free software that enables those media. +mortgages, many opinions have been voiced concerning the causes +of the 2008 financial bubble. Some of technoeconomic nature (for +example Perez 2009a, 2009b) and others (for instance Sowell 2010; +Krugman 2009, 2012; Stiglitz 2010), which focus more on the symptoms +rather than on the inherent contradictory characteristics of the +capitalist system. According to Karl Marx (1992/1885, 1993/1983), the +general pattern of the capitalist system, which makes economic crises +inevitable, is created by the combined action of two laws of capitalist +integration. The first law concerns the tendency of profit's quota to +decrease whereas the second law describes the need for an increasing +capital concentration and accumulation. These two laws contradict each +other leading the system to collapses and crises: Capital cannot be +invested when the declining rate of profit's quota is faster than the +increasing rate of capital accumulation. In Marx's analysis, capitalism +is inherently built on a Sisyphean logic reaching always a dead-end in +which the escapable policy often concerns the partial destruction of the +total capital. For a certain period of time, capitalism –a process of +“creative destruction”, to remember Schumpeter (1975/1942, 1982/1939) +who shares many views with Marx in the analysis of the capitalist +dynamics– may seem sustainable, introducing innovative products and +services. Williamson (1995, 1998), also, from a different perspective +reaches a similar conclusion: Every firm will stop developing once its +organisational costs surpass the organisational costs of a smaller firm. + +The partial transformation of the stagnant capital into loan capital is +used as a pressure valve for overcoming the dead-end (Marx 1992/1885; +Harvey 2007, 2010; Lapavitsas 2012). The overflow of loan capital with +compound interest into international markets along with the shift of +policy decision-making from democratically elected state governments +to the banking sector firms and institutions preserves a global debt +crisis. Once the loanable capital secures its dominant position in the +market, the debt crisis becomes permanent and is reinforced regardless +of the progress in the annual economic indices. Even a prosperous +economy will start declining in the course of time if the annual surplus +is being used to serve external debts. Serving the external debt does +not necessarily mean that the debt is reduced, it may as well increase +if the interest is accumulated into capital, thus neutralising not only +the benefit of the local producers, but also any advantage on innovation +achieved by their talent and effort. This situation occurs when the +creditor and the debtor sign an unbalanced agreement, the interest rates +and spreads are unfairly high and there is no flexibility in monetary +policy. In that case, and especially in bankrupting economies, the +individuals who participate in Commons-oriented communities may fall +into the trap of a parody of the Commons. + +The peer producer participates to satisfy his/her inner positive +motives, interests and needs (for instance, the need to create, learn, +communicate and share) on a voluntary basis (Benkler 2006; Hertel, +Niedner and Herrmann 2003; Lakhani and Wolf 2005). As Hertel, Niedner +and Herrmann (2003, 1174) point out, the Linux kernel community +participants are driven “by similar motives as voluntary action within +social movements such as the civil rights movement, the labour movement, +or the peace movement”. On the other hand, the peer producer has no +idea that his/her voluntary inputs contribute to the retention of the +average profit quota's decrease, offering the chance to capital to +develop, appropriate, expand and grow. Therefore, we argue that those +who have a competitive advantage over the P2P relations of production +will benefit from the appropriation of the commonly peer produced use +value. The aforementioned is a typical case of the transformation of the +tragedy into parody, once the lack of authority, observed in several +Commons-based peer projects, gives the chance to extra-economic means to +take advantage of creative communities' inertia. + +The Parody of Free Software? + +For the economic system the accumulation of means of production is +both a functional necessity and cause for deadlock. In the area of +information sciences, computers and other digital devices, the technical +capacity of using all those devices as means of production is at the +hands of the majority. The private property in the means of production +at this economic sector for the first time is universal and the amount +of means that people own decisively influences their potential. Today, +free software, due to its technical excellence, is being widely used +by organisations that compete against the philosophy and practice of +peer communities. One of the causes is the division of the developers' +community to those who use the term “free software”, thus, contributing +to an increasing power of software communities and to those who prefer +constructs like “open source” or “shared source” arguing in favour of +the ease of free software penetration into the world of business. The +latter removed from all users, individuals or legal entities, the +ability to understand that their political freedom that depends on +the use of digital media is far more important than the technical +superiority of the free software that enables those media. + The majority of the people cannot be aware of all these, when free software is not a corner stone of the public education system. This shortcoming severely