

A
HISTORICAL COMMENTARY
ON
THUCYDIDES

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THE TEN YEARS' WAR

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Drawn by Phyllis Gomme

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BOOK IV

YEAR 7: 425-424 B.C. (CC. I-51)

1. Fighting in Sicily continued

1. 1. περὶ σίτου ἐκβολήν: 'when the ear was beginning to form'; some time before the ἀκμῆ, probably before the end of April. See ii. 19. 1 n.; Busolt, iii. 1085. 1; and below, 2. 1, 6. 1. This is the only place where this phrase occurs in Thucydides, and he is the only classical author who uses it. See Appendix.

Messene, with more or less reluctance, had joined forces with Athens the previous summer (iii. 90).

3. ἐπιβοηθῶσι: perhaps here used in a neutral sense, 'send an expedition to'; cf. iii. 26. 1, and 4. 3, below. But even if it must mean 'send help to', there was no need for Classen to find an inconsistency between this and § 1 on the ground that there Messene is described as already hostile to Athens and so to Rhegion. Its use in c. 7 is a close parallel.

4. ἄλλαι αἱ πληρούμεναι: Cobet's *ā. ai aἰ̄ πλ.* is attractive, for it gives some sense to *πληρούμεναι*. The simple excision of the article does not help. (Classen objected that ii. 25. 4, οἱ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπιβῆναι, is no parallel; it is not, but it is there that the article might be dropped, 'because they were unable to embark'.)

2. Fifth Invasion of Attica. Another Athenian Squadron sent to Sicily

2. 1. πρὶν τὸν σῖτον ἐν ἀκμῇ εἶναι: see 1. 1 n., and 6. 1. About the beginning of May, or a little later if *χειμῶν ἐπιγενόμενος*, κ.τ.λ. (3. 1, 6. 1), means that the weather was unusually cold for a long time.

2. ὥσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο: iii. 115. 4-5.

3. τῶν ἐν τῷ ὅρει φυγάδων: iii. 85. 2-3. (There is much to be said for Classen's *προεπεπλεύκεσαν* for the MSS. *παρ-*, especially after the different use of *παραπλέοντας* just above.)

4. Δημοσθένει δὲ ὅντι ιδιώτῃ μετὰ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τὴν ἐξ Ἀκαρναίας: the orthodox theory is that the strategoi for the year were elected in the spring (not before the seventh prytany, *Ἄθην. 44. 4*), but, like other officials who were not chosen before the end of the civil year, did not take office till the official beginning of the year, i.e. about midsummer; and that Demosthenes, after being dismissed from office in consequence of the disaster in Aitolia (see iii. 114. 1 n.), was re-elected strategos in the spring of this year but had not yet taken office. In 29. 1 below he is called one of the strategoi at Pylos; and in October of this year he is officially strategos (below, p. 505). I am

not convinced of the correctness of the orthodox view, which, however, I cannot discuss here; and I certainly do not believe that by ὅντι ἴδωτη (= 'though without a command') Thucydides means to describe the position of a strategos-elect, waiting to take office as soon as the law allowed; but by the addition of *μετὰ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν*, 'since his return', he may mean that he was then dismissed from office. It should, however, be noted that some time elapsed between Demosthenes' defeat in Aitolia (iii. 98. 5 n.) and his return home; and that in this interval he had the great success in Akarnania which encouraged him to return (iii. 114. 1); we are not told that he was dismissed from office in consequence of his defeat, and there is some reason to suppose that he was not (see iii. 102. 3). From this passage and those in book iii alone, it would more naturally be inferred that Demosthenes had simply not been re-elected, perhaps had not even stood for election, in the spring of 425.

χρήσθαι ταῖς ναυσὶ ταύταις: the main object of the expedition was Sicily; on its way there the fleet was to settle a difficult dispute in Kerkyra; and on its way to Kerkyra it might engage in some special action at some point on the Peloponnesian coast. We can easily imagine the rider added to the main decree, introduced in the ekklisia. No wonder that Athens had little success in Sicily; and cf. ii. 85. 5–6.

3-23. Campaign of Pylos

3. 1. ἐς τὴν Πύλον: for the topography, see below, p. 483.

ἀ δὲ: Demosthenes had been given commission to act as opportunity offered; hence the vague expression here (Classen).

We must bear in mind that the plan was that, once Pylos had been fortified, the bulk of the fleet could safely go on its way; only a small force would be required to hold the place, and the rest would not be detained for long.

κατὰ τύχην: how far Thucydides intended to emphasize the element of chance in the campaign of Pylos is discussed below, p. 488.

κατήνεγκε τὰς ναῦς: Burrows (below, p. 482) notes that Thucydides does not specify in what part of the bay they took refuge, but seems to assume that the whole 'harbour' was safe. See pp. 482–3.

2. *ξυνεκπλεῦσαι*: this, the reading of C, seems preferable to *ξυνέπλευσε* of the majority of MSS., and is perhaps supported by E's reading, *ξυνέπλευσαν*. It is all part of Demosthenes' argument; and there is nothing in Classen's objection that he would not now for the first time divulge his purpose to the strategoi. Probably not; and *ξυνεκπλεῦσαι* does not mean that he did. Yet their objection to Demosthenes' plan—*πολλὰς εἶναι ἄκρας ἐρήμους*—suggests that they had not understood its full implication; nor perhaps had the Athenians at home, for the expedition brought no building tools with them

(4. 2). Contrast the careful preparations made for the Megara expedition, 69. 2. Demosthenes himself, we must suppose, had noted this particular promontory and harbour on a previous voyage round the Peloponnese; and it was his idea to fortify the place and hold it permanently, unlike Methone (ii. 25. 1-2), Pheia (ii. 25. 3-5), Prasai (ii. 56. 6), and, perhaps, Ellomenos (iii. 94. 1 n.).

ξύλων τε καὶ λίθων: there is plenty of stone about now, but no timber in the near neighbourhood. And the Spartans, commanding the whole area round Pylos, had to send to Asine for it (13. 1).

ἐρῆμον αὐτό τε καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς χώρας: how much of the land around was 'uninhabited' Thucydides does not tell us; but the valley of the Pamisos in Messenia is one of the richest districts in Greece. **ἔρημος** therefore must again be used in the sense of 'unguarded', 'with no armed force to defend it', as in iii. 106. 1. This gives the connexion of thought with the next sentence, **ἀπέχει γάρ, κ.τ.λ.**: the hoplites of Sparta are a long way away, and this is an additional advantage. See also **όμοφώνους**, § 3 below (there were inhabitants there), and **πλεῖστ'** ἀν βλάπτειν—for they would do little harm by ravaging uninhabited land.

σταδίους — — τετρακοσίους: approximately correct; but no one would suppose from Thucydides that the figure is right only for the direct route which from the Eurotas valley goes over the high and steep Langáda Pass to Messenia. He is in fact as vague about the journey as Homer had been. There is another, longer path to the north (rising, however, to 4,000 ft.: Leake, *Morea*, iii. 17-18); but the normal route for Lacedaemonian armies was up the Eurotas valley past Orestheion (v. 64. 3), then westwards by the Arkadian uplands and southwards again through upper and lower Messenia; and by this way the distance is nearly 600 stades.

3. **τὴν πόλιν δαπανᾶν:** I agree with Steup that we cannot take **δαπανᾶν**, with the scholiast and Suidas, to mean **ἐς δαπάνας ἐμβαλεῖν**, a unique interpretation of a common word. (A late meaning is 'to exhaust', as in Appian, *B.C.* iv. 108, **ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τῆς χώρας δεδαπανημένης**; and this *may* have arisen from an earlier usage 'to exhaust by squandering money or other resources', though no instance of this appears to be known.) It is perhaps best to translate, therefore, 'if he wished the state to spend its money' or 'if he wished just to spend money by occupying them', bracketing either **καταλαμβάνων** or **τὴν πόλιν**; but neither solution is satisfactory.

Wilamowitz, p. 315 (below, p. 485) would keep the text, comparing Aischin. iii. 166, **ἀμπελουργοῦσι τὴν πόλιν**, which does not seem to be parallel.

λιμένος τε προσόντος: the Athenians, therefore (provided that they could maintain communications with Athens), could make it a permanent station, almost like Naupaktos.

οἰκείους ὄντας αὐτῷ τὸ ἀρχαῖον: just a generation had passed since these Messenians had left the Peloponnese and been settled in Naupaktos (i. 103. 1 n.).

δύοφώνους: see 41. 2; and compare iii. 112. 4. This would not have been of much advantage if the neighbourhood over a large area was uninhabited at the time.

We must remember that not all helots by any means, perhaps, after the last revolt, only a small minority, were of Dorian speech; and those of non-Dorian origin could apparently still be distinguished by their dialect.

4. 1. οὐτε τοὺς στρατιώτας, ὕστερον καὶ τοῖς ταξιάρχοις κοινώσας: explained by most edd. as 'approaching the soldiery through the taxiarchs', as though the discipline in the Athenian army was such that a man in Demosthenes' special position could only communicate with the soldiers through the taxiarchs, and, if this were so, Eurymedon and Sophokles would have allowed him to do so and the taxiarchs' own views were not considered; and as though Thucydides were intending here to be thus pedantically accurate. (In vii. 60. 2, as Steup points out, the taxiarchs are taken into consultation with the strategoi; this is the only other mention of these officers in Thucydides, except viii. 92. 4. See vol. i, p. 22.)

I agree with Steup that the text can hardly stand: he would adopt Köstlin's suggestion, bracketing *τοὺς στρατιώτας* (with a resulting anacoluthon, which is harsh, but just possible)—the officers all refused, until the soldiers took the matter in hand themselves. We might conjecture, if the MSS. reading is wrong, *οὐτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οὐτε τοὺς ταξιάρχους οὐτε ὕστερον καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις κοινώσας* ('nor later the soldiers, when he approached them too') and *αὐτοῖς [τοῖς στρατιώταις]*. A simpler remedy would be *⟨οὐδὲ⟩ ὕστερον τοῖς ταξ. κ.*; but this leaves unexplained the special mention of the taxiarchoi. *ἡσύχαζεν ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας*: this, the MSS. reading, is scarcely possible, for inactivity due to stress of weather cannot be the consequence of failure to persuade the generals and the soldiers; and, if the whole force were thus detained in Pylos, this would not be expressed by *ἡσύχαζεν*, for Demosthenes was not in command, but by *ἡσύχαζον*. This was Dobree's conjecture; but the inconsequence with *ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν, κ.τ.λ.*, is against it. If *ἡσύχαζεν* is right, it must mean 'he stopped importuning them', and *ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας* cannot belong with it. Poppo thought the MSS. reading could be kept by punctuating after *ἡσύχαζεν*, and taking *ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας* with the subordinate clause, placed before the conjunction for emphasis; he was followed by Stahl and Classen. But none of the passages quoted to illustrate an order of words which in general is easy and obvious enough (as i. 11. 2, iii. 39. 2, 109. 2, v. 7. 5, viii. 78. 2), are at all like this one;

which has the added disadvantage of great obscurity, since ήσυχαζεν ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας is in itself so natural a phrase. I would prefer to transpose ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας before σχολάζουσι, with which it belongs.

2. σιδήρια μὲν λιθουργὰ οὐκ ἔχοντες: see n. on 3. 2, ξυνεκπλεῦσαι. δῆπος μὴ ἀποπίπτοι: this certainly looks like a scholiast's explanation (quite unnecessary, as so often) of ὡς μάλιστα μέλλοι ἐπιμένειν. Yet Hobbes's translation reads naturally enough: "and for Morter, where it needed, for want of Vessels, they carried it on their backs, with their bodies enclining forward, so as it might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from falling."

Note that these men, Athenian citizens and allies, popularly supposed to spend their days in ekklesia and dikastery or in watching slaves work, can build a wall, and are not helpless without their tools. Many of them were hoplites, as the presence of ταξιαρχοι shows (cf. 9. 2 n.).

5. 1. ἔτυχον ἄγοντες: 'were at that time holding.' See below, p. 488.
 2. ἐν ἡμέραις ἔξ: Diodoros, who omits or confuses most of what was significant in the story of Pylos, says in twenty days, xii. 61. 1. It is impossible to say from what source this comes, or to what it originally referred.

μετὰ νεῶν πέντε: where were they anchored, or where drawn up on shore? See below, pp. 484-5.

6. 1. πρῷ ἐσβαλόντες: see 2. 1, and compare ii. 19. 1, iii. 1. 1. We must suppose that the corn which was not yet ripe enough to feed the greater part of the army was Boeotian, not that the Athenians were still sowing corn for the enemy to reap. See vii. 27. 4. τοῖς πολλοῖς, of course, does not mean the ordinary soldiers by contrast with the comfortably-living generals and other officers, as Graves curiously supposes. (I would punctuate with a comma before ἄμα δὲ πρῷ.)

τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ὥραν: the season of *settled* weather, τὸ καλοκαῖρι, as it is now called, which should have begun by the first of May in Attica.

7. Athenian reverse in Chalkidike

7. Σιμωνίδης: not otherwise known, any more than is the town which he attacked. The whole episode is of the smallest importance; Thucydides had it among his 'notes'. But he may have decided to keep the note, to remind us that in spite of the fall of Poteidaia Athens had not yet restored her rule in Chalkidike and that with all her activity and success elsewhere her operations were feeble and ineffectual here, and as a pointer to the failure to meet Brasidas' attack which has soon to be related. But his reminders and pointers

are not explicit: he does not, for example, tell us in ii. 70. 4 that the Bottiaioi and Chalkideis continued their successful resistance, a fact which we learn incidentally from ii. 101. 1, this passage, and 79. 2, below.

It appears from the assessment decree of 425–424 (below, p. 500) that Athens had already recovered the southern coasts of Chalkidike from Mekyberna at the head of the Toronae Gulf to Assera at the head of the Singitic: Meritt, *A.J.A.* xxix, 1925, 26–28. See also n. on v. 18. 6.

τὴν ἐπὶ Θράκης Μενδαιών ἀποικίαν: so should we read, as Stuart Jones, with no comma after Θράκης: for the other, well-known Eion, on the Strymon, was also ἐπὶ Θράκης. It may be inferred that this Eion was within easy reach of the Chalkidians and Bottiaioi, probably within the territory of one of them. *πολεμίαν δέ*, presumably, as Stahl and others, ‘though a colony of Mende, which was still loyal (iv. 123), it was at war with Athens’.

ἐκ τῶν φρουρίων: ii. 13. 6 n.

8. Pylos Campaign continued

8. 2. **τὰς — — ναῦς σφῶν τὰς ἔξήκοντα:** see 2. 3, and 11. 2 n.

τὸν Λευκαδίων ἴσθμόν: see iii. 81. 1.

τὰς ἐν Ζακύνθῳ Ἀττικὰς ναῦς: Wilamowitz, p. 310 (see below, p. 485), finds a difficulty in the fact that Eurymedon and Sophokles, who were in a hurry to get to Kerkyra and Sicily (5. 2), were now not beyond Zakynthos: was this not by arrangement with Demosthenes? Or were they covering themselves in case of disaster to the latter? Cf. Busolt, iii. 1089. 1. There is no great difficulty: the Peloponnesian fleet had been sent for at once (*πέμψαντες* above, contrasted in tense with *περιήγγελλον*), perhaps even before the departure of the Athenian fleet from Pylos, and arrived as soon as the first hoplites from Sparta. See 9. 3 n. Eurymedon will have waited for them at Zakynthos. Perhaps, if Thucydides was not well informed in every detail, he had started northwards, and had returned when he found that Knemos had got by him, and found Demosthenes' urgent message waiting for him. What is perhaps to be noticed is that we are not told of any active step to intercept the Peloponnesian fleet; but the immediate return of Eurymedon and the main fleet to Pylos (13. 2) is not surprising. The situation at Kerkyra would be relieved by the retreat of the enemy; and one of Eurymedon's main tasks was the destruction of the enemy's fleet, wherever it could be found.

4. **καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆσοι:** most edd. say these are the two dispatched by Demosthenes, not the main fleet. Classen and Graves thought the latter, I think rightly. We do not particularly want to know that the two obeyed their commander's order, but that Eurymedon acted according to Demosthenes' message.

5. ὅπως μὴ τί - - - ἐφορμίσασθαι: if the Peloponnesians could prevent the Athenian fleet from entering the 'harbour' behind Sphakteria and if, further (§§ 7-8), they occupied the island so as to deny the Athenians the use of it, their enemy would have no nearby base of operations (the shore of Pylos itself being unusable, § 8), and so would be unable to break the siege of the troops in Pylos or interfere with attacks on the fortress, either from sea or land. But we ask ourselves again: if, outside the 'harbour', there was no landing-ground, where were now the three ships remaining to Demosthenes, before he had them dragged up among the boulders of Pylos (9. 1)? Had he hurriedly taken them from their previous anchorage?

6. ή γὰρ νῆσος ή Σφακτηρία, κ.τ.λ.: this general description of Sphakteria in relation to the 'harbour' is accurate, and leaves no doubt that by 'the harbour' Thucydides means Navarino Bay; but, as is well known, it contains two considerable topographical errors. Of the two entrances to the bay, that to the north, between Sphakteria and Pylos, is, as Thucydides says, narrow (*c.* 150 yards) and shallow (now only some 2 ft. at its shallowest, where there is a sand-bank), and could easily be blocked by a couple of triremes; but the southern is not only some 1,400 yards wide, but, what is more important, about 200 feet deep and could not have been blocked even by the whole Peloponnesian fleet. It is quite out of the question (see below, n. on *βύζην*, § 7). The second error is in the length of Sphakteria Island, which is 24 stades, not 15. There is perhaps a MSS. error here in the figure; but in view of the other mistake it is hardly proper to suggest it. See further below, pp. 482-6.

It is highly characteristic of our later authorities (Strabo, Plutarch, Pausanias, not to mention Dionysios) that none of them corrects Thucydides' errors. Such criticism as there was of him ran on very different lines. So Grundy, *J.H.S.* xvi, 1896, 12. Modern editors of Thucydides have often behaved in a similar fashion; but at least they have relied on others to travel and tell them the truth.

ἀλώδης τε - - - ὑπ' ἔρημιας: there is no wood on Sphakteria now. But the presence of man and his goats may account for the change in the many centuries which have passed since this was written. (Krüger wrote δέ for the MSS. τε, surely rightly: see Steup's n.)

7. ἀντιπρώοις: edd. are agreed that this means 'facing the enemy', and hence in this case with the two ships lying lengthways with the strait, prows facing the entrance from the open sea; unnecessarily. Of course, ἀντιπρώος means 'facing the enemy' in such descriptions of battles as 14. 1 below, vii. 34. 5 and 36. 3, because it really means 'stem facing stem'. So here: the two triremes were to face each other. Similar action is differently expressed in vii. 59. 3, *τριήρεσι πλαγίαις*; see next n. (In Xen. *Hell.* vi. 2. 28—in the passage, 28-30, eloquent of the need of triremes for food, water, and sleeping on shore—

ἀντίπρωποι does mean that the ships lie parallel with each other, ready to race for the shore, 'with their prows facing their objective'.)

βύζην: this action also seems to have been misunderstood. The Peloponnesians intended to sink their ships in order to block the entrance, an easy operation in the north strait (above, § 6 n.). *βύσμα* is a plug or bung. Cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 127–8. In the different situation in the Syracusan harbour, vii. 59. 3 (see above), the Syracusans had to anchor their ships end to end.

φοιβούμενοι μὴ ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸν πόλεμον σφίσι ποιῶνται: those responsible had some reason for taking this fatal step. See below, pp. 484–5.

8. ἀπόβασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν: *ἔχουσαν* must be taken in sense with *τὴν νῆσον* as well as with *τὴν ἥπερον*. 'While they were held by their own troops, they afforded no landing place to the enemy.'

τὰ γάρ αὐτῆς τῆς Πύλου, κ.τ.λ.: a correct description, though we might have expected some mention of the small bay to the north of the promontory. Below, p. 484.

9. ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν λόχων: see v. 68. 3.

'Επιτάδας ὁ Μολόβρος: Molobros may have been one of the contributors to the Spartan war-fund which was perhaps instituted in 427 (*I.G.* v (1). 1 = Tod, i. 62); above, p. 294.

9. 1. τὰς τριήρεις — — ἀνασπάσας: we are not told where. The only possible places are the south-east corner of the promontory and, perhaps, the small bay to the north; for all the rest of the coast-line is too rocky. The south-east point must be meant: see below, pp. 450, 485. This action must have been taken as soon as the Peloponnesian fleet arrived, to put the triremes out of danger. (Classen suggested reading *τὰς <τρεῖς> τριήρεις* which is attractive.)

προσεσταύωσε: "In Stephani Thesauro exemplis antiquioribus verbo *προσεσταυροῦν* carentibus t. I, p. 1805 e Thuc. l. iv excitatur *προσταυροῦσι τὰς ναῦς*, quod non potest nisi huc spectare. Interpretatur auctor vallis seu palis (in terram) depactis praemunire, quod alibi (vii. 25. 5) *σταυροὺς πρὸ τῶν νεῶν καταπηγνύναι* Thuc. dicat (cf. vi. 75. 1; Hdt. ix. 97). Sed ipsae quoque naves pro munimento videntur fuisse, cui firmandi causa vallum adiecerunt. Huic interpretationi favet Appian. *Bell. civ.* v. 33, *τὰς ταφροὺς προσεσταύρου*"—Stahl. L. and S. appear rather to translate *προσεσταύωσε*. See S. J.-P., crit. n.

ἀσπίσι [τε] φαύλαις, κ.τ.λ.: I prefer Stahl's suggestion that *kai ἀκοντίοις* or the like has fallen out after *τὰς πολλαῖς* (for some offensive weapons were necessary), to supposing that *τε* should be bracketed, as Stuart Jones after Suidas, or transposed after *φαύλαις*, or treated as 'misplaced'.

οἱ ἔτυχον παραγενόμενοι: "eo non forte delati sunt, sed praedandi

consilio advenerunt, postquam Athenienses ibi consedisse cognoverunt; sed adventus tum accidit, cum Athenienses eorum auxilio uti possent”—Stahl. ‘Had just arrived.’ ii. 95. 3, iv. 111. 2, and v. 44. 1 are good instances of this use. Cf. 3. 3, 41. 2, for the purpose in using the Messenians; and below, p. 485. It remains notable that Thucydides does not say that an immediate message had been sent to Naupaktos to send Messenians to Pylos (cf. 13. 2, *τῶν ἐκ Ναυπάκτου*).

2. *τῶν τε ἀόπλων καὶ ώπλισμένων*: the ‘unarmed’ (those whom he had *armed*—*ώπλισε*—with wicker shields) would be about 600 in number, if we include the crew of the pentekonter and the keles. How many hoplites there were we have no means of knowing. There were ten *ἐπιβάται* to each trireme, who formed part of the complement of every vessel; Demosthenes would have fifty of these if those of the two vessels sent to Zakynthos had stayed behind. But the presence of taxiarchs with the main fleet (4. 1) shows that there was a hoplite force besides, for operations on land; and some of these will have been left with Demosthenes. There must have been many more than ninety hoplites (10 each from the five triremes and 40 Messenians) present on Pylos; otherwise there would have been only thirty left to resist the Peloponnesian attack by land. See 31. 1 n.

πρὸς τὴν ἥπειρον: no detail of the locality is given, where in fact we should expect it; below, p. 483.

ἔξω τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν: the hastily built wall had been planned only to meet a land-attack; no attack from ships had been expected (§ 3); so the wall only surrounded the summit of Pylos.

πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος: more precise than *πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν* above—‘towards the open sea’, not simply sea, opposed to land.

ἐσβιάσασθαι: this is v. Leeuwen’s conjecture (*βιάσασθαι*, Hude), adopted by Stuart Jones for the impossible MSS. *ἐπισπάσασθαι*. Steup objects that it would mean ‘break into the fortification’, which is not what is wanted; and there is something in this. Perhaps the older suggestion to read *ἐπισπάσεσθαι*, with passive meaning, and to bracket *προθυμήσεσθαι*, is preferable.

3. *οὐτε γὰρ αὐτοί, κ.τ.λ.*: the momentary superiority of the Peloponnesians at sea enabled them to try to force a landing at any point on the promontory; and they would try where the Athenian wall was weakest, namely on the west, towards the open sea. ‘It was weak on this side (*οὐκ ἴσχυρὸν ἐτείχιζον*) because they had not expected to be inferior at sea; and (he thought) unless they could prevent a landing by going down to the water’s edge, the enemy would land and then find little difficulty in capturing the wall on this side.’ But why had Demosthenes never imagined that he would be so much weaker at sea, when the main Athenian fleet had left in a hurry for Sicily?

10. *Speech of Demosthenes*

10. 1. μηδεὶς ὑμῶν, κ.τ.λ.: the language of this sentence deserves careful consideration. How often had men, especially Athenians, been warned not to rely on hope, but on judgement: compare especially Perikles' words, ii. 62. 5: ξύνεσις is better than ἐλπίς (which is the resort of the desperate only) to give strength to τόλμα; γνώμη ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων is what is to be trusted (cf. also below, iv. 18. 2 n.). Here another Athenian says: let no man lay claim to be ξυνετός by a careful examination of the dangers (ἐκλογιζόμενος: contrast Perikles again, ii. 40. 3); the position is such (ἐν τῷ ἀπόρῳ in ii. 62. 5::: ἐν τῇ τοιάδε ἀνάγκῃ) that we must rely on a blind hope (ἀπερισκέπτως εὐελπίς); it does not admit of calculation. The position of the Athenians on Pylos did indeed seem desperate for the time being, and to dwell on it might well have led to despair; but Thucydides likes these contrasting situations, and was not quite so credulous of orthodox maxims as he has been represented. Compare another case where λογισμός is not wanted, 92. 2. The more ordinary distrust of ἐλπίς ἀπερισκέπτως is expressed in 108. 4. Demosthenes' exhortation does not prevent him from going on to a careful examination (ἐκλογίζεσθαι) of advantages and disadvantages.

⟨ώσ> καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀν περιγενόμενος, Stahl's emendation, recommends itself. For μᾶλλον ḥ̄ see crit. n.; I incline to read μᾶλλον ⟨δέ⟩. (For the sequence μηδεὶς --- βουλέσθω, μᾶλλον δέ, where πάντες or ἔκαστος has to be understood with the second clause, cf. ii. 53. 4, οὐδὲὶς ἐλπίζων ---, πολὺ δὲ μεῖζω, κ.τ.λ.)

2-4. ἐγώ δὲ καὶ τὰ πλείω ὁρῶ πρὸς ἡμῶν δύτα, κ.τ.λ.: a characteristically complex sentence, involved both in thought and construction. Two main advantages are mentioned, τοῦ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον and τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν; yet this last is not an advantage but only a disadvantage not to be overmuch feared. And the first is only an advantage so long as they stand their ground and prevent a landing; for if they once give way there, the enemy will advance easily enough even over the rough ground (as had been said in 9. 2-3; cf. Xen. *Anab.* iv. 12), 'and even if we do force him back he will have the advantage of us, for *he* will find it difficult to retreat, and *we* shall no longer be in the strong position of fighting on shore against an enemy trying to land from a ship'. The grammatical difficulties (exaggerated, however, by Dionysios, *Ep. ad Amm. II*, 12) do not make for easy reading; and, remembering that ὅ before μενόντων comes only from the MSS. of Dionysios, we cannot help being attracted by Stahl's proposed τοῦ τε γάρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον μενόντων μὲν ἡμῶν ξύμμαχον γίγνεται, ὑποχωρήσασι δὲ χαλεπόν (καὶ γάρ εὔπορον --- ἐν τῷ ἵσω ἥδη), τό τε πλῆθος αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ. (I should prefer ήμέτερον for ξύμμαχον, taking the latter to be a marginal explanation;

and a colon after *χαλεπόν*, the parenthesis only to begin with *ἐπὶ γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶ*, as in most texts. With either this or Stuart Jones's text, I would place a stop before *τὸ τε πλῆθος*.) The whole emphasis of Demosthenes' exhortation is clear enough—the need to prevent a landing; but his soldiers must have wanted it expressed more simply.

4. οὐκ ἐν γῇ, κ.τ.λ.: 'theirs is no army on land, fighting in equal conditions with us and so dangerous because much more numerous, but a body of men fighting from ships, who need a combination of fortunate accidents at the right moment if they are to succeed.'

5. οὐκ ἂν ποτε βιάζοιτο: *βιάζοιτο* is passive, but I think a Greek would feel that not *ἡ ναυτικὴ ἀπόβασις*, but *τις* is the subject. Elsewhere in Thucydides where *βιάζεσθαι* is passive, the subject is personal.

11. 2. τῷ τε κατὰ γῆν στρατῷ προσέβαλλον, κ.τ.λ.: we are not told that this was, in all probability, only possible by two narrow approaches, to the north-east and south-east, and the latter only so long as their fleet commanded the bay. In fact, Demosthenes might have spared more than sixty hoplites and a few archers for the defence of the shore. Diodorus, xii. 61. 2, gives the number of the Peloponnesian infantry, 12,000; hardly trustworthy.

He also puts the fleet at forty-five triremes, not sixty as Thucydides, 8. 2 and 16. 3, a figure which may be drawn from another source, but more probably from a theory based on Thucydides' figure here. For, because of the article, *ταῖς ναυσὶ*, edd. have supposed the entire fleet, as the entire army, to have been engaged, and have therefore found difficulty in this number 43. Unnecessarily: some ships must have been on the look out for the Athenian fleet, especially guarding the southern entrance to the bay, just as part of the army would be at work foraging and perhaps watching for a helot rising; yet it remains true that the Peloponnesians attacked with 'their army and their fleet'. So 31. 1, *τοὺς ὄπλίτας πάντας*, which means the whole force allotted to this task, not all the hoplites under Demosthenes' command, for some were left at Pylos (32. 2); and cf. *τῷ στρατῷ*, 39. 3, with n. there.

Θρασυμηλίδας: Thucydides was well informed about the Spartan commanders engaged in the actual fighting (8. 9, 38. 1). He gives no name for the commander-in-chief: one would expect the king, Agis (2. 1, 6. 1).

προσέβαλλε δὲ ἦπερ ὁ Δημοσθένης προσεδέχετο: Thucydides' general description of the shore of the promontory as rocky and unfit for a landing is accurate, indeed so accurate that it is difficult at the present day to say that one part of its south-west section was more likely to be chosen by Thrasymelidas than another, and that there

only could the attack be made. Farther to the north the ascent, after landing, is more precipitous.

3. ἐκ τε γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης: with Böhme I would like to bracket these words, as an explanation of ἀμφοτέρωθεν. The Athenians were not fighting ἐκ θαλάσσης (see 12. 3). 31. 1, compared by Classen, is different.

ἀναπαύοντες ἐν τῷ μέρει: not only could few attack at once, but, apparently, if the attempt to drive the boat right on shore and to disembark failed, the boat, or the whole section then in action, was withdrawn from the mêlée and another took its place.

4. πάντων δὲ φανερώτατος Βρασίδας ἐγένετο: perhaps it was this brave action as much as any other in his career, as well as his early death, which made men liken him to Achilles (*Plat. Symp.* 221 c).

τριηραρχῶν: we do not know anything of the duties of Spartan trierarchs, but Thucydides leaves us to understand that they were similar to the Athenian.

ξύλων φειδομένους: cf. the well-known phrase, *Hdt.* viii. 100. 2, and *Xen. Hell.* i. 1. 24.

ὅκειλαντας δὲ καὶ - - - ἀποβάντας - - - κρατῆσαι: aorists, 'once for all'. τῶν τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ χωρίου κρατῆσαι is the exact answer to Demosthenes' σώζειν ἡμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ χωρίον; but not the more artificial for that.

12. 1. τὴν ἀποβάθραν: the landing-ladder, or perhaps a section of deck (platform) against which the landing-ladder was placed.

ἐς τὴν παρεξειρεσίαν: probably an outrigger, used by the thranitai, this being the distinguishing feature of the trireme by contrast with the older pentekonter: J. S. Morrison, *The Mariner's Mirror*, xxvii, Jan. 1941, and *C.Q.* xli, 1947, 122–35, esp. 127–8.

πρὸς τὸ τροπάνον ἔχρήσαντο: a detail which implies, if not autopsy (which for other reasons is improbable: below, p. 484), information early learnt from participants in the fighting; for a trophy was erected where the victory had been won. For the trophy on Sphakteria see 38. 4. Other shields got from the enemy were brought to Athens and dedicated in the Stoa Poikile (*Paus. i. 15. 4*); one has been found in the agora, T. L. Shear, *Hesp.* vi, 1937, 346–8, and *'Eph. Αρχ.*, 1937, 140–3.

2. μενόντων καὶ οὐδὲν ὑποχωρούντων: the narrative of events closely following the speech, 10. 2–3, 5.

3. ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης ἐν τῷ τότε: when was this written, to explain the curious reversal of the usual conditions of fighting on the beach at Pylos? And for what kind of reader? At first sight one would suppose not till after 404, when Sparta was apparently all-powerful at sea, as well as on land, and there might have been many who had forgotten how undisputed the old Athenian supremacy had

been. If so, it would be an argument in favour of the view that the whole of the narrative of the Pylos campaign was written after 404; for § 3 does not look particularly like a sentence added later. I do not, however, think this conclusion certain, for two reasons. A historian of the First World War (at least, an English historian) might have written in 1921 or 1922 that it was, in some respects, a war between land-power and sea-power, because 'at that time (i.e. 1914–15) the Allies were supreme at sea and Germany on land', even though the supremacy of the former had not ended—especially if there had been in that war any such curious event as a German attempt to land from the sea on a part of their own coast held by the Allies. (Cf. A. R. Burn on an incident in the Corinthian Gulf in 1944: *B.S.A.* xliv, 1949, 319.) I think Thucydides might have written this not long after 421 B.C., while preparing his narrative and before he knew that he would have to continue it. It surprises *us* because we only *read*, in a month or so, the whole story of the Peloponnesian war and its consequences, in Thucydides and Xenophon or a modern history, and are as immediately familiar with the conditions of 430–420 B.C. as with those of 410–400; it was different for the men who lived through those long years, especially for the generation of readers who grew up in the last twenty years of the century.

Secondly, and perhaps more important, the sentence is difficult to explain yet more on the hypothesis that it was written after 404. For the chief strategic interest of the war was just this—a land-power trying to overcome a sea-power, as Thucydides has already been at pains to make clear in his first three books, especially in the analysis of i. 139–44, but also in the narrative, just as he has made Athenian superiority at sea abundantly clear by his account of the victories of Phormion and Nikostratos and the failures of Alkidas. It is not so strange that he remarked in passing on the reversal of roles in the Pylos fighting; but why explain the remark by a statement which only briefly and indeed superficially sums up what he had profoundly and in detail already made so clear? For the assumption, if he wrote iv. 12. 3 after 404 and it is not a later addition, is that he wrote it *in the course of writing* all the rest of his *History*; and it is this which makes it difficult to see why any such explanation was necessary.

Thucydides more than once refers to a 'reversal' of a past or normal state. In vii. 18. 2 Sparta and Athens again change places; but there it is in their attitude to peace treaties. For an anticipation of Athenian fighting on land from a naval base, see i. 142. 5, with n.

13. 1. ἐπέπαυντο: the struggle ended and there was a pause before the decision to send to Asine for timber. It may be that Thucydides means that the attacks on Pylos from the land side ceased too; but

he does not say so, nor do we know why they should have stopped. He tells us in fact no details of that fighting. See § 4 n.

ἐπὶ ξύλα: cf. 3. 2 n. It is difficult to guess what 'engines' other than scaling-ladders, and perhaps rams, could be made in the time available; but perhaps something as elaborate as that used at Delion (100. 2).

ἐς Ασίνην: on the west coast of the Messenian Gulf, on or near the site of the medieval Koron; a foundation of Dryopes driven out of Asine in the Argolid and granted this site by Sparta: Hdt. viii. 73. 2; Theopompos, F 383; Paus. iv. 8. 3. There are remains of extensive oak-forests on the hills west of the town. See also below, 54. 4 n.

ἐλπίζοντες τὸ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τεῖχος, κ.τ.λ.: this can only mean the section of the wall facing the bay, at the south-east corner of the promontory, where there is in fact a small sandy shore. We must suppose that the Athenian wall here was immediately above the landing-place, though Thucydides should have noted this; indeed it should have cut off further access; otherwise, if the Peloponnesians could force a landing, they might have made their way over the rocky slope westwards and northwards till they came opposite the place where the wall was weakest (9. 2-3, 10. 3), and so have had no need of 'engines'.

I see no advantage in changing the MSS. readings here: 'expecting to find this section of wall high, but to take it with the aid of engines since a landing was here possible.' The subordinate nature of the *μέν*-clause (Böhme compares viii. 9. 1), the shift of *τὸ τεῖχος* from subject of *ἔχειν* to object of *ἐλεῖν* (cf. 17. 1, ii. 84. 1), and the aorist after *ἐλπίζειν*, can all be paralleled. It is a characteristic sentence: freedom in the expression, but no resulting obscurity.

2. τεσσαράκοντα: it is very difficult to justify this figure. Forty ships had been sent from Athens (2. 2), of which three were with Demosthenes (5. 2, 8. 3); yet the figure is explained by the addition of some from the Naupaktos squadron and four from Chios. Moreover, after the arrival of twenty more ships from Athens, there were seventy in all (23. 2). Most edd. follow the later and inferior MSS. in reading *πεντήκοντα*. Steup and Wilamowitz prefer *ἐπτὰ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα*, in order to account for Demosthenes' three in the later total of seventy; equally possible, but not compelling.

ἐκ Ναυπάκτου: the last mention of the squadron regularly based on Naupaktos was in iii. 114. 2.

3. ἀπορήσαντες σπῆ καθορίσωνται: a very good instance of the importance to a Greek fleet of a base close at hand. With the enemy holding Sphakteria and dominating the bay, and Pylos itself offering neither anchorage nor a shore on which fifty ships could be drawn up, the Athenians had no such base; they must for the occasion (*τότε μέν*) withdraw to Prote, but this islet was both too far away to

serve as a base for a blockade of Sphakteria and too small and barren. Contrast the position of the Allies' fleet in 1827 which could use the distant Zakynthos as a base for operations against the Turkish fleet in Navarino Bay (my *Essays*, pp. 200-1).

Leake's description of Prote (*Morea*, i. 70) is worth quoting: "the island of Próti is, in fact, the port of Arkadhía [Kyparissía, which has only an open roadstead], and all the export produce is conveyed there. This consists, in common years, of 15,000 barrels of oil, 50,000 kilos of wheat, together with hogs, barley, vallonea, honey, cotton, cheese, butter, hides. The oil is carried to the Adriatic, the rest chiefly to the Seven Islands"; with a footnote, "I touched at Próti in 1802, sailing from Tzengo to Zákyntho, and found a sheltered cove bordered by steep rocks, the convenience and frequent use of which is attested by numerous Greek scribblings of all ages on the rocks". It would seem that it might be worth making another visit.

ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν: the advantage of open waters lay as usual with the Athenians, both because of their greater skill and speed in manœuvre and because they were better sailors in a choppy sea, ii. 86. 5, 90. 5 nn.; but Thucydides, though he says below that the 'harbour' was not a small one, hardly envisages the true size of the bay. It is about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from north to south, and nearly as much west to east; it is exposed to northerly and southerly winds and can be rough (for triremes), and has comfortable landing-ground only in the north-east sector. It is in fact a bay, not a harbour. Below, pp. 482-3.

4. ἔτυχον ποιήσαντες: below, p. 488.

ἡσυχάζοντες: 'doing nothing on land.' But no reason is given why the land attacks on Pylos had stopped. See n. on *ἐπέπαυντο*, § 1.

ὄντι οὐ σμικρῷ: see n. on *ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν*, § 3.

14. 1. ὡς διὰ βραχέος: certainly 'considering the short distance between the scene of fighting and the shore', the Peloponnesian ships being only just under way and refusing to go *εἰς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν* ("quantum per brevitatem spatii poterant", Poppo, Arnold); not "wie es bei der geringen Entfernung natürlich war" because the short distance between the opposing fleets enabled the Athenians to follow up the Peloponnesians with greater effect (Krüger, Classen). For how would the latter distinguish this from any other battle, in classical times? Whenever there was fighting, the distance between the opposing ships was short, sometimes, it might also be said, non-existent. The Peloponnesian fleet must protect their own base, and must also fight as close to shore as possible to prevent the Athenians sailing round them.

2. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κεκωλύσθαι, κ.τ.λ.: see ii. 8. 4. The phrase is not one which a good writer would repeat, especially on a less apposite

occasion (as Grossmann pointed out, *Neue Jahrb.* cxxv, 1882, 358, at ii. 8. 4·there is a great variety of action required, here only one); if it is genuine here, i.e. if Thucydides purposely wrote both examples for their present contexts, I would follow Wilamowitz, p. 315 (below, p. 485), in reading *τι* for *τινί*, and taking ἔργῳ only with *παρῆν*, and *ἔκαστος* more naturally as the subject of *κεκωλύσθαι*: “ich komme nicht zu meinem Ziele, wo ich nicht tätig, ἔργῳ, eingreife”; “wenn ich nur an dem Schiff vorne mittun könnte, würden die Feinde meins nicht kriegen”. See Rutherford, p. lv of his edition of book iv. 3. ἀντηλλαγμένου τοῦ ἔκατέρων τρόπου περὶ τὰς ναῦς, κ.τ.λ.: I should be glad to believe that Thucydides did not write this. He has already given one comment on a strange reversal of the usual Athenian and Spartan roles, only a page or two back; that was not very profound, but it was true; this is both trivial and untrue. To wade into the sea to save your ships from being hauled away (or to prevent a beaten enemy getting away, as at Marathon) is in no sense ἐκ γῆς ναυμαχεῖν (cf. i. 142. 5), nor is attempting to drag away enemy ships and keeping off enemy hoplites especially ἀπὸ νεῶν πεζομαχεῖν (what that phrase really means in Thucydides can be seen from i. 49. 1-3 and vii. 62. 2-4). Nor is there anything remarkable in what was happening, nor any paradoxical change of role: apart from the well-known case of Marathon, Thucydides has already described, in a straightforward way, just such another fight, near Naupaktos, in ii. 90. 6. There the Peloponnesian fleet was the victor, and would have hauled off Athenian ships if the Messenians had not waded into the sea in full armour to prevent them; there there had been at least this paradoxical element, that the Peloponnesians had won a battle at sea and were trying to follow it up. Here there is nothing unexpected at all.

ἐπεξελθεῖν was characteristic of the Athenians, i. 70. 5. For its use with the dative, other than that of the person attacked, as iii. 38. 1, ‘to follow up their success’, cf. Plat. *Rep.* 361 D, *Gorg.* 492 D, τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξιέναι. For τῇ τύχῃ, see below, p. 488.

ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ ἐκπλήξεως: ‘with an energy born of bewilderment.’ Cf. v. 66. 2 n.

5. καταστάντες δὲ ἐκάτεροι ἐσ τὸ στρατόπεδον: Steup rightly objects that *καταστῆναι* does not mean ‘retire to’ and that the Athenians had no *στρατόπεδον* to go to—they did not go back to Prote, even if that could be described as a *στρατόπεδον*, and there was no room on Pylos. He would therefore bracket *ἐσ τὸ στρατόπεδον* (as an insertion from 15. 1), and translates “nachdem beide Teile (die attische Flotte bei Pylos, die Lakk. auf dem Festlande) eine feste Stellung eingenommen”. This is but a slight improvement; the difficulty, a fundamental one, remains—where was the Athenian *feste Stellung*, whether properly described as *στρατόπεδον* or not, for their large fleet? and

why does Thucydides not notice that he nowhere tells us? See below, pp. 484–5.

15.1. *βουλεύειν* --- *ὅτι ἀν δοκῆ*: here, if anywhere, we should expect aorists. It is a particular occasion, not a general practice, and most edd. take it to mean 'to come to a decision without reporting back to Sparta'. Classen's parallels for such a use of present or imperfect for aorist, i. 97. 1, v. 63. 2, viii. 58. 2, are not at all like this. iv. 58. 3 (*βουλεύεσθαι*) is more like. Apparently the meaning is, 'to think about the matter when they can see things with their own eyes'.

2. *τὰ περὶ Πύλον*: the truce is to be local only, as the scholiast remarks (*τὰς σπονδὰς ταύτας* of 16. 2), but it is to give the opportunity for discussion of a general peace.

16.1. *σῖτον* --- *τακτὸν* καὶ *μεμαγμένον*, κ.τ.λ.: Steup has noticed the verbal inconsequence of making the *ἀλφίτα*, the wine, and the meat all in apposition to *σῖτον μεμαγμένον*, which is a little more surprising in that *σῖτος*, when it does not mean food in general, means wheat, not barley; but he does not improve matters by putting the comma after *τακτόν* and reading *μεμαγμένων*.

The Spartans regularly used barley, not wheaten bread (unlike the Athenians), and *μάττω* is the *vox propria* for barley (Neil on Ar. *Equit.* 55). Stahl says: "μεμαγμένον, non ἀληλεμένον (26. 5). . . . Ut autem talis σῖτος mitteretur, Lacedaemonii videntur pacti esse, quod viri in Sphacteria inclusi mulieres ad panes coquendos (cf. ii. 78. 3) non haberent; Athenienses autem fortasse eo libentius concesserunt, ne conservari diutius posset." The latter must have been the operative reason; for *σῖτος ἀληλεμένος* was got into the island later (26. 5), and somebody presumably baked it.

Two choinikes was rather over 2 litres, 2 kotylai of wine over $\frac{1}{2}$ litre, and the wine would normally be taken with 2 or 3 parts of water. *κρέας* may mean 'the normal ration' of meat, but more likely only such meat as they could get for *ὄψον* (rather like *μακαρόνι μὲ κρέας* in a modern restaurant), for the Greeks, except in Homer, ate meat rarely. This was a generous ration, if a monotonous diet; cf. Hdt. vi. 57. 3 (the Spartan king's allowance), vii. 187. 2 (one choinix per head); Polyb. vi. 39. 13 (the Roman soldier's ration, which was 32 choinikes a month, but of wheat). A choinix per day of barley was reckoned to be the normal slave's ration (cf. Athen. vi. 272 B); the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse were given only half this, no wine, and only a kotyle of water (Thuc. vii. 87. 2).

2. *τότε λελύσθαι*: it seems likely that *Π²⁴* omitted *τότε*; this would be an improvement. *λελύσθαι* is here instantaneous perfect, somewhat different from *ἐσπεῖσθαι*, 'this truce is valid till . . .', and from *λελύσθαι* below, 'this truce is at an end when. . . .'

3. περὶ ἔξηκοντα: see 11. 2 n. Some had been brought in from the rest of Lakonia (§ 1, above), about enough to replace the losses in the battle.

17-20. *Speech of the Spartan Envoys*

17. 2. οὐ παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς μηκυνοῦμεν: not 'we will not, contrary to our custom, make lengthy speeches', but 'our speaking at length will not be a departure from our normal practice', as the following clause makes clear. But Thucydides seems unduly sensitive about giving speeches to Spartans: cf. 84. 2; though not always: i. 79. 2.

οὐ μὲν βραχεῖς --- χρῆσθαι: a trimeter scazon, as has been noted, and therefore, it is said, justifying the omission of *ἄν*. Since no hint is given that this is a verbal quotation, it would perhaps be better to insert *ἄν* in order to break the iambic rhythm. The sentiment is a safe one which might find an echo anywhere, even in Athens.

3. μὴ πολεμίως, κ.τ.λ.: 'not as if coming from an enemy, nor as though we thought you unintelligent and would preach to you', etc. The Spartans are elaborately tactful; and they had need of tact, for they have in fact nothing but a sermon to offer, no *quid pro quo* at all.

4. μὴ παθεῖν δπερ, κ.τ.λ.: cf., with Krüger, vii. 61. 2, where the 'common failure of inexperienced men' is to succumb at once to misfortune, the contrary of what we have here; or i. 80. 1, another case of what men 'suffer' through inexperience. Mme de Romilly, pp. 271-2, notes the frequent use of *παθεῖν* in such a sense by Thucydides and his contemporaries, especially Euripides, as *Herakleid.* 176, *Kresphontes*, fr. 460 (both plays, perhaps, of the 420's: above, 3. 3 n.), and fr. inc. 1062,

πέπονθας οἵα χάτεροι πολλοὶ βροτῶν.
τὰς γὰρ παρούσας οὐχὶ σώζοντες τύχας
ἄλοντ' ἐρώντες μειζόνων ἀβουλίᾳ.

τοῦ πλέονος --- ὁρέγονται: the fatal phrase is more than once repeated later, see 21. 2 n.

5. τῇ τε ὑμετέρᾳ πόλει δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ ἡμῖν: the highest compliment a Spartan thought he could pay. In other circumstances it might have been a winning one; with a confident Athens and a Kleon to browbeat the speakers, it could not be.

18. 1. γνῶτε δέ: 'make your decision' (Classen), not 'learn this truth'.

2. οὕτε δυνάμεως ἐνδείᾳ, κ.τ.λ.: 'not through any loss of military strength' (which would be lasting, and so give confidence to Athens), 'nor because an access of power went to our heads and made us arrogant; on the contrary we judged as the facts warranted, but our

judgement went wrong, as may happen to everyone.' Fortune is fickle. With *ἀπὸ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμη*, cf. ii. 62. 5 n., and, for a bold contrary, i. 70. 3. Diodotos said the complement of this, that fortune sometimes sides with the foolish (iii. 45. 6); Solon had said much the same:

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν εὐ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
ἐσ μεγάλην ὅτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν,
τῷ δὲ κακῷ ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν
συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης (i. 67–70);

where οὐ προνοήσας does not attach particular blame, for some things cannot be foreseen (Thuc. ii. 64. 1: see R. Lattimore, *A.J.P.* lxviii, 1947, 168–9).

4. σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν, κ.τ.λ.: Thucydides has done his best to make the understanding of a not very complex idea difficult. For the combination *οἵτινες* — — *ἔθεντο*, — — *τόν τε πόλεμον νομίσωσι*, Stahl compares Dem. xxiv. 63 (quotation from a *νόμος*), *ὅπόσοι Αθηναῖων* — — *ἢ* *νῦν εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίᾳ* *ἢ* *τὸ λοιπὸν κατατεθῶσι*; but though the grammatical structure is similar, the semantic (if I may use the word) is not; for here there is no distinction of meaning between the indicative and the subjunctive. Further, I believe that Classen's instinct was right that the clause with *οἱ αὐτοί* demands that it be co-ordinate with the previous one (not parenthetical, as most edd., including Stuart Jones); so that we have a third construction, the potential optative, after *οἵτινες*.

I believe that *πόλεμον* is the subject of *ξυνεῖναι*, and I should expect that in such a phrase *τούτῳ* would be masculine: cf. *ξυνείη μοῖρα*, Soph. *O.T.* 863; *ἄται ξυνοῦσαι*, *O.C.* 1244. But if masculine, it must refer to *τις*, and *τούτῳ*, both limiting in sense and emphatic by position, is unsuitable—we should want *ξυνεῖναι αὐτῷ*. *τούτῳ*, therefore, if the text is sound, must be neuter and refer to *μέρος*, and the meaning will be: 'wise men realize that war does not remain within that range in which one would like to wage it.' This use of *ξυνεῖναι* seems to me forced and unnatural.

ἐσ ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο (as *τὴν εὐτυχίαν καλῶς θέσθαι*, 17. 4) can only mean 'deposit in a safe place with a view to the uncertainty of the future', 'for a rainy day' (*ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς* below); and I agree with Steup that this can hardly be got out of *ἐσ ἀμφίβολον*. On the other hand, Hude's *ἐσ ἀναμφίβολον* seems otiose; but it is possible. Steup conjectured *ἐσ ἀμφίβολον* *〈τὸ μέλλον〉*. Cf. 61. 6 for the use of *εὐ*, *καλῶς θέσθαι*. Schmid, in Schmid-Stählin, iv. 197. 4, keeps the text and translates: "die besonnenen Menschen, der Unsicherheit des Glücks bewusst, sehen in dieser Unsicherheit das einzige Sichere. Cf. 62. 4." If this is what Thucydides meant, it is not surprising that later in the book he should express it more clearly.

5. ἦν ἄρα - - - σφαλῆτε, ἂ πολλά ἐνδέχεται: Thucydides very likely 'composed' this speech after 421 (see Appendix to vol. iii); but it is not a prophecy after the event, but a commonplace which could have been spoken at any time, and something like what these Spartan delegates must have said, if they came to Athens at all; for they had no other argument. Cf. ii. 64. 3 n.

One must in general be cautious of arguments about 'prophecy after the event'. Here is another example, which I might have given in vol. i: Uxkull-Gyllenband, *Plutarch u. d. gr. Biographie*, p. 68, says that the passage in Plut. *Kim.* 18. 6-8 about Kimon as the destroyer of the Persian empire and his sending to consult in secret the oracle of Ammon must be a late story, and is only conceivable after Alexander (probably from Deinon, the reviser of Ktesias). This may be correct; but Ammon was of course known to Croesus; and is Herodotos, vii. II. 4, ὃνκων ἔξαναχωρέειν οὐδετέροισι δυνατῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ποιέειν ἡ παθέειν προκέεται ἀγών· ἵνα ἡ τάδε πάντα ὑπὸ Ἑλλησι τὴν ἐκεῖνα πάντα ὑπὸ Πέρσησι γένηται, also later than Alexander?

τύχη καὶ τὰ νῦν προχωρήσαντα κρατῆσαι: this is an indication that Thucydides did not suppose that the Athenian victory at Pylos was in fact only a matter of chance. *εὐτυχία*, 17. 4, means 'success', like *τάγαθός* in 18. 4—'good fortune', but not necessarily due to luck, any more than, in English, the 'fortune' which a man may win by shrewdness and common sense. Below, p. 488.

δόκησιν ισχύος καὶ ξυνέσεως ἐσ τὸ ἔπειτα καταλιπεῖν: just what Perikles had claimed as one of Athens' proudest boasts, in the Epitaphios, ii. 41. 4, and in his last speech, ii. 64. 3; but he did not expect the winning of fame to be *ἀκίνδυνον* (cf. v. 16. 1, n. on *ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου*).

19. 1. ἀνταιτοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας: one must emphasize again that it was the probable loss of the men much more than the possible consequences of the occupation of Pylos that so greatly disturbed Sparta. To account for this a very great decline in population caused by the earthquake of 464 has been suggested; my doubts about this have been expressed in the n. on i. 101. 2.

διοφύγοιεν - - - ἀν χειρωθεῖεν: the first optative is generally taken as akin to the deliberative, the second as potential dependent on *ἐκπολιορκηθέντες* = *εἰ ἐκπολιορκηθεῖεν*. But Hude rightly objected that *ἡγούμενοι μὴ διακινδυνεύσθαι* is present tense (like *διδόντες* and *ἀνταιτοῦντες*) and requires subjunctive of deliberation, and *παρατυχούσης* is as much a conditional as *ἐκπολιορκηθέντες*; and inserted *ἄν* before *διαφύγοιεν*. I am not certain that the simple optatives may not stand, 'run the risk that they escape or fall into your hands'; and should prefer to bracket the second *ἄν*.

2. τὰς μεγάλας ἔχθρας - - - διαλύεσθαι: "beachte die aus der

Grundbedeutung auflösen sich ergebende Verschiedenheit der griechischen Vorstellung von der deutschen beilegen und dem lateinischen *componere*"—Böhme.

τοῦ πολέμου: Stahl's conjecture, *τοῦ πόλεμίου*, is to be adopted, as by Classen, Steup, and (in his earlier edition) Hude: "ne desit unde objectum verbi ἐγκαταλαμβάνων suppleatur et quo αὐτὸν referri possit", and, we may add, a subject for *προσεδέχετο*. αὐτὸν is indeed only the reading of the *deteriores* for αὐτό of the good MSS., but is a certain correction: "quo modo quis facultatem iniquae pactionis superare possit, haud facile expediās, nisi forte superare idem esse opineris atque contemnere. Difficultatem superare possumus, facultatem non item" (Stahl). I feel confident that Arnold is right against most edd. in taking τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶσαι as = τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσου ξυμβῆναι, and πρὸς τὸ ἐπιεικές with ξυναλλαγῇ and connected by καὶ with ἀρετῇ αὐτὸν νικήσας. 'He might have imposed an unjust peace, but instead by preferring equity and a victory in virtue over his enemy has made moderate terms.' With ἀρετῇ νικήσας, Bloomfield compares Eur. *Herakles*, 341–2 (a play of just this period):

σὺ δ' ἡσθ' ἄρ' ἡσσων ἢ 'δόκεις εἴναι φίλος.
ἀρετῇ σε νικῶ θητὸς ὥν θεὸν μέγαν.

4. ἀνθησσάσθαι — — — ὑπεραυχοῦντα: both ἀπαξ λεγόμενα in classical authors, and both used by Dio Cassius (Classen).

παρὰ γνώμην διακινδυνεύειν: as in i. 70. 3, where see n. And see below, pp. 458–9, 516–17, 663.

20. 1. πρίν τι ἀνήκεστον, κ.τ.λ.: I agree with most edd. that ἡμᾶς before *καταλαβεῖν* means both Sparta and Athens: the irremediable disaster will be as unfortunate for the latter as for themselves. If that is correct, the next two clauses, ἀδίον ὑμῖν ἔχθραν — — — ἔχειν and ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι, are both governed by ἐν φῶ ἀνάγκῃ, and we must read ἡμᾶς for ὑμᾶς: 'the result will be that *you* will incur our eternal enmity, personal as well as public, and *we* shall lose what we are now inviting you to give us.' This is excellent sense (cf. § 3, αὐτῶν τε προκαλεσαμένων χαρισαμένοις τε, sc. ὑμῖν); the Spartan delegates pretend to think that Athens will agree that their eternal hatred will be as great a disaster for Athens as the loss of the men on the island for themselves. If we keep the MSS. reading ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι, then ἡμᾶς *καταλαβεῖν* refers only to the likely Spartan calamity, of which only one consequence is mentioned, ἐν φῶ ἀνάγκῃ, κ.τ.λ., and ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι is governed by πρίν. This, which is in general Steup's view, seems very much less likely; and even less probable is Classen's ἡμῖν ἔχθραν . . . ἔχειν, ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι, with ἔχθραν ἔχειν taken actively; for 'we shall be compelled to hate you for ever' is a poor description of the loss which Sparta will suffer. There are

full and not unintelligent scholia on this speech, but they do not help us here by comment or paraphrase.

For *στερηθῆναι* in the sense of losing something which you have not yet got, see ii. 44. 2 n.

2. πρὸ ἀισχροῦ τινός: cf. 38. 3, and v. 46. 1, vi. 10. 2, ii. 6 (below, p. 459). We should read *〈τῆς〉 ξυμφορᾶς* with Stahl and most edd.; and there should be a comma before διαλλαγῶμεν.

καὶ ἐν τούτῳ: καὶ here means 'besides' and goes with the whole sentence 'who will besides give you the whole credit for this', not with ἐν τούτῳ only.

πολεμοῦνται μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: the remarkably abrupt use of the genitive absolute serves a little to isolate πολεμοῦνται (which comes from πολεμέω, not πολεμώ, though L. and S. expresses doubt, here and iii. 82. 1): 'they are at war (are involved in the war, *bello vexantur*), and they do not know which side began it.' The statement is not consistent with ii. 8. 4–5; but there is no reason why it should be.

3. ἦν τε γνῶτε: Krüger's ἦν τ' ἐνδῶτε (cf. τοῖς ἔκουσίως ἐνδοῦσιν, 19. 4) is attractive.

βιασαμένοις: Hude's preference for βιασαμένων (CG?), which he bases on the scholion, μᾶλλον ἥπερ βιασθεῖσιν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, was ill-judged; and I do not doubt that the scholiast in fact had the dative, but thought to interpret the middle as a passive. With the genitive absolute αὐτῶν τε προσκαλεσαμένων, cf. iii. 78. 3.

4. ἡμῶν γάρ καὶ ὑμῶν ταύτᾳ λεγόντων: 'if we use the same language', a vigorous expression for ὁμολογούντων (Classen). Cf. Trygaios in *Peace*, 1080–2:

ἀλλὰ τί χρῆν ἡμᾶς; οὐ παύσασθαι πολεμοῦντας,
ἥ διακαννιάσαι πότεροι κλαυσούμεθα μεῖζον,
ἔξὸν σπεισαμένοις κοινῇ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀρχειν;

The prophecy did not come true in 421.

According to the later tradition represented for us by Plutarch's *Life* (which may have some truth in it), this union of Sparta and Athens had been Kimon's policy. It was later that of Kallikratidas on the Spartan side and, more explicitly, in the fourth century of Kallistratos at Athens (Xen. *Hell.* i. 6. 7, vi. 3. 14–17: de Romilly, pp. 154–5).

This is a speech, like that of the Corinthians at the conference of the Peloponnesian League in 432 B.C. (vol. i, pp. 418–19), of which all the hopes were belied in the event. I may repeat here what I have said in *J.H.S.* lxxi, 1951, 77. The Spartan threat that they will καὶ παρὰ γνώμην διακινδυνεύειν and have eternal hatred for Athens if she now refuses the proffered friendship, came to nothing, as Classen points out: see 41. 3–4, 108. 7, 117, and v. 15, 22–23. The promise that this friendship would be specially sincere and lasting

is proved to be weak by the events following the peace of 421; for the argument that the ineffectiveness of that peace was as much the fault of Athens as of Sparta (but still more of Sparta's allies) does nothing to strengthen the case of a *prophecy*. The rest of the Greek world was even less likely in 425 than in 421 (when they had had four more years of war) to 'give you the highest honours' and to accept a sort of private arrangement between Sparta and Athens agreed mainly in order to save Spartan pride or Spartan lives (cf. 22. 3, 41. 3; and for later feeling see v. 29. 2-3). Mme de Romilly (p. 154) has drawn attention to Nikias' words of warning in 415 B.C., *οἱ ἔχθροι . . . οἰς . . . διὰ ἔνυμφορῶν* *ἡ ἔνυμβασις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσχίονος* *ἡ ήμιν* (vi. 10. 2), and *χρὴ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαιρέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰς διανοίας κρατήσαντας θαρσεῖν, μηδὲ Λακεδαιμονίους ἄλλο τι ἡγῆσασθαι* *ἢ διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σκοπεῖν διώ τρόπῳ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ἢν δύνωνται, σφίλαντες ήμᾶς τὸ σφέτερον ἀπρεπὲς εὖ θήσονται, δῶσι καὶ περὶ πλείστου καὶ διὰ πλείστου δόξαν ἀρετῆς μελετῶσιν* (vi. 11. 6), comparing especially the words here used *ήμιν* *δὲ πρὸ αἰσχροῦ τινὸς τῆς ἔνυμφορᾶς μετρίως κατατίθεμένης* (20. 2); and argues that, since Thucydides 'approves' of Nikias' opposition to the Sicilian expedition, he 'approves' equally of the Spartan offer of peace now. Sparta's 'disgrace' had, it is true, been increased by her desertion of her Thracian allies in 421; but if, even after Mantinea, Sparta was anxious to wipe out the disgrace of the peace of 421, which itself was agreed to after the brilliant successes of Brasidas (not to mention the success of her allies at Delion), how much greater would have been her desire to expunge the memory of a peace of 425, after a war begun with so many hopes, such high-sounding promises, such favour from the greater part of the Greek world, and continued with a series of miserable failures and but one success, the inglorious victory over Plataia! For, alas, it is not true that 'negotiated' treaties, as such, have proved more lasting than 'dictated' ones; the Spartans were not at all likely *αἰσχύνη ἐμμένειν οἷς ξυνέθεντο* (19. 3); and their offer on this occasion, militarily speaking worth nothing, except in the moral effect of its having been made at all, demanded not only a generosity of feeling and a far-sightedness on the part of Athens which they had no reason and no right to expect (and no country can throw a stone at Athens for that),¹ but an even greater generosity, *μεγαλοψυχία*, on their own, to accept the Athenian gesture and *forget* their own disgrace; and, as well, a quite unlikely humility or, if you will, good sense from the rest of Greece, not only the neglected Corinthians and the proud Boeotians, but the disaffected subjects of Athens who had been fed

¹ See Menander, *Perik.* 429-30,

*ὅτ’ εὐτύχηκας, τότε δέχεσθαι τὴν δίκην
τεκμήριον τοῦτον ἔστιν Ἐλληνος τρόπου.*

with hopes of liberation. That we, wisely reflecting long after the event, can say justly what a pity a lasting peace was not then made, means no more than saying what a pity the Peloponnesian war ever broke out; and that the Athenians in 421, the Athenians not of *The Knights* but of *The Peace*, regretted their lost opportunity is only a proof of the irony of history. They had refused an empty and, almost certainly, a vain offer; they had obeyed the true military maxim to follow up a victory, to press the enemy hard; and it had turned out wrong: ἀμαθῶς ἔχωρησαν αἱ ξυμφοραὶ τῶν πραγμάτων. The Athenians too, as well as the Spartans, ἀπὸ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμῃ ἐσφάλησαν. That was the tragedy: in the short run at least Kleon was right; his immediate success at Sphakteria proved it. But he was the wrong person to be in the right; his and Athens' later failures show it.

I cannot, therefore, agree with Mme de Romilly (pp. 150–1) that the absence of any Athenian speech in reply to the Spartan, giving the motives (rational or emotional) for the rejection of the peace offer, shows Thucydides' approval of the Spartan arguments: "Cléon n'a pas plus de λόγος à exprimer que n'en avaient auparavant les adversaires de Périclès;¹ comme alors, l'orateur à qui nul ne répond est le maître de la sagesse. Quand les Lacédémoniens indiquent les raisons qui auraient dû déterminer Athènes à faire la paix, on peut donc présumer que c'est Thucydide, en fait, qui juge." The speech of the Corinthians in 432, which is similarly misguided, also has no answer; what are we to say there of Thucydides' own judgement? We know what it was, for he expresses it very clearly (ii. 65); it is not in agreement with that of the Corinthians. If it be said that the Corinthians get their answer in Perikles' speech, yet the reader has to wait for it, not expecting that it will come; is he to think, for a time, that Thucydides has expressed his own judgement? In the reverse, it is usually said, certainly with some reason, that Thucydides approved of the *sagesse* of Nikias in 415; but Nikias is answered. So are the Plataians, iii. 60: what did Thucydides think, and feel, then? It is clear that he varied his method, and we cannot generalize from this report of the ekklēsia in 425.

21. 1. τοσαῦτα εἶπον: 'so much and no more', but probably with reference to the content, not to the length of the speech (as in ii. 12. 1, cf. iv. 17. 2 n.).

ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ: see ii. 59. 2. Hude would insert μέν before τῷ since

¹ Dionysios, *de Thuc.* 14–15 (pp. 842–4), wonders why Thucydides gave no speeches, for and against peace, on the occasion of the Athenian embassy in 430 (ii. 59), and 'dismissed it as of little importance', and yet composed a speech for the Spartans in 425. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀσθενεῖδα δυνάμεως ἔξειρυστο ερὶ ἀμφοτέρων τοὺς ἐνότας εὑρεῖν τε καὶ ἔξειτεῖν λόγους. Dionysios means little more than that there were two occasions for fine writing and that Thucydides missed one of them, one indeed that might have led up to Perikles' last speech.

μέν after *σπονδῶν* corresponds only with *δέ* after *σφῶν*, not with *δέ* after *διδομένης* which is the major contrast. If any change is required, I should prefer simply to transpose *μέν*, and let it do the work of two (see i. 142. 3–4 n.), in so far as *σπονδῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν* needs *μέν*. iii. 2. 1 is a similar construction.

δέξεσθαι: the future here is necessary, since *διδομένης εἰρήνης = ἡνείρηνη διδώται*, and because *ἀποδώσειν* follows; and it is worth noting, to illustrate how easy such mistakes are, that only G of our good MSS. has it; AB have *δέχεσθαι*; the rest *δέξασθαι*. Or cf. 22. 3 where, according to Hude, for *ποιήσοντας* ABF have *ποιήσαντας* (corr. f.); and 24. 4 n., 28. 5. There are dozens of such cases in Thucydides' text. 2. *τὰς μὲν σπονδάς, ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ νήσῳ*: this and 22. 2 are exactly echoed by Aristophanes, *Peace*, 211–20, 636; cf. also *Acharn.* (produced six months before this *ekklesia*), 652–8, and *Equit.* (produced the following spring), 794–7, though this last may refer to later embassies. Apart from the general agreement between the dramatist and the historian, e.g. in the character of Kleon, *Peace* is very close to Thucydides' narrative.

έτοίμους is feminine, and should perhaps be emended to *έτοίμας*, for though the use of *έτοίμος* as a feminine is found in Herodotus and others, elsewhere Thucydides always has *έτοίμη*, etc. Note that Krüger cannot be right in taking *έτοίμους* with *ποιεῖσθαι*, sc. *τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους*, for that would make the Lacedaemonians subject of *όπόταν βούλωται* too.

ἔχοντες should strictly be *ἔχουσιν*, agreeing with *σφίσιν*; but the order of words in the sentence as a whole avoids any difficulty, in spite of Cobet's doubts.

τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὥρεγοντο: with reference to the words of the speech, 17. 4; see also 41. 4, 92. 2.

3. *ἄνὴρ δημαγωγὸς — καὶ — πιθανώτατος*: certainly an unexpected description of Kleon after the very similar one in iii. 36. 6, and the prominent and characteristic part there played by him, and not to be justified by Stahl's argument that Kleon's influence was not constant and probably weakened after the second debate over Mytilene; it is not like the repetition in i. 139. 4 from 127. 3 either, which is resumption of the narrative, on the same occasion. Another pair, v. 43. 2 and vi. 15. 2–3, is also different, for different aspects of Alkibiades' conduct are given. On the other hand, the words here do not look in the least like an adscript, as Herwerden and Steup maintain. The *History* lacks final revision.

δημαγωγός was of course a respectable term at this time:

ἡ δημαγωγία γὰρ οὐ πρὸς μονσικοῦ
ἢ τ' ἔστιν ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοὺς τρόπους,
ἀλλ' εἰς ἀμαθῆ καὶ βδελυρόν (*Equit.* 191–3)

Thucydides' only other instance (viii. 65. 2) is probably also not abusive. (We must certainly not argue, with Steup, that the word is meant to be abusive here, and the clause, therefore, later than Thucydides.)

τὰ μὲν σπλα καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς — — Αθήναζε: this was the demand, surely, which Sparta was bound to refuse. It was, one might almost say, expressly to avoid such a dishonour that they had proposed discussing peace. The other demands they merely did not want to talk about openly.

See Philochoros, F 128, on Kleon's conduct, which adds virtually nothing to Thucydides, but seems to derive from another source.

ἀποδόντας — — Νίσαιαν καὶ — — Αχαίαν: see i. 115. 1. F. Schroeder would insert *καὶ Μέγαρα* in i. 115. 1 (for the Athenians had actually held the city before 445), and therefore here too.

Achaia was not only independent but, except one of its cities, Pellene, was neutral in this war (ii. 9. 2). This would not prevent Athens repeating an old claim. We may note also that no demand is made for the return of *Plataia*, which had been taken in the war. It is simply and solely 'back to pre-445'.

& οὐ πολέμῳ ἔλαβον: had they taken them in the war, the enemy might have been expected to surrender them after a defeat; see iii. 52. 2.

22. 1. ξυνέδρους: as, on a different occasion, the Melians, v. 84. 3–86. 1.

3. εἴ τι καὶ — — ξυγχωρεῖν: “*καὶ* (wirklich, in der That) deutet an, wie sehr der Gedanke an Zugeständnisse den Spartanern zu wider war”—Classen. Perhaps; but what the Spartans were really afraid of, if the debate were public, was that they might lose face with their allies without getting the peace they wanted. They were ready to make some compromise at their allies' expense, with the certainty of unpopularity, if they could by so doing rescue their men on the island, but not if they were not going to succeed. Note, however, *εἴ — — ἔδόκει*, in place of *ἢν δοκῇ* or *εἴ δοκοῖ*, as though it were an unreal condition ('if we were going to offer some of our allies' territory, which of course we are not', is how they persuade themselves).

Grote remarks what a mistake it was on the part of Athens not at least to start negotiations in order to encourage a breach between Sparta and her allies. Doubtless the Spartan ambassadors on their return announced loudly that of course they had refused to sacrifice their allies.

23. 1. διελέλυντο: as laid down in 16. 2. The only explanation of the MSS. *διελύνοντο* would be that, by a slight variation of thought, the truce in a sense still held good in practice while the parties were

arguing whether its terms had been observed or not. See on *οὐκ ἀπεδίδοσαν* below.

ἄλλα οὐκ ἀξιόλογα δοκοῦντα εἶναι: it seems that Thucydides thought that the Athenians were guilty of sharp practice, morally in the wrong, unless *δοκοῦντα* is here imperfect, and is to be taken strictly, 'were thought (by the Spartans) to be trivial'.

οὐκ ἀπεδίδοσαν: the imperfect is peculiar for so decisive an act. It does not mean 'were not for giving them back, however often the Spartans asked for them (*ἀπήτουν*, impf.), unless . . .'; for no conditions are laid down. Had Thucydides written *οἱ δὲ Αθηναῖοι ἀντέλεγον*, it would have been easy enough. He does not say that they had begun making complaints of Spartan attacks, and had threatened not to give back the ships, before the delegates had returned.

2. *τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς καὶ ἀπασαὶ περιώρμουν*: i.e. all (except the ships which, in turn presumably, sailed round the island during the day) took their rest and their main meal in the daytime. But where? Thucydides does not tell us, though the Peloponnesian camp on land gets a mention, which needed none. See below, pp. 484-5.

πλὴν τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος, ὅποτε ἄνεμος εἴη: when there would have been danger to themselves, and little risk of the men in the island getting away (cf. 26. 7). Thucydides again shows himself unconscious that the bay itself is exposed to northerly and south-easterly winds, even though it can never be as rough as the open sea.

24-25. Operations in Sicily continued

24. 1. *ἐν τούτῳ δέ*: the narrative continued from c. 1, and the Pylos episode interrupted to preserve the chronological coherence. One or two details are repeated.

οἱ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Συρακούσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι: as though there were other Syracusans than those in Sicily? Some would transpose the first *οἱ*; Hude deletes it; Steup deletes *ἐν τῇ Σ.* But it is not here difficult: 'meanwhile the Greeks of Sicily, Syracuse and her allies.'

2-3. *καὶ αὐτοὶ δέ ἐσεβεβλήκεσαν, κ.τ.λ.*: taken by most edd. to refer to the invasion mentioned in 1. 3-4; and this is what it looks like. For the sentence is a sort of explanation of *μάλιστα ἐνῆγον οἱ Λοκροὶ τῶν Ρηγίνων κατὰ ἔχθραν*, both sentences being here in parenthesis, and the latter is certainly a reference back to 1. 2, a reminder to the reader (cf. below, c. 89 and 76-77). But Steup objects that the invasion of 1. 3 was over before the plans for a bigger naval effort, 1. 4 and here, 24. 1, had been made; whereas this invasion only ends after and in consequence of the defeat of the fleet (25. 3). He would therefore insert *πάλιν* here, after *αὐτοὶ δέ*. This is possible, and will certainly remove one difficulty; but everyone will feel that if Thucydides had wished to mention a second Lokrian invasion which is

part of the extended operations hinted at in 1. 4 and related in 24-25, he would have given it an independent place: i.e. an aorist verb, not a pluperfect, and not between *μάλιστα ἐνῆγον οἱ Λοκροὶ* and *ναυμαχίας ἀποπειρᾶσθαι ἔβούλοντο*, but in 25. 1 perhaps, οἵ τε *Λοκροὶ πάλιν ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν τῶν Ρηγίων γῆν καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι, κ.τ.λ.*

4. *χειρώσεσθαι*: ABFM have *χειρώσασθαι*, CEG the future (see above, 21. 1 n.). If, with Stahl, Hude, and Stuart Jones we read the latter, we surely must insert ἀν before *γίγνεσθαι* below, as Krüger proposed. I should prefer with Steup to read *χειρώσασθαι* - - - *γίγνεσθαι*.

τοῦ τε Ρηγίου ἀκρωτηρίου τῆς Ἰταλίας τῆς τε Μεσσήνης τῆς Σικελίας: not a particular cape; “nobis nihil significari videtur nisi utramque urbem in extrema ac prominente parte alteram Italiae alteram Siciliae sitam fuisse. nam ἀκρωτήριον extreum quidvis ac prominentis est”—Stahl. So *ἡπερ βραχύτατον, κ.τ.λ.*, below, is not strictly accurate. See vi. 1. 2 n.

Note how, as so often, information, especially geographical information, is given not when places are first mentioned, but when it becomes especially significant (iii. 21. 1 n.).

5. *ἐσπίπουσα ή θάλασσα ἐς αὐτό*: Hude's *ταῦτο* is tempting (and succeeded with Steup), but not because *αὐτό* (= *τοῦτο*, above) is *ἡ μεταξὺ Ρ. θάλασσα καὶ Μ.*, and “eben dieses Meer ist in unserem Satze, wie die W. εἰκότως χαλεπὴ ἐνομίσθη beweisen, durch *ἡ θάλασσα* bezeichnet”; for *ἡ θάλασσα* here means ‘the water’.

εἰκότως χαλεπὴ ἐνομίσθη: Thucydides gives a natural explanation of the phenomenon, and as well perhaps implies by *ἐνομίσθη* that the difficulties of the strait had been exaggerated by the poets. Certainly the fleets here do not experience Odysseus' sufferings.

25. 1. *ἔκκαδεκα καὶ - - - ὅκτω*: not the whole Athenian and Rhenine fleets in these waters (iii. 86. 1, 88. 1).

2. *ἐσ τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ρηγίῳ*: this can have only one meaning, viz. the Syracusans and their allies to Messene and the Athenians to Rhenion. This is impossible: it would require *ἐκάτεροι* for *ἔκαστοι* and hardly *ἔτυχον*; *μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες* refers of course to the Syracusan side only; and the Syracusans did not escape to Messene, but were dispersed, and managed next morning to collect at Peloris, which is Capo di Faro, the extreme north-east cape of Sicily—i.e. they were driven in a general northerly direction by the Athenians; they only get to Messene the following day. Most edd. bracket *τό τε ἐν τῇ Μ. καὶ ἐν τῷ Ρ.*; but, as Steup points out, *ἐσ τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα*, which without mention of Messene and Rhenion must mean the home ports of the several contingents (if *στρατόπεδον* could be so used), must go too; unless we are to suppose a considerable interval between § 2 and § 3, during which the contingents sailed, unhindered by the Athenians, through

the straits to Peloris with the sole intention of sailing back again to Messene. The words do not look particularly like an adscript; but we must either excise them or assume a lacuna.

3. οἱ μὲν Λοκροί, κ.τ.λ.: see above, 24. 2 n.

ώρμουν: were at anchor, close in to shore, but not drawn up on to the beach. The crews were on shore.

5. ἀπὸ κάλω: not, apparently, 'at a cable's length' from the shore, but 'towed'; which must have been a difficult operation, unless the shore were very regular—not only firm sand for the men who were towing, but a fairly steep bottom close in shore for the triremes; for the purpose of towing was to keep the ships so close to the shore that the Athenians would not attack, though this made it impossible to row (*οἱ γὰρ παρὰ γῆν αὐτὴν πλέοντες οὐ δύνανται ἐρέττειν*, schol.).

ἀποσημωσάντων ἔκεινων καὶ προεμβαλόντων: the very odd word *ἀποσημῶν*, from *σημός*, 'curved' (but 'snub-nosed' always in reference to human features, never 'hook-nosed': see A. S. F. Gow, *J.H.S.* lxxi, 1951, 81–84), is difficult to interpret. It can hardly mean simply 'turn and sail to the open sea' as some ancient lexicographers have it; for there was no need for Thucydides to use a word so rare and so obviously technical for so simple a manœuvre (cf. ii. 90. 4–5), and it does not seem likely that the Syracusans would do now what they had been avoiding so far and what the Athenians had been wishing they would do. A quite different movement seems to be indicated by another ancient grammarian cited by Steup, *τὸ ἐπικύψαι καὶ τὴν πυγὴν προτεῖναι γυμνήν*. Applied to ships this should mean turning the stern of the vessel towards the enemy: the Athenians made a sudden attack hoping to get the Syracusans broadside; but the latter, by a quick manœuvre, turn their prows to the shore, their sterns to sea, and, presumably, back water (*προεμβαλόντων*) to break the prows of the Athenian vessels by the suddenness of their movement. Appian, *B.C.* iv. 71, *αἱ ἐμβολαὶ καὶ ἀποσημώσεις ἐς βαρυτέρας τὰς Ῥωμαίων ναῦς ἀσθενεῖς ἐγίγνοντο*, does not make anything plain but that *ἀποσημώσις* means a manœuvre of some kind; on the other hand, Galen, xviii. 2, p. 347 K., *ὅταν ἀποσημώσαντες τὴν πρώραν ἐπιτηδείαν ἐργάσωνται πρὸς τὸ καταδύσαι*, seems to refer not to a manœuvre at all, but to a change in the build of the vessel, 'making the prows curved and so more effective for sinking the enemy' (by ramming, presumably).

7. Καμαρίνης: this city being on the south coast of Sicily was at some distance and gave the Messenians an opportunity for attacking neighbouring Naxos. For Kamarina's history and present political attitude, see vi. 5. 3, iii. 86. 2.

ὑπ' Ἀρχίου: not elsewhere mentioned. See n. on Demoteles, § 11.

ταῦς ναυσίν: the whole allied fleet, not Messenian only (see § 10, below).

ἐπὶ Νάξον: vi. 3. 1, 3; iii. 86. 2.

8. κατὰ τὸν Ἀκεσίνην ποταμόν: probably the present Alcantara. ἐσέβαλλον: Poppe's conjecture, *προσέβαλλον*, is to be preferred, on the basis of Thucydidean usage. There is doubt also about the reading in ii. 79. 6, where CG and *Π²⁵* have ἐσέβαλλον and the rest *προσέβαλλον* (or *προσέβαλον*), and the latter is the better.

9. οἱ Σικελοὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄκρων: for Sikel allies of Athens, see iii. 103. 1. There is no reason to suppose that all Sikels were allied (cf. vi. 88. 4); and we should probably read, with Krüger, *οἱ Σ. <οἱ>*, or *Σ. οἱ*.

τοὺς πλείστους διέφθειραν: included in the 'over 1,000' killed mentioned above, not the majority of *οἱ λοιποί*; for *οἱ λοιποί* seem to have reached home safely (*ἀπεχώρησαν*, aorist).

10. ἐπ' οἴκου ἔκασται διεκρίθησαν: fearing presumably the immediate fall of the city, which would mean the capture of the whole fleet.

μετὰ Ἀθηναίων: the danger to Kamarina being passed or settled.

11. μετὰ τοῦ Δημοτέλους: not again mentioned. See Archias above, § 7, and n. on ii. 22. 3, 30. 1, 2; *al.* The definite article is specially remarkable.

ἀποβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν: how many? just the 200 ἐπιβάται of the twenty ships (iii. 88. 1), if all twenty were present? We are not told that any other hoplites were sent to Sicily. But such a force may have been adequate in the circumstances. Note that it means leaving the triremes practically unarmed.

12. ἀνευ τῶν Ἀθηναίων: they did not make peace, and so far the Athenian interference had not failed (cf. c. 65, below); but the Athenian commanders did not hope for any success without considerable reinforcements. Cf. iii. 90. 1, iv. 48. 6 nn.

26–41. Campaign in Pylos continued

26. 1. κατὰ χώραν ἔμενεν: rather 'showed no signs of going', i.e. of giving up the attempt to take Pylos, than 'stayed there inactive'. It is the disadvantage to the Athenians which is meant.

2. σίτου τε ἀπορίᾳ καὶ ὕδατος: with a fleet of seventy vessels (23. 2), and the men on Pylos, there must have been 14,000 in the Athenian forces.

οὐ γάρ ἦν κρήνη, κ.τ.λ.: see below, p. 483.

διαμώμενοι τὸν κάχληκα: 'scrabbling in the shingle.' The Patmian scholiast defines κάχληξ, η ἐπὶ τῶν αἰγιαλῶν ἀδρὰ καὶ λιθώδης ψάμμος; there was, however, very little of this at Pylos, only at the south-east corner and a little here and there between the large boulders and rocks of the rest of the shore.

3. ἐν ὁλίγῳ στρατοπεδευμένοις: Thucydides does not say where this little space was. See 14. 5 n., and below, p. 484. They could use, for short periods, the southern end of Sphakteria as well (30. 2).

τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἔχουσῶν ὅρμον: there was no safe anchorage for the

triремes so that the crews could leave them for food and sleep on shore. This is the second reason why they had to take it in turn to come on shore, the first being the lack of space there. *μετέωροι ὥρμουν*, even when off duty.

4. οὓς ἔσοντο, κ.τ.λ.: the tables were turned (8. 4, 8).

ὕδατι ἀλμυρῷ: cf. 31. 2. Grundy, vol. ii, p. 130, says that "the only supply of drinking water on the island" is a well "about 3 furlongs due south of the Panagia landing" (see below for this landing, p. 484); and that "the water from it is decidedly brackish". (Earlier information was that the water was fresh, as stated, for example, in my *Essays*, p. 127, n. 1. Unfortunately, I did not test it, as I should have done. See Addenda.)

5. ἀληλεμένον: see above, 16. 1, n. on *μεμαγμένον*.

οἱ ἄν -- - ξυμφέρῃ: so most edd.; but I agree with Classen that the potential optative (G's reading) is better. 'All kinds of food' has already been expressed by εἴ τι ἄλλο βρῶμα.

6. καὶ ἐσῆγον, κ.τ.λ.: 'and they did get it in.'

7. ράὸν γάρ τὴν φυλακήν, κ.τ.λ.: see ὅπότε ἄνεμος εἴη, 23. 2.

τοῖς δὲ ἀφειδῆς ὁ κατάπλους καθειστήκει: i.e. the reckless driving of ships ashore was an established practice, by agreement with the authorities. For ἀφειδῆς cf. ξύλων φειδομένους, 11. 4. But what happened if the boat was badly damaged? Did the sailors in it stay behind on the island, helping to consume the food they had brought?

8. κολυμβηταὶ ὑψιδροι: skilled divers who for part of the way swam under water pulling skins full of poppy-seed mixed with honey and crushed linseed. On these foods the scholiast has: εἶδος βοτάνης ὁ μήκων, τὸς ὁ μὲν ὅπὸς θανάσιμος, ὡς λέγεται (by whom?), τὸ δὲ σῶμα γλυκύτατον δύναται δὲ πείνης ἀπαλλάττειν μιγματένη μέλιτι. λίνου σπέρμα κεκομμένον τοῦτο δίψαν θεραπεύει πρὸς ὀλίγον τινὰ καιρόν, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πυρέσσουσι προσάγεται παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν. Arnold and Stahl refer to Pliny, *N.H.* xix. 8. 167, and Athenaios, iii. 110 F, who quotes Alkman, fr. 55 D, for the use of poppy- and flax-seeds for food. Theophrastos, *Hist. Pl.* ix. 12. 3-4, does not suggest that poppy-seeds would be a useful food for the Spartans, for they were chiefly a purge.

27. 1. χειμών: here 'winter'; below, at the end of the section, 'stormy weather'.

ἄμα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ, κ.τ.λ.: the construction is harsh, but not impossible—we must remember that the men were in an uninhabited place where they could find no food on the spot and even in summer they were unable to send enough to them'. It is possible to emend to ἄμα <δ> ἐς χωρίον ἐρῆμον [καὶ], or ἄμα <δ> ἐν χ. ἐ. <οὖσι> [καὶ]; but this leaves an awkward ἄμα (which certainly goes with this clause, not with ἐσομένην, as Steup, who brackets ἐν χ. ἐ. καὶ, would like). For the meaning of ἐρῆμος, however, see above, 3. 2 n.

τόν τε ἔφορμον --- οὐκ ἐσόμενον: such blockade as was possible in the summer, and that was not very effective, would be out of the question. The conditions for both ships and men (26. 3) would be too difficult. (Steup, in objecting to this sentence as to 8. 7, in his appendix to 8. 5, shows a misunderstanding of the conditions of blockade in ancient times.)

ἢ τοῖς πλοίοις --- ἐκπλέυσεσθαι: one wonders why the Spartans had not already made some such attempt, *ὅπότε ἄνεμος εἴη*. Courage at sea seems to have been expected only of helots.

2. ἔχοντάς τι, κ.τ.λ.: 'that it was because they had some good ground for confidence that they were no longer negotiating.'

3. μετὰ Θεαγένους: very likely the same as one of the 'signatories' of the treaties of peace and alliance in 421 B.C. (v. 19. 2, 24. 1); but Thucydides gives no explanation. See Busolt, iii. 1103. 2, who thinks he may be Theagenes of Acharnai, known to comedy (*P.A.* 6703).

4. δρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ ὡρμημένους: 'seeing them in fact determined to continue the campaign.' There was no question of Kleon's leading the people or opposing them; he observed which way the wind was blowing before making his proposal. But his proposal was eminently sensible.

μὴ πέμπειν --- πλεῖν: note the tenses—'we ought not to be sending commissioners; we ought to be sailing there'. *πλεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας*: i.e. not to wait for them to surrender from starvation.

5. ἔχθρὸς ὅν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν: the combination of permanent feeling and momentary action is notable, and makes it desirable to take the infinitive *ράδιον εἶναι*, κ.τ.λ., with *ἐπιτιμᾶν*, not with *ἀπεσήμανεν*: punctuating with a comma after, instead of before, *ἔχθρὸς ὅν*.

πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν: cf. *Equit.* 743, *πλεύσας ἐκεῖσε τοὺς Λάκωνας ἥγαγον*.

28. 1. ὅτι οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ: ὅτι, 'why', rather than 'that'—Plutarch's *τί δ' οὐχὶ καὶ νῦν αὐτὸς σὺ πλεῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας*; (*Nik.* 7. 3.)

τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι: Nikias speaking for his colleagues as well as for himself, such of them as were in Athens.

2. τολμῆσαι ὑποχωρῆσαι: a characteristic use of *τολμῆσαι*—'would have had the face to yield the command to him' (characteristic also of *Nikias'* daring). Stahl and Steup make a deal of unnecessary fuss about this clause, finding in it contradiction with *γνοὺς τῷ ὄντι παραδωσείοντα*.

3. τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς: we have not been told that Nikias had any command at Pylos. We must suppose that the words mean only that if reinforcements were to be sent, Nikias, as strategos, would have good claim to their command; and probably that reinforcements had been officially requested (30. 4 n.).

ὄχλος: 'the multitude', 'a crowd', not 'the mob'. But Thucydides has no great belief in the dignity of popular assemblies.

παραδιδόναι - - - πλεῖν: we might have expected aorists, especially for *παραδιδόναι*. Nikias was already 'offering'.

4. ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδένα: i.e. τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδένα, even though the Lemnians and Imbrians, as cleruchs, retained their citizenship. (On this, however, see above, p. 34 n. 1.)

Λημνίους δὲ καὶ Ἰμβρίους τοὺς παρόντας: this does not necessarily imply that contingents from Lemnos and Imbros were sent every year, during the war, to Athens (any more than *πελταστὰς οἱ ἥσαν* ἐξ *Αἴνου* means that Ainos sent peltastai regularly), still less that the whole hoplite force from cleruchies was mustered in Athens and counted with the Athenian hoplites (above, pp. 37–38).

ἐκ τε Αἴνου: see vii. 57. 5; and vol. i, pp. 276–8.

I agree with Steup that the MSS. reading cannot be retained, and that the best remedy is to suppose a lacuna after *Aínou* of the type, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Θράκης ('and besides, from Thrace'); or else ⟨καὶ⟩ before *τοξότας*, or another verb, participle or aorist indicative, after it (cf. 52. 2).

The change from fear to complete confidence in Kleon, though natural enough, is not well brought out by Thucydides (prevented doubtless by his prejudice). Kleon's immediate demand for light-armed troops shows that he already had a good idea of what was wanted at Pylos; but Thucydides gives no definite indication of this.

5. τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ: Kleon's recklessness of speech is so called; the frivolity of the Athenians in general is well marked. But the light-hearted dereliction of duty by Nikias, though not concealed, is not explicitly condemned. How different are *οἱ σώφρονες* here from their exemplar in 18. 4, only a few pages back; also from the citizens of Plato's ideal city, *Rep.* v. 462. But they are not unlike the Knights of *Equit.* 973–6:

ἢδιστον φάος ἡμέρας
ἔσται τοῖσι παροῦσι καὶ
τοῖσι δεῦρ' ἀφικνουμένοις,
ἢν Κλέων ἀπόληται.

Some years after the event Thucydides doubtless reflected that he had been one of this group of 'sensible men' at the time, that Kleon's eminence *was* disastrous for Athens, and that his own career was cut short, because the second of the two alternatives here mentioned came to pass; that is, because Nikias had not done his duty, and because the sensible men were wrong in their calculation of what would probably happen.

For *τοῖς σώφροσι*, 'sensible men' (not 'the conservative party'), cf. 40. 2, n. on *καλοὶ κάγαθοί*.

It is a pity that we do not know when Telekleides' fragment 41 (from Plutarch, *Nikias*, 4. 5) was written, about a blackmailing informer:

Χαρικλέης μὲν οὖν ἔδωκε μνᾶν, ἵν' αὐτὸν μὴ λέγη
ώς ἔφυ τῇ μητρὶ παῖδων πρῶτος ἐκ βαλλαντίου.
τέτταρας δὲ μνᾶς ἔδωκε Νικίας Νικηράτου·
ῶν δ' ἔκατι ταῦτ' ἔδωκε, καίπερ εὖ εἰδὼς ἐγώ
οὐκ ἐρώ· φίλος γὰρ ἀνήρ, σωφρονεῦ δέ μοι δοκεῖ.

(The name Charikles does not help; for even if this man is to be identified with the Charikles who was *ζητητής*, in 415 and strategos in 413—vii. 20. 1—and later one of the Thirty, he could have been active, and a victim of informers, in the 20's.) Nor do we know how good a dramatist Telekleides was; but if he was good, and if he wrote this about 425–424, there could be an admirable irony in *σωφρονεῦ δέ μοι δοκεῖ*, suitable to this occasion in Thucydides, when Nikias' friends, or rather Kleon's enemies, called themselves *οἱ σώφρονες*. Or it might be a simpleton talking, like Metrobios ὁ γραμματεὺς in Kratinos, fr. 1 (cf. vol. i, p. 36, n. 2), though the five lines as a whole do not look like that. It cannot be just the good comic poet of learned theory defending the good Nikias; or why mention the incident at all? For the different, but equally good fragment of Eupolis' *Marikas* also quoted here by Plutarch, see below, v. 16. 1 n. (p. 660); and for Aristophanes, fr. 100, from *Georgoi*, which may also belong here, below p. 486.

ἢλπιζον: 'expected', of course, not 'hoped' (note *σφαλεῖσι γνώμης*). Van Leeuwen, ed. Ar. *Vesp.*, p. xviii, goes badly wrong in his dia-tribe against the aristocratic 'traitors' in Athens.

29. 1. καὶ πάντα διαπραξάμενος, κ.τ.λ.: that is, the proposals were given constitutional validity; Kleon was given commission to take the troops with him and, co-operating on the spot with the military, to capture the men on the island. He was apparently not elected strategos; and we do not know that any strategos left office to make room for him.

Thucydides tells us, but does not comment on, the energy and decision of Kleon's actions, once the assembly had voted. Nor does he comment on the constitutional and effective action of this tumultuous assembly; this he took for granted. See my article in *History*, 1951, p. 25.

τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἕνα — Δημοσθένη: either Demosthenes had been specially elected general since the successful operation at

Pylos, or, according to the more general view, he had been elected in the spring but could not take office before the beginning of the official year—about midsummer—and this date was now past. See 2. 4, 39. 1–2 nn.

2. τὴν ἀπόβασιν: *the landing which he, Kleon, had in mind.* It seems probable, as has been suggested by many, that Demosthenes had informed the authorities at home not only of the general position and of his plan to force a landing, but of his need for more light troops—or perhaps only of his action in collecting more of these (30. 3). There is no need to suppose any *secret* understanding between him and Kleon; and Thucydides is not giving him the whole credit for the plan, as Kleon's enemies did (*Ar. Equit.* 54–57, etc.).

μᾶλλον πολιορκούμενοι ἢ πολιορκοῦντες: like the Athenians at Syracuse after the first defeats at the hands of Gylippos, vii. 11. 4. Cf. my *Essays*, p. 201.

3. ύλώδους: cf. 8. 6. This need not mean a forest of lofty trees; more likely, in Greece, of small and twisted oaks such as are to be seen now on the road from Pylos to Kalamáta, but clearly growing very thickly together; for they were an effective screen.

πολλῷ γάρ ἂν στρατοπέδῳ: as Wilamowitz saw, we cannot have the simple *πολλῷ* in this position; it would imply that the large numbers of the force would be the cause of their losses. He proposed *καὶ πολλῷ γάρ*; either this or *πολλά* will serve. In the latter case *στρατοπέδῳ* is dative after *προσβάλλοντας* and *ἀποβάντι* goes with it. Haacke had seen the difficulty.

Note that there is no question of the Spartans on the island actually preventing a landing (ἀποβάντι, aorist; and cf. 30. 2, τῆς νήσου τοῖς ἐσχάτοις προσίσχοντας ἀριστοποεῖσθαι), as the Athenians had done at Pylos. The island is large for that, even though convenient landing-places are few.

ἀμαρτίας — — — ἀμαρτήματα: I suspect the quick repetition; and why should the Spartans 'go astray', who were ἔμπειροι τῆς χώρας? The paradoxical combination, too, τὰς ἐκείνων ἀμαρτίας καὶ παρασκευήν, seems foreign to Thucydides' manner, instead of εἴ τι καὶ ἀμαρτάνοιεν, or the like.

ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γάρ εἶναι ἂν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν: 'the initiative would be with them', as ii. 84. 2, in a battle at sea, and iii. 12. 3, in general terms.

4. εἰ δ' αὖ — — βιάζοιτο ὁμόσει ιέναι: 'further, if he were forced to fight at close quarters', as the Spartan hoplites would try to force him—the kind of fighting that he succeeded in avoiding. But there is something in Classen's view that the clause thus interpreted adds little or nothing to the previous sentence; and he would take *βιάζοιτο* as middle—'if he succeeded in forcing an engagement in circumstances favourable to himself'. This may be right; for though ὁμόσει

ιέναι would naturally mean the kind of engagement that the Spartans wanted and Demosthenes did not (hand-to-hand hoplite fighting: see 33. 1), in fact §§ 3–4, and 30. 1, suggest that it is the Spartans who might adopt tactics similar to those of the *light-armed* Aitolians.

Note the interest Thucydides takes in the tactics of battles: of normal battles, like Mantinea, and still more of unusual ones, as in Aitolia, on the beaches at Pylos, etc. He likes analysing the conditions, as well as narrating the details. See Grundy, *J.H.S.* xviii, 1898, 218–19.

30. 1. τοῦ Αἰτωλικοῦ πάθους: iii. 97–98 (ἢ ὕλη, 98. 2).

2. τῆς νήσου τοῖς ἐσχάτοις: at the southern end, where in calm weather a landing can be made; but no water would be obtained there—at least there is none now.

ἄκοντος: this ('unintentionally', as Plat. *Rep.* vii. 520 B) and ἔλαθε emphasize the accidental cause of the fire; it was no happy device of the Athenians. See below, p. 488.

καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου, κ.τ.λ.: Poppe conjectured ἔπει for *kai*, placing a comma after *κατακαυθέν*, and beginning the apodosis with *οὐτω δή*. This is an improvement; for *ἀπὸ τούτου* is then taken with ἔλαθε *κατακαυθέν*, not with *πνεύματος ἐπιγενομένου* ('as a result of this', not 'after this'), and *οὐτω δή* has its more usual construction. But see Steup's n.

"It often happens . . . that a fire, occurring accidentally or of intention, clears the face of the island during the droughts of that season: the northern hill exhibits at this moment recent marks of a similar conflagration"—Leake, *Morea*, i, p. 411 (April 26, 1805).

3. αὐτοῦ ἐσπέμπειν: Krüger conjectured *αὐτόσε*, which is grammatical, but unnecessary, Bauer *αὐτούς*, which is preferable. Demosthenes suspected that the Spartans had overstated the numbers of those cut off in Sphakteria, and had been sending, during the armistice, more food than they should, in order to have a reserve. (Cf. n. on *μεμαγμένον*, 16. 1.)

τὴν τε νήσον εὐαποβατωτέραν οὖσαν, κ.τ.λ.: Stuart Jones, like Stahl, Hude, and others, adopts Krüger's suggestion to put this clause after *ἐσπέμπειν*. I am sure Steup was right to reject it. While it brings the *τε - - - τε* clauses together, it separates *ὡς ἐπ' ἀξιόχρεων* from *τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους - - - πλείους ὄντας*, which is its sole justification; it gives a doubtful and obscure construction to *τοὺς Αθηναίους - - - ποιεῖσθαι*; and it deprives *τότε* of any meaning. (Opposed to *πρότερον* above, according to Stahl: better, 'at this time when Kleon was approaching, or when the debate was being held at Athens'; but it ought then to come before *τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν οἱ παρεσκευάζετο*. In its present position, with Krüger's order of words, it serves only as a repetition of *οὐτω δή*.) Steup takes *τότε* with *ἐσπέμπειν*, which makes

excellent sense if we may have *τότε* here at the end of the clause (the other cases of this in Thucydides, i. 86. 1, 115. 4, 128. 5 (where see my note), are not quite parallel), ὡς for *ἄστε* and *ἀξιόχρεων* neuter for *ἀξιόχρεών τι*. I should prefer to read *αὐτοὺς ἐσπέμπειν*, *ῶστε ὡς ἐπ' ἀξ.*, κ.τ.λ. If we do alter the MSS. order as Krüger wished, we should insert *όρῶν* after *τοὺς Αθηναίους*; for *όρῶν* with inf. see viii. 60. 3.

ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς ξυμμάχων: Zakynthos, Kephallenia, Naupaktos.

4. *ἡτήσατο*: sc. *Κλέων* (28. 4). Grote, v, p. 251, makes Demosthenes the subject. He is probably right in supposing, from 27. 4 ff., that Demosthenes had, in sending his report, asked for more troops.

φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ: “the definite article seems to imply a particular kind of imprisonment . . . , the conditions of which were supposed to be known to the Lacedaemonians”—Graves.

31. 1. *τῇ δ' ὁστεραίᾳ* — — — *νυκτός*: ‘the following night’ simply, the night of the same day, or early morning of the next, as we should say.

τοὺς ὀπλίτας πάντας: all, that is, who were to take part in the attempt on the island, excluding those left to guard Pylos, and perhaps others; see ii. 2 n. But what were the Peloponnesian land forces doing all this time, or what did Thucydides imagine them doing? See 32. 2, ad fin.

όκτακοσιοι: the *ἐπιβάται* from seventy ships (23. 2), could be spared, and there were other Athenian and the Messenian and other allied hoplites (4. 1, 9. 2 nn., and 30. 3). The ships were only needed as transports (32. 2), for there was no enemy fleet (23. 1).

τῆς νήσου ἔκατέρωθεν: for the probable landing-places, see below, p. 484.

2. *περὶ τὸ ὕδωρ*: presumably the well of brackish water referred to in 26. 4. See n. there.

αὐτὸ τὸ ἔσχατον — — — *τὸ πρὸς τὴν Πύλον*: Thucydides here makes it clear that he has been describing the island from south to north, and that the Athenian landing was made towards the southern end. The general description of the island is accurate enough; see Leake, *Morea*, i. 408, and below, p. 484.

32. 1. *ἐν τε ταῖς εὐναῖς ἔτι*, κ.τ.λ.: the close parallel (in meaning, not in grammatical construction), iii. 112. 3, *ἄμα ὅρθρῳ ἐπιπίπτει τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἔτι ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς καὶ οὐ προησθημένοις τὰ γεγενημένα*, suggests that there is no need to adopt Haase’s suggestion to transpose *καὶ* (before *λαθόντες*) to before *ἀναλαμβάνοντας*, as Stuart Jones does. Wilamowitz would bracket *τε*, which “gibt das Unsinn, dass sie auf ihrer Schlafstelle die Waffen anlegten, gleich als ob sie es

anderswo tun könnten". This I do not follow: with *καὶ* where the MSS. have it the translation is literally, 'both in their tents as they were collecting their arms and because the landing had not been observed', giving two reasons why they were easily overcome; with *καὶ* transposed, 'some still in their beds (lying down), some collecting their arms, because they had not observed the landing'.

λαθόντες τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ πλοῦ, viii. 17. 3, may justify *λαθόντες τὴν ἀπόβασιν* without *ποιούμενοι* (Stahl) or *ποιησάμενοι* (Rutherford): one of Thucydides' experiments with language.

2. *πλήν θαλαμιῶν*: the lowest rank of rowers, 60 in number in the trireme; there were 60 *ζυγῆται* and 50 *θρανῆται*; so rather more than 7,700 oarsmen landed, if rowers from all the 70 ships were engaged. *ώς ἔκαστοι ἐσκενασμένοι*: most, one imagines, with no arms at all, but throwers of stones and of such javelins as they could pick up in the fray; intended to impress solely by their numbers. The properly armed men are the 800 hoplites of 31. 1, and the archers, peltasts, and Messenians and others mentioned just below, the light-armed over 2,000 in all. Kleon asked for 400 archers (28. 4); there must have been as many others already at Pylos.

τοξόται δέ: there is a small error in the O.C.T. app. crit. here, which should read "τε codd. [Π²]".

3. *τὰ μετεωρότατα λαθόντες*: Cobet's *καταλαθόντες*, adopted by Hude (1898) and approved by Steup, is probable.

ἔχωσι: this is the reading of F only; the other good MSS. have *ἔχουσι*. The latter is surely to be preferred: *ἔχωσι* is an easy 'correction', and it is very like Thucydides to combine, in this sort of sentence, a participle and a finite clause (ἀλλ' ἀμφίβολοι γίγνωνται).

4. *κατὰ νότου τε αἰεὶ ἔμελλον αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.*: there seems to me no difficulty in this—whichever way they turned, their enemies would be *behind* them, light-armed and those the most difficult to cope with, for their effectiveness lay in their being able to fight at a distance'. So Arnold Graves's adoption of the more normal active meaning of *ἀπόρος* (more normal when applied to persons) and his translation 'even the worst provided' fails, because (1) it gives too positive a meaning to *ψυλοί*—'they were all light-armed, even the weakest of them' (as though *οἱ ἀπορώτατοι* might be hoplites), though the *ψυλοί* did indeed have the advantage here; and (2) because *ἀπόρος* means 'helpless', and so can only mean 'poorly equipped' if this results in helplessness. The 'weakest' men on the Athenian side were the rowers (n. on § 2, above); but their weakness does not add to the Spartans' difficulties. (*Π²* supports the MSS. readings.)

φεύγοντές τε γὰρ ἐκράτουν: 'by fleeing they would have the upper hand'; but *κρατεῖν* is not the word we expect. In the fighting in Aitolia, from which Demosthenes had learnt his lesson, there were *διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγωγαί*, *ἐν οἷς ἀμφοτέροις ἥσσους ἦσαν οἱ Αθηναῖοι*,

and this gives the same idea from the other side's point of view. Hude's suggestion *ἐκρατοῦντο*, on the other hand, is clearly not possible.

The light-armed were well handled in the attack; they must have been trained, as well as competently led by Demosthenes.

33. 2. οὐκ ἀντεπῆσαν, ἀλλ' ἡσύχαζον: they did not, in the conventional and gentlemanly manner of hoplites, move to the pitch suitable for hoplites and there fight it out with the Spartans, but stayed where they were, both because (presumably) they were on rough ground and in order to draw the Spartans as far as possible from their prepared position so as to give opportunity to the light-armed. Compare Brasidas' plans before Megara, below, 73. 1-3.

34. 1. οὐκέτι ὁξέως ἐπεκθεῖν: this refers to the immediate counter-attack, when the light-armed got too close. Their failure to pursue far up the difficult slopes has already been explained.

εἰληφότες --- ξυνειθισμένοι: the perfects, somewhat surprising at first sight, correspond to *βραδυτέρους ἥδη ὄντας* above. *φαινόμενοι* --- *φαίνεσθαι* is a notable repetition; Dionysios, in his improvements on Thucydides' style, avoided it (*de Thuc. 872*).

τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι: an exaggerated expression, though we must not forget that the majority were practically unarmed. Cf. (with Classen) ii. 61. 3 (which is not so surprising in the then state of Athenian feeling) and vii. 71. 3. Since *ἔδουλάθη*, i. 98. 4, with a political meaning, is also an exaggeration if taken literally, it looks as though the rhetorical use of the word had in Thucydides' day weakened its force. See below, n. on v. 9. 9. With τ. γν. δεδ. ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους contrast 30. 3, above, τοὺς Λακ. --- πλείους ὄντας --- ὡς ἐπ' ὁξιόχρεων, κ.τ.λ.

2. ἔκπληξίς τε ἐνέπεσεν, κ.τ.λ.: I would bracket *τε*, for there is but little connexion between this and the following *καί*, while *ἀπορόν τε* goes closely with *ὁ κονιορτὸς* --- *πολὺς ἄνω*. I would at the same time put a comma after *μάχης*, and perhaps a colon only after *εἰχεν* at the end of the previous sentence.

3. οἱ πῖλοι: the regular Laconian round steel cap (so Arnold and Steup) rather than cuirasses, as many have supposed. The scholia offer both alternatives. We may still agree that the javelins that were broken had struck the cuirasses. With the latter detail Arnold compares the device of Marius in Plutarch, *Mar. 25. 2*.

ἀποκεκλημένοι μὲν τῇ ὄψει, κ.τ.λ.: cf. iii. 22. 1. For the apparently redundant use of *τῇ ὄψει*, cf. iii. 112. 4, vii. 44. 2.

κινδύνου τε πανταχόθεν περιεστῶτος: just as the Athenians had been beset at Pylos, io. 1. But they had mastered the difficulties.

This account of the fighting, in cc. 34 and 35 if nowhere else, is clearly written from the Spartan point of view (my *Essays*, pp. 128–30).

The speech of the herdsman in *Iphigenia in Tauris*, 260 ff., is interesting when compared with Thucydides' narrative of the Sphakteria fighting. It gives the conventional picture of common people, many in number, arming themselves with stones, in conflict with the two young noblemen. Lines 301–6 show the terror which the latter inspire (as 34. 1); 323–33 give the course of the fighting (34. 2–35. 2); 310–14, 320–1, the καλοὶ κάγαθοί (below, 40. 2). There is even a Kleon,

ἄλλος δέ τις μάταιος, ἀνομίᾳ θρασύς,
ἔγέλασεν εὐχαῖς, ναυτίλους δ' ἐφθαρμένους
θάσσεων φάραγγ' ἔφασκε

(οὕτε φοβεῖσθαι ἔφη Λακεδαιμονίους, 28. 4).

35. 3. περίοδον μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ κύκλωσιν χωρίου ἴσχύι οὐκ εἰχον: we might have been told why in greater detail (cf. 31. 2). The north slope is very steep, but a scrambling ascent is possible; the east slope is all but precipitous everywhere—see c. 36. The western is steep, the southern approach the least difficult.

4. ἡμύνοντο: this, the reading of CG, is preferred by Steup, Hude, and Stuart Jones. But the aorist, which the other MSS. have, is here better: the position is summed up, 'their defence was more successful', and the verb has a different context from ἀντεῖχον just above.

οὐκ οὖστις σφῶν τῆς κυκλώσεως ἐς τὰ πλάγια: see § 3, above. Even more important, they were at the moment on higher ground than their enemies.

36. 1. ὁ τῶν Μεσσηνίων στρατηγός: his name was Komon, according to Paus. iv. 26. 2, the only detail added to Thucydides' narration by later writers. (Cf. the name of the Spartan ambassador in 432 B.C., i. 139. 2, n. on οὗτε τὸ ψήφισμα καθήρουν, and of the Aiginetan recorded by Plut. *Them.* 19. 2.) Pausanias says he was still alive in 371 B.C.

τῶν ψυλῶν: not the same as the τοξόται here; see 93. 3 n.

ἢ ἂν αὐτὸς εὗρῃ: 'wherever he himself found a way'; he was confident of finding some way round, i.e. he had looked at the cliff face, and thought that his men could climb it, though he did not know an actual path. Still, I should have expected the potential ἢν εὗροι (as well as ἦν, as Classen suggested): 'which I would find by myself, if given the opportunity'; still more perhaps ἢν αὐτὸς εύρήσου.

2. κατὰ τὸ αἱεὶ παρεῖκον τοῦ κρημνώδους τῆς νήσου: i.e. along the

eastern side of this natural akropolis, facing the bay, where the cliffs are precipitous (31. 2). For the topography, see Leake, *Morea*, i. 408-9, and Grundy's article referred to below, p. 482.

3. ὡς μικρὸν μεγάλω εἰκάσαι: the Peloponnesian was the greatest war in Greek history, and in particular, greater than the Persian war; but this view did not make Thucydides minimize the greatness of the men of 490 and 480. Indeed this phrase underrates the fighting of the Spartans on Sphakteria. (So Ullrich, p. 105, n. 123.)

ἐκεῖνοι τε γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: Bekker's punctuation, followed by Steup and Stuart Jones, is surely the best; but it leaves a very harsh anacoluthon, ἀλλά (instead of οὐτω, or τότε δῆ), where the main sentence is resumed. Rutherford would bracket ἀλλά; and Steup's criticism of this, that "so in der Parenthese in Bezug auf die Spartaner schon ebenso viel wie nachher im Hauptsatz ausgesprochen würde", amounts to nothing. The objections to the more usual punctuation by which the parenthesis ends at οὐτοί τε are its abruptness and that neither τῇ ἀτραπῷ (*the path*, well known from Herodotus) nor τῶν Περσῶν fits οὐτοί τε, and that διεφθάρησαν barely fits, in view of διαφθαρησομένους in 37. 1. If the anacoluthon cannot stand (and it is very difficult), we should mark a lacuna within the parenthesis, after οὐτοί τε or, better, after ἀμφίβολοι ηδη ὅντες (for these words, which would otherwise add nothing to βαλλόμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν ηδη, are best put in the parenthesis), e.g. τὰ ὄμοια ἔμελλον παθεῖν.

διὰ τὴν σιτοδείαν: i.e. they had had nothing to eat all day, and, more important, their main reserve of food (39. 2) will have been in the central camp and they could expect no more.

37. 1. [ὅτι] --- διαφθαρησομένους: it says little for our feeling for Greek that this reading remained in most of our texts till the scrap of papyrus called *II²*, which omits ὅτι, was discovered; and Steup is logical in saying that, if it is argued that ὅτι could never have got into our MSS. unless from Thucydides himself, this argument is not weakened by *II²*'s testimony. He accepts Classen's view that Thucydides wrote it, but would have expunged it if he had finally revised his text; but this is only to say we should do it for him. ὅτι should not appear in the text, even in square brackets. It is not to be defended by the occasional appearance in our texts of ὡς followed by accusative and infinitive, on which see Jebb on *Oed. Col.* 385, or by εἰπον ὅτι introducing direct speech.

38. 1. Ἰππαγρέτου: *ἱππαγρέτας* was the title of an office-holder at Sparta, the commander of the 300 who acted as guard of the king in battle (Xen. *Lak. pol.* 4. 3; *Hell.* iii. 3. 9), but is here a proper name. Cf. *Ἰππαρχος*, *Πρόξενος*, and other such names at Athens.

Arnold suggests that the Spartans regularly sent three officers on

expeditions abroad, whose order of succession was fixed. Cf. esp. iii. 100. 2, 109. 1.

3. **Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσιν ὑμᾶς**: the Spartan authorities, on this as on other occasions, took a most ungenerous line, by refusing all responsibility. With *αἰσχρόν*, cf. 20. 2 n. Their subsequent treatment of these men, after 421, was not much better: v. 34. 2.

4. **τροπαῖον**: see n. on 12. 1.

διεδίδοσαν: *Π²*, and some *recentiores* (Powell, *C.Q.* xxx, 1936, 88), give **διέδοσαν**, which is preferable.

5. **Ἀθηναίων δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν**: perhaps a quite insignificant number, 10 or 20; see v. 11. 2 n. For *I.G. i.²* 949, which Kirchhoff and Dittenberger considered to be a list of the dead at Pylos, see below, 44. 6 n.

39. 1-2. **ἔβδομήκοντα ἡμέραι καὶ δύο**: the expedition left about May 1, perhaps a week later (2. 1 n.); we can allow say 5 days for the journey to Pylos, 2-3 days' delay, 6 days during which Pylos was fortified, and another 6 before the sea-battle in the bay was fought, a total of 20 days, as a minimum. Since the expedition sailed about the same time as the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, and they stayed there 15 days (6. 2), this leaves only 5 days between the time of the latter's leaving Attica and their arrival at Pylos; which was besides a few days before the battle in the harbour. We should, therefore, date the battle not earlier than c. May 25-30 (c. 25 days after the fleet left Athens). Since Kleon's success was immediate, we need not suppose that more than 10 days passed between the decision in Athens to send him out and the final victory; by this reckoning, the final victory was c. August 5 to 10, and the assembly's decision to send Kleon had been taken c. July 28. We are allowing for a possible later start of the fleet from Athens; but the second week of August seems to be the latest date possible for the finish of the campaign. This means that there remained six weeks yet of the true summer, and nearly three months of a normal campaigning season.

2. **καὶ ἦν σῖτος, κ.τ.λ.**: the *σιτοδεία* of 36. 3 had been of the last day only. See n. there. They were not, however, actually starved into surrender (40. 1); there will have been some food left in this last defence of the Spartans, who could have held out for a day or two longer.

3. **τῷ στρατῷ --- ἐπ' οἴκου**: on the Athenian side practically only the force brought out by Kleon; for a garrison stayed at Pylos (41. 2), and the main fleet proceeded on its way to Kerkyra and Sicily (46. 1).

καίπερ μανιώδης οὖσα: Thucydides' bias is once more clear; but note what he says. It is Kleon's *promise* that is called mad, its

lightheartedness which had provoked the contempt of “the saner elements in the community” (28. 5); and this was mad. No good soldier would make a promise of victory within a stated number of days, in such circumstances as these. We can easily imagine possible delays, caused by bad weather at Athens or at Pylos, or a stricter watch kept by the Spartans on the island, without in any way impugning Kleon’s general attitude towards Nikias on this occasion or belittling the decision with which he himself acted. See H. Delbrück, *Die Strategie des Perikles*, 190 (and so Steup on 28. 5).

It is interesting to note that Plutarch, in decrying Herodotos for his bias, quotes Thucydides’ expression *κουφολογία* in 28. 5 as particularly moderate, showing no bias: ‘he does not call it *θρασύτης* or *μανίας*’ (*de Hdt. mal.* 2).

Grote, in the well-known passage in which he defends Kleon against his detractors (v, p. 266. 1), quotes the line from some unknown comedy recorded by Lucian (*Prom. in verbis*, 2: Eupolis? fr. 456, Kock), *Κλέων Προμηθεύς ἐστι μετὰ τὰ πράγματα*, regarding it as an enemy’s slighting of Kleon’s success at Sphakteria, “certainly undeserved”. That it is so inapposite does not mean that it was not said; but Kleon in the course of his career gave many opportunities to his enemies, and the line may come from a comedy earlier or later than the spring of 424, and have had more point.

40. 1. παρὰ γνώμην: in effect, equal here to *παρὰ δόξαν*—‘contrary to the general judgement about them’, and so against all expectation, the Spartans had surrendered.

τοὺς γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους: Steup takes this to mean the Spartans on the island, not Spartans generally; but this can hardly be so. It would require either *αὐτούς* for *τοὺς Λακ.* and in a less emphatic place in the sentence, or *Λακεδαιμονίους γὰρ ὅντας*, or the like.

τὰ δπλα παραδοῦναι: it is sometimes stated that it was the law of Sparta that no troops should *retreat* from a field of battle (hence their stand at Thermopylai). Of course the Spartans were not so foolish. ‘With your shield or on it’ was the *νόμος*.

2. ἀπιστοῦντές τε μή, κ.τ.λ.: since the sentence *τοὺς γὰρ Λακ.* --- *ἀποθνήσκειν* is a general one, it is, as Stahl says, a kind of parenthesis between *παρὰ γνώμην τε δή* --- and *ἀπιστοῦντές τε μή* ---; but it is not necessary to print it in brackets, and it does not follow that *τε* --- *τε* correspond with each other. The first certainly connects with the foregoing (*ἡ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη*). I would, however, put only a colon after *ἀποθνήσκειν*. It is difficult to accept the anacoluthon of the MSS. reading, as Stahl and Stuart Jones do, the former with a comma after his parenthesis (*τοὺς γὰρ --- ἀποθνήσκειν*) and a stop after *δμοίους*, which makes it even more difficult (i. 18. 1, iii. 36. 2, and iv. 73. 4 are not parallel); both Dobree’s *ἡπίστουν τε*, accepted

by Hude (1898), with Stahl's punctuation, and Steup's suggestion that a finite verb such as *κατεφρόνουν* has dropped out after *όμοίους*, are possible, though neither fits well with what follows. In his 1913 edition Hude reads *ἀπιστοῦντες*, without *τε* (according to him, but not according to Stuart Jones-Powell, the reading of M), with Stahl's punctuation, but no brackets; this avoids the anacoluthon, but fits ill with what precedes and with what follows. For myself I should prefer *ἀπιστούντων*. No scholiast remarks on the difficulty; nor does Dionysios.

καὶ τινος ἐρομένου, κ.τ.λ.: it is not often that Thucydides relates such anecdotes; cf. iii. 113, v. 65. 2. This one has most point.

δι' ἀχθηδόνα: this might mean, as the scholiast says, 'in sorrow', or 'in bitterness of spirit' (the Athenian 'allies' wishing for Athenian defeat); but more likely 'by way of taunt', 'spitefully' like *κατ' ἐπίρειαν*. The parallels for the use of *διά* with acc. in this sense (ii. 89. 4, iv. 102. 4, and v. 53, where see nn.) are not very convincing; but we certainly must not omit the phrase, with Rutherford and Hude, on the ground that *διά* in this sense is common in late Greek. Demosthenes has δι' ἐπίρειαν, xxxix. 32, and Aristotle δι' ὑβριν, *Eth. Nic.* iv. 3. 31, 1125 a 8 (noted by Graves).

εἰ οἱ τεθνεῶτες αὐτῶν καλοὶ κάγαθοι: on the meaning and proper rendering of *καλοὶ κάγαθοι* here see my n. in *C.Q.* n.s. iii, 1953, 65–68. The phrase often has an ethical, not a political or social meaning: *Hdt.* i. 30. 4; *Xen. Hell.* v. 3. 9 (of the *perioikoi* of Lakonia); *Mem.* iii. 5. 19 (of hoplites and cavalry generally); *Plat. Apol.* 25 A; *Ps.-Plat. Hipparch.* 228 C; *Arist. Pol.* 1293 b 39; when social it is a title adopted by aristocrats or the rich, as in viii. 48. 6, *τοὺς καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς ὄνομαζομένους*, who claimed these virtues as exclusively theirs, or by Dorians in opposition to Ionians and islanders, as here. Its use in Aristophanes is particularly interesting, e.g. *Eq.* 185, 227, 735; *Ran.* 728. It has no near equivalent in English, nor should we expect it to have, for it is the product of the special conditions of ancient Greece; 'gentlemen' will not do, for that now only relates to social status; 'officer and gentleman' ('conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman') gives a comparable modern phrase, but is impossible as a translation. We should translate literally, "the brave and fair", writing it in inverted commas to indicate that it is a title assumed by certain classes. It is important to keep "brave" for *ἀγαθός*, for the Spartan in his retort contemptuously shortens the title to this word; besides, it is an Ionian taunting a Spartan, not *τῶν πονηρῶν τις* taunting an Alkibiades or a Nikias.¹ For the Spartan

¹ Crawley translates both *καλοὶ κάγαθοι* and *τοὺς ἀγαθούς*, below, "men of honour", a phrase used in this sense by Cromwell (see pp. 67–68 of my article); which is best, if it is proper to use one current in those times, especially as it has the contemporary French equivalent, *honnête homme*.

claim see Xen. *Lak. pol.* 10. 4, οὐτας καὶ ἡ Σπάρτη εἰκότως πασῶν τῶν πόλεων ἀρετῇ διαφέρει, μόνη δημοσίᾳ ἐπιτηδεύουσα τὴν καλοκάγαθίαν. τὸν ἄτρακτον: 'it would be a fine *sphindle* that could distinguish the brave.' For the contemptuous use of ἄτρακτον compare the story of the dying Spartan in Plut. *Apophrith. Lak.* 46 (*Mor.* 234 E): οὐ μέλει μοι ὅτι ἀποθανοῦμαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὑπὸ γύννιδος τοξότου. 'Hoplite fighting does distinguish the brave; but we could do nothing but wait to be hit by chance stones and arrows. This is what you and your Athenian masters call being soldiers.' Cf. 126. 5, the description of Illyrian fighting by Brasidas, especially ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει, and the passage from *Iphigeneia* referred to above, 34. 3 n., and *Philoktetes*, 436–7.

πόλεμος οὐδέν' ἄνδρ' ἔκών
αἱρεῖ πονηρόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν χρηστοὺς ἀεί.

Achilles' death from an arrow shot by Paris, of all men, will serve as the exemplar of the brave man killed ὑπὸ γύννιδος τοξότου.

41. 1. ἔξαγαγόντες ἀποκτεῖναι: they were used as hostages. (But it was not then argued that this was humane, because the war would thus be shortened in Athens' favour, and the loss of life and property be less on both sides.) The Spartans had, more simply, killed their prisoners at Plataia, including some Athenians.

2. τῆς δὲ Πύλου φυλακήν: see below, p. 493.

ἔστι γάρ ή Πύλος, κ.τ.λ.: almost the same words as 3. 2; a sign of lack of revision by the author (Classen and others), if the words are genuine here. ὁμόφωνοι ὄντες, repeated from 3. 3, is not surprising.

3. ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες — ληστείας: the reading ἀπαθεῖς (which Stephanus gives in his margin, either as a *v.l.* or an emendation) is surely right. ἀμαθῆς is a word of the wrong colour here. Cf. Hdt. vi. 12. 2.

τῶν τε Ειλώτων αὐτομολούντων: cf. 55, below, and v. 14. 3, 35. 6–7. In spite of this testimony, the occupation of Pylos, for nearly fifteen years, seems to have had less effect on the helots and so on the whole of Spartan life than might have been expected. Whether because the majority of helots were humbly and genuinely loyal to their masters (as is suggested by their use in war) or they were cowed by sudden terrors such as that described in c. 80, in fact the Spartan ruling class maintained its position, in peace and in war, for many generations to come. It is possible that there was little love lost between the Messenians, who were Dorians and had probably themselves oppressed the native population after the Dorian occupation of the Peloponnese, and the rest of the helots; and that after the suppression of the last helot (probably mainly Messenian) revolt, there were not so many Messenians of Doric speech left in Lakonia, and most of these probably transplanted away from their homeland.

ἐνδῆλοι εἶναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: above, 22. 3, it had been her own allies from whom Sparta wished to conceal her actions.

4. φοιτώντων αὐτοὺς ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμπον: see Ar. *Pax*, 636 ff., quoted on 21. 2; Philochoros, F 128. (I should prefer to read αὐτῶν here, as the analogous use of a genitive absolute in iii. 13. 7 suggests; αὐτούς seems too emphatic.)

A reference to these offers of peace, closer in time, but obscure in meaning, is that of *Equit.* 794–6,

Ἀρχεπτολέμου δὲ φέροντος
τὴν εἰρήνην ἔξεσκέδασας, τὰς πρεσβείας τ' ἀπελαύνεις
ἐκ τῆς πόλας ῥαθαπυγίζων, αἱ τὰς σπουδὰς προκαλοῦνται.

According to most, Archeptolemos was the son of Hippodamos, the Milesian town-planner and political theorist; he was given Athenian citizenship (Ps.-Plut., *Vit. X Orr.* 834 A), was one of the Four Hundred (but not very prominent, if Thucydides' account is to be trusted in such a detail), and was executed along with Antiphon. He may have been pro-Spartan; but why is he alone mentioned in *The Knights* of all the friends of peace in Athens? Only because of the paradox of his name? And how could an Athenian citizen be said to bring peace, or an offer of peace, unless he had been sent to Sparta as ambassador, or had gone on his own like Amphitheos in the comedy? Earlier in *The Knights* (327) he is mocked for his inactivity. I suspect that Archeptolemos had not yet, in 425–424, been made citizen of Athens, that as a Milesian he was suspect if he proclaimed his impartial neutrality in the war, and that his puny efforts for peace are here gently laughed at. Aristophanes was not particularly pacific when he wrote *The Knights*. See Addenda.

Notes on the Pylos Campaign

A. Topography

It is almost universally agreed that Sphakteria is the island now called Sphagia (a name which it also had in antiquity: Plato, *Menex.* 242 C; Strabo, viii. 4. 2, p. 359), that 'the harbour' is the bay of Navarino, or part of it, and that Pylos is the rocky peninsula now known as Palió-Navaríno (the modern town of Neókastro or Pylos being on the south shore of the bay, opposite the southern end of Sphakteria); it is the only possible place in 'what was once Messenia'. But, as is well known, there are several serious geographical errors in Thucydides' account; these are best described in Grundy's paper in *J.H.S.* xvi, 1896, 1, with an excellent map, and in those of Burrows, *ibid.* 55, and xviii, 1898, 147, with excellent photographs; cf. also Grundy, *ibid.* xviii. 232, and his *Thucydides*, ii (1948), 122–33.

1. *The 'harbour'.* Thucydides, though he knew the harbour was large (13. 4), clearly did not realize how large it is—much the largest

in Greek waters, including south Italy and Sicily—nor, what is more important, that it was a bay and could not properly be described as a harbour at all; for it is deep, apt to be very choppy with northerly or southerly winds, and only in its north-east corner offering suitable landing ground for triremes: on its west side the eastern shore of Sphakteria offers only one small place for landing, and the southern and eastern shores of the bay, though low, are rocky. It is the perfect harbour for modern ships, with their deep draught and imperviousness to choppy seas, but an ‘arm of the sea’, and a not very sheltered one at that, for triremes. For the conditions of the naval battle of 425, with some fifty or sixty vessels on either side, it provided *εὐρυχωρία* almost as well as the open sea (13. 3).

2. *Pylos*. The description of the shore of the promontory on the west, facing the sea, is admirable, but that of the east side is very defective; for Thucydides implies that there was a broad front of attack, though parts of this were less accessible than others. In fact, except in the north-east and south-east corners, the cliff is almost sheer, and its base is washed by the waters of the Osmýn Agá lagoon; so that the fortress is only approachable, from the mainland, by two narrow sand-bars at these corners. There has been apparently no satisfactory geological survey of the region, but it seems very probable that this lagoon has been filling up, by sand and soil brought down by many small rivers on the east (see Burrows, 1898, pp. 157–8; Philippson, *Peloponnes*, 351–5; Leake, on the other hand, i. 412, says that it must be recent), and that in consequence not only was it in ancient times deeper than it is now, but perhaps the southern sand-bar, which now separates it from Navarino Bay, did not exist; that the lagoon was but part of the bay, of what Thucydides calls the harbour. That this was so seems proved by the statement in 13. 1 that when the Peloponnesians plan to attack the fortress wall ‘on the side facing the harbour’, they must do so from ships—the same kind of operation as that attempted on the western shore, but here the landing would be easier (though the wall confronting them was higher). This means that Pylos could only be approached on the land side by one narrow path, along the sand-bar at the north-east end, and up a steep slope; see the map in Kromayer-Veith, *Atlas*. This would help to explain the utter failure of the Peloponnesian land-attacks, and their apparent stop; but Thucydides gives no such picture of the fortress. This is in line with his failure to give any detail of the fighting on the land-side (13. 1 n.).

If it is thought to be unjustifiable to suppose much alteration in the lagoon, we have then to note, not only that *ἀποβάσεως δὲ μάλιστα οὖσης* in 13. 1 is irrelevant, for the Peloponnesians could have approached Pylos at that point by land, but also Thucydides’ failure to mention the lagoon.

3. The very small bay, now called Vóldokoiliá, on the north side of the promontory of Pylos, might have been mentioned by Thucydides, had he had an accurate picture of the place in his mind; for it is, at present at least, bounded on the east by the sand-bank which forms the north-east approach (probably, as explained above, the only approach from the mainland in antiquity) to the fortress. It is probable that the Peloponnesians held this sandbank in force, and prevented any Athenian use of the bay even for a few ships. Leake describes it as one with "a narrow entrance; it is nevertheless bad, exposed to a continual surf, and capable only of admitting boats".

4. *Sphakteria Island*. Thucydides is right about the relation of Sphakteria to the bay, but wrong about its length (8. 6); this in itself is not surprising, in a hilly place, with no accurate survey, and all we need say is that the Athenian triremes which sailed round the island, travelling at normal speed, would be likely to give a more accurate figure than the Spartans on the island (my *Essays*, p. 127). The mistake goes with his general picture of a large harbour rather than a bay. Or, if we will, we may suppose that Thucydides was given the distance from the central Spartan camp to the north point (31. 2) and mistook it for the whole length; or that the MSS. are at fault.

Thucydides' description of the interior of the island is reasonably full and accurate (see Leake, Grundy, and Burrows); and the possible landing-places of the Athenians in their attack, though not described by him, are consistent with it. But he makes a bad blunder over the width and depth of the southern entrance to the bay (on Sikiá, the northern entrance, he is accurate; see n. on 8. 6); and it does not help much to explain the blunder by saying that the Spartans may have intended to block Sikiá channel and the passage from the bay to the *lagoon* (so Grundy), for Thucydides certainly was not imagining any such thing.

It is clear that while Thucydides had gathered as much detail about the topography as possible when collecting information about the events of the campaign, he had not been to Pylos himself, and blunders, due primarily to a misunderstanding of what he had been told, were therefore left uncorrected. It is not surprising that he had little opportunity for going there; for, even if he travelled freely, after his exile, in the Peloponnese, so long as Athens held Pylos (till 409 B.C.) he could not reach it or Sphakteria, and it would have been dangerous to go very near.

5. There is another defect in his narrative which is in one way more serious than any of these topographical blunders. He explains clearly why the Spartans sent a force to occupy Sphakteria (8. 7-8), and he knows its importance: with Sphakteria and the mainland

occupied by Spartan troops, the Athenian fleet would have no base near enough from which to operate, either in aid of their garrison in Pylos or to attack Sphakteria; for Pylos itself offers none (13. 3 n.). But, in essentials, after the battle in the bay and the cutting off of the men in the island, the position of the Athenian fleet was the same, the island and the mainland still occupied by the Spartans and denied to the Athenians, with the exception of the south-east corner of Pylos promontory, 'facing the harbour' (13. 1), if, as argued above, this was only approachable by sea. This would be a very inadequate base for the Athenian fleet of at first fifty and later of seventy vessels; Thucydides emphasizes the inadequacy (26. 2-3, 30. 2); but what he fails to do is to point out at least some change in this respect brought about by the naval victory of the Athenians, and to say where their landing-ground (or *τὸ στρατόπεδον*, 14. 5) was. At least they did not have to retire to Prote Island. Note that this defect in the narrative is independent of any topographical accuracy or inaccuracy: even in an imaginary account the writer, having said that a fleet at first had no base, should explain how it afterwards secured one.

Attempts have been made to explain away Thucydides' mistakes by forcing his words to a meaning which he clearly did not intend, and which generally result in making him guilty of other mistakes instead. Others have sought to explain them by assuming that Thucydides' informants were not only limited in numbers and deficient in knowledge, but singularly stupid and unobservant; of these the chief is Wilamowitz, *Sitzungsber. Berlin*, 1921, 306-18, who tried to show from the narrative that Thucydides only had access to Athenian informants, and therefore that the whole was composed before Thucydides left Athens for good in 424: 'a very early piece of Attic prose.' Grundy and Burrows had also assumed only Athenian sources, including Demosthenes himself, who, for example, could have given him many details of the fighting at the shore of Pylos and on Sphakteria, but not of the land-attack on Pylos (above, p. 447). Schwartz, on the other hand, pp. 290-4, supposed Spartan sources, as well as Demosthenes. To my mind there can be no doubt that Schwartz was in the main right. There are clearly Athenian sources behind the account of the first fortification of Pylos and the defence against the Peloponnesian landing there, and that of the Athenian plans in general, especially for the attack on Sphakteria; but equally clearly the story of the fighting on Sphakteria is from Spartan sources, not only because it explains their defeat, but because it is written from their point of view, particularly cc. 34-35. See my *Essays*, c. vii (*C.Q.* xvii, 1923, 36-40). If this view is right, then there is no external evidence for dating the composition of the narrative: it might be early, for Thucydides could have interviewed the Spartan prisoners in Athens; it might be later, after 421 B.C.,

when he had opportunities of being in touch with Peloponnesian sources. As stated in the n., 12. 3 was surely written after 421, though perhaps not long after; so also was 21. 3, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὅν; and while this latter may have been a note added much later by the author, the former does not look like one.


B. Other Sources

As already mentioned no later writer, not even the geographers and travellers, notes any inaccuracy or inadequacy in Thucydides' topography, though the campaign is frequently referred to; that is because, in the main, he is accurate enough, and, in this as in other matters, it did not occur to his ancient critics or readers to examine the country for themselves. (Cf. Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad*, p. xxviii; J. O. Thomson, *Hist. Anc. Geography*, p. 288.)¹ No new facts are added by them either, except the name of the Messenian commander by Pausanias (see 36. 1 n.); Diodoros' narrative, xii. 61–63, is only commonplace confusion, chronological as well as material; Plutarch, *Nik.* 7–8, adds such touches as Νικίαν προθύμως συμπράττοντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις (7. 2), and a comment on Nikias by his detractors that it was cowardly in him, by resigning his command, to throw away such a chance of success in favour of his enemy, Kleon (not that it was wrong to imperil his country's future), with the addition of a quotation of the lines in *The Birds* (639–40) illustrative of his general anxiety to do nothing, and a more interesting quotation from *Georgoi* (fr. 100):

- A. ἐθέλω γεωργεῖν. B. εἴτα τίς σε κωλύει;
 A. ὑμεῖς· ἐπεὶ δίδωμι χιλίας δραχμάς,
 ἐάν με τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀφῆτε. B. δεχόμεθα·
 δισχιλιαι γάρ εἰσι σὺν ταῖς Νικίου.

Aristophanes very likely wrote *Georgoi* soon after the campaign of 425, but perhaps not very soon after; such a taunt against Nikias would live long. *The Knights* (see below, pp. 501–2) throws no light on the conduct of the campaign, except for the charge, often stated, that Kleon filched from Demosthenes all the credit for the victory. Note that the view that Kleon owed everything to Demosthenes is not borne out by Thucydides: Demosthenes was responsible for the planning and conduct of the capture of Sphakteria, but Kleon made it politically possible—each, that is, fulfilled his proper function, the one as a soldier, the other as politician. Yet Kleon does seem to have got more than his share of the reward: for he was given *προεδρία* (Ar. *Equit.* 575, 702) and *σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείᾳ* (*ibid.* 280, 705, 1404, and esp. 766, *μηδὲν δράσας δειπνεῖν ἐν τῷ πρυτανείῳ*).

¹ Cf. Polybius' censure of Timaios for his ignorance both of affairs and of the scene of events which he describes: xii. 25 g 3–4, h 1 (*F. Gr. Hist.* 366, T 19).



As an instance of his impudent βωμολοχεύματα we are told that he began his official dispatch to Athens announcing the victory in the style of a private letter, *Κλέων Ἀθηναίων τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ* (but it does not seem very bad manners to us): Eupolis' fr. 308.

The only aids from archaeology for the story of the campaign are *I.G. i² 949*, which is perhaps the list of Athenian casualties in this year (below, n. on 44. 6), the shield from Pylos, from a dedication, found in the Athenian agora (12. 1 n.), and, probably, Paionios' statue of Nike at Olympia, with its inscription 'dedicated by Messanioi and Naupaktioi' (*I.G. v (1), 1568 = Tod, 65; Paus. v. 26. 1*); Pausanias, iv. 36. 6, says too that the Athenians set up a Nike on the Akropolis, *εἰς μνήμην τῶν ἐν τῇ Σφακτηρίᾳ*.

I.G. i² 324 (see below), ll. 16–20, records the payment of 30 tal. to Demosthenes as strategos *περὶ Πελοπόννησον* on the third day of the fourth prytany when Stratokles was archon, i.e. c. Oct. 20 of this year, 425. This must have been for the purpose of consolidating the position now won at Pylos (*τῆς δὲ Πύλου φυλακὴν κατεστήσαντο*, 41. 2), as well as for Naupaktos and, perhaps, Zakynthos and Kephallenia. It is highly probable that Demosthenes had by this time returned to Athens, and quite possible that he returned with Kleon to enjoy his share (such as it was) of the triumph: see Meritt, *Ath. Cal.* 91, who notes 37. 1, ὁ Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης — βουλόμενοι ἀγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ζῶντας.

C. Chronology

From *I.G. i² 324* (above, iii. 116. 3 n., cf. iv. 51, below) we know that in the second half of the year 426–425, that is, in the spring and early summer (to July 1) of 425, three payments were made from the treasury of Athena of 44½ tal., 100 tal., and 18½ tal., on the fifth day of the 8th prytany, on the 10th (probably) of the same prytany, and on the 7th of the 10th prytany, respectively: that is, on March 9, March 14, and June 2 of the Julian calendar, within a day or two. In the next year, in the second half of the summer and the autumn of 425, the first payment was that to Demosthenes c. Oct. 20 which has already been noted.

In the n. on 39. 1–2 it was calculated from Thucydides' own statements that the earliest date for the final battle on the island was c. Aug. 5, and that the decision of the ekklesia to send Kleon was therefore not earlier than c. July 28. Unfortunately the purpose of the payments listed in the inscription is not given; but we can make one interesting deduction (assuming that we can trust Thucydides—or his MS. figure)—that Kleon not only asked for no more citizen troops from Athens (28. 4), but no more money either, at least no loan from Athena, for the last payment of the summer had been voted more than seven weeks before. The payments of 44½ and

of 100 tal. in March were doubtless for the equipment of the expedition of Eurymedon and Sophokles (2. 2); that of 18½ tal. in June may have been for the light-armed from Ainos and elsewhere who were already in Athens before Kleon sailed (28. 4).

Philochoros, F 128 (b), says that Kleon attacked the proposal to make peace with Sparta *ἐν' Εὐθύνον ἀρχοντος* (426–425), and Beloch, ii. 2. 235–6, took this as proof that the Spartan embassy to Athens of iv. 17 arrived there before the end of the civil year. This is correct (see above); but Kleon may have spoken in this way on other occasions. (Those inclined to trust too much to the scholia on Aristophanes should, by the way, study the second part of Philochoros, F 128 (a), which makes almost every possible mistake; fortunately we have 128 (b), from a scholion on Lucian, *Timon*, to save Philochoros' reputation, and much guessing by modern scholars.)

D. *The Element of Chance in the Story of the Campaign*

Cornford's view (*Thucydides Mythistoricus*, 1907, pp. 88 ff.) that Thucydides emphasized and exaggerated the element of chance in the Athenian victory, in order, according to him, to minimize Kleon's success—though in reality it would serve rather to minimize that of Demosthenes, with whom Thucydides is generally supposed to have been on friendly terms¹—has recently been revived by Mme de Romilly (p. 151). Certainly the word *τυγχάνειν* occurs frequently: 5. 1 (the Spartan festival), 9. 1 (the arrival of the Messenian vessels), 13. 4 (the omission to block the entrances), and 18. 3 (*τύχη*), 5; cf. also 30. 2 (the fire on Sphakteria). But, as pointed out in the nn. on i. 57. 6, 116. 1, and iv. 9. 1, *τυγχάνειν* does not necessarily mean that an event was accidental, but that it was contemporaneous. 'The Spartans were at that time holding festival': the most that is meant is that Demosthenes had not timed the arrival at Pylos in order to coincide with it. 'The Messenian vessels had just arrived': that the Messenians had arrived by arrangement with Demosthenes is obvious, and is implied by 3. 3;² but to arrive at exactly the expected time was to some extent fortuitous and fortunate. It was similarly fortunate for the Athenians, and again not planned by them, that the Spartans had not blocked the entrances; but it was not chance. The only events that were really accidental were the storm (3. 1, *κατὰ τύχην*) and the fire on the island; and in the latter case Thucydides

¹ Still more would it tend to dim the brilliance and lessen the importance of the Athenian success and of the whole episode: a curious thing in one who is thought to have so greatly exaggerated the importance of the whole Peloponnesian war. Cf., however, n. on the second battle of Amphipolis, below, pp. 653–4.

² As Busolt points out, p. 1086. 2, Demosthenes' choice of Pylos out of "many uninhabited promontories" must itself have been made after consultation with Messenians, not from personal knowledge of the Lakonian coastline.

makes this clear by ἀκοντος and ἔλαθε—he does not use τυγχάνειν. τὰ τῆς τύχης in 18. 3 means 'the fortune of war', which may be no more due to accident than τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι, 17. 4, or τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ, 14. 3; and in 18. 5 the Spartan ambassadors tacitly agree that the Athenian success was not the result of chance (we are not, surely, to find irony here). For other cases of τυγχάνειν having no element of chance, see below, 57. 1, 70. 2, 124. 4, 132. 2; v. 8. 4, 22. 1; it is very frequent. In some cases there is more or less accidental coincidence, iv. 70. 1, 130. 3.

42-45. Athenian Invasion of Corinthia

42. 1. μετὰ ταῦτα εὐθύς: i.e. without avoidable delay; the time taken in preparing the expedition (a considerable one) is understood. ἐν ἵππαγωγοῖς ναυσὶ διακοσίοις ἵππεῦσιν: the achievements of the cavalry, so drily recorded by Thucydides (44. 1), are gaily celebrated in one of the happiest of Aristophanes' choruses, *Eq. 595-610*:

ἀξύνισμεν τοῖσιν ἵπποις, βουλόμεσθ' ἐπανέσαι·
ἄξιοι δ' εἴσ' εὐλογεῖσθαι· πολλὰ γὰρ δὴ πράγματα
ξυνδιήνεγκαν μεθ' ἡμῶν, ἐσβολάς τε καὶ μάχας.
ἀλλὰ τάν τῇ γῇ μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄγαν θαυμάζομεν,
ώς ὅτ' εἰς τὰς ἵππαγωγοὺς εἰσεπήδων ἀνδρικῶς,

κ.τ.λ. ll. 266-8, too, where Kleon pretends to have suffered some unpopularity because he was going to propose a monument to the cavalry on the Akropolis, ἀνδρείας χάριν, will also have reference to this exploit. See below, p. 494.

Kratinos, fr. 197, from *Pytine*, produced the following year, also personifies the triremes,

οὐ δύνανται πάντα ποιοῦσαι νεωσοίκων λαχεῖν,
οὐδὲ κάννης,

perhaps in mockery of Aristophanes.

τῶν ξυμμάχων Μιλήσιοι: old and faithful allies of Athens, often as enemies of Samos (in the Lelantine war, and in 440 B.C., i. 115. 2). They sent a contingent again next year (53. 1, 54. 1). Doubtless Ar. *Eq. 361* is an allusion, obscure to us, to their present activities. So *Eq. 561*, ὁ Γεραίστιε παῖ Κρόνου, may be a memory of the Karystian contingent (see 43. 3-4: so Neil); more likely a reference to the storms that rage at the cape, storms which Athenian sailors under Phormion's leadership would master. The Andrians appear elsewhere with contingents of Karystos, Miletos, and others (vii. 57. 4, viii. 69. 3).

Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου: stung into activity by Kleon's success, and perhaps now anxious to show that he could raid and capture promontories in the Peloponnese as well as Demosthenes?

2. μεταξὺ Χερσονήσου τε καὶ Ῥείτου, κ.τ.λ.: clearly, I think, a description based on personal observation, and more detailed than most of Thucydides' topographical descriptions (where he gives any); but not in consequence free from obscurity (see § 3 and 44. 4 nn.). For a discussion of the topography see Leake, iii. 286–304, and n. on 44. 6. The hill Solygeios I take to be that on which the village of Solygeia was situated; the shore is that of the bay now called Galatáki.

Δωριῆς τὸ πάλαι, κ.τ.λ.: when the Herakleidai led them in the invasion of the Peloponnese (i. 12. 3).

ἰδρυθέντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει - - - ἐπολέμουν: see below, 45. 2 n.

οὖσιν Αἰολεῦσιν: see Buck, *Greek Dialects*², p. 4, who finds Aiolian elements in Corinthian Doric; but they may be due to later borrowing?

σταδίους - - - ἔξηκοντα - - - εἴκοσι: 60 stades is about right for the distance between Hexamília, south of Corinth, and Galatáki Bay; from Corinth itself the distance is more. For the 20 stades from Isthmos, see on § 3.

3. ἐξ Ἀργους: Argos had a foot in each camp—Ar. *Peace*, 475–7.

ἐκ πλείονος ἐβοήθησαν: equivalent almost to 'had for some time been mobilized, and had marched to'. Cf. 44. 4 n.

ἐς Ἰσθμὸν πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἔξω Ἰσθμοῦ: there is great awkwardness of expression here; for how could any but those outside a place march into it? The sentence just above ἀπέχει ὁ Ἰσθμὸς σταδίους εἴκοσι and ἐς Ἰσθμόν here both suggest a town or village: e.g. the place where the transport road from the Corinthian to the Saronic Gulf reached the shore of the latter, might have been called 'Isthmos', though it was in fact Kenchreai; but the phrase *oi ἔξω Ἰσθμοῦ* (those on the north-east coast, bordering on Megara, presumably, who had their own stretch of shore to look after, as Classen and others; for Megara was expressly *ἔξω Ἰσθμοῦ*) suggests that the name means the whole district—at least three-quarters of Corinthian territory (cf. Paus. ii. 1. 3–6). It is generally assumed that *ἀπέχει ὁ Ἰσθμὸς, κ.τ.λ.*, means that the south-eastern extremity of the district reached within 20 stades of the Athenian landing-place (e.g. Leake, iii. 309); but *ἐς Ἰσθμόν* can hardly mean the same place, for, before moving on to defend Solygeia and drive the Athenians into the sea, the Corinthians leave half their force at Kenchreai, which was farther away to the north. I suspect something wrong with the text. *Ἰσθμός* ought to mean here the place where the Peloponnesians were regularly mustered before invading Attica, where the shrine of Poseidon was and where the Isthmian games were held; in that case *εἴκοσι σταδίους* is wrong, and much more likely to be a MSS. error than a mistake by Thucydides; and we would be left with the awkwardness of *oi ἔξω Ἰσθμοῦ*, where, in a conventional phrase,

'Ισθμός has a different meaning. See nn. on Kenchreai and Krommyon below.

The ruins of the temple of Poseidon have now been found: Broneer, *Hesp.* xxii, 1953, 182–95.

ἐν Ἀμπρακίᾳ: see iii. 114. 4.

4. τὰ σημεῖα: see ii. 94. 1, iii. 22. 7–8 nn. The scholiast, however, remarks here that daybreak had come, and therefore a different form of signal must be used.

αὐτῶν: we should surely read *αὐτῶν* here, with Poppe and most edd., not *αὐτῶν*, as the MSS., which Stuart Jones follows, especially after *αὐτούς* — αὐτοῖς.

ἐν Κεγχρειᾱͅ: not further described. The existing village, *Kεχριές*, south of the entrance to the canal from the Saronic Gulf, preserves the old name. For the site, see H. N. Fowler, *Corinth*, 171.

ἐπὶ τὸν Κρομμυῶνα: towards the Megarian border (by the village of H. Theódoroī), and once actually within the Megarid according to Strabo, viii. 6. 22, p. 380; ‘at the beginning of the Isthmus’ to one coming from Megara (Paus. ii. 1. 4); not further described by Thucydides except to say that it was 120 stades from Corinth (45. 1). But why were not *οἱ ἔξω Ἰσθμοῦ* guarding Krommyon? Presumably they were not strong enough to prevent an Athenian landing in such force as they were now seen to possess.

The embarrassment of the Corinthians is a good example in miniature of the disadvantages of the land forces when facing a sea-power threatening to make a landing, at some place or other, on their territory. Cf. below, c. 55.

43. 1. ἐν τῇ μάχῃ: bracketed by Steup, because Battos takes no part in the battle, not even in that part of the line where the Athenians were expected to make for Solygeia (§ 5).

ξυνέβαλεν: *ξυνέβαλλεν* has as good a claim here, and seems slightly preferable.

2. ἐν χεροὶ πάσα: unlike the fighting on Sphakteria, 38. 5 ad. fin.; 40. 2. (The detail below, *βάλλοντες τοῖς λίθοις καθύπερθεν ὅντες*, recalls Sphakteria, though here it is hoplites who throw stones.)

3. αἰμασιάν: a loose stone wall surrounding fields (especially used, as here, on sloping ground where it serves for terracing as well), not “the walls of a city or fortress”, as L. and S. citing this passage and Hdt. i. 180 (the brick walls of Babylon) and i. 191. 4 (embankment walls of the Euphrates in Babylon).

44. 1. οἱ ἵππης: see above, 42. 1 n. It is interesting that the defenders, fighting from the land, had no cavalry (cf. ii. 9. 3).

ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα: see ii. 2. 4 n.

2. οἱ πλειστοί τε αὐτῶν: ‘the majority of those that fell, fell in this

part of the battle', not 'the majority of the Corinthians were killed'. So vii. 30. 2.

τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ: Classen and Steup bracket; Stahl reads **τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ**—"quod in codd. traditum est ad superiora referri posset eodem manenti subiecto, mutato, ubi duo idem fecisse dicuntur, τῷ αὐτῷ scribi necesse est. Interpretare igitur: eodem modo... quo illi, qui servatis ordinibus paulatim ad clivum redierant et, cum constitissent, quieti loco maneabant". To which Classen objected, that the two retreats were not at all alike, and had opposite effects; and Hude in his 1898 edition transposed the negative—οὐ **τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ**. This last is not at all convincing; but some remedy seems necessary; Stahl's may be right, but it would be easier if we had **τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ** before **ἰδρύθη**.

4. ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅρους τοῦ Ὄνείου: this is correct if we assume that Thucydides here uses the name of a long mountain range for the height which he has already called Solygeios, including the cape called Chersonesos. He has not properly related the detail of his geography to the whole. See above, 42. 2 n. Xen., *Hell.* vii. 1. 41, calls the range ὁ ὑπὲρ τῶν Κεγχρεῶν λόφος. See Leake, iii, p. 312. **οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρεσβύτεροι:** see 42. 3, n. on **ἐκ πλείονος ἔβοήθησαν**, the older men being probably included in **πανδημεῖ**; i.e. they had been mobilized, though they had remained behind in the city. Presumably they now take the place of the forces which have just left Kenchreai. For **οἱ πρεσβύτεροι** in general, see i. 105. 4, ii. 13. 6 nn.

5. τῶν ἐγγὺς ἀστυγειτόνων: Stahl reminds one that in German you can say 'ein naher Nachbar'; and we can say 'a near neighbour'. **πλὴν δυοῖν:** this looks like careful staff work on the adjutant-general's side.

6. ἐπικηρυκευσάμενοι: normally, an admission of defeat, for it showed, as was indeed the case here in spite of the erection of the trophy, that you were not master of the field of battle.

Plutarch, *Nik.* 6. 4-7, in a chapter which relates his hero's early unfailing run of successes, due to a careful avoidance of risks, military, political, or moral, ends with an elaborate account of this episode, to show that, from the piety due to the dead, Nikias was prepared to surrender all claim to one of his victories. It looks like embroidery of Thucydides only, like the added details about the assembly which sent Kleon to Pylos, in c. 7; but it has point in Plutarch, for it illustrates the character of Nikias (vol. i, p. 28, n. 2). **ἀπέθανον δὲ Κορινθίων, κ.τ.λ.:** the much heavier losses of the Corinthians may have been due in the main to the action of the Athenian cavalry; cf. 42. 1 n.

Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους πεντήκοντα: Busolt, iii. 1109. 5, follows Kirchhoff and Dittenberger (*S.I.G.³* 77) in putting *I.G.* i.² 949 in 425-424 as the list of the dead for Pylos and elsewhere (see *S.E.G.*

x. 421 for recent bibliography). Each of the two columns has lists of Athenians arranged by the phylai; the top part of the stele is lost, but on col. i there are 29 names from phylai vi–x and at least 5 from v—presumably therefore c. 60 in all; on col. ii there are 12 from vi–x and at least 5 from v, but room for 9 more names at the missing top than from the top of col. i: i.e. c. 50 in all. There are odd names below these in each column: on col. i, from Poteidaia 3, Amphipolis 1, Thrace 1, *Pylos* 1, Sermylia 1, Singos 1; on col. ii, 2 ἔγγραφοι, 9 τοξόται, 6 ξένοι. Kirchhoff took col. i to be the Athenians of Athens who fell at Pylos, col. ii to be the cleruchs (see above, ii. 13. 6 n., pp. 37–38, and iv. 28. 4); the man separately listed for Pylos will be one whose death was reported late in the year. If the stele does belong to 425–424, and records the deaths of the year and not of one campaign, more probably col. i is Pylos, col. ii Solygeia; but it may well belong to another year, though not to 424–423 (Delion and Amphipolis). If the men listed by their phylai are all hoplites the number in col. i is probably too many for Pylos; and the single name of the man who died there looks like the other single names, of men who died in garrisons or skirmishes in different parts. We do not know the special significance of the ἔγγραφοι and ξένοι here; but see H. Pope, *Non-Athenian Inscriptions*, 1935, 78–79; Robinson and Clement, *Olynthos*, ix, 1938, 313.

Note on the Topography

Apart from the obscurity of some detail in 42. 3 and a probable error in the '20 stades' in 42. 2, Thucydides' topography of this campaign is notably clear and true. At the southern end of the east coast of Corinthia, just north of the point where the coast turns eastward to form the Argolid peninsula, is an open and shallow bay (the bay of Galatáki) between two promontories. That to the north, now crowned by a prominent tower, is steep; but inland, that is, in a westerly direction, it sinks to a low col over which the road from Corinth runs, and rises again immediately to the west of this. This will be Chersonesos promontory (42. 2), the eastern end of the range of Oneion (44. 4). Inland from the shore of the bay is a small plain, surrounded by hills; the village of Galatáki is on the foothills to the south-west about 4 miles distant. The southern promontory, or cape, must be that called Reiton (unless the word is masculine, and we should take it for a stream, like the Reitoi near Eleusis); close to the shore off this cape are the islets of 44. 6.

Solygeia village (42. 2) will have been on the northern range of hills west of the col (not at Galatáki village, where most have placed it); and the Athenians landed not far from the foot of Chersonesos—hence the steepness of the land not far from the shore (43. 3)—with their right wing nearer the promontory, their left with a longer but

easier way to follow towards Solygeia (43. 5). The promontory would have hidden the actual landing from the Corinthian forces at Kenchreai, but the dust of battle would rise over the col above-mentioned by which they would march to the assistance of Lykophron and Battos (44. 4).

The precision of this, and the detail of the two bodies left behind, suggest that Thucydides was present on this occasion. If so, it is interesting to note that it was one which excited the imagination of Aristophanes too; and the Knights were proud of it. All classes and characters, including Nikias and the *σώφρονες* who had derided the chances of a major victory over Sparta at Sphakteria, were now infected by Kleon's successful energy. It is possible that Thucydides and Aristophanes were together on the expedition.

45. 1-2. ἐπλευσαν αὐθημερὸν — — τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ — — ἐς Μέθανα: Nikias was showing unwonted and quite Attic energy, of the sort of which the Corinthians had had much unfortunate experience (*ἀ μὲν ἀν ἐπινόσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἥγουνται, ἀ δ' ἀν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωσται, ὅλιγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες*, as they themselves said, i. 70. 7).

Busolt, iii, pp. 1114, n. 3, 1116, followed by Adcock in *C.A.H.* v. 237, thinks that Nikias, in spite of his partial tactical success, had been defeated strategically, because it had been the Athenian plan to capture Solygeia and so dominate Corinth. This plan, he says, is obscured in Thucydides' narrative, but can be seen from the mention of the old Dorian post on Solygeios Hill used as a base of operations against Corinth (42. 1), and from the importance of Solygeia in the Corinthian plan (43. 1, 5). The Athenians, however, could not have held Solygeia, had they captured it, unless they had not only fortified the village itself, but built walls between it and the $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile distant shore (as they did with the more important Megara), and sent a considerable force to man them; and this would necessarily have been part of their original plan. Contrast the ability of the Spartans to hold Dekeleia, because they were supreme on land. The capture of Methana was much more effective, for it could be held along its narrow isthmus with a handful of men, though the harrying of Epidauros, Troizen, and Halieis would not be of such strategic and political value as a direct threat to Corinth. If Methana was not the principal object of the expedition, it was good improvisation on the part of Nikias. *τίνι τε Τροιζηνίᾳ γῆν:* at one time Troizen had been allied with Athens, and was surrendered by the Thirty Years' Peace (i. 115. 1 n.), and recently demanded back (21. 3). See also below, 118. 4 n.

Ἀλιάδα καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίαν: i. 105. 1; see vol. i, p. 311. It would have made a considerable difference to the Athenian position, and to that of Argos, if by winning Troizen and Halieis they could have out-

flanked and finally conquered Epidauros; and this the occupation of Methana threatened. It would have established direct communication by sea and land between Athens and Argos and removed a most obstinate enemy. But Epidauros resisted all attacks, perhaps largely because Athens dispersed her efforts too widely, which is always the temptation of a naval power, and particularly of a people ever enterprising and optimistic. As it turned out, Nikias' counter to Kleon and Demosthenes (if it was so intended, 42. 1 n.) was not very effective, partly because Sparta minded her own territory being raided so much more than that of her allies. Kythera next year was a better move.

In the following year, 424–423, this raiding was followed by a treaty of alliance and mutual support between Athens and Halieis: *I.G. i² 87*; Meritt, *Hesp. xiv*, 1945, 97–105, with photograph and improved text; *S.E.G. x*. 80.

46–48. *End of Civil Strife in Kerkyra*

46. 1. ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν: 2. 2, 5. 2; **ἐς Κέρκυραν,** 2. 3.

ναυσιν Ἀθηναίων: Steup defends this, against Krüger's suggestion that a numeral has dropped out, and Classen's that the numeral was 40 (2. 2), both because the simple *ναυσίν* is good Greek (i. 100. 2, 105. 1, etc.) and because 60. 1 and 65. 4 below imply that fewer than forty went to Sicily. But 'with a fleet' is quite out of place here. If the original forty vessels of Eurymedon and Sophokles, after the return of the additional squadrons to their bases (13. 2, 32. 2, 39. 3), less any losses, sailed on to Kerkyra, that would be *ταῖς Ἀθηναίων ναυσίν* or *ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ν. Ἀθ.*; if fewer or more, then we need a numeral. *Ἀθηναίων*, presumably, because the four Chian ships (13. 2) had returned home (Stahl).

τῆς Ἰστάνης: Dobree wished to emend to *τῇ Ἰστάνῃ*. Cf. iii. 85. 3 n. That Polyainos, vi. 20, with this passage clearly in mind, has *τὸ τῆς Ἰστάνης ὅρος*, is surely only evidence of later usage and gives a reason why the dative of the name might have been altered to the genitive.

τότε μετὰ τὴν στάσιν: the story of these desperate men is resumed from iii. 85.

2. τὸ μὲν τεύχισμα εἶλον: for the memorial of this victory (*I.G. ii² 403*), see iii. 114. 1 n.

3. τὴν Πτυχίαν: in my view, probably Latsaréto Is., in front of the present-day harbour. See above, p. 371, on the topography of Kerkyra.

4. τοὺς ἐλθόντας: we should surely adopt Poppo's *αὐτούς* for *τούς*. Cf. iii. 81. 4 n.

47. 1. παρεδίδοντο: the imperfect, the reading of CGM, is adopted by Steup, Hude, and Stuart Jones—'the Athenians proceeded to

hand them over', the process going on till the aorist *παραλαβόντες*, in § 3. Since, however, the intervening sentence, which itself has an aorist, is only in parenthesis, there is much to be said for the alternative reading, *παρεδέδοντο*, 'at once became the prisoners of the Kerkyraians'. Cf. 23. 1. Steup's *⟨οἱ⟩ ἐκπλέοντες* should be accepted.

2. *ξυνελάβοντο δέ, κ.τ.λ.:* 'the fact that the strategoi had made it clear that they would not like others to get the credit for taking the prisoners to Athens contributed not a little to make the story exact and to encourage the plotters to go through with it.' That is, Eurymedon and Sophokles took no active part in the deceit, but had let it be known that it would suit their plans. Stahl, however, translates *κατάδηλοι ὄντες, κ.τ.λ.*, "eo quod manifestum erat, eis non volentibus fore, si viri ab aliis Athenas deducti his honorem ferrent. Ex qua interpretatione", he adds, "duo cognoscuntur, ἀν βούλεσθαι et condicioni cuidam subiectum esse neque id in aliqua veritate, sed in cogitatione versari eaque de causa infinitivū necessarium esse". Certainly we expect a participle after *κατάδηλοι ὄντες*; and the infinitive may mean that the Kerkyraians thought that 'they obviously would not want'.

3. *προϊόντας*: in spite of most edd. since Duker, I believe the MSS. *προσιόντας* may be retained. The prisoners were taken out of the building and led through two lines of hoplites; men with whips hastened on their way any who approached these lines too slowly. Or perhaps, 'who approached the place of execution too slowly'; for from the description it cannot be supposed that the plan was for them all to be killed as they passed through the lines.

48. 2. *τὸ τέγος - - τὴν ὁροφήν*: here apparently the former means roof, the latter ceiling; but elsewhere *ὁροφή*, or *ὁροφός*, can mean roof, iii. 68. 3, i. 134. 2 (Stahl).

3. *παντὶ ⟨τε⟩ τρόπῳ*: with Steup and Hude, I would punctuate with a full-stop (or colon) before this. It helps to avoid the awkwardness of *σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρον* followed so soon by *διεφθάρησαν*.

The massacre is a repetition of that of two years before (iii. 81, esp. § 3), and Eurymedon plays the same inglorious role on each occasion. There were not, unfortunately, many Athenians like Nikostratos. Thucydides does not conceal his dislike of Eurymedon, especially in 47. 2.

4. *τὸνδραποδίσαντο*: the only instance of the middle with active sense in Thucydides, though it is found in Herodotos, Andokides, and others. Steup was inclined to Bétant's tentative view that it means 'took them as slaves for themselves'; but who did this? and how should we be expected to understand it? It is better, if necessary, to emend to the active.

5. *ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε*: both the meaning and implications of this phrase are disputable. Adcock, in *C.A.H.* v. 281, gives clearly what is probably the opinion of the majority of scholars: when Thucydides wrote iv. 48. 5, "we may fairly assume that all except the qualification *ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε* was written soon after the events (425 B.C.) and that the qualification was added after the end of the Archidamian War and before Thucydides had conceived of a single twenty-seven years war, of which the Archidamian was only a part. For the *stasis* at Corcyra broke out again in 411–410 B.C. a fact which presumably caused the historian to insert the qualification. If that is so, then it was not until after this qualification was made, i.e. after 411–410 B.C., that Thucydides came to view the whole series of struggles as one". Neither of the two main assumptions on which this argument is based is compelling: (1) he could have written 'as far as this war is concerned' soon after 421 B.C., and have meant no more than 'the aptitude of Kerkyra, and of most of the Greek states, for *stasis* is great; I certainly will make no prophecy of the future; I mean no more than that it then ended as far as this war, and therefore my *History*, is concerned. I shall have no more to say about it'. See ii. 77. 4 n., and viii. 97. 2.¹ And (2), from the use of *ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε* to mean the ten years' war and not the twenty-seven years' war (if it does mean this: see below), it does not follow that the former is not yet regarded as part of the latter; for Thucydides used *ὁ πόλεμος* of a part of the war and even of a campaign, as in that very passage in which he is arguing for the unity of the whole struggle, v. 26. 2–3, *τὸν Μαντινικὸν καὶ Ἐπιδαύριον πόλεμον* — *ξὺν τῷ πρώτῳ πολέμῳ τῷ δεκέτει*. That is to say, the phrase *ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε* may have been written after 411–410 B.C. with special reference to a renewal of the *stasis* in that year, but it may not have any bearing on the problem when Thucydides first thought of the whole war as one. Finally, if it was written after 410, we have still before us the question whether this and similar phrases (e.g. *κρήναι γὰρ οὕτω ἡσαν αὐτόθι*, ii. 48. 2) are late insertions in an original narrative or are indications that the whole *History* was written after 404 B.C.

The evidence for renewal of civil strife in Kerkyra in 410–409 is Diodoros, xiii. 48, a chapter which does not inspire confidence in its truthfulness, for both the rhetorical embroidery and perhaps some of the details (e.g. the Messenian troops—cf. § 6 with Thuc. iii. 75. 1) seem to belong rather to 427 (Diod. xii. 57) than to 410 B.C. But we should perhaps believe the bare statement that there was civil war again about this time.

¹ The latter is very similar to our present passage: the famous *καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Αθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες*. This was not written after his death, and with reference to a later period of good government.

The fourth century saw more civil war in Kerkyra, or at least the threat of it: see *I.G.* ii.² 97, the alliance with Athens in 375 (Tod, 127, vol. ii, p. 88).

οὐ γάρ ἔτι ἦν ὑπόλοιπον, κ.τ.λ.: only the complete triumph of one party, and massacre, can secure peace; and even that security seems to have been short-lived. On the whole, it would appear that Thucydides was not aware of the *stasis* of 410 B.C. when he wrote this, and that, if he inserted *ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε* later, he would have altered this sentence as well.

What is much more important, for my part I would judge that this, like the whole of the account of the *stasis* in book iii, was written before the reconciliation of parties in Athens in 403 (cf. above, p. 382). Thucydides was very likely in Athens at the time; and that remarkable, almost unique event, must have made on him an impression which would have left its mark in iii. 82–83, and might have made him modify the bitterness of this sentence here.

48. 6–51. Other Events towards the End of this Year

6. *ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν — — ἐπολέμουν*: we are given no further information about this fighting, not even in 58–65 when the narrative of events in Sicily is again resumed. It is also not fitted to the last account of fighting there, *ἄνευ τῶν Ἀθηναίων*, 25. 12.

49. *τελευτῶντος τοῦ θέρους*: since we have *τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος* in the next chapter, there is no room here for a separate season or semi-season of autumn. For the approximate date of this, see above, pp. 478, 487; and below, p. 706.

Ἀνακτόριον Κορινθίων πόλιν: see i. 55. 1, where we are told how the Corinthians secured for themselves a city which had been a joint possession of themselves and Kerkyra. See also iii. 114. 1 n.

ἀπὸ πάντων: ἀφ' ἐκάστης πόλεως Ἀκαρναῖας (schol.), not from the whole Greek world. For the Akarnanian federation see iii. 105. 1 n.; and for the phrase cf., with Stahl, *οἱ πάντες Βοιωτοί*, ii. 2. 4, iii. 65–66.

50. 1. *Ἄριστείδης ὁ Ἀρχίππου*: nothing appears to be known of him beyond what Thucydides tells us here and in c. 75; Diod. xii. 73. 2. *τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν*: see ii. 69 n., iii. 19.

2. *ἐκ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων γραμμάτων*: i.e. doubtless, a letter written in the Persian language and in the cuneiform script which the Medes and the Persians had learnt from their predecessors in the empire, like the monument set up by Darius I at the Bosporos, Hdt. iv. 87. 1.

I should prefer Cobet's *τοὺς λακεδαιμονίους* to the MSS. reading kept by Stuart Jones (which looks like a marginal note inserted in the wrong place); the words are necessary to supply the subject of *βούλονται*.

πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων: all that Thucydides himself tells us is of proposals (i. 82. 1, ii. 7. 1) and one embassy (ii. 67).

πέμψαι — — ἀνδρας ὡς αὐτὸν: not, one would think, that any better results would be obtained from yet another embassy. The lack of clarity in these Spartan proposals, like that of their embassies to Athens after the defeat at Pylos, was doubtless due to the fact that they did not wish to say openly that they were liberating the Greeks of Asia from the tyranny of Athens only to surrender them to Persia, at least not until they were sure of substantial advantages from Persia.

3. καὶ πρέσβεις ἄμα: this is the first Athenian embassy to Persia mentioned by Thucydides; but it was not the first which had been sent during the war—see *The Acharnians*, produced the year before. Άρταξέρξην — — νεωστὶ τεθνηκότα: Diodoros, xii. 64. 1, agrees that he died in 425–424 B.C., and implies that it was towards the end of that year (that is, if he were ever consistent, towards the end of the corresponding *consular* year: see vol. i, pp. 4–5). He and Ktesias, in their different ways two of the most unreliable writers who have ever been called historians, state that there were troubles at Susa afterwards, two successive kings having reigns of a few months only and being murdered, before Dareios II came to the throne nearly a year later (Diod. xii. 71, Ktes. 45). There appears to be no eastern evidence for this (see *C.A.H.* vi. 3), and Thucydides says nothing of Dareios' accession, though mentioning him more than once in book viii; but it was doubtless these troubles which helped to persuade these Athenian ambassadors to return home.

In *Knights*, 478, Aristophanes makes Kleon accuse his enemies of intrigues with Persia; and the recent decision by Athens to send this embassy doubtless added point to the accusation. But we must not make much of it, for the comedy lies in the fact that all Kleon's accusations are from stock, ready-made, and the charge of Medism was one of the oldest and had now least meaning. See Neil ad loc.

Wade-Gery, in *Athenian Studies*, 127–32, has argued, with some reason, that the Athenians after all sent an embassy to Dareios II in the following year, 424–423 (referred to in *I.G.* ii.² 8 = *Syll.*³ 118: see *S.E.G.* x. 83), and renewed with him the Peace of Kallias of 449 B.C. If this is correct, the silence of Thucydides, doubtless due to his personal activities in 424–423, is still remarkable. See vol. i, pp. 333–4.

51. καὶ Χῖοι, κ.τ.λ.: it looks as though Chios, for a moment, ventured a little from her wonted σωφροσύνη. See viii. 24. 4 n. For the new wall, cf. iii. 2. 2.

ποιησάμενοι μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.: since περὶ σφᾶς must mean the Chians, and the Athenians must therefore be the subject of βουλεύσειν,

ποιησάμενοι πίστεις καὶ βεβαιότητα is to be translated 'having got for themselves, as far as was possible, assurances and guarantees'. This gives *μέντοι*, too, the right meaning—they had to give way about the wall, but they were assured that the Athenians were not intending to interfere in their autonomy. Yet it is certainly curious that *νεώτερον βουλεύσειν* does not refer back to *νεωτεριεῖν*. ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν probably goes with the preceding words, not with *μηδὲν --- βουλεύσειν*; but not for Stahl's reason, "quod Chii stultissimi existimandi essent, si pacti essent, ne Athenienses, quoad eius fieri posset, de condicione sua quidquam novarent. Debebant enim praevidere fore, ut Athenienses, quotienscumque aliquid in pristino suo statu innovassent, hanc necessariam sibi visam esse mutationem dicerent". True; but the Chians may not have been able to get better terms. 'We shall make no change if we can help it' might well have been the best assurance from Athens that they thought was open to them; they were a timid people.

In his *Πόλεις*, which presumably dealt with Athens' empire as Δῆμοι perhaps with home affairs, Eupolis made one of his characters accuse Tenos as vexatious and praise Chios for her obedience (fr. 232):

αὗτη Χίος, καλὴ πόλις ---
πέμπει γὰρ ἡμῖν ναῦς μακρὰς ἄνδρας θ' ὅταν δεήσῃ,
καὶ τᾶλλα πειθαρχεῖ καλῶς, ἀπληκτος ὥσπερ ἵππος.

This has been thought to be a direct reference to the agreement recorded here by Thucydides (e.g. by Busolt, iii. 1184. 1), and the play dated accordingly soon after, perhaps 423. This is to be too precise; Chios was consistently well behaved until her revolt in 413.

The Assessment of Tribute in 425–424 B.C.

The strangest of all omissions in Thucydides is that of the increase in the tribute in 425–424 B.C. This is attested by *I.G. i.2 63* (Tod, 66; *A.T.L.* i, ii A 9; Meritt and West, *The Athenian Assessment of 425 B.C.* (1934); *A.T.L.* iii. 70–89; see *S.E.G.* x. 75), which is the decree of assessment, *τάχσις φόρο*, and by a few, very fragmentary, tribute-lists of the following years. (It is probable, from these fragments, that the tribute was again lowered after the peace of 421—though not in the reassessment of 422–421, A 10 in *A.T.L.*—a measure also ignored by Thucydides.) The omission is the more remarkable because the increase was known to some later historians at least, who were responsible for the inaccurate and rhetorical form which it takes in Plutarch (*Arist.* 24. 3–5, quoted in vol. i, p. 85), and is implied by some orators: Andokides, for example, in that paragraph so full of errors which is repeated by Aischines (Andok. iii. 9; Aischin. ii. 175), says that the total of the tribute was 1,200 tal., *διὰ τὴν*

εἰρήνην; i.e. he refers it to the period after the Peace of Nikias. The passage is, of course, one of great praise of Athens, not, like Plutarch's, in condemnation of unscrupulous demagogues. This new assessment was eminently pertinent to Thucydides' *History*: not only for the general reason that he knows so well the importance of finance in this war and the part which the allies' tribute played in it (see e.g. i. 83. 2 and n. on iii. 39. 8), but particularly because he has twice given earlier figures of total tribute (i. 96. 2 and ii. 13. 3) and has mentioned the special war-tax raised in Athens itself (iii. 19. 1); later he tells us when the tribute was dropped and an indirect tax levied in its place (vii. 28. 3-4). He must have known of the new assessment at the time even if he was away from Athens for most or all of 425-424; for it affected the whole empire, including Thasos and all the Thracian district with which he was so familiar. There is no adequate excuse for the omission, nor explanation of it, unless some note of it was lost after his death, since he did not live to complete his work. This hypothesis would confirm that at least he did not publish the first part of his history in his lifetime. We may remember that he also failed to say how the Athenian reserve was spent (above, p. 432); but this omission of the reassessment is even less explicable than the other.

On the other hand, it is equally remarkable that the measure finds no echo in *The Knights*, which was produced in the following spring,¹ though Kleon's behaviour towards the allies is alluded to more than once—his eager looking for any city which might escape the net, *κάπο τῶν πετρῶν ἄνωθεν τοὺς φόρους θυννοσκοπῶν* (313), *ναῦς ἐκάστοτε αἴτει ταχεῖας ἀργυρολόγους οὐτού* (1070-1), his harrying of the rich, *σὺ - - - ἀμέλεγεις τῶν ξένων τοὺς καρπίμους* (326—unless *οἱ ξένοι* here are foreigners, metics, and others, resident in Athens), and the general policy of Athens towards the subject states (the chorus to the sausage-monger)—

εἰ γὰρ ὥδ' ἐποίσεις,
μέγιστος Ἐλλήνων ἔσει, καὶ μόνος καθέξεις
τὰν τῇ πόλει τῶν ξυμμάχων τ' ἄρξεις ἔχων τρίαιναν,
ἡ πολλὰ χρήματ' ἐργάσει σείων τε καὶ ταράττων (837-40).

Nor does the increase receive any direct mention in *The Wasps* two years later, though in a famous passage the revenue from the 'thousand cities' and the blackmailing activities of the demagogues in exacting it, are described (656-712: see below, p. 504). It would appear that the common assumption (e.g. Busolt, iii. 1116-18;

¹ The final assessment was not to be complete before the end of Poseideon (ll. 16-19), i.e. less than a month before the Lenaia, at which *The Knights* was produced; but the decision to reassess was taken, and the elaborate measures for settling each city's tribute adopted, not later than October, 425.

Adcock, *C.A.H.* v. 236; Tod, i, p. 162; Finley, 195) that Kleon was specially responsible for it, is wrong; still less should we say that the policy was not only his, but intended partly to avoid the necessity for further *εισφορά* at Athens (*A.T.L.* iii. 345), as though he was sensitive about taxing the rich and wished to end it. Nor had it necessarily any connexion with an increase in dicasts' pay from 2 to 3 obols (the increase at this time at Kleon's instance is more than doubtful; it must surely have had definite reference in *The Knights* or *The Wasps*). The reassessment was rather a policy generally acceptable in Athens, defended, and perhaps defensible, by the depletion of the reserve funds (above, pp. 432 ff.) and the consequent need for financing the war as much as possible from current revenue; if the war was to be carried to a successful conclusion the money had to be raised, and at the time, in Athens, the increase in the tribute was not regarded as an exceptional measure; nor do we know that there was much protest in the cities—we must bear in mind that they had as yet no knowledge of Brasidás (iv. 81. 2–3 nn., the place where perhaps Thucydides might have mentioned the recent increase in the tribute), and would not have wanted to exchange Athenian strategoi for Alkidas and his like. It was not a "startling increase" (Tod, p. 162). Indeed, Chios and Methymna, and Mytilene before 428, might have complained that in war-time their burden, as contributors of ships, had been greatly increased since 431 while the rest of the members of the League were as well-off as in peace-time (cf. pp. 19–20, above). I have no doubt, too, from Thucydides' words in iii. 19. 1, that *εισφορά* in Athens itself continued to be exacted from time to time.

The decree, moved by a certain Thoudippos, an otherwise unknown citizen, in, probably, the third prytany of 425–424, September–October, 425, provided first for the sending of eight *κήρυκες* to the cities of the empire, two each to the four geographical divisions (vol. i, pp. 371–2).¹ There follow elaborate arrangements for the

¹ The reading in line 4 is uncertain: [πέμψαι κέρυκας] ἐκ τῶν [βολευτῶν ἡδός] ἀνχερο[τούσσει λε βολέ], κ.τ.λ., *Ath. Ass.*; [μισθοτῶν] instead of βολευτῶν, *A.T.L.* (ἀνδρας in place of κέρυκας, as in Tod, does not apparently fit the epigraphical evidence, and his *ἡδός* for *ἡδόν* is clearly wrong, for the number is stated immediately.) Neither βολευτῶν nor μισθοτῶν satisfies. For the former, I doubt if bouleutai were ever sent abroad (on an extensive journey) during their term of office; and if the boule made the selection (*Ath. Ass.* 57–58), this would naturally be expressed by ἐξ *ἡειτῶν*; as for μισθοτῶν, I cannot believe that *οἱ μισθωτοί* formed a class of persons at Athens called by that name ('civil servants'?), nor that if they did, they would be sent on an important diplomatic mission. (There is a further slight difficulty, that, as *A.T.L.* recognizes, we should expect *τὸν* for *τῶν* before μισθοτῶν, and the *nu* is almost certain; but there are exceptions to this custom.) The only parallel the authors of *A.T.L.* can produce is Isokrates, viii (*On Peace*), 82. In a passage which begins with a generalization on the evils of sea-power and empire by contrast to the brave days of *Aristeides*, *Themistokles*,

preliminary assessment by *táktai*, for the hearing of objections by representatives of the cities and the adjudication and settlement of disputed assessments by a special court of 1,000, and the final adoption by the boule and publication, city by city. The allies' representatives were all to reach Athens in Maimaktorion, and objections to be heard daily in the following month, Poseideon, before the end of which the new assessment is to be complete. (Note, by the way, once more, how frequently, and unremarked, the Greeks crossed the seas in winter.)

We then have the list of cities and their assessments—very fragmentary, but the total of the whole is in part preserved in the last line, [κεφάλα]ιων [τ]ό χούμπαντος: [:] Η Η Η Η Φ Σ [-]; and Meritt and West have shown that the first figure is more likely Σ than Π (*Ath. Ass.* 72–90), and this total therefore 1,460 + tal., not 960 + : at least three times the income from *φόρος* at the beginning of the war, though there had already been some increase (not calculable with any exactness, but perhaps considerable) between 431 and 425. The authors of *A.T.L.*, however (iii. 344–5), think that no more than 950–1,000 tal. was actually collected, pointing out that of all the cities assessed in 425, some, like Melos, had never paid, and did not now pay; others, on the very outskirts, beyond Phaselis to the east and on the Euxine shore, were probably included only for propaganda (and because of the Athenian tendency to hope and to believe all things possible), and that others, especially in Thrace, were in revolt; but I cannot at all follow their argument for this figure 950–1,000 tal., which is based on vv. 656–712 of *The Wasps*. The number

and Miltiades, and contains the words *συναγαγόντες* ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἐλλάδος τοὺς ὄργοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀπασῶν τῶν πονηρῶν μετέχοντας πληροῦντες τούτων τὰς τρίτρεις, which in their context should apply to the sailors of Phormion and Nikostratos, Isokrates wrote: οὗτω γάρ ἀκριβῶς εὑρισκον ἐξ ὧν ἀνθρωποι μάλιστ' ἂν μισηθεῖεν, ὡστ' ἐψηφίσαντο τὸ περιγνωμένον τῶν πόρων (i. ἐν τῶν φόρων) ὄργυριον διελόντες κατὰ τάλαντον ἐς τὴν ὄρχήστραν τοῖς Διονυσίοις εἰσφέρειν, ἐπειδὰν πλῆρες ἦ τὸ θέατρον καὶ τοῦτ' ἐποίουν καὶ παρεισῆγον τοὺς παῖδας τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τετελευτηκότων, ἀμφοτέροις ἐπιδεικνύντες τοῖς μὲν συμμάχοις τὰς τιμᾶς τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν ὑπὸ μισθωτῶν εἰσφερομένας, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις Ἐλλησι τὸ πλήθος τῶν ὄρφανῶν καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς τὰς διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ταύτην γιγνομένας. Clearly *μισθωτοί* here is simply an opprobrious term, 'hirelings', and does not describe a class of state employees. I regret to find in *A.T.L.* (iii. 16) the adoption also of Raubitschek's notion (*T.A.P.A.* lxxii, 1941, 356–62) that Isokrates means that hired men carried placards, talent by talent (διελόντες κατὰ τάλαντον), to display the amount of the reserve fund, and that he was stating what was true: at the Dionysia of 431 B.C. presumably 5,700 of them. Yet Aristophanes thought that his Athenians were impatient, easily bored by repetition, and clever. Raubitschek's suggestion does not even fit with Isokrates' own words (ἐπιδεικνύντες τοῖς συμμάχοις τὰς τιμᾶς τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν); and the authors of *A.T.L.* have to persuade themselves that the regular exhibition of an annually decreasing reserve fund would be an encouraging spectacle for the Athenians, and would properly impress their subjects and their enemies.

of cities Bdelykleon gives as 1,000, though the true number was about 330 (all that were assessed, that is); but *A.T.L.* takes his '2,000 talents' of total Athenian revenue, and the 150 tal. which the jurors receive, which is 'not one-tenth' of the 2,000, very literally: calculating 'not one-tenth' as implying a total of 1,750 or 1,800 tal., subtracting Xenophon's 400 tal. of internal revenue (above, ii. 13. 3 n., p. 19) which "there is little reason to believe had changed" by 422, and a "probable" 400 tal. from imperial sources other than *φόρος* in the strict sense (ii. 13. 3 n., p. 17), and denying any contribution from Athens, by *εισφορά* or other means, they get 950–1,000 tal. for the *φόρος*. As though Aristophanes, with his 'thousand cities', was thus nicely calculating, and remembering to reckon not the assessment, but what actually reached the Athenian treasury. It may well be that no more than 1,000 tal. was collected in 424, and presumably a good deal less after the loss of Amphipolis; but not much reliance can be put on Xenophon's 400 tal. internal revenue, and there is little evidence for the 400 from other imperial sources; and in any case Bdelykleon's eloquence is no reliable guide for such estimates as those of *A.T.L.*

Antiphon wrote speeches for Samothrace (fr. in the Budé edition) and for Lindos, on pleas for reduction in their assessments, which may have been delivered on this occasion, in Poseideon, 425–424. Cf. fr. 2 of the former (= 50, Thalheim), *ἡ γὰρ νῆσος ἦν ἔχουμεν δῆλη μὲν καὶ πόρρωθεν οὖσα ὑψηλὴ καὶ τραχεῖα, καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα καὶ ἐργάσιμα μικρὰ αὐτῆς ἔστι, τὰ δὲ ἀργὰ πολλά*, and ll. 21–22 of the decree: *τ[[ό]]ν δὲ φόρο[ν δλέξ]ο μὲ π[όλει νῦν ταχοδάντ]ον μ[ε]δεμᾶι ἐ ho[πόσον πρὸ τὸ ἐτύγχανον ἀπάγ]οντ[[ες]] ἐὰμ μέ τ[ις φαίν]εται[ι ἀπορίᾳ hόστε ὅσ]ες τ[ε]ς χόρας ὁδυ[νάτο μὲ πλείο (?) ἀπάγεν]*. The Samothracian tribute, which had been 6 tal. up to 431, and 2 tal. in 429 and 428, was raised to 15 in 425–424, and this might well give occasion to an appeal (and the first assessment by the taktai may have been yet higher); moreover, in the same speech Antiphon referred to *ἀπόταξις* (fr. 55, 56 Th.; *A.T.L.* ii T 19, 20), and the separate assessment of the Samothracian peraia (on the Thracian coast opposite: see *A.T.L.* i, Gazetteer, s.v. *Σαμοθράκη* and *Μαρώνεια*), for $3\frac{1}{2}$ tal. in all (*Ath. Ass.* 83, 85–86), was probably made at this time; that is, the Samothraccians of the island were called upon to pay a much larger sum for a smaller territory than before.