damages society or part of it in the face of urgent social issues. Even the application of wide consent policies is doomed to fail if the technical infrastructure does not deal with -immediate social problems. One may observe two heavy consequences of -the community division. The approaches closer to “open source” +immediate social problems. One may observe two heavy consequences +of the community division. The approaches closer to “open source” are anti-pedagogical due to their axiological neutrality, thereby cannot get promoted as educational material, while friction with free software does not offer teachers a clear direction. Then society, due to absence of guidance, is moving conceptually to what people intuitively understand. That software technology is more technology and -less software, hence, a business for specialised engineers. When the new -technology of typography was invented, its high cost kept the majority -at a distance from these new means of production. In our days, when -the excuse of keeping a distance from digital media is not an option, -the misinformation, even by official sources, regarding the dynamics -of software has become epidemic. In that way, it prevents people from -finding out how to use computers for their own benefit, instead forcing -them to assign even the simplest task to computer experts. The network, -i.e., a sum of networked nodes, is actually the “real computer” since -coherence and economies of scale are both possible in the network. The -traditional state policies that give way to monopoly power cannot easily -apply here. The advocates of P2P architecture are struggling against a -coordinated international effort to control the power of peer nodes before -the majority realises the width of opportunities it offers. The chosen -policy to subvert Commons-based communities is on one hand the pressure -for signing international agreements against the freedom of Internet, -which is a typical operation of institutional integration, and on the -other the binding of users to monopoly corporations. Those corporations -charge for pre-installed proprietary technologies that come with any -newly purchased device and deprive all from basic freedoms in exchange -of a presumed ease of use. Although the “golden cage” is a syndrome -that cannot last forever, companies that develop non-free software may -estimate that one way or another it will be a source of income driven by -the power of inertia. Proprietary technologies in operating systems and -software applications have two major consequences. They keep the users -divided and helpless (Stallman 2008), deconstruct local cultures (Greve -2006a, 2006b) and increase digital illiteracy. This is a good example of +less software, hence, a business for specialised engineers. + +When the new technology of typography was invented, its high cost kept +the majority at a distance from these new means of production. In our +days, when the excuse of keeping a distance from digital media is not +an option, the misinformation, even by official sources, regarding the +dynamics of software has become epidemic. In that way, it prevents +people from finding out how to use computers for their own benefit, +instead forcing them to assign even the simplest task to computer +experts. + +The network, i.e., a sum of networked nodes, is actually the “real +computer” since coherence and economies of scale are both possible in +the network. The traditional state policies that give way to monopoly +power cannot easily apply here. The advocates of P2P architecture +are struggling against a coordinated international effort to control +the power of peer nodes before the majority realises the width of +opportunities it offers. The chosen policy to subvert Commons-based +communities is on one hand the pressure for signing international +agreements against the freedom of Internet, which is a typical operation +of institutional integration, and on the other the binding of users +to monopoly corporations. Those corporations charge for pre-installed +proprietary technologies that come with any newly purchased device and +deprive all from basic freedoms in exchange of a presumed ease of use. + +Although the “golden cage” is a syndrome that cannot last forever, +companies that develop non-free software may estimate that one way +or another it will be a source of income driven by the power of +inertia. Proprietary technologies in operating systems and software +applications have two major consequences. They keep the users divided +and helpless (Stallman 2008), deconstruct local cultures (Greve 2006a, +2006b) and increase digital illiteracy. This is a good example of external outsourcing, which holds a more or less important role, however the institutional integration appears to be the most appropriate way of undermining the Commons. -4. Overcoming the Tensions In times when the global economy is relatively -stable, the parody of the Commons can be easily avoided. There is -insignificant migration of labour power from the corporate model -towards the Commons, hence no serious pressure to apply institutional -integration and the mobility of community members practically cancels the -consequence of crowdsourcing. But in an era of economic collapse and while -mobility becomes a risk, gradually more people direct their attention to -communities, with many of them doing so for survival purposes. The state -seems to face Commons-based peer communities as ordinary economic units -subject to heavy taxation while supports “intellectual property”-based -activities. Those activities are injected into communities blocking -their growth. The hope