Payments from the Reserve in the Seventh Year of the War (I.G. i.² 324: above, pp. 432 ff.)

Two large payments, $44\frac{1}{2}$ and 100 tal., were made at the beginning of year seven of the war (p. 435); the purpose is not specified, and Meritt, *A.F.D.* 133–4, has pointed out that in the early part of each of the four years a sum of 100 tal. is paid out, and only once is the

strategos who received it named (Nikias, in 424); yet we may be sure that the greater part of this money at least was granted for the expedition to Sicily, which had been in preparation for some time before it sailed (Thuc. iv. 2. 2). Apart from a small sum paid in June, there is no other this year except 30 tal. to *στρατευοῖς περὶ Πελοπόννεον Δημοσθένει* (*στρατευοῖς* may be a simple error for *στρατευδῖ*: Tod, p. 145), towards the end of October; this will have been sent to him at Pylos, some time after the Athenian victory (above, p. 487), for the maintenance of the garrison and the strengthening of the defences (41. 2); possibly, as Meritt argued, *Ath. Cal.*, p. 91, Demosthenes may have himself returned with Kleon to Athens (cf. iv. 37. 1), and have stayed there till the end of October; but this seems less likely. It is noteworthy that no special sum was voted for Kleon; this is in accord with his statement that he would need no more Athenian troops in order to carry out his promise (28. 4); he would lay no new financial burden on the city either.

YEAR 8: 424–423 B.C. (CC. 52–116)

52. *The Mytilenean Exiles*

52. 1. τοῦ τε ἡλίου ἐκλιπέσ τι ἐγένετο: on March 21, 424 B.C., according to the astronomers; which is an important clue in the problem of what Thucydides meant by summers and winters (below, p. 705). From the expression used one would suppose a partial eclipse only. *περὶ νουμηνίαν*: see ii. 28 n. Not necessarily the first of Elaphebolion, unless the calendar at the time was in line with the moon, which it probably was not.

ἔσεισεν: recorded, with the eclipse, as a portent, or (with scientific doubt) a possible portent? See i. 23. 3 n. The earthquake must have occurred a few days after the eclipse.

The eclipse is referred to by Aristophanes in *The Clouds*, 584–5, produced at the Dionysia a year later: the moon and the sun aiding the clouds in warning Athens against folly in general and the election of Kleon as strategos in particular; Busolt, iii. 1124, n. 5, infers from Aristophanes that a combination of διωσημέναι (rain and thunder, and the eclipse) caused a postponement of the elections, which would normally have been held in the seventh prytany (Αθην. 44. 4, ποιοῦσι δ' οἱ μετὰ τὴν ζ' πρυτανεύοντες, ἐφ' ᾧ ἀν εὐσημίᾳ γένηται), to the eighth. This inference cannot be true as it stands, if the latest calculations of the Athenian calendar are correct: for the bouleutic year of 425–424 began, by the Julian calendar, on July 2 (Meritt, *A.F.D.* 176), and the first six prytanies had 37 days each, the last four 36 (Pritchett–Neugebauer, 103); so that the seventh prytany ended on March 16, 5 days before the eclipse. If Aristophanes, writing

six or nine months afterwards, was accurate in his reference, we must suppose that, for some other reason, the elections to the strategia had been postponed till the eighth prytany; the eclipse may still have caused a further postponement, but Aristophanes seems to me to mean that, in spite of the obvious manœuvres of Kleon's enemies to make use of the eclipse, and the rain and thunder, in order to interfere with the elections, the ekklisia would have none of it:

δ' δ' ἥλιος
τὴν θρυαλλίδ' εἰς ἑαυτὸν εὐθέως ξυνελκύσας
οὐ φανεῖ ἔφασκεν ὑμῖν, εἰ στρατηγήσει Κλέων.
ἀλλ' ὅμως εἴλεσθε τοῦτον.

Further: just before mentioning the sun's eclipse, Aristophanes has mentioned the moon's, *ἡ σελήνη δ' ἔξελειπε τὰς ὁδούς*, and this, as the scholiast points out, was the eclipse of the previous autumn (October 9, 425), which occurred too late to have affected the vote to send Kleon to Sphakteria (above, 39. 1-2 n).¹ Aristophanes, that is, is, in the spring of 423, referring lightly and generally to natural events of a kind which ought to have warned the Athenians against the policy they were pursuing, rather than to actual interruptions of normal procedure in boule and ekklisia—so lightly and generally, that I incline to think that he is referring to the sending of Kleon to Sphakteria, rather than to his election as strategos in the spring of 424; for there is no other evidence that Kleon was elected general then (see below, p. 526); hence Aristophanes goes on:

φασὶ γὰρ δυσβουλίαν
τῆδε τῇ πόλει προσεῖναι, ταῦτα μέντοι τοὺς θεοὺς
ἄττ' ἀν ὑμεῖς ἔξαμάρτητ' ἐπὶ τῷ βέλτιον τρέπειν (587-9).

(On the other hand, ll. 590-4 do seem to show that Kleon was strategos at the time of production, spring 423, for they speak of the future.) It is only surprising that he does not add to the other *διοσημίαι* the earthquake mentioned by Thucydides, unless that did not affect Athens. (We might remember that rain, thunder, and earthquakes are sufficient *natural* causes for postponing a meeting of the ekklisia on the pnyx, without inferring much superstition among the Athenians.) It was a pity for Athens that the elements did not effectively warn her against the Delion campaign rather than against giving a command to Kleon.

¹ Van Leeuwen, in his edition of *Nubes*, notes the imperfect *ἔξελειπε*, and concludes that Aristophanes cannot be alluding to the actual eclipse of the moon, nor of the sun. But in any case, for such a jest to have point, there must be some reference to the particular event. (He will have known, of course, as did educated men generally, that a solar and a lunar eclipse could not both occur on the same day: ii. 28 n., vii. 50. 2.)

2. οἱ Μυτιληναῖον φυγάδες: the story of Mytilene resumed from iii. 50. See above, p. 329.

ὅρμώμενοι — — ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου: like the oligarchs exiled from Kerkyra (iii. 85. 2) and from Samos (iv. 75. 1).

Ῥόιτειον: cf. viii. 101. 3. It was on the coast of the Troad, to the north. See *A.T.L.* i, Gazetteer.

δισχιλίους στατήρας Φωκαΐτας: "reckoned at 24 dr. to the stater, this amounts to 8 tal., the sum at which Roiteion was assessed in 425" (*A.T.L.* ii. 82, iii. 88; strictly, we should say 'probably assessed' —the stone shows . . T T, which might be $\Gamma^{\alpha} \text{TTT}$ or TTTT); "it looks as though the raid was nicely timed, when the *φόρος* was about to be put on board for Athens". The assessment was probably lower in 421 (. . ., three spaces only), like that of Antandros.

3. ἐπὶ Ἀντανδρὸν: inland from the north shore of the Gulf of Atramyttion: *A.T.L.* i, Gazetteer. It was assessed at 15 tal. in 425, perhaps at 8 only in 421 (A 9 and 10, *A.T.L.* ii; *Ath. Ass.* 81).

τὰς τε ἄλλας πόλεις τὰς Ἀκταίας καλουμένας: i.e. those *πολίσματα* on the mainland mentioned in iii. 50. 3; see below. They had before 428 belonged to Mytilene (though Sigeion to the north had long been Athenian, after wars dating back to the beginning of the sixth century); as such they had not been assessed for tribute till the territory was taken by Athens as part of the settlement in 427. They formed a separate group, called *Ἀκταῖαι πόλεις*, in the assessments of 425 and 421.

vās τε γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: I cannot follow Stuart Jones in keeping the MSS. reading *τῇ ἄλλῃ σκευῇ*; and prefer Poppo's *τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευήν* (perhaps the nominative, and without the article, would be more in Thucydides' manner) to Rutherford's *τὰ ἄλλα σκεύη*, which Hude and Steup adopt. There is no scholion to help us. *αὐτόθεν* may go as easily with *ποιεῖσθαι* as with *ὑπαρχόντων*.

τὰ ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ Αἰολικά πολίσματα: 'obviously not the *Αἰολικά πόλεις*, of which Antandros was one, but the Aiolian cities of the mainland such as Pitane, Kyme, etc., which had long been in the Athenian empire'—Steup. I doubt this; the similarity of phrase with that used in iii. 50. 3, and the use of *πολίσματα*, not *πόλεις*, show that the same places are meant.

53-57. Athenians capture Kythera

53. 1. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει: the date is approximately known, from *I.G.* i.² 324. 20-22 (Tod, 64, and p. 145); for on the 15th (or 18th) day of the 9th prytany of 425-424 B.C. 100 tal. was handed to Nikias and his colleagues, and so large a sum was almost certainly paid out shortly before the expedition sailed: see ii. 23. 2 n. The day of payment was c. May 7 or 10 (Meritt, *Ath. Cal.* 71, 118; *A.F.D.* 176; Pritchett-Neugebauer, 103). See above, pp. 435, 504.

Μιλησίους: see 42. I n.

ἀγαγόντες: ἀγοντες coni. Cobet; so Hude and Steup (see the latter's note).

Νικόστρατος: see iii. 75, and below, 129–30, v. 61. I, 74. 3. He was also, as strategos, one of the 'signatories' of the truce next year, 119. 2.

Αύτοκλῆς: only mentioned by Thucydides elsewhere in 119. 2. He was of Anaphlystos, and was strategos again in 418–417, *I.G.* i.² 302₁₂ (*Tod*, 75; *A.F.D.* 160).

2. τὰ δὲ Κύθηρα νῆσός ἐστιν, κ.τ.λ.: some geographical information here, where knowledge in the reader might have been expected.

Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ' εἰσι, κ.τ.λ.: 'the inhabitants are Lakedaimonioi of the perioikoi-class.' ἐκ τῆς Σπάρτης means that this magistrate was a Spartiate.

πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔποιοῦντο: see, however, n. on 54. 4.

3. ὄλκάδων προσβολή: a port of call for merchant vessels. Note that even for Sparta trade was important. Cf. iii. 86. 4 for the Peloponnese as a whole and its trade with the west; and vol. i, p. II. For merchantmen coming from Egypt to Athens, see viii. 35. 3.

πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνέχει, κ.τ.λ.: *πᾶσα* shows that the subject must be *ἡ Λακωνική*, not *ἡ νῆσος* (as Stahl), apart from the fact that Kythera cannot be said to jut out into the Sicilian Sea. *ἡ Λακωνική* of course includes Messenia (see 41. 2). 'Lakonia, well protected on the land side (by the Spartan hoplites), was liable to raids from the sea, as it has a long coast, and would have been very vulnerable had it not been for the care taken in garrisoning Kythera.' This is clear enough, but it must be admitted that Kythera was too far from the Gulf of Messenia to have been of any value in defence against a raid there (see n. on *Ἀσίνην*, 54. 4); and Thucydides makes Eurymedon say that there were many promontories besides Pylos that might easily be seized and held (3. 3). Not much damage would be expected from a raid except in the rich plains of Messenia and Lakonia proper; for the three peninsulas of southern Peloponnese are mountainous and sparsely inhabited.

The Sicilian Sea extended from Sicily (see 24. 5) to the Peloponnese, the Cretan from Crete to Lakonia.

As Arnold points out, there is an interesting illustration of Thucydides' argument in Xenophon's account of the operations of Pharnabazos and Konon in 394 B.C. (*Hell.* iv. 8. 7–8). With Melos as a base they ravaged the east coast of Lakonia; but owing to the lack of harbours there and of food (which was not there for foraging, in a mountainous country), they could do little till they had occupied Kythera to use it as a base for raiding as the Athenians had done thirty years before. Herodotos also saw the danger of Kythera to Sparta, because it might fall into an enemy's hands, rather than its

value, and put into Demaratos' mouth the light-hearted advice to the Persians at Thermopylai to sail south and capture the island, quoting Chilon's saying about it: this he does in language that might well have been inspired by Spartan behaviour in 424, if Herodotos lived still, but perhaps he had Tolmides' expedition in mind (though Demaratos asserts, self-consciously perhaps, that Chilon had not foreseen even the expedition of Xerxes, but always had the danger in mind): ἐκ ταύτης τῆς νήσου ὅρμωμενοι φοβεόντων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. παροίκουν δὲ πολέμου σφι ἔστος οἰκητίου οὐδὲν δεινοὶ ἔσονται τοι μὴ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἀλισκομένης ὑπὸ τοῦ πεζοῦ βοηθέωσι ταύτη (vii. 235). Compare below, c. 55.

54. 1. δισχιλίοις Μιλησίων όπλιταις: the numeral can hardly stand, compared with 53. 1 (Diodoros, xii. 65. 8-9, for what he is worth, gives the same); besides, in viii. 25. 2, the Milesians have only 800 when defending their own lands. Some figure such as 400 or 500 is doubtless right.

1-2. Σκάνδειαν - - - τὴν [ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ] πόλιν - - - τὴν ἄνω πόλιν: we cannot have both *τὴν ἐπὶ θ. π. Σ.* and *τὴν ἐπὶ θ. π. τῶν Κυθηρίων*, for the descriptions are clearly intended to distinguish one from the other; and since Skandeia is described below as *ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι πόλισμα*, and is similarly described by the scholiast here, and by Paus. iii. 23. 1, it is the second *ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ* that must be corrupt. Krüger (whom Stuart Jones follows) bracketed the words; Stahl, feeling that *τὴν πόλιν τῶν Κυθηρίων* was not an adequate distinction, emended to *ἀπὸ θαλάσσης*. A further difficulty lies in *τὴν ἄνω πόλιν*; for this can hardly be identical with *ἡ π. τῶν Κ.*, as Stahl supposes. Elsewhere, as in i. 93. 7 and below, 57. 1, 66. 3, *ἡ ἄνω πόλις* is used simply to distinguish a city from its harbour; and other writers, as Xenophon, l.c. (53. 3, above), Ps.-Skylax 47, Strabo, viii. 5. 1, p. 363, and Pausanias, l.c., as well as the scholiast, speak of only one *πόλις*, homonymous with the island, and a harbour,¹ at a distance of 10 stades the one from the other. Remains of ancient walls at Kastrí on the coast and at Paliókastro about 2 km. inland, and the absence of remains in the north-east where Nikias with the main body (*τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι*) landed, confirm these statements. It seems that there has been considerable confusion in the text; for the natural reading would be *ἔχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄνω πόλιν τῶν Κυθηρίων*, and *κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν πόλιν*. Moreover, there is awkwardness in *τὴν Σ. τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι πόλισμα* (§ 4) following so closely *τὴν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλιν Σ.*; hence Rutherford bracketed *ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ* here as well (better to bracket

¹ Xenophon says that Konon landed at Phoinikous, a spot otherwise unknown. It may be, as is generally assumed, the bay which forms a natural harbour, the only one in the island, on its east coast, near which Skandeia (not mentioned by Xenophon) was situated.

τὴν ἐπὶ θ.?); and we should have another instance of description not with the first but the second mention of the place.

Kastrí, the presumable site of *Σκάνδεια*, is on the east coast of the island, by the bay of Avlémona.

3. ἐπιτηδειότερον, κ.τ.λ.: see 57. 4.

4. Ἀσίνην: this was in Messenia (above, 13. 1); and Kythera was no suitable base for a raid there. Strabo, viii. 5. 2, p. 363, mentions an Asine, together with Gytheion, in the Gulf of Lakonia; and the Asine of vi. 93. 3 could be the same. If this is correct, and Thucydides meant this place, he should have distinguished it. See Oberhummer, *R.E.*, s.v. (3); but I suspect a corruption of the text. Helos was in the low-lying land at the head of the gulf, and near the mouth of the Eurotas; but its site is not precisely known (Leake, i. 199; Bölte, *R.E.*, s.v.). Like Skandea, it had the honour of mention by Homer, *Il.* ii. 584, x. 268.

ἡμέρας μάλιστα ἐπτά: hardly long enough, one would have thought, to cause such despair at Sparta.

Bussolt, iii, p. 1126, notes that in this chapter Thucydides says nothing of the Kytherodikes nor of the hoplite garrison sent from the mainland; yet if the latter had been present it would have resisted more strongly, and if the former, he would have been captured and taken as prisoner to Athens as was the *ἄρχων* at Thyrea (57. 4). They must have been mentioned. He conjectures that, fearful of another island disaster (cf. 55. 3), they had withdrawn their garrison. This may be so; but it is hardly consistent with the words *πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο* of 53. 2, nor indeed with Thucydides' silence.

Thucydides does not note another valuable gain to Athens in the capture of Kythera—its position on the route to Pylos and so to Zakynthos, Naupaktos, and Kerkyra. With a benevolently neutral Argos, Athens now had a series of ports of call for the *periplous* of the Peloponnese (vol. i, pp. 19–20).

55. 1. περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 41. 3. The danger was the same; but again there is not much evidence that the Athenians got much advantage from it. See 80. 4 n., and vii. 26. 2.

πανταχόθεν σφᾶς περιεστῶτος πολέμου: cf. 10. 1, and 34. 3 n. Strategically, as well as tactically, the Spartans for the moment fell short of Athenian initiative and courage.

2. τοξότας: Rutherford marks a lacuna here, for a numeral. It was a confession of weakness for the Spartan army to need the support of bows and arrows: see 40. 2.

ἔς τε τὰ πολεμικά: 'for active warfare.' See below, § 4 n.

ξυνεστῶτες — ναυτικῷ ἀγῶνι: 'caught in a conflict at sea'; cf. Soph. *O.C.* 515, ἀλγηδόνος δὲ ξυνέστας, with Jebb's n.; Hdt. ix. 89. 4, λιμῷ συστάντας καὶ καμάτῳ.

τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρούμενον, κ.τ.λ.: an instance of the use of the participle with the article for infinitive, as the scholiast has it. ‘Not to attempt a thing was to fall short of their expectations of achievement’, rather than ‘what was not attempted’; it would be more like the Athenians to say that what *was* attempted always fell short of their expectations. Cf. in i. 70. 7 the second rather than the first clause: ἀ μὲν ἀν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται, ἀ δ’ ἀν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, δλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες. For the expression ἐλλιπές ἦν, κ.τ.λ., cf. below, 63. 1.

3-4. παρὰ λόγον --- τὴν γνώμην ἀνεχέγγυον: ‘the rapid strokes of fortune’ had been quite unforeseen, contrary to their *reasonable* expectations; and this made them feel that their reasoned judgement was no longer any guarantee; it was unreliable, and with that gone, what could they rely on? Cf. 18. 2 n. ‘They were sure to fail, whatever they tried.’ This is the meaning, not ‘they were sure to fail, because they were now demoralized, because their courage was broken’, as Stahl, Steup, and Graves take it. The Spartans were to some extent demoralized, but in consequence of loss of faith in their judgement. ἀτολμότεροι δέ: “his verbis, quae non diversum aliquid continent, sed repetunt superius ὀκνηρότεροι ἔγένοντο, conclusio fit argumenti modo expositi (καὶ ἄμα . . . νῆσω). Itaque et τε pro δέ scribendum erat et lenius ante hoc incisum distinguendum”—Stahl; who was followed by Steup. On the contrary, something new is now stated: the Spartans were ever slow to go to war (i. 118. 2) and shy of bold strategy (i. 70. 3), and they were now more hesitant than ever (*εἰπερ ποτέ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι*); but they had never before been wanting on the field of battle; now they were less confident in this too, because they could not judge the kind of battle it was going to be, or because they had misjudged this new kind of warfare. See e.g. 56. 1, 57. 2. This of course would not make τε wrong, if we found it in our MSS., for τε often introduces a new point (as it does indeed in ἐς τε τὰ πολεμικά above); but it is unnecessary to make the change. But Cobet’s *ἡσαν* for *ἥσαν* may be right.

56. 1. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις: “this dative . . . is placed at the beginning of the sentence to denote what state of things *the Athenians found*”—Graves. That is, this chapter gives things from the Athenian point of view, as the last gave them from the Spartan.

καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: I am not content with the comment “sc. ὅντες”, and the explanation that ‘such a state’ means the conditions described in 55. 3-4; there seems to be a word or two missing, such as ἀν κρατεῖσθαι.

Κοτύρταν --- Ἀφροδιτίαν: the situation of both places is unknown; and only the latter is elsewhere mentioned, Paus. iii. 22. 11. See Leake, i, p. 511.

τροπαίον τε στήσαντες: a trophy indeed, for a victory, however small, on Laconian soil.

2. Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Λιμνόν: a place which became more important, or less insignificant, in Byzantine times, as Monemvasia. Thucydides mentions Athenian raids there on other occasions, vi. 105. 2, vii. 26. 2; cf. Strab. viii. 6. 1, p. 368; Paus. iii. 23. 6; and Leake, i. 210–17; R.E., s.v. .

Θυρέαν: see ii. 27. 2, when the gift of the Spartans to the Aiginetans and the motives for it are given just as here. A mark that the *History* was not all written continuously, and not finally revised.

μεθορία δέ, κ.τ.λ.: so v. 41. 2, as well as ii. 27. 2. (Krüger would bracket δέ, thus making νεμόμενοι δὲ αὐτῆν correspond to ἔστι μὲν τῆς Κυνουρίας. This is neat; but Thucydides would have written, I think, μεθορία οὖσα.)

πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην: i. 67. 2. This use of ἐκείνων to refer back to the main subject is of course not uncommon: e.g. ii. 11. 6. It makes the statement, however, a little less personal to the Spartans; and the pluperfect ἔστασαν (EM γρ F) too, which seems preferable to ἔστάσι (cett.), makes it more a comment of the author.

57. 1. τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ — — τεῖχος — —, ἐς δὲ τὴν ἄνω πόλιν: cf. 54. 1–2 n.

σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα: according to Leake, ii. 492, the distance was 30 stades at least.

3. τὸν ἄρχοντα: as Steup says, not the officer commanding the φρουρά, who would be with his force, but a Spartan sent to 'look after' the Aiginetans at Thyrea before the special present danger from Athenian raids.

Τάνταλον: Thucydides was well informed about the Spartans here, as at Pylos and Sphakteria (ii. 2, 38. 1). He could have got this, as the other details, from the prisoners at Athens, unless he had already left Athens for Thrace. If he had done so, he presumably got the name from Spartan sources after his exile. The former seems the more likely.

4. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κυθηρίους, κ.τ.λ.: see 54. 2–3. By the terms of the capitulation all the inhabitants might have been expelled; but the ekklēsia stood by the unofficial agreement made by Nikias. Thucydides does not make this point in the easiest way.

φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν: no record of this has survived on stone; lists Nos. 31 and 32 (424–423 and 423–422 B.C.) are completely lost, and only small fragments of No. 33 have been preserved (A.T.L. ii, and iii. 65, 351–2). By the treaty of 421 it was to be restored to Sparta (v. 18. 7).

Αἰγινήτας δὲ ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας ὅσοι ἔάλωσαν: as revolted subjects.

But the Lacedaemonian prisoners from Sphakteria were hardly better treated, for they were hostages for Spartan behaviour. The 'customs of war' were becoming grimmer, as the fighting progressed. (In Diod. xii. 65. 9, ad fin., which appears to say that the Aiginetans were kept prisoners, *ἀπέκτειναν* is surely to be supplied, though *prima facie* Plut. *Nik.* 6. 7 would also be interpreted to mean that the Aiginetai were not killed.)

58–65. Truce in Sicily. Speech of Hermokrates

58. The narrative of events in Sicily is resumed from c. 25. The only intervening statement has been the short sentence, 48. 6.

τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους: we have no knowledge of the date beyond what Thucydides tells us, that the truce was made between the expedition to Kythera and that to Megara.

Καμαριναίοις: iii. 86. 2, iv. 25. 7; and cf. their conduct in the war of 415–413. Timaios, F 22 (see below, p. 522), adds a little embroidery: Gela hard pressed in the fighting, and Kamarina enthusiastically accepting her invitation to discuss terms of a truce.

'Ερμοκράτης: the man who, with Gylippos, dominates the story of Syracuse in Thucydides from 415 to 411 B.C. (vi. 32. 3 to viii. 85. 3), but who does not always control Syracusan policy..

ἐς τὸ κοινόν: 'to the assembled delegates', certainly, as Steup; not 'in the interests of all' (like *ἐς κοινόν*, 59. 1, by contrast with the other speakers, who each pleaded his city's case), as Stahl, still less 'in the interests of agreement', as Classen; cf. 59. 1. I would also punctuate after these words, not before, as all edd., and understand *ξυνελθεῖν*: 'who had in fact persuaded them to come to the conference': not 'whose speech now proved the most effective'.

τοιούτους δὴ λόγους: a clear indication that no close following of actual words is intended. See below, pp. 520–2.

59. 1. **οὕτε πόλεως ὅν ἐλαχίστης:** "qui si essem, pro mea' potius civitate quam pro tota Sicilia dissererem"—Stahl.

2. **ἐκλέγων:** 'pronouncing', surely, not 'choosing', though L. and S. will not allow this meaning. Classen compares Isokr. ii. 44 for this meaning, perhaps wrongly. (Rutherford notes vii. 87. 4, *ἐξειπεῖν*; but *ἐξειπεῖν* is the normal aorist of *ἐξαγορεύω* too, which is the verb usually found in the present tense with the sense of 'pronounce'.) See Neil on Ar. *Equit.* 908.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτε, κ.τ.λ.: the thought is not quite logically expressed; for this opening suggests that we are to be given two or more reasons why war should be avoided (cf. i. 80. 1, 120. 3); whereas we are given the commonplace, 'nobody is so foolish as to want war, or so cowardly as to run away from it if certain advantages are to be gained by it'. Then *ξυμβαίνει δέ*, κ.τ.λ., belongs only to the second half of this

sentence, those for whom war is preferable, for aggressive or defensive reasons. It is as if Hermokrates had begun 'I am not going to condemn war in general; but I shall prove that this one is untimely'. Cf. 62. 2.

ἀμαθία is not here used as Archidamos used it (i. 84. 3); and πλέον σχήσει does not necessarily mean imperialist aggression: 'to preserve your liberty', for example, might be one of the advantages to be gained by war, as the second half of the next sentence (*οἱ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους, κ.τ.λ.*) shows.

4. εὐ βουλευόμενοι δὴ θέσθαι: the ironical δὴ belongs only to the first of the three clauses which follow (*τὸ πρῶτον ἐπολεμήσαμεν*). 'Of course our plans (or intentions, if we read βουλόμενοι) were well meant', 'each city planned a wise settlement of its difficulties'.

πειρώμεθα: Steup argues that this must be indicative, as Hermokrates is putting forward "nur Thatsächliches". But the future, πολεμήσομεν, cannot be factual; to take πειρώμεθα as subjunctive is better.

πάλιν πολεμήσομεν: Hermokrates must surely mean, *when the Athenians have gone*, we can go to war again, as he says later in the speech. So the scholiast understands it. But as the words stand, they mean only, 'if the conference fail, no harm is done; we can start fighting again'; which is true, but not a strong argument at a conference which has already begun. Note perhaps ή ξύνοδος ἔσται, future tense, in the next sentence.

60. 1. τηροῦσιν: 'are on the look out for', as ἄνεμον τηρεῖν, i. 65. 1, νύκτα χειμέριον, iii. 22. 1—Classen.

ὁλίγαις ναυσί: according to the scholiast these words were not found in some copies (so Hude and Stuart Jones; but this is not recorded in Hude's edition of the scholia). They introduce an irrelevant point just here. Hude once conjectured *⟨οὐκ⟩ ὀλίγαις ν.*, which is an improvement. Others, as Jebb, *Speeches of Thucydides*, p. 288, think that the words are Thucydides' own written with reference to the great expedition of 415 B.C.; which argues a clumsy writer, more particularly since an obvious reference, if any, is made in πλέονί ποτε στόλῳ below. The meaning of the phrase is clear enough: 'admittedly, the Athenian force now present is not strong enough to conquer all Sicily; but do not be deceived; they are biding their time and watching us wear ourselves out, and will later come with a larger force'; but that is not exactly what it says; for the emphasis is different. In truth ὀλίγαις νῆσοι only fits with the numbers of the first Athenian squadron (24. 3, 25. 1), not with the second under Sophokles and Eurymedon (39. 3 n., 48. 6).

τὸ φύσει πολέμιον: either 'our own mutual enmity', which is natural because Ionian and Dorian cities in Sicily will quarrel, and which

the Athenians are turning to account by the specious pretence that they are the natural defenders of the Ionians (so Stahl; cf. 61. 2, 64. 3, and iii. 86. 2); or 'the natural enmity between Athens and Sicily as a whole', as the scholiast takes it (so Steup; cf. 63. 1, *τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας πολεμίους*, 63. 2, 64. 2, 4, *τοὺς ἀλλοφύλους*). It is difficult to decide; but the former seems better in the immediate context (*πόλεμον γὰρ αἰρομένων ἡμῶν, κ.τ.λ.*).

2. *ἐπαγομένων αὐτούς*: cf. iii. 82. 1, esp. with 61. 1 below in mind.
τοῖς μὴ ἐπικαλουμένοις: Alkibiades in 415 said that Athens won her empire *παραγγνόμενοι προθύμως τοῖς αἰεὶ ἡ βαρβάροις ἢ Ἑλλησιν ἐπικαλουμένοις*, vi. 18. 2. There is contrast between *παραγγνόμενοι* there and *ἐπιστρατεύονται* here; Hermokrates means something hostile in *ἐπι-*. But the contrast is only a superficial one; in essentials, in that whole passage, especially in *οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν*, Alkibiades bears witness to Hermokrates' assertion. Neither of course speaks the whole truth, as Thucydides saw it.

πλέονί ποτε στόλῳ: regarded by almost all scholars as a reference to the greater expedition, and so written after 415 B.C. It should at least have been observed that *τετρυχαμένους* does not fit the conditions of 415 at all. See below, p. 520.

61. 1. *καίτοι, κ.τ.λ.*: the repetition of *καίτοι* and of *εἴ σωφρονοῦμεν* (and, perhaps, of *νομίσαι*) after 60. 1 argues a certain lack of care just here. Yet it is a most elaborately phrased speech in general.

ἐπικτωμένους - - *τὰ ἔτοιμα βλάπτοντας*: for the language, cf. i. 70. 4.

3. *τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*: Stahl produces an ingenious argument to show that we must take this with *ὅτι δίχα πέφυκε*. But what is the point, in that case, of the order? In fact, whatever the grammatical structure of the words (with *πέφυκε* or with *ἐπίσαιν*), the order allows of only one meaning to the sentence as a whole: 'it is not a matter of race', or 'it is not from a quarrel of races', etc., as Graves translates.

The 'races' are still only the Dorian and Ionian Greeks; the Sikels are ignored.

4. *τοῖς γὰρ οὐδεπώποτε, κ.τ.λ.*: Alkibiades, vi. 18. 1, exactly meets this point, which is only rhetorical in Hermokrates. Nikias had suggested the same thing, vi. 13. 2.

τὸ δίκαιον: Steup, following Portus, makes *τῆς ξυνθήκης* depend on this, not on *μᾶλλον*, as most edd., probably rightly. 'The Ionians of Sicily have done nothing on their side in accord with the treaty, while the Athenians are enthusiastically carrying out their duties as stipulated by it', a good ironical point.

5. *καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις, κ.τ.λ.*: a recurrent theme of imperialism at the time, so well analysed by Mme de Romilly; e.g. i. 76. 2 and v. 105. It is not, however, the only theme: Perikles' *ώς*

τυραννίδα γὰρ ἥδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἦν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον, is markedly different. Here, of course, the emphasis is on φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἐπών.

7. παύονται: Cobet proposed *παύσονται* on account of the future ἀπίσται in the second half of the sentence; and he is followed by Hude. Steup answered that ἀπίσται might be present, like ἐπίσται, § 3, and compares 95. 2 and the similar vii. 56. 2 for the use of the present for the future in lively oration. (See Adam on *Rep.* v. 473 c.) But since ἀπίσται is normally at least future, and the action expressed by it here is in the future, I prefer Cobet's change. (The two verbs should be in the same tense; πόλεμος πολέμω, κ.τ.λ., is not simply a γνώμη.)

οἵ τ' ἐπίκλητοι, κ.τ.λ.: a truly Gorgian sentence, neatly yet elaborately antithetical, picturesque rather than forceful, highly artificial. Cf. the similar instance above, § 1, ξύμπαντες μὲν ἐπιβούλευόμεθα, κατὰ πόλεις δὲ διέσταμεν, where κατὰ πόλεις has only rhetorical point; and the use of πρεσβύτατον for μέγιστον in § 6 (cf. Jebb on *O.T.* 1365); and below, ὑπεριδῶν and προϊδεῖν, 62. 2. Contrast the more forceful conclusion of Pagondas' speech before Delion, 92. 7.

εὐπρεπῶς — εὐλόγως: Arnold here and on vi. 8. 4 points out the normal differences between *εὐπρεπῆς* and *εὐλόγος* in Thucydides—the latter is “that which *is* fair and reasonable”, the former, “that which *seems* to be so, but is not so really”. Cf. iv. 86. 6 and 87. 3, vi. 76. 2-3. Stahl accepts this distinction here, but adds that *εὐλόγος* can mean the same as *εὐπρεπῆς*, iii. 82. 4, vi. 79. 2; and here I feel sure we have, as in iii. 82. 4, *variatio* only. ‘Our visitors came with a fine reason for a wicked purpose, and for a fine reason they will depart, with nothing done’, repetition being on the whole the English rhetorical manner.

62. 2. τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων, κ.τ.λ.: ‘the universally admitted advantages of peace’ is a phrase to be remembered by those who think that the Greeks in general, and Thucydides following them, believed in the validity of all arguments for war and empire (see 61. 5 n.).

ἢ δοκεῖτε, κ.τ.λ.: I agree with Classen, Steup, and Graves that Herwerden's correction of *ἡσυχία* and πόλεμος to accusatives is a most unlikely one, and with Steup that we must restore the correct optative forms *παύσειεν* and *ξυνδιασώσειε*. In lively oratory *δοκεῖτε*; ‘is it your opinion?’ can stand without influence on the structure of the sentence, as, in a different style, can *δοκεῖ μοι*. Then in the last clause, *καὶ τὰς τυμάς, κ.τ.λ.*, oblique oration is used, with the idea of ‘thinking’ understood from *δοκεῖτε*, as often enough in Thucydides. i. 3. 2 is a fairly close parallel.

ἀκινδυνοτέρας ἔχειν τὴν εἰρήνην: cf. v. 16. 1 (the attitude to peace of Nikias).

ώσπερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν: with Krüger, Stahl, and Hude I would omit these words as intolerably flat, and a marginal comment referring back to 59. 2.

3. δυνάμει τινί: Krüger's *τι* for *τινί* is attractive.

προσκαταλιπεῖν: this means *προσαπωλέσαι*, as the schol. renders it (without comment). *καταλιπεῖν* can mean 'to abandon', 'to leave on the field of battle' (Classen compares *Il.* xii. 226) as well as 'to bequeath', though in the only other instance of the double compound in Thucydides, ii. 36. 2, it means 'bequeath *fresh* territory'. In iii. 58. 5, 'you will leave on the field of battle' is exactly right (note ἐν πολεμίᾳ τε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς αὐθένταις). Here I do not feel satisfied with the meaning 'abandon'; but no alternative rendering or reading suggests itself.

4. τιμωρίᾳ γὰρ οὐκ εὔτυχεί δικαίωσι: cf. the equally lively expression in i. 140. 1, τὰς ἔνδηλας τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἡσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι η καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, though the meaning of that is nearer akin to the next sentence, οὐδὲ ισχὺς βέβαιον, δίοτι καὶ εὔελπι. For this latter (the wisdom of which Athens so often ignored) cf. the Spartan complaint, 18. 2, οὕτε δυνάμεως ἐνδείᾳ ἐπάθομεν αὐτό, - - - ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμη σφαλέντες, ἐν φάσι τὸ αὐτὸ δροῖς ὑπάρχει. So uncertain is the future that the wisest judgement may fail, and neither a just cause nor the optimism of superior strength guarantees success. If Thucydides expresses his own views in such speeches as those of Perikles, the Spartan ambassadors in 425, and Hermokrates, he did not believe in the cyclic view of history, nor that a man learned in the history of the past could foretell the future (i. 22. 4 n.). Men should, however, exercise *προμηθία*, and the very uncertainty of the future makes this necessary (so far is *προμηθία* from meaning 'divining the future'). With οὐδὲ ισχὺς βέβαιον, δίοτι καὶ εὔελπι, compare, too, ii. 62. 5.

ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ἐρχόμεθα: we use *προμηθία* 'when we go to war'; that is, 'we prepare ourselves well before going to war'. Again, as in 59. 2, οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε, κ.τ.λ. (see n. above), we have a general statement when a more particular one, with a different meaning, seems required by the context: we expect, that is, 'let each of us abandon, at the present crisis, our own cause, though we think it just, and make peace between ourselves', not only because of the obvious danger of Athens, but from common prudence, because no cause, however just or however strongly supported, is sure of success. Or, if only a *γνώμη* is wanted here, since we get the particular argument, in part, in 63. 1, we expect here, 'that is why, in common prudence, men avoid war if possible'.

63. 1. καὶ νῦν, κ.τ.λ.: after the generalizations of the last sentence Hermokrates returns to the present occasion—"it is because of this

fear of the uncertain future, from which nothing can be inferred (except that it *is* uncertain: so ἀτέκμαρτον, literally), and because of the frightening presence of the Athenians (the one thing that is certain) . . . , that we must escort them away from our territory'.

διὰ τὸ ἥδη τρόφοβερούς παρόντας Ἀθηναίους: much the best discussion of this is Steup's, and I feel that he is right in his conclusion that we have here a corrupted form of a clause with predicative participle of the type δι’ ὑμᾶς ἔνυμαχήσαντας, vi. 80. 2, διὰ τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχίζομένην, vii. 42. 2, διὰ τοὺς φρουρούς προελθόντας, viii. 100. 2. My only objections to his reading, which simply omits τό, are that one expects τοὺς Αθ. (Αθ. without the article twice in 60. 1 means 'Athens'; here we need very clearly 'the Athenian forces on the spot'; in 61. 7 probably the article should be inserted), and that the order should be διὰ τοὺς Αθ. ἥδη φ. π. (Steup quotes Plat. *Legg.* viii. 837 c, μεθ' ἀγνεύοντος τοῦ ἐρωμένου; but there all the emphasis is on the participle.) The only arguments for restoring the infinitive with διὰ τό are (1) that the scholiast, who understands the general meaning of the sentence, renders, διὰ τὸ τοὺς Αθ. ἥδη φοβερούς ἡμῖν εἶναι παρόντας, without any note on the abnormality of our MSS. reading (as though he had an infinitive in his text: contrast the n. on οὐ περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τινα, below); and (2) that in two other passages in Thucydides where we have διὰ τό with the infinitive, iv. 35. 1 and viii. 105. 2, in the former one MS. (B) (according to Hude—not in Stuart Jones-Powell) and in the latter four (ABFM) have a participle in its place. The corruption is therefore not unlikely.

τὸ ἐλλιπὲς τῆς γνώμης, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 55. 2 for the language (which led Rutherford to think the clause here a clumsy imitation by an 'editor'), and 62. 3 init. for the thought. I agree with Steup again that this cannot be either the subject of εἰρχθῆναι or an internal object (as Ar. *Vesp.* 333, τίς ἐσθ' ὁ ταῦτα σ' εἰργαν, cited by Poppe), but must be an *accusativus pendens*, as in 62. 1. I would prefer ὅν ἔκαστός τις, which according to Hude is the reading of G, to ὅν εἰ τι. 'To account for that failure in our judgement of all that each of us expected to do in the war, we must realize that we have been well hemmed in by those two obstacles' (the fear of the future and the presence of the Athenian forces).

ἀποπέμπωμεν: the aorist was to be expected, as in the three following verbs (and in the schol., ἀποπεμψώμεθα). Ironically polite, 'let us begin escorting'?

ἔς αἰδίον ἔνυμβωμεν: treaties of peace or alliance 'for all time' were already fashionable, including Athenian treaties with Rhegion and Leontinoi (Meritt, *C.Q.* xl, 1946, 85–91).

2. ἀρετῇ ἀμυνούμεθα: 'we shall repay righteously', the good and the bad, ἀρετῇ including both generosity of spirit and courage.

οὐ περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τίνα: λείπει τὸ ὁ ἀγών ἡμῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δουλωθῆναι—schol. I feel that not only are the words 'missing', but that ἔσται at least should be inserted. Van Leeuwen conjectured that ὁ ἀγών (*άγών*) was concealed in *ἄγαν*, and, inserting the former, rejected the latter. It would be better to suppose ὁ ἀγών to have been omitted by haplography; for *ἄγαν* is clearly right; but ἔσται will suffice.

This section recalls the eloquent words of Agelaos at Naupaktos in 218 B.C.: *ἔὰν ἄπαξ τὰ προφανόμενα νῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσπέρας νέφη προσδέξηται τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόποις ἐπιστῆναι, καὶ λίαν ἀγωνιῶν ἔφη μὴ τὰς ἀνοχὰς καὶ τοὺς πολέμους καὶ καθόλου τὰς παιδιάς, ὃς νῦν παιζομένων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐκκοπῆνα συμβῇ πάντων ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε κανεὶς εὑξασθαι τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἡμῶν τὴν ἔξουσίαν ταύτην καὶ πολεμεῖν ὅταν βουλάμεθα καὶ διαλύσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ καθόλου κυρίους είναι τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀμφισβητουμένων* (Polyb. v. 104. 10-11). Cf. also 64. 3, below, πολεμήσομέν τε, οἵμαι, ὅταν ξυμβῇ, κ.τ.λ. This does not mean that Agelaos had just been reading Thucydides; nor that this speech of Hermokrates could not have been composed before the end of the third century. But it illustrates the soundness of Thucydides' judgement in i. 22. 4.

καὶ ἄγαν εἰ τύχοιμεν: probably sc. *τιμωρησάμενοι*, rather than *τυχεῖν* = to be successful, as iii. 39. 8, 82. 5; and anyhow not "auch im besten Falle, wenn wir nicht aller Selbstständigkeit beraubt werden" (Steup), but 'even if we do win our wars here'—Sikeliots against each other; i.e. 'those of us who win will anyhow have the wrong friends and enemies'.

οἱς οὐ χρή: τοῖς Σικελιώταις—schol.; the Peloponnesians, says Steup, because the Sikeliots, being united in subjection to Athens, would have no opportunity for quarrelling among themselves. True; but the Peloponnesians are very remote here, and besides were not the natural friends of all the Sikeliot cities; nor is it any part of Hermokrates' argument that his countrymen should be active on the other side in the Greek struggle. It is a little illogical; but the scholiast is surely right.

γιγνοίμεθα: all the MSS. have *γιγνόμεθα*, and, though the change, adopted by most edd., is slight, I am inclined to think that the indicative should be restored and *ἄν* in the first clause deleted (there being no distinction of mood between the two clauses). The scholiast does not help.

64. 1. ἀμυνούμενος: Hude's correction, *ἀμυνόμενος*, accepted by Steup, seems necessary. Hermokrates is not thinking of the future (cf. 59. 1). Cf. the readings in 92. 5, 93. 3; and for confusion of *ο* and *οὐ* in this very sentence the MSS. readings *προειδομένος* and *αὐτούς* below.

ἐπών τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀμνόμενος is somewhat as he had described Athens (60. 2).

μωρίδι: as often in tragedy, of a fatal folly.

τῆς τε οἰκείας γνώμης: see i. 70. 6 n., where this passage should have been cited to confirm the interpretation of *οἰκεῖος* given there; and for *αὐτοκράτωρ*, iv. 126. 5 n.

2. ποιῆσαι — παθεῖν: since these words are normally opposites, I find that to treat *τοῦτο παθεῖν* as in apposition to *ταύτο μοι ποιῆσαι* (I should prefer Krüger's *ταύτῳ ἔμοι*) is awkward; and would read *ποιῆσαι, <καὶ>*.

3. οἰκείους οἰκείων ἡσάσθαι, κ.τ.λ.: except Kamarina all Dorian states in Sicily were united or neutral; and all the Ionian states were fighting together. There is, therefore, little point in 'whether Dorian to Dorian or Chalkidian to their kin'; more particularly since amongst the kin of the Chalkidians were the Athenians, or at least many cities outside Sicily. It was Ionian and Dorian within Sicily that Hermokrates wished to make yield to each other. As a consequence, 'in sum we are all neighbours and inhabitants of one land, an island, and are all Sikeliots', does not follow easily. Rutherford conjectured a lacuna after *τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν* (keeping the MSS. reading *δέ*); it would be better to suppose one after *τῶν ξυγγενῶν*, so that *τό τε ξύμπαν* (reading *τε* with Classen) will then sum up.

4. ξυμάχους — διαλλακτάς: both predicative, like *ἐπελθόντας*, with *τοὺς ἄλλοφύλους*—'as allies or mediators'.

5. δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν οὐ στερήσομεν: generally in such negative sentences the meaning is 'one of two advantages is certain—either . . . or . . .'; here it is 'we shall obtain both blessings'.

This is one of the speeches which scholars feel *must* have been entirely composed by Thucydides out of his own head—the sort of speech which in Thucydides' judgement such a man as Hermokrates would have made on such an occasion; and not only this, but 'such a man as Hermokrates later proved himself to be', and on an occasion which only later events suggested might have been significant; perhaps even an occasion invented as freely as the speech. And *πλέονί ποτε στόλῳ ἐλθόντας*, 60. 2, is quoted in proof, 'if proof is necessary'. (One might equally say that the sentence, *ξυμάχους — οὐδὲ διαλλακτάς*, 64. 4, 'unmistakably points forward to Timoleon'.) See, however, the n. on 60. 2; and observe once more that, as will be seen from v. 4-5, the optimistic prophecies in the speech, as in the Corinthian and Spartan speeches, i. 120 and iv. 17, especially of Syracusan forbearance, were not proved true in the event. It is of course clear that the events in Sicily in 426-424 B.C. must have gained an added significance for Thucydides after 415; but Athens had had an eye on Sicily since the fifties and had made alliance with

Kerkyra in 433 partly just because it lay so favourably on the route to Italy and Sicily—any events, therefore, that illustrated this aspect of the alliance would be noted by Thucydides as they occurred; he did not wait till 415 before taking them into account. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the narrative of events in the west interspersed in the general narrative from iii. 86 to iv. 58 is, though sometimes detailed (cf. n. on *Mοργαντίνη*, 65. 1, below), meagre—just the kind of narrative that would be made from notes made at the time by a man far from the scene of operations—and that it is hardly weighty enough to carry the long and carefully elaborated speech of Hermokrates.¹ The speech, therefore, may have been composed later; but having said that, we have not said all, but only made a beginning; for the question immediately arises—did Thucydides (inspired perhaps by the later events of 415–413) make further inquiries about the conference of Gela in 424 and especially about the deciding speech of Hermokrates? He had, on this hypothesis, in 424 only noted the conference and the end of hostilities, and perhaps recorded Hermokrates' name as the principal author of the peace; and he would naturally ask himself in 415, how came it about that peace in Sicily was made in 424 (for 'Egesta and Leontinoi and other states are not *now* happy about their position in relation to Syracuse'), and that the Athenian forces could do nothing to prevent it? That is to say, when we have said that Thucydides composed the speech after 415 (a proposition which to my mind is possible, but by no means certain) we have still to ask ourselves, from what materials? Did he make inquiries from people who had been at the conference, or from those who had known those who had been at it? It is an interesting problem. We must admit, however, that even if he did do this, he would have a less accurate and a much less vivid report of what Hermokrates had said than he had of speeches he had heard himself or had inquired about immediately after their delivery; and this seems to be indicated by the introductory words, *τοιούτους δὴ λόγους εἶπεν*, which are less precise than the normal *τοιάδε ἔλεξεν*. In admitting this we must remember that such a cautionary phrase was used also by Thucydides of events, things done, as well as of speeches: cf. v. 74. 1, *καὶ ἡ· μὲν μάχη τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτι ἐγύρατα τούτων ἐγένετο*—this does not mean that he invented what he does tell us of the battle of Mantinea.

Furthermore, Antiochos of Syracuse ended his *Σικελιῶτις συγγραφή* with the narrative of this year's events (Diod. xii. 71. 2), presumably with the story of the conference and the general peace; and his work may have been published not long after. If, as seems probable, it forms the basis of Thucydides' account of ancient Sicily (vi. 2–5), it may also have given him some information about the

¹ So Bartoletti, *Pap. Soc. Ital.* xii, 1950, 5 n. 2; cf. above, iii. 86. 4 n.

conference (including perhaps the terms of the treaty, 65. 1-2), even though it was not in my opinion (see above, iii. 88. 3 n.) the source of his narrative of this Sicilian warfare: that is, the account of the conference, so much fuller and weightier than that of the fighting, may be a good deal later. Even if Antiochos published his work c. 420, it may have been some time before it came into Thucydides' hands: the reason for the digression at the beginning of book vi is that the facts were not generally known to Thucydides' readers (see Dover, op. cit., in n. on iii. 88. 3, p. 15); which would mean that if Antiochos is his source, or one of his sources, his book was not generally known in the Aegean area, and we cannot say more than that Thucydides knew it before he wrote vi. 2-5; and the date of that is doubtful.

The general contents of Hermokrates' speech are also interesting as illustrative of Thucydides' method. In the course of the meetings of the delegates most of the discussions were concerned with the many grievances of the several states and with bargaining for position (58); of these several problems, between Kamarina and Gela, Leontinoi and Syracuse—and unless they were settled no peace was possible—Hermokrates says nothing. Yet, as Busolt says, iii. p. 1131. 3, we need not doubt either that the general plan 'Sicily for the Sikeliots' was then (and perhaps not for the first time) put forward, or that it was accompanied by an eloquent plea for its acceptance made by Hermokrates. Thucydides would omit the details of the bargaining in a speech, as he omits almost all the details of the event—the final peace-treaty (see 65. 1 n.)—and has said next to nothing about military events (25. 12).

Polybios, in his long-winded attack on Timaios (xii. 25-28), in which he has much to say about the aims and methods of history (the aims being purely practical, *εἰ μέλλομεν μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλ’ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἀγαγνώσκοντας* (25^a6), and the methods being akin to those of the writers on medicine, and history to be written only by a man with practical experience of politics and war and knowledge of the topography won by travel), deals principally with the faults of the speeches in Timaios' History.¹ He says that Timaios forsook the principle that the historian should record the sense of what was actually spoken and must not invent (25^a3-25^b4); but he elsewhere implies, in the manner of Dionysios, that it is the historian's duty to choose arguments suitable to the speaker and the occasion (25^c4-8),

¹ It is the business of the historian, he says, not only to report speeches, but to explain why this speech succeeded and that failed, just as he must analyse the causes of events, "if he is to benefit and not harm his readers". Polybios here at least comes close to Thucydides' view that the problems of narrating what was said and what was done were essentially similar: cf. vol. i, pp. 144-7.

and censures Timaios for piling up in one speech all possible arguments, whether or not they were likely to have been used on the given occasion. To illustrate this he mentions the speech put by him into Hermokrates' mouth at this conference of Gela in 424 B.C., which began with the speaker expressing his pleasure that his hearers (delegates from each city, not a mass meeting) knew well the difference between peace and war (cf. 59. 2, above), and went on with lengthy arguments and quotations from Homer and Euripides to make clear what that difference was (25^k-26). Polybios censures only the childish folly and confusion of the speech, not its untruthfulness; and—most interesting of all, whether he is talking about the aims and methods of history and the principles especially to be followed in the composition of speeches, or is censuring this particular speech in Timaios—he says no word of Thucydides, whom, one would have supposed, he would have had in mind throughout (cf. his words in iii. 31. 12, quoted vol. i, p. 150); he does not even say that the irrelevance in the Timaios speech about the arguments for war and peace is well illustrated by their absence in the speech in Thucydides, nor that both speeches could not be a record of arguments actually spoken by Hermokrates, and so censure one or other or both of them. The nearly complete silence about Thucydides in what remains to us of ancient writers before the age of Cicero and Dionyios of Halikarnassos (by which time he was established as *the* great historian) is anyhow remarkable, nowhere more so than in the pages of Polybios who was of course aware of Thucydides' work (viii. 11. 3), and was so fond of contrasting his own scientific and therefore beneficial historical methods with those of others. The silent compliment paid him by Kratippos, Xenophon, Theopompos, and Philistos does not make this less remarkable.

65.1. Μοργαντίνη: it was situated apparently not far from Katane, and therefore not near the boundaries of Syracuse and Kamarina, Strabo vi. 1. 6, p. 257, 2, 4, p. 270; inland, not far from Agyrrion, Diod. xiv. 95. 2, xix. 6. 2, but its site unknown; a Sikel town of some importance, which played a part in later history. See K. Ziegler in *R.E.*, s.v.

This little detail is very notable in its context. Morgantine is nowhere else mentioned by Thucydides, and there is no reason why he should expect his readers to know anything about it. Even if they did know something, why should they be interested in its relations with Kamarina and Syracuse? Such odd details are indeed to be found scattered through most of Thucydides' work, relicts of notes made at the time, in many cases intentionally left in, in some perhaps they would have been removed by a final revision. But where and when did Thucydides learn this detail? It looks as though

it came from a written record of the agreement now reached; if so, did he only learn it years after 424? But in that case, why did he record it, when its utter lack of interest was obvious? Or did Eurymedon take back to Athens an official copy, and was Thucydides there to see it? See above, pp. 520-2.

2. κάκείνοις κονταί: i.e., as the scholiast observes, the Athenians would leave Sicilian waters unmolested, and the Sikeliots would see that they were not molested. It is possible also that Nikias' words in vi. 13. 1, *οὐσπερ νῦν ὅρους χρωμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, κ.τ.λ.*, imply that the Sikeliots now agreed that they would send no forces to aid the Peloponnesians if Athens stayed away from the west (Adcock in *C.A.H.* v. 225); if so, it is strange that Thucydides does not say so here.

Lokroi, in Italy, as we learn later (v. 5. 3), did not now join in the truce with Athens.

ἐπαινεσάντων: 'expressed their approval', as v. 37. 5. There was both good sense and timidity in their action, which would have been altogether expected from Nikias, but is surprising in Eurymedon after his conduct, on both occasions, in Kerkyra. Strictly, once the agreement had been made between the Sikeliots themselves, the Athenian commanders had no alternative: unless they were to seize Katane or some other allied city by force, i.e. 'defend its citizens against oligarchs within and aggressive enemies without', they would have no base of operations. But they might have been expected to use more energy and more skill in preventing the agreement; and their prosecution on their return home, perhaps unjust, is certainly not surprising. The Athenians were in the mood for enterprise; and *Knights*, 1303-4, may be a reference to a real proposal, by Hyperbolos, to send large reinforcements to the west (Busolt, iii. 1122); but it may be only jesting at the sort of thing Hyperbolos *would* propose (*οἶνον ἀν γένοιτο*, not *δ ἐγένετο*, to use Aristotle's language). The charge of bribery was of course common, almost conventional; the condemnation on such a charge did not prevent subsequent election to office.

3. Πυθόδωρον καὶ Σοφοκλέα: it is characteristic of later learning to quote Philochoros (F 127: ap. schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 240) for this, not Thucydides, the ultimate source.

For Pythodoros, see iii. 115. 2 n.

4. οὕτω τῇ [τε] παρούσῃ εὔτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι: see v. 14. 1. Bekker's *τότε* seems the best correction for *τε* rather than its excision. Benedict's *γε*, approved by many, seems to have no point.

ηξίουν σφίσι μηδὲν ἔναντιοῦσθαι: cf. Eupolis, fr. 217, quoted below; also *ἔναντιώμα τι*, 69. 1.

μεγάλῃ τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρᾳ παρασκευῇ: Thucydides may well have had his own condemnation in mind when he wrote this (Busolt, iii. 1157. 3).

ὑποτιθεῖσα ἵσχυν τῆς ἐλπίδος: 'forming a strong basis for their hopes', 'giving them strength' (but—οὐδὲ ἵσχυς βέβαιου διότι καὶ εὐελπί). Confidence, and over-confidence, as well as enhanced ambitions, are the natural results of success; but elsewhere hope is strong only in the desperate (ii. 62. 5; cf. iv. 10. 1 n.). Cf. also iii. 45. 5. v. 103 to some extent combines both aspects. We may emphasize here the more obviously comparable passages (21. 2, 41. 4, v. 14. 1: de Romilly, 152); but the words used in this sentence suggest as well the Corinthian's description, i. 70; and not only that, but ii. 62 and 88, the language of Perikles and Phormion; but the occasion is different—then the Athenians, despondent or nervous, needed encouragement; now Kleon should have curbed their ambitions, as Perikles had done when necessary, and for that he had no equipment at all. But it was a high standard of statesmanship that was demanded.

Eupolis, fr. 217, from *The Cities*, which was perhaps produced near this time, τί δ' ἔστι Αθηναίου πρᾶγμα ἀπώμοτον; (see i. 70. 3 n.) gave expression to this boundless optimism; so did Aristophanes, more subtly,

φασὶ γὰρ δυσθούλιαν
τῆδε τῇ πόλει προσεῖναι, ταῦτα μέντοι τοὺς θεοὺς
ἄττ' ἀν ύμεις ἔξαμάρτητ' ἐπὶ τῷ βέλτιον τρέπειν (Nub. 587-9).

The mood of Athens in 425-424 was not, essentially, different from what it had been in the days of Kimon and the young Perikles; but ἄδηλον αἰεὶ τὸ μέλλον. And Aristophanes' *Georgoi*, with its picture of farmers longing to get back to the country, and still hating Sparta (frs. 107-11), may also belong to this time (above, p. 470), though a later date, e.g. 421, is by no means excluded.

This is the high tide of Athenian success (and the extreme of Spartan despair, c. 55); thereafter the ebb begins; this rebuff in Sicily, which was in no sense a military defeat, was its first sign. The successes had come within a very short time, after six years of fighting with varying fortune (for, though a stalemate was in the end a victory for Athens, was what in fact Perikles had looked for, it was not inspiring), and were unexpected by both sides (cf. cc. 17-20); hence the different moods shown in *The Acharnians* and *The Knights* (well observed by Grote, v. 270-1). Athens just did not have enough σωφροσύνη to support the success, and so make best use of it; a more accommodating or a more generous attitude on the part of Nikias and others towards Kleon, instead of the continued belittling of his share (which was decisive) in the Sphakteria campaign, might have secured ultimate victory. But Kleon did not make this easy.

It is notable that Thucydides does not stop his narrative by more than this sentence, in order to point the moral. He does not detail

Athens' inordinate ambitions (cf. the mention of Carthage in *The Knights*, 174, 1303). Nor does he insert a speech to mark a significant pause in the action (my *Essays*, p. 183).

It is generally supposed, on the evidence of *Nub.* 587 (see 52. 1 n.), that Kleon had been elected strategos in the spring of 424, a triumph for the war-party, now all-powerful, as well as a personal one for himself. If so, it is interesting, and surprising, that Thucydides does not mention it, as he was himself one of the ten. But, as stated above, p. 506, I doubt this inference from the line in *The Clouds*; and there are other reasons for the doubt. We know for certain the names of seven strategoi for this year (424–423), without counting the three in Sicily: Nikias, Hippokrates, Demosthenes, Nikostratos, and Autokles (119. 2), Eukles (104. 4), and Thucydides himself (Beloch, ii. 2. 264–5). The phylai known to be represented are Aigeis (II, Nikias), Leontis (IV, Thucydides), Akamantis (V, Hippokrates), Aiantis (IX, Demosthenes), Antiochis (X, Autökles probably). If Eurymedon was Myrrhinousios (below, p. 627), Pandionis (III) is also there. The three strategoi in Sicily were surely re-elected in the spring of 424; otherwise they were (according to the accepted view) due to return at the end of the official year, 425–424, that is, before the middle of July, and their successors should have been sent to Sicily some time before. We have to bear in mind that they did in fact leave Sicily, at some time in the summer, before they had been expected to. Busolt (iii. 1125. 1), in order to find room for Kleon, supposes that Eurymedon and Sophokles had been re-elected in the spring, but not Pythodoros; but this is clearly in conflict with all that the narrative of Thucydides implies, in which the three stand and fall together. Unless then one, two, or three of the seven other known strategoi, perhaps Thucydides himself, Eukles, and Autokles, were not elected till the late summer when Pythodoros, Sophokles, and Eurymedon were dismissed, there is no room for Kleon. Moreover, if Eurymedon was Myrrhinousios, he and Kleon (*Kydatheiaieus*) were of the same phyle.

But if Kleon *was* strategos in 424–423, it is interesting, as I said, that Thucydides does not mention the fact; and still more interesting are the names of some of his colleagues. For Nikias was Kleon's great enemy, Demosthenes (according to *The Knights* at least) no friend, Hippokrates was nephew to Perikles, Thucydides an aristocrat, Nikostratos perhaps another; it was a curious thing if Kleon, at the time of his greatest influence, could not prevent the election of such men. As a variation, A. B. West suggested that Thucydides was elected to replace Eurymedon, deposed when he was fined—a victory for the moderate party (*C.P.* xix, 1924, 220; *A.J.P.* xlvi, 1924, 152: see also Finley, 32); we are to suppose that Eurymedon

was of the war-party, and that Kleon could not, in midsummer 424, save his friend from condemnation. But who, if not Kleon and his friends, were the men so elated with success, so convinced that all things were possible to Athens, that they thought that only incompetence and dishonesty could explain the failure in Sicily? How strange that the condemnation of Eurymedon for *failing* to spread the war in the west (*ἀρχὴν ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ*) should have been followed by the election of Thucydides, of all men! We must rid ourselves of our notion of Athenian political parties of the modern pattern, of elections won or lost by them; these elections of strategoi were conducted on very different lines. In this year Kleon's election (if he was elected) was a personal victory; so was Nikias', though of another kind, for it was due to *continued* confidence in him; Hippocrates may have owed his to his illustrious connexions; Demosthenes and Nikostratos, as far as we know, only because they had been successful commanders; Thucydides because a general was wanted in Thrace, and he was a man who knew the country and had influence there. All this has nothing to do with a victory of a party, whether of the war-party or of the moderates.

Aristophanes shows us in *The Knights* a whole city on the tide of victory, not a part only, the knights themselves conspicuously so (551–610); if we wished for a symbol of this unity, we could find it in Poseidon, the aristocratic god, who is here also the god of the sailor-crowd (554–64), and in Athena, the goddess of progress and the democracy, whom here, as on the Parthenon frieze, the knights are glad to serve,

εὐλογῆσαι βουλόμεσθα τὸν πατέρας ἡμῶν, ὅτι
ἀνδρες ἡσαν τῆσδε τῆς γῆς ἄξιοι καὶ τοῦ πέπλου, κ.τ.λ.

Thucydides relates a similar unanimity of enthusiasm in all classes before the Sicilian expedition of 415 (vi. 24. 3), and a similar despair of all in 430 (ii. 65. 1–3). There was no permanent political division according to social class in Athens of the kind that many have supposed, no organized parties: there were political clubs, *έταιρεῖα*, on occasions revolutionary; there were the interests of rich and poor always different, often conflicting; there were personal rivalries, some from individual love of power, others neither mean nor dishonest, as Nikias' with Kleon and with Alkibiades. Such things influenced elections of course; but war-parties and peace-parties, or extremists and moderates, did not 'carry' them. When Kleon was elected in 422, he had spent many years abusing both Nikias and the young 'oligarchic traitors'; but it was his advocacy of forceful measures against Amphipolis and Skione, mixed of course with more abuse, which carried the day. Nikias and Nikostratos had already recovered Mende and invested Skione.

66-74. Athenian Attack on Megara

66. 1. Μεγαρῆς — πιεζόμενοι: we last heard of Megara, when the Athenians captured Minoa in 427 B.C., three years before (iii. 51). Her sufferings play a larger part in Aristophanes than in Thucydides; but neither in *The Acharnians* nor in *Peace* does the poet show any sympathy with them. Note especially *Peace*, 246-9, 481-3, 500-2. He has a full share of his countrymen's streak of cruelty.

For the topography of Megara and its harbour, see iii. 51 nn.
 $\alphaἰεὶ κατὰ ἔτος ἔκαστον$: see ii. 31. 3.

τῶν σφετέρων φυγάδων τῶν ἐκ Πηγῶν: we have not been told before either of the *stasis* at Megara (except in the hint at iii. 68. 3), or of this detail, that there were exiles at Pegai; these latter were very likely the same men as had been given the right to live at Plataia for one year, in 427 (so Steup).

For Pegai, cf. i. 103. 4, 111. 2, 115. 1. Grote (v, p. 287) was right perhaps in suggesting that Pegai had become even more important to Megara after the capture of Minoa by the Athenians, as the only remaining harbour at which foodstuffs could be imported into the city; but I expect that their supplies came mainly by land from Corinth.

ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους: this implies that Megara was a democracy of some sort. Clearly, however, from the rest of this sentence and the narrative which follows the majority were not fanatical, and were more patriotic than loyal to party, anxious to preserve their independence of both Athens and their Peloponnesian neighbours. $οἱ τοῦ δῆμου προστάται$, below, § 3, therefore, here means the leaders of the popular party, not the leaders of the majority of the people; for they clearly did not carry the majority with them. The extremists on both sides were unscrupulous, particularly the oligarchs, and it was they who came to the front.

χαλεποὶ ἦσαν ληστεύοντες: just like the oligarchs of Kerkyra (46. 1). But the democratic party leaders there held the city firmly, so that Athens could give effective help.

3. μετὰ σφῶν καρτερεῖν: 'to hold out (both against the hardships of the war and the oligarchic pressure) under *their* leadership', 'with *their* help alone'. Note that, in effect, $τὸν δῆμον$ is something quite different from $τοῦ δῆμου$, though these leaders would identify them. Similarly, below $σφίσι$ is 'themselves' (the leaders), but $ὑπὸ σφῶν$; to be taken with $κατελθεῖν$, is 'by their fellow citizens'. (We could take $ὑπὸ σφῶν$ with $τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας$, so that it again means 'themselves, the leaders'; but this is less effective than the contrast with the Athenians, who would be safer for them than their own countrymen.)

τὰ μακρὰ τείχη: built by the Athenians at the time of the alliance, i. 103. 4.

σταδίων μάλιστα ὄκτω: see iii. 51 n.

τὴν ἄνω πόλιν πειρᾶσθαι ἐνδοῦναι: Classen notes the change of subject from ἔλειν, and compares 65. 4. But here one would expect αὐτοὶ — πειρᾶσθαι ἐνδοῦναι, for it is expressly their part in the operation, but for αὐτοὶ μόνοι above.

67. 1. ἐπλίνθευσον τὰ τείχη: a remarkable construction, with which Böhme compared Ar. *Ekkles.* 253, τὴν πόλιν κεραμεύειν, which is not parallel (apart from the jesting, this does not mean to *make* a city out of roof-tiles). Classen also objected that as the wall was built c. 462 B.C. we must have ἐπλίνθευσαν, to which, as Steup says, τότε οἱ ποτέ must be added. The imperfect may stand, for frequent repairs to a mud-brick wall, intended for defence, were likely (Bölte-Weicker—above, pp. 334–6). Steup transposed καὶ (i.e. καὶ τὰ τείχη ἀπεῖχεν). I should prefer ⟨ἐσ⟩ τὰ τείχη.

Hippocrates must have marched from Minoa to the trench outside the Long Walls by the 'bridge' mentioned in iii. 51. 3; we should have expected Thucydides to say so.

2. περίπολοι: very little is known of this military force. It is often stated that they were foreign mercenaries; but for this there is little evidence—none here nor at viii. 92. 2, 5 (their only mention in Thucydides; Lysias, xiii. 71, often cited to show that the *peripolos* of viii. 92. 2 was a foreigner, may be giving a different version of the story of Phrynicos' death), nor for two-thirds at least of the fourth century, Aischin. ii. 167; Xenophon, *Poroi*, 4. 47, 52; *Ἀθπ.* 42. 4; only towards the end of the century does the evidence of inscriptions show that foreigners were engaged (Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1195, nn. 2, 3). In Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1174–9, clearly the *peripoloi*, like the *hippotoxotai* (ii. 13. 8 n.), are citizens. In Eupolis, fr. 341, they seem to be in close relation with the garrisons of the *φρούρια* of Attica (ii. 13. 6); Aischines, as *ephebos*, was *περίπολος τῆς χώρας* during his two years of service; in *Ἀθπ.*, more precisely (perhaps owing to a reorganization of the *ephebia*), the *epheboi περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν* during their second year—in their first they do their training partly as garrison troops of forts in Peiraeus; and Xenophon says that the *peripoloi* would always be there to help the cavalry check raiding of the mines of Laureion by a force from Boeotia. They seem in Thucydides' time and later to be a special mobile force, in peace-time at least probably already formed of *epheboi* who got their training partly in this way, partly by garrison-duty in the fortresses.

ἐσ τὸ Ἐνυάλιον: unidentified, but probably near the shore, and just east of Nisaia.

It is generally supposed that Demosthenes' force had come by

land from Eleusis, the spearhead of the larger force (68. 5); see e.g. Bölte-Weickert p. 83. It looks like it; but it would have been more difficult to arrive unobserved.

ησθετο ούδεις: Grote, v, p. 288, notes the surprisingly successful secrecy kept in this affair by all concerned, who must have been fairly numerous (68. 4 n.). At Athens presumably the expedition had been voted as an ordinary invasion of the Megarid; if Demosthenes had simply asked for some light-armed and *περίπολοι* to accompany the force, it would have been granted him after his success at Sphakteria.

τὴν νύκτα ταύτην is awkward, and bracketed by Steup. It must go with *εἰδέναι*, not with *ησθετο*, and should mean 'know during this night what had to be done then'. But we should expect *φυλάττεσθαι*, or the like, 'to be on guard', rather than *εἰδέναι*.

3. ἀκάτιον ἀμφηρικόν: *πλοιάριον ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐρεσοσόμενον, ἐν ω̄ ἔκαστος τῶν ἐλαυνόντων δικωπίαν ἐρέττει*, says a scholiast, without adding how many scullers there were. Anyhow a light boat, made for, or employed for, privateering. Edd. note that the Athenian capture of Minoa had been carried out in part to check privateers (iii. 51. 2).

For the device, Stahl compares Livy, xxv. 9.

ἀφανῆς - - - ή φυλακή: this seems very dubious; *ἀφανῆς* would have to mean 'unseeing', or 'uncertain how to act' (*ὅπως ἀφανὲς δῆθεν γίγνεται Αθηναῖοι, τί χρὴ φυλάττειν*—schol.). Steup suggested *ἀμελῆς*; perhaps *ή ἐκδρομῆ* for *ή φυλακή*?

μή for *οὐ* is also to be noted, carried on from the *ὅπως*-clause, though the meaning seems to be, 'since there was no boat kept openly in the harbour'. See A. C. Moorhouse's interesting paper, *C.Q.* xlvi, 1948, 49–50.

5. οὐδὲν τὸ τροπαιόν ἔστι: when was this written? It is a little detail that one would suppose to have been told Thucydides at the time, just as the whole narrative seems to be almost contemporary with the event. In the similar case of Amphipolis (v. 10. 6) he might easily have seen the trophy soon after the battle.

The trophy is presumably that set up after the fighting outside Nisaia (68) or after the cavalry skirmish (72. 4). Note that the Megarians did not remove the trophy when they recovered the walls and destroyed them (109. 1); these rather absurd records of battles seem to have been religiously preserved by both sides, till they fell into a natural decay. The decay would not, however, be a long process; that is why we may suppose that this note and that in v. 10. 6 were written soon after the event.

68. 4. ἄλλο μετ' αὐτῶν πλῆθος: not 'the rest of the majority' (*τὸ πλῆθος = ὁ δῆμος*), or even 'the rest of the (self-styled) democratic party', as Steup, who understands *ἄλλο* as *τὸ ἄλλο*, from the article

in *οι --- πράξαντες*, but 'a number of others, who were in the conspiracy'. It is surprising that so many were in the know (67. 2 n.); but they must have been, for they all *λίπα ἤλειψαντο*.

5. *λίπα γὰρ ἀλείψεσθαι*: see i. 6. 5. One would not suppose that to anoint oneself with oil would have been a very effective means of recognition in a mêlée, especially, as Steup says, if they were fully armed. Further, *ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται* above suggests becoming victims in a subsequent *trial* (or pretence of a trial) rather than in open fighting.

6. *αὐτοῦ τὴν μάχην ἔσεσθαι*: 'there would be fighting on the spot' (after *εἰ* with fut. indic., as often in threats), meaning 'you will have to fight against us'; or is it 'the fighting (with the enemy) will take place here, to our disadvantage, instead of outside the walls'? The former seems more natural in itself, but rather too open a threat for the Peloponnesian party to use; for, wishing to avoid civil strife at that moment, they were careful not to reveal their knowledge of their opponents' plans.

69. 1. *ἐναντίωμά τι*: the first obstacle met by the confident Athenians (65. 2).

2. *παρεγένετο*: probably pluperfect in meaning, 'had been brought in', not 'were now brought in', and so in parenthesis.

τοῦ τείχους: singular, for the whole structure known as the Long Walls, as in 67. 3 and elsewhere.

διοικοδομήσαντες: walling them off, i.e. putting up a cross wall between the two lines of the Long Walls, as usual a sufficient guard against attack (here, from the direction of the city).

τάφρον τε καὶ τείχη διελομένη ἡ στρατιά: those surely are right who demand a finite verb, such as *ἡγεν* or *διῆγεν* before *διελομένη*. Madvig's alternative suggestion, *διῆλαυνεν* in place of *διελομένη*, from the use of *ἔλανω* which is found, though rarely, in Attic, is attractive.

3. *τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ - - - δόσον οὐκ ἀπετετέλεστο*: as stated above, p. 335, this was only possible if Paliókastro is Nisaia (Bölte-Weicker, p. 85).

τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις: as so often, a Spartan was in command of a mixed Peloponnesian contingent acting as garrison in another state. Cf. Tantalos in Thyrea, 57. 4, and Pasitelidas at Torone, v. 3. 1. This man is presumably the *ἄρχων* of 67. 3. We are not told what happened to him, so, like Tantalos, he probably joined the other Spartan prisoners in Athens.

4. *ἀπορρήξαντες*: they made a breach in the Long Walls, near their own cross wall, in case they should not get control of Megara, in order better to isolate their own position. When the Megarians recovered the walls later and destroyed them (109. 1), they were removing what in the circumstances was of no value to either side.

70. 1. ἐπὶ Θράκης στρατείαν: this important statement is not explained till 79–80.

ἐπὶ Τριποδίσκον: the village must have been where a road from Boeotia met the road from Megara to Corinth, and in the foothills of Geraneia; and in fact extensive ruins have been observed, since Leake's time (*N. Greece*, ii. 410–11), 7–8 km. north-west of Megara, west of the road that goes from the city to Pegai on the Corinthian Gulf. This road from Boeotia, through Plataia, once across Kithairon, diverges from the other which goes more directly to Megara; the latter is the one which presumably the Peloponnesians took to reach Oinoe in 431 (ii. 18: see n. there).

τοὺς μεθ' αὐτοῦ ὅσοι ἥδη ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν: apparently not more than one hundred or two, to reckon by the figures given here (3,700 from Corinth, Sikyon, and Phlius) and below, 72. 1–2 (2,200 Boeotians, and 5,000 hoplites in all); a surprisingly small number, for Brasidas did not wait long after the Megara episode to start off northwards with his whole force, which numbered 1,700 (78. 1); and of these 700 were helots, who were surely already mustered and under Brasidas' command. Doubtless, a good many of the 1,000 who were not helots came from these men from Corinth, Sikyon, and Phlius; but his total force at Megara, one would think, would have been over 7,000 hoplites, together with the 600 cavalry.

2. ἔτυχε γάρ νυκτὸς — — ἔξελθών: generally taken to explain what follows; but 'he had in fact started out at night' might equally explain how he now knew of the capture of Nisaia—it had fallen the evening before (69. 3).

71. 1. οἱ μὲν — —, οἱ δέ — —: Thucydides attributes the better motive to the oligarchs, who fear both for themselves and for the state, the democrats only for themselves. But see 74. 3.

2. κρατήσασι προσχωρήσα: not simply 'to join the victors', whichever side won, or 'to wait to see which side won' (as 73. 1); οἵ τις εἴη εὑνόος introduces a slightly different note: 'it would be safer to make no decisive change in Megara (as would be done by admitting Brasidas) till the issue of the expected battle, which each of the two parties hoped would be in its favour'; as Forster Smith translates, "it was safer for them not to join the side which one favoured until it was victorious".

72. 1. οὐκ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος τοῦ κινδύνου: with Athens in possession of the Megarid, Boeotia was cut off from the Peloponnesian and could be invaded, as in 457, with less likelihood of Peloponnesian help (cf. i. 107. 2; *A.T.L.* iii. 302. 7).

τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀπῆλθον πάλιν: the full muster had been evidence of anxiety; now with the news of Brasidas' force there was no need for so many.

2. ἔξακισχιλίων: see 70. 1 n.

4. οὐ μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.: I agree with those who hold both that some word for 'decisive victory' is needed with the first part of this sentence, i.e. that οὐ --- τελευτήσαντες will not stand, and that ἀλλά after ἀπεκρίθησαν, without any following verb by way of contrast, is impossible. Rutherford's ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίθησαν is perhaps the easiest correction of the latter difficulty, which means that we need a finite verb in the first part; but it may well be that Thucydides wrote, after a phrase meaning 'with no decisive victory on either side' (e.g. οὐδέτεροι κρατήσαντες), which takes all the emphasis, ἀπεκρίθησαν, ἀλλ' ἀνεχώρουν, οἱ μέν, κ.τ.λ. Alternatively, with κρατήσαντες, and the negative going only with the participle, ἀλλά should be bracketed.

73.1. χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον: if Minoa is the line of hills with H. Geórgios at its western end (above, p. 335), this will be on the slopes facing it, to the north, beyond the valley along which the road from Eleusis to Megara runs.

οἴμενοι σφίσιν ἐπιέναι: see below, n. on §§ 2-3.

καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρέας, κ.τ.λ.: in strict logic (if the MSS. reading οἴμενοι --- Αθηναίους is right) we do not need καὶ; for he thought the Athenians would attack because, as he knew, the Megarians were waiting on the event, the second participle in sense being dependent on the first.

2-3. καλῶς δὲ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ἀμφότερα ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.: ἀμφότερα points forward, not backward to ἐπιέναι τὸν Αθηναίους and τὸν Μ. περιορμένους (there was no particular advantage to them in the latter); but I believe that the two advantages are (1) the avoidance of loss and of needless risk, by refusing to leave their superior position, and (2) the fact that the victory in this case would be attributed to them; and that we should therefore read either ἐπειδὴ τε (with the not uncommon μέν --- τε) and bracket καὶ before αὐτοῖς, or transpose καὶ before ἐπειδὴ γε. 'The easy victory would be acclaimed theirs now that they had shown themselves ready to fight'; not, 'the avoidance of risk was an advantage now that they had shown themselves ready to fight'. If this is correct, then ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ, κ.τ.λ. is a third advantage, or rather the second one seen in special relation to Megara. An alternative way to take the whole would be to read ἐπειδὴ τε, and to regard this sentence as an expansion of τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῦν, κ.τ.λ. ('and they might actually receive credit for the bloodless victory'), leaving ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ as the complement to ἄμα μέν.

Steup would read ⟨οὐκ⟩ οἴμενοι σφίσιν ἐπιέναι τοὺς Αθηναίους in § 1. (He refers to vii. 29. 3 and 63. 3, two other instances in Thucydides where all our MSS. but one omit the negative; and cf.

v. 66. 2 n.) This at first sight is attractive; for though Brasidas might have thought that the Athenians would attack because, in the circumstances, no battle meant a political victory for him, it seems clear that the assumption underlying what he regards as his advantages, especially ὥσπερ ἀκοντί, κ.τ.λ., is that he did not expect them to (owing to their inferior numbers and his own strong position). That is why it was an advantage to him not to start a battle nor run any unnecessary risk. In that case ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγένετο means that his expectations were confirmed. But further thought shows this to be wrong; for νῦν δὲ καν τυχεῖν, κ.τ.λ., must mean, 'but, as it is, there is even a chance that the Athenians themselves will refuse battle....' It cannot, therefore, have seemed probable to Brasidas that they would refuse; and ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγένετο refers only to οὐθ. μὴ βουληθέντας ἀγωνίζεσθαι. Besides, he would not have thought at one and the same moment that there would be no battle and that the Megarians were waiting to see which way victory would go.

We must take *σφίσιν ἐπένει* literally and give it its emphasis: 'he thought the Athenians would *attack*' (not merely be prepared to fight in the plain), 'and, owing to his superior position, he would have all the advantage of not *starting* the battle or running any risk; and, even though he was apparently trying to avoid battle (by refusing to leave a position easily defensible against hoplite troops), he would not be denied the credit of an easy victory on that account since he had shown his readiness to stand his ground. Similarly, things were going right for him with the Megarians: he had to bring his army thus far, within sight of Megara; for, if he had not, the city was gone for good. As it was, there was even a chance of the Athenians themselves refusing an engagement, in which case the Megarians would be convinced, and his object was attained without any fighting at all'. This, indeed, might have been more clearly expressed; and when we come to ἀμαχητὶ ἂν περιγενέσθαι, κ.τ.λ., so soon after ἀκοντί τὴν νίκην δικαίως ἂν τιθεσθαι, one suspects two alternative ways of expressing the same thought. The Bâle scholion (omitted by Hude, and printed by Powell, *C.Q.* xxx, 1936, 86) gives a wordy explanation, which does not help with the reading.

Busolt, iii. 1139, notes the lack of confidence in the Peloponnesian forces, in that they would not attack the smaller Athenian army: true the latter, if defeated, could retire behind the Long Walls and into Nisaia; but a victory for Brasidas would have produced a marked moral effect on both sides. This seems a proper criticism; but Brasidas may not have been very sure of his Peloponnesians, especially after the quick surrender of Nisaia (cf. also v. 8. 2); and the fact remains that he achieved all he wanted without fighting; and the subsequent events of the summer, as it happened, confirmed his judgement.

4. οἱ γὰρ Μεγαρῆς, κ.τ.λ.: the subject, restricted to *οἱ τῶν φευγόντων φίλοι Μεγαρῆς*, and the principal sentence, are resumed at *οὗτω δή*, after long explanatory clauses of which we almost forget the subordinate origin; and we should, therefore, punctuate with a colon after *ώρμήθησαν*, as most edd., not a full stop, as Stuart Jones. Cf.

75. I.

ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πλείω αὐτοῖς προυκεχωρήκει: this is hardly true on the evidence Thucydides has given us, Nisaia affording no great additional strength to the garrison of Minoa. In another context, how much we should have applauded this unwonted self-restraint on the part of Athenian commanders; for to follow up a victory (i. 70. 5) is sometimes called *τοῦ πλέονος ὀρέγεσθαι*. One wonders: was any attack made in the ekklisia on the half-heartedness of the commanders? Later in this same summer Hippocrates and Demosthenes had bold plans, which had nothing half-hearted about them, for action against the formidable Boeotians; were they already impatient to get this begun?

τοῖς δὲ ξυμπάστης τῆς δυνάμεως, κ.τ.λ.: *οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι πολλὴν μὲν ἔχοντες δύναμιν αὐτόθι, ἀφ' ἐκάστης δὲ πόλεως αὐτοῖς ὀλίγου μέρους παρόντος, οὐκ ἐφοβοῦντο τὴν ἡτταν*—schol. But the sentence as the MSS. have it can hardly stand: as Stahl says, “Qualis haec sit distinctio universi exercitus et praesentium nequaquam appetet. Nam universum exercitum sive totius societatis sive uniuscuiusque civitatis intellegis praesentibus copiis oppositum, illius, non harum pars in periculum vocatur”. Besides this there is the redundancy of *κινδυνεύειν ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν*; Arnold quotes i. 71. 6, *βουλομένων ὕμῶν προθύμων εἶναι* in comparison; and we may add ii. 94. 1, *εἰ ἐβούλήθησαν μὴ κατοκνῆσαι*; but more probably one infinitive, *κινδυνεύειν* or *ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν*, is an adscript in explanation of the other. But no satisfactory correction has been made. Something like *τοὺς δὲ <ἐκ> ξ. τ. δ. μέρει ἐκάστους ὀλίγῳ παρόντας εἰκότως ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν* is required. Steup's further objection, however, that after *ἡσύχαζον καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐπίοντων* ‘if they, the Peloponnesians, were not going to attack’, it is surprising to find the Athenian commanders reckoning that the enemy would be more likely to run the risk of fighting, is a trivial one.

74. 1. *τὴν ἐπὶ Θράκης στρατείαν*: 70. 1 and 78. We are nearing the climax of the drama.

2. *ἀποχωρησάντων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων*: leaving a garrison of course in Nisaia, as edd. note. Also, they must have left before, or at least at the same time as, the Peloponnesians; or they would have remained masters of the field and so of Megara. The Athenians in fact lost a great opportunity here. Had they stayed longer at Nisaia, they would probably have worn down the patience of the Peloponnesians; and if not that, they would have delayed decisively

Brasidas' march into Thrace, though they were unaware of that. They might also have avoided the disaster at Delion.

εὐθὺς ὑπεξῆλθον: some of them later went on the expedition to Sicily, as light-armed troops (vi. 43, ad fin.).

3. οἱ δέ: the extreme oligarchs, most of them from among the exiles, as distinct from the general body of citizens.

Hude once suggested transposing *kai* from before *ἔξέτασιν* to before *διαστήσαντες*; it is a distinct improvement.

ἔξέτασιν ὅπλων: the Thirty at Athens used the same device, more than once—Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 20, 4. 8. Hippias' method, Thuc. vi. 58, had not been very different.

ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν: this device, too, was followed by the Thirty; who besides had a Spartan garrison to assist, *Hell.* ii. 4. 9–10. As Steup says, there is some irony in *διενεγκεῖν* as though they were encouraged to vote either way, according to their conscience. These methods by which a minority obtained control used to seem too simple to us, it was hardly credible that men should be so easily deceived and overpowered; now we know better.

4. *καὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χρόνον, κ.τ.λ.*: unfortunately Thucydides does not tell us how long, except that the oligarchy survived at least till 421 (v. 31. 6), and we do not know from other sources (see e.g. Ernst Meyer, *R.E.* xv (1931), 191–2).¹ Had we known, we should have had a fixed *terminus post quem* for the writing of this sentence; for the aorist, *ἔννέμεινε*, probably implies that the narrow oligarchy which seized power in 424 was no longer in control. In any case the sentence was clearly written many years after 424. It does not particularly look like one inserted into an already finished narrative; yet there is nothing in the previous narrative of events at Megara that might not have been written very soon after the events themselves, and some details, as 67. 5, look as if they were written almost immediately.

75. *Antandros captured; Lamachos in Pontos*

75. 1. *τῆς Ἀντάνδρου*: 52. 3. οἱ *Μυτιληναῖοι* here are the exiles from Mytilene.

τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν: 50. 1. Cf. also iii. 19. Demodokos is only mentioned here, Aristeides only here and 50. 1. The former is very likely the speaker in Plato's (or Ps.-Plato's) *Theages*; if so, he was now nearly 60, and had held the highest offices in Athens and was very popular in his deme, Anagyrasioi (*Theag.* 127 E).

This is the first mention of Lamachos in Thucydides, though *δὲ γὰρ τρίτος* suggests that he had been already named as commander in

¹ I would not, as some have done, include Plato, *Kriton*, 53 B, as evidence for its survival to 399 B.C., especially if a Spartan harmost was in control from 404 (Dem. xviii. 96).

this year. He was, of course, a well-known figure, the type of *miles gloriosus* in *Acharnians*. It is generally supposed that he was born c. 470, for according to Plutarch, *Per.* 20. 1-2, he accompanied Perikles on the expedition to the Pontos and was left there in command of a squadron, presumably as strategos (c. 437? see vol. i, pp. 367-8); and in *Alkib.* 18. 2 Plutarch says of him when elected one of the three strategoi for Sicily, ἡλικίᾳ προήκων ὅμως ἔδόκει μηδὲν ἥττον εἶναι τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου διάπυρος καὶ φιλοκίνδυνος ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι. Yet in *Acharnians* he is not only spoken of as young, but as one of the youthful aristocratic group (like Alkibiades, cf. 716: the group that Kleon so much disliked), 601-6, and, incidentally, it is implied, not at all poor (593 ff., 608-11; contrast Plut. *Nik.* 15. 1). Unless there is a remote and elaborated jest in Aristophanes (e.g. Lamachos playing the young man's part when nearing 50), there seems to be a contradiction in our evidence.

Both the Aktaian cities (cf. 52. 2 n.) and those on the Euxine shore formed new groups in the assessment of 425-424 B.C. (above, p. 500). ὕσπερ τὰ Ἀναια: iii. 19, 32. 2.

2. ἐν τῇ Ἡρακλεώτιδι: cf. Xenophon, *Anab.* vi. 2. 1-3.

Μεγαρέων ἀποικίαν: see below, 104. 4 n. Thucydides might have told us that Herakleia was another colony from Megara.

76-77. Athens plans Attack on Boeotia

76. 1. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει: for the date, see below, 89. 1. n.

Δημοσθένης - - - ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ναύπακτον: for his subsequent action, see 77. 2. The intermediate paragraph explains the origin of this expedition.

2. ἐς δημοκρατίαν: and, one would have supposed, for some cities, or for a party in some cities (Thespiae and Orchomenos, for example) to loosen the bonds of the federal government, centralized as it was in Thebes. Two MSS. according to Hude (B and F) have ἐκ Θεσπιῶν in the margin as a variant for ἐκ Θηβῶν below; it would certainly be more usual if the chief conspirator had been from Thespiae (cf., e.g., *I.G.* i. 2 36). Ptoiodoros is a specially Boeotian name, like Asopolaos, iii. 52. 5.

3. Σίφαι: a small town at the eastern end of the bay which also sheltered the port of Thisbe, in the territory of Thespiae, *Paus.* ix. 32. 4 (my *Essays*, pp. 33-35).

Μινύειον πρότερον καλούμενον: *Il.* ii. 511.

νῦν δὲ Βοιώτιον: see iii. 87. 4 n.

ξυντελεῖ: see *Hell. Ox.* 11, though the divisions of Boeotia in the early fourth century were not the same as in 424 (below, p. 560), and Chaironeia was linked not with Orchomenos, but with the more distant Akraiphnion and Kopai (near the east and north shores of Lake Kopais respectively). In *Hell. Ox.* 11. 3, συντελούντων (*Πλαταιέων*,

κ.τ.λ.) εἰς τὰς Θῆβας, the verb implies subordination (cf. id. 12. 3); it is not certain that it does here.

Orchomenos seems to have retained a measure of independence greater than that of the other cities; at least to the end of the fifth century her coinage, and hers alone, did not have on the obverse the buckler characteristic of the Boeotian federal coinage; this she did not adopt till the fourth century (Head, *Hist. Num.*², 1911, 346).

οἱ Ὀρχομενίων φυγάδες: contrast i. 113. 2. Orchomenos had often been at enmity with Thebes.

πρὸς τὴν Φανοτίδην: the territory of Phanoteus or Panopeus, not far from Daulis (ii. 29. 3), and 20 stades from Chaironeia, according to Pausanias, x. 4. 1.

Steup is surely right in extending the parenthesis to *καὶ Φωκέων μετεῖχόν τινες*; otherwise we should expect *καὶ (έστι γὰρ ἡ X. --- τῆς Φωκίδος) Φ. μ.τ.* This participation of Phokians was dangerous (89. 1, ad fin.). In i. 113. 1 Thucydides did not think it necessary to explain the position of Chaironeia; but this is not evidence that he wrote the *Pentekontaëtia* later. He is too variable in his geographical and historical notes.

4. Δήλιον: Boeotia is being threatened from three sides, east, west, and south-west, which should have been sufficient to distract her energies.

The site of Delion has not been certainly determined. It was 30 stades from Aulis, and near the coastline (Strabo, ix. 2. 7, p. 403); but trial excavation has not discovered it.

ὅπως μὴ ξυμβοηθήσωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἀθρόοι: Steup would bracket *ἐπὶ τὸ Δ.*, on the ground that the Athenian aim is to prevent any concentration of Boeotian forces, not a particular one at Delion. Certainly that would appear to be true from the immediate context, in which *τοῖς δὲ οὐκ οὖσῃς ἀθρόας τῆς δυνάμεως* below refers to dispersal in all three directions, and the object of the Athenians in eastern Boeotia is stated to be only the occupation of Delion in order to encourage the revolution, or, at the most, to carry on raids from there, as from the other two places, in the manner which had proved effective against Sparta; and there would be no difficulty in supposing *ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον* to be an adscript. But Delion had to be fortified (§ 5), like Pylos, before the Athenians could use it; and for that time was needed. Thucydides may also be thinking ahead, of the later development of the plan, when the whole Athenian army was near Delion, and concentration of the Boeotians *there* was to be hindered if possible.

Demosthenes had already conceived one fine plan of invading Boeotia (iii. 95. 1), and an Athenian army had before tried a raid into the territory of Tanagra (iii. 91). It is clear that the Athenians were not planning the conquest of Boeotia by one decisive battle—that

was what they were trying to avoid, but in the event had to face. They wished to do there the same sort of thing they were doing against Sparta from Pylos and Kythera (Busolt, iii. 1141).

It is curious that Aristophanes shortly before had referred to oligarchic intrigues (apparently) between Athens and Boeotia (*Eg.* 479).

5. οὐσῆς ἑκάστους διὰ βραχέος ἀποστροφῆς: *τοῖς τῶν Αθηναίων λήσταις*, schol.; rather for the democratic plotters in the Boeotian cities, according to Steup. But was it their business to retreat, to take refuge within the Athenian lines? And if they did, would the revolution be successful?