that the multiplicity of communities will help -them rise into dominant relations of production is refuted since -the political system will allow communities to grow only if their -operations and functions become integrated to the established mode of -production. History shows that the capitalist mode of production allowed -no other form of production. The future of pre-capitalist or novel produc- -tion modes was predetermined: destruction or integration. While P2P -relations are not dominant, their dependence on a friendly economic -environment becomes imperative. A recent example where a Commons might be -commodified is the case of ERT's digital archive. ERT was the Greek state -television and radio network. It was a constituent of the public sector -and had been funded through a mandatory tax implemented into the bill of -the public electricity enterprise (DEI) for decades. In December 2007, -the launch of the effort to digitise the old ERT archives was announced, -which first delivered results a few months later. Although initially this -endeavour was considered an important step for the public availability -of a unique cultural wealth, the decision to be distributed in that -specific way was met with the opposition of several Commons-oriented -communities and civilians. According to the protesters, behind this -initiative lies an “innocent fraud”: The digital archive remained -in the exclusive ownership of ERT. Patented file types and video, text -and picture formats were selected to implement the digitisation while -download and further use of the material was forbidden. Further, in the -current event of ERT's dissolution as a consequence of the Greek crisis, -(at the time of this writing, August 2013, the fate of ERT's archive is -still unknown) this national cultural aggregation, created and funded by -the Greek citizens, may revert to private ownership. Already during the -summer absence of a public Greek network, private stations broadcasted -parts of the archive. The ERT case highlights the traditional concept for -state ownership of public goods: The state manages a resource on behalf -of the civilians over which they have no authority. And in turbulent -times the exploitation of the Commons, as part of “shock doctrine” -policies (see Klein 2008), more easily takes place contributing to -and catalysing the process of capital accumulation. An effective -treatment is arguably the use of means that guarantee the smooth growth -of communities. Structurally, a measure is the adoption by society of -the five maturity conditions to enter the Commons: open standards, free -software, P2P architecture, advanced learning system and communities. As -far as the political context is concerned, the parliamentary democracy, -for instance in Greece, is trying hard to secure the current status -quo by demolishing various citizens' rights and occasionally violating -constitution. One should not rest his/her hopes on the political party -system and the associated policies mainly due to three characteristics -inherent to political party policies: i) restrictions on democracy is -a policy to overcome economic crisis; ii) supranational centralism in -deciding and applying fiscal and monetary policies serves the vision -of a United Europe; iii) in a long period of depression, increased -capital borrowing is the best method to return to growth. This set -of characteristics makes this intentional absurdity evident in the -behaviour of political parties, for which the probability to adopt P2P -practices is practically zero, since this perspective requires immediate -implementation of P2P infrastructures, something which is in contrast -with the notion of “property” as it is embedded in the philosophy -of the political system. How is it possible for a political system that -defends the constitutional interpretation of “property”, to take the -lead in confiscating private properties? One possible answer is that while -the political system simply declares itself as an adherent of property, -it only defends a particular monopolising trend, a form of impersonal -appropriation against the real individuals. When Jean Monnet (1976) -declared “nous ne coalisons pas des Etats, nous unissons des hommes” -(“we are not building a coalition of states; we are creating a union of -peoples”), his wish came along with the deconstruction of the national -state, conceptually prepared in various publications. The philosophical -background of that approach was clearly Manichaeistic since the bipolar -schema national-supranational is interpreted on the basis of a theocracy -that proclaims a dualism of absolute extremes. Only a few scholars, -Victor Hugo one of them, attempted to transcend the anti-dialectic -heritage of the discourse around the “ideal of a unified Europe” -(Swedberg 1994). The answer to the problem should be a type of democracy -capable to emerge from the activity of Commons-based communities and -the interactions among them. A political project at both national and -international level is required to release the healthy forces that demand -the construction of communities for the benefit of their members. Given -the estimated lengthy time period of the economic crisis as well as its -structural peculiarity, which is a combination of monetary inflexibility -and debt accumulation regardless the possible reduction of deficit, -the parody of the Commons can be eliminated only if communities adhere to -their mission: To ensure a high maturity level and make their requests -for a Commons infrastructure a government policy towards a “partner -state”, i.e., democratically-run, civic institutions that protect -the common good (see Bauwens 2012; Kostakis 2012). This high maturity -level could be achieved through the establishment of a democratic legal -jurisdiction, which would impose restrictions on the exploitation of the -Commons (Kleiner 2010; Fuchs 2013; Bauwens and Kostakis in press). Peer -production might be collectively sustainable but it is not individually: -Most of the peer contributors cannot make a living and they are dependent -on wages from the capitalist market. We side with Bauwens and Kostakis -(in press) who suggest “the creation of Commons-friendly, ethical -enterprises, consisting of the commoners themselves, who also control -their own governance and have ownership. Such enterprises would be -legally structured so that theirs is an obligation to support the -circulation of the Commons”. The development of the Peer Production -Licenses, introduced by Kleiner (2010) as a copyfarleft type license, -could be part of the debate. These licenses could be oriented towards -a plural form of ownership, which would include “maker ownership -(i.e. a revisiting of worker ownership for the P2P age), combined with -user ownership, i.e., a recognition that users of networks co-create -value; and eventually a return for the ethical funders that support -the enterprise” (Bauwens and Kostakis in press). In that way profit -making is allowed, but profit-maximisation would not be the driving -force of economic development. Against the capital accumulation, +Overcoming the Tensions + +In times when the global economy is relatively stable, the parody of +the Commons can be easily avoided. There is insignificant migration +of labour power from the corporate model towards the Commons, hence +no serious pressure to apply institutional integration and the +mobility of community members practically cancels the consequence of +crowdsourcing. But in an era of economic collapse and while mobility +becomes a risk, gradually more people direct their attention to +communities, with many of them doing so for survival purposes. + +The state seems to face Commons-based peer communities as ordinary +economic units subject to heavy taxation while supports “intellectual +property”-based activities. Those activities are injected into +communities blocking their growth. The hope that the multiplicity of +communities will help them rise into dominant relations of production +is refuted since the political system will allow communities to grow +only if their operations and functions become integrated to the +established mode of production. History shows that the capitalist +mode of production allowed no other form of production. The future +of pre-capitalist or novel produc- tion modes was predetermined: +destruction or integration. While P2P relations are not dominant, their +dependence on a friendly economic environment becomes imperative. + +A recent example where a Commons might be commodified is the case +of ERT's digital archive. ERT was the Greek state television and +radio network. It was a constituent of the public sector and had +been funded through a mandatory tax implemented into the bill of +the public electricity enterprise (DEI) for decades. In December +2007, the launch of the effort to digitise the old ERT archives was +announced, which first delivered results a few months later. Although +initially this endeavour was considered an important step for the +public availability of a unique cultural wealth, the decision to +be distributed in that specific way was met with the opposition of +several Commons-oriented communities and civilians. According to the +protesters, behind this initiative lies an “innocent fraud”: The digital +archive remained in the exclusive ownership of ERT. Patented file +types and video, text and picture formats were selected to implement +the digitisation while download and further use of the material was +forbidden. Further, in the current event of ERT's dissolution as a +consequence of the Greek crisis, (at the time of this writing, August +2013, the fate of ERT's archive is still unknown) this national cultural +aggregation, created and funded by the Greek citizens, may revert to +private ownership. Already during the summer absence of a public Greek +network, private stations broadcasted parts of the archive. The ERT +case highlights the traditional concept for state ownership of public +goods: The state manages a resource on behalf of the civilians over +which they have no authority. And in turbulent times the exploitation of +the Commons, as part of “shock doctrine” policies (see Klein 2008), more +easily takes place contributing to and catalysing the process of capital +accumulation. + +An effective treatment is arguably the use of means that guarantee the +smooth growth of communities. Structurally, a measure is the adoption +by society of the five maturity conditions to enter the Commons: open +standards, free software, P2P architecture, advanced learning system +and communities. As far as the political context is concerned, the +parliamentary democracy, for instance in Greece, is trying hard to +secure the current status quo by demolishing various citizens' rights +and occasionally violating constitution. One should not rest his/her +hopes on the political party system and the associated policies mainly +due to three characteristics inherent to political party policies: i) +restrictions on democracy is a policy to overcome economic crisis; ii) +supranational centralism in deciding and applying fiscal and monetary +policies serves the vision of a United Europe; iii) in a long period of +depression, increased capital borrowing is the best method to