That Plataia was now in Theban hands must have greatly affected Athenian plans; both politically and strategically it would have been easier for Athens to enter or to threaten Boeotia from Plataia (even though Thebes, her strongest enemy among the Boeotians, there faced her) instead of, or as well as, by Siphae, thus making a third line of attack. It is notable that Thucydides says nothing of this, probably the most important military result of the capture of Plataia. Wade-Gery may be right that he was deficient in the understanding of or interest in the major strategy of the war (cf. above, p. 67): at any rate, the Plataia campaign, which plays so large and so important a part in Thucydides, had not much effect on the course of the war; and what effect it had, he apparently did not see, or, if he did, decided not to mention.

77. 1. προαπέστειλε: one is not to suppose, I think, from this that Hippocrates had a superior command; but certainly *προαπέστειλαν* would have been easier. (ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, says Steup, goes with *στρατεύειν*, not with *δύναμιν ἔχων*, being contrasted with *ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον* below. But it may be that it is contrasted with *ὅπως ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν χωρίων, κ.τ.λ.*, and therefore to be taken with *δύναμιν ἔχων*.)

2. ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης: rather *μέν solitarium* than answered by *Brasidas* δέ, 78. 1; for Demosthenes' actions are not here contrasted or compared with those of Brasidas. In fact ὁ μὲν Δ. is resumed in ἔδει *τὸν μὲν Δ.*, 89. 1; and *Bp.* δέ is like ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει, 76. 1.

Oiniádas: hitherto hostile to Athens, i. 111. 3, ii. 82, 102. 2, iii. 114. 2; and cf. ii. 9. 4. *I.G.* i. 2 67, a decree honouring and rewarding three citizens of Oeniadas, may belong to this time; it has recently been dated some ten years later (see *S.E.G.* x. 112), but on insufficient grounds.

δέ after *Oiniádas* is awkward. "Ideo positam esse recte docet Class., quod Demosthenes, quo advenerit consilio, ut Siphæ statim aggredetur, id mutaverit cum Oeniadas invenerit in Atheniensium societatem vi adductos; quare inter se quodammodo opposita esse

ἀφικόμενος et καταλαβάν” (Stahl). But this will not do; for it was part of the plan that Demosthenes should collect forces from Akarnania before sailing for Siphai (§ 1, above), and he was still waiting for the day which had been arranged (which was not till winter, 89. 1) when he had done all this (*ὅταν δέη, ἀπαντησόμενος*, below); and in the end arrived at Siphai before Hippokrates arrived at Delion. Steup adopts a suggestion of Poppo's, *Oἰν. τε ὑπὸ Ἀκαρνάνων*. I should prefer *καὶ* *Oἰν. τε ὑπὸ Αἱ.*; but see Denniston's cautious remark, p. 162, n. 3.

ἐπὶ Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους: see iii. 106. 2, III. 4.

In the ancient edition of Thucydides in thirteen books, book vi ended here, according to the scholiast. The division then was not more according to subject-matter than the present; a weightier pause occurs at the end of c. 74 or 75.

78-88. Brasidas' Expedition into Thrace

78. 1. Βρασίδας δέ: here perhaps more than in any other part of his history Thucydides cuts up the narratives of two simultaneous events, Brasidas' expedition to Thrace and the Delion campaign, in a manner for which many, since Dionysios, have upbraided him, and which few have copied, even when they can in other respects do little but follow his narrative. The object Thucydides had in view was in part chronological—simply to get events in the right order—but only in part: this method does bring out more clearly than could otherwise be done, the simultaneity of these two major episodes and therewith their close connexion—or should we say, the obstinate Athenian refusal to see the connexion? It is probable that meetings between dissatisfied Boeotians and Hippokrates and Demosthenes had taken place before the attempt on Megara; the hopes raised at these, in the then temper of the Athenians (who had not forgotten Myronides: 95. 3 n.), would have been high; and it is not surprising that the two generals were unwilling to give up so promising and so grandiose a scheme, because Brasidas was said to be marching northwards through central Greece ('our Thessalian friends will surely stop him'). But it was fatal that they did not; clearly Demosthenes should have been sent with a considerable force to Thrace as soon as Brasidas' march was known. The ignoring of Brasidas at Athens, beyond a perfunctory *φυλακὴν πλέονα κατεστήσαντο* (82), is well brought out by Thucydides, in his own fashion, without comment. See below, 79. 2 n., and my Sather lectures, pp. 134-7. For the comparison with the author of *Hellenika Oxyrhynchika*, who followed Thucydides, and with Ephoros who did not, see H. Bloch in *Ath. Stud.* 308-10.

πορεύμενος: his preparations for the march have been briefly referred to, 70. 1 and 74. 1, in connexion with a different campaign.

ἐπτακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὅπλιταις: see 80. 5, 70. 1 n.

Ήρακλείᾳ: iii. 92. 3.

ἐς Φάρσαλον παρὰ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους: the Thessalian federation was in alliance with Athens, and Pharsalos was amongst the cities which had sent cavalry to Athens in accordance with its terms in 431 B.C. (ii. 22. 3). But they were ruled by narrow oligarchies (§ 3), and the ruling class, or some of them, tended to be pro-Spartan, or at least not pro-Athenian; in Larissa apparently divisions between parties, but perhaps between different aristocratic sections rather than between aristocrats and people, had to be reconciled in 431 before aid was sent to Athens. Cf. § 3, n. on *τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ*.

For the site and the walls of Pharsalos, see Stählin (below, p. 544), pp. 135–44. It was the chief and almost the only city of the Thessalian *tetras* Phthiotis (in classical times to be distinguished from Achaia Phthiotis: see below); and claimed, perhaps rightly, to be Homer's Phthia. It was a rival of Larissa, and its leading families now, apparently, took the initiative in helping Brasidas; cf. ii. 22. 3 n., and below, § 3, n. on *δυναστείᾳ*; in the laudatory inscriptions beneath the statues of the Daochos family at Delphi—a Pharsalian family—Daochos I is said to have been the constitutional and peaceful ruler of all Thessaly for twenty-seven years, perhaps the years of the Peloponnesian war (Dittenberger, *S.I.G.³* 274: but see n. on Menon, ii. 22. 3).

Μελίτειαν τῆς Αχαΐας: about half-way between Herakleia and Pharsalos, and a day's forced march from Pharsalos (§ 5), but near the village of Avarítsa, that is, c. 7 km. to the east of the normal route from the lower Spercheios valley to Thessaly; which goes by the pass of Phoúrka (800 m. high, after a steep climb from the valley) across the upland plain just east of the shallow Lake Xynias (463 m.) to Thaumakoi, a notable site which from 520 m. up commands a wonderful view over the western plain of Thessaly (Livy, xxxii. 4; Philippson, p. 61: see n. on § 3), thence steeply down to the plain. (The railway takes a route farther to the west and must make many hairpin bends in its ascent and a wide detour in its descent.) Brasidas was avoiding this usual route. For his further journey, see below, § 3, n. on the Enipeus river.

In Meliteia was shown the grave of Hellen, the eponymos of all Hellenes (Strabo, ix. 5. 6, p. 432).

τῆς Αχαΐας: Achaia Phthiotis was, like Perraibia (below, § 5) and Magnesia, not part of Thessaly proper, but subject to it, a kind of *περιοική*, though the citizens had more rights than the perioikoi of Sparta and their lands a greater independence; for example, they were, equally with the Thessaloi, independent members of the Delphic

amphiktyony, and Perraibia in the fifth century issued its own coinage: Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1478-87. It is the passage through Thessaly proper about which Brasidas was most anxious; he seems to have had no difficulty in reaching Meliteia, and none after entering Perraibia.

Πάναιρος, κ.τ.λ.: where did Thucydides get these names from, and what was his purpose in recording them? Cf. again, ii. 22. 3 n.

2. καὶ μετὰ ὅπλων γε δή: I do not feel comfortable in making a pause after this, and taking *καὶ τοῖς πᾶσι γε* --- διέναι parenthetically (see Steup's n.; cf. 92. 4); but we must do so, unless we can assume the sort of anacoluthon involved in *τὴν γὰρ Θ. ἄλλως τε* --- ἀγωγοῦ, *καὶ μετὰ ὅπλων γε δὴ καὶ τοῖς πᾶσι γε*, where the second *καὶ* together with *γε* emphasizes *τοῖς πᾶσι* (see e.g. Denniston, p. 158; but he would here place the comma after *γε δή*: p. 246); this would, moreover, mean that *ἄλλως τε* is 'misplaced', for *τε* is certainly answered by the first *καὶ*. 'Thessaly is in any case a difficult country to cross without invitation, and for an armed force (both there and) in Greece generally....'

For the difficulty of getting through Thessaly, without invitation, see i. 111. 1, and vol. i, p. 15.

τοῖς πᾶσι γε ὄμοιώς "Ελλησιν, κ.τ.λ.: for what class of reader did Thucydides write that it was not usual to march through the territory of any Greek state without its consent, and such an act would everywhere be regarded with suspicion? And of what country outside Greece was it not true? (It was certainly true of the independent Thracians of Thucydides' day.) Is it 'it used to be so—καθειστῆκει— but is so no longer, after many years of warfare'? (The scholiast fancifully explains, "Ελληνας λέγει τοὺς περὶ τὰ Φάρσαλα οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ λέγονται.)

3. εἰ μὴ δυναστείᾳ μᾶλλον ἡ ἴσονομίᾳ: if Thucydides is here using *δυναστεία* in the same sense as in iii. 62. 3, iv. 126. 2, where see nn., and vi. 38. 3, *ἴσονομία* does not necessarily imply democracy, and in Thessaly would not; that is, it would not imply a constitution in which the political rights of the penestai were equal to those of the landowners, but an *ἴσόνομος δῆμος* (iii. 62. 3), an oligarchy of the Boeotian or Chiote type, constitutional not arbitrary government, and with equality among the citizen body. In that case *τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεσσαλῶν* does not mean the common people in the ordinary sense, but the majority of full Thessalian citizens (so J. S. Morrison, C.Q. xxxvi, 1942, 63). For *ἴσονομία* in a democratic city, see ii. 37. 1, iii. 82. 8. See also below, 132. 2 n.

τὸ ἐγχώριον: this adverbial construction ("according to the customs of the country", L. and S.) is hard to parallel (see Stahl's n.);¹ and

¹ The scholiast in his note has *ἐγχωρίως*, but it is not clear what his reading was.

it is certain that Dionysios read the dative, *τῷ ἐπιχωρίῳ* (*Ep. ad Amm.* 2. 10, p. 799), for he censures the use of the neuter in place of the feminine agreeing with *ἰσονομία*. Stahl keeps Dionysios' reading, translating “*nisi domesticus quo Thessali utebantur rerum status magis principum dominatio quam legum aequabilitas fuisse*”; but with this *τῷ ἐγχωρίῳ* seems to lack all point. Hude reads *ἐγχωρίῳ* without the article ‘a native kind of *ἰσονομία*’, by which in effect he takes the passage in the same way as Dionysios (*'their native form of *ἰσονομία*'*); that is, their ‘equality of rights’ was very different from the Athenian, and from the Spartan, system, but it was, when working, a constitutional government which (besides being, formally at least, pro-Athenian) would have been strong enough to prevent Brasidas' lawless march. That is why the representatives of the other side leave Brasidas alone on receiving his promise (§ 5); they thought that law and international custom would prevail. As it was, a narrow clique was momentarily in control. If this is the meaning, we need the article, and the article was surely written by Thucydides in the feminine. It is possible that Dionysios' MS. was at fault (*τῷ ἐγχωρίῳ* would be an easy error), and that he was too impatient and too petulant to confirm the reading. This, of course, does not explain our MSS. reading; but even if *τῷ ἐγχώριον* may be construed adverbially, an adverb is not what we need—‘if they had not been governed by a small clique in their native manner’ (as Busolt-Swoboda, i. 358. 2) is surely not the meaning: the *tone* of this would be more like Aristophanes (*Ach.* 523).

Busolt-Swoboda, ii, p. 1482, notes the contrast between the inscription in honour of Daochos I who ‘ruled all Thessaly’ for twenty-seven years, *οὐ βίᾳ ἀλλὰ νόμῳ* (above, p. 541), and some other *ταγεῖ* of the fourth century, e.g. Jason of Pherai who was elected constitutionally but made himself all powerful (*Xen. Hell.* vi. 4. 28) and his two sons and grandson who must have seized power and who used it like a *τύραννος* (*Hell.* vi. 4. 33–35; *Diod.* xv. 60. 5, 61. 2).¹ The inscription for Daochos was made in 337 B.C., and doubtless had reference to the history of the *ταγεῖ* in the fourth rather than in the fifth century; and Daochos could not have been a very strong ruler if, while he was the constitutional *ταγέ*, a few families ruled Thessaly as a *δυναστεία* and his own city took a prominent part in the ‘dynastic’ policy of aiding Brasidas.

τῷ Ἐνίπει ποταμῷ: this is clearly for Thucydides the river, or rather the chief of the many rivers which rise in hills just east of Lake Xynias; they flow north or north-east across the upland plain, then, united, north through the north-eastern region of Mt. Othrys, before bending due west to pass about 4½ km. north of Pharsalos towards

¹ Diodorus' use of *δυναστεία* here is of no significance: it only means *power*, and is used equally of Amyntas of Macedon and Agesipolis of Sparta.

the western Thessalian plain: now called Chiliadótikos in its upper reaches, Tsanarlés when it approaches Pharsalos and for the rest of its route to the Peneios. In the upland plain near Meliteia it formed, in all probability, the boundary between Achaia Phthiotis and Thessaly proper.

The Apidanos (below, § 5) is the Pharsalítēs, which, while there is an insignificant stream east of the town, receives most of its water from a copious spring at the north-west foot of the hill on which is the akropolis of Pharsalos (see Stählin, fig. 9, p. 138). It flows roughly parallel to the Enipeus and joins it just west of Phakion (§ 5) only about 6 km. south of the confluence with the Peneios, Strabo, ix. 5. 6, pp. 431–2 (who, however, gives too low a figure, 70 stades, for the distance between Meliteia and Pharsalos; it is over 25 km. in a direct line). Herodotos, however, appears to change the names of the two rivers; for in vii. 129. 2 he names the five chief rivers of Thessaly (not in geographical order) which include the Enipeus and the Apidanos, but in 196 he expressly puts the latter in Achaia (as though it and not the Enipeus was the Chiliadótikos-Tsanarlés). For the whole Othrys region see Philippson's fine description, *Thessalien u. Epeiros*, 1897, 57–75, and Stählin, *Das hellenische Thessalien*, 1924, 81–83, 150–70.

Brasidas' route from Meliteia to the Apidanos may have followed, fairly closely, the valley of the Enipeus; or, more probably, since he arrived at the Apidanos, which is west of Pharsalos, after keeping east of the main route till it was past Thaumakoi (above, § 1) he reached the plain by one of the valleys which descend in a westerly direction north of that place, and marched thence north to the Apidanos. It was a march of about 35 km.

ἄνευ τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ: in spite of the rivalry of the cities (ii. 22. 3 n.), and of the anti-Athenian families who now in fact controlled affairs, though with difficulty (§§ 4–5), the federal government of Thessaly—of the four *tetrades* combined—still functioned; and it was the old tribal state of all Θεσσαλοί which was a member of the Delphic Amphiktyony (cf. § 1, n. on *τῆς Αχαΐας*). It was *τὸ κοινόν* which, probably only in time of war or other crisis, elected the *ταγός* of all Thessaly (often called *βασιλεύς* or *ἡγεμών* by historians); cf. Hdt. v. 63. 3 (*κοινῇ γνώμῃ χρεώμενοι*), vii. 130. 3, 172; and it was with it that Athens had made alliance in 462–461 (Thuc. i. 102. 4, ii. 22. 2–3). See Busolt–Swoboda, ii, p. 1479. 4.

4. **πολεμίους οὖσι:** 'who were at war with them', as 79. 2, 82. **ἔχθρα** below is 'enmity', 'unfriendly feeling'.

5. **δρόμῳ:** cf. διέδραμε, 79. 1; clearly here 'at speed', 'a forced march', not 'at a run'; a point of some interest to historians of the battle of Marathon. (W. W. How, *C.Q.* xiii, 1919, 40–42, thought δρόμῳ must mean 'at the double', and that Thucydides' use is a 'pardonable

exaggeration'; he was generous in pardoning.) At v. 3. 1 δρόμῳ could mean 'at a run', but does not necessarily mean it.

τῷ Ἀπιδανῷ ποταμῷ: see n. on § 3, above; and for Pharsalos, n. on § 1. Brasidas did not, of course, enter Pharsalos, nor had any need to, unless he was short of supplies.

ἐς Φάκιον: its site is uncertain; but it was probably in the north-east corner of the western plain of Thessaly, near the confluence of the Enipeus with the Peneios, perhaps at a classical site on the hills east of the confluence of Apidanos and Enipeus, where Stählin, pp. 133-5, puts it (B. Lenk in *R.E.*, s.v., 1938, agrees). This suits Livy, xxxii. 13. 5-9 and xxxvi. 13, as well as Thucydides.

Περραιβίαν: the most northerly district of the Thessalian confederacy, stretching from the Peneios past Oloosson as far as the northern slopes of Olympos, and apparently including the mountain range, Hdt. viii. 128. 1, 131; not part of Thessaly proper, but subject (§ 1, above). See Stählin, pp. 5-39, or in *R.E.*, s.v. 'Thessalia' (1936), 99-102. Brasidas avoided Larissa, the most usual place for crossing the Peneios, altogether, doubtless for political reasons, and crossed the river much higher up. He also avoided the pass of Tempe, but mainly because the other route is more direct, by Oloosson and then over the north-west spurs of Olympos in a north-easterly direction down to the sea at Dion. After crossing the Peneios north of Phakion he will have gone through the mountains which form the northern boundary of Thessaly proper, then north-west across the plain to Oloosson. (Xerxes, it will be remembered, avoided Tempe; his main body apparently went not along the coast from the head of the Gulf of Therme to Dion, but up the Haliakmon valley and then south, by the pass now called Sérvia, or Sarandopótamo, to Oloosson.)

6. ἐς Δίον τῆς Περδίκκου ἀρχῆς: clearly the frontier town of Macedonia towards Thessaly. In vol. i, p. 214, n. 2, I said that the coastal strip, east of Olympos, between Dion and Herakleion near the mouth of the Peneios, was not included in Macedonia at this time; for from this passage in book iv I inferred that Dion was the first place in Macedonia to one coming from Thessaly by either route, Oloosson or Tempe. Edson, *C.P.* xlvi, 1947, 97, disputes this, and would put Herakleion in Macedonia in the fifth century as it was later. This passage is not decisive, for the eastern slopes of Olympos might have been in Macedonia, while the western and northern were under the Thessalian dominion; but I still think my view the more probable; otherwise Brasidas' shortest route to his friend Perdikkas' territory would have been by Tempe—unless Herakleion, though Macedonian, was at the time in Athenian hands, as Edson and the authors of *A.T.L.* (iii. 324) believe. The name is restored, but with practical certainty (see A 10), in A 9 (*I.G.* i².63: col. iv. 108); but, even so, Athens

did not necessarily control it. It was assessed again in 421 (A 10). See n. on Bormiskos, 103. 1.

To give more precision to the statement here made, Dobree suggested that *πρῶτον* had dropped out after *Μακεδονίας*.

79. 2–3. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, κ.τ.λ.: ‘that this force had been brought from the Peloponnese was due to the fears both of the cities which had revolted from Athens and of Perdikkas, who got it to come to Thrace because they thought’, etc. ‘They were aided by conditions in the Peloponnese.’

From here to the end of c. 81 is a statement of the motives of the expedition and the conditions which made Sparta willing to sponsor it (she did not do more). We have had already first the hints about the expedition, 70. 1 and 74. 1, and then the details of Brasidas’ exciting march; only afterwards are we told the reason for it. See 78. 1 n. The narrative might almost be said to follow the order of appreciation of the events in Athens: first rumours of Brasidas being busy about something in the neighbourhood of Corinth, then, after his interference in Megara, information of his getting through Thessaly, finally a realization of what it was all about—Perdikkas proving false again and the danger (not very great, as Athenians hoped) to the empire in those parts. This order of narrative is not uncommon in Thucydides: i. 57–58, the story of the first revolt in Chalkidike, is not unlike it in this respect, or ii. 93–94, and the *Pentekontaëtia* is only another instance on a large scale. It is a way, so common in Greek, of letting the narrative tell its own tale. The repetition of Arrabaios’ name and title, in somewhat fuller form, in 83. 1, might indeed suggest that 79. 2–81 was written later than the rest, the only adaptation that was needed, if it was later inserted, being the alteration of 82 init. from *οἱ δὲ Αθ. πυθόμενοι*, or the like, to *τότε δὲ οὐν ἀφικομένου*, κ.τ.λ. (the difference in time of composition, if any, need not have been great, perhaps only a matter of weeks); but it is not necessary: “the fullest description of a person is not necessarily given at his first appearance” (J. E. Powell on Hdt. viii. 42. 2; cf. 2. 2); cf. also the description of the Peloponnesian wall at Plataia (above, iii. 21. 1 n.). Cf. 108. 1, n. p. 580.

οἵ τε ἐπὶ Θράκης ἀφεστῶτες Αθηναῖων: the Chalkidians and Bottiaioi of i. 58, ii. 101. 1, and iv. 7 (where see n.); named in v. 18. 5.

Περδίκκας: the situation is very similar to that in 433–432 B.C. (i. 57–58). In 431 he was temporarily an ally of Athens (ii. 29. 6), but not a very faithful one (ii. 80. 7). In ii. 99–100 we have a description of his realm.

Ἀρραβαῖον τὸν Λυγκηστῶν βασιλέα: see ii. 99. 2. The Lynkestai must have been friendly when Perdikkas marched to Molossia to help Corinth (ii. 80. 7: see Beaumont’s article there cited).

80. 2. ἐπὶ προφάσει: either 'with a good pretext', i.e. an offer of freedom to the helots, an offer of which we hear nothing here but which was later fulfilled (v. 34), or 'with good cause' (cf. iii. 75. 4), i.e. the fear of further trouble. Presumably the latter is right, the subordinate clause giving the explanation.

As Professor Pearson says (see n. on iii. 13. 1) *πρόφασις* is the 'explanation' of conduct which needs to be explained or defended. The explanation may be true or false, adequate or inadequate; and it may consist either in an event external to the person who is explaining his conduct (e.g. 'he struck me first', as, I think, in iii. 13. 1; cf. iii. 75. 4 and the analogous use in ii. 49. 2), or his own motives (here and 'we had to stop the continued increase of Athenian power', i. 23. 6, 'we had to include all Sicily in our dominion', vi. 6. 1, or 'we had to go to the assistance of our allies', vi. 33. 2). For an example of the simply inadequate explanation, see vi. 8. 4: Nikias' view was (at least as he expressed it to his fellow countrymen) that the alliance with Egesta might be a good reason for helping her in the war against Selinous, but was quite inadequate, almost frivolous, *βραχεῖα*, as an explanation of an expedition against all Sicily.

τῆς Πύλου ἔχομένης: one expects a mention of Kythera too. This led Hude at one time and Steup to bracket the words.

3. καὶ τόδε ἔπραξαν: unfortunately Thucydides does not tell us on what occasion. Not immediately before Brasidas' expedition, on general grounds and because of *καὶ τότε* in § 5; nor, one would suppose, very long before, for in that case we should expect *ποτέ* here. So Grote's conjecture, soon after the surrender on Sphakteria, when the Spartans might fear that the helots would take advantage of their depression and loss of prestige, is as likely as any. Certainly Thucydides does not make clear its relation to the sending of helots with Brasidas.

τὴν σκαιότητα: see Stuart Jones's crit. n. Either reading seems possible; but I have a decided preference for *τὴν νεότητα* both as combining better with *τὸ πλῆθος*, and because *σκαιός* generally means 'awkwardly stupid' rather than 'awkwardly mischievous'. Stahl quotes Polyb. xxxii. 13 (19).4, *ἀπειθείᾳ καὶ σκαιότητι*, which, however, means 'obstinacy and ill manners'; but Hdt. vii. 9 β 1, *καίτοι ἐώθασι* "Ελληνες ἀβουλότατα πολέμους ἴστασθαι ὑπό τε ἀγνωμοσύνης καὶ σκαιότητος, and Soph. Ant. 1028, *αὐθαδία τοι σκαιότητ'* ὁφισκάνει, by showing the association of the word with wars and *αὐθαδία*, may explain its use here. (I note that Stuart Jones does not cite this passage in the new L. and S. either s.v. *σκαιότης*, or s.v. *νεότης*.) There is no scholion to help. Widmann's conjecture, *καινότητα*, adopted by Hude (1913), will not do; Steup's *ἰταμότητα* is not much better.

αἱεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλά, κ.τ.λ.: rightly (if not elegantly) explained by Graves, "most of the relations between the Lacedaemonians and the

Helots were of an eminently precautionary character", not "most of the Lacedaemonian institutions were intended especially to guard against the Helots". With the latter meaning the order would probably have been *αἰεὶ γάρ πρὸς τοὺς Εἵλ., κ.τ.λ.*

4. ὡς ἡλευθερωμένοι: should we insert ἥδη after ἡλευθερωμένοι (bearing in mind the later pronunciation of -οι οἱ δέ)?

ἡφάνισάν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐδεὶς ἥσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἔκαστος διεφθάρη: "a stratagem at once so perfidious in the contrivance, so murderous in the purpose, and so complete in the execution, stands without parallel in any history. It implies a depravity far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The Ephors must have employed numerous instruments, apart from each other, for the performance of this bloody deed. Yet it appears that no certain knowledge could be obtained of the details—a striking proof of the mysterious efficiency of the Council of Five, surpassing even that of the Council of Ten at Venice—as well as of the utter absence of public inquiry or discussion"—Grote, v, pp. 284-5. (Grote's dislike of fraud and cruelty, his belief in the efficacy of public discussion, seem old-fashioned. Even in respect of this episode Thucydides could speak truly of *τὰ μέλλοντά ποτε αὐθίς κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια ἔσεσθαι*. We should punctuate perhaps with a colon after *ἀπλίτας*.)

5. ἐπτακοσίους ὁπλίτας: see 70. 1 n. '700 in number, to serve as hoplites'; i.e. they were provided with the armour for the occasion.

81. 1. δραστήριον: Stahl quotes Plat. *Symp.* 221 c, the comparison of Brasidas with Achilles. Thucydides has probably in mind that Brasidas was rather too active (and too popular) for the authorities at Sparta, who were not unwilling to see him go. Cf. 108. 7 n.

πλείστου ἄξιον --- γενόμενον: cf. ii. 65. 4, of Perikles. In thought this is connected with *βουλόμενον*, as is δραστήριον: he was energetic and so wanted specially to go; and besides he knew what he could accomplish. (We cannot accept Hude's conjecture *βουλόμενοι*, by which Spartan anxiety to have Brasidas out of Lakonia would be clearly expressed; for *αὐτόν τε Βρ.* clearly requires *βουλόμενον*.) Note that *γενόμενον* is not "grammatically" to "be taken closely with *ἀπέστειλαν*", and so "can then only mean 'who had (already) proved' ", which "of course is nonsense" (Graves, following Rutherford). We have a case of a not uncommon Greek usage, a practically independent clause expressed by a participial construction: 'he was a man with a reputation for unremitting energy (in explanation of *αὐτὸν βουλόμενον*, and of *προυθυμήθησαν οἱ Χ.*, and only incidentally perhaps of *ἀπέστειλαν* too), and later proved to be of the greatest value to Sparta'.

2. ὅπερ ἐποίησαν: v. 17. 2.

ἀνταπόδοσιν καὶ ἀποδοχὴν χωρίων: illustrated by the treaty of 421 B.C., v. 18. 5–8.

τὸν χρόνῳ ὕστερον — πόλεμον: written, according to Steup, before Thucydides had thought of the several wars as one. But the words have no such significance—see above, p. 497.

ἡ τότε Βρασίδου ἀρετὴ — μάλιστα ἐπιθυμίαν ἔνεποιει, κ.τ.λ.: contrast ii. 8. 4–5. The two passages were not written at the same time.

3. πρώτος γὰρ ἔξελθων, κ.τ.λ.: “aliter quondam Pausanias” (i. 130)—Stahl. But, what is much more significant, *aliter*, only three years before, Alkidas; cf. esp. iii. 32. 2, *Σαμίων* — πρέσβεις ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦντος αὐτόν. We must take *πρώτος* with ἔξελθων only, not with ἔξελθων καὶ δόξας — ἀγαθός ('the first Spartan who made a good reputation abroad'); it is the only logical translation: it was because the first Spartan seen abroad was Brasidas, so admirable a man, that men thought that all others would be like him; had he been the third or fourth, and the only good one among them, he would have raised no such hopes. Yet the statement, thus interpreted, is not true, not because of Pausanias the Regent, for Thucydides is clearly only thinking of this war, but because of Alkidas and, to a less degree, of Knemos and Menedaios. But Brasidas was the first Spartan to be seen by the cities of Thrace; and it was from there that his reputation spread. It is extremely interesting that Alkidas was forgotten both by Thucydides and by the Greeks of Asia Minor; but this passage was written late in the war or after its close, and Thucydides has telescoped the course of events: not unnaturally, for the last eight or nine years impressed men with their horror, and the influence of Brasidas' character and achievements was very great, so great that the conduct of his predecessors, become unimportant by comparison, was forgotten, and even that of some of his successors ignored, by the cities who were to be liberated by Sparta.

τῶν δὲ συμμάχων ἔσειον τοὺς παχεῖς καὶ πλούσιους
αἰτίας ἀν προστιθέντες ὡς “φρονεῖ τὰ Βρασίδου”

(*Peace*, 639–40): τὰ Βρασίδου, not τὰ τῶν Πελοποννησίων or τῶν πολεμίων.

Compare Timokreon of Ialyssos on other citizens of powerful states who appeared among the weaker (fr. 1):

ἀλλ’ εἰ τύ γα Πανσανίαν ἦ καὶ τύ γα Ξάνθιππον αἰνεῖς
ἢ τύ γα Λευτυχίδαν, ἐγὼ δ’ Ἀριστείδαν ἐπαινέω
ἄνδρ’ ἴεραν ἀπ’ Αθανᾶν
ἔλθόνθ’ ἵνα λῶστον, ἐπεὶ Θεμιστοκλῆν ἥχθαρε Λατά, κ.τ.λ.

(ἔλθόνθ’ is J. E. Powell’s reading for ἔλθεῖν: ed. Hdt. viii. 79. 1). Unlike

Brasidas, Aristeides did not appear alone; so the islanders and Ionians were not so easily deceived by Athens as by Sparta.

This chapter in fact is in a manner foreign to the context of the narrative of events in books iii and iv, just as ii. 65. 4–13 is foreign to that of all of books ii to vii (see nn. there). And since these passages are demonstrably late, it seems probable that the general narrative is a good deal earlier. See my article in *J.H.S.* lxxi, 1951, 70–74; also below, 108. 2–3 and vi. 15. 4 nn.

It may also be noted that in i. 77. 6, the passage in the speech of the Athenians at Sparta which is so generally pointed at as a prophecy after the event, the last sentence, ἀμεικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ' ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε καὶ προσέτι εἰς ἔκαστος ἐξιών οὕτε τούτους χρῆται οὕθ' οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἐλλὰς νομίζει, was singularly inappropriate to Brasidas (and so 'must have been written before 424'? see Adcock in the same volume of *J.H.S.*, pp. 6–7).

82. φυλακὴν πλέονα: increase in numbers or in wakefulness, or in both? Perhaps no more troops were sent from Athens before those mentioned in 108. 6 (so Classen and Graves); but there might have been a concentration of troops then overseas, especially of ships, in the Thraceward parts. Anyhow Thucydides and Eukles were warned, at least in general terms; or perhaps they were sent to Thrace now for the first time (cf. above, pp. 526–7).

83. 1. Περδίκκας δὲ Βρασίδαν καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν εὔθὺς λαβών: at Kozáne (which is in Eordia, ii. 99. 5) in 1949 there was found in a tomb a silver phiale dating from the beginning of the fifth century, inscribed *τὰς Αθαναίας λαπὰ τὰς Μηγαροῦς*; "it must have been brought there from Megara as a trophy" (J. M. Cook, *J.H.S.* lxx, 1950, 7 and pl. i c). The tomb itself is of the second half of the fourth century. The bowl had perhaps been looted from a Megarian temple by one of Brasidas' Peloponnesians, and sold or bartered to a Macedonian, or might even have been brought as a present for Perdikkas or Arrabaios by Brasidas, and given later to some Macedonian. (But, if it came from Megara, why is the goddess described as "Athena at Megara"??) See V. G. Kallipolítes and D. Feytman, *'Εφ. Αρχ.*, 1948–9, 92–97, for a full description.

Ἀρραβαῖον: see 79. 2 n.

2. **τῇ ἐσβολῇ τῆς Λύγκου:** see below, cc. 124–32, esp. 127. 2 n.

3. **μέσω:** 'intermediary' rather than 'impartial'.

4. **τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν χωρίων:** but Perdikkas would have replied that Lynkestis was not a region 'about Macedonia', but a part of it, and Arrabaios subordinate to him (ii. 99. 2).

κοινῇ: the natural meaning is 'in common with Perdikkas'; for Brasidas is asserting his right to interfere. But other meanings,

'impartially' (as the adjective, though, as it happens, not the adverb, often means), or 'in common with Arrabaios', or, perhaps best, 'in the common interests of all', are possible.

5. τρέφοντος τὸ ἡμισυ: the Chalkidians presumably supplying the other half (80. 1).

6. τρίτον μέρος: why did he continue to supply any? Brasidas was persuaded by Arrabaios' promises; which will then have included an agreement that Arrabaios would not do anything that would injure the joint plans of Perdikkas and himself, and in particular not take any hostile steps against Perdikkas—terms in fact rather favourable to the latter, as perhaps he had grudgingly to admit.

But the last has not been heard of Arrabaios: c. 124.

84. 1. Ἀκανθον: on the north-eastern shore of the isthmus which connects Akte with the mainland, near the north-east end of Xerxes' canal; the modern Ierissó, the terminus of the road from Salonika, is on or near its site (Leake, iii. 148). See Hdt. vii. 22. 2; Strabo vii, fr. 35 (who places it on the south-western shore of the isthmus—doubtless its territory later stretched across it); Ps.-Skylax, 66. Cf. Munro, J.H.S. xvi, 1896, 313 (an inscribed boundary stone of the city found in Ierissó); A.T.L. i. 467. Akanthos had paid 3 tal. tribute until 428 (perhaps 5 tal. before 445); its subsequent payments and assessments are unknown. Cf. v. 18. 5.

Thucydides does not explain what reasons, political or strategic, made Brasidas approach Akanthos before other cities in Chalkidike: probably the need for a base on the Strymonian Gulf, with a view to his attack on Amphipolis. But why does Thucydides tell us nothing? He is often, in the speeches, ready to generalize; in some cases, as for Amphipolis, he gives some of the strategic factors; but elsewhere, as here, his statement is as bare as the barest annals.

δλίγον πρὸ τρυγήτου: about the middle to the end of August, if Thucydides is thinking of vintage time (September) in the northern Aegean lands. But, as Classen points out, this is not intended as an exact date, but as a circumstance of Brasidas' action which affected the result. See ii. 4. 2 n.

2. ὁ δῆμος: Thucydides implies that the majority of the people, not merely the leaders of a 'democratic' party, sided with Athens. Cf. γι. 1 n., 88. 1; and ii. 8. 4–5 n.

ώς Λακεδαιμόνιος: see 17. 2 n.

85–87. *Speech of Brasidas.*

85. 1. προείπομεν: ii. 8. 4.

2. ἐπήλθομεν: cf. ἐπίω, § 6.

ἄνευ τοῦ ὑμετέρου κινδύνου: a clever touch.

4. καὶ πρὸν ἔργῳ ἀφικέσθαι, τῇ γοῦν γνώμῃ ηξεῖν: ἐλπίσαντες τὴν παρουσίαν ἡμῶν ἀσμένοις ὑμᾶν ἔσεσθαι, οὓς γε, καὶ πρὸν ἀφικέσθαι, τῇ γοῦν προαιρέσει φίλους εἶναι, ηξεῖν τε ὅπότε βουλούμεθα [ιττὸ διναίμεθα] ὡς παρὰ φίλους ἀφικέσθαι—schol. ‘We thought we should arrive to find you already allies in spirit even before our actual appearance’; as Hobbes puts it, “we imagined that we went to such Confederates, as before we came, had us present in their hearts, and were desirous of our coming”. But the difficulty of this sentence does not seem to have been appreciated by edd. This is that ἔργῳ and γνώμῃ would naturally refer to the same subject—this apart from the difficulty of supposing that in such a sentence as τῇ γνώμῃ ηξεῖν the γνώμῃ can belong to someone other than the subject of the verb. That is, we expect either ‘we Spartans were here in spirit before we arrived (so late) in person’; or ‘we thought that you would be already our allies in spirit before you were in a position to act’. Yet we have neither of these. If, on the other hand, the essential meaning is, ‘we expected you to be on our side even before our arrival’, that would be καὶ πρὸν αὐτοὶ ἔργῳ ἀφικέσθαι, παρ’ ὑμᾶς τῇ γοῦν γνώμῃ ξυμμάχους ηδη ὄντας ηξεῖν. If our text is sound, Thucydides is quite remarkably obscure in expression.

I agree with Steup that τε after οἰόμενοι is difficult (though certainly not to be changed to γε), not only because of its displacement, but because παρὰ ξυμμάχους ηξεῖν has no need of τε to combine it with καὶ βουλούμενοι ἔσεσθαι. The retention of τε after κίνδυνον and the consequent alteration to παρεχόμεθα are unsatisfactory for a similar reason. I suspect that τε --- τε correspond to each other—so the rhythm of the sentence, though perhaps not the logic, suggests—and that if we must emend, we should read ἀνερρίψαντες and assume the loss of a principal verb with the meaning ἀφίγμεθα. This is, in general, Arnold’s explanation; but he thinks that ἀνερρίψαμεν can stand, with anacoluthon. This is very doubtful. In any case the two participles ιόντες and παρεχόμενοι are combined by καὶ, both dependent on ἀνερρίψαμεν.

It is worth while to read Grote (v. 319–21) on the surprise of Brasidas in not finding the oppressed subjects of Athens enthusiastic for the liberator. See also below, 88. 2 n.

πᾶν τὸ πρόθυμον: Brasidas exaggerates not his own enthusiasm, which was very un-Spartan, but certainly that of Sparta (108. 7).

Momigliano, in an interesting note on Greek ideas of sea-power, C.R. Iviii, 1944, 1–7, says that this section is a “rejoinder to Ps.-Xen. 2. 5”, a pamphlet which Thucydides “probably knew”, and that the arguments of Perikles in ii. 60–64 may be directed against it. Apart from the question of the date of the pamphlet, it is clear to me that Perikles, as in i. 143, is referring to questions commonly debated in Athens (and strongly felt as well in 430), and so known also to the

pamphleteer; and that this present passage is not a rejoinder to anyone but those who said that Sparta had been a little slow in coming to the aid of the cities which it was her declared policy to liberate.

6. οὐ μόνον ὅτι: Stahl's *οὐχ ὅτι* is surely right.

οἰς ἀν ἐπίω: ἐπιέναι used without, apparently, hostile intent (as in i. 36. 3), like ἐπὶ οὐς --- ἥλθον below and ἐπῆλθομεν, § 2 above, but, strangely, unlike ἦν ἐπίωσι at the end of this section. See 87. 6 n.

πρῶτον: I think Herwerden's *πρώτους* is necessary (cf. the discrepancy in the MSS. reading at i. 53. 2, and the papyrus reading at iv. 87. 6), unless the meaning is 'my first action is to approach you', and we read *〈τὸ〉 πρῶτον*.

καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ ἔξω πιστὴν ἀποδεικνύναι: Steup and Hude adopt Sauppe's suggestion οὐ δόξω (cf. schol., ἀλλ' ἡ προφασίζεσθαι δόξω ἐλευθεροῦν ἐπαγγελόμενος, κ.τ.λ.) in order to make the construction of ἐπιφέρειν and ἀφίχθαι easier; and they explain the *αἰτία*, with the scholiast, as the cause of Brasidas' expedition, not of his rejection by Akanthos. This is very improbable.

ἀδικον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπιφέρειν: 'that the freedom I bring is a false freedom', as explained by most edd., with a reference to 86. 3–87. 1. I believe, however, that the alternative, 'that it is wrong to bring freedom', is better. Cf. 87. 3–4. The word *ἐπιφέρειν* is several times repeated in this speech (86. 4, 87. 2, 5); see n. on 87. 6.

7. στρατιῷ γε τῇδ' ἦν νῦν ἔχω --- πλέονες ὄντες: neither statement is true, as Thucydides notes later, 108. 5; for Brasidas' forces here and at Megara were not the same, and at Megara had outnumbered the Athenians (67. 1–2, 68. 5, 72. 2, 74. 1, 84. 1). Moreover, he himself had on that occasion refused to engage, just as the Athenians did.

νηῆτῃ γε αὐτούς, κ.τ.λ.: the general meaning is clear, but the text can hardly stand: not only does it require that *στρατῷ* be taken with *νηῆτῃ*, and so be separated from *τῷ ἐν Νισαΐᾳ*, but *νηῆτῃ στρατῷ πλῆθος ἀποστεῖλαι* is not idiomatic Greek (cf. vii. 42. 2). Hude's simple emendation *νηῆτην* cures both ills. His preference for E's reading, *τῷ ἐκεῖ στρατῷ* is also justifiable; *ἐν Νισαΐᾳ* as an explanation of *ἐκεῖ* (immediately after *ἐν N.* above) is of the kind of marginal comment of which there are hundreds of examples in the Thucydides scholia.

Arnold noted that the logic of this *ῳστε*-clause is obscure: "so that you cannot suppose that now, when they must come by sea, they will send against you such a force as they did then against me; and if not, we know that they will not venture to meddle with us". These last words, which are the real conclusion meant by the *ῳστε*, are left to be supplied by the reader [the listener?]; and what is in fact only an additional consideration, from which the conclusion follows, is put as if it were itself the main thing to be proved." He compared

v. 14. 4. Steup thinks that some such words as *καὶ προσέτι χρημάτων δαπάνη ἐφθάραται* have dropped out before *ώστε*.

86. 1. οὐχ ἵνα ἔνταξις ὑμᾶς ἔχωμεν: in spite of *παρὰ ἔνταξις* *ῆξεν* in 85. 4. Here the meaning is apparently 'not in order to have you fighting in our ranks'; but we have just had *προσαγάγωμαι ἔνταξις*, and *ἔνταξις* is to follow immediately. Brasidas adopts a rather different tone later, at Skione, 120. 3, and before the second battle of Amphipolis, v. 9. 9.

2. οὐκουν ἀξιῶ, κ.τ.λ.: besides accepting Reiske's *γε* for *τε* after *πίστεις*, edd. have either altered the second *οὐτε* to *οὐδέ*, with the effect of combining *οὐτ' αὐτός* with *προσχωρεῖν τε*, or altered this *τε* to *δέ*, marking it as the positive complement of the previous negatives. The former is the neater; but no alteration other than Reiske's seems necessary.

3. *πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω*: Brasidas lays especial stress on this promise not to interfere in the constitution of the state, and especially not to install an oligarchy of partisans of Sparta. This is precisely what had been done, without his doing anything to prevent it, at Megara; and had the Akanthians heard of that, their suspicions would have been more lively.

4. οὐδὲ ἂν σαφῆ: Bauer's conjecture, which requires *σαφῆ* to mean, in effect, *βέβαιον*, is not entirely satisfactory; and the alternative reading, *ἀσφαλῆ* (recc. et *γρ. f.*), deserves consideration.

5. *ἔχθιονα - - - κατακτώμενοι*: a bold phrase, 'obtaining as the prize of victory' *ἐγκλήματα ἔχθιονα*; used ironically and for the sake of the rhetorical assonance.

6–87. 1. ἀπάτη γάρ εὔπρεπεῖ, κ.τ.λ.: not only is the manner of expression elaborated and rhetorical (note as well the two rare words *περιωπήν* and *ἀναθρούμενα*: cf. Dion. Hal., *Ep. ad Amm.* ii. 3, p. 793), but the idea too is more Athenian than Spartan—Thucydidean–Athenian, that is (cf. i. 76–77). Perhaps intentionally, for we have here the first successful instance of Sparta playing the Athenian role of liberator—Athens from Persian oppression, Sparta from Athenian—and we know that the liberator became in turn the oppressor (i. 77. 6). Cf. n. on 87. 6, below. For the simple defence of the use of superior strength, cf. Hdt. vii. 9 a 2 (*δυνάμει προσκτᾶσθαι βουλόμενοι*).

2. μὴ κακούμενοι διωθεῖσθαι: i.e. 'that you can reject us without being treated as an enemy'.

μάρτυρας μὲν θεούς, κ.τ.λ.: cf. ii. 74. 2, another solemn invocation of the gods of a threatened city, to introduce the threat (below, p. 556), by a Spartan and one of the best of the Spartans, when his action did indeed require some defence.

ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ήκων οὐ πείθω: the very voice of empire-builders, and of invaders of neutral countries (in a good cause always). But why did not Brasidas simply say ‘you are not neutral, but an ally of Athens (whether you like it or not)?’ There is, indeed, a close similarity between the attitude of Archidamos before Plataia and Brasidas here; and the elaborate excuses made by both for what would seem to us to be ordinary operations of war are interesting examples of Greek thought.

3. τῶν μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων: note that of the two compelling reasons, the interests of Sparta come first.

τῷ ύμετέρῳ εὖνῳ: ‘your good will, towards us’, referring to εὖνοι ὄντες above. So all edd. and they are probably right; but the meaning may be ‘lest Sparta, through her good will towards you, be injured by your contributions of tribute to Athens’. Ordinarily, this would be easier; and Sparta would not actually be injured by any good will which the Athenian allies might feel for her.

4. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰκότως γε, κ.τ.λ.: “and this second necessity for my doing as I am doing—the necessity of not allowing you to hinder the common deliverance of the Greeks—is that which actuates me most of all. For otherwise, certainly, we could with no good grace be thus dealing with you; nor is it the duty of the Lacedaemonians to force freedom upon any, were it not on account of some common good. And again, as we are not striving after dominion”, etc. So Arnold; and most edd. take the passage this way, some reading Dobree’s τάδ’ ἐπράσσομεν; which is certainly easier. It requires a full stop after ἐλευθεροῦν (so Arnold), and, preferably, only a colon before οὐ γὰρ δὴ; but even so the meaning is unsatisfactory, and the connexion of thought with the next sentence, οὐδ’ αὐτὸν ἀρχῆς, κ.τ.λ., difficult. I incline towards the interpretation: ‘for, surely, it would be quite wrong for us to do this—namely, *leave you alone*—and we are under no obligation to refrain from setting free, in the common cause, states which do not wish for freedom.’ *⟨καὶ⟩ τὸν μὴ βουλομένους* would make this meaning clearer. See Denniston, 243, 151.

6. πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθε εὖ: in a different tone the Corinthians had urged Sparta, in 432 B.C., πρὸς τάδε βουλεύεσθε εὖ, i. 71. 7; and on the same occasion the Athenians had advised, βουλεύεσθε οὖν βραδέως, i. 78. 1. Now it is Sparta’s turn; and it is a threat, or rather a half-threat, in transition from the plain speaking of §§ 3-4 to the more encouraging words that follow.

τά τε ίδια μὴ βλαφθῆναι: referring to the threatened laying waste of their farms (Classen). But also to the promise that individuals would not suffer for political reasons (86. 3).

I have noted above the use of ἐπιέναι in the sense ‘come to the aid of’ and the repetition of ἐπιφέρειν (85. 6) in this speech. Except here,

vii. 78. 1 (where it means 'approach') and perhaps ii. 49. 3, where it may mean 'follow on', and the three or four instances of the type *τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτός*, *ἐπιέναι* has always—i.e. in some seventy-five cases—in Thucydides its normal meaning, 'to attack', to approach, that is, with hostile intent. *ἔφοδος*, *ἐπίπλους* are similarly used.¹ The clearest case is perhaps v. 9. 8, *τὸ ἐπὶὸν ὕστερον*, where *ὕστερον* must be added because *ἐπὶὸν* means only 'attack', not 'come after'. (Curiously, *ἐπέρχομαι* and *ἐπῆλθον* have no such preponderance of meaning: of the seventy or so cases of present indicative and aorist in Thucydides, not more than half mean 'attack'; the rest mean 'go on, or over', 'arrive', 'approach', 'come upon', or 'follow on', with three or four instances of 'come to the aid of'.) Similarly with *ἐπιφέρειν* (in its transitive use): apart from three or four instances of its literal meaning, 'bringing to' or 'adding to', and the idiomatic uses in iii. 82. 3 and viii. 83. 3, everywhere else in Thucydides it means to 'bring' something to someone which he will not like, 'inflict', 'impose' (*ὅπλα, φόγον, αἰτίαν, δουλείαν, κ.τ.λ.*; vi. 76. 3 is characteristic), like Plato's *δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμποντα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαίρεσις* (*Kriton*, 46 C); only here, to bring what the receiver would like.² Compare with this esp. vii. 55. 2, Thucydides' explanation of the Athenian failure against Syracuse: *πόλεσι γάρ ταύταις μόναις ἥδη ὅμοιοτρόποις ἐπελθόντες δημοκρατοῦμέναις ---, οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπενεγκεῖν οὔτ’ ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς, ὡς προσήγοντο ἄν, κ.τ.λ.* I believe the use of *ἐπιέναι* and of *ἐπιφέρειν* (four times) in this speech is deliberate: the speech promises fair, but it is a veiled threat. The 'march to the aid of Akanthos' was also a march against it. Freedom was not only offered; it would be imposed, if refused. Not till 87. 2 does the threat appear near the surface; but it had been underlying the whole speech. Cf. the words of Archidamos to Plataea, *ἐπὶ γῆν τήνδε ἥλθομεν*, ii. 74. 2 (above, 87. 2 n.). Certainly Brasidas showed himself οὐκ ἀδύνατος εἰπεῖν on this occasion. (*τοσαῦτα εἰπεν*, in fact, 'so much and no more', which would suit Sthenelaïdas better, hardly does justice either to the length or to the cunning of the speech.) Note, too, the later implication, in the speech at Skione, that the Akanthians had shown no courage: 120. 3 n.

88. 1. ἐπαγωγά: in 108. 5 his words are described as *ἔφολκὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ ὄντα*.

¹ *ἔφοδος* twice (i. 6. 1, v. 35. 8) means a more or less friendly approach, and once is quite neutral (iv. 8. 1) (out of 21 instances), *ἐπίπλους* once (viii. 102. 2, out of 28 cases). *ἐπιπλεῖν*, except when it is used of a commander 'on board', in every case but one (i. 59. 2) means 'attack'.

² There are of course instances in other writers of *ἐπιφέρειν* meaning 'to bring something pleasant': Homer's *ἐπὶ ήρα φέρειν*, and Pindar, *Ol.* i. 31, *ἐπιφέροισα τημάν*; and ὁ *ἐπιών* may have a different meaning (Jebb on *O.T.* 393).

2. Στάγειρος: the site is not accurately known, except that it was north of Akanthos and south or south-east of Bormiskos. It had a small harbour, and an island opposite: Hdt. vii. 155. 2; Strabo vii, fr. 33–35; Leake, iii. 165–7; Struck, *Makedonische Fahrten*: i. *Chalkidike* (1907), 70–73; A.T.L. i. 550. Recently T. J. Cadoux has made journeys in this district, and in a valuable paper, which is not yet published but which he has kindly allowed me to see, has located it on the coast north-west of C. Elefthéra, about half-way between the cape and Bormiskos, at a spot called Vína; for here only is there a harbour (if it can be called a harbour) with an islet opposite, called *Kápprou λιμήν* on the Greek staff map.

It paid 1,000 dr. tribute regularly down to 429; we know nothing of its subsequent payments or assessments. Cf. v. 18. 5.

“There are few acts in history”, says Grote (v. 318), “wherein Grecian political reason and morality appear to greater advantage than in this proceeding of the Akanthians. The habit of fair, free, and pacific discussion—the established respect to the vote of the majority—the care to protect individual independence of judgement by secret suffrage—the deliberate estimate of reasons on both sides by each individual citizen—all these main laws and conditions of healthy political action appear as part of the confirmed character of the Akanthians. We shall not find Brasidas entering other towns in a way so creditable or so harmonious.” And he goes on to point out that in most of the subject cities the majority was for Athens even at this time so soon after the doubling or trebling of the tribute (which may indeed have hurt only the rich); and that even when Brasidas was in the neighbourhood with his army, none but Argilos and Skione seized the opportunity to revolt at once and spontaneously, though Athenian garrisons were few and small. Grote’s picture is doubtless rose-coloured (“the deliberate estimate of reasons on both sides by each individual citizen”: especially in the face of Brasidas’ threats); but it is in essentials true and important, both for Greek political history in general and for the story of the Athenian empire. For “the habit of fair, free, and pacific discussion” was truly Greek, and had not been suppressed nor had decayed through disuse in the days of Athenian power; and, perhaps most noteworthy of all, Thucydides takes such political conduct for granted: it is the natural assumption, unselfconscious and unemphatic, of democratic methods which impresses, like the similar assumption in the conduct of the Ten Thousand after Kounaxa (the mobile πόλις, as W. M. Calder named it—*Proc. Class. Ass.* xl ix. 8). On the other side we may remember Aristophanes’ line, *καὶ τοὺς δῆμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δείξας ὡς δημοκρατοῦνται* (*Ach.* 642), ‘what sort of democracies they are’ (i.e., I think, how the peoples are gulled by their popular leaders;

certainly not 'how they are governed by your democracy', as Rennie, ad loc., suggests).

89-101. *The Campaign of Delion*

89. 1. τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου: that is, about the beginning of November (see Appendix); Demosthenes will have left Athens (76. 1) some three months earlier (Busolt, iii. 1141, 1145).

τῷ Ἰπποκράτει, κ.τ.λ.: resumed from 76-77.

Ἀκαρνᾶνας - - - ξυμμάχων: see 77. 1, 101. 3.

μηνυθέντος τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύματος: since Demosthenes arrived at his destination before Hippocrates, it would seem that the principal cause of the failure of the campaign was the leakage of information as much as the mistiming of one of the two invasions (§ 2, οὐ γάρ πω 'Ι. παρελύπει ἐν τῇ γῇ ὅν). Thucydides does not say as simply as he might that there were two causes.

ὑπὸ Νικομάχου, κ.τ.λ.: Thucydides was now in Thrace, and it is generally supposed that he did not return to Athens after the fall of Amphipolis. He may, however, have come back and stood his trial. He certainly collected full and detailed information about this campaign from both sides: cf., e.g., 90. 3, 96. 1.

Φωκέως ἐκ Φανοτέως: cf. 76. 3.

2. καὶ ἡ Χαιρώνεια: see 76. 3.

90. 1. πανδημεῖ, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν: edd. have noticed that this *levée en masse* is the first known occasion on which non-resident foreigners were mobilized. It was also the first important occasion on which the *metoikoi* were used for foreign service: their proper place, among the military forces, was garrison duty at home (ii. 13. 7), and the parade in the Megarid (ii. 31. 2) was hardly an exception even if they took part in it every year, which is doubtful (above, p. 36, with n. 1). There is no doubt to my mind that the ξένοι, like the large numbers of ψυλοί, were mobilized only for the rapid building of the wall round Delion, not at all for fighting. See below, on τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον, § 4.

ὕστερος ἀφικνεῖται: Thucydides does not tell us whether Hippocrates, or the Athenian authorities at home, already knew of Demosthenes' failure, and yet persisted in the attempt to stimulate political quarrels in Boeotia and so to gain control, though the chief prerequisite to success was wanting. If we remember that Demosthenes in the Corinthian Gulf would have had difficulties in communicating with Athens by any route shorter than that round the Peloponnese, we would suppose that no news had yet reached Athens from him; just as 101. 3 suggests that Demosthenes had not then heard of the defeat of his colleague.

ἥδη τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀνακεχωρηκότων: leaving of course a garrison at Siphai, a small one doubtless, but large enough in the conditions of Greek siege warfare (vol. i, pp. 16–19) to keep Demosthenes at bay. The latter could not even make raids from his ships to much purpose, for he now had no nearby base.

τοιῷδε τρόπῳ: Thucydides' interest in the technical aspects of warfare is again apparent; see also c. 100 below. The method of building this wall is substantially the same as that of the mound built by the Peloponnesians against the walls of Plataia, and of the Plataian counter-wall (ii. 75. 2, 5), and indeed of the Peloponnesian wall there, though more hasty and far less elaborated.

2. ἀντὶ τείχους τὸν χοῦν: cf. ii. 78. 1, n. on *ἐπλυνθεύσαντο*.

σταυρούς: reasonably stout timber; perhaps some of it stakes from the vineyards (*χάρακες*, iii. 70. 4), perhaps some from buildings. Its purpose was to hold the mud wall together, and to enable the builders to reach a good height of wall quickly. The brushwood from vines, the stones, and tiles all serve the end of strengthening the wall. There was enough timber in it to make it inflammable (100. 3–4; cf. ii. 77. 2–6).

πύργους τε ξυλίνους: cf. iii. 21. 3, in the Peloponnesian wall round Plataia.

3. ἡμέρᾳ δὲ ἀρξάμενοι τρίτῃ: they had taken two days on the march; which was a rapid one for so large and so miscellaneous a force. For Delion is about 35 miles from Athens, and the route (the same as that taken by the Peloponnesians on leaving Attica in 431, ii. 23. 3) includes a climb to 2,000 feet and a descent to sea-level again.

4. τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον, κ.τ.λ: the military situation was that Delion, supplied with food from Oropos which was firmly in Athenian hands (cf. ii. 23. 3, iv. 99), should form a strong point, an *ἐπιτείχισμα* (i. 142. 3–4 n.), from which harassing raids could be made into Boeotian territory, as later into Attica by the Peloponnesians from Dekelia, and, if possible, support given to revolutionary movements in Boeotian cities (76. 5). For this purpose a garrison would be left in Delion, but the main Athenian army was not needed; it therefore was returning home, and waited only for Hippocrates to join it. It had marched out to prevent the Boeotians from interfering with the occupation and fortification of Delion; it had no intention, if it could help it, of engaging the enemy forces in open combat, and besides hoped that they were distracted. The great mass of the *ψιλοί* were for home anyway, because they had completed the task allotted to them—the *rapid* building of the wall (94. 1). They would only be a hindrance in a battle, if there had to be a battle; and Pagondas saw to it that there should be one. By way of contrast compare the purely conventional picture of light-armed troops in Plutarch, *Phok.* 12. 3.

But why had the Athenians not gone by sea, so that they could withdraw without any fear of interruption? They had sent some triremes there (96. 9, 100. 5) and must have been prepared at least to supply the garrison of Delion by sea if necessary. And if they were to go by land the short distance to Oropos, why did they not go straight there, instead of southwards from Delion in order to save a mile or two of the journey to Athens? It looks as though in this a mistake was made in the original Athenian plans, and another one in Hippocrates' directions to his army—both due to their confidence that the Boeotians could not bring all their forces against them.

Θέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα: see 91, 93. 3 nn.

91. *τῶν --- βοιωταρχῶν, οἵ εἰσιν ἔνδεκα:* cf. Hdt. ix. 15. 1; and see *Hell. Ox.* 11, where the structure of the Boeotian federal state (then more closely knit than in 424) is described. The number of boiotarchai remained the same, and the division of the central boule into four sections and the relations of the boiotarchai with this boule seem not to have changed (see v. 37. 4-5, 38. 2); but the distribution of the eleven parts, each of which chose one boiotarchēs, was different in the fourth century. Then Thebes elected four, two for herself and two for her subordinate territory (Plataia, Erythrai, Skolos, Aulis: *Hell. Ox.* 11. 3, 12. 3), and, as far as we know, she may have done so now—Pagondas and Arianthidas being the two for herself; cf. also ii. 2. 1; but in the early fourth century Orchomenos and Hysiae together elected two, Thespiae with Eutresis and Thisbai two, Tanagra one, Haliartos, Lebadeia, and Koroneia one between them (each in turn), and Akraiphnion, Kopai, and Chaironeia one. This grouping is different from that of 76. 3 above and from what is implied in 93. 3-4 (for each of the eleven parts also sent its own division of troops).

Presidency of the board of boiotarchai changed regularly (*ἡγεμονίας οὐσῆς αὐτοῦ*); but at what intervals, and whether between all the boiotarchs, or only between the two Thebans, is not known. 93. 1, *ἥδη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ὁψὲ ἦν*, is certainly not evidence that it changed daily and that Pagondas must fight that day if the *command* was to be in his hands (see 96. 5); it means that little time was left for battle that day, and they must fight then if they were to catch the Athenians. But we are reminded of Herodotos' account of the strategoi at Marathon.

Παγώνδας ὁ Αἰολάδου: perhaps identical with the Pagondas celebrated in Pindar's Partheneion (fr. 84. 8, O.C.T.), certainly of the same family. If he was the same man, and Agasikles, the *παιᾶς δαφνηφόρος* of the festival, was his son (as seems likely: see Schroeder, and Sandys, Loeb ed.), then Pagondas was at least 40 years old at Pindar's death, and over 60 now. This is not impossible.

μετ' Ἀριανθίδου: another small detail learnt and recorded. (According to Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, 14. 2, the name should be Ἀριανθος—Bourguet, *Inscr. Delph. Syll.* 115: "wieder ein Beleg für die Unzverlässigkeit der Namen in dem Texte des Thukydides." It may be that the name was Arianthos; but this hardly affects the reliability of our MSS.)

κατὰ λόχους: he made, therefore, several speeches, obviously all very much alike, but at any rate all converted into one by Thucydides. Cf. 94. 2.

ὅπως μὴ ἀθρόοι ἐκλίποιεν τὰ ὅπλα: not, as Arnold, because soldiers always attended addresses by their commanding officers unarmed, and there was danger of sudden attack; but because the troops were at the time in order of march, and since Pagondas was urgent for an immediate advance into Oropia (93. 1), he did not want the order disturbed. As Steup observes, τὰ ὅπλα here means not their arms, but their posts. Cf. 93. 3, τεταγμένοι ὡσπερ ἔμελλον.

92. *Speech of Pagondas*

92. 1. μηδ' ἔστι ἐπίνοιάν τινα ἡμῶν ἐλθεῖν: 'it should not have occurred to some of us, as it has'; not quite the same as 'to any of us', which would require μηδένα. For ἔστι ἐπίνοιαν ἐλθεῖν, cf. iii. 46. 6.

2. οὐ γάρ τὸ προμηθέει, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 62. 4; and for this sentiment, differently expressed, Sthenelaïdas' words, i. 86. 4. With ἐνδέχεται λογισμόν, cf. iv. 10. 1, another instance, and a clearer one, where calculation is said not to be an advantage.

4. τὸ ἀντίπαλον: this should, in the context, mean 'readiness to contest with' an invader, rather than 'equality of strength' with him. So Stahl, relying on a marginal note in some late MSS.

ώς αὐτοῖς διάκειται: "quomodo eis res se habeant" (Stahl). I should prefer to punctuate with colons after ἀγώνος ἐλθεῖν and διάκειται, instead of the parenthesis.

εἰς ὄρος οὐκ ἀντίλεκτος: 'there will be no mutual settlement of boundaries, but a single, indisputable boundary, namely that of Attica; for Boeotia will cease to exist'; or, as Wade-Gery would interpret (*Mél. Glotz*, 1932, 881), 'a single stone to record our absorption in Athenian territory, like a ὄρος recording (but not marking the boundary of) mortgaged lands', the ὄροι which Solon removed. Or the use here may be purely figurative (like εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος) and contemptuous, as Lobel, quoted by Wade-Gery, suggests.

5. τὴν παροίκησιν τῶνδε: see n. on i. 142. 3–4, where this passage might have been quoted. Classen compares iii. 113. 6 and the proverb Ἀττικὸς πάροικος, Arist. *Rhet.* ii. 21.

ἀμυνόμενον: the copies of G have ἀμυνούμενον; and Hude accepts ἀμυνουμένους (recc.) for ἀμυνομένους in § 7, below. But the present

in both cases is preferable. (In 93. 3, on the other hand, the future is obviously a proper correction.)

κατέχειν: I agree with those who find this unsatisfactory. It could only mean here 'hold down' (*πολέμω κατέχειν*, i. 103. 4), as Stahl takes it; but we need a word meaning aggression. There is the further difficulty, first noted by Junghahn (*N. Jahrb.* cxix, 1879, 360) and stressed by Steup, that *πεῖραν δὲ ἔχομεν*, κ.τ.λ., does not at all follow logically from what has just been said; for the battle of Koroneia is not a good example to prove the advantage of meeting the enemy before he crosses your border and beginning the fight yourself. It would have been more logical in fact if Pagondas had instanced Oinophyta to show how fatal the opposite policy could be. Steup therefore assumes a lacuna: a possible solution, though that Koroneia was not a good example does not mean that Pagondas was not prepared to assume that it was. He wished to mention a great victory.

6. *ἐν Κορωνείᾳ*: i. 113. In i. 108. 3, in his very brief reference to Oinophyta, Thucydides says nothing to justify Pagondas' *ἡμῶν στασιαζόντων*. That does not prove that Pagondas was lying; on the other hand, it is a convenient fiction for any defeated state.

7. *τούς τε πρεσβυτέρους*: twenty-three years had passed since the battle of Koroneia, and there cannot have been many now present who had fought there, though Pagondas himself may have done (91 n.). It is a conventional rhetorical theme.

τὰς προσηκούσας ἀρετάς: "the virtues which are as it were the heirlooms or *belongings* of the race or family"—Graves; who quotes iii. 64. 4, 67. 2, and Arist. *Rhet.* i. 9. 31.

τοῖς ἱεροῖς: it is rare for Thucydides even to mention what we sometimes call the indispensable preliminaries of a Greek battle; very unlike Xenophon in this. Pagondas must have managed the sacrifice rapidly and cleverly.

δεῖξαι δτι, κ.τ.λ.: the true object of this is the sentence *οἰς δὲ γενναῖον* --- *ἀπίστιν*, the *μέν*-clause being wholly concessive; hence the vivid and apparently unorthodox use of the imperative, *κτάσθων*. *γενναῖον*: *ἥγουν πάτριον καὶ ἀπὸ γένους*, schol.; but it is 'inherited virtue, or valour'.

ἀνανταγώνιστοι --- *οὐκ ἀπίστιν*: a similarly effective close to an argument was used in Hermokrates' speech, 61. 7.

93. 1. *λόφου ὄντος*: see below, p. 567, for this characteristic feature of the land near Delion.

2. *ὄντι περὶ τὸ Δήλιον*: I agree with those who think Rutherford's *<ἔτι>* *ὄντι* necessary. Hippocrates was 10 stades distant from his army at the moment (90. 4).

ὅπως φύλακές τε ἄμα εἰεν: but not the only garrison. See 96. 9, 100. 5. καὶ τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.: had they put in an appearance ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, it might have been decisive; but Pagondas seems to have acted too quickly for them.

3. ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα: this is the decisive passage which proves that the phrase does not mean 'piled their arms' in any fashion (see ii. 2. 4 n.); for clearly the men were all drawn up ready to charge. See Grote, V. 302, n. 2.

ῶσπερ ἔμελλον: with reference to ἔτασσέ τε καὶ παρεσκευάζετο ὡς ἐς μάχην above, § 1. Still, the omission of an infinitive, such as ξυνίεναι (Cobet's suggestion), is strange.

ὅπλιται ἐπτακισχίλιοι μάλιστα --- ἵππῆς: in *Hell. Oxyrh.* II. 4 it is stated that each of the eleven divisions into which the Boeotian confederacy was divided (at the beginning of the fourth century) was due to provide 1,000 hoplites and 100 cavalry. With this in mind P. A. Seymour in *C.R.* xxxvi, 1922, 70 and xxxvii. 63, suggested that the 7,000 hoplites and 500 peltasts at Delion represented two-thirds of the total force from ten divisions (10×666) and the full muster (1,000) from the eleventh in which the campaign was to take place (Tanagra); and he further argued that this was the rule of the confederacy, borrowed in principle from the Peloponnesian League (ii. 10. 2), and had been the rule perhaps since the victory at Koroneia. Hence the Boeotian forces that joined the Peloponnesians in 431 will have been a two-thirds muster (ii. 12. 5; see n. there); and for a campaign within Boeotia the same rule applied with the modification that the division invaded mustered πανοπλιτική. It seems probable that the forces at Delion were in fact about two-thirds of the total hoplite force (and nearly all the cavalry); but it seems unlikely that there should be, in the constitution of the confederacy, so little difference between the muster when Boeotia was invaded and that when the troops were to invade another. On this occasion, too, there must be garrisons left in certain cities where disaffection was strong or suspected to be strong; and these would be unequal in number.

πελτασταί: the first occasion on which peltasts are mentioned as a force in a Greek army. Thracian peltasts had before been employed by Greek states: ii. 79. 4, iv. 28. 4; cf. also iv. 129. 2. Unless, to be strictly accurate, the peltasts from the γῆ Κρονίας and from Ainos were Greek, and part of the city's army, as they may have been.

4. οἱ ξύμμοροι αὐτοῖς: 'united in the same μόρα', as L. and S. explain. But we do not know what a μόρα was in the federal army of Boeotia, or the federal constitution, nor who were thus united (edd. generally suppose those semi-dependent cities which ξυνετέλουν ἐς Θήβας; cf. 76. 3, 91 nn.). This is the only place in which the word is found. Another minute detail in the narrative of this campaign, and probably a technical Boeotian term; cf. ὁμωχέτας, 97. 4.

οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ τὴν λίμνην: 'the others' with reference probably to Kopai only, a small city on the north shore of Lake Kopais; for if Haliartos and Koroneia were reckoned amongst the cities round the lake, so also should Orchomenos, which was much more closely connected with it than either of the other two. 'The other cities' would include Akraiphnion and Hyettos, and perhaps others even smaller (my *Essays*, pp. 30–31). See above, 91, n. on *τῶν βοιωταρχῶν*.

ἐπ' ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι: the first mention of the deep Theban phalanx which was to prove so effective in the fourth century (the Thebans were drawn up 50 deep at Leuktra, Xen. *Hell.* vi. 4. 12) and, in its later form, 16 deep, as adapted by the Macedonians in the third century (Polyb. xviii. 13), till it in its turn succumbed to the more mobile Roman legion. It was the culmination of the Greek hoplite formation and hoplite method of fighting (vol. i, pp. 10–15).

ώς ἔκαστοι ἔτυχον: no element of *chance* here in the use of *τυχεῖν* (above, p. 488); 'in the formation to which each unit was accustomed' is what it means in practice. Even so, the Boeotian army does not seem to have been very well organized into a single whole.

94. 1. ἐπὶ ὅκτω: the normal Greek, including the Spartan, formation. Cf. v. 68. 3, vi. 67. 1.

πᾶν τὸ στρατόπεδον: i.e. the formation was uniform throughout, unlike the Boeotian army, in which the Theban phalanx was differently formed from the other contingents, who may also have differed among themselves (93. 8).

πλήθει ισοπαλεῖς τοῖς ἐναντίοις: for the number here implied, 7,000, in a full muster of the Athenian hoplite force, compared with the 13,000 of ii. 13. 6, which many have found inconsistent, see my article in *C.Q.* xxi, 1927, 149–50, and *Population of Athens*, p. 6.

The number of the cavalry is uncertain. Athens may not have been able to maintain 1,000, and 200 ἵπποτοξόται (ii. 13. 8), after the pestilence.

Steup, not without reason, misses here a reference to the *τοξόται*, an important body 1,600 strong in 431 who were not included among the *ψυλοί*; and suggests a lacuna in the MSS. But we miss altogether in Thucydides, and in other writers, an account of how these Athenian bowmen, including the *ἵπποτοξόται*, which in ii. 13. 8 would seem to be of some importance, were used in battle.

ψυλοί δὲ - - - οὐ παρεγένοντο ὅτι μὴ ὄλιγοι: only a small fraction of the 'light-armed' were, properly speaking, part of the army at all (cf. 90. 4, n. on *τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον*); and ἄοπλοι here means 'unarmed', not 'light-armed' as in 9. 2; though this did not prevent their suffering heavy losses in the Boeotian pursuit (101. 2). Because there was no organized force of light-armed at Athens (the *τοξόται* not counting

among the *ψυλοί*: cf. Stahl on 36. 1), Thucydides does not give numbers for them, e.g. in ii. 13. 7 or iii. 87. 3 or here.

The Athenian army at Delion was considerably outnumbered by the enemy, who had over 10,000 *ψυλοί* and 500 peltasts, even if we include the missing *τοξόται* on the Athenian side.

οὐτε τότε παρῆσαν οὐτε ἐγένοντο τῇ πόλει: Thucydides writes as though he were contradicting a popular misconception (cf. i. 20. 3). Arnold notes here not only that there is no mention of an organized force of *ψυλοί* in ii. 13. 7, but that the few who went to Sicily were not Athenians (vi. 43, vii. 60. 4). As he says, the chief reason for this was doubtless that the majority of the poorer citizens of Athens who might have been drafted into light-armed units served in the navy.

ἄσπλοι τε πολλοί: the majority of edd. adopt Krüger's *⟨οἱ⟩ πολλοί*, which is surely right.

2. *ἐπιπαριών τὸ στρατόπεδον:* like Pagondas (91 ad fin.), Hippocrates made several speeches, here composed into one.

95. *Speech of Hippokrates.*

95.2. *ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ:* contrast 91, *οὐκ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι εἰσί·*

οὐ προσήκοντο: there is an element of self-excuse here and in *ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ὁ ἀγῶν ἔσται*. For Hippocrates had not in fact planned an open battle with all the forces of Boeotia.

οὐ μή ποτε, κ.τ.λ.: it might be thought that Hippocrates would not have used these words after Sphakteria, for already in the early summer of this year it was apparent that the Spartans were heading the Athenian threat to kill their prisoners if Attica were again invaded.

ἀνευ τῆς τῶνδε ἵππου: see ii. 9. 3, 22. 2. Sparta had but recently formed a small cavalry force to deal with raids from the sea (iv. 58. 2).

3. *ἡν ἔκαστος — — ἀγάλλεται:* cf. ii. 63. 1; and ii. 41 for 'the first city in Greece'.

μετὰ Μυρωνίδου ἐν Οίνοφύτοις: i. 108. 3. Cf. vol. i, p. 308.

96. 1. *ἀντεπῆσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι:* this looks like nothing but unintelligent conformity with conventional methods of hoplite fighting (cf. 101. 2 n.); we should expect, that is, the Athenians to have taken up position on a height and waited for the assault with conditions in their favour, like Brasidas at Megara (73. 1). But the Athenians had been wholly surprised by the rapidity of Pagondas' attack; we might suppose that they had already reached the flat land of the Oropian plain, Pagondas making use of the last eminence

in the hill country, but that this does not fit the details of the fighting. See below, pp. 567–8.

2. τὰ ἔσχατα: both *extreme* wings, for most of the Boeotian hoplite force, at least, was engaged, left, centre, and right. It was therefore only the cavalry of the Boeotians, and perhaps a few hoplites, who were prevented by *ρύακες* from being engaged. The light-armed would not have been hindered by *ρύακες*, but should have taken advantage of them against hoplites.

This confining of the battle-area was a disadvantage to the Athenians; who, having about the same number of heavy-armed men on the field, but in shallower formation, must have outflanked the Boeotian hoplites. Hippokrates did nothing to counter this, and seems to have shown as little tactical skill as strategic caution.

ρύακες: for the topography, see below, p. 567. Note that, as usual, even a small stream can upset, or threaten to upset, Greek hoplite ranks.

ἀθισμῷ ἀσπίδων: edd. quote Hdt. vii. 225. 1 (note *συνεστήκεε* there, too), the fighting over Leonidas' body at Thermopylai, and, a clear picture of conventional hoplite fighting, ix. 62. 2; and, for Roman armies, Livy, xxx. 34. 3, *umbone pulsantes*, and Tac. *Hist.* ii. 42, *corporibus et umberibus niti*. But see my *Essays*, p. 135.

3. τῶν παρατεταγμένων: presumably those to their right, the men of Kopai and Koroneia, as well as the Tanagraians and Orchomenians to their left.

κυκλωθέντων — — — *κατεκόπησαν:* *τῶν δὲ κυκλωθέντων τούτων ὅσοι διεφθάρησαν, γενναῖς ἀμυνόμενοι διεφθάρησαν*, is Doukas's explanation, accepted by Stahl and inevitable if the MSS. reading is correct. But no one will call it satisfactory. Of the attempts to improve, Rauchenstein's *διεκρίθησαν* for *διεφθάρησαν* (quoted by Widmann) deserves mention, though *διακρίνομαι* in this sense generally means 'enemies' being separated from each other, not a contingent isolated from its friends. Steup, regarding *διεφθάρησαν* as an explanation of *κατεκόπησαν* which has ousted another verb, and with the description of Thespian losses in 133. 1 in mind, thinks that practically the whole Thespian contingent was destroyed, and would read *παρῆσαν*; this may be on the right lines, but we should require *ὅσοι* for *οἵπερ* and *〈ἄπαντες〉* (or *οἱ πολλοὶ*) *κατεκόπησαν*. There is no doubt that Krüger's *κυκλωθέντες* [*οἵπερ διεφθ. Θ.*] is the easiest reading; and once the participle had been wrongly copied in the genitive, it is possible that *Θεσπῶν* was added to explain it (a necessary explanation) and *οἵπερ δ.* then added as well. Certainly we do not need *Θεσπιῶν* with Steup's conjecture. Perhaps *καὶ κυκλωθέντων 〈αὐτῶν〉 ἐν ὀλίγῳ, ἐν χερσὶν ἀμ. κατεκόπησαν* is a more likely reading than Krüger's.

καὶ τίνες καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων: another small detail, of the many in the account of this battle.

4. πρὸς τὸ μαχόμενον: we expect ἔτι before or after μαχόμενον.
 6. παραρρηγνύντων: either 'breaking their ranks' generally, forcing one man away from his neighbour, or, with Arnold, breaking the advanced right wing and centre away from the left which was forced back. He compares the similar action at Mantinea, v. 73. 1.
 7. οἱ δὲ ὡς ἔκαστοι, κ.τ.λ.: these last no longer in any formation, but scattered groups and individuals.
 8. οἱ Λοκροί: see ii. 9. 3.
 νυκτὸς δὲ ἐπιλαβούσης τὸ ἔργον: it had been a short, though sharp, fight, for the day was far spent before the armies engaged (93. 1).

97. 1. σκυλεύσαντες: according to Diodoros, xii. 70. 5 (below, p. 568), so great was this booty that the Thebans built 'the great stoa in the agora' from it and adorned it with statues. They also instituted a Delian πανήγυρις. It is difficult to guess what rich things the Athenians had taken with them for a very brief campaign.

Toponography of the battle

The site of the battle cannot be accurately determined: it was about 10 stades from Delion (90. 4) and on the borders of Oropia and Boeotia (91, 99), which should be sufficiently precise, but neither the site of the shrine (76. 4 n.) nor the line of the border is known to us. But it should be, not on the coast road between Delion and Oropos, for in that case the Athenians would have been cut off from Delion (96. 7), but to the south of the shrine: the Athenians were making for the main road which led, from Tanagra, over the shoulder of Mt. Parnes, the road by which they had come. Here there is hilly country exactly of the kind that Thucydides describes: not high, nor too steep or too rugged for hoplite fighting, with ridges long enough between the valleys to hold the battle-line (7,000 hoplites, in eight ranks, would need little more than a kilometre breadth, and the Athenians could not use all their troops: 94. 1, 96. 2 n.), but steep enough to conceal an enemy (93. 1, 96. 5), and with some narrow gullies, *ρύακες*, which would hinder hoplites and stop cavalry (96. 2). It is the kind of country of which there is not much in Greece, hills covered with soil, here cultivated or good grazing land, there covered with pines. The *ρύακες* would probably have water in them in November (89. 1). Thucydides' description, that is to say, is accurate, only just not precise enough for exact determination of the site, because he was not present at the battle and may well have never seen the country. See Busolt, iii. 1147. 1; Kromayer, iv. 178–84; *Karten v. Attika*, Textband, 9, 16.

Delion is one of the battles about which we have details of some of the Athenian participants: Sokrates, Laches (both of them 45 years old or nearly), Alkibiades (in the cavalry on this occasion)—

Plat. *Apol.* 28 E, *Laches*, 181 A, *Symp.* 221 A; Plut. *Alkib.* 7. 6 (from Plato); Pyrilampes wounded and saved by Sokrates—Plut. *de gen. Socr.* II (*Mor.* 581; cf. Cicero, *de Div.* i. 54); Xenophon, according to Strabo, ix. 2. 7, p. 403. Athenaios, v. 215 C, professes to be sceptical about Sokrates' courage and even about his presence at this and other battles, relying on the silence of Thucydides. Further, as Grote observes, v. p. 311, Sokrates was "exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanes was exposing him to derision in the comedy of the 'Clouds', as a dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable". Ameipsias' *Konnos* was produced in the same year, and was not, apparently, more flattering (fr. 9).

Diodorus' account, xii. 69–70, follows Thucydides in its arrangement, with few errors and less confusion than is usual with him; but the two details which he adds, a cavalry fight at the beginning of the battle, brilliantly won by the Athenians, and the 300 ἐπίλεκτοι, called ἡνίοχοι καὶ παραβάται in Homeric fashion, who fought in front of the hoplite phalanx, do not deserve to be believed.

3. πάντα γίγνεσθαι: Stahl compares *πάντα ποιούντων* in vii. 87. 2 (the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse).

4. ὁμωχέτας: something like ὁμοβωμίους, iii. 59. 2, where the Plataians are speaking. *Βοιωτικὴ ἡ λέξις*, Souidas. The word does not occur elsewhere in extant Greek literature.

98. 1. ἀδικήσαι - - - βλάψειν: "the distinction between the words ἀδικεῖν and βλάπτειν, so familiar to the readers of Aristotle's Ethics, is here strictly observed. The Athenians had done no *injury* to the temple; for there can be no injury where men are not the aggressors, but are merely repelling wrong offered to themselves: and what *harm* they might do to the temple would be wholly involuntary, because it was necessity which compelled them to apply sacred things to profane uses" (Arnold). Stahl, on the other hand, wrote: "discrimen non tam in verbis ἀδικεῖν et βλάπτειν quam in temporibus inesse nobis videtur." The latter would be in accordance with Thucydides' normal style; but in the highly sophistical (and unnecessarily long-drawn-out) argument that follows, there is point in the distinction explained by Arnold.

2. οἷς ἀν πρὸς τοῖς εἰωθόσι: Stahl's *πρὸ τοῦ* for *πρὸς τοῖς*, adopted by Hude and Steup, seems necessary.

3. καὶ γὰρ Βοιωτούς, κ.τ.λ.: i. 12. 3.

4. καὶ αὐτοί, κ.τ.λ.: this does not follow § 3 with strict logic, which requires, 'this law, namely that the conqueror becomes the owner of the temples too, would have applied to us'. To say, 'if we had been

able to conquer more, we should be holding on to it', is not to the point here. The second part of the sentence, however, *νῦν δὲ --- οὐκ ἀπέναι*, suits the text well enough.

5. *ἀλλ' ἔκείνους προτέρους --- ἀμυνόμενοι*: as Steup points out (unnecessarily, one would have thought), *ἐπὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐλθόντας* does not refer to the impending attack on the sanctuary at Delion; it refers to the whole war, and is an assertion that the other side is the aggressor. We have here a good example of the stock argument (as used by cultured peoples) to justify any breaking of the rules of war. Thucydides is curiously interested in this sophistical stuff; note especially the Boeotian answer in c. 99.

6. *πᾶν δ' εἰκός, κ.τ.λ.*: with the reading *τὸ - - - κατειργόμενον* we must translate, with Stahl, "consentaneum autem esse, ut, quidquid bello et periculo aliquo expressum ... fieret, venia aliqua dignum esset etiam dei existimatione"; where the unexampled non-personal use of *κατείργεσθαι* is to be noted. If we read *τῷ - - - κατειργομένῳ*, we translate: "omnino autem consentaneum esse eis, qui bello atque aliquo periculo premantur, veniam contingere etiam a deo"; where *κατείργεσθαι* has its normal usage, but *ξύγγνωμόν τι γίγνεσθαι* (cf. iii. 40. 1) is for *ξύγγνώμην γίγνεσθαι*, and we have the awkward separation of *τῷ* from *πολέμῳ*. Steup, who starts with the opinion that *ὁ θεός* is Apollo of Delion and none other (cf. 92. 7), and that, therefore, this is not a generalization about all actions in war-time, but the particular actions of the Athenians at Delion (*πᾶν - - - γίγνεσθαι* to be related to *πάντα γίγνεσθαι*, 97. 3), would read *τῷ πολέμῳ - - - κατειργομένῳ*. This leaves us with the awkward combination *τῷ πολέμῳ* ('the fighting here') and *δεινῷ τωί*. I do not doubt that the best of these three readings is the first; such a use of a passive verb of a man's actions rather than of himself is in Thucydides' manner.

ἀκουσίων: Steup, following Krüger and Herwerden, argues that a decided preference is to be given to what was claimed to be the reading of ABFM, *ἐκουσίων* (B, *ἐκουσίων*), both in logic and because altars were the refuge for much more than unwilling crimes (Eur. *Ion*, 1312 ff.). It is obvious that either word will suit the context here; and Stuart Jones and Powell silently contradict any variation in the MSS.

παρανομίαν τε ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀνάγκῃ κακοῖς ὄνομασθῆναι: cf. Kleon's arguments, iii. 39. 2, which equally belong to the sophistic of the day.

7. *τὰ πρέποντα*: there is no reason for altering this, the reading of all our best MSS., to *τὰ μὴ πρέποντα* of the schol. 'To barter a sanctuary to get back what is proper anyhow to get back' makes rather better sense than 'to get back, at the price of a sanctuary, what it is not proper so to get back'.

8. σπένδουσιν: Rutherford defends the active as a particularly nice and accurate use to describe the part taken by one side only in such an agreement: each side *σπένδει*, together they *σπένδονται*; and the Boeotians could 'clearly announce' to the Athenians only what the latter should do. Yet this must be wrong; for the clear announcement must include a statement or an implication that the Boeotians will on their side observe the truce (cf. *ἐσπένδοντο*, 99). One can only say that the MSS. reading is an anomaly (unnoticed by any scholiast) for *σπενδομένοις*.

99. εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν: "finding that the Athenians had answered their charge of sacrilege . . . , they (the Boeotians) now varied their ground, and tried to evade the Athenian request in this manner: 'If, as you say, you are not in our country, but in your own, then you can bury your dead without asking permission of us: but if you are in our country, then first go out of it, and afterwards you shall have your dead.' The Boeotians knew all the time that this was merely vexatious; for the Athenians could not bury their dead without their leave, whether the ground which they occupied belonged to Attica or Boeotia"—Arnold. This is true; the Boeotians were wholly in the wrong according to the universal Greek custom (contrast the behaviour of Brasidas at Torone, 114. 2); but it is not the whole truth. The point of the Boeotian reply lay in its reference to the Athenian claim to Delion as a *permanent* conquest, and hence the reversion of the sanctuary to their care; after the battle this must have seemed to the Boeotians an impudent claim, and they answer, 'if you are *masters* of this territory which you have won by the sword, come and get your dead' (see Grote, v, p. 308, with n. 2). The dishonesty of this lay simply in the fact that the field of battle was not Delion. They admit in fact that the field of battle is Athenian territory, *κατὰ τὸ ὑπῆκοον*.

It is difficult to see the logic of the sentence, *τὴν μὲν Ὀρωπίαν --- βίᾳ σφῶν κρατήσαι*, whether it is concessive or substantive. It would appear to be concessive: 'though they admitted that Oropia was Attic, yet their answer, "depart from *our* country" was a good one', because it referred to Delion; but that leaves *καὶ οὐκ ἀν --- κρατήσαι* in the air. Classen may be right in explaining this concessive to mean that, if the Boeotians laid claim to the strip of Oropia they now held, as theirs by right of conquest, this would concede the same right to the Athenians at Delion; but it is a thin argument. We expect *οὐ μέντοι ἀν αὐτοὺς βίᾳ σφῶν κρατήσαι αὐτῶν*.

οὐδ' αὖ ἐσπένδοντο, κ.τ.λ.: presumably a comment by Thucydides himself—"nor were they, of course, negotiating about *Attic* territory". The Boeotians pretended that they were not interested in changes of frontier.

Thucydides' insertion of this long dispute, his insistence on this argument of words, was due to his feeling that the Boeotian refusal to allow the Athenians to collect their dead was another evil resulting from war (no matter whether the war was being fought for a good or a bad cause), an abandonment of one of the recognized, and humane, usages of Greece.

100. 1. ἐκ τε τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου: it is remarkable that the Boeotians, who had over 10,000 light-armed at Delion, should have needed these reinforcements. That they should need 2,000 and more additional *hoplites* for the overcoming of a small and dispirited garrison behind a wall was only in accordance with the usual practice in siege-warfare (vol. i, pp. 16–18). The wall was in fact captured practically without the aid of hoplites; and the overwhelming force was unable to prevent the escape of the greater part of the garrison.

μηχανὴν — τοιάνδε: again we have Thucydides' interest in the technical side of warfare, here in the account of an action itself of minor importance. For the detail, compare the failure of a more primitive attempt at Plataia: ii. 77. 3–6.

3. τῇ ἀμπέλῳ καὶ τοῖς ξύλοις: 90. 2.

5. διακόσιοι δὲ ἐλήφθησαν: the Boeotians still held Athenian prisoners after the Peace of 421 B.C., v. 35. 5, who were presumably from Delion.

τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸ πλῆθος: see 93. 2 n., 96. 7, 9. For the ships which rescued them, cf. 96. 9.

101. 1. ἐπτακαιδεκάτη ἡμέρᾳ: because of the long delay in the burying of the dead, this figure has been doubted; but unjustifiably.

2. ἀπέθανον δὲ Βοιωτῶν μέν, κ.τ.λ.: for the Thespians among them, who lost heavily (96. 3), see I.G. vii. 1588.

Ἀθηναίων δὲ δλίγω ἐλάσσους χιλίων: an enterprise which had been begun with such fine plans and great hopes had ended in a very heavy defeat.

ψυλῶν δὲ καὶ σκευοφόρων: since only a small number of them were present at the battle (90. 4, 94. 1), Bloomfield was doubtless right in supposing that the Boeotian cavalry followed up after the battle, and attacked the unarmed masses.

The official monument to the dead was still standing in Pausanias' day (i. 29. 13).

Not long after the battle, in the same year 424–423, the Athenians honoured, with the usual privileges, those Boeotians, now in exile at Athens, who had aided them in their plans to subvert the established constitutions of Boeotia (76. 2–3): I.G. i.² 68–69, 70 (cf. 103); S.E.G. x. 81, 84. (My note, vol. i, pp. 344–5, is to be modified.)

The account of the Delion campaign is especially interesting in the problem of Thucydides' sources. He was away himself in Thrace. He may have returned to Athens after the loss of Amphipolis (below, p. 585) and, while awaiting trial, have had opportunity to meet Athenians who had taken part; we know that later he was in touch with the Peloponnesians and their allies. His account is in general trustworthy, and has much detail that must have come direct from eyewitnesses not long, one would think, after the event, from both sides: from the Athenian, e.g. 90, 96. 1 init., 96. 3; from the Boeotian, 91, 96. 5, 100. If it is correct that 96. 3 and 96. 5, both from the middle of the battle, come from different sources, we can see how well he fused his information in his narrative.

3. τὰ περὶ τὰς Σίφας τῆς προδοσίας πέρι: a surprising and clumsy expression. Rutherford's view that *τῆς προδοσίας πέρι* was a marginal comment is unlikely (unless by someone who thought it was elegant to put the preposition after the noun).

καὶ Ἀθηναίων τετρακοσίους δόπλιτας: it is probably correct to take *τὸν στρατὸν* with *Ἄκαρνάνων καὶ Ηγραίνων* only, so that all 400 hoplites are Athenian; but it is wrong to add, with Arnold and most edd., that these were only the epibatai of the forty ships under Demosthenes' command (76. 1). The ten epibatai of each trireme were part of the ship's complement, and, first, need no special mention or would be called *ἐπιβάται*, and, second, though they might have been available for a short and sudden raid like this in Sikyonia, they would not have been used for what would have proved a lengthy campaign in Boeotia, had Siphai been captured; for they were required in defence of their ships. That is to say, Demosthenes in all probability took some Athenian hoplites with him for the Boeotian campaign, besides the epibatai.

For the Akarnanians and Agraioi, see 77. 1-2.

101. 5. *Death of Sitalkes*

101. 5. ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ Σιτάλκης: we last heard of him, and of his nephew Seuthes, in the Thracian campaign of 428 B.C., ii. 95-101.

There is a story in the *Letter of Philip* (Dem. xii. 9) that Sitalkes was assassinated and that Athens at once made friends with the assassin (Seuthes?). Sitalkes is called there a citizen of Athens, which he was not, but his son Sadokos was (ii. 29. 5, 67. 2). If the author of the *Letter* is referring to our Sitalkes, his story is clearly not to be believed in face of Thucydides' silence (who would have heard of an assassination; cf. 107. 3). See Steup's n.

The accession of Seuthes, Perdikkas' brother-in-law (ii. 101. 6), instead of the pro-Athenian Sadokos, doubtless helped the plans of Brasidas indirectly, and might increase the difficulties of Thucydides

in securing the aid of his Thracian friends, as suggested by Adcock, *C.A.H.* v. p. 244; but Thucydides does not say so.

102-8. Capture of *Amphipolis* by *Brasidas*

102. 1. τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος: the narrative of Brasidas' expedition resumed from 88 (which was still in the summer).

Ἄθηναίων ἀποικίαν: it was in a different position from other subject cities of the empire, in that it paid no tribute (unlike the cities of Lemnos, which had also been colonized from Athens, but before 480 B.C.). But 108. 1, χρημάτων προσόδω, suggests that it contributed to the expenses of the empire in some way; see n. there.

2. Ἀρισταγόρας: as told by Herodotos, v. 11, 124-6.

οἱ Αθηναῖοι: see i. 100. 3 nn., and Hdt. ix. 75. On the losses at Drabeskos, see now *A.T.L.* iii. 106-10. I do not find any such difficulty in the translation of the present passage as the authors of *A.T.L.* do: οἱ διεφθάρησαν means that the colony (not the Athenian expeditionary force only) was destroyed, but it does not follow that 10,000 colonists, and their wives and children, were all killed. Nor do I find anything surprising in the fact that Isokrates, viii. 86, said they were, and that all 10,000 were hoplites in the ranks of the army.

3. ἐνὸς δέοντι τριακοστῷ ἔτει: Thucydides has exact dates, though he does not here date these events for us, for he does not say how long before the beginning of the war any one of the three events occurred. Presumably he assumed in his readers a knowledge of the date of the foundation of Amphipolis. See vol. i, pp. 8, 362, 390-1; and Appendix, below, p. 713.

Ἀγνώνος τοῦ Νικίου: see v. II. 1 n.

ἐκ τῆς Ἡιόνος: Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, like Amphipolis, paid no tribute; but it was presumably only a commercial station, not strictly one of *αἱ ξυμμαχίδες πόλεις*. See *A.T.L.* i, pp. 453, 454.

πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίους: this is correct, though Strabo, vii, fr. 35, p. 331, says it was 20 stades from Amphipolis to the river-mouth, and Diodoros, xii. 73. 3, says 30.

ἐπ' ἀμφότερα περιρρέοντος τοῦ Στρυμόνος: the Strymon in fact flows on three sides, north, west, and south (or south-west), of the conspicuous hill, on which Amphipolis was situated (152 m. above sea-level, i.e. c. 140 m. above the river), where on leaving the marshy plain to the north its stream is forced into a sharp westward and then south-easterly bend by the high range to the west (Kerdylion, v. 6. 3) and Amphipolis' hill. See the map opposite p. 656. Thucydides does not say in so many words that the city was built on a hill but implies it in *περιφανῆ ἐσ θάλασσάν τε καὶ τὴν ἥπειρον ὕκισεν*; words which, as well as *ἐπὶ ἀμφότερα περιρρέοντος τοῦ Στρυμόνος*, explain the name Amphipolis.

For the strategic importance of the city, see 108. 1; and for details of the topography, v. 10. 6 n.

τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβών ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμόν: the city was almost certainly walled (104. 1), but this was a wall running roughly north and south, from the first bend of the river from a southerly direction westwards, to its last from the south-easterly direction southwards. (But *ἐκ π. ἐς π.* would more naturally suggest from one river to another, or from one branch of a river to another.) It served as a defence against land attack from the Edonoi and others who lived east of the river. For part of its length it was also doubtless the east wall of the city itself. For *ἀπολαβών* cf. i. 7. 1.

Note that though Thucydides had an intimate knowledge of Amphipolis and its neighbourhood, he contents himself with saying what he might say about any other place of strategic or political significance. There is no irrelevant detail. We could have wished for more. Below, p. 584.

103. 1. ἐξ Ἀρνῶν τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς: the site is unknown beyond that it was in the territory of the Chalkideis.¹ Cadoux (above, 88. 2 n.) suggests that it is marked by some classical walls near Arnica-Liángova (near the source of the Meliádhā river: see map in vol. i, opp. p. 222), from which there is a mountain path, not too difficult, to the east end of Lake Bolbe and Aulon (below). The alternative route from Akanthos by Stratóni and Vína (Stageiros, probably) is very steep and difficult, through thick wood, and lacking water.

Arnai was not assessed separately in the Delian League. Bormiskos, which was near what was before the war the pleasant and friendly village of Stavrós, was assessed for tribute, at 1,000 dr., in 421 and, almost certainly, in 425 (A 9, col. iv, 109); but we know of no payment before that, and its name is absent from the full panel of the Thraceward district in 442, 434, 431, and 429 (see *A.T.L.* i). Cf. i. 58. 2 n. Edson, p. 98 (see 78. 6 n.), maintains that Bormiskos was Macedonian, but was now in Athenian hands like Herakleion in Pieria, and that Brasidas just by-passed it, with its 'small Athenian garrison'. It had been assessed in 425; but no one would suppose from Thucydides' narrative that Athens now held it. See n. on Herakleion, above, 78. 6. Aulon was never an independent city, and may be the name of the ravine through which flows the river from Lake Bolbe. See Leake, iii. 169, 461.

It was at Bormiskos that Euripides was said to have been killed;

¹ The map in *C.A.H.* v, opp. p. 173, puts it not far from Bormiskos, to the west, just south of Lake Bolbe; but this is not in Chalkidike, and the implication of Thucydides' words here, *ἀφικόμενος περὶ δεῖλην*, is that Brasidas' army had marched most of the day. See vol. i, p. 206, n. 2.

and his tomb was later shown near by (Amm. Marcell. xxvii. iv. 8, p. 339 ed. Vales.).

ἐχώρει τὴν νύκτα: he travelled by what must have been in Greek times the main route from the head of the Thermaic Gulf to Abdera, the Chersonese, and Byzantium (it became later the eastern section of the via Egnatia). In more modern times, during the Turkish occupation of Macedonia and Thrace, the road from Thessalonike ran much farther inland, crossing the Strymon north-west of Lake Tachinós, and keeping inland almost till the Hebrus is reached; and the railway makes an even longer and more northerly detour, crossing the river at Siderókastro near the Bulgarian frontier. In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. this inland country was not in Greek hands; and it is only recently (since 1938) that a new road has been made by the coastal route taken by Brasidas.

An exception to this general statement should be mentioned. Berge was within the League, paying tribute in 452–451–450, 447–446, 435–434, 433–432–431, perhaps 429–428, and certainly absent from the quota-lists only in 443–442 and 430–429; and scholars accept the statement of Strabo, vii, fr. 36, that it was in the Strymon valley 200 stades upstream from Amphipolis in the country of the Bisaltai. Bisaltia had been conquered by the Macedonians and is supposed, therefore, to have been all west of the Strymon (Thuc. ii. 99. 6), though Strabo says that the river divides the territory, or flows through it. Ps.-Skymnos, 653–4, agrees in calling it an inland town. Casson, *B.S.A.* xxiii, 1918–19, 33–35, confidently identified it with a site on the right bank of the river near where the Salonike–Serres road now crosses it (see also F. B. Welch, *ibid.*; p. 65); and this is accepted by Edson (above, n. on 78. 6), 94–96, and in *A.T.L.* i (Gazetteer) and iii. 219. That Athens should be able to control a town so far inland, even before the foundation of Amphipolis (though they might perhaps have been granted it *for a time*, by Philippos (i. 57. 3) or some other rival of Perdikkas), is most surprising; it would also be expected that Thucydides would have mentioned a second crossing of the Strymon controlled by Athens, and the (presumed) secession of the town after the fall of Amphipolis—unless it had broken away after 429. I confess to being still doubtful whether we know its site, whether Strabo, or the manuscript which quotes him, is reliable. At the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries, Berge issued some silver coins which imitate those of Thasos (Edson, p. 95); this suggests Thasian influence, and I doubt whether that either spread so far inland.

Brasidas and his army had about 12 miles to go, though along level ground, from Borniskos to Argilos, and 5 or 6 more before they reached the bridge over the Strymon at Amphipolis. This makes

a very notable 24 hours' march from Arnai; and it is not at all to be wondered at that both Eukles and Thucydides were taken by surprise.

2. χειμῶν δὲ ἦν καὶ ὑπένειφεν: since Delion was fought about mid-November (above, p. 558), we should place this march not more than a month later (Busolt, iii. 1151. 5).

4. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι: see vol. i, pp. 211, 277. The successive reductions of the tribute payable by Argilos did not appease her jealousy of Amphipolis, nor make her more loyal to Athens.¹ For the site of Argilos, perhaps at a place on the coast called Paliókastro about 2 miles west of the Strymon, see Collart and Devambez, *B.C.H.* lv, 1931, 191–2; Edson (above, 78. 6 n.), p. 98, n. 2.

ἐπραξάν τε ἐκ πλέονος, κ.τ.λ.: if Classen, followed by Stahl, is right in taking ἐπειδὴ --- ἥλθεν to mean definitely Brasidas' first arrival in the north, by which interpretation ἐκ πλέονος refers to the interval of three months or more that had elapsed between then and the present occasion (*καὶ τότε*, below), the text may stand. It is not easy thus to interpret either ἐπειδὴ --- ἥλθεν or ἐκ πλέονος (for which cf. 42. 3), and it may be better to transpose ἐπειδὴ --- ἥλθεν after *καὶ τότε*. Then, however, ὅπως ἐνδοθήσεται ἡ πόλις is difficult; for the surrender of the city was a very unlikely proposition before Brasidas' arrival in Thrace.

ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν: for its site see v. 10. 6 nn. The bridge was well known in Athens: Eur. *Rhes.* 349 (perhaps an indication of a recently built bridge; see *B.C.H.* xliv, 1920, 406; lv, 1931, 186; but there had

¹ The authors of *A.T.L.* (iii. 5–6, 62) now propose to emend the high figure of Argilos' tribute in 454–453 from $10\frac{1}{2}$ tal. as it appears from the quota-list (X[¶]: I mistakenly wrote '15 tal.', vol. i, p. 277) to $1\frac{1}{2}$ (H[¶]), assuming an error by the stone-cutter or the clerk, in order to do away with the remarkable later reduction and an 'anomalous' figure ($10\frac{1}{2}$ tal. is unique). All of their arguments are not sound: (1) in a paper read at Cambridge in 1951, the late R. Hoyle showed strong arguments for the view that 3 tal. was the original unit, so to speak, of assessment in the League, and had been regarded as the equivalent of one trireme; we have examples of 18 and 12 tal., as well as many of 6 and 3, none of 20 or 10; thus $10\frac{1}{2}$ tal. = $3\frac{1}{2}$ 'units', and, though unusual, would not be anomalous. (2) The argument from v. 18. 5—Argilos is to pay according to Aristeides' assessment, which would be little comfort if they had paid $10\frac{1}{2}$ tal. earlier and only 1 tal. later. But (a) the assessment of the town in 454–453 may have been, for a reason quite unknown to us, much higher than in 477; (b) as *A.T.L.* points out, we do not know what was the assessment of Argilos in 425 and, still more, in 422 (after its treachery in 424); it may have been higher than in 477; (c) the treaty of 421 was not one between Athens and the revolted states, but with Sparta, and a few of the allies of Sparta: Aristeides' *τάξις* seemed just, and Sparta would agree to it—she was deserting the Thracian cities anyway and she would not even know their past tribute-history, whether it was, in fact, just or not; and (d) the guarantee in the treaty against arbitrary or arbitrary-seeming increases in the future stood, and was valuable, whether the particular figure in Aristeides' assessment was high or low.

been a bridge of some kind over the Strymon in Xerxes' time according to Herodotos, vii. 114. 1).

5. οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη ὥσπερ νῦν: i.e. the bridge over the Strymon had not been brought within the fortification system of the town. The town itself had a wall round it (*ἐς τὸ τεῖχος*, 104. 1), the east side of which was presumably part of the wall *ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμόν*. When walls down to the river on the west were built, whether before or after 422, we are not told; see v. 10. 6 n.

κατὰ πᾶν τὸ χωρίον: to be taken, we are told, with *οἰκούντων*, 'for they had property over the whole area of the city's territory'. But this is to state the obvious: who else would *οἰκεῖν* there, and of what city did the citizens not *οἰκεῖν* **κατὰ πᾶν τὸ χωρίον?** It is better to take the phrase with *εὐθὺς εἰχεν*—Brasidas overran the whole territory. This leaves *οἰκούντων* in the air; and we should transpose *ἔξω* to before *οἰκούντων*. **τὰ ἔξω τῶν Α.** is not the same as **τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πόλεως τῶν Πλαταιῶν**, ii. 5. 4 (where *τοῖς* is masculine).

104. 2. καὶ λέγεται Βρασίδαν --- δοκεῖν ἀν ἐλεῖν: 'it is said [as Thucydides learnt afterwards] that the general opinion was that Brasidas might have captured the town', to adopt Classen's rendering—'Thucydides will take no responsibility for the judgement'. But why not simply *ἔδόκει τότε Βρασίδας ἀν ἐλεῖν?* The meaning may be 'it is said that Brasidas thought he could have taken the town'. Cf. v. 7. 5. **ἔφ' ἀρπαγήν:** after so long and so rapid a march, foraging for food—to be obtained by looting the countryside—was probably almost a necessity, and Brasidas consented.

4. κρατοῦντες τῷ πλήθει: once more the majority are on the side of Athens.

μετὰ Εὔκλεους: not otherwise known; but the name was not rare. **τὸν ἔτερον στρατηγὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης:** both Eukles and Thucydides seem to have been sent with commands in the Thraceward district generally, though Eukles was given the particular task of defending Amphipolis, perhaps after the news of Brasidas' march reached Athens (c. 82). He does not appear to have had any Athenian troops with him, though there would be some raised from the small element of Attic origin in the city population (106. 1). Similarly, Argilos evidently had no garrison, in spite of its latent or even open hostility, and apparently no Athenian official present. Athenian rule could not have been very oppressive in these conditions. Compare the situation at Akanthos, c. 88, and n. on § 5, below.

Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλόρου: contrast this with Θ. Αθηναῖος *ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον*. Here he is described like any other Athenian general, except that he is identified as *ὅς τάδε ξυνέγραψεν*, as another might be by *ὅς καὶ πρότερον προσετάχθη*; as author of the *History* he describes himself to his readers from all parts of the Greek world as *Αθηναῖος*.

(Cf. C. Hoeg's article on Xenophon's *Anabasis* in *Class. et Mediaev.* xi, 1950, p. 166, n. 23.)

δόντα τερι Θάσον: see below, p. 585.

Παρίων ἀποικία: a detail not relevant here, but corresponding to the information given about Akanthos (84. 1), Stageiros (88. 2), and Argilos (103. 3). Cf. also 75. 2 n., 107. 3, 120. 1.

ἡμίσεος ἡμέρας μάλιστα πλοῦν: nearly 50 miles in fact—a long row in half a day.

5. κατὰ τάχος: these, and perhaps the next which indicate the smallness of the force available, are almost the only words written by Thucydides in self-defence. See also ἄμα οὐ προσδεχόμενοι, κ.τ.λ., 106. 1, and 106. 4.

ἐπτὰ ναυσὶν αἱ ἔτυχον παροῦσαι: 'seven ships, all that were at the moment under his command.' A very small force; if there were other ships in Thucydides' command, where were they? See 108. 1, 6, 113. 2 nn. Athens 'held the allies in hand' very lightly.

105. 1. τῶν χρυσέων μετάλλων: i. 100. 2 n. Thucydides had the right of working them (*έργασίας κτῆσιν*). His father, Oloros, had the same name as the Thracian prince who was father to Hegesipyle, wife of Miltiades; and he was known to be related to Miltiades. The son of Melesias was *κηδεστής* of Kimon, i.e. related by marriage; and the identity of name suggests that the historian was related to him too. See Cavaignac, *Rev. de phil.*, 1929, 28 (Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* lii, 1932, 210–11), whose scheme, however, does not make an easy fit; others are obviously possible.

106. 1. ἀλλοιότεροι ἐγένοντο: we should probably read ἀ. ἐγίγνοντο; cf. ὑπελάμβανον, followed by the final ἐγένετο ή ὁμολογία, below.

τὸ δὲ πλέον ξύμμεικτον: mainly Ionian, in all probability: Tod, ii, p. 150.

συχνόis: as Classen says, *συχνοί*, the reading of all MSS. except E, gives better sense than *συχνοῖς* (though we should expect a dative rather than a genitive after *οἰκεῖοι*). So Dover, *C.Q.* iv, 1954, 79.

οὐκ ἐν ὁμοίῳ: this must surely mean, 'their danger was greater than that of the rest of the citizens', as Graves, not greater than it would be if they agreed to the surrender and departed free, or the like, which is obvious. The Athenians were in a special position among the mixed inhabitants of Amphipolis: they might, if captured, be killed; at the best they would be held as hostages like the Spartans from Sphakteria. See next n.

πόλεως τε ἐν τῷ ἵσῳ οὐ στερισκόμενοι: Stahl refers this to 105. 2, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἔαυτοῦ τῆς ἵσης καὶ ὅμολας μετέχοντα μένειν; which makes excellent sense, but is not easy to get from the Greek as it stands. Classen took ἐν τῷ ἵσῳ = ἄμα, simply connecting the two participles.

Steup connected the phrase closely with *οὐχ ἐν ὁμοίῳ* above, and translates “indem sie glaubten, daß, wenn sie abzögen, die Gefahr für sie nicht ebensogroß sei wie gegenwärtig, wo Brasidas vor den Thoren stehe”; and *πόλεώς τε ἐν τῷ ἵσω, κ.τ.λ.*, “da sie nach Brasidas’ Vorschlägen sowohl ebensowenig wie jetzt ohne Vaterstadt waren, als auch”, etc. “Wie die Athener hier ihre zukünftige Lage für den Fall, daß sie . . . die Stadt verließen, mit ihrer gegenwärtigen vergleichen, so wird auch mit *πόλεώς τε, κ.τ.λ.*, die zukünftige Lage der übrigen Amphipoliten mit ihrer gegenwärtigen verglichen.” But this interpretation of the Athenians’ feelings is very unsatisfactory. ‘Equally with the Athenians not losing their city’ (for the Athenians would get back to Athens) is not much better. Either Stahl’s or Classen’s interpretation must be accepted.

The use of *ὅμιλος* here may be noted: it is not derogatory; or at least it includes rich and poor, *σώφρονες* and *πονηροί*, even the common man and the distinguished.

2. οὐκέτι ἀκροώμενον: there is not much evidence by which to judge these events, but Eukles seems to have been unfitted for the post allotted him. Below, p. 587.

4. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐβοήθησαν αἱ νῆσει διὰ τάχους: the speed of Thucydides’ arrival was remarkable: Eukles could not have sent his message off much before dawn (103. 4, 104. 4), so that Thucydides’ arrival, in the short winter’s day, was little more than twelve hours later. He had a journey of nearly 50 miles, which at speed could hardly have taken less than seven or eight hours; and he will have taken some little time in getting his squadron ready. It looks as though Eukles’ message must have been sent by signalling of some kind; a messenger, going by land to Neapolis and thence across the strait to Thasos, would himself have taken twelve hours and more. Cf. iii. 29. 1, 80. 2 nn. If this is correct, the fact that the signalling is not expressly mentioned is of some importance; for it implies that the use of signals was commoner, and more elaborate, than is generally supposed.

This and 104. 5 are all that Thucydides allows himself in self-defence. If he had not saved Eion, Kleon could hardly even have attempted to recover Amphipolis (v. 6. 1); but he does not explain this at length.

107. 2. πολλοῖς πλοίοις: merchant and fishing vessels of all kinds that sailed (or were towed) up the river as far as Amphipolis: an indication of the commercial activity of the place (108. 1).

τὴν προύχουσαν ἄκραν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους: it had not been thought feasible to fortify with a wall the whole of the land at the mouth of the Strymon, but only a comparatively small fortress. Thucydides, however, might have been a little more explicit about ‘the height

which jutted out (towards the river) from this wall', from which perhaps the entry to the river could be controlled.

3. Μύρκινος: inland and north-east of Amphipolis.

Πιττακοῦ, κ.τ.λ.: curious details, learnt on the spot, about individuals who remain as obscure as before Thucydides mentioned them. They may, of course, have been playing some part at the moment when Thucydides wrote this chapter.

Γαληψός: a tributary city of the empire; see vol. i, pp. 211, 277; more recently, *A.T.L.* ii. 79, iii. 50, n. 43 (its tribute), ii. 85, and Bakalákes and Mylonás, 'Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.', 1938, 53–59 (the site). It was on a hill, 16 or 17 km. east-south-east of Amphipolis, south-east of Orphanó (photograph in *B.C.H.* iv: see below, p. 650).

Οἰσύμη: Oisyme was not counted a separate state, and is not mentioned in the tribute-lists. Yet Thucydides calls it *Θασίων ἀποικία*, like Galepsos. It was probably part of the Thasian *pēriaia* (Ps.-Skyl. 67); it was mentioned, with Galepsos, by Antiphon, κ. *Λαισποδίον* (frr. 23, 24 Thalheim). It may have been the same as Homer's *Αἴσυμη* (*Ili.* viii. 304–5), the home of Kastianeira. Its site was probably on the Gulf of Eleftherai, north-west of Thasos, which is enclosed on the south by a cape called *Βρασίδα* (*Medit. Pilot*, iv. 284, as well as the Greek Staff Map, sheet Kavalla). It may be that Brasidas' name has survived the centuries (E. Oberhummer, in *R.E.*, s.v. Oisyme), a remarkable tribute.

Θασίων ἀποικίαι: cf. 104. 4 n.

καὶ Περδίκκας: quickly on the scene, in spite of his quarrel with Brasidas, doubtless to congratulate him and make sure that Macedonia got its share in his success (he was, of course, still helping to maintain Brasidas' force).

108. 1. ἔχομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως: "wie c. 55. 1, *Πύλου ἔχομένης*. Überhaupt bildet unser c. 108 eine Art Gegenstück zu c. 55"—Classen.

ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἣν ὀφέλιμος: we have here a note of the value of Amphipolis to Athens, financial and strategic, and as a source of supply of timber, with a note on its situation (*ἄνωθεν* — λίμνης), which might well have been inserted in c. 102, at the beginning of the narrative and where Thucydides starts to tell us something about the site of the city; but the Athenians only now realize what they have lost by their failure to pay due heed to Brasidas; cf. 79. 2 n. See below, § 2, n. on ὁ γὰρ *Βρασίδας*.

ξύλων τε ναυπηγησίμων: Attica provided but a small supply of timber suitable for ships, and she got most of the large quantities she needed from Macedonia, Thrace, and Mysia. See Ps.-Xen. 2. 11–12.

χρημάτων προσόδῳ: Amphipolis was not a tribute-paying city of the empire; but this phrase must mean that she contributed a

considerable sum to the imperial revenue (not simply that Athens, by occupying it, could collect tribute from neighbouring cities). See ii. 13. 3, n. on *προσιόντων μὲν ἔξακοιών ταλάντων*.

Θεσσαλῶν διαγόντων: 'provided that the Thessalians gave them passage', as they had done to Brasidas. **Θεσσαλῶν τε καὶ Περδίκκου** would have been more accurate.

For this aspect of the strategic importance of Amphipolis, cf. Livy, xlvi. 30. 3, 'quae obiecta claudit omnes ab oriente sole in Macedonia aditus' (noted by Grote, v. 326 n.).

ἄνωθεν μέν, κ.τ.λ.: this was the extensive and marshy lake Kerkinitis, or rather two lakes now called Neochóri and Tachinó. The Strymon is liable to flooding in its whole course through the plain below Sideróastro (near the Bulgarian border); but the Tachinó district was permanent lake and marsh until it was drained in the 1930's. See n. on *ἔχώρει τὴν νύκτα*, 103. 1. With the interior in Thracian hands (but see above, p. 575, on the site of Berge) the importance of Amphipolis was clear both to Athens now and two generations later, and to Philip of Macedon when he must make sure of his passage (by land, for Athens still held the sea) to Byzantium and the Chersonese for the sake of his invasion of Asia; and see Livy, l.c., for later times. Here was the only practicable crossing of the river, which, it must be emphasized, is a large one for Greece, and deep at this point. Yet, apart from the secession to him of Galepsos and Oisyme, Brasidas did not make any use of the passage eastwards, but turned back to the Chalkidic peninsula. He had, of course, to secure his communications with Thessaly and the Peloponnese, if he was to get the reinforcements that he asked for (§ 6, below); he could not wholly rely on Perdikkas for this service; but it remains noticeable that, if Abdera, Ainos, Perinthos, or any other important city to the east were among those which secretly sent for help to Brasidas, he did not strike a further blow in that direction, before the winter was out and a larger Athenian fleet had arrived. He might have drawn off the Athenian forces from Eion. Possibly the Athenians *had* squadrons in those waters, which may explain the small number of ships left with Thucydides. Possibly the conspirators in each city were few.

τηρουμένων: 'being watched by', a meaning of *τηρεῖν* illustrated by Ar. *Eg.* 1145,

*τηρῶ γάρ ἐκάστοτ' αὐτούς,
οὐδὲ δοκῶν ὄρâν,
κλέπτοντας.*

But I am not happy about it, and Hude's *τηρουμένον* is tempting. What we want, however, is *αὐτῶν τηρούντων*, which is the way the scholiast interprets the MSS. reading.

2-6. δὲ γὰρ Βρασίδας, κ.τ.λ.: this passage is, if not alternative to, yet, in its present position in the *History*, supplementary to 81. 2-3. It is characteristic of Thucydides to divide, at times, his comments (see n. on § 1, above, ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς τὸν ὀφέλιμον); but in this case, no one, I think, but will feel that the two passages were written at different times. This one comes in its natural place, after two signal instances of Brasidas' skill as a diplomatist (ἐφόλκα καὶ οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντος) and of his personal πράστης and μετριότης; c. 81. 2-3 is, in its present position, wholly anticipatory. In this respect, c. 81 is like ii. 65. 7 and 11-12 and vi. 15. 4, three other passages in which Thucydides, after the end of the war, makes his own comment on the effect of prominent individuals on its course. In the notes on ii. 65 and iv. 81, and in the article in *J.H.S.* lxxi there referred to, I have remarked as well on a certain inconsistency with the narrative of current events, an inconsistency, however, which is natural enough if the comment was written (after 404) a good deal later than the narrative. It should be observed that in our present passage there is no such explicit inconsistency; yet it also was written some time after the winter of 424-423, or at least § 4 was, ἐψευσμένοις τῆς Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅση υστερον διεφάνη; for that presumably refers to the surprising recovery and long resistance of Athens after the Sicilian disaster, not to the surprising strength of Athens in the war generally (iv. 85. 2, v. 14. 3), or in 413 (vii. 28. 3), as Classen suggested. Cf. also τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ὁργώντων, § 6.

3. αἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι: these words, in an awkward order, might well be from a marginal explanation of αἱ πόλεις. So Hude.

4. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄδεια ἔφαίνετο αὐτοῖς: I have said above that this sentence belongs to a later period, after 410 in all probability. It may well have been *inserted* later in an earlier narrative; for §§ 3 and 5-6 belong wholly to the present, and there is perhaps a slight inconsistency between ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν κρύφα and ἄδεια (even with καὶ γὰρ καὶ before it), which implies no need for secrecy. With Dover, *C.Q.* iv, 1954, 81, I prefer E's ἐψευσμένοι: ii. 53. 4 may well be compared both for this and for εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι below.

βουλήσει — — — ἀσαφεῖ: cf. iii. 3. 1, v. 113.

προνοίᾳ: the quality possessed especially by Pericles (ii. 65. 6, 13). εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι: an expression equivalent to 'accustomed, as all men are accustomed'; and though the anacoluthon is a remarkable one, there is no need of Johnson's not very probable correction οἴ(α) for οἱ, which was once accepted by Hude.

"Our headlong desires became our politics and our morals"—Burke, *Works*, iii. 365 (from the passage aptly quoted by Grote, v, p. 248, on Athenian folly after Pylos).

ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ: cf. 10. 1, with n., 92. 2.

λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι: this surely means, as the scholiast puts it,

τοῦτο μόνον λογισμῷ ἔξακριβοῦντες, 'submit to a rigorous reasoning', 'in these cases give reasoning full power'; not 'arbitrary judgement', as most edd. ('durch willkürlich aufgestellte Gründe ... die Entscheidung in persönlichen, nicht in sachlichen Gründen suchend, daher subjektiv und sophistisch', Classen, comparing *αὐτοκράτωρ μάχη*, 126. 5, where see n.); this would be the contrary of *λογισμός*. The irony consists in the statement that, after we have made up our minds that we do not like a thing, we use our godlike gift of reason to reject it.

5. *ἔφοικὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ δόντα*: see 88. 1 n. We have here, presumably, a statement of what Thucydides was told had been one of Brasidas' arguments at Akanthos and elsewhere, which he later, *ἔχόμενος δὲ τὴν ἐγγύτατα τῆς ἔνυπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶν λεχθέντων*, incorporated in his version of the speech in 85. 7.

ὥς αὐτῷ - - - στρατιᾷ: some participle seems necessary to explain *ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν* as well as *τῇ - - - στρατιᾷ*; but Linwood's *βοηθήσαντι* (cf. 85. 7) is not very elegant, with *μηδένα ἀν ἐπὶ σφᾶς βοηθῆσαι* to follow. (*ἐπιόντι* would be preferable.) Steup would prefer to bracket *αὐτῷ ἐπὶ N.*; but this does not leave a sufficiently intelligible statement. *μηδένα ἀν ἐπὶ σφᾶς βοηθῆσαι* recalls directly Brasidas' *οὐκ εἰκὸς - - - ἐφ' ὑμᾶς βοηθῆσαι*, 85. 7.

Busolt, iii. 1159. 1, notes that Thucydides here speaks as though inclination towards and even enthusiasm for the Peloponnesian cause was general in each city, whereas when he relates the story of the several revolts—Akanthos, Amphipolis, Torone, Mende, all except Argilos and perhaps Skione—he mentions a division of opinion, with a vigorous minority only for independence and secession from Athens. Cf. ii. 8. 4–5 n.; but it may be partly due to Thucydides' method of writing: see below, 117. 1 n., p. 593.

6. *τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ὅργωντων - - - πειράσεοθαι*: *τὸ πρῶτον* may go either with *ὅργωντων* or with *πειράσεοθαι*. It is comparable with *πρῶτος ἔξειθών*, 81. 3; and may have been written some time after this event (see above, n. on §§ 2–6). The expression should mean, 'Sparta was in a state of excitement, or enthusiasm, or eagerness'; remarkable enough in any case of a people not prone to excitement (i. 84. 3, 85. 1), and now immediately contradicted by § 7, which tells us that, from various motives, Sparta was not at all enthusiastic for Brasidas to proceed farther. (We can hardly stress *ἔμελλον* to mean: 'it was to be expected that they would find Sparta enthusiastic', as Classen, an expectation that is shown to be doomed to disappointment in § 7.) We want *〈ἀνδρῶν〉 Λακεδαιμονίων*, 'their first experience of Spartans in a state of excitement'; Brasidas and his men might well have been so described. In 413, after the Athenian defeat in Sicily, Sparta is described as confident (*ἐθάρσει*), even optimistic

(εὐέλπεσ); but it is the cities subject to Athens, Ionians and islanders and the rest, who were ready καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν ἀφίστασθαι διὰ τὸ δργῶντες κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα (viii. 2. 2-4; note that κινδυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἔτοιμοι ἦσαν, here said of the same cities, is closely paralleled in viii. 2. 2). *δργᾶν* is a vigorous word, in this sense not common in prose.

φυλακάς — διέπεμπον: the small force at Torone (113. 2) may have been one of these. See above, 104. 4 n.

ἔφιέμενος: Steup's suggestion that *μειζόνων* has dropped out before *ἔφιέμενος* gives the participle its usual sense in prose and is an improvement. Cf. 117. 2. It would help also the contrast with the position in 425 noted by Classen: see n. on ἔχομένης τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, § 1, above. For ἐς τὴν Α. — — — ἐκέλευε, Steup compares vii. 17. 1, *στρατιὰν ἐπαγγέλλων* ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους.

ναυπηγίαν τριήρων παρεσκευάζετο: nothing effective came of this.

7. **τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν:** cf. 81. 1 n., v. 16. 1, 17. 1. We have been taught from our childhood that such unworthy motives and mean mistakes were characteristic of the democracies; but Sparta was ever suspicious of her able men, more so than Athens—not to our surprise, when we think of the careers of Kleomenes, Pausanias, and Lysandros.

Thucydides himself would have preferred us to pass over in silence the question of his responsibility, or the degree of his responsibility, for the loss of Amphipolis. And it would have been logical, as well, to do so; for we know nothing more than he has thought fit to tell us, in a narrative that is so remarkable that it must be almost unique, in that he not only makes no attempt at self-defence—for this would mean the insertion of biographical detail, a thing which he avoids nearly everywhere and would especially avoid about himself—not only does he not exaggerate the part that he personally played, but he does not exaggerate the importance of the campaign itself, because he took part in it, either explicitly, or implicitly by the length or the detail of his narrative. He must have known so much more, both of what was relevant and what was irrelevant to his own theme, than he chose to tell; but had he told it (as Herodotos would have done, as *we* should be so glad if he had), it would have thrown the story of this campaign out of scale with the rest of the book.¹ In no other part of the *History* is his passion for the truth, as he saw it, so clearly displayed. But one result of this is that we have, practically, no evidence on which to judge his responsibility for the disaster. Diodoros, it may be noted, follows Thucydides' narrative closely and adds nothing (xii. 67-68, esp. 68. 4); and fails

¹ We may contrast the digression on Sitalkes and his kingdom, ii. 95-101 (see n. ad init.).

to mention even the historian's presence as one of the two strategoi.

Nevertheless, Thucydides is too great a man to allow us to follow either his preference or logic; we can scarcely avoid the discussion.

He probably returned to Athens, recalled by the ekklesia, after the fall of Amphipolis (89. 1, n. on *Νικομάχου*), was dismissed from office and stood his trial, like Perikles in 430. He was banished for life (how characteristic of him to mention this only on a different occasion, in explaining his opportunities as a historian: v. 26. 5). It is now traditional that Kleon was his principal enemy; and though the tradition has no more solid foundation than the foolish *Lives* of Thucydides, it is probable enough (cf. 122. 6); and we may be confident that there was plenty of abuse, and charges of bribery and treachery, and the rest. Aristophanes alludes to such charges in *The Wasps*, 288–90, produced thirteen to fourteen months later:

καὶ γὰρ ἀνὴρ παχὺς ἥκει
τῶν προδόντων τάπι Θράκης·
δὲ ὅπως ἐγχυτριεῖς.

This need not, of course, refer to Thucydides himself, or to Eukles; there were doubtless others put on trial. But it is not impossible that Thucydides' trial was delayed for many months, till the time when Aristophanes was writing *The Wasps*. See also *Peace*, 639–40, quoted above, p. 549.

Those scholars who believe that Kleon could do nothing right tend also to think that his opponents (on whatever occasion, of whatever kind) could do nothing wrong; and for them Thucydides is the innocent victim of the demagogue who would hide his own shortcomings. Grote, in a well-known passage (v. 328–34), answered this argument adequately, by insisting on the consideration of what Thucydides' duties were: his main contention is that, since Brasidas had no fleet, Thasos was in no danger and Thucydides should not therefore have kept his force there, and that, since Brasidas had now been in Chalkidike for some two to three months, and his energy and enterprise were already well known, and, as Thucydides knew better than anyone, Amphipolis was a key position and was in part to be defended by a fleet at Eion (*τὰ δὲ πρὸς Ἡέοντα τριήρεσι τηρουμένων*, 108. 1), he should clearly have been at Eion, using it as his base.¹ It is no answer to a charge of culpable negligence against a commanding officer to say, "who would have thought that Brasidas

¹ W. Schmid, in Schmid-Stählin, v. 2. 2, p. 12, adds the further charge that in staying at Thasos Thucydides was probably influenced as well by concern for the safety of the gold mines. But their protection depended on that of the crossing of the Strymon, that is on the Amphipolis-Eion line, not directly on a fleet at Thasos.

would lead his forces against Amphipolis in the depth of winter, in such bad weather, and march all night, accomplishing the journey from Chalkidike in less than twenty-four hours?" Nor is it a sufficient answer to say, with Adcock, "the historian had failed to be wiser than his colleagues or his countrymen, who might have crushed Brasidas with half the force that was defeated at Delium" (*C.A.H.* v. 245); for, as Grote with his excellent sense knew, mistakes made by authorities at home, or by other commanders in the field, however serious and however numerous, do not excuse a general from exercising proper prudence and skill within his own sphere. That he did not do this is the charge against Thucydides; and the charge may be true even though it was made by Kleon, in a loud, harsh voice, and with vulgar and hateful acrimony.

Two things, however, may be said on the other side. Thasos was probably the main Athenian base in the North Aegean, as Sestos was in the north-east (cf. vol. i, pp. 276–8), and it has a better natural harbour than any town on the northern coast; it would therefore be fitted with all the essential supplies of a base, reserves of food and of timber, and labour for the maintenance and repair of ships. And in ordinary circumstances it was geographically well suited to keep watch on the Thraceward district of the empire, especially in winter, when repairs would be done and fighting on the mainland was unusual. Classen (n. on 106. 4 in his appendix) quotes Dem. iv. 32: *χειμαδίω χρήσθαι τῇ δυνάμει Λήμνῳ καὶ Θάσῳ καὶ Σκιάθῳ καὶ ταῖς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ νήσοις, ἐν αἷς καὶ λιμένες καὶ σύτος καὶ ἀ χρή στρατεύματι πάνθ' ὑπάρχει.* It may well be that Eion, though an *ἐμπόριον* (102. 3, especially for timber, 108. 1), and though it had been used as a base for a time, perhaps in summer, in 446 (quota-list 8, col. i, 105: *A.T.L.* i. 453–4), as well as by Xerxes in 480 (Hdt. vii. 25; cf. viii. 118, 120), was not well equipped as a naval base, and could only, in winter, be used as one for short periods (see Delbrück, *Strategie des Perikles*, 1890, 177). It might have been natural and even proper for Thucydides to stay at Thasos while Brasidas was in Chalkidike. This would mean that the authorities (not Thucydides), as it turned out, had failed to make proper preparations for the defence of the Thraceward district.

Secondly, it is to be remembered that Thucydides was, at Thasos, within half a day's voyage of Eion, and that he was ready to sail at a moment's notice; he must have reached Eion, on the evening of a short winter's day, within twelve hours of the message for help having left Amphipolis, and much sooner than the Athenian party in the city had expected (106. 1). (Busolt, iii. 1157, says that he took no steps to watch Brasidas; but what messenger from Chalkidike could reach him quicker than Brasidas himself?) The only risk he ran by staying at Thasos was in the ability of Amphipolis, with an

Athenian strategos in charge, an Athenian element in the population and the majority of citizens in their favour, to hold out for twenty-four hours. (The loss of the bridge was not decisive, as Grote implies; Brasidas could not have held on to it, if Amphipolis had stood firm against him. If Sane and Dion could resist, 109. 5–110. 1, much more might Amphipolis.) He may well have thought this a reasonable risk; and our problem becomes, to what degree was *Eukles*, in Amphipolis, not Thucydides, culpably negligent? Had he failed to keep the citizens alive to the obvious danger from Brasidas? Had he done nothing to organize defence? Did his nerve completely fail him in the crisis? Or was his task one of the kind that only exceptional genius could undertake? That is, did the Athenians make the mistake of sending an incompetent man to Amphipolis; or did they not realize how weak their position in the city really was? In the former case Thucydides is largely exculpated; in the latter it may be that he, the best-informed of Athenians, had not warned his fellow-countrymen with sufficient emphasis. Thucydides' narrative suggests that *Eukles* was altogether incompetent, but as usual he casts no blame.

It is clear, nevertheless, that Brasidas' sudden march, after some two months or more of quiet in winter quarters, took both *Eukles* and Thucydides by surprise. It was this which was decisive; and responsible commanders should not allow themselves to be surprised by the enemy. Thucydides, I feel, was conscious not only of his failure, but of his partial responsibility; it is noteworthy that after Kleon's death and the peace, no one, as far as we know, not Nikias nor Demosthenes nor Alkibiades, tried to get his banishment ended; and the bitterness with which he pursues Kleon in the narrative of the second Amphipolis campaign reflects this. He had failed and Kleon (probably) had mercilessly abused him and got him banished; what would Kleon himself accomplish, with a larger, a prepared force, on the same ground, against the same opponent?

And did Thucydides reflect, after 422, that in 425 "the saner elements in the community" had thought that they were sure of one good thing at least, either the end of Kleon or an important victory over Sparta? Did the end of Kleon turn out to be so beneficial to Athens?

The most significant thing, however, remains, the historian's strict impartiality not towards Kleon but, so to speak, towards himself as historian, to his real work—in his refusal to exaggerate the importance of the campaign, the only one in which he himself had played a major part as a citizen and soldier. The one argument we must not use is Oncken's (see Busolt, iii. 1154. 4): "bei der Wortkargheit des Thukydidies könne zwar weder der strenge Beweis seiner Unschuld, noch seiner Schuld geführt werden, allein das Schweigen

des Angeklagten gehöre zu den zahlreichen Indizien seiner Schuld." Thucydides' silence has a quite different significance (my Sather lectures, p. 162.)

109–16. Megara. Brasidas in Chalkidike

109. 1. Μεγαρῆς τε τὰ μακρὰ τείχη, κ.τ.λ.: see 69. 4, 73. 4. The destruction of the wall did not directly affect the Athenian positions in Nisaia and Minoa (118. 4); it was intended to make an attack on the city from Nisaia more difficult.

Βρασίδας — — ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀκτήν: see 108. 1 n.

2. ἔστι δὲ — — ἔσω προύχουσα, καὶ ὁ Ἄθως, κ.τ.λ.: Akte was properly the name of the peninsula, Athos only of the highest peak, over 6,000 feet, which terminates it at the south-east. Herodotus' description, with the names of all these πόλεις, vii. 22, which he gives in connexion with the cutting of Xerxes' canal (from Akanthos to Sane, see above, 84. 1 n.) looks like Thucydides' authority (note Hdt.'s αἱ δὲ ἐκτὸς Σάνης, ἔσω δὲ τοῦ Ἄθω οἰκημέναι), though he repeats the information doubtless because he knew the country himself.

3. Σάνην μὲν Ἄνδριν ἀποικίαν: cf. Hdt., l.c., Σάνη πόλις Ἑλλάς. As usual Thucydides records the colonizing state: cf. in this book 7, 75. 2, 84. 1, 103. 3, 120. 1, and Amphipolis itself, 102. 8. (Hdt. vii. 123. 1, mentions a Sane in Pallene, by error—or a MS. error: there is no other trace of a second town of the name, and in this context he has not mentioned Sane in Akte.)

Sane is among the cities mentioned in the tribute-lists from the beginning. For the first year, 454–453, it pays a joint contribution, of $\frac{1}{3}$ tal., with Olophyxos and Dion; thereafter, separately, through the years, 1 tal., $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{2}{3}$, and 1 tal. again.

ἔσ τὸ πρὸς Εὔβοιαν πέλαγος τετραμμένον: although the coast here runs west-north-west to east-south-east and Sane faces little west of south, and so towards Euboia, yet it looks on Sithonia peninsula, not to the open sea; and even the open sea so far north is curiously described as τὸ πρὸς Εὔβοιαν. Cf. Hdt. vii. 122.

Θουσὸν καὶ Κλεωνάς, κ.τ.λ.: the sites are uncertain, but are perhaps approximately as in the map, C.A.H. v, opp. p. 173; see A.T.L. i, Gazetteer, s.v. Ἄθως. Thyssos paid $\frac{2}{3}$, $1\frac{1}{2}$, and 1 tal. tribute in successive periods; Kleonai 500 dr. and only from 434–433 B.C. and in a special class; Akrothooi never paid as a separate state, but was assessed, for an unknown sum, in 421 and probably in 425; Olophyxos and Dion, after being joined with Sane in 454–453, paid $\frac{1}{3}$ tal. and 1 tal. respectively thereafter. Their assessment in 425 is unknown.

4. αἱ οἰκοῦνται — — διγλώσσων: Steup's punctuation, with a comma before this sentence and a colon after it, making it parallel with Ἄνδριν ἀποικίαν above and the following sentence an explanation

of it, is preferable. These foreigners still spoke their own tongue as well as Greek, and so had not been completely hellenized like, e.g., the Argives of Amphilochia, in contrast with whom the other Amphilochians are called *βάρβαροι*, ii. 68. 5.

καὶ τι καὶ Χαλκιδικὸν ἔνι βραχύ: 'there was indeed a small Greek element, Chalkidian, in the population.' According to Strabo, Eretria, not Chalkis, was the colonizer (x. i. 8, p. 447).

Πελασγικόν: see Hdt. i. 56–58, and my n. in vol. i, pp. 94–97.

τῶν καὶ Λῆμνον ποτε καὶ Ἀθῆνας Τυρσηνῶν οἰκησάντων: Herodotus nowhere actually calls the Tyrsenoi Pelasgians (unless we emend i. 57. 1 to read *Πελασγῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ Κρηστῶνα πόλιν Τυρσηνῶν οἰκεόντων*), nor does he say that Tyrsenoi, but only that Pelasgians, were in Lemnos (v. 26) and Attica (ii. 51, vi. 137); but Kreston was one of their neighbouring cities (i. 57. 1), and the presence of a 'Krestonic' element in the population here surely points to a general agreement between Thucydides and Herodotus, as indicated in my nn. on i. 3. 2 and ii. 68. 5.

Βισαλτικόν καὶ Κρηστωνικόν: cf. ii. 99. 6, 100. 4. Grestonia and Kreston seem to be the same: see Oberhummer, *R.E.* xi. 1718.

The Edones or Edonoi were also among the people conquered or driven out by the Macedonians, ii. 99. 4; and are mentioned elsewhere by Thucydides, i. 100. 3, iv. 102. 3, and in the course of the narrative of Brasidas' campaign, iv. 107. 3, v. 6. 4.

5. *ἐμπείνας*: see ii. 19. 2 n.

110. 1. Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν: the chief city in the next peninsula, Sithonia, on the south-west coast not far from the peninsula's end, with some remains still called Torone (Leake, iii. 119); Hdt. vii. 122. On *τὴν Χ.*, see 114. 1 n.

κατεχομένην ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων: i.e. there was a garrison (§ 2, init.). Cf. ii. 13. 6 n.

ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι: again there is no evidence that the majority wanted to be quit of the Athenians; they may have been content though, or perhaps because, there was an Athenian garrison, and in spite of the fact that their tribute had been doubled, to 12 tal., in 430, and increased, probably, to 15 tal. in 425.

2. προελθόντες: the reading of the majority of the MSS., *προσελθόντες*, seems to be contradicted by *ἐτήρουν τὴν πρόσοδον*. Cobet also would read *ὅλιγον* for *ὀλίγοι*, because the total of *οἱ πράσσοντες* are *ὅλιγοι*; and Classen–Steup follow him.

διαδύντες: this implies that there were gaps in the wall, as on the land side (112. 2), not yet repaired; an inexcusable failure since Brasidas' arrival in Chalkidike.

διὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τείχους: where they would be least expected, as Brasidas could not approach by sea, and there were two triremes

on the watch (113. 2). Brasidas' men had to make their way round the city to reach this point and the postern gate on this side (111. 2). The main gate on the land side was near the agora, where the Athenian garrison bivouacked (111. 2, 113. 2).

τὴν κατὰ Καναστραῖον πυλίδα: Kanastraion was the name of the eastern promontory of Pallene, the westernmost of the three peninsulas, which Torone faces on its coastal side (Hdt. vii. 123. 1), only some 9 miles away. Thucydides assumes that it is known. Cf. Strabo, vii, fr. 32.

For the manner of introduction of the topographical detail, see 113. 2, n. on *Λήκυθον*.

111. 2. χρόνου ἐγγιγνομένου καὶ θαυμάζοντες: in themselves easily comprehended words; but Thucydides does not say what they had to wonder at in this smoothly run conspiracy.

ἔτυχον - - - προσελθόντες: there was no element of chance in this, nor at 116. 2 (above, p. 488).

αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πύλαι: see n. on *Λήκυθον*, 113. 2.

τοῦ μοχλοῦ διακοπέντος: as at Plataia, ii. 4. 4.

ἀνεῳγοντο: Steup took objection to the imperfect, and suggested *ἀνεῳχατο*; but the tense is clearly right: the opening took place while some of the peltasts were being taken round to the postern on the harbour side. We can suppose that it was opened slowly, with infinite pains not to wake the Athenian hoplites in the agora. But Steup was right to restore *ἀνέσχον* for Classen's *ἀνῆσχον* (adopted also by Stahl); iii. 22. 8, compared by Classen, is quite different.

112. 2. δοκοὺς τετραγώνους: sawn planks, up which men would walk and big stones be dragged. For the detail, see 113. 2 n.

καὶ οἰκοδομουμένω: Herwerden conjectured *καὶ ἀνοικοδομουμένω*, which seems right (Steup, Hude; but the latter should not have printed *κάνοικοδομουμένω*).

3. ὁ δὲ ἄλλος σμιλος: probably troops that Brasidas had raised locally, Macedonian, Thracian, and some Greek (e.g. from Argilos, 103. 3-4).

113. 2. ᔾτυχον - - - καθεύδοντες ὡς πεντήκοντα: not 'there were 50 hoplites then asleep in the agora', but 'they had at the time a force of 50 hoplites in the agora, who were sleeping there'.

ἔς τὴν Λήκυθον - - - ἄκρον, κ.τ.λ.: a headland jutting out to sea and joined to the mainland and the city by a narrow isthmus. Note once more how Thucydides introduces topographical detail only as it becomes immediately relevant to the story, as the actors in the story, or some of them, become aware of it: *τὸ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τεῦχος, πρὸς λόφον, κατὰ Καναστραῖον*, 110. 2, *αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πύλαι*, 111. 2,

Lekythos here, and the shrine of Athena, 116. 2. Similarly with other details, the wall in disrepair, 112. 2, the signal, 111. 1, the Athenian force in the agora and the two triremes. We are not given at the beginning, 110. 1, an account of Torone and its defences, and of the plans of Brasidas and his friends in the city, before the action opens. Cf. iii. 21. 1, iv. 79. 2 nn.

καταλαβόντες: with a similar meaning to *κατέχομένην*, 110. 1; 'which they had taken over and occupied with a force of their own'.

114. 1. ἐξελθόντα: ἐκ τῆς Αγκύθου, schol. But Hude's *ἐσελθόντα* is inviting.

ὡς οὗστις Χαλκιδέων: cf. 110. 1, *Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν*. It seems to imply that Torone was a member of a Chalkidic Federation.

3. τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ παραπλήσια: cc. 85–87. Cf. n. on §§ 4–5, below.

4. τούτου ἔνεκα: pointing forward, as Steup explains, 'because he thought', not back to *ἀφέχθαι οὐ διαφθερῶν*.

4–5. ὡς ἥγούμενος, κ.τ.λ.: Brasidas is indeed rather gentler to the Toronaiοi than to the Akanthioi—he had won his way and could afford to be more generous, and knew how to be. But the threat (see 87. 6 n.) remains in the next sentence, *τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε, κ.τ.λ.*, partly veiled again by the last words, *τὰ δὲ πρότερα --- ἡναντιοῦντο*.

This summary of a speech, in *oratio obliqua*, is, like the other summaries, of great interest. It consists, one would say, of notes for a speech similar to that of cc. 85–87, but a speech not given us, not even composed, because two speeches of the same tenor and purpose were not required. But are these 'notes' authentic, that is, written at the time and from the best sources available? If so, does it follow that the speech to the Akanthians is, to that extent, authentic? Further, the shortened form of the speech that Thucydides here gives may not contain all that he had heard of it from his informants; he may well, in this case, have cut down his notes. We are too much inclined to think that he always expanded.

115. 2. πύργον ξύλινον: it would be inflammable; but clearly it was in the circumstances the best they could do. Its purpose was to provide a high and a protected platform from which arrows and javelins, and heavy stones, could be directed against the enemy—at the moment at least unarmed—who would be bringing up the 'engine'.

116. 2. τριάκοντα μνᾶς: a remarkably large sum to be promised a soldier (who might earn 1 dr. a day, so this is equal to 3,000 days' pay) in an enterprise that we cannot believe to have been either desperate or of the first importance. Mahaffy suggested *τέσσαρας*

(\bar{A} for $\bar{\Lambda}$), *Hermath.* iii. 458, and Steup was inclined to agree. Thirty minae might of course have been dedicated to the goddess (see below).

According to the scholiast on Ar. *Vesp.* 718, Philochoros (F 119, 130) said there was an Athenian expedition to Euboea this year, 424-423: Bergk, ap. Meineke, and Kock on the fragments of *Holkades*. The same scholion refers to the gift of grain to Athens from Psammetichos of Egypt in 445-444; and it is probable that the note is a confusion of an earlier and longer commentary, which mentioned Perikles' campaign in 446-445 (cf. *Nub.* 213, and Philoch. F 118), though some scholars have thought that there was another gift of grain from abroad in 424-423. No occasion for an expedition to Euboea can be imagined that would go unnoticed in Thucydides, unless it was some quite small affair, perhaps in the spring of 423.

Payments from the Reserve in the Eighth Year of the War (I.G. i.² 324: above, pp. 433 ff.)

Of the four payments belonging to this year, the first was the 100 tal. paid as usual early in the spring or summer (above, pp. 436, 504), but on this occasion allocated to Nikias, clearly *περὶ Πελοπόννησον*, in preparation for the expedition to Kythera (iv. 53). For the second, of about 33 tal., at the end of July, the gap in the inscription (ll. 28-29) has been filled with *στρατεγοῖς ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκες* (the sum borrowed is also restored, calculated from the interest, which is preserved); this is not certain, and nothing in Thucydides suggests any special attention to Thrace at this time;¹ it was much later, after Brasidas'

¹ Pritchett-Neugebauer, p. 99, restore ἔχεις Ὁμηροδόμο, with a different figure for the sum borrowed (making, however, very little difference to the total): see above, p. 434 n. 1.

I may add one further remark. Pritchett and Neugebauer say on p. 104: "we wish to offer one observation concerning the use of this inscription for historical evidence. Quite apart from [purely epigraphical difficulties], we must recognize that there were at least two errors in the numerical notations in this document. (Meritt, *Ath. Cal.* 48-50, 69-70. Meritt quotes several parallels in Athenian inscriptions.) Less than half of *I.G. i²* 324 is preserved, and few of the payments provide sufficient data to permit a check of the figures. It would be a great coincidence if the errors occurred only in the preserved portion, and not in the lost part." Historians should be even more cautious how they take this caution. When I was reviewing Pritchett and Neugebauer's book in *C.R.* (lxiii, 1949, 120), I noticed, or thought I did, more than one misprint (one was the omission of a Greek numerical sign, p. 97, n. 10); but that is not to say that it is not a most carefully written, carefully printed, *reliable* book. Historians should know that all things human are fallible; but they must rely on good evidence, even though it is not certain evidence; and the new suggestions for this inscription made in *Calendars of Athens* hardly affect the historical conclusions to be drawn from it. The change noted above from *στρατευότι ἐσ τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκες* to *ἐξ Ὀπισθόδημο* in a restoration of ll. 28-29 seems radical; and the figure for the sum borrowed

arrival in Chalkidike, that the Athenians took some measures to guard against his attack, and those not in great strength (82). It would be more likely that at the end of July money was taken from the reserve to prepare Demosthenes' expedition to Naupaktos (73), though it is not easy to fill thus the lacuna on the stone. The 24 tal. voted at the end of September might be for Thrace; but, just as likely, for Hippokrates' plans for Delion.

YEAR 9: 423–422 B.C. (C.C. 117–35)

117–19. One Year's Truce

117. 1. νομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἀν ἔτι, κ.τ.λ.: they were to be disappointed in this; it was just what Brasidas succeeded in doing at Skione and Mende.

It is to be observed that Thucydides ascribes this opinion to the Athenians in general; there had been a change in the atmosphere in Athens (as much as in 430, ii. 59. 1, *ἡλλούσαντο τὰς γνώμας*, only then the change was more sudden); he says nothing about a struggle between parties, a peace party of moderate men, and a war party of extreme democrats, with presumably many others in the middle able to alter the balance between them. Later he says something about the *personal* characters of Kleon and Nikias which led the one to favour war, war as such, the other peace (v. 16), but still not about parties, though both men had their own followers. Modern historians do not agree with him in this, but draw up party lists of strategoi for the annual elections (above, pp. 526–7); and Mme de Romilly in an interesting section of her book (pp. 57–62), argues that the greater simplicity in the presentation of the story of a war between states, or rather of Athenian imperialism, gained thus by ignoring party struggles within a state, was a method deliberately adopted by Thucydides. But the picture of Athens given us by Aristophanes exactly at this time, for we know when his plays were written, fits in very well with the historian's: the difference, for example, in the attitude towards the war (and in consequence towards war in general) of the general body of citizens in *Acharnians*, *Knights*, and *Peace*. It is odd, or seems to us so, that Thucydides says more about differences of party in Sparta (i. 80, iv. 108. 7, v. 16–17, and esp. v. 36. 1, init.) than in Athens.

from Athena is altered from the ΔΔΔΤΤΤΠΠΠ of A.F.D to ΔΔΔΤΤΠΠΗΗΗΗΠΠΔΔΔΔΠΠΠ; but this is a change in sum from 33 tal. 550 dr. to 32 tal. 5,983 dr. only, which is trifling when an annual revenue of well over 1,000 tal. is in question. It is restorations, and arguments built on restorations, that historians must watch with care. Incidentally, Meritt cites here only one other certain error, by the stone-cutter.

καθ' ἡσυχίαν: cf. ii. 93. 3, and n. there. Classen points out the contrast with 108. 6, above, ὡς ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν χειμῶνι.

καὶ ἄμα — — καὶ ξυμβῆναι τὰ πλείω: 'and thinking to make a general peace, if things should go well'; but here perhaps, in view of the intervening protasis, Krüger's κὰν ξ. for καὶ ξ. is to be preferred. For τὰ πλείω in this context, cf. ἔως ἂν τι περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ξυμβαθῆ, 30. 4, ἐς τὸν πλείων χρόνον ('the usual longer period') below, and v. 15. 2.

Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ, κ.τ.λ.: Steup, by putting a comma after δέ, carries ον νομίσαντες to govern ἐπιθυμήσειν, and makes ταῦτα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγούμενοι — — φοβεῖσθαι subordinate to it ('because they supposed'); but without modern punctuation I doubt if anybody would so read it; and there is little to be gained by it except that it makes αὐτούς before πειρασαμένους easier, and some loss, in that καὶ before γενομένης is then inexplicable.

τοὺς ἄνδρας σφίσιν ἀποδόντας gives the essential of the Lacedaemonian thoughts, corresponding to Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸν Βρασίδαν, κ.τ.λ.

2. τοὺς γάρ δὴ ἄνδρας: 'for the men, of course', were of more importance to them. There may be some irony in this δὴ (cf. iii. 104. 1 n.). Who 'the men' were is easily understood: they were last mentioned in 108. 7.

περὶ πλέονος ἐποιοῦντο κομίσασθαι, κ.τ.λ.: the general sense of this and the following sentence must be, 'they wanted their men back more than anything; and, if Brasidas went on fighting, even though with success, they lost their men and were, in addition, risking the safety of the state'; or perhaps, 'and were, even so, not sure of final success': see 108. 7, τὰ δὲ καὶ βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ. They wanted, if I may so express it, to cash in on Brasidas' *present* success, and not risk everything, and especially the men, by a prolongation of the war. But I can see no way of getting this either from the MSS. text or from any of the proposed alterations, such as καὶ ⟨μὴ⟩ κρατήσειν (Koraës), εἰ καὶ κρατήσειν (Velsen, Madvig, Stahl, Hude: 'it would be uncertain whether they would in fact win'; cf. i. 78. 2; so one interpretation in the scholion), or [καὶ κρατήσειν] (Krüger, Böhme, Steup); and the last has the further disadvantage that its insertion is not easy to explain. As a variation on Stahl's reading, I would propose εἰ καὶ κρατήσειε, sc. ὁ Βρασίδας, taking τοῖς not with ἀμυνόμενοι but with κυδυνεύσειν (as Steup and others): 'they would risk the others, even if Brasidas were to win (his own campaign in Thrace only).' But I believe that Steup was more probably right in assuming a lacuna after κομίσασθαι, for Brasidas' success could not increase their desire to get the men back or their sense of the importance of getting them back, but only, perhaps, make their return easier; and only *perhaps*, for a prolongation of the war as such would delay

their return and might even jeopardize their lives. He proposed ἡ ἐπίδας μεγάλας καθίστασθαι (cf. v. 103. 2—not a very good comparison—viii. 81. 2); and this may be on the right lines; I should prefer ἡ μεῖζον ἐπαρθῆναι ἐλπίουν (ἡ τοῦ πλέονος ὄργεσθαι gives the best sense, but περὶ πλέονος has just preceded): ‘they thought more of getting the men back than of indulging in ambitious hopes because of Brasidas’ present success.’ But the next sentence remains difficult: ἀντίπαλα is explicable by contrast with the feelings expressed in 79. 3–80. 1; but (1) *<τὰ πράγματα>* is almost necessary after *καταστήσαντος*, (2) *τοῖς* by itself can hardly be understood as ‘the rest of Spartan manhood’, for *τοῖς ἄλλοις σφῶν οὐ τῶν σφετέρων* (yet what else can the antithesis to *τῶν* be?), and (3) while ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι is easily to be explained as consequent on ἀντίπαλα *καταστήσαντος*, it does not give us the meaning that we principally require, namely ‘a prolongation of the war’, ‘if they go on fighting, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου, even on an equal footing’; without some phrase for ‘if the war were prolonged’, Brasidas’ continued success (*ἐπὶ μεῖζον χωρῆσαντος αὐτοῦ*) is said itself to increase the risk to Sparta (whether we bracket *καὶ κρατήσειν*, or insert *μή*, or read *εἰ καὶ κρατήσειε*). Clearly it cannot do this; all it could do would be to postpone perhaps the return of the men by prolonging hostilities. Finally, if we bracket *καὶ κρατήσειν* and, as we must, take *τοῖς* with *κινδυνεύσειν* (as ii. 65. 7), we are making the Spartans think that the worst thing in the world was to risk the lives of their soldiers in defence of their country. *τοῖς δὲ πᾶσι* (neuter) would be better. I cannot agree with Graves that we have here a *μὲν* — *δέ* clause in which it is the *δέ*-clause which is concessive (‘though we may win in the end, we shall lose the men’, even if that were a satisfactory meaning): his parallels, 126. 4 and 6, are not close (see nn.), and for ii. 42. 4, *τοὺς μὲν τιμωρεῖσθαι*, κ.τ.λ., see my n. there.

Mervyn Jones, *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.*, 1951, 23-24, takes the different view that Sparta is thinking that Brasidas' success has increased the chance of getting the men back, and that this chance must not be jeopardized by the taking of further risks; he reads, therefore, with Herwerden and Hude, $\epsilon\omega s \epsilon\tau i B\rho. \eta\nu\tau\chi e i$, and renders $\epsilon\pi i \mu e i\zeta o n \chi a r\acute{h} o s a n t o s a u t o u$, as Grote did, 'if he were to aim at more'; the consequence of which is, 'and if he were to suffer a setback', which must be the meaning of $\alpha v t i p a l a k a a s t \acute{h} o s a n t o s$ —'create an evenly balanced situation' by contrast with the advantageous one described by $\eta\nu\tau\chi e i$. He then reads $k r a t e i s \theta a i$ or $k r a t e i \theta h n a i$ (dependent on $\kappa u d u r e u s e w$), and $t o u s$ for $t o u s$ (the Athenians, the object of $\alpha m u n \acute{o} m e n o u$). I feel that this meaning of $\epsilon\pi i \mu e i\zeta o n - - - k a a s t \acute{h} o s a n t o s$, in this context (with no explanatory $k a i$ $m u \eta$ $\tau u x o n t o s$ or $\epsilon i \tau i$ $\sigma f a l e i n \eta$), is too difficult, and the contrast between $t o u v$ (the men from the island) and $t o u s$ (the Athenians) pointless; and that (though $\epsilon\omega s$

for ὡς may well be right) *περὶ πλέονος ἐποιοῦντο* does take us back to 108. 7 and means 'thought more of getting the men back than of any amount of success by Brasidas in Thrace'. They will use the success in the bargaining, because the Athenians will be wanting peace; but they will not risk losing what advantage they have. A possible interpretation of the text with the minimum of correction might be: 'they thought more of getting the *men* back, while Brasidas was still successful, than of anything else: they were likely, if he went farther and produced a stalemate, to lose them and would run the risk of losing all even when fighting on equal terms' (*τοῖς δὲ πᾶσι καὶ --- κρατηθῆναι*); or 'would risk all --- even if Brasidas won in Thrace' (*τοῖς δὲ πᾶσι καὶ --- εἰ καὶ κρατήσειε*).

118. Text of the Truce. Kirchhoff's discussion of cc. 118–19, first published in *Berliner Sitzb.* for 1880 and later in his *Thukydides u. s. Urkundenmaterial*, 1895, remains the best that we have and nearly a model of what such discussion should be. Steup also wrote an essay on the decree in *Thuk. Studien*, i. 1–28 (1881) and ii. 81–99 (1886), and summarized his views in the *Anhang* to Classen–Steup (3rd ed., 1900), pp. 306–10. With a certain number of his objections to Kirchhoff in detail I agree. I note each separate matter of debate as it occurs, as usual, and give a further note at the end of c. 119; in this case, this procedure involves a certain amount of anticipation and repetition. Further, the same problems, or some of them, recur in Thucydides' treatment of other documents—all discussed by Kirchhoff and the three most important by Steup—and two of them occur within this volume: so I must refer also to my nn. on v. 19 and 21.

γίγνεται --- ηδε, not *τοιάδε*, and *αὐτη*, 119. 3, not *τοιαύτη*, indicate a verbatim report, not a composition, like the speeches.

On the absence of a heading or title to the document, see n. on § 4, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων*.

1. περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἱεροῦ, κ.τ.λ.: the treaty of v. 18 also begins with a clause about the use of panhellenic religious places; but except that it was usual to begin agreements with such a clause if the question was relevant at all, there is no resemblance between the two documents. In v. 18. 2 it is general—the resumption of normal peace-time arrangements—here it is particular to Delphi, and refers to the exclusion, in practice if not in theory, of Athenians and their allies from the shrine owing to Peloponnesian domination; the Athenians could easily reach the port of Krisa by sea, if they were prevented from going by the Sacred Way through Boeotia and Phokis, but could be denied access from there. Such exclusion was, probably, not general, not always exercised during the war; on the contrary there

is good evidence for normal relations between Athens and Delphi in 431–421 (Daux in *Ath. Stud.* 46–48); but there had been some particular trouble. The Peloponnesians promise that access to the shrine shall be free and undisturbed; they cannot, however, themselves promise that the journey by the Sacred Way will be safeguarded, so they add that they will do their best to persuade the Boeotians and Phokians to grant safe conduct, or, perhaps we should say, to reopen the road. Boeotia and Phokis were clearly not only not now represented in Athens, but had taken no part in the negotiations for this truce—had presumably refused. We only learn this interesting fact by accident, as it were (below, p. 606).

The Boeotian control of the Sacred Way was almost proverbial: *Ar. Av.* 188–9,

*εἰθ' ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, ἦν ίέναι βούλώμεθα
Πυθώδε, Βοιωτοὺς δίοδον αἰτούμεθα.*

ἡμῖν: the Peloponnesians (Kirchhoff); the Athenians (Steup). See below on § 3 and pp. 601–3; I feel sure Kirchhoff is right.

καὶ ἀδεῶς: “F'GM: om. cett.” There will be occasion further in 118–19 to note a greater number than usual of disagreements and errors in our MSS. Steup thought that ancient copyists (and eminent scholars, we may add) would take less care in transcribing a document than Thucydides' own words; if we remember the treatment received in our MSS. by so many documents quoted by the orators, we may agree with him.

2. *τοῖς παροῦσιν*: i.e. those who ‘sign’ the agreement in 119. 2, Corinth, Sikyon, Megara, Epidauros, *τὰς παρούσας* of 118. 14; more strictly, perhaps, as Steup argues, those who were present at the meeting of the allies at Sparta—but this would come to much the same thing, for those who agreed would send delegates to Athens (see Busolt, iii. 1164 n.). Thucydides does not mention the attitude of the rest of the Peloponnesians (ii. 9. 3), to say nothing of allies outside the Peloponnese, nor say why they were not present in Athens. We may note, however, that the two which control the Isthmos, and so made invasion of Attica possible or impossible, were present, and their neighbours; they form a block, though one separated from Sparta by Arkadia (Tegea and Mantinea) and Phleious. With Sparta, too, they provided nearly the whole of the Peloponnesian fleet (ii. 9. 3).

προσκηρυκεύμενοι: Kirchhoff thought that by this a herald, someone distinct from an ambassador or ordinary delegate (i. 53. 1 n., 146), must be meant and in consequence that a journey between hostile Athens and Boeotia is implied. But, apart from roads between Peloponnesian and Boeotia which do not pass through Attica, which Spartans might use, ‘heralds’ were, as Steup notes, used on

other sorts of occasions, as between Athens and Plataia (ii. 6. 2) or Athens and her subject-allies (e.g. *I.G.* i.² 63. 50 = *A.T.L.* A 9, Tod, 66).

3. *περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων*: Kirchhoff and Steup must be right that a specific crime, or rather alleged crime, about which Athens had complained to Sparta, is referred to. It seems quite impossible that this can be a general agreement not to allow robbery and sacrilege at Delphi. But it is not necessary to say, with Steup, that, because there is no further reference to the matter in the Treaty of 421, the criminals had by then been caught and punished; after the further defeats of Athens in Thrace, and the death of Kleon, the subject may have been quietly dropped. Bloomfield thought that the clause refers to Peloponnesian designs on the treasures of Delphi, which had been openly expressed before the war began (i. 121. 3); this is just possible; but, if so, the Athenians must have used very diplomatic language and have agreed to say that such a proposal was really the act of a criminal who must be caught; and the Spartans said 'we will join you, and get others to help'—*καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ βουλόμενοι*.

4. *περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, κ.τ.λ.*: since the corresponding clause, *τάδε δὲ ἔδοξε, κ.τ.λ.*, contains the qualification *ἐὰν σπονδὰς ποιῶνται οἱ Αθηναῖοι*, we must assume that this qualification was of set purpose absent from the agreement on the first two clauses (§§ 1–3); that is, that Athens said, 'Before we will discuss cessation of hostilities, you must change the present situation at Delphi, which is intolerable and contrary to all established usage', and that the Peloponnesians agreed. (Steup, p. 307, notices the problem, but refuses the natural solution.) This implies, what is probable in itself (108. 7), that the initiative in the negotiations came from Sparta. This distinction between §§ 1–3 and the rest does not in any way weaken Kirchhoff's contention that what we have in §§ 1–10 is the draft—or copy of it made by an Athenian *γραμματεὺς*, under direction probably of Phainippos, § 11—of Peloponnesian proposals, made after more or less formal consultations with Athenian representatives at Sparta, and brought to Athens to be put before the *ekklesia* by Spartan and allied delegates who had been given power to conclude a truce on these terms.

What, however, is required, and must I think be inserted, is an introductory formula before § 1: *τάδε εἰπον Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι* (or *οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις*; but the former would be more correct as the delegates were given full powers to take the oath), *οἱ τάδε δοκεῖ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξ.*, would be short forms; but it may have been longer. A peace treaty, as in v. 18. 1 (see n. there), or any other kind of statement of conditions, or request or offer, must have such an introduction. The treaty with Argos and her

allies in 420 had not only such a formula (v. 47. 1), but also, on the stele, a title (*I.G. i.2* 86; Tod, 72).

τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμάχοις: there should be, in a formal document, a difference in meaning between this and *τοῖς ξυμάχοις τοῖς παροῦσιν* of § 2, and again *τοῖς ξ.* alone in the summing up of § 9; but there is none in practice. It may be that though the four allies represented by delegates in Athens were the only ones who formally agreed, Sparta represented it as a general agreement, and, since these were the states which principally mattered to her (above, n. on *τοῖς παροῦσιν*, § 2), Athens accepted this. But looseness of expression is not uncommon in ancient documents: cf. v. 18. 7, where *Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξ.* is followed by *Λακεδαιμονίους* only, though Sparta was not the only state interested.

(Kirchhoff says that *οἱ ἄλλοι ξ.* here must mean all the allies, on whose behalf Sparta is speaking; and that Athens accepts this because in any case she was not in contact with those not present. But she was, by sea, with Elis and Achaia, not to mention the states outside the Peloponnese.)

έκατέρους ἔχοντας ἅπερ νῦν ἔχομεν: cf. i. 140. 2, iii. 52. 2, iv. 65. 1 (in peace treaties).

Κορυφασίω - - - Βουφράδος - - - Τομέως: Koryphasion is given as the Peloponnesian name for Pylos in iv. 3. 2, as well as in the peace treaty, v. 18. 7; Bouphras and Tomeus are mentioned only here, and their positions cannot be determined. Relying on partial identity of name, some have said that Bouphras is the small bay of Voïdokoiliá (above, p. 484), which may be right; but it would be interesting to know how far inland Tomeus was to be found.

τοὺς δὲ ἐν Κυθήραις: iv. 54. 4, 57. 4. Since the settlement of 424 is left undisturbed, Athens presumably was entitled still to exact tribute from the island.

τοὺς δ' ἐν Νισαΐᾳ καὶ Μινώᾳ, κ.τ.λ.: iii. 51, iv. 69, 73, 109. 1. We do not know where the shrine of Nisos was, nor the Poseidonion, only that the former was near one of the gates—the gates of Nisaia presumably, not of Megara itself, for the Athenians would not be allowed so close to the city.

We should surely read *παρὰ τῷ Νίσου* with Haacke, followed by Hude; it is less likely that the gate was known as 'from the shrine of N.', but cf. *τὸν Ρειτὸν τὸν παρὰ τοῦ ἀστεως*, *I.G. i.2* 81. 5 (cited by L. and S., s.v. *παρά*), 'the Reitos first reached by one coming from the city'.

τὴν γέφυραν τὴν ἐς Μινώαν: iii. 51. 3.

καὶ τὴν νῆσον - - - ἔχοντας: I agree with Steup that this should not mean Minoa, after the explicit reference to the Athenians in Minoa just above. Steup thinks there is a lacuna and that the island was Atalante (ii. 32, iii. 89. 3); and conjectures, *ἡνπερ ἔλαβον οἱ Άθ. Λέπι*

Λοκροῖς, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους> ἔχοντας, with *μήτι ἐπιμισγομένους* to follow, for the MSS. *μήτε ἐ.* (*μηδὲ ἐ*, edd.). If Atalante is meant we must of course insert the name before *τὴν νῆσον* (cf. v. 18. 7); and change *μήτε* to *μή*, not to *μήτι*, or assume another lacuna (e.g. *μήτε Ληγίζοντας μήτε*); but there is the objection that the Lokroi, like the Boeotians and Phokians, are standing aloof from the agreement altogether, and it would not be in the interests of either Athens or the Peloponnese to insert such a clause. I am more inclined to think, with L. Herbst, *Philol.* xlvi, 1883, p. 731, that the 'island' is Methana (iv. 45; perhaps we should have to emend to *χερσόνησον*), in which case *τὰ ἐν Τροιζήνῳ* will be some further territory beyond the peninsula proper which the Athenians still held. (This is possible even if Methana was held by Troizen as her own territory before 425, as most suppose from Paus. ii. 34. 1.) We would do best to read *καὶ Μέθανά τε τὴν νῆσον* (or *χερσόνησον*). There is, as Steup, ii. 96–97, pointed out, nothing to be said for Herbst's conjecture to read *Μεθώνην* for *μήτε*.

If, however, this is wrong, and the island is Minoa, we must, I think, bracket *καὶ* before *τὴν νῆσον*, for this is a subordinate, defining clause to *τοὺς δ' ἐν Ν. καὶ Μ.* *μὴ ὑπερβαίνοντας, κ.τ.λ.* This makes the conjecture *μηδὲ ἐπιμισγομένους* right; with *καὶ τὴν νῆσον* (whatever the island) we should have either *μὴ ἐ.* or (as I should anyhow prefer) *μήτε <--- μήτε> ἐ.*

καθ' ἀ ξυνέθεντο πρὸς Ἀθηναίους: I am sure we must either insert *<Τροιζήνωι>* before *πρὸς Αθ.*, as many have suggested, or (perhaps better) read *ἀλλήλους* for *Αθηναίους*; for the Athenians are the subject of *ἔχουσι.*

The previous agreement between Athens and Troizen has not been recorded by Thucydides. We last saw the Athenians raiding the territory of Troizen, Halieis, and Epidauros (45. 2; from Methana by land they could only raid Halieis and Epidauros through Trozenia). It is noticeable that Troizen was not represented in Athens; it is possible enough that this clause was opposed by her at Sparta, as giving Athens control over perhaps recently seized territory, and that she refused to send a delegate. Earlier this year, 424–423, Athens had concluded a treaty with Halieis (see 45. 2 n.); perhaps some arrangement was come to at the same time with Troizen.

Böhme points out that whereas the movements of Athenian troops occupying enemy territory are specifically restricted by the treaty, nothing is said about any corresponding restriction on Peloponnesian troops, that is, on Brasidas and his army, except in the general clause, *ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν μένειν ἐκατέρους, κ.τ.λ.* A Spartan officer and the troops under his command were of course subject to an *ἐκεχειρία* wherever they were (Böhme was quite wrong when he continued,

'the Athenians were to pay dearly for this *Leichtsinn*, cc. 122, 123, 135'; for the treaty was expressly invoked against Brasidas' later aggressions); and I incline to think that it was the Athenians who did not wish to acknowledge, in a formal document, the conquests of Brasidas. Legally the cities had seceded from the Delian League, and by the treaty of 445 Athens would be allowed to compel them back into it, as she compelled Samos in 440 (Brasidas and his men being bound by the truce). The Athenians were not so unrealistic as to suppose that they could at once attack Akanthos or Amphipolis with Brasidas sitting idly by ('an internal affair of the Athenians with which other states have no concern'); but they may well have hoped that Brasidas would be soon recalled—they would know or guess something of Spartan sentiments (108. 7)—and his force dispersed; they could then act.

5. ἀλλω δὲ κωπήρει πλοίῳ: most suppose that sailing-vessels (such as would trade with Egypt or the West) were altogether forbidden. I am not certain: the Peloponnesians are already confined to their own territory and that of their allies; and the restriction probably means 'no war vessel, and no oared vessel at all above 500 tal. burden', leaving them free to sail the ordinary merchant vessel, which could not be used, even as an auxiliary, in a battle unless supplied with oars. More notable is the omission of any definition of ἡ ἔνυμαχία: did it include Boeotia and Lokris, Melos, Perdikkas, Syracuse? Probably only the Peloponnesian League, the 'alliance' as of old.

ἐς πεντακόσια τάλαντα: this method of measuring ships' capacity is found in Herodotos, i. 194. 3, ii. 96. 5. These passages, and Thuc. vii. 25. 5, show also that a ship of 500 tal. burden was a very small one (Busolt, iii. 1165. 3).

7. τοὺς δὲ αὐτομόλους, κ.τ.λ.: primarily, helots from Lakonia and sailors (free men) from the Athenian fleet (i. 121. 3); the revolt of subject allies is not of course referred to (as Grote supposed, v, p. 347). The definite article is unexpected.

9. τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις, κ.τ.λ.: as Kirchhoff and Steup saw, the Peloponnesian delegates were given the power to 'sign' the treaty if the Athenians accepted the terms proposed (which had been agreed after discussion with Athenian delegates at Sparta), so that the truce could come into force at once; but not to alter the terms. If, therefore, the Athenians had major amendments or additions to propose, they must return to Sparta for discussion, with Athenian delegates who, the Peloponnesians request, should be given the same power, in the event of agreement, to 'sign', so that the truce may then come into force as soon as possible. The peaceful intentions of the Peloponnesians are obvious.

οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἀποστήσονται: 'they will not stand aside from any

proposals you make', as Hammond puts it (*J.H.S.* lxx, 1950, 44, n. 11); in effect, 'they will not refuse to consider' (Wade-Gery, *C.Q.* xxxvii, 1943, 69).

10. κελεύετε: Kirchhoff proposed ἐκελεύετε, and Steup agreed; it is surely better. When after discussion in Sparta (perhaps lengthy discussion) terms to be referred to Athens were agreed, the Athenian delegates urged that the Peloponnesians should be empowered to sign. On another occasion, it will be remembered (v. 45), Spartan delegates with such powers were confounded.

αἱ δὲ σπουδαῑ ἐνιαυτὸν ἔσονται: the addition of this clause here, instead of after § 8, may mean that the length of the proposed truce was only agreed after discussion in Athens and perhaps in the ekklesia; such disorders in the arrangement of treaties and other documents are not indeed so uncommon, but the repetition of the clause in the Athenian resolution (§ 12) supports this view.

ἐνιαυτός means a year of lunar months, for it is dated by the lunar calendar (§ 12, 119. 1); but does it, by implication, exclude intercalation by either side? There would seem to be some chance of misunderstanding if one party was about to enter upon an intercalary year, and the other was not; still more if intercalation, of days, or of a month, was ordered unexpectedly during the year (see Pritchett-Neugebauer, *Calendars of Athens*, e.g. pp. 56, 91). In fact, it seems, this year, 423–422, was ordinary in both cities; the next, 422–421, was intercalary in one, but not in the other: see v. 19. 1 n.

11. ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ: the beginning of the Athenian resolution regarding the proposals of §§ 1–10 made by the Peloponnesians. Since the Athenians had no alterations to propose, all were free to 'sign' the treaty straightway, as soon as the ekklesia had voted.

Kirchhoff maintained, and Steup agreed, that the omission of τῇ βουλῇ καὶ in the opening formula is not a MS. error, but shows that the motion was formulated in the ekklesia, not beforehand in the boule. Since the date of the meeting is the day after the festival of the Dionysia, the boule must have met to receive the Peloponnesian delegates and discuss their proposals some days before, the three days of the festival being holidays. The omission, says Kirchhoff, would not mean that the matter was ἀπροβούλευτον; the boule's resolution which named the day for the meeting of the ekklesia and at the same time gave the delegates their opportunity for appearing at it, is ignored because it was only formal. This is surely wrong: the essence of a formula is that it makes clear that a resolution has been formally, that is, constitutionally, passed; for 'it is important that procedure should not only be constitutional, but should be seen to be so'. Laches' motion is not even a rider or amendment (which might be raised in the ekklesia—τὰ μὲν ὅλα καθάπερ τῇ βουλῇ),

but the principal motion. The prytaneis had met every day, including the days of the festival, to elect an ἐπιστάτης if for nothing else. I would certainly emend *<τῇ βουλῇ καὶ>*¹

Λάχης εἶπε: on his political affinities, see below, n. on Αθηναῖων δὲ οἱ στρατηγοί, 119. 2.

12. τὴν *<δ>* ἐκεχειρίαν: the punctuation adopted in O.C.T. and Hude and the emendation are Kirchhoff's and are clearly right.

τετράδα ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνός: see 119. 1, below, and v. 19. 1 n. This is the day after the city Dionysia, and the Peloponnesian delegates must have arrived for discussion with the boule a day or two at least before the festival began and have stayed in Athens while it lasted. They were guests of the state, and were doubtless taken to see the tragedies and comedies in the theatre: there they would have seen representatives of 150 and more states of the Athenian empire, 'the allies' of Athens who do not require a mention in Athenian treaties; there also they would have seen Kratinos win the prize with *Pytine*, Aristophanes come a disappointed second or third, with *The Clouds*, and Ameipsias' *Komos*—as it happened, a trio of comedies with, for the time, less of politics in them than might have been expected. Some of the delegates, one would guess, were present at a Dionysia for the first time, and the experience must have been an interesting one. Did Athenaios the Spartan return home as strong for friendship with Athens as his father had wished him to be?

13. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ίόντας ὡς ἀλλήλους, κ.τ.λ.: this was the main purpose of the truce; inserted in Laches' resolution, but clearly in keeping with the expressed aims of the Peloponnesians. So Thucydides himself informs us, 117. 1, v. 15. 2.

14. ἐκκλησίαν δὲ ποιήσαντας, κ.τ.λ.: edd. refer to ii. 59. 3 to illustrate the powers of the strategoi to call a meeting of the ekklēsia; but that referred to their right to demand a special meeting in an urgent matter; this is normal procedure in which the boule and strategoi share responsibility.

The lacuna in the text was established by Kirchhoff: the business of strategoi is *χρηματίσαι*, not *βουλεύσασθαι*; we can hardly allow a transfer of subject from *τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς πρυτάνεις* to *Αθηναῖοις*; and *ἡ πρεσβεία*, the embassy, demands a mention or a reference in a previous clause. The Athenians must decide whether to send, or to receive, an embassy to discuss a permanent peace, or no; and to this, and perhaps more besides, *ἡ πρεσβεία* refers. Kirchhoff further objected to *καθ' ὅτι ἀν ἔστη*, that this must be the object of *βουλεύσασθαι*, and demanded the future indicative like *καθ' ὅτι ἔσται*

¹ In *I.G.* i.² 71 (below, 132. 1 n.), l. 47 [*ἐδοχοσεν τῷ*] δέμοι is printed in *S.E.G.* x. 86; but both Wilhelm and the authors of *A.T.L.* iii. 313, n. 61, restore the usual formula.

above: 'decide how' a thing will be done; and since he thought that the embassy was an Athenian one to Sparta, he proposed *εἰσων* for ἀν *έστη* (accepted by Hude). I am not convinced that *εἰσων* is right even for this meaning, nor that the embassy was to be Athenian; if it was to be Peloponnesian *έσεισων* would be a probable conjecture; but I am not even sure that *καθ' ὅτι* with the future gives the sense required: *καθ' ὅτι* ἀν *εἴπη* may be right, 'the Athenians to decide (or to discuss) whatever proposals the embassy may make to end the war'.

ἢ μὴν ἐμμενεῖν: Steup noted that this formula is surprising after *σπείσασθαι*, and suggested transposing it after *ῶμοσαν* in the next clause (see n. there). I should prefer, if necessary, to insert ⟨*καὶ δόμοσαν*⟩ before ἢ μήν.

119. 1. ταῦτα ξυνέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι, κ.τ.λ.: there is a variation of readings here, *ῶμοσαν* and *ῶμολόγησαν* (*ῶμολόγ.* E), and others too, which led Kirchhoff to bracket *καὶ* *ῶμοσαν*, in which he was followed by Hude and Stuart Jones. Steup argued that these words should stand (*ῶμολόγησαν* coming, he thought, only from an adscript to *ξυνέθεντο*; and see above on ἢ μὴν ἐμμενεῖν, 118. 14), and be placed before *Λακ.* *καὶ οἱ ξ.*; also that probably *καὶ Αθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι* is to be inserted after *Αθηναῖοι* (so that, besides, *τοῖς ξ.* are Sparta's allies): for (1) we can have an oath for a truce as for a treaty (though there is no mention of one in iv. 16, but only of *σπονδαῖ*; for a treaty, cf. v. 17. 2); (2) the oath should be mutual; and (3) there is hardly place for the Athenian allies—cf. v. 18. 1, 9. In the light of the final clause, however, *ξυνέθεντο δὲ καὶ ἐσπένδοντο*, followed by the names of Peloponnesian and Athenian 'signatories', Kirchhoff may be right that there was no oath. At first sight one would agree with Steup's ⟨*καὶ Αθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι*⟩ *καὶ τοῖς ξυμάχοις*; but only the Spartan date follows, and *ταῦτα ξυνέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξ.* corresponds to *ἔδοξεν* ⟨*τῇ βουλῇ καὶ*⟩ *τῷ δῆμῳ* above, followed later by the Athenian date.

Kirchhoff, pp. 18–19, notes that the formula is similar to those found on inscriptions: see *I.G. i.2 63. 58, 116. 24–27* (Meritt, *A.F.D.* 147).

μηνὸς ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ Γεραστίου δωδεκάτῃ: the same day as the 14th of Elaphebolion (118. 12) in Athens. For the calendar implications of this, see n. on v. 19. 1; cf. also n. on *μέχρι Πυθίων*, v. 1. 1.

2. Αθήναιος Περικλεῖδα: a suggestive name for a Spartan. None of these Peloponnesians is otherwise known, except that Athenaios went to Chalkidike with a copy of the terms of truce (122. 1), Philocharidas was a 'signatory' of the treaties of 421, and known as friendly to Athens (v. 44. 3), and Euphamidas of Corinth had been a general in 431 (ii. 33. 1) and was again a delegate in 419 (v. 55. 1).

Perikleidas, father of Athenaios, was presumably the same who came to beg Athenian help against the revolted helots forty years before, when Kimon led the Athenian forces and 'saved the city' (*Ar. Lys.* 1138–44). Kimon had called one of his sons Lakedaimonios. Αθηναίων δὲ οἱ στρατηγοί: it is often stated that signature to a truce or a treaty of peace shows, in Athens, the pacific policy and so the party affiliations of those named. This is quite unwarranted. In this particular case we know that Nikias was for peace always, and that Laches, the mover of the resolution (118. 11), was for it at this time (v. 43. 2); but nothing else. (The latter had been in command in Sicily—*τοῦ πλέονος ὀρεγομένων Αθηναίων*—and was to be strategos on the provocative campaign in Mantinea too, and he may generally have been bellicose, but have joined forces with Nikias in 423 for military reasons, or for personal ones because he had been attacked by Kleon.) Nikostratos and Autokles may, for all we know, always have belonged to the war party, so far as such a phrase can be properly used at all (see above, n. on *νομίσαντες οὐκ ἀν ἔτι, κ.τ.λ.*, 117. 1). The strategoi who 'signed' this agreement were ordered to do so by the ekklesia, and were so ordered, because, as likely as not, they were the only strategoi present; it was common, of course, for the strategoi, with the boule, to take the oath in treaties: e.g. *I.G.* i.² 87; see *J.H.S.* lxxi, 1951, 75–80.

Autokles had been in command in the campaign against Kythera in 424, with Nikias and Nikostratos (iv. 53. 1), and was strategos again in 418–417 (*I.G.* i.² 302. 16 = *Tod*, 75).

There is an interesting detail in the record of the names of those who took the oath: all are given with their patronymics, which is in accord with *Thucydides'* normal manner, but not with that of official documents, especially Athenian documents. These in certain formulae (as, e.g., δέῖνα εἰπε) give the name only; in others, the majority, they give the name and the deme; in some others name, deme, and patronymic. In v. 19 and 24. 1 names only are given. It is clear also from these later instances that the whole of c. 119 is part of the document quoted by Thucydides, not a piece of his narrative. Are we to assume that he changed the wording of the document, in this particular and this particular only? Surely not; and there is a further deviation from normal practice as known from our inscriptional evidence: with the exception of *I.G.* i.² 50 (*A.F.D.* 48–56; the treaty with Samos), where the strategoi, who all took the oath, are named, each with his phyle, and no patronymics, there is, I think, no record of a treaty preserved on stone with any names of individual Athenian 'signatories' at all, though foreign ambassadors who take the oath are named (*I.G.* i.² 51, 52, 87);¹ the one which is

¹ *I.G.* i.² 71, the treaty with Macedonian princes (below, 132. 1 n.), is different: the princes were all parties to the treaty themselves, not delegates of the state,

both recorded by Thucydides and preserved on stone (v. 47 and *I.G.* i.² 86), for example, has none. It may be that, normally or exceptionally, the names were recorded with patronymics on the papyrus copies, or, in this case, at least on the Peloponnesian copies; they would have some importance for Brasidas and for the authorities in the Greek cities in Thrace who were shown the document.

Kirchhoff, pp. 21–27, asks further the important question, when did Thucydides first see this document? or rather when was he in a position to transcribe it, word for word, or to get a copy from another? He points out that there is no evidence that it was copied on stone (no order for publication on a stele is added to the resolution), which is understandable for a year's truce, whereas treaties for 30 or 100 years or for all time were more durably recorded; and that in consequence only somebody with access to the Metroon at Athens, where official documents on papyrus were kept, could have seen it; but Thucydides was already in exile, or, if his trial was delayed and he had returned to Athens and was still there (see above, p. 585), he would be neither in a position nor in the mood to study archives. (I doubt this last point.) He might, says Kirchhoff, have got someone to copy it for him, especially after 421, but more probably he waited till 403. Steup answered that, besides the 'originals'—the copy in Attic for the Metroon and five others, at least, in Doric for each of the other 'signatory' states—there must have been one, more probably two copies, in Attic and in Doric, taken to Chalkidike by the Athenian and Spartan delegates (122. 1); and Thucydides might have been shown one; certainly he would have had a chance of learning the terms, if not of seeing the Attic copy for himself. The fact noted above that he records the names of the Athenian 'signatories' shows that he was in all probability using a papyrus copy; he at least did not wait to examine a stele which he could only have seen in Athens. The same argument applies to the document of the peace-treaty (v. 18–19), which will certainly have been recorded on a stele; the copy he saw was on papyrus.

Kirchhoff adds, however, that in his *narrative*, before and after cc. 118–19, Thucydides shows no knowledge of the peculiarities of the truce, but only of its general terms, *μένειν ἐκατέπους ἔχοντας ἀπερ νῦν ἔχοντας*, and one particular, that it was to be for a year, and of the military conditions which made it possible and the motives which inspired it (117, v. 15. 2); it is only from the document that we learn that the Boeotians, Lokrians, and Phokians take no part in the negotiations at all, that some of the Peloponnesian allies, at least apparently, did not vote for the final offer made to Athens like Greek ambassadors or strategoi. Similarly a treaty between Athens and Persia was with Artaxerxes or Dareios.

(118. 1), and that a separate truce had already been made between Athens and Troizen. The absent allies observed the truce in fact (cf. e.g. 134. 1), and may have concluded a separate treaty; but Thucydides does not tell us so. Kirchhoff, therefore, argued that he was unaware of these peculiarities before he saw the document itself, or a copy of it which he could use in the *History*, and that he died before he could complete the modification of his narrative that it required. This would make it more probable that he did not see it before his return to Athens after the war.

There is obviously something to be said in favour of this view; and it must be further considered when I deal with the other two documents which come within my present volume (as well as those which will come in the next volume). Here I will only say, first, that there is, always, an apparent capriciousness in Thucydides' choice of events worth narrating, e.g. the omission of the assessment of 425, of the embassy to Dareios of 424–423 (above, pp. 499–500), beside the inclusion of comparatively unimportant detail (e.g. iii. 90. 2 n., iv. 65. 1, 107. 3); I say 'apparently capricious' because we do not know what led to the omissions—it is *possible* that he had made notes of the events, which he put aside till he could get more information, that is, that the omissions are due to the fact that he was unable to complete his work even down to 413 B.C. Secondly, wherever he was when this truce was concluded, whether in Athens or already in exile, most of his surprising omissions about its details, for example, the absence of so many enemy states from the final confirmation, are just those which he should have found no difficulty in learning, from his usual sources of information, especially perhaps, as Steup points out, because the truce was proclaimed in Chalkidike. He learned about Brasidas in Torone, Skione, and Mende after his own retirement from office; why not also about the main terms of the truce? And he learned accurately (at least he thought so) the date when the truce began (122. 6; though see n. there).