return to +growth. + +This set of characteristics makes this intentional absurdity evident in +the behaviour of political parties, for which the probability to adopt +P2P practices is practically zero, since this perspective requires +immediate implementation of P2P infrastructures, something which is +in contrast with the notion of “property” as it is embedded in the +philosophy of the political system. How is it possible for a political +system that defends the constitutional interpretation of “property”, to +take the lead in confiscating private properties? One possible answer is +that while the political system simply declares itself as an adherent +of property, it only defends a particular monopolising trend, a form of +impersonal appropriation against the real individuals. + +When Jean Monnet (1976) declared “nous ne coalisons pas des Etats, +nous unissons des hommes” (“we are not building a coalition of states; +we are creating a union of peoples”), his wish came along with the +deconstruction of the national state, conceptually prepared in various +publications. The philosophical background of that approach was clearly +Manichaeistic since the bipolar schema national-supranational is +interpreted on the basis of a theocracy that proclaims a dualism of +absolute extremes. Only a few scholars, Victor Hugo one of them, +attempted to transcend the anti-dialectic heritage of the discourse +around the “ideal of a unified Europe” (Swedberg 1994). + +The answer to the problem should be a type of democracy capable +to emerge from the activity of Commons-based communities and the +interactions among them. A political project at both national and +international level is required to release the healthy forces that +demand the construction of communities for the benefit of their +members. Given the estimated lengthy time period of the economic crisis +as well as its structural peculiarity, which is a combination of +monetary inflexibility and debt accumulation regardless the possible +reduction of deficit, the parody of the Commons can be eliminated only +if communities adhere to their mission: To ensure a high maturity level +and make their requests for a Commons infrastructure a government policy +towards a “partner state”, i.e., democratically-run, civic institutions +that protect the common good (see Bauwens 2012; Kostakis 2012). + +This high maturity level could be achieved through the establishment +of a democratic legal jurisdiction, which would impose restrictions on +the exploitation of the Commons (Kleiner 2010; Fuchs 2013; Bauwens and +Kostakis in press). Peer production might be collectively sustainable +but it is not individually: Most of the peer contributors cannot +make a living and they are dependent on wages from the capitalist +market. We side with Bauwens and Kostakis (in press) who suggest “the +creation of Commons-friendly, ethical enterprises, consisting of the +commoners themselves, who also control their own governance and have +ownership. Such enterprises would be legally structured so that theirs +is an obligation to support the circulation of the Commons”. The +development of the Peer Production Licenses, introduced by Kleiner +(2010) as a copyfarleft type license, could be part of the debate. These +licenses could be oriented towards a plural form of ownership, which +would include “maker ownership (i.e. a revisiting of worker ownership +for the P2P age), combined with user ownership, i.e., a recognition +that users of networks co-create value; and eventually a return for the +ethical funders that support the enterprise” (Bauwens and Kostakis in +press). In that way profit making is allowed, but profit-maximisation +would not be the driving force of economic development. + +Against the capital accumulation, which leads to the parody of the Commons-based communities' political struggle should include the creation of an infrastructure that protects, enables and catalyses the circulation of the Commons. In that way peer @@ -913,9 +958,11 @@ capabilities (see Kostakis 2013); iii) and, thus, protect itself against capital accumulation with the aim to marginalise, control and eventually transcend capitalism. -5. Conclusion We defined two main features of the parody of the Commons: -the institutional integration and the external outsourcing, according -to which the Commons-based peer production is converted into a mode of +Conclusion + +We defined two main features of the parody of the Commons: the +institutional integration and the external outsourcing, according to +which the Commons-based peer production is converted into a mode of crowdsourcing. In these conditions, we described how the Commons emerge as a promise, then a tragedy and evolve into a parody. As soon as the gradual destruction is perceived (tragedy) the management of the commons @@ -934,9 +981,14 @@ advantage or preferential access and control delegation to the most powerful parts cannot be possible if Commons-based communities follow their principles. The opening of a path to such a perspective depends on whether the majority decides to take creative control of their future. -References Andrejevic, Mark. 2013. Estranged Free Labor. In Digital + + +References + +Andrejevic, Mark. 2013. Estranged Free Labor. In Digital Labor. The Internet as Playground and Factory, edited by Trebor Scholz, -149-164. New York: Routledge. Aytes, Ayhan. 2013. Return of the Crowds: +149-164. New York: Routledge. +Aytes, Ayhan. 2013. Return of the Crowds: Mechanical Turk and Neoliberal States of Exception. In Digital Labor. The Internet as Playground and Factory, edited by Trebor Scholz, 79-97. New York: Routledge.