120–3. Skione and Mende join Brasidas

120. 1. ἐπήρχοντο: the rarity of the use of the imperfect of ἔρχομαι and its compounds in Attic, prose or verse, and the doubtful meaning of ἐπέρχομαι here (*εἰς ἄλληλους ἐκάτεροι*, says a scholiast; but this is only what we should like it to mean: 'were approaching', even with hostile intent, would be normal), have led some edd. to take this as from ἐπάρχομαι: " = σπένδομαι ; zu vergleichen ist besonders das homerische ἐπάρξασθαι δεπάεσσων ", Steup, after L. Herbst. But, apart from a doubt whether Thucydides would thus use ἐπάρχομαι without further explanation, are we really to understand that the σπένδεσθαι itself took several days and that Thucydides wished to define in this

way the time of Skione's revolt? It revolted in fact in the interval between the actual acceptance of the truce by *σπονδαῖ* and the arrival of the delegates to announce it. In view especially of 122. 3–6, I do not doubt that he meant to say 'while delegates (from both sides) were leaving (Athens or Sparta) to announce the truce', or 'were approaching the various states at war'; and that *ἐπήρχοντο* is a late adscript which has ousted the true reading. It is very curious that immediately below, 121. 1, there should be a similar problem about *προσήρχοντο*.

Σκιώνη: the site has not been discovered for certain; but see *A.T.L.* i, Gazetteer. It was the most easterly of the towns of Pallene, near the south-east foot of the peninsula.

Skione had regularly paid 6 tal. a year tribute up to 440 B.C. (except during the second assessment period, when its payment was included with that of Mende); there is then a gap in the record, and afterwards we find 15 tal. in 435–434, 4 tal. in 432–431, 9 tal. in 430–429–428. The amount for which it was assessed in 425 is not known. The other variations in the amount paid can readily be explained (the reduction to 4 tal. in 431 as a reward for loyalty after the revolt of Poteidaia, or because Athenian strategoi levied supplies or special troops; the increase in 430, owing to the expenses of the siege of Poteidaia), but not the 15 tal. in 434. Poteidaia, after paying 6 tal. regularly till 435–434, paid 15 tal. in 433–432 and perhaps in 434–433, where the figure is missing on the stone; the increase in the assessment was doubtless part of the pressure brought to bear on her at this time and helps to explain her secession in 432. In the list for the year 435–434 the entry for Poteidaia comes immediately before that of Skione:

I^Μ Ποτειδέαται
X^Μ Σκιωναῖοι

and the authors of *A.T.L.* (iii. 64–65) now make the attractive suggestion that the stone-cutter, or the clerk who had made his copy, made a mistake and that the two amounts should be transposed; so that Poteidaia was already paying 15 tal. by 435–434, and Skione never paid this amount at all, and in this year paid the 6 tal. which had been her tribute in the past.

φασὶ δὲ οἱ Σκιωναῖοι, κ.τ.λ.: such a phrase could refer either to local tradition known by hearsay only, or to written statements in books recording local tradition; and the local tradition was, in this case, also the official version of past history. But Skione was utterly destroyed, the men killed, the women and children sold as slaves, and the land given over to Plataians, in the summer of 421 (v. 32. 1); it disappears from the *History*: could Thucydides write *φασὶν οἱ Σκιωναῖοι* after 421? or, if he wrote it before, did he leave it unaltered?

We could say in English, in such circumstances, 'the Skionean tradition *is that*', etc.; but it is the difference in form which makes that possible. Or does he mean, as Steup says, the continued tradition, still living among the women and children who were removed to Olynthos in 423 (below, 123. 4)? Cf. n. on *Ποτειδέατας*, *οἱ οἰκοῦσιν*, i. 56. 2.

Note the usual interest taken in the origin of the Greek colonial states (109. 3 n.).

τῷ χειμῶνι φέρχρίσαντο Ἀχαιοῖ: the well-known storms which wrecked the Greeks returning from their triumph over Troy; cf. vi. 2. 3, where also Ἀχαιοῖ is used for the Greeks of the epic (cf. i. 3. 3).

2. διέπλευσε νυκτός: from Torone. The details of the journey that follow are interesting, and obviously learnt at the time; interesting, because the precautions were unnecessary. The Athenian navy is still playing little part; and anyhow a strict blockade was impossible for Greek triremes (my *Essays*, p. 201). But we should like to know where Brasidas got his trireme from—Amphipolis (108. 6)?

ἀντιπάλου: not exactly 'another trireme of equal strength', as though triremes like modern battleships were measured one with another by their power, but certainly 'to balance matters' (as in 10. 5), so to speak, not simply 'a hostile trireme', as Steup: a trireme would be larger, or more effective, than a πλοῖον τοῦ κέλητος μεῖζον.

τρέψεσθαι: the future here is obviously necessary, or *⟨ān⟩ τρέψασθαι*; and it is worth noticing that all our major MSS. have τρέψασθαι—elsewhere edd. often make a fuss of altering similar MSS. readings, involving, for example, *ān* with the future. Cf. 126. 5.

3. ἢ τε ἐν τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ καὶ Τορώνῃ: 85–87, 114. 3–5.

οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ νησιῶται: see 121. 2 n.

ἀτολμίᾳ ἀνάγκην σφίσι προσγενέσθαι: very encouraging to the men of Skione, but not very tactful towards Akanthos, Torone, and other states which had helped him. The hard necessity to choose freedom had been imposed on Akanthos: see 87. 6 n.

εἴ τε θήσεται, κ.τ.λ.: i.e. 'if I am going to win over all Chalkidike', or 'all the cities of the Thracian coast' (Steup). (It was apparently Argyriádes in 1895, not Stuart Jones, who first suggested this reading: see Steup's n.)

121. 1. ἐπήρθησάν τε, κ.τ.λ.: the people of Skione were excited and encouraged, all of them (unlike those of Akanthos, Amphipolis, Torone, and Mende, where only the energetic few joined Brasidas), and were enthusiastic for carrying on the war; it was they who suffered the hardest fate. Sparta, whose general, with such flattering words, had induced them to join him, deserted them; when they were hard pressed, they could get less help from her than Plataia got from Athens.

πάντες ὄμοιῶς: nobles and masses alike, as the Athenians in 430 and 415 (cf. above, nn. on ii. 59. 1 and iv. 117. 1).

προσήρχοντο: cf. n. on *ἐπήρχοντο*, 120. I. *προσάρχομαι*, if it can properly mean 'offered first-fruits to' (*primitiis honorabant*, Stahl), might do here. See Addenda.

ῶσπερ ἀθλητῆ: cf. Plut. *Per.* 28. 5, perhaps in imitation of this passage, but there it is Athenians applauding their own Perikles.

"The sympathy and admiration felt in Greece towards a victorious athlete was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was perhaps of all others the most widespread and Panhellenic. It was connected with the religion, the taste, and the love of recreation common to the whole nation—while politics tended rather to disunite the separate cities: it was further a sentiment at once familiar and intensely personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason. But Thucydides cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and unanimity with which Brasidas was welcomed at Skione . . . than by using this simile" (Grote, v, p. 350). And, I believe, there is no satire here in Thucydides.

Just before, Grote had written: "this remarkable incident illustrates what I observed before—that the achievements, the self-relying march, the straightforward politics, and probity of this illustrious man—who in character was more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant—inspired a personal emotion towards him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life." Curiously almost the only other instance from the fifth century, of a man being enthusiastically received in another state, was Themistokles in Sparta: Hdt. viii. 124. 3; Thuc. i. 74. 1, 91. 1; Plut. *Them.* 17. 2–3.

2. ἐπεραίωσε: see 122. 2 n. Perhaps Brasidas himself stayed at Torone (see 122. 2)—Steup. The Athenians can now (cf. 120. 2 n.) justly, it would seem, be accused of sluggishness. They had had warning enough. Perhaps Kleon was too busy prosecuting Thucydides and Eukles, and Nikias too busy with promoting the truce, for attention to be paid to military needs; with the result that the efforts of the former for war and of the latter for peace alike failed.

τῆς τε Μένδης: also on the south coast of the peninsula, to the west of Skione. The site is about a mile south-east of the village of Kalándra—at least the identification is most probable: Leake, iii. 156–7; Meritt, *A.J.A.* xxvii, 1923, 447–50.

Its tribute record is steady: with only slight variations (including that when it was combined with Skione: above, 120. 1 n.), it paid 8 tal. from 451 to 428, with no increase after the war began such as had been imposed on Skione.

τῆς Ποτειδαίας: last mentioned in ii. 79. 7, when the Athenian forces

retreat there after Spartolos. Its capture in 429 had been related in ii. 70.

ώς ἐσ τῆσον: see 120. 3. For the Athenian feeling about *islanders* daring to show independence, see below, 122. 5, and ii. 62. 2 n., iii. 39. 2, 91. 2, v. 99. In an interesting passage in his *En Campagne avec Thucydide*, 1921, pp. 92, 122 (see my Sather lectures, p. 157, n. 7), Thibaudet compares the Athenian with the British naval empire, pointing out that strategically India is virtually an island (*ώς ἐσ τῆσον ἐπήλθομεν*).

καὶ τι αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπράσσετο: clearly without such enthusiasm as was shown at Skione; more like Torone.

122. 1. Άριστώνυμος: nothing more is known of him.

2. ἡ μὲν στρατιὰ πάλιν διέβη: as Steup notes, there was no dispute that this force had left Torone after the date of the armistice; and probably there were among the troops some from allies who now accepted its terms. So the Peloponnesian commander withdrew them; the aorist, *ἐπεράλωσε*, in 121. 2 should mean that they had reached and landed at Skione.

τῷ Βρασίδᾳ: bracketed by many, because the ambassadors were already arrived at his headquarters (*παρ' αὐτὸν* above); unnecessarily.

5. δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἥθελον κινδυνεύειν: we can see the fiery Marathonomachai, Acharnians, and waspish dicasts, refusing with indignation, though this was one of the things they had just agreed to (118. 8). Brasidas' conduct was certainly provocative; and Sparta's word, as ever (they would say), not to be trusted.

στρατεύειν δὲ ὡς τάχιστα: this also is characteristic. True, the normal campaigning season was barely begun, especially at sea; but in the crisis following the fall of Amphipolis the warlike Kleon might have persuaded his fellow countrymen to make a special effort to send a fleet to save other Athenian possessions in the Thraceward region. **οἱ ἐν ταῖς νήσοις ἥδη ὄντες:** some transpose *ἥδη* and *ὄντες*, others bracket *ὄντες*; Steup keeps the MSS. reading, but still takes *ἥδη* with *ἀξιοῦσι*. We might read *δή* for *ἥδη*—they are really only *like* islanders (120. 3); or translate, 'they who were now islanders after the capture of Poteidaia'; or we must transpose *ἥδη*. The use of *ἐν ταῖς νήσοις* (instead of *νησιῶται*) suggests to me that *δή* is right, for it more clearly needs, as it were, apology.

τῇ κατὰ γῆν Λακεδαιμονίων ισχύι ἀνωφελεῖ: cf. the Melian debate, v. 104–10. This might seem remarkable now, after their experience of Brasidas; but the *land* force of the enemy could not reach Skione, past Poteidaia. Brasidas had necessarily approached by sea, and the Athenians could now prevent further aid that way. See 129. 1, 135.

6. εἰχε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, κ.τ.λ.: it would seem that Thucydides was confident that he knew the dates when the truce came into force and

when Skione revolted; see above, p. 607. Yet this might mean not that, but 'the majority of my intelligent and reliable informants, including some Spartans and Skionaioi, agreed that the Athenian claim was correct, and that the revolt occurred two days after the truce came into force'; i.e. Thucydides is not necessarily saying that *he* knew the calendar dates of the two days.

τάλλα ἡσυχάζοντες: they probably congratulated themselves that they were 'localizing' at least this new conflict.

123. 1. Ἐρετριῶν ἀποικία: cf. 109. 3 n. This description of Mende, however short, after the mention of the place just above, 121. 2, is characteristic. Cf. 108. 1 n.

2. ὅτι οὐ προύδιους: they knew Brasidas (or nearly—Brasidas was also committed to Perdikkas: 124), but did not know Sparta; 81. 3 n. **τῶν πρασσόντων σφίσιν, κ.τ.λ.:** 'their negotiators', almost 'their pro-Spartans'. I agree with Classen that a considerable improvement is made by bracketing *καὶ* before *καταβιασαμένων*; we then get two principal reasons for the readiness of Mende to revolt, *τήν τε τοῦ Βρασίδου γνώμην ὄρωντες ἔτοιμην* and *τῶν πρασσόντων σφίσιν* — — *καταβιασαμένων* ('because their negotiators, few in number and refusing to give up since they had once intended the coup, and fearing revelation of their intrigues, forced the majority'). *ὡς τότε ἐμέλλησαν* refers to the last sentence of 121. 2; and *ἐμέλλησαν* must be taken as in i. 134. 4. *ἀ τότε ἐμέλλησαν* would have been easier.

παρὰ γνώμην: 'contrary to their true intentions', but here the *γνώμη* of the object of the verb, not of the subject.

4. παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας: but not apparently all—see v. 32. 1 n. It was an obvious precaution after the terms of the Athenian decree were known; and Athens could not prevent them, though they presumably went by sea (to Torone), not up the Pallene peninsula, past Aphytis and Poteidaia.

124–8. Campaign of Brasidas and Perdikkas in Lynkestis

124. 1. τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Λύγκον: see 83 for the first time; and for Lynkestis, ii. 99. 2 n. We are not told by what means Perdikkas persuaded Brasidas to march against the man he had treated with the year before (83. 6); presumably by keeping him short of supplies. Unless Brasidas was helpless in the matter he was dividing his forces in a reckless, almost an Athenian, manner, as well as leaving his new allies to face the enemy (§ 4).

τῶν ἐνοικούντων Ἑλλήνων: the inhabitants of those cities on the coast which were predominantly Greek but had long been within the Macedonian kingdom, Strepsa, Pydna, and others (see vol. i, pp. 214–15, and Edson's paper cited above, p. 545); for Methone see below, 129. 4 n.

πρὸς τοῖς αὐτοῦ περιλοίποις: i.e. in addition to those he still had

after sending the 500 to Skione and Mende (123. 4) and keeping probably some troops in other towns. Brasidas had left the Peloponnesus with 1,700 hoplites (78. 1). I agree with Steup that Popo's suggested *αὐτοῦ*, in contrast with *ό μὲν ὅν ἐκράτει*, is preferable to the vulgate *αὐτοῦ* ('there').

τῶν βαρβάρων: only Macedonians, according to Steup; allies of the Macedonians, say others. Steup may be right; see esp. 126. 3, where Illyrians are also referred to; and 125. 1 n.

3. *λόφον ἐκατέρωθεν, πεδίου δὲ τοῦ μέσου ὄντος*: this is not sufficiently detailed for identification, but it would suit the gap in the mountains of western Macedonia which is generally called the pass of Lynkos; see 83. 2 n. All around is mountain country, *τὰ μετέωρα* mentioned below.

4. *τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους*: exactly where these come from is not stated, but probably from the north-west, beyond the lakes, and through Lynkestis (the plain of Monastir), the easiest approach both to Eordia and to Macedonia proper from the north.

There is extant the fragment of an Attic decree, *I.G. i.² 72* (=S.E.G. x. 88), honouring a certain Grabos, who was probably an Illyrian (cf. *I.G. ii.² 127*), which belongs about this time. Some Illyrians clearly may have done some good service to Athens.

ጀ Περδίκκας ἔβούλετο - - -, *Βρασίδας δέ, κ.τ.λ.*: this was the principal weakness of Brasidas' position, that he had from time to time to leave Chalkidike and Greek Thrace to aid Perdikkas, yet a quarrel with him was always likely; but the Athenians seem not to have made good use of it.

125. 1. *ὅτι οἱ Ἰλλυρίοι*: only B omits *καὶ* after *ὅτι*, and there seems every reason for keeping it—omission is commoner than insertion, and the meaning is, 'besides this, the Illyrians were actually on the other side, having betrayed Perdikkas'.

νυκτός τε ἐπιγενομένης: I would bracket *τε*.

οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες: Steup inserts *ἴππεῖς* here, because he thinks *τὸ πλῆθος τῶν βαρβάρων* is also all Macedonian (124. 1 n.).

ጀπερ φιλεῖ, κ.τ.λ.: 'the sort of panic, without apparent cause, which is liable to strike large armies'; as in vii. 80. 3, though there there was some excuse for the confusion. W. Schmid, *Rh. Mus.* 1, 1895, 310-11, thinks that by *ἀσαφῶς* Thucydides, in his enlightened way, is denying the superstition that Pan sent panics, and Steup follows him; but I doubt this. *ἀσαφῶς* is almost equivalent to *ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως* (ii. 49. 2).

2. *προκεχωρηκότας*: Hude prints Herwerden's conjecture, *προανακεχωρηκότας*; unnecessarily, for both Perdikkas and Brasidas had agreed to retreat, and it can be said, therefore, that the former 'had gone on ahead'.

3. ἐκδρόμους: Stahl suggests, so placed within the square that they could break out through narrow gaps in the ranks, as the Peloponnesians had intended their fast ships to do in the first action against Phormion, ii. 83. 5.

126. 1. *Speech of Brasidas to his troops.*

Thucydides gives yet another general's speech because the situation in which these troops find themselves is different: the description of the barbarians' mode of fighting and its effect distinguishes it from the rest of such speeches.

ἄνδρες Πελοπονήσιοι: yet the majority of his troops were not Peloponnesians, but Chalkidians, 124. 1 (there would not be more than 1,100 Peloponnesians; of these some were helots, who in this address are altogether forgotten). See § 2, below, and v. 9. 1 n. It may be simply conventional simplification; it may be more deliberate, as perhaps with the Athenian parties or factions, as explained by Mme de Romilly, 57–62 (above, p. 593).

τὴν ἀπόλειψιν τῶν ἡμετέρων: edd. take ἀπόλευψις actively, 'defection' (so L. and S.); and not unnaturally Steup says we should read τῶν ἡμετέρων *(ξυμμάχων)*. It would be simpler to take it as passive, 'the desertion of our troops (by the Macedonians)', 'our own isolation'; 'our abandonment by our allies' (Forster Smith); as τῷ μεμονῶσθαι above.

τὰ μέγιστα: i.e. their own superiority in discipline and morale (Steup).
2. μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἔτερων: as Demaratos says of the Spartans (Hdt. vii. 104. 4–5), Phormion of the Athenians at sea (Thuc. ii. 88. 2).

οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοί, κ.τ.λ.: see my n. in C.R. N.S. i, 1951, 135–6, where I have argued against the view of edd. that Brasidas is alluding to the proud Peloponnesian position, the few and brave ruling a majority of a lower class, an interpretation which requires either emendation (omission of *μηδέ* or of *οὐ* before *πολλοί*, or *οἱ πολλοί*, or *ἐν αἷς* *(δέ)*), or a strained construction (e.g. Steup's); on the contrary *δυναστεία* is here, as elsewhere in Thucydides, an opprobrious term to describe a narrow clique of rulers (iii. 62. 3, where it is the opposite of all that Sparta stood for—note especially *κατέχοντες ἴσχυν τὸ πλῆθος* and *ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις οὐκ αὐτοκράτωρ οὖσα ἑαυτῆς*—iv. 78. 3, vi. 38. 3, 89. 4);¹ and Brasidas

¹ A similar use of *δυναστεία* is found in Plato and Aristotle: *Rep.* viii. 544 D, *δυναστεῖαι καὶ ἀνητραὶ βασιλεῖαι*, where Cornford curiously translates *δυναστεῖαι* 'hereditary monarchies', which gives the wrong colour, suggesting a Theseus or Dareios or the Spartan kingship: Plato, like Thucydides, means a variety of oligarchy and a deformed variety (*πολλαὶ γοῦν καὶ ἄποποι, ἔφη, λέγονται*); *Pol.* iv. 5. 1292 b 5, *ἔτερον εἶδος δλιγαρχίας, ὅταν πᾶς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίη, τέταρτον δ' ὅταν --- ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἄρχοντες, καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς δλιγαρχίαις ώσπερ ἡ τυραννίς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις --- καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην δλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν*.

Another interesting use is Plato's in *Epist.* vii. 325 B–C, 326 D, of *δυναστεύειν*

with these words is describing the situation in the enemy's camp—a mass of unwilling soldiers driven on by their rulers, unlike the free citizens of a Greek city (cf. his words later, v. 9. 1). No emendation is required: 'do not fear their numbers, for you do not at all come from states in which not many rule a few, but a few the many, having won their mastery only by military prowess'—the few being the princely families of the Lynkestai, the Illyrians, and others (many of whom claimed Greek descent, which would particularly distinguish them from their subjects). Not only democratic states, not only the normal Peloponnesians of Phleious, Sikyon, or Mantinea who were to be found in Brasidas' army, but the Spartans themselves asserted their freedom and equality when opposed to the barbarian (the autocrat with his *servants*); as Demaratos did to Xerxes, as Agesilaos, according to Plutarch, *Aροφ. Lak.* (Agesil. 50), *Mor.* 212 B, did to Xenophon in urging him to let his sons be educated at Sparta, *ώς τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν μαθημάτων παιδευθησομένους, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.*

Luschnat, p. 61, who interprets the passage in the traditional way, with Steup's rendering ("ihr kommt auch nicht aus derartigen Staaten; in ihnen herrschen nicht viele über wenige, sondern", etc.), thinks that Brasidas is addressing only the 300 *λογάδες*, who would all be Peloponnesians. I do not believe this is right, but that *ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσου* is conventional (see v. 9. 1 n.); it is not only the *λογάδες* who must stand firm against the barbarian onslaught (§ 6 and 127. 2, init.); and indeed these *λογάδες* may well have included some of the ex-helots, if not Chalkidians. In any case they would not recognize their cities as ruled by a *δυναστεία*, and would not be complimented if they did; Mantinea indeed was a democracy (v. 29. 1: perhaps already of the special type described by Aristotle, *Pol.* vi. 4. 4–5, 1318 b 21; see Larsen, *C.P.* xliv, 1950, 180–2).

3. *προηγώνισθε τοῖς Μακεδόσιν αὐτῶν*: the previous conflict is presumably that just related, 124. 3. ii. 99. 2 and iv. 83. 1 show that the Lynkestai were regarded as Macedonians.

εἰκάζω τε καὶ ἄλλων ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι: although *εἰκάζων* is the reading of the great majority of MSS., and *εἰκάζων τε καὶ ἄλλων ἀκοῇ* would be a typical Thucydidean combination, yet Stuart Jones was surely right to read *εἰκάζω* (with Stahl, against Classen, Steup, and Hude); for it is the proper contrast with *ἐπίσταμαι*, not a basis for *ἐπιστήμη*. Steup indeed defends *εἰκάζων* on the ground that *ἐπίσταμαι* here means 'believe', a purely subjective conviction, unlike *εἰδέναι*, 'a use not rare in Thucydides, as ii. 35. 2, iv. 10. 5, 73. 1, v. 36. 1'. iv. 10. 5, *ἐπισταμένους ἐμπειρίᾳ*, was an unfortunate comparison; so was ii. 35.

(in the latter case in contrast with *ἰσόνομος πολιτείᾳ*), to mean the control of cities by groups of politicians in the early fourth century, including that group which got Sokrates condemned.

2, where ἐπίσταται is used of ὁ ἔννεδός; and neither of the others has in it any element of τὸ εἰκάζειν.

ἄλλων ἀκοῇ can mean 'from history' as easily as 'from what others tell me' literally.

4. καὶ γὰρ ὅσα μέν, κ.τ.λ.: Graves cites this and § 6 below, and 117. 2, as instances where the δέ-clause is concessive; and so they may appear at first sight. But οἷς δὲ βεβαίως τι πρόσεστιν ἀγαθόν in fact carries its full weight: ὥσπερ ἡμῖν, says the scholiast rightly. Formally it may mean simply 'it would be better not to explain, and men would fight the more boldly'; but in effect it means 'our advantage over the enemy lies in our superior discipline and courage, ignorance of which may indeed lead him to attack us boldly enough; but—let him try!' (A better instance of a concessive δέ-clause than these would be vi. 12. 2, τὰ μὲν δημόσια ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀναλοῦν.)

There is no need for Bekker's προγενομένη for MSS. προσγενομένη, though Steup and Hude adopt it.

5. πλήθει ὄψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοῆς μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι: how different from the Macedonian army less than a hundred years later, which the Greeks knew so well! (These words, it is true, are meant more for the Illyrians; but all of the enemy, and the allies who have deserted them, are βάρβαροι.) Edd. have quoted many similar descriptions of barbarian fighting from later writers, as Livy, vii. 10. 8, xxxviii. 17; Tacitus, *Germ.* 6.

πλήθει ὄψεως is one of the strangest of Thucydides' expressions, and one can understand, though not follow, Rutherford's bracketing of ὄψεως. "Amplitudine spectaculi (quod conferta acies praebebat)", Lobeck ad Soph. *Aj.* 196, quoted by Stahl; who adds, "monemus non de multitudine hic agi, sed de ampla specie, quam immania barbarorum corpora habeant". But I doubt this; and it makes it no easier.

οὕτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες, κ.τ.λ.: cf. Plat. *Legg.* 706 C–707 D, and vol. i, pp. 266–7. And with this and ἀνεξέλεγκτον τὸ ἀνδρεῖον, cf. 40. 2, on Spartan fighting; but also ἀνευ τάξεως below, 128. 1; and v. 9, 4–5. αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη: a bold phrase for 'the kind of fighting in which each man is his own master, decides his own tactics, fights independently of his fellows'. Not quite 'arbitrary fighting', with a comparison with 108. 4; where see n. αὐτοκράτορες in 63. 2 is nearer in meaning: 'each state independent of the rest.' For the scholia here see Powell, *C.Q.* XXX, 1936, p. 86.

6. ἔργῳ μέν, κ.τ.λ.: see § 4 n., above; but μέν here is surely concessive, 'though trifling in action'—Brasidas dismisses it. It would be better to have only a colon after κατασπέρχον. The use of κατασπέρχον, 'will impress, forcibly', a word found elsewhere only in Ar. *Ach.* 1188 in classical Greek, is noteworthy; cf. ἐπέσπερχε, 12. 1 (used of Brasidas, incidentally).

κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει: cf. εὐτάκτοι---κόσμον καὶ σιγήν, in Phormion's speech, ii. 89. 9; and iii. 108. 3 for the opposite.

μελλήσει: I find this awkward, and suspect that it may be the remains of a note on ἀπωθεν ἀπειλᾶς which referred to τὴν μέλλησιν --- φοβεράν, § 5. Dio Cassius, xxxix. 45. 2, copied this sentence, without μελλήσει and with ἐν ταῖς ἀπειλᾶς, which led Hude to insert ἐν here.

οὐδὲ δ' ἂν εἰξωσιν, κ.τ.λ.: Graves treats this too as concessive (see § 4, above); but clearly it contains the core of the whole matter—the clear warning, almost threat: 'if you give way to their onslaught, then they will show their courage fast enough, at your heels.' Brasidas knows perfectly how to combine encouragement and warning, at times putting the final emphasis on the former, as 87. 2–6 (where see n.), at times on the latter.

127. 2. ἐπικειμένους: Hude's ἐπικειμένους would certainly be easier, though i. 144. 4 is a case (an easier one) of ὑφίστασθαι in this sense with an accusative object. Perhaps we should read ἐπικείμενος, 'resisted by attacking with his select troops'.

ἐπί τε τοὺς φεύγοντας τῶν Μακεδόνων: the genitive is not partitive, for the whole of Perdikkas' army had retired; but as in οἱ τριακόσιοι τῶν Σκιωναίων, 130. 1 (after Σκ. τριακόσιοι, 129. 3).

τὴν ἔσβολήν: since this is described as ἐς τὴν Ἀρραβαίου, it is presumably identical with ἡ ἔσβολὴ τῆς Λύγκου, 83. 2. It is now taken to be the narrow, though not lofty, pass, called in Turkish times Kirli Derven, between Eordia in the south and Lynkos, the gap through which invaders and travellers have gone from the plain of Monastir (Herakleia Lynkou) either south through Eordia into Greece, or eastwards, by Lake Ostrovo, to Thessalonike. It is disputed whether the Via Egnatia went from Herakleia by the pass of Bánitsa, north of the Kirli Derven and of Lake Ostrovo, in a general easterly direction, to Edessa, or south through Kirli and north-east along the shore of the lake: for a recent discussion see C. F. Edson, *C.P.* xlvi, 1951, 1–16, who argues for the latter; but Edson is in no doubt that the pass and its hills mentioned by Thucydides, both here and 124. 3, is Kirli (p. 4 and n. 29); and that Polybius' *αἱ εἰς τὴν Ἐορδαίαν ὑπερβολαί* (xviii. 23. 3) refers to the same pass in the opposite direction. I am not convinced that Thucydides' description is so precise that the Bánitsa pass, from Perdikkas' country (that is, from Edessa), is not the ἔσβολὴ τῆς Λύγκου, Polybius of course meaning the Kirli Derven. It would be the more direct way, and we could understand more easily why the Lynkestai and Illyrians gave up the pursuit once Brasidas had got through the pass, because he was now in Perdikkas' territory *καὶ διαπεφευγέναι* (128. 2). Unfortunately the question cannot be decided by the site of Arnisa (128. 3), which

is unknown. But I do not know the country so well as Edson does, and the Bánitsa pass not at all, and his judgement carries weight.

128. 1. ἀνευ τάξεως: ‘without keeping to their ranks’, ‘in open formation’, because it was to be hill-fighting. Orthodox hoplite fighting was the Peloponnesian, and especially the Spartan, ideal (40. 2, and by contrast, 126. 5); but they could use other methods if necessary, especially when led by Brasidas; see esp. v. 9. 5.

τοὺς ἥδη ἐπόντας: the MSS. reading *ἐπίόντας* is by no means certainly wrong; and that it is wrong in 131. 2 is not necessarily an argument for assuming that it is here.

3. ἀφικνεῖται: the story of this march is told in great detail, yet it is over quickly, and Brasidas had little difficulty.

5. Βρασίδαν: though the soldiers’ spoliation of the Macedonians was spontaneous and not by order (*αὐτοὶ ὄργιζόμενοι* above), Brasidas had not stopped them.

τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ, κ.τ.λ.: this is generally translated somewhat as follows—he had a hatred for the Peloponnesians which in his heart was, because of the Athenians, uncongenial to him'; i.e. the presence of the active Athenians in Chalkidike and Thrace made him naturally prepared to be friends with their enemies the Peloponnesians, but now he felt an unwonted hatred for them. The sentence goes on, ‘and so, departing from his necessary interests (the undeniable advantages which alliance with the Peloponnesians gave him) he now sought how best to compose his differences with Athens and get quit of Brasidas and his troops’; and I agree with Arnold, who seems to be the only ed. to have seen the major difficulty in this, that “one would suppose that the words *τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων ξυμφόρων διαναστάς* must answer to *τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ* --- *μῆτος εἰχε*; which according to the above interpretation they do not, and the particle *μέν* has nothing to answer to it”. The clause beginning with *τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ* should express Perdikkas’ real feelings or opinions, and should be opposed to what he was compelled (*ἀναγκαίων*) now to do, and not be the cause of it. Add to this the extreme obscurity and difficulty of the phrases *τῶν ἀναγκαίων ξυμφόρων* and *τῶν ξυμφόρων διαναστάς*, and we are almost left with no alternative but to mark the sentence as corrupt. Madvig’s *τῷ δὲ ἀναγκαίῳ ξυμφόρῳ διαστάς*, adopted by Stahl, Classen, and Hude, only helps in that it at least gives us an external cause for a change of policy, to balance *τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ*, but it leaves *διαστάς* unexplained. Steup’s transposition of *δὶ Ἀθηναίους* to the next clause, after *ξυμφόρων* and to be taken with it, is no improvement.

The first part of the sentence, however, is not difficult. The sense required is (put in clumsy English, to preserve the Greek order): ‘his future attitude to the Peloponnesians was that, while he had,

owing to the actions of Athens, no deep-seated hatred for them, he was compelled to forsake his true interests and come to terms with Athens and get rid of them'; and it is the mistranslation of οὐ ξύνηθες as 'extraordinary' or 'unnatural', making the μέν-clause in effect positive instead of negative, that has led to the trouble. With ξύνηθες μῖσος cf. vi. 34. 4, τὸ ξύνηθες ἡσυχον. It is, however, difficult to believe that τ. ἀν. ξ. διαναστάς can be Thucydides' words for διὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην συμφέρειν νομίσας μωσεῖν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀποστάς, which the scholiast, perhaps rightly, gives as the general sense. See my n. in *C.Q.* i, 1951, 136–7, where I have suggested as well that some case of ξυμφορά rather than of ξύμφορον is required, τῇ δὲ ἀναγκαῖῳ ξυμφορᾷ giving the sense we need, 'the compelling situation'. (Busolt, iii. 1168. 3, prints τῶν δὲ ἀν. ξυμφορῶν, but it is not clear from his text that this is not a misprint for the ξυμφόρων which most edd. read.) See Mervyn Jones, *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.*, 1951, 24, who proposes διὰ δὲ ἀναγκαίων ξυμφορῶν ἀναστάς (or perhaps ἀπαναστάς), 'extricating himself with the minimum of disasters': ἀναστάς, 'withdrawing', as in vii. 49. 2, 50. 3; διὰ with the genitive of 'attendant circumstances'; and the 'disasters' being the mishaps which Perdikkas 'had to suffer before he was certain that Brasidas was not an ideal ally'.

Thucydides does not tell us how Perdikkas, without the help of Brasidas, made comfortable terms with Arrabaios. For the agreement between Perdikkas and Athens, see 132. 1 n.

129–32. Athenian Counter-attacks in Pallene. Perdikkas changes sides

129. 2. ἐπὶ τε τὴν Μένδην καὶ τὴν Σκιώνην: not against Torone as well, which was protected by the terms of the one year's truce (Busolt, iii. 1169. 4).

ὅν ἡσαν δέκα Χῖαι: Chios as usual obedient, especially just now: Eupolis, *Poleis*, fr. 232, a play produced perhaps the following spring (below, 132. 2 n.). Cf. Mytilene's argument, iii. 11. 4.

τοξόταις ἔξακοσίοις: it seems that they were citizen archers (ii. 13. 8).

πελτασταῖς: Athens was learning to appreciate these light-armed troops (ii. 79. 4–6).

Νικίας — — — Νικόστρατος: they had served together before against Kythera, 53. 1. Nikostratos was a bold and enterprising commander, and this combination seems a foretaste of the later one of Nikias and Alkibiades.

3. ἐκ Ποτειδαίας: i.e. they made Poteidaia their base.

κατὰ τὸ Ποσειδώνιον: either a promontory or a shrine, or a promontory with a shrine on it. It has been identified with the cape now called Posédi, Leake, iii. 156.

ξύμπαντες [δέ] ἐπτακόσιοι ὄπλῖται: Steup argues that a mention of light-armed has fallen out, because (1) Polydamidas had 300 peltastai in his command; (2) Mende itself probably had some light-armed; (3) even putting aside (1) and (2), the total 700 is too small, for Polydamidas will surely have had with him the majority of his 500 Peloponnesians, and to them we must add the Mendaioi and the 300 Skionaioi (123. 4). Further, after the departure of these last, he was still anxious to meet the Athenians in battle outside the walls (130. 1, 3). Steup would, therefore, read ξύμπαντες δέ (keeping the MSS. δέ, perhaps rightly) ἐπτακόσιοι ὄπλῖται <καὶ ἵσοι (or ἔξακόσιοι or ὀκτακόσιοι) πελτασταί>. This seems probable, though the number 700 for the hoplite force still seems too small.

4. Μεθωναίους: Methone, geographically within Macedonia, held a special position within the Athenian domain. See vol. i, p. 214; *A.T.L.* ii, D 3–6 (= *I.G.* i.² 57, Tod, 61; see *S.E.G.* x. 66), iii, pp. 133–7; and compare vi. 7. 3.

τραυματιζόμενος: not Nikias himself (which, as Graves says, would require *τραυματισθείς*), but his troops: they 'received a blow'. Cf. *βαλλόμενος*, i. 63. 1.

ἐκ πλέονος: Nikostratos had a longer route to go. Does Thucydides mean to imply that the two attacks did not synchronize as they should have done? Phormion was another great naval commander who was not conspicuously successful on land. It would seem that, for all their pride in the navy, this specialist skill was rather wasted by the Athenians and somewhat ignored in the tradition.

5. οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναχωρήσαντες, κ.τ.λ.: a characteristic piece of Greek warfare, especially siege warfare. We are not told that at Mende the occupation of the hill by the defenders would prevent a siege altogether, as was the case at Skione (131. 1); so what is meant is that with the Peloponnesians outside the city undefeated the Athenians could not safely ignore them and begin the siege (cf. Brasidas' tactics at Amphipolis, v. 6. 3). They must retire some distance to their camp, for their own safety; and the enemy can return to the city, for food and rest (but a resilient Athenian force, i. 70. 5, might have taken the hill during the night? This, however, would not have been so great an advantage if the enemy's forces were not defeated). Next day the Athenians can ravage the land with impunity; presumably they did not wish for a long siege; and Polydamidas cannot meet them in the open, especially without the Skionaioi, unless he has the advantage of a good defensive position, and as well because there was strife within the city.

130. 1. ἐς τὸ πρὸς Σκιώνης: i.e. to the east side.

2. κατὰ τὰς ἄνω πύλας: on the side away from the sea, here the north.

4. οὐκ ἐπέξεισιν οὐδὲ δέοιτο πολεμεῖν: 'that he was not marching out and had no need to be at war.' We are not to suppose that the use of the singular indicates the personal attitude of this democrat; quite respectable men often spoke for their cities or their troops, as Her-mokrates, 64. 1, and Brasidas, v. 9. 6-7; it is not egoism.

καὶ θορυβηθέντος: Hude's *καὶ καταθορυβηθέντος* is attractive.

6. αὗτοὶ εἰχον: i.e. the Peloponnesians, who, with the Mendaian oligarchs, are meant as the subject of *κατέφυγον*.

7. πολιτεύειν -- ὥσπερ εἴώθεσαν: in this sensible measure, restoring to Mende full autonomy, we can see the mind of Nikostratos.

131. 1. οὐκ ἐγίγνετο σφῶν περιτείχισις: cf. 129. 5 n.

2. ἐσ τὸν περιτείχισμὸν -- παρεσκευάζοντο: Skione would naturally resist to the end after the savage decree passed at Athens (122. 6); but they might have done so anyhow (120-1). Were Nikias and Nikostratos prepared to carry out the terms of the decree moved by Kleon?

132. 1. ὄμολογίαν ποιεῖται: see n. on 129. 4. The engraving of the decrees for Methone in 424-423 (above, 129. 4 n.) may have been ordered at this time (early summer, 423) when an alliance was once more made with Perdikkas. It was an alliance, not simply a truce (v. 6. 2); or rather an alliance must soon have followed this ὄμολογία.

It has generally been assumed that *I.G. i² 71*, the fragmentary record of a treaty of friendship and alliance between Athens and Perdikkas, to which Arrabaios was also a party, is a record of this alliance agreed in 423-422 (in the eighth prytany, if it was this year): see Hondius, *Nov. Att. Inscr.* 22-37; P. A. Davis, *A.J.A.* xxx, 1926, 179-88; Weston, *A.J.P.* lxi, 1940, 347-52; Meritt, *Hesp.* xiv, 1945, 118; *S.E.G.* x. 86; but the authors of *A.T.L.* iii. 313, n. 61, besides giving to it a more probable number of letters to the line and correcting Davis in other points, argue with some reason that it is really the alliance of c. 435 B.C. alluded to by Thucydides in i. 57. 2 (*ξύμαχος πρότερον καὶ φύλος ᾧν*). They point out that a restoration of the names of Philippos (brother of Perdikkas: i. 57. 3) and of his son Amyntas (friendly to Athens: ii. 100. 3) would exactly fill the line with the new number of letters, and hence Philippos was still alive. This is an attractive suggestion, if Amyntas and Perdikkas' son, Archelaos, who is also a 'signatory', were already grown up in 435; but the combination of Perdikkas and Arrabaios in the treaty tempts one to return to the date 423-422. *A.T.L.* adds that "*I.G. i² 71* is much more suitable to the original treaty of 436 than to the patching up of differences which Athens had with Perdikkas near the close of the Archidamian War"; but the most elaborate of treaties

were often the shortest-lived, and we are not told that this was a hasty affair like that of i. 61. 3.

Athens engages to secure friendship between Perdikkas and Arrabaios; Perdikkas, among other things, to make no alliance with another Greek city without Athens' agreement, and to send no timber for oars (the main need that Athens always had of Macedonia) to any state but Athens. A remarkably large number of names of Macedonian 'signatories', beginning with Perdikkas and his brother Alketas, is engraved at the end of the treaty. Whatever the date, Thucydides omits something of the relations between Athens and Arrabaios.

The treaty between Athens and Bottike, *I.G. i.2 90* (= Tod, 68; *S.E.G. x. 89*, with new frr. and restorations) is very likely to be dated in 422 and to be set in connexion with the new alliance with Perdikkas, as Busolt had thought: Meritt in *A.J.A. xxix*, 1925, 29–31; Adcock in *C.A.H. v. 248*. It seems probable (but not certain, for the stele is broken) that only some cities, and very small ones, were included, and not Spartolos, the most important and the centre of the small federation (see v. 18. 5). This is another minor event which we would expect Thucydides to have recorded. See v. 3. 6 n.

διὰ τὴν τοῦ Βρασίδου ἔχθραν: just as his *natural* friendship with the Peloponnesians was διὰ Αθηναίους, 128. 5.

2. Ἰσχαγόρας: one of the 'signatories' of the Peace of 421 and of the alliance, v. 19. 2, 24. 1. See below, § 3 n.

Presumably Sparta still accepted Brasidas' story that Skione had joined him before the truce (122. 4), and was prepared to assist the city further.

καὶ τὴν παρασκευήν: nobody has given a satisfactory explanation of this. It will not do in its ordinary and natural sense after τὸ στράτευμα; and neither Stahl's interpretation, 'the Peloponnesian attempt to win over the Thessalians', corresponding to Περδίκκας — παρασκευάσας above, nor Steup's transposition of τὸ στράτευμα after Θεσσαλῶν, as subject of πειρᾶσθαι, will convince.

In *The Wasps*, 1265–74 (produced in 422), there is some elaborate and to us obscure jesting at the expense of a certain Amynias, who went on an embassy to Pharsalos, and there

μόνος μόνοις
τοῖς Πενέσταισι ξυνῆγη τοῖς
Θετταλῶν.

From this and a possible reference to the same embassy in Eupolis (*Poleis*, fr. 209, also a play perhaps produced about this time), it has been plausibly conjectured that Amynias intrigued with the penestai, and that since in *The Wasps* Bdelykleon is called κομηταμνίας, and μισδόμος and ξυνῶν Βρασίδᾳ, it may be that Brasidas, too, had

exploited the grievances of the penestai to undermine the ὀλιγαρχία ἵσόνομος of Thessaly (78. 3): see J. S. Morrison, *C.Q.* xxxvi, 1942, 64 (above, p. 194). That the small clique of Thessalians who managed so successfully for Brasidas had intrigued with the penestai is just possible; and that the Athenians sent an embassy to undermine Brasidas' influence in Thessaly just at this time is likely enough; but the joke against Amyntias was (apparently) that, once very poor, he was now dining with Leogoras (for he was a glutton too); his association with the penestai suited his low birth and his low tastes, *αὐτὸς πενέστης ὧν ἐλάττων οὐδενός*, as Aristophanes says; and his love of good living would make him glad to be in Thessaly (*Plat. Kriton*, 53 D-E). Political association with them may, therefore, not be intended at all. The charge of associating with Brasidas was, of course, the usual one against anybody who was disliked.

3. Ἀμεινίας καὶ Ἀριστεύς: not otherwise known.

τῶν ἡβώντων αὐτῶν παρανόμως: because it was illegal for a man of military age to leave Sparta without permission (*Isokr. xi. 18*; cf. *Plat. Prot. 342 c*); or *παρανόμως* means not 'illegally', but as the scholiast and edd. say, *παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκός*, it being contrary to normal Spartan custom to send men of military age as governors of allied cities. Grundy, ii. 219, compares v. 63. 4, 64. 2. If this is what was *παράνομον*, this second interpretation of the word must be correct, for Ischagoras was in no position to break a Spartan law when he left the city. But why should Thucydides have expressed himself thus ambiguously? For there was another 'law' which was certainly broken. 'The first hint of the future harmosts', we are told (*Busolt. iii. 1170-1*; the first *mention* of a harmost is in viii. 5. 2); just so—Brasidas had promised Akanthos, Torone, Skione that he would by all means leave them free: he was fulfilling, he had said, the Spartan promise to free the cities from Athenian tyranny, and had come bound by an oath that Sparta would not interfere in their autonomy (86. 1); and here were Spartan governors being sent to them, not just officers in command of troops. The extreme brevity of Thucydides' narrative leaves his meaning obscure in any case; but why should he, when so grave a 'law' was being broken, refer to the comparatively trivial custom that governors sent abroad should be over 40? Moreover, the chief object of this action was to secure proper persons as governors (*μὴ τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν*); how was this particularly achieved by sending young men contrary to the usual practice?

Stahl read *αὐτῷ* (sc. Brasidas) for *αὐτῶν*, and was followed by Steup and Hude; an attractive suggestion, for it supplies a subject to *καθίστησιν* below, which should be Brasidas, they say, not Ischagoras, for the latter has two colleagues. But, though *αὐτῷ* is probably right, I am not convinced by the conclusion drawn. *αὐτῷ* may be

dativus incommodi as well as *commodi*; and, since Brasidas was, as far as we know, though no saint (above, 78. 3-4, 87. 6 n., 108. 5, 120. 3), a moderately honest man, this breaking of his promise to the liberated cities may have been quite contrary to his policy. We might go farther and believe that Ischagoras was no friend to Brasidas; that he 'signed' the peace and the alliance of 421, may not mean much; but he was prepared to urge the surrender of Amphipolis to Athens (v. 21. 1, 3), and we know that there was enmity against Brasidas in Sparta, both personal and political (108. 7). Cf. v. 3. 4 n. If, on the other hand, the subject of *καθίστησιν* is Brasidas, then, 'compelled', doubtless, 'by circumstances', he himself broke his word, and Klearidas, made governor of Amphipolis, may have been one of his men and at enmity with Ischagoras. Or he may only have been doing his best with orders, and men, sent from Sparta.

There is another question: who were meant by *οἱ ἐντυχόντες*? or, put in another form, who used this expression? Who said, 'we must have governors in the liberated cities, and they must be young and energetic; we cannot leave this to just anybody'? It sounds like Brasidas, if it is true that he broke his word to his allies; 'just anybody' will mean Alkidias and his like (iii. 92. 5 n., 93. 2, ad fin.); but I do not see the Spartans at home agreeing. It may mean rather that the latter said, 'We cannot leave it to Brasidas to appoint anyone he pleases' (or 'we cannot leave the cities to be administered just as *they* please, as Brasidas is insisting'); that is, they meant to curtail Brasidas' dangerous powers (so Busolt). This, however, would not explain why they sent younger men; and it may be that we must accept the view that Ischagoras was, for the moment at least, trying to help Brasidas, and had so 'worked it' at Sparta that two younger *ἀρχοντες* accompanied him. Thucydides' brevity here leaves some very interesting questions unanswered. (Cf. above, p. 593.)

Κλεαρίδαν: often to be mentioned in the opening chapters of book v; Pasitelidas only in v. 3.

133-5. Events in Boeotia and Peloponnese; Brasidas' Attempt on Poteidaia

133. 1. Thebes and Thespiae.

παρεσχηκός δὲ ρᾶον, κ.τ.λ.: see 96. 3. Thucydides does not spare the Thebans. We may remember as well that Thespiae, like Plataia (iii. 62), had played a gallant part in 480.

2-3. The Heraion at Argos burned down.

Presumably this is specially mentioned, in a year of truce when there was not much else to record, because the names and years of the priestesses of the Heraion had been recorded, and used in establish-

ing a chronology; see ii. 2. 1 n. Hellanikos published the record; and this may have caused Thucydides to include the priestess's name and year in ii. 2. 1. It is a pity that we do not know the date of Hellanikos' work (cf. vol. i, p. 6, n. 3). K. J. Dover (above, iii. 88. 3 n.) suggests that the mention in ii. 2. 1 is due to interest in a recently published work; and that Hellanikos may have ended his book before the burning of the temple, which is, therefore, mentioned by Thucydides. This may well be true; but we cannot be certain that these sections were not inserted later into the narrative.

ἐπικαταδαρθούσης: she had been priestess for $56\frac{1}{2}$ years (ii. 2. 1), so she was presumably a very old lady. According to Pausanias (ii. 17. 7 and iii. 5. 6), she took refuge in Tegea, a long journey; and she did not go by the shortest route, through Argos, but by Phleious; from which she would go to Stymphalos, and thence by a very steep route to Arcadian Orchomenos. The shrine of Athena Alea was of especial sanctity, where illustrious persons, such as Leotychidas and Pausanias kings of Sparta, took refuge, and no state would demand extradition. Pausanias also tells us that the Argives did not destroy the statue of Chrysis in the Heraion.

ἐπέλαβεν: cf. *ἐπεβίω*, ii. 65. 6. The time is given to fix the date at which the new priestess took office—hence also the pluperfect *ἐπεφύει* (Steup). But Hude's *ἀπέφυεν* seems probable.

4. Skione. The usual tactics are followed (vol. i, p. 18); but the Athenians had not hurried over their operations.

134. Mantinea and Tegea fight. They do indeed take advantage of the truce from the major war (in which they were allies) to have a war on their own. Each city had allies in this battle, and one may surmise with Graves that it was they on each side who were driven back and suffered heavy loss; and since both cities claimed the victory and set up a trophy and sent spoils to Delphi, *they* were happy. It is almost a parody of the foreign policy of the small autonomous city. Who the allies were may perhaps be gathered from v. 33. 1 (Parrasioi), and perhaps 67. 1 (Heraieis and Mainalioi). Cf. v. 47. 1.

Busolt, iii. 857. 2, points out that from v. 31. 5 we must assume that by an agreement made before the war with Athens began, mutual guarantees were given by the states of the Peloponnesian alliance that the existing territorial boundaries would be preserved while the war lasted; and that Mantinea was breaking this agreement. She had got control of Parrasioi (v. 33. 1) near the Lakonian border and on Tegea's flank, and was seeking to strengthen herself there.

1. ἐν Λαοδοκείῳ: the site is not known.

νίκη ἀμφιδήριτος: usually cited as one of Thucydides' poetical words,

for *δηριάομαι* and *δῆρις* are only found in the poets; but as such it is here in an unexpected context. The compound verb had been used by Simonides of Amorgos (7. 118), and the adjective was to be used again by Polybios; perhaps it had lost its poetical colour.

Soon after the Peace of Nikias Mantinea quarrelled with Sparta and joined the Argive alliance (v. 29 ff.). Doubtless this little war presaged that change, or its ill-success provoked it. But we need not suppose that Thucydides, if he had lived to finish his work, would have stressed the connexion: this chapter is a typical ‘note’ made at the time, but it may well have been left as it is, to tell its own tale of unease within the Peloponnesian ranks and to hint at the future, like the note on the little episode in Chalkidike in c. 7.

135. 1. Brasidas attempts to surprise Poteidaia. This is one of the rare attempts at surprise attack by night on a defended town; and it is easily foiled. Brasidas apparently does not observe the truce, claiming still that Athens too had broken it (123. 1); on the other hand, the warfare during the summer is haphazard and spasmodic. Brasidas attempts little: perhaps, with no support from Sparta, Perdikkas hostile, and his Peloponnesian troops not anxious to fight during a truce, he was not able to do much. In what he does this year, it would seem that success had made him less scrupulous, or his previous forbearance and moderation had been only politic.

κλίμακα προσθεῖς: there is no need to emend to *κλίμακας*, but it hardly means one ladder only.

τοῦ γὰρ κώδωνος, κ.τ.λ.: i.e. a sentry marched to the next post with the bell, and for a brief period a short space of the wall was unguarded. We are not, I think, to suppose that Brasidas listened for the bell; he hoped to find the Athenians in general off their guard, and happened to find for a few moments an empty space with his first ladders.

πρὶν προσβήναι: not ‘before approaching’, but ‘before getting at’, or ‘getting on’ the ramparts; cf. iii. 22. 3 (Graves).

2. ξυνέγραψεν: the scholiast tells us that in the edition of the *History* in thirteen books, the seventh ended here. Cf. the end of iii, where in that edition the fifth book ended. The present first book occupied two, so that ii and iii took three books only between them. It would not appear that either edition ended a ‘book’ at the Peace of Nikias. The scholiast adds here that Thucydides himself wrote his work as one, and that the division into eight or thirteen books was made by later scholars.

Perhaps to this year, 423–422, and if so towards the end of it, in the eighth prytany, belongs the tantalizingly small fragment of a

coinage decree found in the agora at Athens and published by Meritt, *Hesp.* xiv, 1945, 119–22 (*S.E.G.* x. 87). It looks, as Meritt says, to be a re-enactment or modification of the old coinage decree of the 440's which established, or aimed at establishing, uniformity of coinage within the Athenian empire (*A.T.L.* ii D 14; Tod, 67; see vol. i, pp. 383–4). We can now understand better the well-known jest in *The Birds*, 1136–41, which must allude to a recent decree. Indeed, it may be that this new fragment should be dated later, c. 418; its attribution to 423–422 was due to the close similarity of its letter forms to those of *I.G. i.2* 71, then dated to 423–422 but now, in *A.T.L.*, to c. 435 (above, 132. 1 n.).

Payments from the Reserve for the Ninth Year of the War (I.G. i.2 324: see above, iii. 116. 3 n.).

For the year of the armistice, only one expedition would, one supposes, call for special expenditure from the reserve, that for the defence of Athenian positions in the Thraceward district: and the usual 100 tal., voted towards the end of April, would be for this purpose. The next two sums, 60 and 31 tal. (the latter from the Other Gods), paid out at midsummer, will also be for the campaign against Skione and in Thrace generally, not (as Wade-Gery, *C.Q.* xxiv, 1930, 33–39, suggested for the 60 tal.) for a routine expedition to Ionia, which, if so little out of the ordinary as to require no mention by Thucydides, would have been paid for out of income (above, p. 433). The 60 tal. were paid to a strategos of the deme Myrrhinous, whose name is lost; Wade-Gery, in a very ingenious argument, conjectured that he was Eurymedon son of Thoukles, last heard of when he was fined for his part in the failure to keep the war going in Sicily, 65. 3. Eurymedon was a very rare name in Athens, as far as we know (first given in all probability, as Wade-Gery says, by Thoukles to his son after Kimon's victory of the Eurymedon); and one of the holders was Plato's brother-in-law, father of Speusippos, who was of Myrrhinous. Besides this, it would fit well if Eurymedon were the strategos of Pandionis phyle, to which Myrrhinous belonged; and Wade-Gery's suggestion has been accepted by Meritt (who has conjectured as well ἐς Σκιώνεν on the inscription, nine letters being missing, if Eurymedon is rightly restored), Tod, and in *S.E.G.* x. Only two remarks need be added: first, it is to be noted that Thucydides, who knew that Nikias and Nikostratos were in command of the first force sent after the armistice to Pallene, did not apparently know that Eurymedon was sent out to reinforce or to succeed them at Skione. (He would have been a suitable man to carry out Kleon's decree; and it is *possible* that the Athenians had shown displeasure at the humane and sensible treatment of Mende, 130. 2.) Secondly, one of the three or four Eurymedons known was of Acharnai (Oineis

phyle), son of the well-known Charidemos of Demosthenes' day: Wade-Gery suggests that he was sister's son to Speusippos. This is possible enough; but, possibly also, Speusippos' father, Eurymedon of Myrrhinous, was related to the general of the Peloponnesian war through *his* mother; and the possibility weakens the case for the conjecture [*Εὐρυμέδοντι Μυρρίωσιοι*] in *I.G. i.² 324*. It should be noted also that the payment of 31 tal. from the Other Gods was probably to Nikias and his colleagues, *Νικίαι καὶ χοινάρχους* filling the gap; and it is not difficult to see why; if so, and if Eurymedon was bringing reinforcements, presumably a request from Nikias for more money had reached Athens immediately after the vote for Eurymedon.

The last payment from Athena Polias for this year, 11½ tal. at the end of October, was originally restored [*πρὸς Σαμίος*], and Wade-Gery supposed that some trouble in Samos had occurred during Eurymedon's Ionian expedition (above); but Meritt has shown that [*παρὰ Σαμίου*] is at least equally possible in itself—a special sum collected from Samos (above, pp. 17–18, 33), and paid into Athena's treasury—and perhaps preferable, since we do not know of anything in Samos requiring Athenian intervention.

BOOK V

YEAR IO: 422-421 B.C. (CC. I-24)

1. *Truce continued. Further Purification of Delos*

1. διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων: I agree with those who have maintained that this is impossible Greek for 'the truce continued till the Pythia', and that some words have dropped out. The truce did, it seems, continue till then, or rather there were no hostilities before then. For the Delphic month Boukatos during which the Pythian festival was celebrated corresponded (erratically, because intercalation did not necessarily take place at Athens and Delphi in the same year) with the Attic Metageitnion, the second of the religious year, that is, about August or September of the Julian calendar; in this year Metageitnion was from July 25 to August 23 (Meritt, *A.F.D.* 178), and from 2. 1 and 12. 1 it is clear that Kleon's not very long campaign ended not before the middle of October, and so did not begin before August. διελέλυντο means 'was at an end' (automatically; its period had run out: cf. iv. 23. 1), and we might suggest, as the simplest form of words, *ai μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο, οὐ μέντοι ἐπολέμησάν γε ἀλλήλους μέχρι Πυθίων*; to which, however, there are two objections: first, the unique use in Thucydides of the Pythian, or any other festival, simply as a date (cf. 20. 1 n.; Busolt, iii. 693. 2), and second, that *ἡ ἔκεχειρία*, elsewhere used for the formal truce (iv. 119. 3, 122. 1), would here mean simply an absence of hostilities in contrast with the formal truce. Wilamowitz, therefore (*Cur. Thuc.* 15), proposed ingeniously *ἀνὰ δέκα δ' ἡμέρας σπενδόμενοι οὐκ ἐπῆσαν ἀλλήλους*; and Steup, as something simpler, *ἄλλαι δ' ἐπεγεγένηστο*. I prefer the latter, with, however, the aorist, not the pluperfect; the words *μέχρι Πυθίων* will be a date not in Thucydides' narrative but in the terms of the truce, a date common to all Greeks, which Elaphebolion 14 and Gerastios 12 were not. (It should be further noted that even after the Pythia the fighting is confined to Thrace, though now in the area which was before covered by the one year's truce.)

There was, by the way, no general truce in wartime during the Pythia or any other festival, only an agreed safe-conduct for those taking part in it (and even that was not certain, to judge from the first clause of the year's truce, iv. 118. 1-2); nor need we suppose that the Athenians were especially ready to agree to a further truce that would include the Pythia because they still felt that they had not honoured Apollo, at Delos, enough. Arnold has an eloquent passage, in an appendix, some of it quoted by Graves, on Athens and Apollo; but Thucydides gives no hint of such feeling.

Note that in iv. 117. 1 we had the expression *ἄμα ήρι τοῦ ἐπιγυνομένου θέρους* for what was in fact 14th Elaphebolion; here τ. ἐπ. θ. only, for a date just a year later, and indeed earlier in the solar year, if *αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἔσονται* (iv. 118. 10) means twelve lunar months, and excludes the possibility of an intercalated month. See Appendix.

οὐ καθαροὺς ὄντας: this must mean that the Delians themselves were, as alleged, guilty of some ritual sin; for the argument that removal of the remains of the dead was not sufficient is additional (*καὶ ἄμα*). Hence they could be driven out of the island without any charge of wanton cruelty against the Athenians; and there seems to be no other reason why they should not have been settled in some nearby island, or in Athens. Later, however, the Athenians changed their minds about all this (32. 1).

πρότερὸν μοι δεδήλωται: this is one of only two ‘cross-references’ in Thucydides of the kind common in Herodotus; the other is vi. 94. 1. It refers back to iii. 104 (not to i. 8. 1).

Ἄτραμύττιον: on the coast of Asia Minor opposite Lesbos, but not included in the Lesbian *περαία* (iii. 50. 3). The modern town has kept its ancient name (*Edremid* in Turkish).

Φαρνάκου: satrap of the Hellespontine region, ii. 67. 1 n.

ώς ἔκαστος ὥρμητο: ‘as each man was minded’; i.e. they were not settled as a colony, a political group, but in individual families (Stahl). Steup, following a suggestion by Wilamowitz, would read *ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὥκησαν <οἱ πλεῖστοι, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι> οὐτως, κ.τ.λ.*

Payments from the Reserve for the first half of the Tenth Year of the War (I.G. i.² 324: see above, iii. 116. 3 n.).

During this summer, that is, between the end of the one year’s truce and the Pythian festival, three payments were made from the Athenian reserve fund (one of them from the Other Gods), amounting to 142 tal. in all. That for the usual 100 tal., in April, was doubtless for the siege of Skione (2. 2), and so were perhaps the other two as well; it is surprising indeed, when we remember the cost of Poteidaia, that so little was required. There was no other fighting at the time; and probably a larger proportion of the phoros-income, itself double what it had been at the beginning of the war, was allotted to the Skione campaign than had been possible for Poteidaia.

Since the record of I.G. i.² 324 ends at midsummer 422, the end of Ameinias’ archonship, and we do not have a similar record for the next *penteteris*, we do not know what sums were taken from reserve for Kleon’s expedition in the second half of Year Ten.

For the summary of total expenditure for eleven years, see below, pp. 687–9.

2-3. *Kleon in Chalkidike*

2. 1. Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας: we have not been told that Kleon had opposed the year's truce, or its extension during the first half of the summer of 422. He is in fact following in the footsteps (iv. 129-32) and continuing the policy of Nikias, at least as Nikias later expressed it (vi. 10. 5); but the initiative now was apparently his. *μετὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν:* that is, as has been argued above on c. 1, the second truce agreed after the expiration of the year's truce, not after the truce of the Pythia, as Busolt, iii. 1174. 5. The time is about the end of August 422 (above, n. on 1).

ἱππέας τριακοσίους: we hear nothing about them in the final battle. See 10. 12 n.

2. Σκιώνην — — ἔτι πολιορκουμένην: iv. 133. 4. Because it was almost the only military event of the previous autumn and winter, it was much in the minds of the Athenians: Ar. *Vesp.* 209-10,

*νὴ Δί' ή μοι κρείττον ἦν
τηρεῖν Σκιώνην ἀντὶ τούτου τοῦ πατρός.*

ἐς τὸν Κωφὸν λιμένα: Leake, iii. 119, had seen that the MSS. reading *Κολοφωνίων* was a mistake, and that the harbour must be that called Kouphó in his day, to the south of Torone. See Strabo, vii, fr. 32. There is no need, with Steup and others, to place a comma after λιμένα and take τῶν Τορωνίων, awkwardly, with τῆς πόλεως, because 'the harbour', i.e. the city harbour, is a different one and is given no name. τῶν *T.* here only means 'belonging to Torone', within its territory.

3. οὐτε Βρασίδας ἐν τῇ Τορώνῃ: though it was apparently his headquarters (iv. 122. 2, 129. 1).

4. περιτείχισμα: Graves notes that this word is commonly used by Thucydides of the works of a besieger, not of a city's wall, and therefore means complete circumvallation; and suggests *προτείχισμα*, which may be right (cf. iv. 90. 2, vi. 100. 2).

3. 1. ἐβιάζοντο — — τοῦ τειχίσματος ἀλισκομένου: the Athenians accomplished something rare in Greek warfare, the forcing of a defensive wall against regular troops, though these troops were perhaps taken by surprise. Note the tenses: the Athenians were forcing their way through, when Pasitelidas decided he must retreat in order to meet the new threat from the harbour. It almost seems as though the new wall round the suburb was inadequately built, or that the old city-wall was here demolished before the new fortification was complete; perhaps the stone for the new wall was taken from the old. Brasidas seems to have left too much to Pasitelidas.

2. ἐλόντες τὴν Τορώνην: we should have liked more detail of the marines' part in this enterprise as well.

ἐπισπόμενος αὐτοβοεὶ -- - ξυνεσπεσών: 'by following on Pasitelidas' heels without having to strike another blow they entered the city at the same time as the enemy.'

4. ὁ δὲ Κλέων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαλά τε ἔστησαν δύο: the victory was decisive and the strategy—the decision to leave Skione to the slow siege and to attempt to carry Torone by storm—both intelligent and bold; the action was as brilliant as that of Brasidas at Amphipolis. Pasitelidas seems to have been no more competent than Eukles (we are not even told that he was hindered by discontent within the city); and Brasidas must bear at least as much blame for the defeat as Thucydides bears for Amphipolis, for Kleon was already near at hand. Was he upset at the sending of Pasitelidas from Sparta, and on no very good terms with him (iv. 132. 3 n.)? But the loss of Torone was not so important for the Peloponnesians as that of Amphipolis had been for Athens; and Brasidas' reputation is scarcely tarnished, and Kleon's not at all whitened. See 'Thucydides and Kleon' in '*Ἑλληνικά*', xiii, 1954, 1–10.

ἐπτακοσίους: a small number, as it included Peloponnesians as well as citizens and some Chalkidians, though large enough to defend the town (see vol. i, pp. 17–18). Presumably not many of the citizens had been entrusted with arms (cf. iv. 113. 1); but what had happened to those who had been on the Athenian side, or at least not against them? Were *their* wives and children enslaved, and were *they* left unharmed? Or had Pasitelidas, or Brasidas, already dealt with them?

ἐν ταῖς γενομέναις σπονδαῖς: see 18. 7.

ἀνὴρ ἀντ' ἀνδρὸς λυθείς: see 18. 8 n. Thére may not have been many Athenian prisoners of war in Chalkidian hands (after Spartolos, ii. 97, and the loss of the other Eion, iv. 7, perhaps); but, as Arnold remarks, pro-Athenian Chalkidians would have been detained, and now exchanged. The men seem to have got off better than their wives and children, though doubtless the majority of these were ransomed, that is, bought, when enslaved, by friends and set free. The women and children of Mende and Skione had been got away to safety (iv. 123. 4).

5. *The Boeotians take Panakton*

εἶλον δὲ καὶ Πάνακτον, κ.τ.λ.: a remarkable instance of Thucydides' order of narrative; for the next sentence goes closely with what has preceded this mention of Panakton, and is itself interrupted by the account of affairs in Sicily (cc. 4–5); and if the capture of Panakton had been recorded after § 6, it could still, one would suppose, have been said to be ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον. Perhaps the order reveals lack of revision by Thucydides.

The site of Panakton has been much discussed. The older opinion

was that it was a small fort near Kavásala in the stony upland plain of Skoúrtā, west-north-west of Phyle; to which most recent scholars have objected that this is too small and too out-of-the-way for Panakton. They identify the latter with Gyptókastro, the imposing fortress seen above the main road from Athens to Thebes, on the Athenian side of the pass and not far from its summit; earlier this had been thought to be Eleutherai, but there is no evidence that this township was ever fortified. It is not certain; but probably the identification of Panakton with Gyptókastro is correct. See Beloch, *Klio*, xi, 1911, 436–9; Kahrstedt, *Ath. Mitt.* lvii, 1932, 16–18; Wrede, *Attische Mauern*, 33, 57 (pls. 83–86), and Chandler, *J.H.S.* xlvi, 1926, 6–8 (Kavásala, which she thinks was Panakton), 9–12 (Gyptókastro); J. H. Kent, *Hesp.* x, 1941, 346.

6. In *I.G.* i. 2 90 (= Tod, 68; *S.E.G.* iii. 16, x. 89) we have a treaty between Athens and the Bottiaioi; or so they are called. Actually it was only with some of the small towns which made up the Bottiaian Federation (or *πόλις*), on which see vol. i, p. 207; Spartolos, for example, seems to have remained at war till 421 (18. 5). See iv. 132. 1 n.; and Edson, *C.P.* xlvi, 1947, 104, n. 117. The terms of the treaty are of the usual kind: mutual settlement of disputes by *δίκαι*, the oaths and their administration, publication (including the year in which the treaty is to come into force; but the name of the archon is lost); interesting details are the oath not to *μηνσικακεῖν* and some reference to assessment of tribute. As stated above, the date of the decree is not certain, but 422 B.C., accepted by many, seems as probable as any other, perhaps a little earlier when Nikias was in Chalkidike and the treaty with Perdikkas, ally of the Bottiaioi, was being arranged. Presumably it antedated Kleon's defeat at Amphipolis. Or was it perhaps part of the process of persuasion envisaged in the Treaty of 421 (18. 5)?

4-5. *Athens reopens Negotiations in Sicily*

4. 1. **Φαίαξ δὲ ὁ Ἐρασιστράτου:** one of the lesser politicians of the day, and known as a leader of a new style of speech or writing. It was of him that Eupolis, fr. 95, said *λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν*, and Aristophanes, two and a half years before this present event, wrote (Demos resolving that young men in the New Athens shall not haunt the agora):

τὰ μειράκια ταντὶ λέγω τὰν τῷ μύρῳ,
ἀ στωμυλεῖται τοιαδὶ καθήμενα·
“σοφός γ’ ὁ Φαίαξ δεξιῶς τ’ οὐκ ἀπέθανεν.
συνερτικὸς γάρ ἔστι καὶ περαντικός
καὶ γνωμοτυπικός καὶ σαφὴς καὶ κρουστικός,
καταληπτικός τ’ ἄριστα τοῦ θορυβητικοῦ” (*Equit.* 1375–80).

If he was an 'excellent checker of the unruly' (unless this is irony with a double edge), he was more than a 'good talker, but a most weak orator'. He was a man of noble birth, according to Plutarch (*Alk.* 13); to eat poorly at his house was a paradox (*Eupol.*, fr. 7); and his father, his son, and a nephew (all called Erasistratos) are known. The father (probably) had been strategos and in some trial had been defended, we are told, by Aischines of Sphettos and prosecuted by Antiphon (*Diog. Laert.* ii. 63; *Ant.*, frr. 57–59 Blass). His nephew is a character in the pseudo-Platonic *Eryxias*; he himself is made the speaker of ps.-Andokides iv. (*ag. Alkib.*); and either the son or the nephew may have been the Erasistratos who was one of the Thirty Tyrants (*Xen. Hell.* ii. 3. 2). See *P.A.* Phaiax later played a part in the ostracism of Hyperbolos (viii. 73. 3 n.; see *Plut.*, l.c.). **τρίτος αὐτός:** we do not know who his two colleagues were. They may not any of them have been strategoi.

ναυσὶ δύο: they went, presumably, in different directions, so that Italiot and Sikeliot cities could receive them, one ship at a time, in accordance with the laws of neutrality (ii. 7. 2).

2. μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν: that is, the general agreement of 424 B.C., iv. 65. 1–2.

τὴν γῆν - - - ἀναδάσασθαι: Arnold well compares Hdt. iv. 159. 2, the story of the new settlers in Kyrene who, on the respectable advice of Delphi, were invited *ἐπὶ γῆς ἀναδασμῷ*. Leontinoi apparently had no spare land to offer, as Kyrene doubtless had, so proposed to expropriate the big landowners; the latter objected so strongly that they preferred the disappearance of their own city, and that the majority of their fellow citizens be made wandering exiles.

3. ἐρημώσαντες: so there was peace at last. But not for long; the desert was refreshed, and they were at war again.

4. τῆς πόλεως τι - - - χωρίον: as edd. have noted, *ἡ πόλις*, which is distinguished from *ἡ Λεοντίνη* below, is probably the city itself here. Presumably there had been some special friendships with Ionian Phokaia which caused the name to be given to this quarter of the city.

ἡλθον ὡς αὐτούς: the rest of the Leontinoi, the rich who stayed now as citizens in Syracuse, returned later, in 404–403 (*Xen. Hell.* ii. 3. 5). **καταστάντες ἐκ τῶν τειχῶν ἐπολέμουν:** 'established themselves, and proceeded to make war from the two fortified posts' (Phokaiai and Brikinniai). *καταστάντες* is not to be interpreted as in ii. 1; rather as in i. 49. 3 (Stahl, and others).

5. τοὺς - - - ξυμάχους: either 'allies' here means, loosely, 'friends', or the earlier alliances had not been ended by the general peace in Sicily in 424. The latter seems improbable. The friends are the Chalkidian colonies and Kamarina (iii. 86. 2). Katane, below, § 6, is assumed to be friendly, and no comment is required.

6. πείθει: Phaiax had some effectiveness at least as a speaker; perhaps the Sikeliots were easy victims of the rhetoric they themselves are said to have invented.

διὰ τῶν Σικελῶν: i.e. to assure himself of their good will. He went by land into the interior, while his ship must have sailed round to Katane, unmolested by the Syracusans.

5. 1. καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ: for the importance of such friendship for Athens, in her ambitious policy in Sicily, see vi. 43–44.

Λοκρῶν — — τοῖς — — ἐκπεπτωκόσιν, οἵ μετὰ τὴν — — ὁμολογίαν, κ.τ.λ.: an episode in two parts which Thucydides might, in accordance with his general practice, have inserted in its chronological place between iv. 65 and v. 4. The order, in a case like this, reflects the manner in which Thucydides himself was informed.

2. τοῖς κομιζομένοις: the words can hardly stand; and surely those are right who bracket *τοῖς* only (Dobree, Poppe, Steup, Hude), not both words. Cf. io. 3, n. on *τοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν*. For *κομίζεσθαι* = 'return home', see ii. 73. 1, vi. 29. 3.

ἐγεγένητο γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: as Steup says, probably on Phaiax's outward journey to Sicily.

3. μόνοι γάρ τῶν ἔυμμάχων — — οὐκ ἐσπείσαντο Ἀθηναίοις: cf. iv. 65. 2, καὶ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἔσονται κάκεινοις κοιναί. The exceptional position of Lokroi was not there noted; it was not, of course, in Sicily.

Ἴππωνιᾶς καὶ Μεδμαίους: Hipponion, the Oscan Vibo, was at Monteleone, lying inland from the Gulf of Euphemia; it was a colony of Lokroi, taken by them from the Brettioi: Strabo, vi. 1. 4–5, pp. 255–6. Medma was also a colony of Lokroi, on the river Mesima, near the modern Rosarno: Strabo, 256; both in Bruttium. See Weiss and Philipp in *R.E.*, s.vv.; and the Olympia dedication, *S.E.G.* xi. 1211.

6–13. Kleon's Campaign against Amphipolis

6. 1. ὄρμώμενος ἐκ τῆς Ἡύόνος: he used Eion as his base of operations. This may mean that the small port had been improved since two years before when Thucydides, using Thasos as his base, saved it (above, p. 586); but perhaps it was only the immediate base for the attack first westwards back to Stageiros (cf. iv. 88. 2), then eastwards to Galepsos (cf. iv. 107. 3). Doubtless also its inadequacy as a base helps to explain the impatience of the Athenian soldiery (7. 2). Eupolis, fr. 404, thought it witty to pun on *Γαληφός* and *λαμβάνειν*, meaning that Kleon took something for his own pocket when he captured the place.

Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίᾳ — — τὴν Θασίων ἀποικίαν: this only repeats the information given in book iv, locc. citt., and was clearly not written at the same time as the former passages. For the interest shown in colonial origins, see n. on iv. 109. 3.

West and Meritt, 'Cleon's Amphyopolitan Campaign and the Assessment List of 422–421' (now A 10 in *A.T.L.*), *A.J.A.* xxix, 1925, 54–69, argued that Kleon won back many other cities besides Torone and Galepsos, all in fact except the six listed in the treaty who are to be autonomous (Argilos, etc.: 18. 5); and that Thucydides may have suppressed this, from his bias against Kleon. Adcock, in *C.A.H.* v. 248, accepts this view in general (see, too, de Romilly, 166), but adds that it is possible that some of the places were recovered by the Athenians after Kleon's death. (One or two might have been recovered by Nikias after his success at Mende.) The chief argument in favour of this is that many places reappear in the assessment of 422–421 B.C.; but they did not necessarily pay because they were assessed, any more than Melos did, or Olynthos and Spartolos which were assessed in 425–424 and doubtless had been regularly, since their secession in 432. For arguments based on the clauses of the peace, see 18. 5–6 nn.

2. **κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν:** see iv. 132. 1 n. Perdikkas in fact did very little to help his new allies.

παρὰ Πολλῆν: mentioned here only. The Odomantoi are among the Thracian tribes mentioned in ii. 101. 3.

3. **ἐπὶ τῷ Κερδυλίῳ:** either the hill on the right, western bank of the Strymon, close to the river and south-west of Amphyropolis, only some 60 feet higher than the hill on which Amphyropolis stood (172 and 154 m. respectively: iv. 102. 3, 108. 1 nn.), but well above Eion and looking straight across to it; or the height farther to the west (312 m.), 3–4 km. from the bridge. The territory of Argilos (iv. 103. 3–4) reached as far east as the Strymon. **πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ** is said from the point of view of Amphyropolis, or perhaps of the Athenian army on the left bank, or even of Thucydides himself whose property was in Thrace, eastwards of the river.

For the object of occupying a hill outside and close to a town which may be besieged by the enemy, see iv. 129. 3 n.

σφῶν τὸ πλήθος: 'their small numbers', as in iv. 10. 5; but see 8. 2–4 nn. on οὐ τῷ πλήθει, **καταφρονήσεως**, and **μεμονωμένους**.

τῇ παρούσῃ στρατιᾷ: with his present forces, without waiting for the reinforcements asked for from Thrace (§ 2)—schol.

4. **τοὺς Ἡδῶνας:** see i. 100. 3, iv. 107. 3; and iv. 109. 4 for a remnant in Akte peninsula.

Μυρκινίων καὶ Χαλκιδέων: for Myrkinos, a town of the Edones, see iv. 107. 3. Just below there is mention of 300 Greek horse; in 10. 9 of both Myrkinian and Greek horse. The absence of the Myrkinian horse here, together with the slight awkwardness of sequence (the peltasts already present in Brasidas' army following the request for others from Thrace) and the ambiguity of the phrase **πρὸς τοῖς ἐν Αμφιπόλει** (a peltast force belonging to Amphyropolis? it should not

mean 'those at the moment in the city', as *ἐν Α.* below, for the whole force at Brasidas' command is being enumerated), led Steup to suspect both mistaken omission and mistaken insertions. The former, the lacuna, is perhaps correct, unless we are to suppose that reinforcements from Thrace, including some Myrkinian horse, arrived before the battle (8. 2, n. on *οὐ τῷ πλήθει*).

5. τούτων: Steup says this means, 'of the whole force', hoplite, cavalry, and light-armed. More likely it is the hoplite and cavalry only, mentioned in the last sentence, though, as we generally find a separate mention of cavalry numbers, the 1,500 may be all hoplite. From those he made a selection just before he attacked (8. 4).

Κλεαρίδου: see iv. 132. 3.

7. 1. ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας προσεδέχετο: it is not quite what he expected (6. 3). That was that Kleon would despise his small force and march inland against Amphipolis without waiting for reinforcements; in fact he wanted to wait for them (6. 2, 7. 3), but was compelled to a reconnaissance by unrest among his men which he had not the character to control. Even this is not made quite consistent with what is said in 7. 3.

2. τὴν ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν πρὸς οἷαν ἐμπειρίαν, κ.τ.λ.: Steup notes the repetition of *οἷος* "mit derselben emphatischen Wirkung" as in vii. 75. 6; but on what very different occasions! The expression has a poetic colour (*Ajax*, 503). There is nothing in Thucydides' narrative, from the first mention of Brasidas and of Kleon, that would for a moment suggest either that the Athenians had an exaggerated fear of Brasidas or that Kleon had displayed any particular lack of military intelligence, still less *μαλακία* (whether *μαλακία* is here 'cowardice', as is probable, or 'weakness', 'lack of energy', for which see ii. 40. 1 n.; and cf. ii. 85. 2). Athenian hoplites, and sailors too, had met Brasidas before, with success; and had recently been sent to confront him in Chalkidike, under Nikias and Nikostratos (iv. 129), without special note made of it (though the men might well have feared the matching of the hesitant *Nikias* with Brasidas), and it was they now, not Kleon, who, apparently full of confidence, *ῆχθοντο τῇ ἔδρᾳ*; and as for Kleon—at Pylos he had shown good sense at least in not interfering with Demosthenes' plan of attack on the island, the big defeats at Delion and Amphipolis had not been by his fault (as far as we know from Thucydides), and in the present campaign he had till now acted with marked energy and success—his only failure had been at Stageiros, which was no more remarkable than Brasidas' failures at Sane, Dion, and Poteidaia (iv. 109. 5, 135. 1). The whole sentence shows the strongest bias against Kleon, a hatred and contempt for him, as does the next section and the account of his death. Yet there is also no reason to suppose that

Kleon did possess any military skill, and every reason to think that his confidence, which had hitherto carried him almost from one success to another, arose from nothing but an overweening arrogance; for Thucydides' picture of him agrees in all essentials with that of Aristophanes. His first failure (as far as we know) was his inability to withstand the restlessness of his soldiers, and, even more clearly, to inspire confidence in them; or rather this was his second—he had before this quite failed to curb Aristophanes.

Busolt, iii. 1176. 3, quotes Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5. 18–21, who makes the younger Perikles say to Sokrates, that it is remarkable that sailors are so well disciplined and orderly (cf. ii. 89. 9), and competitors in the games and members of choruses, but hoplites and cavalry, οἱ δοκοῦσι καλοκάγαθίᾳ προκεκρισθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, are the worst-disciplined of all; Sokrates, who does not despair of Athens, answers that this is probably due to the lack of skill—professional skill—in the strategoi; they have never been trained. We do not know of what Xenophon was thinking when he wrote this; and the term 'ill-disciplined' is relative only;¹ but it is an interesting comment, and can be compared (but only with the necessary caution) with Ps.-Xen. 2. 14. Note, of course, that it is not the aristocrats only who are charged with bad discipline, but the hoplites generally, which includes the honest farmer class, and Sokrates himself.

Homer says of the Achaeans on one occasion,

ἀσχαλόωσι γάρ οἵδε καθήμενοι, οὐδὲ δύνανται
ἴσχειν ἐσυμένους πολέμου βασιλῆς Ἀχαιῶν (*Il.* xxiv. 403–4),

lines which might have been cited in justification both by the Athenian hoplites and by Kleon.

Sokrates himself, by the way, cannot have been on this campaign at Amphipolis, as some (including myself) have supposed from *Apol.* 28 E. Note, for one thing, the order in that passage: Poteidaia, Amphipolis, Delion. It is more interesting that he was not, apparently, on any campaign before Poteidaia, in the 40's and 30's. οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον: this seems to imply that the troops chosen to go to Thrace did not know till shortly before they sailed that Kleon was to be in command; and this is possible enough. The opinion that they were an aristocratic body of troops and for that reason despised Kleon, is unjustified: see n. on *καθαρόν*, 8. 2.

Most¹/edd., Stahl, Steup, and Hude among them, adopt Dobree's conjecture, ξυνεξῆλθον, coll. ξεξῆλθε, 8. 2.
οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς — — ἀναλαβών τιγεν: those who can believe

¹ From *Hipparchikos*, cc. 2–3. 8, we might suppose that Athens had considerable difficulty in getting the *τιττεῖς* to undergo *any* training. But we should read further: 3. 11–12 describes a manœuvre in the Peiraeus Hippodrome which, it would seem, only well-trained troops could perform.

that in iv. 63. 1 Thucydides wrote διὰ τὸ ἥδη φοβεροὺς ὄντας, here construe διὰ τό with καθημένους and βαρύνεσθαι with οὐ βουλόμενος; and this makes sense in spite of Steup's objection that Kleon could not be wishing that the men would not καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι because they already ἔβαρύνοντο and he knew it. Others must either, as H. Schütz followed by Stahl, take οὐ βουλόμενος independently ('led them out unwillingly, διὰ τὸ --- βαρύνεσθαι', with αὐτούς awkwardly placed), which is not at all convincing, or, with Steup, assume a lacuna, as of ἀπειθεστέρους ἔτι γίγνεσθαι after βαρύνεσθαι. The easiest solution would be the bracketing of διὰ τό; but how did the words get there? (In iv. 63. 1 the deletion of the second διὰ τό would hardly solve the problem.) We might perhaps read διὰ τὸ --- καθήμενον, on the analogy of τὸ δεδιός αὐτοῦ; but it would be very harsh. The scholia have no comment on any eccentricity of grammar here.

3. ἐχρήσατο τῷ τρόπῳ, κ.τ.λ.: most take τῷ τρόπῳ as 'plan', 'procedure', 'principle of action' (*ratio, das Verfahren*—Stahl), and Stahl compares iv. 29. 2–30,—oddly, for that plan was not similar, and was not Kleon's, but Demosthenes'. Steup, a little more aptly, compares ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἰρήσων τὴν πόλιν with iv. 33–36, when the Spartans were in fact surrounded on all sides and their positions taken by storm. But even so the similarity is not great, and it ignores the essential ἐσ μάχην μὲν γὰρ --- τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν (which is altogether different from his conduct at Sphakteria), οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, κ.τ.λ. That means that Kleon was brim-full of confidence, but confident not of immediate victory, but of safety: 'I am not going out to *battle*, but to survey the land; nobody is going to attack'; and he was waiting for reinforcements not in the cautious spirit of a Nikias, to be safe with superior numbers (cf. vi. 23. 3, 24. 1, ἀσφαλῶς ἐκπλεῦσαι), but because he was certain he would then be able to surround and capture the city by storm. τῷ τρόπῳ, therefore, as Arnold says, should mean 'he acted in the same spirit, with the same temper as at Pylos'; or, perhaps, we should take εὐτυχῆσας to mean 'after the success of his expedition to Pylos'; that is to say, in different conditions, and with a different plan, he was as foolishly cocksure as ever; for what was 'mad' about his conduct in the Pylos affair was his boast of success within twenty days. Yet he was not so confident that he attacked at once (§ 5); and personally he had been prepared, apparently, to wait for reinforcements at Eion. I am doubtful whether Thucydides had made clear to himself what was wrong with Kleon's strategy.

Busolt, iii. 1178, accepts Delbrück's view (*Strategie des Perikles*, 1890, 206) that Kleon planned to have his Macedonian and Thracian allies attack Brasidas' position on Kerdylion, with the tactics of light-armed troops, on the flanks and in the rear, and to bring his

Athenian hoplites in front, on the right bank of the river, and so to compel him either to withdraw altogether or retreat into Amphipolis, where he could be besieged. Apart from the fact that this is not at all what Thucydides tells us, it would be a possible explanation only if he means by Kleon's plan what he had intended before he was frustrated by the restlessness of his troops; but he clearly does not—he explains *τῷ τρόπῳ* in the sentences that follow, which include, among other things, *κατὰ θέαν μᾶλλον ἀναβάνειν*, which is certainly part of his present action; and *βίᾳ αἰρήσων* means, not to besiege a town, but to capture it by storm.

ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν: Thucydides' contempt is clear. We cannot but be reminded of *οἱ σώφρονες τῶν πολιτῶν* who in 425 were mistaken in their expectations of what would be the result of Kleon's leadership.

4. ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ: east of Amphipolis are hills much higher than that of Amphipolis itself (and separated from it by a valley), and to the north, about 2 miles away, a more isolated one, 133 m. high, which gives a good view of the great marshy area of the Strymon valley (*τὸ λιμνῶδες*; cf. iv. 108. 1) and the general position of the city 'over against' Thrace, or towards Thrace. It would seem that Kleon himself went somewhat beyond Amphipolis (10. 2), and that his forces were halted at the foot of one of these hills to the east of it. See below, 10. 6, 10. 9 nn.

5. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἔφαίνετο, κ.τ.λ.: he was in general confident that he would not be attacked (§ 3), and besides there was not an enemy to be seen on the walls or at the gates.

μηχανὰς ὅτι οὐκ ἀνῆλθεν ἔχων: Haacke's conjecture, *οὐκ ἀνῆλθεν*, for *οὐ κατῆλθεν* of the MSS. is almost certain (cf. *ἀναβήσεσθαι*, 6. 3; *ἀναβάνειν*, 7. 3; *ἀναβῆναι*, 9. 3); but Grote's interpretation (v, p. 380, n. 1) that *κατῆλθεν* refers to Kleon's arrival at Eion should be mentioned. (His statement that "battering engines would be brought from nowhere else but from Athens" is beside the point: they could as easily be at Thasos, and *μηχαναῖ* here need be little more than ladders.)

ἀμαρτεῖν ἔδοκε· ἐλεῖν γὰρ ἄν, κ.τ.λ.: the criticism of Kleon is curiously like that of Brasidas, iv. 104. 2 (see n. there). But whose was the criticism? Is it only Kleon's own—'why did I not bring ladders? I could have taken the place; there is no one in it'? *διὰ τὸ ἔρημον* suggests this; it is proof of Kleon's complacent folly; for though Brasidas had at the moment large forces outside the town, and a little distance away, the city was not at all empty of troops even then, and Brasidas moved into it at once (8. 1).

8.1. εὐθὺς ὡς εἶδε κινουμένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: that is, soon after the Athenian forces had left Eion. His movement was not completed

till after Kleon had passed Amphipolis, and was seen by the Athenians (io. 2).

2. ἐπέξοδον μὲν καὶ ἀντίταξιν: he did plan a sortie and attack; so, as Steup says, these two words are to be taken together as forming one idea—a march out in formal line of battle, without surprise (9. 4, ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς καὶ ἀντιπαραταχθέντος).

νομίζων ὑποδεεστέρους εἶναι: one expects a nominative (singular or plural), and Portus's conjecture ὑποδεέστερος is probable.

οὐ τῷ πλήθει (ἀντίπαλα γάρ πως ἦν): this is unexpected after ὑπεριδόντα σφῶν τὸ πλῆθος, 6. 3 (an inferiority of numbers which Brasidas tried to end by getting troops from nearby Thrace), and with *εἰ δεῖξει τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὸ πλῆθος* immediately below (§ 3), both of which imply that Brasidas' troops were in fact fewer in number. It is more in accord with *μεμονωμένους* (§ 4 n.).

ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀξιώματι: 'but in quality.' A remarkable admission by Brasidas (cf. 9. 1, in a speech), even though his troops were a mixed lot and the Athenian hoplites had often proved themselves a match for the ordinary Peloponnesian; for the best of his men were volunteers who had had all the advantage of a successful campaign under his inspiring leadership. "Brasidas' magnificent troops" (*A.T.L.* iii. 325) is how we naturally describe them. Did he in fact have difficulty in keeping them up to the mark? see iv. 126. 6 n.

καθαρόν must mean 'citizen troops only', ἐκ τῶν τάξεων (iii. 87. 2 n.), as the scholiast says, by contrast with Brasidas' heterogeneous force of Peloponnesian volunteers and helots (excluding the northern allies on either side, 2. 1; 6. 4–5), not a specially select force of citizen troops (vi. 31. 3, *καταλόγοις χρηστοῖς ἐκκριθέν*, where see n.). Steup's objection that *τῶν Ἀθηναίων* here anyhow means Athenian citizens—for it cannot mean, 'on the Athenian side', for there were many allies—is not valid; for though it means 'from Athens', as opposed to Lemnos, Imbros, and the allies, it might have included *μέτοικοι* and *ξένοι*, and light-armed thetes: any class, in fact, that could be grouped in an *ὅμιλος* or *σχῆμα* (iii. 87. 3, iv. 106. 1; cf. iv. 94. 1). Arnold compares Hdt. i. 211. 2, where *τοῦ καθαροῦ στρατοῦ*, opposed to *τοῦ ἀχρησίου*, means 'the fighting force', not specially selected troops from the fighting force, and iv. 135. 2 (the fit men opposed to the wounded and the sick).

We are not therefore to suppose either that the troops who distrusted Kleon's capacity as general were well born (even had they been specially selected, they need not have been that—they are not in vi. 31. 3), or that the quality of the Athenian hoplite was not recognized (even though they did not form quite so well trained a body as the Boeotians and the Spartans), and recognized by Thucydides. I mention this last point because there were and are men who believe that Thucydides could have written the pseudo-Xenophontic

Constitution of Athens, including the sentences, 2. 1 and 2. 14. (The nearest thing to this in Thucydides is from Alkibiades' speech, vi. 17. 8; and it is a long way away.)

Λημνίων καὶ Ἰμβρίων: from the islands settled by Athens; cf. iii. 5. 1, iv. 28. 4 nn., and on ii. 13. 6, p. 38.

3. εἰ γὰρ δεῖξει, κ.τ.λ.: i.e. by drawing up his troops in the conventional manner, in line for a set battle, which would allow the enemy full sight of his weaker forces.

οὐκ ἂν ἡγεῖτο μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ.: one of the most difficult of Thucydides' sentences. It is clear from *εἰ δεῖξει τοῖς ἐναντίοις* that the Athenians are the subject of the *πρόοψις* and *καταφρόνησις*—Brasidas must avoid letting the Athenians see and despise his smaller and hastily equipped force. For this we must assume that “*μή* is a redundant negative, the negative form of the sentence being already determined by *ἄνευ*” (Graves; a similar suggestion has been made, but I think wrongly, at iv. 126. 2; cf. perhaps vii. 75. 4). This in itself is not easy; and the natural way of taking the last phrase is *ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος καταφρονήσεως*, ‘mistaken contempt’, ‘contempt based on false ideas, not on reality’; but ‘without mistaken contempt’ by the enemy gives the opposite sense to what is required. There is a further, and more serious difficulty: normally, in Thucydides as in other writers, it is a mistake, a recognized mistake, to despise your enemy, even when you are in fact much stronger: cf., for example, ii. 11. 3–5, where Archidamos expresses clearly this salutary doctrine, and later Nikias, vi. 11. 4–5, and Hermokrates, vi. 33. 3, 34. 9 (the last very like Archidamos). Compare also, in this very context, 6. 3, above, *ὑπεριδόντα σφῶν τὸ πλήθος*, the mistake which Brasidas expects and hopes that Kleon will make; and again 9. 3–4 (*τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμαρτίας*), in Brasidas' speech. In all these cases *καταφρόνησις* is a fault, which should be avoided but which a man like Kleon is likely to commit. It is only on an exceptional occasion, and as an intended paradox, that Perikles in ii. 62. 4–5 can praise *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος καταφρόνησις*, contempt based on full and justified confidence in superior strength. It is, almost, the last thing to be predicated of Kleon. On the other hand, in vi. 49. 2, καὶ τῇ ὄψει καταφρονεῖν μᾶλλον, though the supposed circumstances are by no means similar to our case here, the *καταφρόνησις* is said to be advantageous. (vii. 63. 4, Nikias to his despairing troops at Syracuse, is again different; it is more conventional, like Brasidas' words below, 9. 1, and had been better expressed by Phormion, ii. 88.) Edd. are in general content, and it is probably right to take the sentence in this way, with redundant *μή*. As Mervyn Jones says (above, iv. 117. 2 n.), “our passage is different from all the others [in which to despise the enemy is foolish], because here it is not a question of despising the enemy, but of being despised by him; it is not a speech but a soliloquy”. For the construction,

Mervyn Jones is inclined to follow Göller, who suggested that *οὐσῆς* be understood after *καταφρονήσεως*, or, in the alternative, the redundant negative. A third possibility is to take *μὴ ἀπό* as repeating *ἄνευ*, with *ἀπό* governing *καταφρονήσεως* and *τοῦ ὄντος* the objective genitive, 'without their despising the reality' (Brasidas' real weakness); but this is less probable. Together with the contradictory hints about Brasidas' numbers (§§ 2, 4), the difficulties of this sentence make the whole chapter extremely puzzling.

4. πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ὁπλίτας: this is a very small force, too small, one would suppose, for his purpose against well-trained troops. I suspect the figure. See below, 9. 7 n.

ἀπολαβεῖν αὐθις μεμονωμένους: a strained expression, 'isolated', for the whole Athenian force except the hoped-for Thracian allies, a force stronger either in numbers or quality (§ 2 n.), than his own; cf. the use of the word in iv. 126. 1. And not only this; it is not in tune with §§ 2–3: there Brasidas' position is described as a difficult one, which demands a stratagem; here, apparently, he has the advantage. *εἰ τύχοι ἐλθοῦσα, 'once the reinforcements had arrived'*.

The best MSS. all have *αὐτίς* for *αὐθις*, presumably an example of the phenomenon suggested in n. on i. 100. 3.

9. *Speech of Brasidas*

9. 1. ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, — — Δωρῆς: Thucydides has just before clearly stated that, after selecting his chosen body of 150, Brasidas is addressing the whole of his forces, *τοὺς πάντας στρατιώτας*, and these included Amphipolitans, Chalkidians, probably Argilioi, and some barbarian Myrkinioi (iv. 103. 3–4, v. 6. 4). It may be only a conventional simplification, Thucydides' convention, that is (cf. n. on iv. 126. 1); or *τοὺς πάντας*, maybe, should not be taken too literally; § 7 below reads as though the allies of the Peloponnesians are not included in this part of the address; and that in § 9 they are, for though the word *ξύμμαχοι* might include the Peloponnesians as allies of Sparta, the volunteers who had joined Brasidas' army, *ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι*, yet from what follows it is clear that the northern Greek cities are principally meant. Steup thinks that at § 9 Brasidas turns from one part of his forces to the other; but there is clearly no reason in the *rhetoric* to suppose this—it is from *ἐγὼ μέν* in § 6 that he divides his hearers into three sections, his own small force, Klearidas' men, and the northern Greek allies. In any case we should naturally ask, did the northern Greeks, almost all Ionians, hear the opening of the address to the Peloponnesians? It is better not to try to visualize these addresses too clearly. The helots in the army, 70c of them (iv. 80. 5), less casualties, were certainly Peloponnesians, and may well have been Dorians; but for certain Brasidas was not

addressing them as such—they hardly ‘come from a city of free men’. See Luschnat, pp. 61 (cf. above, p. 615), 64.

ἀπὸ μὲν οἵας χώρας ἥκομεν, κ.τ.λ.: see iv. 126. 2 n.

διὰ τὸ εὑψυχον ἐλευθέρας: cf. ii. 43. 4, τὸ εὐδαιμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δὲ ἐλευθερον τὸ εὑψυχον, Perikles’ words.

Δωριῆς — — "Ιωσι: i. 124. 1 n.

2. διδάξω: cf. διδαχή, iv. 126. 1, and n. there, ad init.

3. καταφρονήσει τε ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀν ἐλπίσαντας, κ.τ.λ.: ‘because they despise us and cannot have expected any attack.’ See 6. 3, ὑπεριδόντα σφῶν τὸ πλήθος, 7. 3, ἐσ μάχην μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ., and 8. 3, n. on ἀνεν προσόψεως τε, κ.τ.λ.; and for correspondence of narrative and speech, ii. 21. 2 n.

κατὰ θέαν τετραμμένους: ‘with their minds on the view’; cf. πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις, ii. 40. 2. Although θέα, reconnaissance, is a sound military action, yet Brasidas has an ironic inflexion in his voice; that is, Thucydides intends a slight variation in tone from the use of θέα and θεᾶσθαι in 7. 3-4, though there, too, in the description of Kleon’s thoughts and actions, there is a light, contemptuous note.

4. ὅστις δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμαρτίας, κ.τ.λ.: for both the sense and the manner of expression of this and the following sentence (to μέγιστον ἀν ὠφελήσειν) see iii. 30. 4, and n. there.

μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς — — καὶ ἀντιπαραταχθέντος: so 8. 2, ἐπέξεδον μὲν καὶ ἀντίταξιν.

5. τὰ κλέμματα: ‘tricks’, *furtæ belli*. Dem. xviii. 31 has τὸ μὲν τούννεν τῇ πρεσβείᾳ πρώτον κλέμμα μὲν τοῦ Φιλίππου; but the word was particularly used of deceiving the enemy in war, Xen. *Anab.* iv. 6. 11-17. (If this passage, in which Xenophon the Athenian gets the better of Cheirisophos the Spartan in § 17, means that κλέπτειν was used of stratagems in war particularly in Sparta (so Steup; cf. also *Republic*, viii. 547 D-548 A), it would be interesting; for the Spartans were the chief upholders of the conventional hoplite battle, of ἀντιπαραταξῖς; it was to their interests to do so (see vol. i, p. 15), and they were a likely sort of people to despise ‘clever’ warfare, as at iv. 40. 2. But it was left to Alexander to say to those who advised a sudden night attack, οὐ κλέπτω τὴν νίκην (*Plut. Alex.* 31. 12); which would have been approved by Plato in his old age: see vol. i, pp. 266-7.)

6. τοῦ μένοντος: as a substitute for τοῦ μένειν (which the schol. has in his n.) this seems to me doubtful, and not really parallel to τὸ — — ἀντιπαραταχθέν, § 4, above, nor to other instances in Thucydides of neuter article and participle (e.g. τὸ δεδιός and τὸ θαρσοῦ, i. 36. 1); and the *variatio* between infinitive and participle (Ros, p. 405) scarcely tolerable. Thucydides does not parody his own style. I suggest τοῦ μένοντες ⟨μάχεσθαι⟩, or the like.

πρὶν ξυνταθῆναι μᾶλλον τὴν δόξαν: practically all edd. accept Krüger’s correction of the MSS. ξυνταχθῆναι (read also by the

scholiast), and take *τὴν δόξαν* as *variatio* for *τὴν γνώμην* (see Ros, p. 104). Graves suggests, however, that *ἔνταχθῆναι* may be right, a good military metaphor used by Brasidas—'before their opinions or expectations of what the fighting will be like have, as it were, been properly drawn up in line'. 'Their ideas would be all abroad.' (Cf. ii. 63. 3.) I think this possible, with this interpretation of *τὴν δόξαν* as something different from *τῆς γνώμης* ('when their minds are not concentrated'); but the frequent contrast between *ἀνίεσθαι* and *ἔντείνεσθαι* perhaps makes the correction more probable. See Steup's n.

φθάσας: Steup argues that we are not to understand *τοὺς Αθηναῖους* as the object (which would only be repetition of *πρὸν ἔνταχθῆναι* — *τὴν δόξαν*), but *τοὺς μετὰ Κλεαρίδου*—Brasidas is to get his attack in first; but *ἡν δύνωμαι* seems decisive against this.

7. τοὺς τ' Ἀμφιπολίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔυμάχους: by itself, this would naturally mean the allies from north Greece, Akanthioi, Chalkidians, and others (iv. 124. 1); and this seems to be confirmed by § 9, *αὐτός τε ---, ὅπερ σε εἰκὸς ὄντα Σπαρτιάτην, καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὁ ἄνδρες ἔυμάχοι*, where the *ἔυμάχοι* are certainly the northern Greeks. Yet, if Brasidas took only 150 men with him, the most efficient, presumably, though not the most numerous, part of Klearidas' force will have been Peloponnesians, and experienced troops at that (1,700 hoplites had left the Peloponnese with Brasidas, iv. 78. 1; at Skione there was a garrison, iv. 121. 2, 122. 2, and the majority of the 500 who had been sent first to Mende, 123. 4, 131. 3; at Torone, there had been only a small Peloponnesian force, v. 2. 3, 3. 2-4). As stated above, 8. 4 n., the figure 150 may be corrupt for one a good deal larger. If, however, Klearidas had a considerable number of Peloponnesians with him, say, about 600, we should expect here *τοὺς μετὰ σεαυτοῦ* *καὶ* *τοὺς τ' Ἀμφιπολίτας καὶ τ. ἀ. ἔ.* So, in the main, Ullrich, except that he thought (oddly) that all the 2,000 hoplites (6. 5) were Peloponnesians. Otherwise, if Steup is right that *τοὺς μετὰ σεαυτοῦ* must mean the whole force (cf. 8. 3, 10. 5), then I suggest *τοὺς μ. σ. Πελοποννησίους τε καὶ* *Ἀμφ. καὶ τ. ἀ. ἔ.* Steup would omit all but *τοὺς μετὰ σεαυτοῦ*.

ἐπεκθεῖν: see iv. 34. 1, where the action is slightly different.

8. τὸ γάρ ἐπιὸν ὑστερον, κ.τ.λ.: cf. e.g. Demosthenes' success at Olpai, iii. 108. 1.

9. καὶ ὑμεῖς: see n. on § 1, above.

τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι: see i. 84. 3 for a close parallel; it was a commonplace of Greek thought.

Λακεδαιμονίων ἔυμάχοις κεκλήσθαι: cf. iv. 120. 3 (Brasidas at Skione), and 86. 1 n. (Akanthos), and below, n. on 18. 8.

Αθηναίων τε δούλοις: we should understand *γενέσθαι* rather than *κεκλήσθαι*; they would be called *ἔυμάχοι*. I prefer to take *τε* with

καὶ δουλείαν, κ.τ.λ., with a slight irregularity, rather than with *τοῖς* δὲ λοιποῖς, κ.τ.λ., as most edd.; the latter would probably require *〈αὐτοῖς〉 τε Ἀθ. δούλοις*. (This does not mean, as Steup objects, that three clauses, *τε --- καὶ --- δέ*, correspond to the two previous, ἐλευθερίαν *τε --- καὶ*—and it would not matter if it did—but that the first clause is divided into two parts.) Cf. Herodotos' δούλοισι καὶ τούτοις ὡς δρηπέτησον, vi. 11. 2.

δουλεία, δουλοῦσθαι, etc., are frequently used of political subjection (as i. 98. 4), and in a figurative sense generally (ii. 61. 3, iv. 34. 1), ἀνδράποδα always literally of individual slaves (or as 'low fellows': see L. and S.); Athens' worst enemies did not call her subjects ἀνδράποδα, which would have meant that they were personal property and could be bought and sold. In an English translation we must here say 'servants of Athens . . . and bound by a harsher servitude' (Forster Smith has 'vassals' and 'vassalage'), in order to keep the word 'slavery' for ἀνδραποδισμός, even if this weakens a little the force of δοῦλος and δουλεία. Another obvious instance of δουλεύειν meaning simply 'serve', the opposite of ηγεμονεύειν as well as of δεσπόζειν, is *Phaedo*, 80 A. See *A.T.L.* iii. 155–7, on the political use of δουλεία at this time. An earlier instance of it is in Hdt. i. 27. 3, τῶν --- 'Ελλήνων, τοὺς σὺ (Kroisos) δουλώσας ἔχεις, just after οἱ 'Ελληνες κατεστράφατο ἐς φόρου ἀπαγωγὴν (27. 1). When the Greeks called the barbarians δοῦλοι (not πολῖται), this meant 'servants' (of the one man, the King), rather than 'slaves', which would be ἀνδράποδα; but the ambiguity of the word δοῦλος was made much use of for political ends.

κωλυταῖς γενέσθαι: cf. Brasidas' words at Akanthos, iv. 85. 5–6, 87.5.

10. 1. τὰς Θρακίας καλουμένας τῶν πυλῶν: this will be a gate in the east or north-east sector, probably the latter, for that way lies the natural route to the interior east of the Strymon; and, as well, this position suits better the story of the deception of Kleon.

ἐπεξίοιεν: as ἐπέξιοδος, 8. 2, ἐπεξίωμεν, § 5, below.

2. καταβάντος: he had already done this; he now proceeded to prepare a sacrifice to Athena, θυομένου. He did this in a conspicuous part of the city, so that he might be seen by Kleon from the hill to the east (7. 4 n.).

ἐπιφανεῖ οὕσῃ: see iv. 102. 3 and v. 7. 5, and n. on ὑπὸ τὰς πύλας, below.

καὶ ταῦτα πράσσοντος: i.e. making his preparations and plans with Klearidas, whose troops were concentrating at the Thracian gate; for this is the news which is given to Kleon. Kleon had himself gone ahead of his army, in a north or north-east direction; and when he heard of the position of the enemy troops in the centre of the city

and at the Thracian gate, he thought he was safe to move southwards. It was Brasidas' sudden attack from a gate well to the south of this position that upset his plan.

ὑπὸ τὰς πύλας: this may mean 'near the gate'; but the sight of the feet of horses and men can only have been got in a gap, a considerable gap, between the lower edge of the gate and the roadway. It has been objected to this that only an enemy very close to the gate could have seen this; true, but scouts could have been sent forward by the Athenians. It was not Brasidas' purpose to conceal the presence of troops at this gate. Besides, the distance between the main Athenian forces and the "Long Wall" of the town must have been very short, or it would have been impossible for Brasidas' small force to cause consternation among the experienced Athenian hoplites. See the topographical n. below, § 6.

3. πρίν οἱ καὶ τοὺς βοηθούς ἤκειν: see nn. on 7. 3, and 8. 4. Kleon does not seem to have been in all respects over-confident, nor his forces particularly strong; or should one say that his original confidence has gone, and another sort has taken its place? The reinforcements are those mentioned in 6. 2.

φθήσεσθαι: i.e. the attack which, according to the reports, might come from the Thracian gate.

τοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν: since it is the whole Athenian force that must withdraw to Eion 'by the left wing' (because they had taken up position facing westwards towards Amphipolis, and hence their left was to the south, towards Eion), not only a part, Krüger, followed by Stahl, could see no meaning in *τοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν* and bracketed *τοῖς*. Steup objected that this leaves *ἀπιοῦσιν* quite otiose, and justified the article by contrasting *τοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν* with *τὸ δεξιόν*; for, he argued, since it is expressly stated of the right wing, and of the right only, that by Kleon's manœuvre (the left turn) it exposed its unshielded side to the enemy, the left wing did not thus expose itself—it must have adopted some such tactics as the front rank remaining facing the enemy while the rear ranks marched successively to the left, again to face the enemy as a covering force, while the original front rank marched behind them, and continuing this till they were beyond the reach of any surprise attack. This would be a slower process, and it was this that made Kleon impatient (reading *σχολῇ γίγνεσθαι*, § 4). This seems correct, unless all that Thucydides means is that the left wing from the start was out of reach of a surprise attack, because it was farther south, or merely that in fact Brasidas did not attack it; which is hardly satisfactory. Steup's view, however, still does not justify *τοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν*, for clearly such an order, as interpreted by him, must originally have applied to the whole force, indeed particularly to the right wing because it was in greater danger of attack. I should prefer to read *αὐτοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν*; otherwise we must take *τοῖς ἀπ.* to be

equivalent to *τοῖς αἰεὶ ἀποῦσιν*: the order applied to the whole force, but to its several units in turn. (In 5. 2 there was another case of doubtful article with participle; see also iii. 81. 4.)

I would adopt Steup's view of the manœuvre, which was only followed by the left wing; the *right* wing was ordered to turn left and march (1) before it was ready, and (2) without the necessary precaution of the covering rank, which thus resulted in the dangerous exposure of its unshielded side. As stated below (§ 5), this does not mean that the right wing was at once in disorder; and we may note that when it is attacked, it stands its ground (§ 9); it was the left that fled without fighting. We are perhaps to suppose that the hasty manœuvre of the right disturbed the more orderly movements of the left wing.

ὑπάγειν: this word was used of an orderly retreat by Brasidas, iv. 126. 6.

4. **σχολὴ γίγνεσθαι:** he thought 'he had plenty of time', and so "it was no longer necessary for the right wing to stand fast in order to cover the retreat, but the whole army might be safely withdrawn" (Graves). This (as Graves saw) requires *εἶναι*, and it is difficult to see the meaning of *γίγνεσθαι*: 'events were proving that he had plenty of time'? I prefer the old conjecture *σχολῆ*, adopted by most edd.: 'he thought that this was being done at too leisurely a pace', and lost patience and exposed his flank when there was perhaps already a gap between the right wing and the left. (See also n. on *ἀπορραγέν*, § 8.)

5. **κάν τούτῳ:** this does not, I think, refer only to Kleon's action on the right wing; it is the whole army which is 'on the move', the 'movement' of whose heads and spears indicates that it will not stand. Further, as Steup suggests, *τῶν τε δοράτων τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν* does not mean that their movement was disorderly, as the scholiast interprets, only that it was of an army on the march, moving away. That *κινούμενον* and *κινήσει* may have this meaning here is shown sufficiently by *κινούμενος* in 8. 1, above; or *Il.* iv. 427.

οἱς γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο γίγνηται, κ.τ.λ.: Krüger suspected *τοὺς ἐπιόντας*, and Widmann the whole sentence, as unsuitable in the circumstances of the moment. But, whether suitable or no, it is just the kind of generalization that we find in all the speeches, long and short; cf. esp. iii. 30. 4.

6. **κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας, κ.τ.λ.:** where the palisade was to which the gate led, and what its purpose was, is unknown to us (for Grote's view, which I find unacceptable, see below). Thucydides, of course, knew the place well, and so gives this and other details; but he has rather forgotten his readers. For *τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος*, see iv. 102. 3, ad fin. *αἱ πρῶται τ. μ. τ. πύλαι* might theoretically be either

the northernmost or the southernmost gate in the wall, according to the direction of approach; here obviously the latter (the first to the Athenians coming from Eion).

It is supposed that the palisade, whatever it was, was outside the Long Wall, and that Brasidas divided his small force and they left by the two gates mentioned, which must have been both in the wall and close to each other; for otherwise his force would be ineffectively divided. In that case *κατὰ τὰς <τε> ἐπὶ τ. στ. πύλας* should be read (especially after the simple *τὰς πύλας* just above); and what purpose would two gates close together serve, and why should one of them only be said to lead to the palisade? Perhaps the *στραίρωμα* was some defensive work *within* the walls, cutting off the south-east angle of the town, and Brasidas' men had first to pass a gate into this area and then through the 'first gate in the wall'. Otherwise we must suppose that one gate led to the palisade and the other, 'the first gate' (i.e. the southernmost), led out of the wall to the country outside the city.

Grote, v. p. 377, n. 1, with a map, followed by Graves and Busolt, iii. 1152. 4 and 1178. 1, places the bridge across the Strymon (iv. 103. 4-5) south of the town, over the eastward bend of the river, and outside, that is, to the east of 'the long wall from river to river'; and supposes that the *στραίρωμα* was a light defence carried down from the wall to a point east of the bridge, so as to include it within the defended area: presumably the same as, or in the same line as, the *τεῖχη* which, after 424, were carried down to the bridge (iv. 103. 5). This makes the gate leading to the palisade—which would be more naturally called the gate leading to the bridge—the first (the southernmost) to one coming from Eion, and *αἱ πρῶται πύλαι* becomes in fact the middle gate. (Grote also places the Thracian gate too far south, too close to the other.) Apart from that difficulty, is it likely that Hagnon, in building the Long Wall to defend the city and its immediately surrounding fields against attack from the east, would have terminated it close to the bridge but so as to leave the bridge outside, and therefore the passage of the river between west and east uncontrolled? Besides this, here the river is considerably wider than elsewhere in the course of its horse-shoe bend round the city. Papastávrou (see below), on the other hand, would put the bridge north of the city, where the river is narrowest. But to my mind there can be little doubt that the ancient bridge was at or near the site of the modern one, where the river is still narrow, at its western bend; the Long Wall ran from the north-east corner of the land enclosed by the bend to the south-east corner, and the *τεῖχος* of the city itself (iv. 104. 1) crowned the top of the hill, with presumably a part of the Long Wall as its eastern side. Later two walls were carried down from this *τεῖχος* to either side of the bridge. What

change Thucydides had in mind in writing here *τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὅντος* we do not know.

Lehmann-Haupt, ap. Papastávrou, p. 148, states that there are remains of a bridge of Imperial, or perhaps late Hellenistic date, probably of stone, near where Grote placed that of the fifth century. This will be the bridge for the Egnatian Way, which passed south of Amphipolis.

We may here add a few details to complete the picture of Amphipolis and the surrounding country, so far as this is relevant to Thucydides' narrative and his topographical notes (iv. 102. 3, 103. 4, 108. 1, v. 7. 4, and here). For a careful description see J. Papastávrou, *Amphipolis* (*Klio*, Beiheft 24, 1936); Kromayer, vol. iv; and some notes by S. Pelekídes in *Πρακτικά*, 1925; also *B.C.H.* lv, 1931, 190–2 with plate ix, photographs from Kerdylion (i.e. hill 312: see below) eastwards to Amphipolis and Mt. Pangaion, and from Argilos westwards showing the coast of the Gulf of Strymon. The town, as has been said, was on a hill 152 m. high which descends steeply to the river on the north, west, and south, and is connected by a saddle with the higher hills to the east (the western foothills of Pangaion); the road from Eion east of the Strymon crosses this saddle, going north and south, where it dips to its lowest point, which is just under 100 m. About 2½ km. east of this point on the saddle is the highest of the Pangaion foothills, a conspicuous summit, 386 m., giving wide views all around. There is another hill, 2 km. north of the saddle; it is only 133 m. high, but falls steeply to the river, lake, and flat land to the north, and gives a nearer view of the course of the river and so of the strategic position of Amphipolis (iv. 108. 1). Kleon when he went forward, beyond his army, to reconnoitre (10. 2), will have gone either to hill 386, as Kromayer and Papastávrou suppose, or, as I think is more likely, to hill 133. The Athenian forces had marched by the road east of the Strymon, and probably drew up in line, *θέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα*, on the slopes above it east of the town and astride the saddle, probably not much above its lowest point. Other distances are: c. 2½ km. 'from river to river', i.e. the line of the 'Long Wall', and about the same distance from the westernmost bend of the river (where is the modern bridge, and where, I think, was the ancient) to the low point of the saddle.

Brasidas, on the slopes of Kerdylion on the opposite side of the river, and commanding the bridge, was either on hill 172 immediately above the river bank and about 1½ km. south of the bridge (see Kromayer, *Atlas*: 'hill 151'), or on the hill west-south-west of the bridge, 312 m. high and 4 km. from the summit to the bridge (see 6. 3 n.). From his point of view either hill might be Kerdylion; but from Kleon's, as he could see his enemy's movements (10. 2), perhaps the latter is the more probable.

ἢπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου ίόντι τροπαῖον ἔστηκε: another change indicated since the days of Athenian possession, like iv. 103. 5, and 11. 1, below; but in this case it may be only that the trophy is new. A particular trophy is meant; there were doubtless others near the city, perhaps one by the bridge to mark Brasidas' first success. τὸ χωρίον is naturally Amphipolis itself: if you went along the strongest part of the city, you came to a trophy, and a road running from a gate in the wall eastwards (though ὁδός does not necessarily mean a *made* road, or even a path); it is not the hill to the top of which Kleon went to reconnoitre, as Steup and Graves suppose. The Athenians must have been posted well below the top of hill 386, on its western slopes not much above the road to Eion, and have descended to the bottom of the valley to begin the march back to their base.

As I have said above, the distance between the gate and the Athenian position must have been quite short, a few hundred yards only; Brasidas covers it at a run, and he takes the Athenians (who were good soldiers: 8. 2) by surprise and, with a very small force, causes consternation. His way was probably along the ridge connecting the hill of Amphipolis with the western outliers of Mt. Pangaion. κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα: he attacked at the place where, I suppose, a gap had already been formed between the left and the right wings, and, more specifically, on the extreme left (from the Athenian point of view) of the right wing. That is to say, this phrase does not mean that he attacked first the Athenian centre; if it does mean that, then Thucydides tells us nothing of how the centre behaved. Rather is the Athenian force divided into two parts only, a left and a right half. 7. καὶ ὁ Κλεαρίδας - - - ἄμα: but the distance which Klearidas' troops had to cover was probably a good deal greater, and it was an already frightened force which they attacked (9. 8, τὸ ἐπὶὸν ὑστερὸν δεινότερον).

8. εὐθὺς ἀπορραγὲν ἔφευγεν: the imperfect (see crit. n.) would mean, 'the left wing was at once cut off from the right, and now continued its retreat'; perhaps at first in an orderly manner. This suits the pluperfect προύκεχωρήκει. If we read ἔφυγεν, 'was cut off and fled', we must suppose that the whole Athenian force had started its withdrawal together, though not all in good order (§ 4 n., above), and that Brasidas caught the rear of the left wing in his first contact κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα. Since the right wing in fact stayed its ground better, the latter might seem preferable, and we should read ἔφυγεν; it will then have been the left which was particularly thrown into confusion; but see above.

ἐπιπαριών: perhaps 'passing along the Athenian line, attacking now here, now there', somewhat like Phormion's movement in the battle of the Corinthian Gulf, ii. 84. 1 (*ἐν χρῷ αἰεὶ παραπλέοντες*).

τιτρώσκεται: this was the second time Brasidas had been wounded leading an attack against the Athenians; cf. iv. 12. 1.

9. τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔμενέ [τε] μᾶλλον: they put up some defence in spite of the fact that it was they who were caught by Brasidas and confused; they had exposed their unshielded side and it was this act which gave Brasidas his opportunity. Thucydides has hardly made these two points clear.

I think, with Arnold, that *τε* should remain: the meaning is, ‘the right both stood their ground better and, though Kleon (who was with them) tried to escape and was killed, beat off two or three attacks’; the only irregularity being that, the concessive clause being expressed paratactically with *μέν*, there is a variation of the subject in the second half of the sentence.

δο μὲν Κλέων, κ.τ.λ.: the prejudice is again clear, though not so pronounced as in 7. 2-3, and in fact not very clearly expressed. ὡς τὸ πρῶτον οὐ διενοεῖτο μένειν refers back to § 3, οὐ βουλόμενος μάχη διαγωνίσασθαι, κ.τ.λ.; but that is his plan as commander, which has nothing to do with his personal courage. (Leonidas, when he found he would be surrounded, tried to disengage his forces and retreat.) εὐθὺς φεύγων, on the other hand, means only, in this context, his personal behaviour, in the midst of the battle when his own troops were standing their ground. I would in fact suggest εὐθὺς *⟨αὐτὸς⟩* φεύγων here, *αὐτὸς* having been omitted owing to assonance, as in the examples cited in vol. i, p. 296. It may be noted as well that Kleon, however anxious to get away himself, had not gone off with the left wing—the place of the officer commanding being with the rear in a retreat—but awaited Klearidas’ attack; for the Myrkinioi were all with the latter, not with Brasidas. οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν, κ.τ.λ., recalls the fighting in Sphakteria: the Athenian hoplites of the right wing, probably outnumbered by the enemy hoplites alone (2. 1, 6. 5), held out till surrounded and shot down by the light-armed, at this much greater disadvantage compared with the Spartans on the island that they were attacked by cavalry as well. Kleon was shot by a peltast, with a javelin, not “stabbed in the back as he fled”;¹ he may have been as brave, though he was doubtless not so calm, as the two Spartan commanders who were killed on Sphakteria (see iv. 40. 2). Compare also the account of the Athenian retreat in Aitolia, iii. 98. 3, where there is no suggestion of cowardice, or even incompetence. With the evidence of Thucydides’ bias before us, and considering the uncertainty of any report of this kind from the middle of a confused battle which ended in a humiliating defeat, I would not be certain that he was, on this occasion, sufficiently awake to his own principles of work, i. 22. 3.

¹ Frazer on Paus. i. 29. 13.

Eupolis' line (fr. 359), ἔξεπλάγη γάρ ιδών στίλβοντα τὰ λάβδα (that letter being inscribed on Spartan shields), may well refer to Kleon's conduct in this battle. Diodoros, xii. 74. 2, makes Kleon die heroically fighting against the equally brave Brasidas; but his account of the battle is a conventional battle-picture of the worst kind, which, as Grote said, "it is almost painful to read".

ὑπὸ Μυρκινίου πελταστοῦ — — ἡ τε Μυρκινία καὶ ἡ Χαλκιδικὴ ἥπτος: see 6. 4–5. After their victory in 432 under Kallias son of Kalliades, the Athenians never overcame the Chalkidian methods of fighting in the open. The field of battle here (§ 6) must have been one suitable to cavalry. Cf. ii. 79. 6–7.

οἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ ξυστραφέντες ὄπλιται: Steup quotes iii. 53. 3, 66. 3 for Thucydides' occasional preference for a predicative participle in the attributive position; but the parallel is not close. Classen's bracketing of ὄπλιται, or its transposition after δέ, is preferable; perhaps οἱ δὲ *〈μετ’〉 αὐτοῦ* ξ. [ὄπλιται], for αὐτοῦ, 'in that place', is not quite correct. With ξυστραφέντες cf. οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπιτάδαν — — ξυνετάξαντο, iv. 33. 1. αὐτοῦ — — ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον: this can hardly be the hill of 7. 4, if that is either hill 133 (which would be too far to the north) or 386 (which is too high for this attempt to group their forces); perhaps a lower hill is intended in both places.

10. οὕτω δή: I agree with Steup that the MSS. reading, οὕτω δέ, should be restored; for this is not strictly resumptive (as in ii. 6. 3 and iv. 30. 3 cited by Stahl), not "superiorum comprehensio atque conclusio".

11. οἱ μεθ’ αὐτοῦ: in the context (cf. § 5, τοῖς μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις) this should mean only Brasidas' chosen force, which would do less than justice to the rest—unless we are to assume that Brasidas did not live to hear of the final, complete victory, in which case we should expect ἐνίκων, 'were winning', rather than νικῶσιν, 'were the victors'. Perhaps we should read οἱ ἑαυτοῦ; cf. τοῖς ἑαυτῶν, viii. 45. 2, and Xen. *Anab.* i. 2. 15, 5. 12, 8. 13 (quoted by Stahl on § 9).

12. τροπαῖον: see § 6.

Thucydides' description of the battle, vivid as it is and in general convincing, is short and omits some things and leaves others unclear. To summarize what has been said in the notes above: there is some confusion about the relative size and quality of the two armies (6. 3, 8. 2, 3, 4); if the Athenian cavalry (2. 1) were absent from the battle, we should have been told why; it is not immediately clear that the Athenian army is divided into two sections, left and right, instead of the conventional three, left, centre, and right; or, if the usual division was made, we are not told the fate of the centre (10. 6); nor exactly what part was played by the left wing (10. 5). But I believe that the best interpretation is somewhat as follows. The left wing had begun its retreat by an orderly movement, the right wing too

hurriedly and without the proper covering tactics. Brasidas attacked between them (where there was either a gap, or confusion because the right was pressing on the slower, because more orderly-moving, left). The left was cut off from the others and fled; and it was this action that was decisive, and responsible for the defeat, as Thucydides understood it. The right, both as forming the rear of the column (the army on the march) and because it was nearer to the Long Wall, was the more exposed to the attack; the leading ranks of the left were probably too far south to be in immediate danger, and an attack was the last thing they expected. It was the last ranks of the left who received Brasidas' attack at first and fled; and when he turned his attention to the right, *they* were already facing Klearidas. If the right had been in the beginning properly posted to cover the start of the march to Eion, neither they nor the left wing would have been so taken by surprise; this sound principle is what Kleon ignored (10. 4)—he was too impatient and too confident that he knew all about the situation, and would not be attacked. No wonder if he lost his own nerve too.

For some further discussion of the details of the fighting, and of the reliability of the account of the behaviour of the Athenians and of Kleon in particular in this battle, see my article in '*Ελληνικά*', xiii, 1954, pp. 1-10. I think it possible that neither was as bad as Thucydides says; and we may at least note that most of the hoplites who despised their commander (7. 2) behaved, according to him, no better than he did.

It is as well interesting that one cause of Athenian failure in the Archidamian war was too close adherence to old-fashioned hoplite tactics, in Aitolia and at Spartolos and Amphipolis. Demosthenes seems not to have carried enough weight.

11. 1. πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὕσης: this indicates a greater change in the layout of the city, since before 424, than either 10. 6 or iv. 103. 5.

For burial of an *οἰκιστής* in the agora of a city, cf. Xen. *Hell.* vii. 3. 12; and for other *μνημεῖα* of famous men similarly situated, above, i. 138. 5 (Themistokles), and Cicero, *ad Fam.* iv. 12. 3 (Servius Sulpicius had been unable to obtain a similar honour for M. Marcellus at Athens: 'it would have been against all precedent'). There was a cenotaph of Brasidas at Sparta, Paus. iii. 14. 1; but we do not hear of any special honours to him there.


Because *οἱ Αμφιπολῖται* is the subject from *καὶ τὸ λοιπόν* to *τὰς τιμὰς ἔχειν*, and *οἱ ξύμμαχοι πάντες* again the subject of *ἀπέδοσαν* in § 2, Steup puts the whole of the former into a parenthesis; hardly an improvement. No more precise subject of *ἀπέδοσαν* is required. *ἐτησίους θυσίας*: either sacrifices to Brasidas, as to a god (not hero) or, more probably, annual festivals in his honour (or to celebrate

ENVIRONS OF AMPHIPOLIS

Contours at 50 metre intervals

— tracks
— marsh

The line of the city walls, and
the sites of the gates and the
bridge are formal only.



the liberation) in which sacrifices to the gods took place; for ἐντέμνονται and θυσίαι are presumably used in their ordinary different senses. Aristotle, however, *Eth. Nic.* v. 7, 1134 b 23, uses θύειν of the offerings made to Brasidas.

The tenses, ἐντέμνονται and δεδώκασιν, seem to indicate the eyewitness, at least the observer living in the neighbourhood (Classen).

"The death of Brasidas", says Grote, v, p. 389, commenting on the Athenian disaster, "converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained no Spartan, like or second to that eminent man, either as a soldier or a conciliating politician; none who could replace him in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace; none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens on her unshielded side, which he had first shown to be practicable. With him, the fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in respect to the future, alike disappeared." Not so (apart from the fact that these hopes and fears were now centred on the peace): it was this personal gallantry of Brasidas, a readiness to take any risks himself which he asked of his men, that most made for his popularity and fame. He gave his own life for this; but Sparta reaped the full benefit later, as Thucydides, iv. 108. 4, tells us. It was to Achilles, παναύριος, that men likened him (*Plat. Symp.* 221 c).

ὡς οἰκιστὴ: cf. vi. 5. 3 for similar action in Kamarina.

τὰ Ἀγνώνεια οἰκοδομήματα: see iv. 102. 3. (R. Goossens in the article cited above, p. 188, curiously supposes these buildings to have formed part of the private property of the rich Hagnon. They are of course public buildings named after the oikistes.)

σωτῆρα: perhaps the first recorded instance of an individual receiving a title which afterwards, in Hellenistic times, became so often used, and so often combined with another, θεός. For its growing use in general, cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 264; Soph. *O.T.* 304; Hdt. vii. 139. 5 (the Athenians as saviours of Greece at Salamis);¹ and, especially, Ar. *Eq.* 149.

τὸν δὲ Ἀγνώνα, κ.τ.λ.: οὐ τοῦτο λέγει ὅτι ὁ Α. οὐχ ἤδετο ταῖς τιμαῖς,

¹ The opening words of this famous passage (*ἐπίφθονον μὲν τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων*) have been, I think, slightly misunderstood. The majority of men gave the palm to Sparta for the victory over Persia, and her name came first on the monuments at Olympia and Delphi; unthinkingly, according to Herodotos, for ('though here the majority of men will quarrel with me'), though the Spartans fought the bravest and deserved the prize for valour (Thermopylai, Plataia), yet had not the Athenians stood firm at Salamis, and so wrenched from the Persians the command at sea, Spartan valour would have been either useless or without an opportunity to show itself (*μουνωθέντες δὲ ἄν καὶ ἀποδεξάμενοι ἔργα μεγάλα ἀπέθανον γενναίως. ἡ ταῦτα ἄν ἔπαθον, ἡ πρὸ τοῦ δρῶντες ἄν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας μηδίζοντας ὀμολογίη ἄν ἔχρισαντο πρὸς Εέρετην*). This does not mean either that Herodotos would have given the prize of valour to Athens or that in his day the Athenians were almost universally unpopular.

ἀλλ' οὐτε συμφέρειν τοῖς Ἀμφιπολίταις τιμᾶσθαι τὸν Η., διὰ τὸ κολακεύειν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐτε ἡδὺ ἦν τοῖς Ἀμφ. τιμᾶν αὐτόν—schol.; and this may be right, though most edd. suppose that the pleasure which is denied was Hagnon's. Cf., with Grote, iii. 58. 4–5. Müller-Strübing, *Aristophanes*, 716–21, who is followed in this by Steup, argued that Hagnon must have been dead at this time (and so is not the Hagnon of ii. 95. 2, nor the father of Theramenes, but perhaps the Hagnon of ii. 95. 3); further, says Steup, he must have died before the capture of Amphipolis in 424, for honours would not have been continued to an active enemy between 424 and 422. This may be right; but the Greeks could do strange things with their gods and heroes, and it is all but certain that Hagnon, son of Nikias, of the deme Steiria, father of Theramenes (who lived to 411 at least), was the oikistes of Amphipolis. See ii. 58. 1 n.

2. ἀπέθανον δέ, κ.τ.λ.: startling figures, with which edd. compare the battle near Corinth of 394 (Xen. *Hell.* iv. 3. 1) and the 'tearless battle' (*ibid.* vii. 1. 32); which are by no means parallel, for there the Spartan hoplites stood their ground, in close ranks, here Brasidas' troops must have broken rank to charge so rapidly, and we should expect some losses among Klearidas' force as well, for they were beaten off two or three times. See Busolt, iii. 1181. 3, who thinks that the Peloponnesian losses were higher, and that Thucydides' figure is the official figure accepted at Sparta, where they would conceal their losses (v. 74. 3); but Thucydides should have got his information from nearer at hand. Marathon in fact affords a closer, as well as a more famous, comparison; and Herodotos' figures for its dead may be believed. Cf. also the fighting on Sphakteria, iv. 38. 5, where οὐ πολλοί, said of Athenian losses, may mean a very small figure. Pausanias saw the monument of the Athenian dead in Athens, i. 29. 13.

According to Eratosthenes, quoted by the scholiast on Aristophanes' *Peace*, 48 (*F. Gr. Hist.* 241, F 39), the battle took place eight months before the production of the play at the Dionysia of 421 (δέκτῳ μησὶ προγεγονέναι). This was perhaps about April 1 by the Julian calendar (below, p. 712); eight lunar months before this would be in the first half of August, 422 (that is, near the middle of Metageitnion in that year, if it was intercalary:¹ above, n. on 1). This is too early for Thucydides, who says in 12. 1 that the battle was fought towards the end of the summer, at least two, perhaps nearly three months later. It is probable that Eratosthenes is misquoted, and that he dated the start of Kleon's expedition from Athens eight

¹ Meritt, *Ath. Cal.* 114, says "Metageitnion if 422–421 was ordinary, Boedromion if it was intercalary"; but that is because he interprets δέκτῳ μησὶ to mean seven months (what is called 'reckoning inclusively'). I feel sure that this is wrong; μηνὶ δύδοις or ἐπτά μησὶ is seven months.

months before the Dionysia, just after the Pythia of 422 (2. 1 n.). See Busolt, iii. 1174; Meritt, *Ath. Cal.* 114; *A.F.D.*, p. 178. (Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 549 says that Kleon was killed ἐπ' Ἀμεινίου, but that Androtion [F 40] put his death ἐπ' Ἀλκαίου. Androtion is of course right. It is interesting that in our scholia, in the form that we have them, the wrong view could thus be so clearly given, and the other only stated as an alternative.)

3. οἱ μὲν ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπέπλευσαν: leaving of course a garrison in Eion and a squadron in nearby waters. But the campaign was over.

12. 1. **Ραμφίας, κ.τ.λ.**: perhaps the same as the ambassador of i. 139. 3, and presumably the father of Klearchos (viii. 8. 2), though O.C.T. index distinguishes the latter. The other two Spartans are not otherwise known.

ἐς Ἡράκλειαν: Brasidas too had come by this route, iv. 78. 1.

ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἔδόκει μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν: see iii. 93. Athens was not the only city which allowed minor troubles or interests to delay more important operations (ii. 85. 4–6).

13. 1. **Πιερίου**: the site is uncertain, but surely in southern Thessaly, somewhere in the Othrys district.

κωλυόντων δὲ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν: cf. the experience of Brasidas, with twice the strength of this force (iv. 78. 1), and of Ischagoras (iv. 132. 2). The present tense of the participle means not more than ‘were for preventing them’, not ‘stopped them’, as Steup implies, when arguing that Thessalian opposition was the true and sufficient reason for Ramphias’ return home.

νομίσαντες οὐδένα καιρὸν ἔτι εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.: Steup suggests οὐδέ (‘that there was not occasion either’), for the reason given above; and though he gives undue weight to the Thessalian action, this is attractive.

At first sight the two reasons given seem contradictory; but Thucydides may mean: ‘as reinforcements against Kleon’s attack, we are no longer necessary; as troops which, combined with those on the spot, were intended to carry out Brasidas’ plans (a march to the Hellespont?), we are insufficient’, with a feeling probably as well of relief, and that only Brasidas could carry out such plans. These Spartans were very pusillanimous; they do not send any further help even to Skione; and their refusal *τοῦ πλέονος ὀρέγεσθαι* and to follow up Brasidas’ victory brought no more lasting peace than Athens’ opposite action in 425.

2. **μάλιστα δέ, κ.τ.λ.**: the ultimate reason was that they knew that hearts at Sparta were not in the expedition—‘Brasidas had to be helped against Kleon, but there is now no need for that, and they will prefer that we return’. See also 14. 1, n. on *πρὸς δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην*.

14–17. Peace Movements

14. 1. πρὸς δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην — εἶχον: this has just been stated of Sparta (13. 2), and, in the absence of an emphatic ἀμφότεροι here, Steup found difficulties and suggested interpolations; unnecessarily, after πολέμου μὲν — μηδετέρους. See n. at end of c. 17.

Cf. for the general feeling Aristophanes' *Holkades*, fr. 400; and for Athens, frs. 402–3, which are like *The Peace* (incl. frs. 295 and 296). οὐ προσεδέχοντο πρότερον τὰς σπονδάς: iv. 21, 41. 4. This ignores the year's truce of 423–422; but Thucydides in part retraces his steps later, 15. 2.

2. μετεμέλοντο: so Aristophanes, *Peace*, 665–9. But indeed the whole of the play is a lively illustration of the feelings at Athens at this time, soberly described by Thucydides.

Thucydides says nothing of Athenian financial difficulties as a motive for peace: see below, pp. 687–9; nor of Hyperbolos as successor to Kleon, who might be expected to oppose it. He had for some years been one of the butts of Comedy.

3. οἱ δ' αὖ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, κ.τ.λ.: cf. iv. 41. 3, 55. For παρὰ γνώμην, cf. γνώμῃ σφαλέντες, iv. 18. 2, with n.

ὁλίγων ἐτῶν καθαιρήσειν: cf. i. 81. 6, 120. 3 (with my n.), iv. 85. 2, vii. 28. 3.

αὐτομολούντων τε τῶν Εἰλάτων: see iv. 41. 3 and my n. there. This passage certainly says that helot desertions played a considerable part in determining Spartan policy; yet Thucydides' narrative elsewhere would not have led us to this conclusion. C. 80 of book iv is indeed startling; yet Brasidas could, obviously, rely on the loyalty of those helots who were given arms and marched with him into Thrace. The Spartans at least succeeded in preventing another organized revolt like that of 464 B.C.

πρὸς τὰ παρόντα σφίσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον: in 464, when they took the opportunity offered them by the great earthquake (i. 101–2).

4. τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδάς: see 22. 2, 28. 2. It must have been concluded in 451 or 450 B.C., in the summer or autumn. Thucydides does not mention it in the *Pentekontaetia* (see vol. i, pp. 328, 366); and it is anyhow surprising that he gives no explanatory note here. There was no reason to suppose that his readers knew much about it. See *A.T.L.* iii. 304 for a recent brief discussion of this treaty.

As to the feeling about Argos at this time, see *Peace*, 475–7; Pherekrates, *Automoloi*, fr. 19.

τὴν Κυνουρίαν γῆν: see iv. 56. 2, v. 41. 2.

ῶστ' ἀδύνατα εἶναι: since the impossibility of fighting both Athens and Argos together is not the consequence either of the Spartan desire for making peace with the former nor of the difficulty of renewing a peace with the latter, the expression is difficult: it must

mean 'so that they might have to face both at once, which they thought impossible'. Herwerden and Stahl's [*ώστ'*] ἀδύνατα ⟨δέ⟩, adopted by Widmann and Hude, is not very convincing, but gives good sense. Steup's objection to it, that Sparta had before fought against both Athens and Argos and was to do so again, amounts to nothing; his own suggestion was *ώστε δυνατὰ εἶναι*, 'so that it was possible that they would have to fight', etc., with the use of ἀδύνατα in viii. 60. 1 for comparison; but I am very doubtful of this, in place of the usual *ώστ'* ἔμελλον --- πολεμήσειν, or the like. Mervyn Jones has suggested to me *εἴτα* for *ώστε*; which is neat, and though somewhat rhetorical for this passage, is perhaps the best conjecture yet made.

ἀποστήσεσθαι: the same word that is used of the members of the Athenian alliance. See iii. 13. 1 n.; and frequently below.

ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο: see 28. 2, 29. The victories of Brasidas were far away, and had made little impression in the Peloponnese, as they had raised but few hopes in Sparta itself.

It is characteristic of his method that Thucydides gives few details of the strategic situation, which led to the desire for peace, and no summary based, for instance, on the pre-war estimates of the Corinthians and of Perikles which have been given in book i, saying only that Sparta was disappointed of her hope to defeat Athens by the traditional method in a few years.

15. 1. οἱ Σπαρτιάται αὐτῶν: cf. iv. 38. 5. The meaning of the whole sentence is probably adequately given by the scholiast's *ἥσαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν Σπαρτιάται τε καὶ πρῶτοι καὶ τοὺς πρώτους ξυγγενεῖς*, and by Plutarch, *Nik.* 10. 8, to the same effect; but the MSS. reading cannot stand, and no one has suggested a satisfactory cure.

2. ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ.: iv. 41. 3-4. Dover, *C.Q.* iv, 1954, 81, is surely right in preferring *οῦπω*, the reading of EG¹, to *οὔπως*.
ἐν δὲ ἔδει --- βουλεύεσθαι: iv. 118. 6, 13-14.

16. 1. Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας: the deaths of both are equally welcomed in *Peace*, 261-86. Cf. iv. 28. 5 n.; now the acceptance of Kleon's failure, as on the whole good, was not confined to *οἱ σώφρονες τῶν ἀνθρώπων*. Yet the position was a curious one. Kleon had been killed in battle and his name was engraved on a stele commemorating those who had died for the city (for whom even previous shortcomings were forgotten in their death: ii. 42. 3); *οὐς ἄπαντας ὄμοιως ἡ πόλις τῆς αὐτῆς ἀξιώσασα τιμῆς ἔθαψεν, Αἰσχίη, οὐχὶ τοὺς καροθώσαντας αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τοὺς κρατήσαντας μόνους*; and his policy on this occasion at least was sound, in accord not only with that of Perikles but with Nikias' the year before and later. And no one after him could prove that success at Amphipolis—even after the death of

Brasidas, and even with a competent commander—was possible. Kleon's death, in fact, made very little difference to the immediate military situation, and *οἱ σώφρονες* were proved doubly wrong.

ὅ μὲν διὰ τὸ εὔτυχεῖν, κ.τ.λ.: cf. iv. 117. 2, ὡς ἔτι Βρασίδας ηὔτύχει. The motives attributed to Brasidas are, if more honourable, no less personal than Kleon's, even if *τὸ εὔτυχεῖν* means, as Stahl says, not his own success but that of his country; and I doubt this in view of the description of Nikias' *εὐτυχία* below. Nikias' motives are very like those of Brasidas (compare as well vi. 9. 2, *ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, κ.τ.λ.*); but he has opposite desires.

ὅ δὲ γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος — — κακουργῶν, κ.τ.λ.: so Aristophanes, three years before, *Equit. 801-9*:

ἀλλ' ἵνα μᾶλλον
σὺ μὲν ἀρπάζης καὶ δωροδοκῆς παρὰ τῶν πόλεων, ὁ δὲ δῆμος
ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς ὁμίχλης ἢ πανουργεῖς μὴ καθορᾶ σου, κ.τ.λ.

κακουργῶν might mean only 'doing harm', not necessarily 'playing the knave' (ii. 67. 4); but doubtless it means the latter here.

A lively picture of the sort of way in which Kleon διέβαλλε is given in the fragment of Eupolis' *Marikas*, 181, produced soon after Kleon's death; you find out a man's past associations and his guilt is clear:

- A. πόσου χρόνου γάρ συγγεγένησαι Νικίᾳ;
- B. οὐδ' εἴδον, εἰ μὴ "ναγχος ἑστῶτ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ.
- A. ἀνὴρ ὅμολογες Νικίαν ἔστρεψεν.
καίτοι τί παθὼν ἀν εἶδεν, εἰ μὴ προυδίδουν;
ἡκούσατ' ὁ ἔννήλικες
ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ Νικίαν εἴλημμένον.
- B. ὑμεῖς γάρ, ὃ φρενοβλαβεῖς,
λάβοιτ' ἀν ἄνδρ' ἄριστον ἐν κακῷ τινί;

In the later *Δῆμοι* (fr. 91) Eupolis gives us the helpless Nikias asking the ghost of Aristeides just how he managed to be δίκαιος.

Kleon's motives, as stated, for wanting the war to go on are very like those attributed to Perikles for starting it, at this very time, *Peace*, 605-11; cf. also *Equit. 866-7*. Further, as Grote points out, v. p. 368, war can throw up successful commanders—Phormion, Demosthenes, also Nikias—who will outshine the home-keeping demagogue, however much he may *κακουργῆ καὶ διαβάλλῃ*, at least for a time; hence, in part, Kleon's need for a military command. Athenagoras, too, in Syracuse feared a war which would give the power to Hermokrates and his like (vi. 38. 3, esp.). As Phokion said to the demagogue who asked, had he the face to preach peace when his city was at war? *ἔγωγε καὶ ταῦτα εἰδὼς ὅτι πολέμου μὲν ὄντος ἐγώ σοῦ, εἰρήνης δὲ*

γενομένης σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄρξεις (Plut. *Phok.* 16. 2); and Perikles was said also to have caused the war so that the Athenians would need him as commander and would forget τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας (Diod. xii. 39. 3). The similarity between the charges made against Perikles and those against Kleon makes yet more notable Thucydides' ignoring the former in ii. 59 and 65, especially this charge that he began the war for a base reason. He is quite outspoken about Kleon, and he has something to say of the insolent lawlessness of Alkibiades and can suggest that his war-policy in 415 was partly motived by his need for money to pay for his extravagances (vi. 12. 2, 15).

διαβάλλων: cf. iii. 42. 2, iv. 27. 4. Thucydides himself, in all probability, had been one of Kleon's victims. διαβάλλειν is a word that is constantly recurring in *The Knights*.

τότε δὴ ἔκατέρᾳ τῇ πόλει σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν: Stahl's ingenious emendation, τὰ μάλιστ' αὐτήν [ἡγεμονίαν], and his explanation, that μάλιστ' αὐτήν was first corrupted (easily enough) to μάλιστα τὴν and ἡγεμονίαν inserted to fill the gap, have been accepted by most edd. αὐτήν means τὴν εἰρήνην; and the sentence is in antithesis to οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μάλιστα ἥντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ above. I am not altogether convinced; τὴν ἡγεμονίαν is not itself open to suspicion, provided that it may mean 'leadership in the state'—that is, Nikias and Pleistoanax were each seeking the leadership in his own city—not 'hegemony in Greece', which would be clearly unacceptable here as a motive for wanting peace. For this *<ἐν>* ἔκατέρᾳ τῇ πόλει is necessary (apparently one or two of the *deteriores* have *οἱ* ἐν ἔκ. τ. πόλει), a smaller change than the other, and indeed also desirable if we adopt Stahl's correction ('in the one city P., in the other N., was the chief advocate of peace', or 'especially anxious for peace'). Note that if τὴν ἡγεμονίαν is right, we again have a not very worthy motive, a mild example in fact of the party strife and personal ambitions which could, on occasion, be so disastrous (iii. 82. 8, init.).

But I would go farther. With our present text the whole sentence of 16. 1 is not only inordinately long, but is clumsily done: τότε δὴ --- σπεύδοντες --- Πλειστοάναξ is not naturally taken as the beginning of the main clause but an additional reason why the hopes of peace were high (Kleon and Brasidas dead, Nikias and Pleistoanax, now more influential, eager for it), and the MSS. reading, τότε δέ, seems to be right; πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον following so closely on τότε δὴ ἔκατέρᾳ τῇ πόλει, does not read like Thucydides; the brief description of Nikias, πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις, is out of place when the fuller account of his motives is immediately to follow, unless we translate 'in spite of his successful commands'; and, more important than either of these, the structure of the whole, with Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας ---, ὁ μέν --- ὁ δέ --- closely balanced by

Πλειστοάναξ τε --- καὶ Νικίας ---, Νικίας μὲν --- Πλειστοάναξ δέ ---, yet the first pair in a subordinate clause, and the second forming the subject of the principal clause, *before* the explanatory participial clauses, seems to me not like the Greek manner. Some of these objections would be removed if we restored the MSS. reading *τότε δέ*, for *τότε δή* which has been accepted by all recent edd. except Steup (who retains *τότε δέ*, however, only because he believes these chapters, 13–17, to have been so seriously interpolated that neither grammar nor sense is to be expected); the apodosis will then begin with *πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον*, and the subject of *προυθυμοῦντο* will be the Athenians and the Spartans, as we should expect from cc. 14–15 (even though *προυθυμήθη τὴν ἔνυμβασιν* is said of Pleistoanax in 17. 1). This would require the emendation *⟨ἥσαν⟩ σπεύδοντες*, or *ἔσπευδον*; and besides, a most marked anacoluthon in *προυθυμοῦντο, Νικίας μέν, κ.τ.λ.* But the general sense and the structure of the sentence is improved: ‘Athens and Sparta had each its separate reasons for desiring peace; and now that both Kleon and Brasidas were dead, who had been so much opposed to peace, . . . , and Pleistoanax and Nikias were each of them striving for leadership (*or*, promoting the cause of peace) in his own city, they were all the more eager; for Nikias wanted it because . . . , and Pleistoanax because . . .’ If this is not correct, and Pleistoanax and Nikias are the subject of *προυθυμοῦντο*, we must accept Stahl’s emendation and *τότε δή*; otherwise the sentence will mean that they were all the more eager for leadership or hegemony; while if my interpretation is correct, we may still accept the emendation, if this meaning for *ἡγεμονία*, leadership in the state, is to be rejected for Thucydides. (It is found in Aristotle: *Ἀθην. 23. 1, Pol. iii. 17, 1288 a 9*; but not, I think, *Pol. iv. 1296 a 39*, as L. and S.) With *τότε δή* I should prefer to bracket *δή* after *πολλῷ*.

There is a different emendation which should be mentioned (since I believe the whole sentence to need some correction), Heilmann’s (the translator of Thucydides into German at the end of the eighteenth century), who wanted, with some reason, *τότε δὲ --- σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν* to belong to the description of Brasidas and Kleon. This was supported by Müller-Strübing, *Aristophanes u. die hist. Kritik*, 636, who argued that *ἡγεμονία* must mean supremacy for the city in Greece, but made the improbable emendations, *ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐκατέρᾳ --- τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, τότε δὴ Πλειστοάναξ τε, κ.τ.λ.* I should prefer *τότε δὲ --- ἔσπευδον τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, ⟨τούνταιτίον δὲ⟩ Πλειστοάναξ τε δ Ἰ. β. Λ. καὶ Νικίας δ N. ⟨τὴν εἰρήνην⟩, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον*, with, as suggested, the Athenians and Lacedae-monians as subject of *προυθυμοῦντο*.

Whether such a major change is right or wrong, there is a case for transferring *πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις* after *Νικίας μέν*, inserting *⟨καὶ⟩* before *βουλόμενος*. His success in war,

thus expressed without qualification, is no reason for his pursuing peace, nor for his aiming at leadership with the object of pursuing peace, though it gave him the opportunity of leadership; and the concessive 'in spite of his success in war' seems to me forced. (*πλεῖστα τῶν τότε* is a curious exaggeration, for it puts Brasidas in the second place: *τῶν τότε <Ἀθηναίων>*?)

ἡξιοῦτο: 'was held in honour' (= ἐν ἀξιώματι ἦν, i. 130. 1); but a very uncommon meaning is thus given to it.

Cf. 46. 1, the advice given by Nikias to the Athenians in general, εὐ έστωτων τῶν πραγμάτων --- διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐπραγίαν; and vi. 17. 1, ἔως --- ὁ Nikias εὐτυχῆς δοκεῖ εἶναι, and vii. 77. 2.

καὶ τὸν πολίτης παῦσαι: Nikias' motives are not entirely personal. νομίζων ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου τοῦτο ξυμβαίνειν: Nikias was very different in this from Perikles, i. 144. 3, ii. 63. 2-3, 42. 4, etc.; see 41. 4 n., and J.H.S. lxxi, 1951, p. 79. Cf. too πόνων πεπαῦσθαι above with i. 70. 8, ii. 36. 2, 63. 1, etc., and καταλιπεῖν ὄνομα ὡς, κ.τ.λ., with ii. 41. 4, 64. 3. Cf. Phrynicos, fr. 59:

ἥν γὰρ πολίτης ἀγαθός, ὡς εὐ οἴδ’ ἔγώ,
κούχ ὑποταγεῖς ἐβάδιζεν, ὥσπερ Nikias.

ὅστις ἐλάχιστα τύχη αὐτὸν παραδίδωσι: similarly in vi. 23. 3; yet fortune had treated him very well. Cf. Perikles again, i. 144. 4, ii. 62. 4. For this analysis of Nikias' character as statesman, see the good remarks of Bender, p. 43 (to whom I ought to have referred in my J.H.S. article).

τὸ δὲ ἀκίνδυνον τὴν εἰρήνην παρέχειν: contrast ii. 61. 1; and cf. iv. 62. 2. How well Thucydides understood that political problems are neither simple nor easy to solve.

Πλειστοάναξ δέ, κ.τ.λ.: he also is given only a personal motive, but at least one that is understandable and pardonable.

διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου κάθιδον παρανομθεῖσαν: at other times and in other moods the Spartans could give a different reason for their ill-success: see vii. 18. 2.

2. πεῖσαι: not necessarily a bribe, with money, but clearly a dishonest act. These charges made against Delphi from Sparta, the city of σωφροσύνη, especially in a party quarrel or a personal struggle for power, are always interesting.

Θεωροῖς: there were θεωροί from every city, but the Spartan had special privileges, Hdt. vi. 57. 2.

3. ἐς Λύκαιον: in Arkadia near their own borders (54. 1), at the western end of the plain of Megalopolis, now Diaphorti (Paus. viii. 38); a good place from which to intrigue with friends in Sparta.

διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς --- ἀναχώρησιν: so ii. 21. 1. See n. there; this passage too seems to have been written without reference to it, or to i. 114. 2. (*μετὰ δώρων δοκήσεως* is clearly the preferable reading,

as explained by Stahl: *propter redditum illum ex Attica, ad quem muneribus adductus videbatur*. The crit. nn. in O.C.T. and in Hude's edition are not quite accurate, for clearly the scholiast knew of both readings, δόκησιν and δοκήσεως.)

Ἐτεὶ ἐνὸς δέοντι εἰκοστῷ: the invasion of Attica under Pleistoanax had been in the late summer or the autumn of 446 (vol. i, p. 396); but his son, Pausanias, was still on the throne in early summer, 427 (iii. 26. 2). If Pleistoanax was recalled in the late summer of 427, the earliest possible date, he was not exiled before the summer of 445 ('in the 19th year', i.e. 18 years before his return). Busolt, iii. 1079, says he returned in the summer of 426 or the following winter, because Thucydides (1) is reckoning by his own years (spring to spring), and (2) is reckoning 'exclusively'; but neither argument is correct.

It is noticeable that Thucydides said nothing about his return in book iii, in its chronological place, nor in iv anything of grumbling about it after the disaster at Sphakteria or of Pleistoanax's efforts for peace at that time (it may be that his position in Sparta was too uncertain for him to take an independent line; see next n.).

17. 1. προυθυμήθη: 'he became, or, had become, eager for the agreement', as a consequence of his experience. It is not by any means certain that he had always been with the peace party in Sparta, or that his return had been engineered by them.

2. καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔαρ ἥδη: I prefer to mark a pause here and take these words with ἥσαν ἐσ λόγους, making the τε after παρασκευή to mean 'and'; it is not likely that the threat of ἐπιτειχισμός was made at the last minute; and clearly we do not want the connexion, παρασκευή τε, κ.τ.λ., with καὶ ἐπεδή. For the date cf. 19. 1, 24. 2, and Appendix.

προεπανεσείσθη: one would have thought this a most dangerous game to play when facing the Athenians, at most times, but particularly now. Trygaios might easily have been aroused again to anger (*Peace*, 628–31).

ώς ἐσ ἐπιτειχισμόν: Sparta already, then, had this weapon in mind; but the proposal is oddly introduced, and we are not told why it had not been adopted already. Only because the men from the island would at once be in danger? Cf. i. 124. 3 n.

ἢ ἑκάτεροι πολέμῳ ἔσχον ἀποδόντας: for the apparent inconsistencies with the text of the peace treaty, see n. below at end of this chapter; and 19. 2 n.

ἀνταπαιτούντων: 'demanding in their turn, or in reply'; but in reply to what? The sequence seems to be that Thebes refused the demand for the surrender of Plataia, and the Athenians then, in their turn, insisted on keeping Nisaia.

οὐ βίᾳ, ἀλλ' ὁμολογίᾳ: see iii. 52. 2.

τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ τὴν Νίσαιαν: see iv. 69. 3. The surrender was the action of the Peloponnesian troops rather than of the Megarians; and there was no case for the claim here made, any more than for the Theban claim to Plataia. Nor did anyone think that there was. A much better case could have been made for the retention of Amphipolis by the Peloponnesians, or for its independence.

No reference to Plataia or to Nisaia is made in the treaty; this was doubtless intentional.

τοὺς ἔστων ρυμάχους: as Steup points out, this means the members of the Peloponnesian League, including the Boeotians and a few others (those called so often in the *History οἱ Πελοποννήσου*: see ii. 9. 2 n.); and excludes the northern Greek cities who had joined them and were given by Brasidas the proud title of 'allies of Sparta'; 9. 9; cf. iv. 120. 3. They had only to accept the decisions taken at Sparta, and be handed back to Athens (21. 1). Cf. also 18. 7 n. παρακαλέσαντες means here summoning to a formal meeting, after informal discussions have provided a basis for agreement.

πλὴν Βοιωτῶν, κ.τ.λ.: cf. iv. 118. 2 n. The Boeotians refused because of Panakton, 18. 7, 39. 2 (as well as being stubborn over Plataia), the Megarians because of Nisaia; the causes of Corinthian and Elean refusal are not told till cc. 30–31. From 29. 1 we might have expected Mantinea too to have held aloof. See *Peace*, 464–6, 481–507 for Athenian feeling about Boeotia and Megara, 478–80 for Sparta.

It is remarkable how briefly here, and parenthetically, Thucydides relates this refusal by many states, some of great importance, to join in making peace; for the answer to the question whether the peace would endure largely depended on it. See below, 22. 1.

καὶ ὕμοσαν: see iv. 118. 14, 119. 1 nn.

Steup, in the appendix to his edition, and in *Studien*, i. 56–59, gives the nine or ten reasons why he rejects much in cc. 15–17, as not Thucydidean. Most of them have no substance, and only three need be mentioned here: (1) that the words in 15. 2, εὐθὺς μέτὰ τὴν ἀλωσιν, ignore the efforts for peace made by Sparta before the capture of the island (iv. 15 ff.); (2) ibid., παραχρῆμα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, κ.τ.λ., 'cannot possibly come from Thucydides himself', for the winter intervened between the battle of Delion and the year's truce; and (3) 17. 2, ὡστε ἀ ἐκάτεροι πολέμω ἔσχον — — τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ τὴν Νίσαιαν, which ignores the difference between the cases of Plataia and Nisaia and as well the fact that the former had been surrendered to Sparta, not to Thebes. (Stein had indeed conjectured that we should read here οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι in place of οἱ Θηβαῖοι.) There is little in the first two; and, for the third, we must remember that we are dealing with the preliminary discussions, and that there is no reason to look for the exact truth from the lips of the various delegates (cf. nn. on 18. 5). For οἱ Θηβαῖοι, see my n. on iii. 68. 3; certainly it was

they, not Sparta, who refused to hand Plataia back now; and what more natural than that Athens should then turn to Sparta with the retort, ‘then we shall keep Nisaia, which was also surrendered to us by agreement’? Since both the major powers, however, still wanted peace, they agreed to accept the general condition, *ἀ ἐκάτεροι πολέμῳ ἔσχον ἀποδοῦναι*, while tacitly interpreting it in such a way as to exclude Plataia (in the hope that the Boeotians would join the peace, and Athens hoping to get back Panakton) and Nisaia (if Megara stood out by herself, it would be unimportant); and then went on further to discuss the detailed interpretation of the formula (Panakton, Koryphasion, Kythera, etc.). See Busolt, iii. 639–40 n.

What is really remarkable is that we are told here that Elis and Corinth also stood out, but not their reasons (an omission which is the more notable if cc. 30–31 belong to a different phase in the composition of the *History*); further, while the cause of quarrel between Elis and Sparta naturally finds no mention in the text of the treaty, it is surprising that Sollion and Anaktorion do not either. Athens may well have made excuses for not giving them back (‘they are not in our hands; the Akarnanians have them’, by way of retort to the excuse about Amphipolis), and the Corinthians seem to have been reluctant to make a direct claim (30. 2: see the very sensible page by Adcock in *C.A.H.* v. 252; though it was after the Akarnanians had withdrawn from the war, iii. 114. 3, that Athens helped them to capture Anaktorion, iv. 49, and Akarnania gave Athens further help later, iv. 77, 101); but unless this reluctance has some important, though unknown, bearing on the matter, it does not explain the omission in the peace treaty. These difficulties, however, are in no way cured by omitting yet more from the text than we have.

18–19. *Treaty of Peace for Fifty Years*

For the references to Kirchhoff and Steup in the following nn. on cc. 18 and 19, see above, n. on iv. 118. 1.

18. 1. Σπονδὰς ἐποίησαντο - - - καὶ ὕμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις: this is the heading of the document which Thucydides quotes, but, as is seen by the use of the two verbs in the aorist, not strictly the heading of the treaty itself; which must have been either in the form *σπονδαῖ ἔσονται* (cf. 23. 1), or simply *σπονδαῖ Αθηναῖων καὶ Δακ. καὶ τ. ξυμμάχων*. This is from an Athenian copy made after the oaths had been taken; and we have two documents, given, so to speak, in inverted commas, one within the other: “*σπονδὰς ἐποίησαντο - - - Δημοσθένης*” (18. 1–19. 2), and the terms of the treaty proper, ‘*περὶ μὲν τῶν ἱερῶν - - - φθίνοντος*’ (18. 2–19. 1). The heading which would have been used for the latter has been absorbed into that for the whole. This is of especial importance in this treaty, for several of Sparta’s allies

refused to take the oath (§ 9 n.). The difficulties which Kirchhoff, pp. 29–30, found in this are not serious.

On *κατὰ πόλεις* see n. on § 9, below.

Note that, as usual, Athens speaks for all her allies, who appear to have had no voice in the negotiations, not only the members of the Delian League, whether fully autonomous (now only Chios and Methymna) or not, but also Zakynthos, Kephallenia, and Kerkyra, and probably Akarnania (above, p. 666). See iv. 119. 1 n. Sparta, on the other hand, only speaks first among her allies. The allies of Athens only appear in §§ 3 (see note), 4, and 5; see esp. § 9, the provision for the taking of oaths. It is indeed possible (in view of §§ 3 and 4) that we should read *οἱ ξύμμαχοι* *〈έκατέρων〉* here, in the heading; but this will not affect the truth of the statement that Athens speaks for all her allies.

2. *περὶ μὲν τῶν ἱερῶν, κ.τ.λ.*: for this, as the first clause of the treaty, cf. iv. 118. 2. It was to meet Athenian wishes.

καὶ ιέναι: see crit. n.; but I agree with Steup that the words are necessary, and only out of place. *θεωρεῖν* may mean ‘to send *θεωροί*’ as well as ‘to be *θεωροί*’; but if it here means the former, it can only refer to official delegations to the common shrines from all Greek states; whereas here the security of private visits is guaranteed as well (*τὸν βουλόμενον*). The journey, as Arnold saw, as well as the performance of rites at the shrine must be made safe. Steup would put *καὶ ιέναι* before *καὶ κατὰ γῆν*; and this may be right (or, more simply, *καὶ ιέναι κατὰ γῆν*).

Cf. *Peace*, 342, *ἐς πανηγύρεις θεωρεῖν* (clearly, unofficial visits), as one of the results of peace.

τὸ δ' ἱερὸν — αὐτονόμους εἶναι: the shrine and the community of Delphians are almost one, at least so bound with one another that one could not be free without the other. This clause is primarily directed against the Phokians (though they were allies of the Peloponnesians) and, through them, against Athens (cf. i. 112. 5, iii. 95. 1). *αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους*: words necessary to define the vague term *αὐτόνομοι*, which could, for example, be used of the members of the Delian League generally, or of the privileged members, as e.g. iii. 10. 5, or as it is used below, § 5, of members with a particular privilege. Delphi was not to pay tribute either to a superior power as *ὑποτελεῖς*, or as member of a federation as *ξυντελεῖς* (cf. iv. 76. 3); nor was any other state to interfere with her own administration of her affairs.

Kaibel, in an interesting note on *αὐτοτελεῖς* in *Ἀθην. 3. 5 (Stil u. Text*, pp. 39–40), because the word is not found in Athenian documents (either with the meaning ‘self-taxing’ or meaning ‘with full powers’), suggests that it may be Lakonian usage, and that we have here a word of the original Lacedaemonian text. It is possible; and it is easy to understand why the Athenian translator did not think

it necessary to alter it, as ἔνυπτελεῖν and ὑποτελῆς were in use in Attic; but for the same reason we would have no difficulty in believing in an Attic usage when αὐτόνομος must be defined.

3. Άθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμάχοις: see § 1, above. The allies of Athens are mentioned here and in §§ 4 and 5 (and they include, it must be remembered, fully independent allies) to show the area over which peace was to extend, rather than to give them any choice in the matter.

ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς: words common in treaty formulae: cf. 47. 8; similarly in § 4, ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῆ, and μήτε τέχνη μήτε μηχανῇ μηδεμᾶ: cf. 47. 2, 8; and index to *I.G. i.*².

4. ἦν δέ τι διάφορον τῷ, κ.τ.λ.: cf. iv. 118. 8. For the reading δικαίω, see crit. n. Classen compares i. 37. 5 to support this, the reading of the best MSS.; but it is δικαίω without the article (or without λόγῳ, cf. § 11) that is difficult. δίκαιος is much more probable.

5. ἀποδόντων δέ, κ.τ.λ.: this begins the third part of the treaty—part 1, access to common shrines (§ 2); 2, duration and general terms (§§ 3–4); 3, particular claims and concessions (§§ 5–8); 4, arrangements for the oath, publication, future amendments, and date of coming into force (§ 9–19. 1). The general arrangement of the treaty is logical and clear, though that does not mean that we should expect a completeness that an international jurist would now require; and there are signs of the haste that does not prove worth while in the end: see esp. §§ 5 and 11.

παρέδοσαν: Stahl maintained that there is an essential difference between this and ἀποδόντων in the previous sentence—Amphipolis, an ἀποικία of Athens, was to be 'restored' to its former position; the other cities were only to be 'handed over', and on conditions. Steup pointed to 21. 3 and 35. 5 to show that the two words are not mutually exclusive. ἀποδοῦναι does, however, here mean 'restore' to Athens, to one or other form of allegiance to Athens; and παραδοῦναι the physical handing over. Either word, or both, could thus be used of all former allies or subjects or colonies of Athens who had seceded from her and had been helped by Peloponnesian forces.

For the meaning of the aorist indicative here, see below, p. 671.

αὐτούς καὶ τὰ ἔαυτῶν ἔχοντας: I suggest a lacuna, αὐτούς <τε> καὶ <τοὺς οἰκείους>, τὰ ἔ. ἔχοντας. As the text stands, καὶ is difficult and αὐτούς by no means clear. Cf. iv. 97. 4, 105. 2, 114. 1, and vii. 3. 1, cited by Steup, all of which illustrate the difficulty of our present text.

The general purpose of this clause is not only to secure the lives and property of individuals, but to avoid *stasis* in the future. But where were these displaced citizens to go? And where did they go? Perhaps to Olynthos and Spartolos, as subsequent events suggest (cf., e.g., 39. 1), if I am right in my argument below.

φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου: see i. 96. 2, 99. 3 nn. As stated there (vol. i, p. 274, n. 1) Aristeides' assessment of the cities mentioned below may have been exceptionally low; and, even if it was not, the assessment of 425–424 had presumably doubled it at least (none of the figures for these six cities is preserved in the inscription), and this clause was a guarantee, or intended to be one, against increase of tribute in the future. Moreover, since this whole treaty is a result of much mutual bargaining between Athens and Sparta, in which each side made concessions at the expense of others, we are not even sure that 'paying the phoros as fixed by Aristeides' would be particularly favourable to these cities; but it was a good face-saving phrase for Sparta. See my paper cited below, at the end of the n. on § 6.

μηδὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους: another mention of Athenian allies. This must be intended to prevent such an action as that of Dion (if *Διῆς* be the right reading) against Thyssos, 35. 1, or Athens encouraging one of her allies to attack one of these six and thus avoiding open aggression herself against the terms of the treaty.

ἐπειδὴ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἔγενοντο: on the meaning of this clause see below. **Ἄργιλος:** for its secession see iv. 103. 3–4; it had not been won back by Kleon in 422, v. 6. 1–3. For details of its tribute to Athens, see vol. i, pp. 211, n. 4, 277, and above, n. on iv. 103. 4.

Στάγιρος: its secession iv. 88. 2; Kleon failed in his attack, v. 6. 1. It had regularly, since 454–453, paid 1,000 dr. tribute.

Ἀκανθός: its secession iv. 85–88. 1. We are not told anything of its subsequent history to this date, except that it sent some forces with Brasidas into Lynkestis, iv. 124. 1. For its tribute, see vol. i, pp. 208, 211, and 206, n. 2; also *A.T.L.* iii. 239–43, 265–74, which, however, seems to me too tidy an arrangement.

Σκῶλος: Thucydides has told us nothing of any action by this small place either for or against Athens. But we can surmise something of its history from the tribute-lists (where the name is Stolioi), an association with Mekyberna and secession from Athens in 432 (vol. i, pp. 204–5, 211). It had paid from $\frac{1}{2}$ tal. to 1 tal. tribute before that. It was probably situated some miles inland up the valley of the river which flows into the sea near Sermylia (West, *A.J.P.* lviii, 1937, 157–66; *A.T.L.* i, Gazetteer. See map, vol. i, facing p. 222).

Ὄλυνθος, Σπάρτωλος: for these two states (whose official names, not recognized by Athens, were probably *Χαλκιδῆς* and *Βοττιαῖοι*), see vol. i, pp. 203–8, 211. They had both shown themselves hostile to Athens, continuously as far as we know, since their secession in 432; and the Chalkidians had asked for Brasidas' help in the first instance and had sent troops to help him (iv. 79. 2, 81. 1; 84. 1, 123. 4, 124. 1, v. 6. 4). There is no reason to suppose that either state had yet surrendered or been surrendered to Athens, or made peace or a truce

with her, except that some states of the Bottiaioi, which had been federated with Spartolos, had perhaps already rejoined the Athenian alliance in 422 (v. 3, 6 n.).

ξυμμάχους δ' εἶναι μηδετέρων: this must mean that, though members of the Delian League as payers of tribute, they are not to be liable to send military contingents, to 'fight with' Athens (or Sparta); a difficult arrangement to carry out, and not clearly expressed; also subject to change (*ἢν δὲ Αθηναῖοι, κ.τ.λ.*)—doubtless because Sparta, to save face, wished to insert something on behalf of those she had so gallantly liberated, but was not prepared to insist on anything precise, and in fact left them in the lurch. They had been allies of Sparta; they were now to be allies of neither—one can see the compromise.

βουλομένας ταύτας, κ.τ.λ.: see crit. n. I believe Stuart Jones's and Hude's punctuation to be right, and Stahl's bracketing definitely a mistake; for *ταύτας* means in effect 'such cities as are willing'. But Hude's emendation, *αὐτοῖς Αθηναῖοις* for *αὐτοὺς Αθηναῖοις*, seems an improvement. (According to him E has *Αθηναῖοις*.)

It is obvious how dangerously ambiguous such a clause as this was (*πείθωσι, βουλομένας*); but Sparta was anxious to get out of Thrace, and was ready to give her late allies away. Even Nikias could, for a particular purpose, advocate the forcible recovery of Olynthos (vi. 10. 5).

There remain to be discussed other difficulties in this section; and first the subdivision of the one-time allies of Athens which are mentioned. It is clear that Amphipolis belongs to a different class from those who are to have autonomy on condition of paying their tribute according to Aristeides' assessment; for not only was it not founded till 437, but it did not pay any tribute (at least never appears on our tribute-lists; see n. on *ἔξακοσίων ταλάντων*, ii. 13. 3); but scholars have differed about the other class or classes. Steup, arguing principally that cities which are to be 'handed over' to Athens could not later be given not only autonomy but the right of neutrality between Athens and Sparta (*ξυμμάχους εἶναι μηδετέρων*), says that *ὅσας πόλεις παρέδοσαν Λακ.* cannot be the six named later, and emends *τὰς δὲ πόλεις φερούσας* to *τὰς δὲ πόλεις φερούσας*, beginning a new clause here, with a new class of one-time allies, who have not yet been recovered by Athens but are to be enjoined later by Sparta to accept the peace (21. 1, 35. 3); they were never to be 'handed over' or 'restored' to Athens. He assumes as well a lacuna after *Αμφίπολν*, containing the names of Oisyme and the four cities in Akte which had joined Brasidas (iv. 107. 3, 109. 3–5), about which we have heard nothing since and hear nothing now in the treaty; Amphipolis will then belong to this class, which is that of cities to be restored

and handed over to Athens, to be as they were before they seceded to Brasidas.

There is, however, an obstacle to this last interpretation which seems to me fatal: *ὅσας πόλεις παρέδοσαν* cannot be the equivalent of *ὅσας ἀν πόλεις παραδῶσι*. Stahl, assuming, like Steup, a lacuna before *ὅσας δὲ πόλεις*, thinks it can in effect, if we insert (as the beginning of a new clause in the treaty, Amphipolis being in a class by itself) some such words as *ὅσαι δὲ πόλεις τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης ἀποστᾶσαι Αθηναίων Λακεδαιμονίους προσεχώρησαν παραδοῦναι Λακεδαιμονίους Αθηναῖοις*, and for *παρέδοσαν* he compares the present indicative *βοηθοῦμεν*, vi. 10. 5, with reference to the treaty engagement, vi. 8. 2. This is singularly unconvincing. Kirchhoff's remedy was unconvincing in another way: he saw that an aorist indicative here must refer to a past action, and emended to *παρέλαβον*, punctuating after *Λακεδαιμόνιοι*, and forcing *Αθηναῖοις* (or *Αθηναῖον*) into the principal clause; the cities are the six named below (it being assumed, though Thucydides does not say so, that Brasidas had also 'taken over' Olynthos and Spartolos), and any *Athenians* therein, cleruchs and others, who had been kept under guard since the secessions, are to be given leave to go.

The best solution is to suppose that there are mentioned, in this section, not two, but three classes, as Steup suggested: (1) Amphipolis, the colony of Athens and of unique strategic importance; (2) cities which the Peloponnesians have already surrendered, and (3) (since they certainly had not surrendered four of the six named cities and had probably not surrendered any) six cities who are to pay tribute to Athens but with certain privileges and guarantees, and are to be enjoined by Sparta to accept these terms. This means accepting Steup's easy emendation *τάσδε δὲ πόλεις*, mentioned above, and altering the punctuation (a full stop after *ἔχοντας*, and a colon after *αὐτονόμους εἶναι*).

It remains to identify the cities of the second class. It may well be that Steup is right in taking them to be Oisyme and the four cities in Akte; for, unless they are, or are included among them, Thucydides tells us nothing of the fate of any of them, except that in the next year Thyssos was within the Athenian alliance (35. 1).¹ In that case we must suppose that Athens had recovered them before the treaty had been agreed. Kirchhoff thought they might have been won over by Kleon, without fighting, on his way to Eion; or by the Athenians after Kleon's death (above, 6. 1 n.). We might perhaps add Galepsos and Mende (iv. 107. 2, v. 6. 1; iv. 123. 1, 129–30); for though they were recovered by force, they might, in the wording of a treaty meant to be complimentary to both sides, be said to have

¹ There are difficulties of reading there; but there is nothing to be said for Steup's view that *Αθηναίων οὖσαν ξύμμαχον* should be bracketed.

been handed over, or surrendered, by Sparta. Torone, however, like Skione, was reserved for a special clause (§ 8); and perhaps Mende and Galepsos are included there in *καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλην πόλιν ἔχοντιν Αθηναῖοι*. There is a further slight difficulty arising from 35. 3, *καὶ τὰλλα οὐκ ἀπεδεδώκεσαν*; but I believe that Panakton is there meant (see 35. 5).

Finally, *ἐπειδὴ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο*. Just as *ὅσας --- παρέδοσαν* is not the same as *ὅσας ἀν --- παραδῶσι*, so this is not the same as *ἐπειδὰν αἱ σπονδαὶ γένωνται*, whether the clause be taken with *ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν* or with *ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον* (see below); it should only mean 'now that the treaty has been agreed' or 'after it had been agreed', 'since the time when it was agreed'. If that is so, *αἱ σπονδαὶ* must be either the year's truce of 423 B.C., and *⟨αἱ ἐνταύσιοι⟩* or *⟨αἱ ἐπὶ Ἰεράχου⟩* should be inserted; or the ten days' truce between Athens and the Chalkideis, which is not related here, but is referred to in a later context (vi. 7. 4). The only way, as far as I can see, to avoid this is to read, in a lacuna before *ὅσας δὲ πόλεις παρέδοσαν* above, something like: *ταῖς δὲ ἄλλαις πόλεσι ταῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης ἀγγέλλειν τάδε*, and continue *ὅσας πόλεις, κ.τ.λ.*, with reference to the order sent to Klearidas later (21. 1); for by that time this treaty will have been agreed. As Kirchhoff and Steup saw, the *ἐπειδὴ*-clause is to be taken with *ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον* only, and means that no arrears of tribute (in the case of Olynthos and Spartolos, since 432) are to be demanded, or, if *⟨αἱ ἐνταύσιοι⟩* is right, only from 423.

6. Μηκυβερναίους δὲ καὶ Σαναίους καὶ Σιγγαίους: neither Mekyberna nor Singos¹ have been mentioned before by Thucydides. Mekyberna was on the coast about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles south-east of Olynthos, Singos on the north-east coast of Sithonia peninsula, near the head of the gulf. They are doubtless included among the coastal towns who seceded, with Olynthos, Spartolos, and Poteidaia, in 432 (see vol. i, p. 211), and whose inhabitants were removed for safety to the territory of Olynthos and of Perdikkas of Macedonia (i. 58. 2). They are now to be guaranteed their separate existence against encroachment by Olynthos. The latter is to be an independent state, paying a certain tribute regularly to Athens; but it must not attempt to include within its territory the coastal towns (which were more open to influence from Athens).

Similarly Sane, which had remained loyal to Athens when Akanthos and most of the cities of Akte seceded (iv. 109), is guaranteed her independence against Akanthos, though Thucydides has not told us of any attempt by the latter, successful or unsuccessful, to incorporate her. This clause is inserted at the instance of Athens.

¹ *Σιγγίους*, not *Σιγγαίους*, appears to be the correct form, and Kirchhoff would restore it here. Stephanos of Byzantium, who has *Σιγγαῖοι*, probably got it only from his Thuc. MS. (Edson, C.P. xlvi, 1947, n. 54; and see above, p. 410 ad fin.)

All that is curious is the order, Mekyberna, Sane, Singos; for the last presumably, as well as the first, was in danger from Olynthos, the second from Akanthos.

It is not stated what is to be the position of the three states within the Delian League; but presumably they were to be ordinary members. Mekyberna and Singos were assessed for tribute in 422–421 B.C., as they had been in 425–424, but for a nominal sum only, 10 drachmai; they had not yet been re-established. An Athenian garrison was put into the former in the course of the ensuing summer; but the town was suddenly attacked and stormed by Olynthos (39. 1).

As far as we know there was only one city called Sane, whose position is given in iv. 109. 3. Herodotos, vii. 123. 1, is probably wrong about a city of the name on Pallene, west or north of Mende; he has the position correctly at vii. 22. 3.

The authors of *A.T.L.*, however, iii. 90 (cf. 143, 218, n. 119), understand by this clause that the three cities are to have the same kind of independence of *Athens* (Aristeidean tribute, 'allies' of neither side) as Olynthos and Akanthos; and besides follow A. B. West in *A.J.P.* lviii, 1927, 166–73, who emended Σανάτους to Γαλατός because Gale is placed with Mekyberna and Singos in the assessment lists of 425 and 422, all three paying the token tribute only, 10 drachmai, and because its previous tribute history had been similar. Neither suggestion convinces me. These assessments are clearly based on the ability to pay of three small states from which most of the inhabitants had been removed; and they may also have had to pay towards the upkeep of Athenian garrisons (see above); their degree of autonomy would rest on a different basis from that of Olynthos and the other five. If their autonomy was to be of the same kind as that of Olynthos, not only should we expect (as is recognized in *A.T.L.*) either καθάπερ Ὀλύνθιοι only or all six names, but there is no reason why they have not already been included with them in one clause. As I have said (above, p. 669), this is a treaty between Athens and Sparta, not between Athens and her own allies. It is a compromise: in § 5 Sparta gets some guarantee of good treatment for her recent allies; in § 6 Athens qualifies this—Mekyberna is to be independent of Olynthos, presumably Singos too, and Sane of Akanthos. It is a guarantee for the small place against a more powerful neighbour; the effect of καθάπερ Ὀλύνθιοι καὶ Ἀκάνθιοι is the same as καθάπερ Αθηναῖοι in the treaty between Athens and Chalkis (*I.G.* i.2 39. 70–72; Tod, 42). Indeed, the very mention of Mekyberna as a separate state shows that it is separate from Olynthos, and not to be regarded as part of it, its port: which is the Athenian, not the Chalcidian view. We must bear in mind too that Olynthos was not satisfied with the treaty (21. 2). Strabo, vii, frr. 31 and 33, suggests that at some time at least Sane had been incorporated with Akanthos,

for the latter is placed on the Singitic Gulf, i.e. at the southern, instead of the northern, end of the canal of Xerxes, which indicates that Akanthian territory included Sane. Kahrstedt, in an article otherwise perverse (*A.J.P.* lvii, 1936, 416–44: see vol. i, p. 204, n. 4), is right in this matter (pp. 431–3). Further, we do not know enough of the history of these small places to justify West's alteration of *Σαναίους* to *Γαλαίους*. See my n. in *Γέρας Αιγαίου Κεραμοπούλων* (Athens, 1953), 35–41.

7. Πάνακτον: see 3. 5. This clause was not carried out, and was an occasion of many complaints by Athens (35. 5–46).

Λακεδαιμονίοις: we should insert *⟨καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις⟩*, with Kirchhoff, for Methana, Pteleon, and Atalante belong to the allies.

Κορυφάσιον: for this name for Pylos, and for Kythera and Methana, see iv. 118. 4 nn.

Πτελεόν: only here mentioned by Thucydides, so that, out of several places of the name, all obscure, we do not know which is meant, nor when the Athenians secured it. The most probable is the town on the coast of Achaia Phthiotis (which still retains its ancient name, in the form *Φτελιό*), which Athens may have captured to help in the defence of Euboea. (So Adcock, *C.A.H.* v. 251. 1.) Steup thinks it may have been near Methana and included in *τὰ ἐν Τροιζήνῃ ὅσταπερ νῦν ἔχουσι*, iv. 118. 4.

Ἀταλάντην: see ii. 32, iii. 89. 3; and iv. 118. 4, n. on *τὴν νῆσον*.

Steup demands a stop after *Ἀταλάντην*, and this may be right, though his other objections to the text of this section amount to little. But if we insert a stop, the next sentence should begin *τοὺς δὲ ἄνδρας ⟨ἀφέντων Αθηναῖοι⟩*.

τοὺς ἐν Σκιώνῃ πολιορκουμένους Πελοποννησίων ἀφεῖναι: see iv. 121. 2, 131. 3. Sparta had given up the cause of Skione as hopeless (cf. the use of *ἔχουσι*, § 8), and had probably abandoned Brasidas' claim that Skione had joined him before the truce of 423 came into force; and the Peloponnesian forces within could do very little to help and were consuming limited supplies of food; but this was a base betrayal of the city which had been welcomed by Brasidas, and had welcomed him, more warmly than any other (iv. 120. 3–121. 1). It is indeed remarkable that Sparta retained in the Thracian district and acquired in Ionia any reputation at all for either sincerity or reliability (iv. 81. 3, 108. 3–4).

καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, κ.τ.λ.: see iv. 123. 4. See *A.T.L.* iii. 97, n. 11, for the wording of this sentence. It seems clear that by *Πελοποννήσου* the clause means such of Brasidas' original expeditionary force as remained in Skione; *Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι* would appear to mean citizens of these states, other than Skione, which Brasidas had accepted as 'allies of Sparta' (iv. 120. 3); but see next n.

εἴ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων, κ.τ.λ.: see, e.g., 3. 4, the garrison of Torone;

but 'the allies' here would also, apparently, exclude the citizens of Torone themselves (§ 8). It may therefore mean 'members of the Peloponnesian League' both here and in the previous sentence (in the latter 'other than those from cities in the Peloponnesian proper'—Megarians, Leukadians, Boeotians); and the wording may be intentionally vague (*A.T.L.*, l.c.).

8. Σκιωναίων: Athens had already decided what to do to the citizens of Skione, and Sparta was not prepared to interfere. It was not yet in Athenians hands, but it was only a question of time (32. 1).

Τορωναίων: Athens had sold the women and children; the men had been sent to Athens to await events. For their fate, see 3. 4 and n. there.

Σερμυλιῶν: the last we have heard of this town was when Aristeus the Corinthian, in 432, getting out of Poteidaia after the siege had begun, attacked it and killed many, i. 65. 2. We are not there told that the Chalkidians got control of it; but apparently they did, for its name disappears from the tribute-lists of 432–431 and 430–429. Nor have we been told that Athens had recently reconquered it (or was besieging it), as she presumably had, to judge from its association with Skione and Torone.

εἴ τινα ἄλλην πόλιν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι: perhaps, as indicated above (p. 671), this includes Galepsos and Mende, which had been recaptured, perhaps Thyssos (35. 1); or it may only mean, from the Spartan side, 'if you are now besieging some other town as you are Skione, we make no demands'; again intentionally vague. *ἔχουσιν* has the meaning which *ἔσχον* has in 17. 2, 'hold by conquest'. (It is possible, but I doubt it, that Mytilene is included in this category; for it too had had the honour of being enrolled among the allies of Sparta.)

περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων: Athens is to be left a free hand not only with this group of cities but with the rest of those in her empire. Sparta withdraws completely, for herself and her Peloponnesian and other allies, from the role of liberator of Hellas. The recognition of the maritime empire is as certain, though perhaps not so clearly expressed, as in the peace of 446–445. Well might Nikias say at a later time, when perhaps he was not so proud of 'his' treaty, that it was unstable because *τοῖς ἔχθροῖς πρώτον μὲν διὰ ξυμφορῶν η̄ ξύμβασις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσχίου η̄ ήμῖν κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐγένετο, ἐπειτα ἐν αὐτῇ ταύτῃ πολλὰ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἔχομεν* (vi. 10. 2).

Both Kirchhoff, p. 56, and Steup would bracket *αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων*, and read *πέρι* (governing *Σκιωναίων, Τορωναίων, Σερμυλιῶν*). This seems to me impossible for style, and quite unjustifiable for the sense.

Note that there is no express mention in the treaty of Nisaia and Plataia (17. 2). Each was in fact retained by the side which had captured it, and both Thebes and Athens, before the negotiations

for the peace had been concluded, had definitely refused to withdraw from the positions they had assumed; and equally neither was ready to accept in writing the claim of the other. So the treaty ignored them.

Adcock, in *C.A.H.* v. 251, well sums up the terms of the treaty: the attack on the empire had failed, the Long Walls and the Athenian fleet remained intact, the treasury could be replenished; Athens had lost only two strategically important places in the ten years' war, Panakton and Amphipolis, and it was stipulated that they should be returned. (Perhaps we should add Plataia.) Thucydides gives no such summary, not only because it was not his way (cf. above, p. 659), but because he knew that this Athenian victory was dubious. The Athenian defeats in action had occurred towards the end of the war and had not been followed by any success; and the peace was, from the first, obviously unstable.

9. ὅρκους δὲ ποιήσασθαι — κατὰ πόλεις: this was done (§ 1); Athens took the oath first with Sparta, then with each of Sparta's allies in turn. This had not been done for the year's truce, but something very like it was done in the treaty between Athens and Argos, Mantinea, and Elis (see 47. 10): in each case Athens was on one side, and a number of states on the other, and though these others were of course also at peace and allied with one another, that fact does not form part of the treaty. In the case of this treaty of 421 B.C. Athens had a special reason for asking for a separate oath-taking by each of her former enemies; for during the negotiations it became clear that some of them were reluctant to 'sign', and four, three of whom were her neighbours, finally refused; she had to know where she stood with each state. That is why we have only the Spartan 'signatories' in 19. 2: this is a copy of the treaty with Sparta—*πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους*, 17. 2 ad fin.; there were other copies of the treaties with the other states.

ὅμνυντων δέ, κ.τ.λ.: objection has been taken to this sentence, for example both by Kirchhoff, pp. 59–60, and by Steup, because it has not been seen that the word *ὅρκος* includes both parts of the oath, the invocation formula (*νὴ τὸν Δία*, etc., which is, or may be, different in each state, but must always be *ὁ μέγιστος ὅρκος*—cf. 47. 8), and the promise (*ἔμμενῶ*, κ.τ.λ.), which is the same for every state; it means the first in this sentence, the second in the next. *ἐκάτεροι*, because in each treaty there are two parties (Athens and Sparta, Athens and Mantinea, etc.); then, with perhaps pedantic accuracy, *ἐξ ἑκάστης πόλεως*, seventeen representatives from each of the states which agree to the treaty. For the wording, *ἔμμενῶ ταῖς ξυνθήκαις*, κ.τ.λ., cf. 47. 8 and *I.G.* i. 2, Index.

ἐπτὰ καὶ δέκα (*ι*), Ullrich's emendation for the MSS. *ἐξ*, is to be accepted (or rather, Stahl's improvement, *〈ἐπτὰ καὶ δέκα〉 ἐξ*), not

only to give meaning to *εξ ἑκάστης πόλεως*, but because the number 17 on either side, which we find implemented in 19. 2, is unusual enough for it to have been directly mentioned in the terms of the treaty. The number may be, as Kirchhoff, 63–64, suggested, the sum of 2 kings, 5 ephors (of whom Pleistolas is the *eponymos*, 19. 1, 25. 1), and 10 others; so that its origin would be Spartan (as the oaths were taken in Sparta, 22. 1 n.), and her allies and the Athenians complied; but J. H. Oliver thinks it may be of old Athenian origin, and he points to *I.G. ii²* 40 (a treaty with Thebes and Mytilene of 378–377 B.C.) as another instance of seventeen ‘signatories’ from each city (*Class. Weekly*, xliv, 1951, 203).

10. ἀνανεοῦσθαι: cf. 23. 4 n., 47. 10 (where the renewal is to be every four years). But such a proviso was not common in treaties of peace or alliance, as far as we know, though it occurs in the Athenian treaties with Halieis and Perdikkas of this period (above, pp. 495, 621), as well as in that with Argos. It may have had its origin in the feeling that yearly magistrates cannot bind their successors when they take an oath—a democratic feeling—though that would not apply to the Spartan kings.

στήλας δὲ στῆσαι Ὀλυμπίασι, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 23. 5, 47. 11. Of the pan-hellenic shrines two, at Olympia and Isthmos, were controlled by states which refused to take the oath, Elis and Corinth. The stelai may for all that have been set up there, though Kirchhoff thinks not (p. 65); Paionios' Nike at Olympia celebrated a victory of Messenians and Athenians in the Peloponnesian war (above, p. 487: though it may have been set up after 421, and after the Athenian treaty with Elis, Mantinea, and Argos). The Greeks had common customs, a sort of international courtesy, in such matters.

Ἀθήνησιν — — — ἐν Λακεδαίμονι: this is a copy of the treaty of peace between Athens and Sparta. In the other copies the two places mentioned would be Athens and the other state, e.g. in Mantinea *ἐν τοῦ Διός τῷ ιερῷ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ* (see 47. 11). The copy at Athens is mentioned in v. 56. 3 (for this, as Kirchhoff argues, was probably that containing the treaty of peace, not the alliance of c. 23). Amyklaion was c. 20 stades south of Sparta, on the right bank of the Eurotas: see Frazer on Pausanias, iii. 18. 6.

11. εὔροκν εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις, κ.τ.λ.: for the first time in this document Sparta agrees to a clause which altogether ignores her allies, and the latter took umbrage (29. 2); it is indeed a wonder that any of them agreed to it in 421. It savours altogether too much of the attitude expressed by the Spartan ambassadors from Pylos in 425, *ἥμῶν γὰρ καὶ ὑμῶν ταῦτα λεγόντων τό γε ἄλλο Ἐλληνικὸν ἴστε ὅτι* *ὑποδεέστερον ὃν τὰ μέγιστα τιμήσει* (iv. 20. 4), and by Trygaios in the play produced just when the treaty was concluded (*Peace*, 1080–2, quoted in the n. on iv. 20. 4). The clause, however, does not, strictly,

give Athens and Sparta the right to alter anything in the previous clauses, only to change the wording if it is found that something has not been mentioned that should have been (*εἰ δέ τι ἀμνημονοῦσιν*): e.g. the date for treating as enemies those allies who refused to make peace (35. 3). See 24. 1 n. It seems clear that this clause was repeated in each copy of the treaty, *ipsissimis verbis*, and not *mutatis mutandis*; for it was a grievance of the allies that Athens and Sparta had assumed this privilege. Contrast *I.G. ii.2* 112 (Tod, 144), 35–36, where (as restored) any change must be agreed by all the states concerned, Athens on the one side, Arkadia, Achaia, Elis, and Phleious on the other.

19. 1. ἄρχει δέ: for the present indicative in place of the usual infinitive, cf. *I.G. i.2* 377. 14 (434–432 B.C.), 21. 'Ελαφηβολιῶνος μηνὸς ἔκτῃ φθίνοντος: the 25th of Elaphebolion. This date is described below as *τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἅμα ήρι*, 20. 1; or at least the last negotiations were finished and the oaths taken as the winter ended and in the first days of spring, as already stated in 17. 2, init.—the parties may have agreed to a delay of a few days to allow for the publication of the treaty in all parts of Greece, perhaps expressly to avoid such arguments as arose about the secession of Skione (iv. 122. 3–6). The date indicated by the words in 17. 2 and 20. 1 is like that in iii. 116: in that chapter the military events of the winter of 426–425 have been narrated; the eruption of Etna occurred *περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἥσαρ*; and after that has been mentioned we have the formula 'the winter ended and with it the sixth year of the war'. There follow the first *military* events of the seventh year (iv. 1). So here we are not told that the eleventh year of the war began till 24. 2, though the winter had in fact ended immediately before the conclusion of the peace, and another event, the alliance between Athens and Sparta, had intervened. Thucydides in fact is not pedantically accurate in his narration in relation to summers and winters. In describing the making of the year's truce of 423 he is, not more accurate, but more logical in expression: the winter of 424–423 ends at iv. 116. 3, and in 117. 1, *ἅμα ήρι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους*, the truce was made.

It is clear that, assuming that Thucydides has an exact date in mind for the beginning of his 'summers and winters' and that that is a date of the solar year (for this see Appendix), the Peace of 421 followed almost exactly two solar years after the year's truce of 423. The truce began on the 14th Elaphebolion (the day on which the oaths were taken), the peace on the 25th; the latter is also said to be *ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθὺς τῶν ἀστικῶν*, which is reasonable enough if, say, six days were allowed for communication, as suggested above; for the last day of the Dionysia was the 13th Elaphebolion (see n. on

iv. 118. 12). Another possibility is, as E. H. O. Müller suggested (p. 23: see below, on 20. 1), that after agreement between Athenian and Peloponnesian delegates at Sparta the text was communicated to Athens to be confirmed by the ekklesia, and the oaths taken, in Sparta, only when the affirmative reply was received; in that case *ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθύς* may refer to the date of the ekklesia's vote, a few days earlier than the oath-taking. See Meyer, *Forschungen*, ii. 288; Busolt, iii. 1191. 3.

For the calendar equations, which are not at all easy, and the relation between these dates and those of the truce of 423, see the Appendix, below, pp. 711–13.

2. <*Πλειστοάναξ*, 'Αγις>: this emendation (Arnold's) is as near certainty as any can be; for in the immediately following treaty of alliance it is laid down that the same persons shall take the oath, and all the names are repeated, on both sides, except that the two kings are there at the head of the Spartan list (23. 4, 24. 1). The disappearance of the two names is easily explained as a case of haplography (*Πλειστοάναξ* — *Πλειστόλας*). The persistence of the mistake, so that all our MSS. are in agreement in it, shows that it took place early; it may be Thucydides' own; it is possible even that it was a mistake of the writer of the original copy which Thucydides saw (though one would expect the historian to have corrected it). For the meaning of the number of oath-takers, see 18. 9 n.

Πλειστόλας, κ.τ.λ.: of the fifteen other Spartan 'signatories' of this and the following treaty, none is otherwise known except Pleistolas, who was ephor eponymos of the year (§ 1), Ischagoras, who had been in command of reinforcements for Brasidas (iv. 132. 2, 3) and now went, with Menas and Philocharidas, to announce the peace in Thrace (v. 21. 1), Philocharidas, who had also 'signed' the year's truce in 423 (iv. 119. 2) and is later mentioned as one in favour of friendship with Athens (v. 44. 3), Tellis, who is presumably the father of Brasidas (ii. 25. 2), and Menas, who only reappears in 21. 1. That King Agis and Tellis are in the list perhaps shows that the Spartan 'signatories' no more belong to a single 'peace-party' than do the Athenians.

Λάμπων, κ.τ.λ.: of the seventeen Athenians, Lampon is presumably the well-known *mantis*; Euthydemos may be he who was later sent as strategos to Syracuse (vii. 16. 1); Pythodoros is not the strategos who went to Sicily in 426–425, for he was banished (iv. 65. 3), but may be one of the three who raided Lakonia in 414 (vi. 105. 2; or that may be the banished general, if he was recalled after 421); Hagnon may be the father of Theramenes and oikistes of Amphipolis (see 11. 1 n.); there is no particular reason to identify Theagenes with the man elected to go on a commission to Pylos (iv. 27. 3); nor Timokrates with the father of Aristoteles (iii. 105. 3). Thrasykles and

Leon may be the general of the Ionian war (viii. 15. 1, 17. 3, 19. 2; 23. 1, *al.*), and Aristokrates may be the son of Skelios (viii. 89. 3), a well-known figure, but his name was not uncommon.¹ Thrasykles is probably the same as the mover of the decree of 421–420 in honour of Asteas of Alea (perhaps also of the similar decree for Polystratos of Phleious), *I.G. i. 2* 82: Asteas and Polystratos had, both publicly and privately, welcomed and shown hospitality towards Athenian delegates. (Probably early in 421–420, soon after the peace-treaty; the delegates may have travelled to and from Sparta to discuss the implementing of the treaty. They may have passed through Megara and Corinth—they need not have made the journey by sea, as Köhler supposed—but they would not have been *welcomed* there.) Isthmionikos, Prokles, Mytilos, and Iolkios are not mentioned elsewhere by Thucydides, nor for certain anywhere.

The presence of Lamachos and Demosthenes, beside Nikias and Laches (for the latter, cf. iv. 118. 11, v. 43. 2), shows that members of the 'war-party' as well as permanent and temporary appeasers could take the oath in a peace-treaty; it is not significant that Nikostratos' name is not there. But it may be significant that Alkibiades' name is not, though it would be difficult to answer the question, significant of what? Had he been passed over as delegate, as too young or too irresponsible? Had he refused? Or was he busy with some private and lawless affair of his own?

As with the document of the truce of 423 (above, pp. 596 ff.), Kirchhoff concludes from the inconsistencies between the previous narrative and the document (Stolos, Mekyberna, Sane, Singos, Pteleon, Sermylieai, and perhaps Oisyme and the cities on Akte: see nn. on 18. 5–8) and the existence of two dates (19. 1, 20. 1), that Thucydides did not know the document till after he had written all his narrative up to and including c. 20, and had had no intention to insert it; that he would have had no opportunity of seeing it before his return to Athens after 404, and that it was then inserted with no other alteration than the 'awkward addition of *τάδε*' at the end of 17. 2. Kirchhoff adds that the narrative from c. 21 onwards, however, shows clear knowledge of the details of the treaty (21. 1, 27. 1, 29. 2, and 32. 5; in 27. 1 and 32. 5 it is called simply *αἱ πεντηκοντούτεις σπονδαῖ*); and since 'every intelligent student of the subject' agrees that book v from c. 25 onward was written after 404, we may add cc. 21–24 to this late section, and the view that Thucydides first saw the document of the treaty in Athens after 404 is confirmed. The problem of the composition of Thucydides' history is not an easy one; but, so it seems to me, the view that he put down his pen at the end of

¹ The index to the O.C.T. Thucydides, s.vv. Αριστοκράτης and Θρασυκλῆς, is deficient, as occasionally elsewhere.

v. 20 somewhere about 419 or 418 B.C. and did not pick it up again to write c. 21 till fifteen years or so later, is altogether perverse, and quite unnecessary as an explanation of the inconsistencies. Moreover, as Steup points out (in his edition, p. 257), we cannot believe that Thucydides, when he first learnt of the treaty of peace (early in 421), did not learn that it was to be for fifty years, or that he did not think it worth while to mention its duration; to which we may add that the same applies to the fate of Skione, that of the prisoners taken at Torone, and probably to Panakton, Methana, and Atalante. The terms of the treaty, like those of the year's truce, were announced in Thrace (21. 1), and the exact terms were as important to the cities there as to any other part of Greece; and Thucydides in exile had the same opportunity to become informed about them as about all other events of the war after 424.

On the other hand, I agree with Kirchhoff that the announcement of the date in 20. 1, by Thucydides' own method of dating, does not naturally follow the date already given, according to a quite different method, a few lines before: not because the two dates are inconsistent (I think they can be reconciled: above, 19. 1 n), but because the methods are different, and the second (20. 1) betrays no consciousness of the first. Contrast ii. 2. 1, where also two methods, his own and the annalistic (perhaps official), are used together, but where the purpose of using both is clear, and the sentence is one. We must, I think, conclude that Thucydides did see a verbatim copy of the treaty only after he had written cc. 17 and 20; but that he wrote, simultaneously with 17 and 20, in narrative form, an outline of the principal features of the treaty (without anything of c. 19), and discarded this when he got the verbatim copy; he knew, that is, already in 421 all those features which appear in the narrative from c. 21 onwards, and the question of the date of the composition of that narrative is not affected by the other problem, when did he first see the treaty itself? but we may say, 'probably before his return to Athens'; for the reasons which make that answer right for the truce of 423 are equally applicable here. We have not the evidence at our disposal to answer the last question. We can say also (if the above analysis is correct) that he first got hold of a copy of the treaty at a time when he, for whatever reason, was not disposed or was not able to revise his previous narrative in order to get rid of the small anomalies, Stolos, Mekyberna, and the rest, which appeared when the text of the treaty was inserted; at a time when all he wished to do, or could do, was to put aside his previous outline of the treaty and to add *τάδε* ('in these words') at the end of 17.

Similarly 25. 1, ἐπὶ Πλειστόλα μὲν ἐν Λακεδαιμονι ἐφόρου, Ἀλκαίον δ' ἄρχοντος Αθήνησ, was in all probability written before he had the texts of the two treaties before him; but there it is a date much to

the point, serving a particular purpose like that of the dates in ii. 2. 1, namely to relate the end of the ten years' war to the past and the future, as the other related its beginning.

We may note again that ancient scholars, at least as represented in scholia, e.g. those on Aristophanes, often quote Philochoros for an event and its date when they might have quoted Thucydides: F 131 (schol. *Peace*, 465) for this treaty, as F 129 (schol. *Vesp.* 210) for the Athenian campaign against Mende and Skione. In F 133 (schol. *Lys.* 1094) on the Hermokopidai, both Thucydides (inaccurately) and Philochoros are quoted for different versions about the guilty. But schol. *Peace*, 479 quotes Thucydides (iv. 117. 2) for the circumstances of the truce of 423.

Plutarch, *Nik.* 9. 7–9, tells us of the rejoicing in Athens at the conclusion of the peace, how songs of Euripides were on all men's lips, especially

κείσθω δόρυ μοι μίτον ἀμφιπλέκεν ἀράχναις

from *Erechtheus* (fr. 369), and all blessed Nikias for ending the war and contrasted him with Perikles who began it, for so trivial a cause, and with the present war-mongers who were for continuing it. All this, except the gratitude to Nikias, is reflected in the contemporary *Peace*. Thucydides says nothing of it. The Athenians were soon to be undeceived.

20. *The Dating of the Ten Years' War*

20. 1. τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἄμα ἦρι: for the combined expression cf. 17. 2, 39. 3 (comparing also 24. 2 with 40. 1), and iii. 116. 1, 3 n.; and for its significance for the problem of Thucydides' summers and winters, see Appendix. At first sight this passage seems not to be on all fours with the others, as Steup points out; for here we apparently have a date exact to a day, which clearly should be either during the winter or during the spring, but not both. This view is, however, misleading, and arises from familiarity with the text of the treaty, 19. 1; and, as I have already argued above, 20. 1 was not written with c. 19 in mind—was in fact probably written before Thucydides had seen the words of the treaty. The parallel between this passage and 39. 3 is almost exact: ἐγένοντο here and ἐποιήσαντο there include at least the last negotiations, covering some days, before the oaths were finally taken, and, perhaps, before the treaty came into effect (see above, p. 678, and n. on εἰ ἔτι μετακινητή, 21. 3). That this is the right explanation seems to be shown as well by τὸν τε χειμῶνα τοῦτον ἥσαν ἐσ λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἕαρ ἡδη παρασκευή τε, κ.τ.λ., 17. 2.

ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθύς: according to Steup and others, a more exact

determination of ἄμα ήρι above; which would show as well that there was a definite interval of time between the city Dionysia (which ended on Elaphebolion 13: Mommsen, *Att. Feste*, 433) and the beginning of spring. But this cannot be so unless Thucydides means by the first day of spring a date, a fixed date, by the *lunar* calendar; for the dates of the festivals were of course fixed by that calendar. See below, Appendix. Thucydides is giving rather a circumstance of the conclusion of the treaty, a circumstance that affected Athens, and Athens only of the states concerned. "Die Erwähnung der Dionysien dient allerdings zur Datierung [cf. 19. 1, 23. 4], doch steht das Fest auch in Zusammenhang mit den Ereignissen" (Busolt, iii. 693. 2). Cf. 1. n. on μέχρι Πυθίων. On the other hand, Thucydides knew that the length of the war, and therefore the date of the treaty, could be determined within a few days.

Theophrastos' ἀδολέσχης would remark, *τὴν θάλατταν ἐκ Διονυσίων πλόιμον εἶναι*; but that does not mean the same day, by the sun, every year ('the days are beginning to draw out').

καὶ ἡμερῶν ὀλίγων παρενεγκουσῶν: 'and a few days having been carried beyond', as in the literal meaning of παραφέρω, iv. 135. 1. That is, with a few days in excess of ten years, not 'with a difference of a few days, either way'. Cf. 26. 3 n. The scholiast here interprets παρενεγκουσῶν by παρελθουσῶν; on 26. 3, by προσθεμένας: in effect rightly in both cases.

ἢ ὡς: we would certainly do better without *ἢ*. Cf., with Steup, iv. 90. 3.

τὸ πρῶτον ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐγένετο: almost the most disputed passage in Thucydides; characteristically there is no scholion. As I have said in the n. on ii. 19. 1, there are evident indications that Thucydides at one time thought of so arranging his narrative that the actual invasion of Attica in 431, the crossing of the frontier, marked the true beginning of the war, with the Theban attack on Plataia as the most recent and most provocative of its *αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοραί*; this would have been logical enough, for it is repeatedly made clear that Thebes attacked in peace-time. There would therefore be no objection to the *phrase* here used, on the ground simply that Thucydides regarded the attack on Plataia and not the invasion as the beginning of the war; it would mean only that when he wrote this he had not decided to begin the war with *τὰ Πλαταικά*. But the dates of the two events make this interpretation impossible. Fortunately, it is not a question of the reliability of figures in our MSS. (*μηνὶ ἔκτῳ, δύο μῆνας*, and *ἡμέρᾳ ὁγδοηκοστῇ*, ii. 2. 1 and 19. 1), nor of the meaning of the phrase *ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ διετρίβῃ, ἔλασσον δέ, i. 125. 2*; for *ἄμα ήρι ἀρχομένῳ* (ii. 2. 1) and *θέρους καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος* (ii. 19. 1) sufficiently mark the interval of time between the attack on Plataia and the invasion

of Attica, and, since the Treaty of 421 was agreed *τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἄμα ἡρι*, there were not ten years and a few days between the first invasion and the peace, but ten years less, probably, nearly two and a half months, whereas it must have been very nearly ten years to a day between *ἄμα ἡρι ἀρχομένων* in the archonship of Pythodoros and *τελ. τ. χ. ἄμα ἡρι* in that of Alkaios (see Appendix).

In ii. 10. 1 we are told that Sparta μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταιᾶς εὐθύς sent to her Peloponnesian and other allies demands to prepare for a foreign war, ὡς ἐσβαλοῦντος ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν (in accordance with the brave resolution of the previous summer). The allies arrived on the appointed day, Archidamos addressed their leaders, and then dispatched Melesippus to Athens to see if the latter would give way. He was not received, and as he recrossed the Athenian frontier he said, *ἢδε ἡ ἡμέρα τοῖς Ἑλλησι μεγάλων κακῶν ἀρξεῖ* (ii. 12. 3). That day also might then have been taken as the beginning of the war. But even it, whatever length of time elapsed between it and the invasion proper, is too late for the date given here: there is no particular reason to suppose that the Peloponnesian states hurried to get their contingents to the Isthmos, or that Sparta hurried them, for the month of May was a natural time for an expedition abroad; and in fact the date given for the attack on Plataia, *ἄμα ἡρι ἀρχομένων*, is the only one that fits with that of this present chapter. Indeed, some have objected that the Peace of 421 was agreed even earlier in the year, by a few days, than that attack was made; for it was *τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος* as well as *ἄμα ἡρι*; but, as stated above, Thucydides probably by the combined phrase means a certain passage of time during which the last discussions about the terms of the peace were held.

It would appear, therefore, that E. H. O. Müller, who in his Marburg Thesis of 1852, *de tempore quo bellum Peloponnesiacum initium ceperit*, p. 33, n. 5, first proposed to delete the words *ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν καί*, was right; he was followed by Stahl, Classen, and Steup, though not by Stuart Jones or Hude. But it is not an easy correction, both because the offending words do not look like a later supplement or comment, and because in themselves, that is, apart from the difficulty of the date, they would suit the description of the invasion in ii. 19. 1.

Stahl saw as well a difficulty in *τὸ πρῶτον*, saying that we should have *ἡ πρώτη ἐσβολὴ*; and G. Meyer bracketed it too; but it will stand, whether *ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τ. Α. καί* is to be kept (cf. ii. 13. 9) or bracketed (cf. ii. 47. 3, iii. 86. 2). So Steup.

Thucydides expressly says that the 'herald' state began with the attack on Plataia and that by this he means the beginning of the war (ii. 1); and this can mean only that the period during which the parties ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως (i. 146) was at an end, though he does not

tell us that the Athenians at once declared it to be at an end, and indeed it was some time later that they resolved not to receive *ambassador or herald* (ii. 12. 2); how Melesippos described himself we are unfortunately not told (perhaps, 'herald or ambassador, what you will; but listen to me'). It may well be that the fact that no ambassador passed between the states after the end of the winter in 431 finally decided Thucydides to include the Plataian affair as the first event of the war: that and the fact that it occurred in any case in the first year of the war, and that it made a neat picture of a ten years' war almost to a day, may all have influenced him. So Ullrich, pp. 32–34 and vi–vii. Otherwise the fighting at Kerkyra in 433, and, with greater reason, that at Poteidaia in 432, might have been included in the war—with greater reason because the siege of Poteidaia lasted well on into the war, and some people thought of the whole campaign there as part of it (*τρία καὶ δέκ'* ἔτη, *Peace*, 990: contrast *Equit.* 793, *ἔτος ὄγδοον*—8 archons inclusive from Pythodoros to Stratokles, and *Ach.* 266 *ἔκτῳ ἔτει*, which is, strictly, inconsistent). That system of course would upset as well the prophecy that the war would last thrice nine years (26. 4).

For a bibliography of the many theories about this passage, see Schmid, 72. 7, 73. 2.

2. κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους: 'by the natural divisions of time', that is, in effect, the seasons, almost as important in a narrative of war as for a 'Works and Days'; not especially for chronological accuracy in the driest meaning of the word (which could be obtained by other systems), but for understanding a military move—whether, for example, an invasion by land into the enemy's country was timed to destroy his corn crops or reap them for the invader, or was later, after his own and the enemy's harvest was over; whether it was likely to be favourable weather or no (vol. i, p. 11). Thucydides might well have explained this in greater detail.

καὶ μὴ τῶν ἐκασταχοῦ, κ.τ.λ.: I agree in general with Steup's treatment of this sentence, that is, to accept Arnold's transposition of *τὴν ἀπαριθμησαν τῶν ὄνομάτων* (so Stuart Jones and Hude), to take *ἀρχόντων* and *ἀπὸ τιμῆς τινός* as parallel to each other and both subordinate to *σημαιωνότων*, to reject Classen's bracketing of *ἐσ* and Hude's *ποιήσας* for *πιστεύσας*, and to read *τῇ ἀπαριθμήσει* (a conjecture due, apparently, to Schütz in 1877—*Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialw.* xxxi. 251—rather than to Wilamowitz). *πιστεύσας* has no connexion with the rest of the sentence without its dative, and it is a strain to regard *τὴν ἀπαριθμησαν* as governed still by *κατά*; while Hude's *ποιήσας*, which he defended by the scholiast's rendering, *μὴ ἐξ-αριθμεῖσθα μήτε τοὺς ἀρχοντας, κ.τ.λ.*, with no reference to *πιστεύσας* (this scholion also ignores *σημαιωνότων*), should have been *ποιησά-μενος*. Steup is also probably right in taking *ἀρχόντων* and also *ἀπὸ*

τιμῆς τινός in the most general way—not those called *archontes eponymoi* as such, but ‘those who, as holding office or some other dignity, can signify something in relation to the past’; compare Aristotle’s analysis of *ἀρχαῖ*, *Pol.* iv. 15, esp. 1299 a 14–20 (priests, choregoi, and others, are not *archontes*); at the same time Thucydides is clearly thinking in the main of eponymoi and such priesthoods as were used in chronological systems; and these latter need not be annual, for the priesthood of Hera in Argolis, the only one used by Thucydides for dating (ii. 2. 1; cf. iv. 133. 3), was held for life.

έκασταχοῦ is an important word, for these offices and dignities were local, and, therefore, few of them were widely known and, even if only annual magistracies were selected for dating, the years of office did not necessarily coincide (vol. i, p. 4).¹ It would be not only clumsy, but confusing and not particularly accurate if, on the analogy of 25. 1, Thucydides had dated the revolt of Mytilene not only to near midsummer in year 4 of the war but by the eponymoi of Athens and Mytilene, the surrender of Plataia by those of Plataia, Sparta, and Thebes, and so on throughout his history with every event, wherever located. Timaios may have done something of this kind, if Polybios’ attack on him is to be trusted (xii. 11. 1).

The meaning of *ἐς τὰ προγεγενημένα σημαώντων*, ‘of significance for past history’, is at first sight doubtful; for Thucydides is writing contemporary history. He may be referring to the significance of his own occasional use of eponymoi for dating, ii. 2. 1 and v. 25. 1, to relate the Peloponnesian war to past events, but also, more significantly, to the needs of future readers of his own work.

οὐ γὰρ ἀκριβές ἔστιν, κ.τ.λ.: the scholiast’s interpretation of this and the previous sentence is a loose paraphrase, but in general right—*κατὰ θέρη, φησί, καὶ χειμῶνας τὰ δέκα ἐτη σκοπείσθω τις καὶ μὴ*

¹ For the many varying local calendars see Ferguson, *Hesperia*, xvii, 1948, 123, nn. 34, 36, who, however, exaggerates the differences between them; for every state tried to make its calendar a lunar one, and the moon waxed and waned for all alike. Aristoxenos, quoted by him, is either exaggerating or referring to a particular occasion when Athens had inserted a few days (perhaps, indeed, to correct a misfit with the moon) and other states had not. The Euboean inscription of 294–288 B.C. (*I.G.* xii. 9, 207. 49 ff.), in which four cities agree to a common calendar, is most illuminating; but the differences between the calendars could hardly ever have been of more than two or three days (which would be quite bad enough, especially as the differences would not be constant). As Ferguson says, the authorities of the great festivals, Olympia, Pythia, and others, must have given some indication in advance of the day when a festival was to begin, informing the public particularly if their year was ordinary or intercalary; but this cannot have been overwhelmingly difficult. The delegates from Delphi started on their mission to the cities six months before the festival, those from Athens, for the Eleusinian Mysteries, two and a half months before; the decision to intercalate or not must already have been taken, and, presumably, the relation of the local calendar to the moon’s phases accurately stated.

ἐξαριθμείσθω μήτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας μήτε τοὺς ἀπὸ ἄλλης τινὸς τιμῆς ἐπωνύμους τοὺς ἔτεσι γεγενημένους· οὐ γάρ ἀκριβῶς ἐντεῦθεν οἱ χρόνοι τῶν πράξεων λαμβάνονται, ἐπειδὴ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ κατὰ τοὺς μέσους καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τελευταῖους πολλὰ ἐπράχθη. It might be thought that Thucydides could easily have avoided this rather superficial difficulty by the formula which he uses in ii. 2. 1, ἐπὶ τοῦ δεῖνος ἔτι *x* μῆνας ἄρχοντος Αθηναίου; but, apart from this being local to Athens, owing to the anomalies which arise from the use of a lunar calendar corrected by intercalation (vol. i, p. 5), it would not mean the same thing from one year to another; and it would in consequence still be necessary to add ἅμα ἥρι, οր τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος, ορ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος, to give not only greater chronological accuracy, but military significance to the narrative.

ἐπεγένετο τι: 'one event followed another.' *οἰς* and *τῷ* are 'ethic' datives; ὅπως ἔτυχε τῷ, sc. ἐπιγενόμενον, as iii. 43. 5.

3. ἐξ ἡμισείας - - - ἔχοντος: "ordo est, ni fallor, ἐκατέρου ἔχοντος ἐξ ἡμισείας τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ", Dobree; "cum utraque vim anni dimidia ex parte contineat", Stahl. We must remember what Thucydides is arguing—that by using his method of reckoning we can see, not that the war lasted 'about ten years'—ten summers and ten winters—because it would have been as easy to show that by enumerating ten archonships, but that it lasted exactly ten years (within a few days), because he says that it began ἅμα ἥρι ἀρχομένῳ (ii. 1-2. 1) and ended τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἅμα ἥρι (v. 20. 1), and he has enumerated ten summers and ten winters.

On the question whether ἐξ ἡμισείας means that, for this purpose, summer and winter are reckoned as of equal length, the year divided into exact halves, see Appendix, p. 710.

The Reserve Fund at Athens at the End of the Ten Years' War (I.G. i.² 324)

I have given above, iii. 116. 3 n., a brief description of this important document of the logistai, with, on p. 436, tables summarizing the information; also, at the end of each Thucydidean year, a note about the sums spent in that year, where anything is known (ii. 47. 1, iii. 50. 3, 116. 3, iv. 51, 116. 3, 135. 2, and v. 1—the last being given in the middle of the Thucydidean year, for the document stops there). Here a word must be added about the important summaries of the loans made in the seven years before 426-425; they only give totals, but that affords us some information about the financial position of Athens in 421, on which Thucydides is silent.¹

¹ We have no certain records of *annual* expenditure from the spring of 431 to midsummer 426; but for the probable fragment of the record of 431-430, see above n. on ii. 47. 1.

Of the total of just over 4,000 tal. borrowed from Athena Polias from 433–432 to 427–426, we can safely assume that 1,000 tal. at least belong to the year and a half between midsummer 433 and the beginning of 431 when Perikles made his statement recorded at ii. 13. 3–5—spent on the Propylaia and the siege of Poteidaia (above, pp. 20 ff.); 3,000 tal. had, therefore, been borrowed since the beginning of the war from Athena; and, besides, c. 790 tal. from Nike and from the Other Gods, some of which, however, may also have been spent before the war began. At this latter date there were 5,000 tal. in the treasury (or rather, 6,000, from which 1,000 tal. was taken soon after, for the special reserve, ii. 24. 1); of this 5,000, then, probably not more than 1,200 or 1,300 tal. were left at midsummer 426; and it must have been clear at the time that the war was by no means over—as clear to Athens as to the Peloponnesians. Between midsummer 426 and midsummer 422 another 800 tal. was borrowed, which would leave only 400–500 tal. We cannot, however, say that no more than this was then left in the two treasuries; as I said above (pp. 433–4), it seems probable that a certain amount of the annual phoros, and perhaps the product of *εισφορά* as well, were paid over to Athena; and, if this is correct, a considerable sum from these sources, after the reassessment of 425, was paid in annually; perhaps as much as 800–1,000 tal. in all between autumn 428 (the date of the first *εισφορά*) and the spring of 422.

The comparatively small sum of 55 tal. borrowed from the Other Gods in 423–422 was distributed between some twenty-four shrines in different parts of Attica whose treasuries had been placed on the Akropolis before the war and were all administered by one board, the *ταμίαι τὸν ἄλλον θεῶν*, some of the amounts being minute. It has been supposed that this argues that the main treasury, of Athena Polias, was practically empty and all the others produced what they could. Since, however, quite a considerable sum in total, 766 tal., had been borrowed from these tamiae before 426, this can hardly be the case; in the alternative, if Athena had no money left by 426 and this made borrowing on a large scale from the Other Gods necessary, money must have been paid into her treasury after 426, from *εισφορά* or *φόρος* or both (and something from her own income), to enable 747 tal. to be borrowed from her between 426 and 422; if that was done, it was probably done before 426 as well, that is, the nearly 4,800 tal. borrowed before then (Table B, p. 436), less 1,000 borrowed before 431 (above), will have left more than 1,200 tal. in the two treasuries at midsummer 426. It seems to me more likely that the treasuries of the Other Gods were glad to take part in the lending, especially if they hoped some day to get the interest. This would explain the very small sums, of a few drachmai only, borrowed from one or two of the Gods. So Meyer, *Forschungen*, ii. 129.

On a strict accounting basis, among the 'assets' of Athena and the Other Gods in 422 was the accumulated interest then due, which amounted to about 1,450 tal. Any payment of this interest can have made only a paper difference to the state of Athenian finances: if, for example, 3,000 tal. was paid over to the two treasuries between 421 and 415 (on which see vi. 12. 1 n.), it made no difference whether this was called, as to half, payment of interest and half repayment of principal: all that mattered for the state finances was that the reserve had increased by 3,000 tal. The only difference would be for the smaller shrines, and only for them if the total in reserve had risen higher than the Athenians regarded as a safe limit—e.g. higher than the total of 6,000 tal. of 431. We do not, I think, know whether any of the sums paid in to reserve during this period of doubtful peace was called payment of this interest. If it was, it would only mean that the Athenians were taxing themselves, or their subjects (more probably both), for a paper *εὐσέβεια*.

If the above reasoning is correct, as much as 1,400 tal. was probably in the hands of the two boards of treasurers (perhaps all of it in those of Athena) at midsummer 422, and not much less at the end of the ten years' war. This would be justification enough for Perikles' confidence that, financially, Athens could hold out: he was right not to act as though the war would last longer than ten years; and even after the disasters of the last three years, they had foiled the Peloponnesian attack, and their empire, the object of that attack, was, in the main, still held. Athens had won, and won without exhausting the financial reserve which had been accumulated for this very purpose of being spent in the defence of the empire.

21-22. Difficulties in carrying out the Peace Treaty

21. 1. ἔλαχον γάρ πρότεροι: Plutarch, *Nik.* 10. 1, says that, according to Theophrastos, Nikias won this point for Athens by bribery. Theophrastos seems to have been fond of finding that the honest men, Aristeides and Nikias, were not above trickery of one kind or another (see vol. i, p. 63).

Ισχαγόραν: iv. 132. 2, 3 n., and v. 19. 2, above; for Menas, v. 19. 2; and for Philocharidas, iv. 119. 2 as well. See also n. on οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, 24. 2, below. For Klearidas, too, see n. on iv. 132. 3.

ώς εἴρητο ἔκάστοις: see 18. 5-8.

2. οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἤθελον: how many of the states refused, Thucydides does not tell us. Certainly the Chalkidians (39. 1), as well as Amphipolis and Skione; probably also the Bottiaioi or some of them (above, 3. 6 n.), and Argilos, at least.

3. μετὰ πρέσβεων αὐτόθεν: from Amphipolis and perhaps other cities. They stayed behind in the Peloponese when Klearidas returned to

Thrace (*αὐτὸς μέν* below), and doubtless conducted the negotiations with Argos which led to an alliance (31. 6).

εἰ ἔτι μετακινητὴ εἴη: as Steup says, Klearidas may have hoped for some modification under the clause of the treaty given in 18. 11; and there is no conflict between this passage and 18. 11, as Kirchhoff thought. But it is more probable, if there was an interval between the ‘signing’ of the treaty and its coming into force (20. 1 n.), that Klearidas hoped to obtain some modification before the final date (*ἔλθων κατὰ τάχος*, above). He found Sparta’s hands tied (*κατευλημένους*)—not only, perhaps, by the terms of the peace, but already by the treaty of alliance; for Thucydides is somewhat anticipating the narrative of c. 22.

καὶ τὸ χωρίον παραδοῦναι: *καὶ* means, not only withdraw the Peloponnesian troops (Steup).

ἔξαγαγεῖν: presumably the Peloponnesian and allied troops in Skione had already been withdrawn, and given safe conduct by Athens (18. 7).

It is clear both that Klearidas was playing false, though doing the best he could for his friends in Amphipolis, and that the Lacedaemonian instructions to him were in direct violation of the treaty. Of course we may believe that there was opposition in Amphipolis to being surrendered to Athens (but perhaps only among *οἱ τὰ Βρασίδου φρονοῦντες*—a powerful minority?), and of course Sparta did not like having to *enforce* her betrayal of her allies in the north; but she should have thought of that before agreeing to the treaty. Athenian suspicions of her good faith were justified. See Busolt, iii. 1200.

22. 1. ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ αὐτοὶ ἔτυχον ὅντες: *αὐτοὶ* seems clearly to be pointless, and *ἔτι* no less clearly to be required. I prefer, with Steup, Rauchenstein’s simple emendation, *ἔτι* for *αὐτοὶ*. Krüger’s *αὐτοῦ* is unnecessary after *ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ*; we might bracket *ἐν τῇ Λ.* and read *ἔτι αὐτοῦ*, for *αὐτοῦ* alone would be understandable after 21. 3; but it is not so good. See also below on § 3; and the n. on 46. 5.

The Peloponnesian and other allied delegates do not leave Sparta till 27. 1.

αὐτῶν τοὺς μὴ δεξαμένους: i.e. Boeotia, Corinth, Elis, and Megara, 17. 2; not, strictly speaking, Amphipolis and the other Thraceward cities as well, for in 21. 2–3 Thucydides has been anticipating events somewhat, and Klearidas’ arrival in Sparta was probably later than the negotiations for this alliance with Athens (when the Spartans had only the Peloponnesian situation in mind). But we have not been told why they refused: from 17. 2 we can guess Megara’s reason, but Boeotia, holding on to Plataia, might have signed as Athens

did; and of Corinthian and Elean objections we only hear later, 30–31. So the sentence immediately following, *οἱ δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ προφάσει ἥπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεώσαντο, κ.τ.λ.*, is not consistent; for no earlier *πρόφασις* has been mentioned. Was there a brief mention in the paragraph which, as I think, must have been written before the text of the treaty came into Thucydides' hands (pp. 680–2, above)?

2. ἀπέτεμψαν: this does not mean that the delegates left Sparta (see 27. 1), but that the conference of Sparta with her allies was closed by Sparta, who at once turned to Athens. All these events between the peace and the alliance took but a few days, apparently.

νομίζοντες ἡκιστα ἄν σφίσι, κ.τ.λ.: I cannot follow Stuart Jones's text here—did he interpret it, 'Sparta proposed an alliance with Athens because (if she did not) there was danger that Argos would not keep quiet and there was hope that, if the alliance was made, the rest of the Peloponnese would keep quiet'? Nor can I agree with him and Hude (following Göller) that *νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ἀνευ Αθηναίων οὐ δεινοὺς εἶναι* can give the Argive reason for refusing to renew the peace with Sparta: what in that case could *ἀνευ Αθηναίων* mean? It would only have sense if Sparta and Athens had long been allies but had now quarrelled, so that Argos had little to fear. Or is it to be 'realizing that Sparta was no danger to them even without Athens on *their* side'? Heilmann's bracketing of *νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ἀνευ Αθ.* *οὐ*, which was adopted by Stahl, seems arbitrary; but there is something seriously corrupt in the sentence, and *νομίσαντες* following so quickly after *νομίζοντες* is surely wrong. Madvig's *⟨ἐπιτίθεσθαι⟩* after *τούς τε Ηργείους* may be right (though I would prefer *ἐπιέναι*); but I should then read, *⟨ἐπιέναι⟩, ἐπειδὴ --- ἐπισπένδεσθαι, ⟨καὶ⟩ αὐτοὺς ἀνευ Αθ. οὐ δεινοὺς εἶναι*. The only anomaly will then be the anyhow misplaced *ἡκιστα ἄν*, which, in its present place, should properly belong to both *τε* and *καὶ*-clauses—the parenthetical clause giving rise to the anomaly. (iii. 55. 3, where there is a redundant *εἰκὸς ἦν*, gives a sentence of somewhat similar pattern; cf. also iii. 42. 6 n., where there is a displacement of the opposite kind.) The temporal *ἐπειδή*, where we might expect a concessive, means: 'this possibility was in their minds since the rejection of peace offers by Argos.' If we do not adopt *⟨ἐπιέναι⟩*, I would anyhow keep *ἀνευ Αθ.*, bracketing only *νομίσαντες* and *οὐ*, with a comma after *ἐπισπένδεσθαι*, as Badham and Herwerden; for the following sentence, *πρὸς γὰρ ἀν τοὺς Αθηναίους, κ.τ.λ.*, explains *ἀνευ Αθηναίων*. (This is really Arnold's view, but that he did not bracket; Badham and Herwerden also transpose *πρὸς γὰρ ἀν --- χωρεῖν*, in parenthesis, after *δεινοὺς εἶναι*, following Stahl.) Forbes Smith takes a different view: he would understand *ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι* after *τούς τε Ηργείους*, leaving the text unaltered, except, perhaps, for *⟨καὶ⟩* before *νομίσαντες*, and putting a comma after *ἐπισπένδεσθαι*: "thinking that the Argives would by no means make an

alliance with Sparta—since they had refused to renew the treaty with them when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos—and believing, etc." This may be on the right lines, but if so, it would be better to put a comma before as well as after ἐπισπένδεσθαι and take the infinitive with νομίζοντες and as understood after οὐκ ἥθελον (and, as suggested above, read καὶ and bracket νομίσαντες); but I think it more likely that the ἥκιστα ἀν and μάλιστ' ἀν clauses both point in the same direction, meaning 'thus neither the one nor the other would be dangerous and go over to Athens'. K. Praechter, *Hermes*, xlvi, 1910, 155–6, supposed that an original νομίσαντες ἥκιστ' ἀν σφίσι was at some time omitted by mistake and added in the margin, and later inserted in the wrong place as well as (by another copyist) in the right one; and, bracketing νομίζοντες ἥκιστα ἀν σφίσι, read ἐπισπένδεσθαι νομίσαντες ἥκιστα ἀν σφίσιν αὐτοὺς ἀνευ Αθηναίων δεινούς εἶναι. This, with a comma after ἐπισπένδεσθαι, may be right.

ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἥθελον, κ.τ.λ.: see 14. 4.

Ἀμπελίδου: not mentioned elsewhere.

Λίχου: presumably the Lichas of 50. 4, 76. 3, and several passages in viii. He was *proxenos* of Argos at Sparta.

3. παρόντων οὖν πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῶν Αθηναίων: since the delegates who take the new oath were the same as those for the peace treaty, we expect not only *<έτι>*, as much here as in § 1 above, but also *<τῶν>* πρέσβεων. If they had gone to Athens to report the conclusion of the peace and at once returned, we still need the article. They will have stayed (or returned) in the hope that the Boeotians and other malcontents would take the oath.

Is the MSS. reading an indication that Thucydides did not know that the 'signatories' were the same in both treaties, because he only saw the documents later?

ξυμμαχία ἥδε: it is really an *ἐπιμαχία* (i. 44. 1 n.).

The conclusion of this treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens was remarkably abrupt, and is abruptly, and meagrely, related. Why did Athens agree? In the hope of getting back Panakton and Plataia, and keeping Nisaia if Megara broke with the Peloponnesian League? What did she in fact gain by it? It was obviously open to attack in Athens. We should like to know much more of the details of so hasty a transaction. It seems probable that Thucydides did not know more; its importance was soon lessened by new events, and he may never have learnt much of its causes and consequences.

23–24. 1. Treaty of Alliance between Athens and Sparta

23. 1. ἦν [δέ] τινες: Stahl argued, from the statement in 39. 3, εἰρημένον ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μήτε σπένδεσθαι τῷ μήτε πολεμεῖν, and its repetition in 46. 2, that there must have been such a clause in this treaty (for had it been agreed later, in accord with § 6, Thucydides

must have mentioned it), and proposed to insert here, after *⟨καὶ Αθηναῖοι⟩*, some such words as *⟨ἐπὶ τοῖς ἵσους καὶ ὅμοίοις, μήτε σπένδεσθαι τῷ ἄνευ κουῆς γνάμης μήτε πολεμεῖν εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἔνυμαχίαν⟩* πεντήκοντα ἔτη. We should thus as well have an explanation of δέ at the beginning of the next sentence, which Krüger (followed by Hude and Stuart Jones) felt obliged to bracket. Kirchhoff and Steup (above, p. 596) replied that no such comprehensive clause could possibly have been included in a purely defensive treaty of alliance (and neither Athens nor Sparta would have so tied her hands), and anyhow it would not have been the first clause—it might have come after § 3. The former thought that the words in 39. 3 and 46. 2 could be confined to the case of the Boeotians and their occupation of Panakton; for Panakton being within Athenian territory, if the ten-day truce between Boeotia and Athens were once not renewed, the Boeotians would be enemies invading Attica, and Sparta would be bound by § 2 of this ἔπιμαχία. Steup, as his manner was, would bracket the offending words in 39. 3 and 46. 2 (as the work of the tiresome man who, he asserted, had played such havoc with cc. 15–17). This particular difficulty must be discussed when we reach those chapters (I will refer only to articles by Momigliano and De Sanctis in *Riv. d. filol.* vii, 1929, 371–7 and 433–56); here I would say that I think δέ should be kept, for it introduces what is in effect a new clause: 'the treaty is to be for fifty years. If', etc. I should prefer to read *⟨καὶ Αθηναῖοι. εἶναι τὴν ἔνυμαχίαν⟩* πεντήκοντα ἔτη. ἦν δέ τινες, like 79. 1–2. But there are variations within the treaties given in this book: 77. 1–2 would perhaps justify Steup in keeping to the MSS. here with no change but the addition of *καὶ Αθηναῖοι*. 47. 3 can be cited to support the bracketing of δέ; while 47. 1–2 shows that δέ is correct if *κατὰ τάδε* has not preceded, but shows also that the duration of the treaty and the first of its conditions are treated as separate clauses, and so joined by a connective particle.

3. ἡ δουλεία: cf. 14. 3, iv. 41. 3 n., 80. 2–5. It has been observed by many that no mention is made of any possibility of a slave revolt in Athens, not even of desertion on any scale that would matter. Athens in fact never once, before late Hellenistic times, had trouble with the many slaves there, while Sparta was in constant fear, and other cities, as Argos and those of Thessaly, had from time to time similar troubles. Whether this was because Athens treated her slaves more kindly, or more cruelly but more efficiently, than Sparta (if we take all the circumstances of their lives into account), may well be matter for discussion; but not here.

Müller-Strübing, p. 280 n., would emend, by inserting words of corresponding Spartan obligation towards Athens. This is not impossible, but is unlikely.

4. οἵπερ καί, κ.τ.λ.: see 19. 2 n.

ἀνανεοῦσθαι: cf. 18. 10.

πρὸς τὰ Διονύσια: that is, very near to the anniversary of the treaty (20. 1, 22. 2, n. on ἀπέπεμψαν). Had the Spartan delegates acquired a taste for tragedy and comedy?

τὰ Υακίνθια: the date at which this festival was held (at Amyklai) is uncertain, but apparently in the Lacedaemonian month Hekatombaion, which may have coincided with Thargelion, the last month but one of the Attic calendar; if so, the Athenian delegates were to go to Sparta about two months after the Spartans had been to Athens. This in itself seems unlikely. See the discussion in Busolt, ii. 722, 2; Stengel in R.E. s.v. 'Υακίνθια, and 24. 2 n.

5. στήλην δὲ ἐκατέρους στῆσαι, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 18. 10.

6. προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν: this is like the clause in the peace treaty, 18. II, but with some significant differences; and here Sparta and Athens are the only interested parties. See below, p. 695.

The formula is found in the treaty with Perdikkas, I.G. i.2 71. 16 (above, p. 621), and part of it in the treaty with Argos, below, 47. 12.

24. 1. The names are repeated, with insignificant variations of order, from 19. 2. That they are repeated in Thucydides' text (after δμοῦνται δὲ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ., in 23. 4, which tells us all that we need to know) is due, as Steup says, only to the fact that this is a document, cited word for word.

This makes it all the more remarkable that no date when the treaty is to come into force is mentioned. Kirchhoff, pp. 83–84, said that this was because the alliance followed so closely in time after the peace, and was so closely connected with the failure of some states to agree to the treaty of peace, that it was regarded only as an appendix to the other, and the same date was assumed; and the yearly renewal of the oaths must have been of both treaties, taken at the same time (18. 10, 23. 4). But why was this not stated in the text, *〈ἄρχειν δὲ τὴν ἔνυμαχίαν ὅθεπερ καὶ τὰς προτέρας σπονδάς〉*? and ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ *〈τὸν τε ὄρκον τόνδε καὶ τὸν πρότερον〉*? I think we must assume a lacuna; it is a more important matter than the stipulation that the same delegates should take the oath.

Kirchhoff also maintains (pp. 84–85) that this document, so closely connected with the other, must have been seen by Thucydides at the same time, that is, according to him, after 404; and further that, since there is no contradiction between the surrounding narrative and the document, and 24. 2 clearly never followed directly after 22. 3, everything, narrative and copy of document (all of book v from c. 21), was written after 404. This is to look at the problem of composition too simply. If a document was inserted later in a narrative, some alteration, a few words at least, would be made almost automatically, before and after; and here it may well be thought

that there is inconsistency—not contradiction, but a lack of continuity—between the very jejune account of the origin of the alliance (c. 22: it was after all a remarkable volte-face for both Athens and Sparta) and the detail of its text. But, with this admitted, the narrative may still belong, in essentials, to an earlier period, and Thucydides may have learned quite soon the principal conditions of the alliance, though he may not have seen the text till later, perhaps after his return to Athens; for there is no reason to suppose that a copy of it was taken to Thrace, as copies of the earlier documents, the year's truce and the peace, were, though Thucydides might have seen a copy (an Attic copy) in Sparta. And, once more, what is meant by *written after 404?* Much of the narrative in this book, after c. 20, is the briefest kind of chronicle; no 'notes' that Thucydides made as soon as he heard of an event could be briefer than e.g. 32. 1, 32. 2, 35. 1, 39. 1; or, to take a rather more spacious narrative, c. 29, what is significant is not so much the question, When did Thucydides make that a part of his continuous narrative, as, When did he first learn of the incident and make a note of it? When did he think it? We have indeed in 29. 2 a hint: *ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς ἐγέραπτο εὔορκον εἶναι προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν ὅτι ἄν, κ.τ.λ.* This is clearly a reference to the peace treaty (18. 11), because, as Thucydides goes on to explain, the grievance of Sparta's allies was precisely that Sparta had taken to herself an authority to alter a treaty which was the concern of all, an authority to which she had no claim; *δίκαιον γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ξυμμάχοις γεγράφθαι τὴν μετάθεσιν*, whereas no one but Sparta and Athens had any concern with future alterations in the treaty of alliance. Yet these words, *προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν*, belong to the later treaty, 23. 6, not to the earlier, which has *μεταθεῖναι*, though the actual words (*ἐγέραπτο*) of the clause are intended, and (more important) there is a significant difference between the two; for *μεταθεῖναι* is vaguer and more general and could be more easily written into a difficult clause. It seems as though we could say with some confidence that when Thucydides wrote this he had been informed (as we should expect) in some detail of the contents of both the treaties, but had not got the texts of them in front of him when he wrote, and had not already incorporated them in his narrative. We saw perhaps another reason for believing this in the MSS. text of 22. 3. To my mind also the scrappy nature of c. 22 is a sign that it represents just what Thucydides learnt soon after the events when he first heard of the treaty of alliance. See further below.

24. 2. End of the Ten Years' War

2. οὐ πολλῷ ὥστερον: here a matter of days only, for the Peloponnesian delegates for the peace treaty were still in Sparta, and all

the Athenian delegates too—at most, the latter may have gone to Athens and soon returned (22. 1, 3 nn.). Three of the Spartans had had time to go to Thrace (21. 1) and return. There had also been time for the release of Athenian prisoners of war held by Sparta, 21. 1, but not for the Athenians to release those whom they held.

Busolt, iii. 1202. 2, who is followed by Adcock, *C.A.H.* v. 256, dates the treaty of alliance in May, several weeks after the treaty of peace (interpreting *τὸ θέρος* below as the summer distinct from the spring). This seems to be impossible, because the 'eleventh year' apparently begins at the same time as this 'summer', because the narrative suggests that the seventeen Athenian delegates remained in Sparta after the 'signature' of the first treaty in order to negotiate the second (it being plain that the position was not yet stable, if Boeotia, Corinth, and others were standing out from the agreement), and because the second treaty was presumably to begin near the same date at which it was to be renewed every year. (23. 4).

τοὺς ἄνδρας — - **ἀπέδοσαν**: therewith Athens surrendered her surest pledge that the terms of the treaty (the restoration of Amphipolis in particular, and of Panakton) would be observed. Why did she not wait till she had Amphipolis, at least (a test of Sparta's good faith)? Here we can see the hand of Nikias, as Plutarch does (*Nik.* 10. 8); a generous gesture, in the interests of peace, failed, and Nikias' own influence declined, and that of the provocative and ambitious Alkibiades increased in consequence.

τὸ θέρος ἥρχε: the summer, which includes the spring (below, p. 705), had in fact just begun when the treaty of peace had been ratified (20. 1). We have here an instance of Thucydides overrunning, so to speak, the boundaries he has set for himself, as he does in iii. 116, when he wishes to keep two events together, because the next event to be related is separated from these two either by a longer interval of time (as iii. 116, iv. 1) or, as here, by logic. He might have begun c. 21 with *τοῦ δ'* ἐπιγυγνομένου *θέρους ἅμα ἥρι*, and have ended c. 20 with *καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα ὃν Θ. ξυνέγραψεν* (though even that would not have been strictly accurate: the spring had already begun); but that would have at once implied, by its wording, that the war was going on as before, and, besides, Thucydides not only thought of the second treaty as belonging logically to the negotiations which ended the war, not to the period of uneasy peace which followed it, but, somewhat pedantically perhaps, wished to bring it within his ten years' limit—'the first war lasted almost exactly ten years'. It is significant that we do not here find *δέκατον ἔτος ἐτελεύτα*, unlike iii. 116 in this.

Note once more not only where Thucydides ends the first war, but his omission to give any summary of its results—for example, to take a major issue, the failure of Sparta to liberate Hellas. Busolt

and Adcock both give such a summary, and both end their sections with the peace treaty, and make the alliance between Athens and Sparta an event of the uneasy period which followed. It is possible that, if Thucydides had not soon become aware that the peace was not likely to last, or at least that the situation at the time of the peace was not stable, he would have written a summary of the results of the war, something, for example, similar to what he wrote long afterwards of the wisdom of Perikles' strategic plans (ii. 65. 13). But he leaves us in no doubt at what point he ends the ten years' war; that, however, may be because he was writing soon after the conclusion of the treaties, in the early summer of 421, and could not yet know what would happen almost immediately after them. That is to say, he wrote, perhaps, only a provisional note of the end of hostilities (after recording the second treaty), including, perhaps, the names of ephor and archon (25. 1) after the words *οὐ πολλῷ* *υστερον* (24. 2), and modified the form even of that short note when he came to write the sequel.

ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δέκα ἔτη --- γέγραπται: 'the history of the first war, which continued uninterruptedly for these ten years, is now done' (as Steup and Crawley), rather than 'during these ten years the first war, of which the history has now been written, was waged continuously' (Forster Smith, following Stahl).

With δὸς πόλεμος ξυνεχῶς γενόμενος, cf. ii. 1, ξυνεχῶς ἐπολέμουν; but I agree with Stahl (see n. there) that the phrases have not the same reference. The ten years had not in fact been years of continuous fighting; there had been about eighteen months of truce; but this differed from the years of *ὑποπτρος ἀνοκωχή* which followed the treaty of 421 in that there was no peace even on paper.

These are the closing words of the first great section of Thucydides' *History* (the second rather, for book i is the first), whether he wrote the whole, more or less consecutively, after 404, or had composed this section, in the main as we have it (though there are obvious later additions), within a few years of 421. Steup's view (*Studien*, i. 85–87), that the next section began with c. 26, c. 25 belonging to the preceding section, based on certain supposed repetitions in 26, is perverse. From its first sentence, with its date by archon and ephor, even though that date refers to a past action not to the one about to be related, and though it may have first been written in the original, provisional form of 24. 2 as suggested above, c. 25 shows as clearly as does ii. 1–2 that a new part of the *History* has begun. *γέγραπται* is the last word of the previous part.

The major problem of the composition of Thucydides' work, namely, had he completed (as far as his aim and ability would take him) his account of the ten years' war before he realized that the war had not ended, or before he had made up his mind to continue

his work? and did he publish, or intend to publish, that account separately?—the discussion of that problem must be deferred till the end of this commentary; but here we may consider a particular question, one about which it is interesting to speculate: namely, when were cc. 21–22 and 24. 2 composed (leaving aside, that is, the question, briefly discussed above, when was the text of the treaty inserted)? It is clear of course that its present form, with the words *τοῦ ἐνδεκάτου ἔτους, ὁ πρῶτος πόλεμος*, and probably *ξυνεχῶς γενόμενος*, dates from a time after the end of the doubtful peace (25. 3; see too *τῷ πρώτῳ πολέμῳ*, 20. 3); but these phrases may easily belong to a later rewording. Perhaps the hurried narrative of c. 22, and the somewhat artificial *καὶ τὸ θέρος ἡρχε* of 24. 2 after we have been told in 20. 1 that the spring had begun, are to be explained as follows: after the ratification of the peace treaty Thucydides continued ‘making notes’ of events as they occurred (26. 5–6)—it was now almost a habit—and he must very soon have observed how uneasy the peace was, with the Boeotians and the Corinthians holding out and Argos threatening, and politicians on both sides intriguing against it before even a year had passed (36. 1), and with ever increasing charges and counter-charges; with increasing certainty as a historian and decreasing hope as a man and an Athenian, he will have seen that he must continue his work as narrator of events; and he may then have decided to leave the story of the Spartan–Athenian alliance as he had recorded it—where he felt it belonged, where in fact it obviously belonged in a history of war between Athens and the Peloponnesians, at the end of the ten years’ war, not as the first event of the uneasy peace. If this is true, we are near to seeing Thucydides at work. It is clear anyhow that he did not stop at c. 20; that is, that even if, for a time (however short), he thought he had finished either his whole task, or that part of it which was the story of the ten years’ war, when he had recorded the peace treaty and his estimate of the length of the war, there will have been another chapter, or at least another sentence, following our present c. 20, which he will have later deleted. It does not seem from our present text as though he ever thought that the war and his task were beyond doubt finished; that may be due to later alteration of what he had first written; but if so, he has covered his tracks well enough to make it idle to guess what those first words were.

APPENDIX

NOTE ON THUCYDIDES' 'SUMMERS AND WINTERS'

THE questions to be discussed are: (1) is Thucydides' year solar or lunar? (2), if solar, does it always begin and end at a fixed time? For example, does his summer begin at the spring equinox or so many days before or after the equinox? (Theoretically at least we need not be strict as to the *day*; he might mean, say, 10–15 days before, or after, the equinox—as we might use a week rather than a day as our unit, so many weeks before or after—provided it was the same every year.) And (3), if he used a fixed beginning, can we say what it was? Although some of the evidence comes from the later books, and can only be discussed in detail in my next volume, it is desirable to examine the whole matter here, if for no other reason, in order to explain c. 20 of book v.

The following list shows the formulae used by Thucydides in books ii to v. 24 (omitting generally simple instances of *τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους*, or *χειμῶνος*, and *κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους*); it provides us with our evidence.

- ii. 1. ἄρχεται δὲ ὁ πόλεμος ἐνθένδε ἥδη — —, ἐν φ. οὔτε ἐπεμείγνυντο ἔτι ἀκηρυκτεὶ παρ' ἀλλήλους καταστάντες τε ἔνυχάς ἐπολέμουν γέγραπται δὲ ἔξῆς ὡς ἔκαστα ἐγίγνετο κατὰ θέρος καὶ χειμῶνα.
- 2. 1. ἅμα ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ [*plus* the formal dating by archon, etc.].
- 4. 2. τελευτῶντος τοῦ μηνὸς τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν.
- 19. 1. θέρους καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος. *iibid.* μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταιᾷ γενόμενα ἡμέρᾳ ὁγδοηκοστῇ μάλιστα.
- 28. τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους νουμηνίᾳ κατὰ σελήνην (= August 3, 431 B.C.).
- 31. 1. περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον τοῦ θ. τούτου.
- 32. τοῦ θ. τούτου τελευτῶντος — —. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θ. τ. — — ἐγένετο.
- 33. 1. τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος.
- 47. 1-2. ἐν τῷ χ. τ.· καὶ διελθόντος αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἔτος τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐτελεύτα.

τοῦ δὲ θ. εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου.

- 67. 1. τοῦ αὐτοῦ θ. τελ.
- 68. 9-69. 1. τοσαῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θ. ἐγ. τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. χ. .
- 70. 4-71. 1. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ χ. ἐγ., καὶ δεύτερον ἔτος ἐτελ. τῷ π. τ. δν Θουκυδίδης ἔνεγραψεν.

APPENDIX

τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. θ.

78. 2. περὶ ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολάς (= c. September 20,
429 B.C.).

79. 1. τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θ. --- ἀκμάζοντος τοῦ σίτου.¹

92. 7-93. 1. τὸ θ. ἐτελ. --- ἀρχ. τοῦ χ.

103. 1-2-iii. 1. 1. ἄμα ἦρι.² --- ὁ χ. ἐτελ. οὗτος, καὶ τρίτον ἔτος τῷ
END OF YEAR 3. π. ἐτελ. τ. δν Θ. ξ.

τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. θ. --- ἄμα τῷ σίτῳ ἀκμάζοντι.

(iii. 8. 1. ἦν δὲ Ὁλυμπίας ἢ Δωριεύς, κ.τ.λ. = c. August 1,
428 B.C.)

15. 2. ἐν καρποῦ ἔνυγκομιδῆ.

18. 3. περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον ἥδη.

18. 5. ὁ χ. ἡρχετο γίγνεσθαι.

25. 2-26. 1. ὅ τε χ. ἐτελ. οὗτος, καὶ τέταρτον ἔτος τῷ π. ἐτελ.

END OF YEAR 4. τ. δν Θ. ξ. .

τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. θ.

86. 1. τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θ. τελ.

86. 5-87. 1. καὶ τὸ θ. ἐτελ. τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. χ.

88. 4-89. 1. ὁ χ. ἐτελ., καὶ πέμπτον ἔτος τ. π. ἐτελ. τ. δν Θ. ξ.

END OF YEAR 5.

τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. θ.

100. 1-2. τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θ. --- καὶ --- περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον.

102. 7-103. 1. τὸ θ. ἐτελ. --- τοῦ ἐπιγ. χ.

115. 6-116. 1, 3- τελευτῶντος τ. χ. --- περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἕαρ τοῦτο ---

iv. 1. 1. ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τ. χ. τ. ἐγένετο, καὶ ἔκτον ἔ. τ.
π. ἐτελ. τ. δν Θ. ξ.³

END OF YEAR 6.

τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. θ. περὶ σίτου ἐκβολήν.

iv. 2. 1. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ ἥρος, πρὶν τὸν
σῖτον ἐν ἀκμῇ εἶναι.

6. 1. πρὼ ἐσβαλόντες καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἔτι χλωροῦ ὅντος.

49. τελ. τ. θ. --- καὶ τ. θ. ἐτελ.

50. 1. τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. χ.

51-52. 1. ὁ χ. ἐτελ., καὶ ἔβδομον ἔ. τ. π. ἐτελ. τ. δν Θ. ξ.

END OF YEAR 7.

¹ C. 79. 1 expressly returns to the time of 71. 1, the Peloponnesian march against Plataia. 78. 2 is the end of all the operations of that campaign.

² See below, p. 704.

³ For the apparent inconsequence, see below, p. 704.

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τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. θ. εὐθύς.

52. I. τοῦ ἡλίου ἐκλιπέσ τι ἐγένετο περὶ νουμηνίαν
(= March 21, 424 B.C.).

53. I. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει (after c. May 10, 424 B.C.: see n. ad loc.).

88. 2-89. I. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τ. θ. τ. ἐγένετο. τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. χ. εὐθύς ἀρχ.

116. 3. τοῦ χ. διελθόντος ὅγδοον ἔ. ἐτελ. τ. π.

END OF YEAR 8.

117. I, 118. I2. ἄμα ἦρι τοῦ ἐπιγ. θ. εὐθύς (= Elaphebolion 14 = c. March 24, 423 B.C.?).

133. I-3. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θ. --- ἔτη δὲ ἡ Χρυσὸς τοῦ π. τ. ἐπέλαβεν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἕνατον ἐκ μέσου, ὅτε ἐπεφύγει.

133. 4-134. I. τοῦ θ. ἥδη τελ. --- ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπιόντι χ.

135. I. τοῦ αὐτοῦ χ. --- τελ. καὶ πρὸς ἕαρ ἥδη.¹

2. ὁ χ. ἐτελ. καὶ ἕνατον ἔ. τ. π. ἐτελ. τ. δὲ Θ. ξ.

END OF YEAR 9.

V. I. I. τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. θ. αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο (= Elaphebolion 13).

I. I-2. I. μέχρι Πυθίων (= c. mid-August, 422 B.C.) --- μετὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν.

I2. I-2. τοῦ θ. τελ. --- τὸ θ. ἐτελ.

I3. I. τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. χ. εὐθύς.

V. 17. 2, 19. I. τόν τε χειμῶνα τοῦτον --- καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἕαρ ἥδη² (= till Elaphebolion 24).

20. I-3. τελ. τ. χ. ἄμα ἦρι,² ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθύς τῶν ἀστικῶν.

END OF YEAR 10.

24. 2. τὸ θέρος ἥρχε τοῦ ἑνδεκάτου ἔτους. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δέκα ἔτη ὁ πρῶτος πόλεμος ξυνεχῶς γενόμενος γέγραπται.

We add to this that twice in later books, vii. 16. 2 and viii. 39. I, Thucydides uses the winter solstice, *περὶ ἡλίου τροπάς*, as an indication of time. See below, p. 711.

To the first of the three questions put above there is only one answer: his is a solar year, as Böckh and other early scholars had seen. The seasons, spring, summer, autumn, winter, are determined by the sun, not by the moon; and the question is only put because there have been some who have suggested lunar dates, for example, the last full moon before the spring equinox or the first after it for the beginning of Thucydides' summer.³ This is not possible, if for

¹ See below, p. 705.

² See below, p. 704.

³ E.g. E. H. O. Müller (cited above, p. 684); G. F. Unger, *Zeitrechnung* (Müller's

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no other reason, because it would fail precisely in what Thucydides claims to be an advantage of his system—the calculation of the length of the war to within a few days (20. 3).

Another preliminary point may be made: we may be reasonably sure that Thucydides was not the first to use this method, 'by summers and winters', for history; or if he was the first to use it for history, others must have established it for another purpose, e.g. for manuals of agriculture, in such a manner that it would be well known to his readers. The fact that he nowhere explains it, though he defends it against other systems, and can assume that every one will know that besides 'summers and winters' there may be 'spring' and 'autumn', and that these two are only parts of his summer, is sufficient to show this. (See n. on ἄμα ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ, ii. 2. 1, and iv. 1. 1, 2. 1.) This suggests as well that, though he does not say that his year begins at a fixed time in the solar year, he may mean it, and, again, supposes that his readers will know what the time is. See Steup, *Einleitung* (to Thuc. i), pp. lvii–lviii; Busolt, iii. p. 688.

In this respect we must not be misled by the observation that Thucydides nowhere dates an event so many *days* before or after the beginning of spring or of summer or winter, into arguing that, therefore, there was no fixed day (or period) for such beginning. The Olympiad of 428 began and ended on fixed dates which Thucydides could have stated in the terms of another calendar had he wished; but he does not tell us how many days before the beginning of the festival the Mytilenean envoys arrived at Sparta, nor how many days after it ended Mytilene was received into the Peloponnesian alliance (iii. 8). And the Peace of Nikias was exactly dated, and Thucydides adds that it was 'signed' ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθύς; but of the subsequent alliance between Sparta and Athens, also exactly dated, we are only told that it occurred οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον (v. 24. 2; with, indeed, a resultant ambiguity: see n. there). Nor must we suppose that, because his main purpose, very often, in giving an indication of the season is to explain an action, or to give one aspect of it, *therefore* he had no fixed dates for the seasons in mind: τελευτῶντος τοῦ μηνός, ii. 4. 2, means that the Thebans had chosen a dark night, not that the day was c. Anthesterion 28 in the archonship of Pythodoros; θέρους καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος, ii. 19. 1, that the weather was warm and dry and that the invading Peloponnesians would be able to deprive the Athenians of much of their wheat and barley and harvest it for themselves if they wished; and δλίγον πρὸ τρυγήτον, iv. 84. 1, that the Akanthians would suffer a great loss if they shut themselves up behind their walls and resisted Brasidas (as they might successfully have done), and this greatly influenced their vote.

Handbuch, i) even suggested the Attic civil and religious calendar. See Busolt, iii. 675–93, for a summary of various theories and sensible criticism.

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But this proves nothing about the exactness of the Thucydidean seasons; ii. 19. 1 is dated within a day or two to 80 days after Anthesterion 28 or 29.

Meritt, in *Ath. Cal.*, p. 109, said that these seasons were "elastic. θέρος comprised also spring (iv. 117) and fall (ii. 31), although spring and fall were transition periods and sometimes associated with the winter half of the year (v. 20). It may indeed be assumed that these periods were determined by the phenomena of the solar year, warmth and cold, growth and harvest of crops, etc., though it would again be a forced interpretation to attempt the equation of any of the seasons with definite dates in the solar or the civil [i.e. lunar] years". The objection to this view is that either, in the genial climate of Attica and the much less genial climate of Thrace, these "phenomena of the solar year" did not vary in date from year to year by more than a day or two, in which case we are just where we were—with practically fixed solar seasons—or, if they could vary much more, Thucydides' argument that his system of dating by seasons enables him to state the length of the ten years' war exactly, falls to the ground. From the fact that a season, or part of one, is 'transitional', it does not follow that it has no fixed limits (e.g. 'from the September equinox to the setting of the Pleiads', or whatever it might be, for the autumn); or, if we prefer it, since spring and autumn are included in the summer (below, p. 705), we may say that only the beginning of spring, which is the same as the beginning of summer in Thucydides' military sense, and only the end of autumn, which is the same as the end of summer, are fixed, and the end of spring and the beginning of autumn not.¹ In Greece, of course, spring, summer, and autumn do belong together, for soldiers as for farmers, and are separate from the winter.

Soldiers, it is true, must observe not only the seasons of the year but the weather of a day; an enterprise planned to take place 'ten days after the beginning of spring' may have to be postponed for a day or a week, or, if the 'bad weather' is an earthquake, abandoned altogether. So, yet more clearly, must farmers; they cannot be sure within two or three days when they can begin ploughing in the autumn. That did not prevent Hesiod from giving exact dates for the instruction of those who would farm wisely, by the close observation of the movements of certain stars (below, pp. 708–10).

Furthermore, apart from phrases like *τοῦ χειμῶνος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου*

¹ On p. 108 Meritt had said, of the calculation of the length of the whole war (v. 26. 1–3), "whether Thucydides reckoned by the actual solar year, or the senatorial year, or by the civil year, or merely by summers and winters, as he himself says he reckoned (v. 20), this period of time amounts to 27 years and some additional days". This conclusion is true (see below, p. 713); but "by summers and winters" is the same thing as "by solar years", which consist of summers and winters.

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(iv. 89. 1) and the division of the narrative of an unimportant event between summer and winter (v. 12. 2, 13. 1), there is another pointer towards exact dating, at iii. 116. In the previous sentence, 115. 6, we are told of the arrival of Pythodoros in Sicily with a few Athenian ships *τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος*, and of a small and unsuccessful action by him; then, *περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦτο*, Mt. Etna erupted. After this comes the usual formula about the end of the year, followed by the formula for the beginning of the next summer (iii. 116. 3, iv. 1. 1: see above, p. 700). The reason for this superficially illogical writing is clear: Thucydides did not want to begin a new 'book' with the mention of an incident, the eruption of Etna, which, worth recording for its own sake, had nothing to do with the war; it was best to tuck it away at the end of a 'book', even if that meant, strictly, putting it in its wrong year: especially here, since there is an interval of some length before the next event to be mentioned, which occurred in the spring (iv. 2. 1), but *περὶ σίτου ἐκβολῆν* (1. 1), which would be c. April 20 or a little earlier. But, had the date marking the end of the winter and the beginning of summer, or of spring as part of the summer, been in fact movable by Thucydides' system (e.g. as Meritt suggests, had this spring of 425 been, in Sicily at least, exceptionally cold and "late"), there was no reason why he should not have extended his winter and said, in so many words, that the eruption took place at the end of it, and thus have avoided the apparent contradiction.

In ii. 103. 1-2 there is another apparent inconsequence, *ἄμα ἦρι κατέπλευσαν* followed by *δὲ χειμῶν ἐτελεύτα*; but here the explanation is easy: Phormion left Akarnania before the winter ended, and did not reach Athens till the beginning of spring; it was one operation. Similarly in the more important case of v. 17. 2 and 20. 1, together with 24. 2: it is not that spring is any more closely associated with winter here than in the record of any other year; but that, first, the negotiations and final settlement of the treaty of peace took place over a period which began before the end of winter and extended into the spring (and is expressed in this way, *τοῦ τε χειμῶνος τούτου --- καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔαρ ἦδη* and *τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἄμα ἦρι*, just because there was, formally, a fixed dividing line between winter and spring); and, secondly, because, as explained above, the treaty of alliance was, in the historian's opinion, so closely associated with the peace—and had followed so soon after, and was to be reaffirmed each year at the same time probably as the peace-treaty—that he decided that the usual division of his narrative, *δὲ χειμῶν ἐτελεύτα*, did not here fit with the division of events. Normally it did, for the spring of the year was the time for the opening of another campaigning season; but not always—not, for example, between v. 116 and vi. 1 or between vii. 87 and viii. 1—and particularly not here.

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In iv. 135. 1, an action which was not at all prolonged, a matter of hours only, is described as taking place *τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος* — *τελευτῶντος καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ ηδη* (which is followed a few lines later by *καὶ ὁ χειμῶν ἐτελεύτα*) ; this means simply that it took place at the turn of the year, perhaps, if Thucydides had very accurate information, which he may have had of this action, on the very last day of his year. See, too, v. 39. 3 and 40. 1.

That the spring is formally part of the Thucydidean summer, and begins when winter ends, is seen from iv. 1. 1-2. 1, 117. 1, 135. 1, and v. 17. 2 ; that the autumn is also formally part of his summer, and ends when winter begins, is seen from ii. 31. 1-32, iii. 18. 3-5, 100. 2-102. 7. All of these passages are quoted in the table given above.

We must remember that c. 20 of book v contains two statements : the first, simply, that the Archidamian war lasted just ten years and a few days; the second, Thucydides' defence of his system of dating by summers and winters, one advantage of which, over dating by archons or other magistrates, is that it enables him to give the length of the war exactly, within a limit of a few days. If *ὅλγαι ἡμέραι* could mean anything up to 30 or 35 days or more, there is no advantage in his system ; for, in any period of c. 4 or 6 or 10 years the lunar calendar would be equally accurate—Elaphebolion 1st to Elaphebolion 1st would also be 'just four or six or ten years plus or minus a few days', if 'a few' may mean any number up to 30 or 35.

If the argument as stated is sound, Thucydides meant by the first and last days of summer a fixed time of the solar year, the same every year. It was one familiar to and accepted by his readers ; hence he does not say what the dates were. From the evidence we can reduce the area of uncertainty. (1) 'The beginning of spring' in 431 B.C. (ii. 2. 1) was shortly before, perhaps the day before, a new moon (ii. 4. 2 : cf. n. on iii. 56. 2);¹ this must be the new moon of March 10, not that of April 8, unless we emend *όγδοηκοστῆ* of ii. 19. 1 to *πεντηκοστῆ*, for the Attic harvest begins about the last week of May, not of June (see also nn. on ii. 23. 2-3). (2) The eclipse of iv. 52. 1 occurred on March 21, 424, and this was 'at once in the ensuing summer'. (3) In 423 the year's truce was made 'with the coming of spring at once in the ensuing summer', iv. 117. 1 ; and this truce came into force on Elaphebolion 14 (118. 12), which in 423, according to Meritt, was about March 24 (Meritt, *A.F.D.*, p. 178). (4) The truce was to last a year, *ἐνιαυτόν* (118. 12), which was of course a lunar year, and would end, therefore, on Elaphebolion 13 in 422, which, if 423-422 was an ordinary year, as it almost certainly was (Meritt, p. 176), was

¹ The observed new moon, that is, not the astronomical new moon, if on this occasion there was a difference.

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about March 11 of the solar year;¹ in v. 1. 1 (see n. there) this is said to be in the ensuing summer (above, p. 701). We conclude, therefore, that by the Greek convention spring, that is, by Thucydides' convention, summer also, began not later than the first week of March in the Julian calendar.

The date for the end of Thucydides' summer cannot be thus precisely determined. (1) We know that the heliacal rising of Arktouros, which is about September 20, was within the summer (ii. 78. 2); this was the date when the circumvallation of Plataia by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians was completed. Thucydides at this point in his narrative goes back to the time in that year when the Peloponnesians first invaded Plataia in order to relate the Spartolos campaign (71. 1, 79. 1); it was *τοῦ σίρου ἀκμάζοντος*, i.e. towards the end of May, or early in June if he is thinking particularly of harvest time in the Chalkidic peninsula. This is followed by the campaign of the Peloponnesians in Akarnania and the subsequent battles at sea off Naupaktos; when these are over, the defeated Peloponnesian fleet retires to Corinth, and, before dispersing, *ἀρχομένου τοῦ χειμῶνος*, plan the attack on Peiraeus (ii. 93. 1). (2) The Athenians invaded the Megarid *περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον* in 431 (ii. 31. 1), but no long time need have elapsed between this and the beginning of winter (33. 1). (3) A longer time would have been required for the operations of Paches at Mytilene, in his circumvallation of the town, between his departure from Athens *περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον ἥδη ἀρχόμενον* and the beginning of winter (iii. 18. 3–5), and for (4) the campaign of the Peloponnesians in Ozolian Lokris in 426 (iii. 100. 2–102. 7). (5) vii. 8, 10 and 16. 2 (*περὶ ἡλίου τροπὰς τὰς χειμερινάς*) make it clear that winter could hardly have begun before November 1 (see Busolt, iii. p. 683).² We might assume that the autumn began at the equinox or at the heliacal rising of Arktouros; but we cannot be very precise about the date of the end of the summer and the beginning of winter: not earlier than November 1, but not much later is all that on this evidence we can reasonably say.

¹ Assuming, that is, that there was also no intercalation of odd days, of the kind that Pritchett and Neugebauer think was often done, either for political reasons or to correct past errors. There were errors in the Attic calendar about this time (below, pp. 713–15).

It is now thought that intercalation, both of months in the normal way, and of odd days, was not predictable many months before the event. Since it took place in different years in different states, as well as by differing systems, it would be interesting to know whether, in agreeing to a truce for a year, or for that matter to a peace of thirty or fifty years, precautions were taken to secure common understanding of the date when the agreement was to end. Thucydides, iv. 122. 6 (on the date of the revolt of Skione), implies that, though there was dispute about its date and that of the year's truce, the latter was clearly ascertainable everywhere in Greece.

² I do not think that such definite conclusions can be drawn from vii. 50. 4 (Aug. 27, 413 B.C.) and viii. 1. 4 as Busolt, iii. p. 684, and others have thought.

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In order to see whether we may make a probable conjecture about the precise dates of the Thucydidean seasons (which we take to be dates known to his readers), we must look at other writers—ignoring of course those that use the varying lunar, or rather lunisolar, calendar ('spring begins on Anthesterion 1'), and only mentioning by the way the more regular but still varying natural phenomena ('spring begins with the coming of the swallows' --- ἴδον χελιδών ἔαρ ηδη).¹

Herodotus gives no clue to date his seasons precisely, though his phrases are often like those of Thucydides, and he may mean the same: τὸν χειμῶνα παρεὶς ὅμα τῷ ἡρὶ στρατεύειν (i. 77. 3), χειμερίσας περὶ Μῆλητον τῷ δευτέρῳ ἔτει, κ.τ.λ. (vi. 31. 1: cf. vii. 37. 1, viii. 113. 1, 130. 1; and ii. 75. 3 for natural history); τὸ φθινόπωρον, ix. 117, pointing to the end of the campaigning season, and iv. 43, the season for sowing (see below, p. 708). In the Hippocratic treatise, however, περὶ διάτης, iii. 1 (68. 10 Loeb: it may date from the last quarter of the fifth century—W. H. S. Jones, *ibid.*, vol. iv, pp. xlvi, liii), we read, τὸν μὲν οὖν ἐναυτὸν ἐς τέσσαρα μέρεα διαιρέω, ἀπέρ μάλιστα γινώσκουσιν οἱ πολλοί, χειμῶνα, ἥρ., θέρος, φθινόπωρον· χειμῶνα μὲν ἀπὸ πλειάδων δύσιος (= c. Nov. 6) ἀχρι ἵσημερίνης ἡμερινῆς (= March 24), ἥρ. δὲ ἀπὸ ἵσημερίνης μέχρι πλειάδων ἐπιτολῆς (= c. May 12), θέρος δὲ ἀπὸ πλειάδων μέχρι ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολῆς (= c. Sept. 20), φθινόπωρον δὲ ἀπὸ ἀρκτούρου μέχρι πλειάδων δύσιος. Elsewhere, too, the Hippocratic writings use observed stellar movements for dating, as *Epidemiae*, i. 3. 13 (vol. i, p. 164, Jones). Aristotle also, *Probl.* 20. 6, gives the spring equinox as the dividing line between winter and summer. These are all fixed dates—at least as fixed as ordinary human observation could make them—and since 'the majority recognize them', it would be easy if we could accept them as those of Thucydides, as Stahl does (appendix to his vol. i); but it is clear from the table given above that, without emending, we cannot take the March equinox to be the beginning of his spring (see ii. 2. 1 and 19. 1, iv. 52. 1), though May 12 may be the beginning of summer (ii. 19. 1); either the rising of Arktouros (ii. 78. 2 and 92. 7) or the September equinox may mark the division between summer and autumn; and, as shown above, c. November 6 will fit Thucydides for the beginning of winter. Other writers, e.g. Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* vi. 569 b 3, and Theophrastos, *Sign.* 2, use the autumn rising of Arktouros as a limit, Aristotle interestingly giving the other limit as "the spring", just as in ix. 633 a 11 (the migration of cuckoos) he gives the rising of the dog-star and the spring as limits, without saying what he means by "the spring", though implying that it begins on a fixed day; or it may be the popular usage, like the six months of pasturage in the

¹ Unger's *Zeitrechnung* gives a full account of Greek theories, both popular and scientific, by both lunar and solar calendars.

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mountains from spring to Arktouros in *O.T.* 1187. Theophrastos, *Sign.* 6, divides the year into approximately equal halves, from the rising to the setting of the Pleiads (*c.* May 12 to *c.* Nov. 6), which puts the spring in the winter half, *τὸ θέρος* marking the commencement of *τὸ θεριζεῖν*, the harvest, with the cutting of barley, wheat, and oats. The autumn rising of Arktouros is near the end of the Greek harvest—the vintage and the gathering of figs and olives.

This is made clearer by Hesiod.¹ In *Works and Days*, 383–91, the farmer is told to sharpen his sickle for the corn-harvest when the Pleiads rise, and to sow when they set:

οὐτός τοι πεδίων πέλεται νόμος, οἵ τε θαλάσσης
ἔγγύθι ναιετάουσ' οἵ τ' ἄγκεα βησσήντα
πόντου κυμαίνοντος ἀπόπροθι, πίονα χῶρον,
ναίοντοι.

Works and Days is of especial interest in this connexion because it includes popular observations, as of migrations of birds, and popular superstitions, as well as astronomical phenomena which can be dated, most of them, within a day or two.² Thus (with astronomical dates printed in italics): 414 ff., when autumn rains come (*i.e.* generally the last days of September or the first of October: it is not yet winter), cut timber for wagons and ploughs; 448 ff., watch for the voice of the crane, it is the sign for ploughing and sowing (see below, 609 ff.);³ 479 ff., do not wait for the *winter solstice* to plough—but if you do, there may be a remedy, if, after the first hearing of the cuckoo which delights the heart of men, it rains on the third day (so Mair; others, less probably, for three days after); 504 ff., avoid the rainy month, Lenaion (“February Fill-dyke”: this appears to be the one reference to the lunar calendar, by which Lenaion would not always be the rainy month, however regular the weather, and even with systematic intercalation);⁴ 564 ff., *sixty days after the winter solstice* (*i.e.* *c.* Feb. 20) Zeus finishes the days of winter, and *Arktouros rises in the evening*; then the swallow comes, *ἔπος νέον ισταμένοι*, and you must finish pruning your vines before she arrives; 571 ff., when *φερέοικος* begins to climb the plants, *fleeing from the Pleiads* (*c.* May 12: cf. 385 ff.), it is time to sharpen sickles for the harvest, *ἄρη ἐν ἀμήτοι, ὅτε τ' ἡέλιος χρόα κάρφει*; 582 ff., the artichoke is in bloom and the cicada chatters, *θέρεος καματώδεος ἄρη*, and at the rising of Orion (*c.* June 23) threshing must be done; 609 ff., *Orion and Sirios in mid-heaven, and with the rising of Arktouros* (*c.* Sept. 20), it is vintage time; and later when the Pleiades, the Hyades and Orion

¹ See Mair's appendix to his translation (Oxford, 1908) for an account of the calendar; and especially H. L. Lorimer in *B.S.A.*, xlvi, 1951, 86–101.

² For the Homeric comparisons, see Mair, p. 107.

³ Cf. *Theognis*, 1197 ff.; *Ar. Birds*, 710; *Theokr.* x. 31; *Aratos, Phainom.* 1075.

⁴ See G. Thomson pp. 58–59 (below, p. 711 n.).

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set (c. Nov. 6) it is time to plough and sow.¹ Then for going to sea (if you wish to go to sea): 618 ff., lay up your boat, and stow away the rigging *after the setting of the Pleiads*, when the winds blow hard, and wait for ὥραν πλόον; 663 ff., the best time for sailing is *the 50 days after the summer solstice*, before the vintage and the autumn rains and winter winds; 678, you may sail in the spring, after the first leaves are seen at the top of the fig-tree, but this is not so good.

Among Thucydides' formulae, ἀμα ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ corresponds to Hesiod's ἔπος νέον ἴσταμένοι (569), his θέρους καὶ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος το ὥρῃ ἐν ἀμήτοι, ὅτε τ' ἡέλιος χρόα κάρφει (575), not to θέρεος καμάτωδεος ὥρῃ (584). His spring (and so his summer in its wider sense) may thus begin with the acronychal rising of Arktouros; this was observable c. Feb. 25, but the astronomical date, known apparently to Euktemon in the last third of the fifth century (Unger, p. 722), is March 4, which would suit Thucydides rather better. The end of spring may be the rising of the Pleiads early in May, the beginning of autumn the rising of Arktouros; the beginning of winter c. Nov. 6 suits Thucydides' narrative well. This was L. Holzapfel's view, *Berliner Studien*, vii, 1888, 58 ff., though I would express Thucydides' attitude to popular thought rather differently. He followed, that is, the popular view that spring and summer lasted the seven months from (by our calendar) about the end of February to about the end of September, conveniently expressed as from the acronychal to the heliacal rising of Arktouros, because this was known and was, for Greece, accurate, covering all agricultural operations from the pruning and hoeing of vines to the gathering of the later fruits, grapes, figs, and olives; and as well the other popular view, equally accurate, that the autumn, μετοπωρινὸς χρόνος or φθινόπωρον, 'the season after the fruits', belonged to this main division of the year, for it continued till the normal time of ploughing and sowing of wheat, barley, and oats, which is near the setting of the Pleiads, and only after that did the rough season of winter, the slack time for the farmer, begin. It corresponded as well with other natural phenomena, which are nearly as regular in Greece, the migrations of birds and the coming of the autumn rains; flowers, especially almond and peach blossom, may appear before the end of February. Thucydides adopted this system because this whole period of a little over eight months corresponded to the normal season for warfare on land and sea and to sailing in general, though he knew well enough that both land and sea operations might be and were carried on during the winter. What we do not know is his *exact* dating—especially for the beginning of spring, for example, whether he was

¹ Cf. Xen. *Oikos*. 17. 1-2, in the autumn, μετοπωρινὸς χρόνος, when the rains come, and men have always known that it is soon time to sow.

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following popular or astronomical calculation for the late rising of Arktouros; but if the astronomers had made an accurate, or fairly accurate, calculation, and this had been published, his attitude towards it would have been like that towards the astronomers' account of eclipses: he accepts the most recent discovery (ii. 28). The only difference, a slight one, will be (if his date for the late rising of Arktouros is March 4, or near it, rather than Feb. 24) that we may be sure this had been accepted by some writers before him, whereas he draws attention to the lunar time of the eclipse.

This gives for the summer about two-thirds of the solar year and for winter one-third. We must not, however, bring this into close relationship with 'the four winter months' of vi. 21. 2: these are, of course, lunar months, and therefore not an exact third of the solar year, or a close approximation to it; and the statement made about them, that not even a messenger could get through between Sicily and Athens during their passing, is rhetorical, not intended to be exact, and in fact, not at all true (see vi. 7. 1 and 8. 1; iii. 115. 1-2; vii. 16. 2: n. on vi. 21. 2).

There are, however, three difficulties in the way of immediate acceptance of the above calculation of the divisions of the Thucydidean year. The first is the wording of v. 20. 3, *κατὰ θέρη δὲ καὶ χειμῶνας ἀριθμῶν* ---, *ἐξ ἡμισείας ἐκατέρου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντος*, which certainly gives a first impression that summer and winter are calculated to be of equal length (e.g. from equinox to equinox) and together to make up a year: literally, 'each division having its force from half of the year'. But such great difficulties would be met if we supposed that Thucydides meant his summer and winter to be equal halves of the year, that it is easier to regard the artificial mode of expression (*ἐξ ἡμισείας τὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντος*) to be used because *ἡμισείας* is here not exact. It need only be said here that two of our fixed dates, the eclipse of March 21, 424, and the rising of Arktouros in 429, both within the Thucydidean summer, would be at the extreme limits if the summer were only six months, and the Theban attack on Plataia, if it took place c. 80 days before the invasion of Attica, would belong to the winter. It makes, of course, no difference to the particular argument of v. 20. 3, which is that 'since the events that I have related fall into 10 summers and 10 winters (with a few days over), from *ἄμα* *ἡρι* *ἀρχομένω* of ii. 2. 1 to *τελευτῶντος* *τοῦ χειμῶνος* *ἄμα* *ἡρι* of v. 20. 1, the whole war lasted just 10 years (*plus* a few days): i.e. $(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2})$ or $(\frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3})$ or $\frac{247}{365} + \frac{118}{365} \times 10 = 10$; whereas had I only named the eleven archonships during which these events took place, from Pythodoros (ii. 2. 1) to Alkaios (v. 25. 1), no such accurate calculation could have been made'.¹

¹ Stahl, p. 245 of the Appendix to his vol. i, gives instances of loose uses of *τὸ ημισυ* in Greek. Some, as Hesiod's *πλέον ημισυ παντός*, and Plat. *Rep.* x. 601 C, are

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The second difficulty is that of the interval between viii. 39. 1 (the winter solstice of 412 B.C., Dec. 24) and the end of the winter, 60. 3. This, according to 44. 4, was one of 80 days *plus* those taken by the events of 39-42; a total of 95 days (the minimum, it would seem) brings us to March 29, 100 days, which is perhaps more probable, to April 3. If we could reduce the total to 90, we could just make the end of winter the equinox (above, p. 705); but it would still be inconsistent with iv. 42. 1 (the eclipse of March 21) and with the date of the Theban attack on Plataia unless in ii. 19. 1 we emend *όγδοηκοστή* to *πεντηκοστή*. The problem will be discussed ad loc.; here we need only record that Wilamowitz conjectured *πεντήκοντα* for *όγδοήκοντα* in viii. 44. 4; and that to emend, or to assume a slip by the author, so as to make the 80 days cover the whole period from 39. 1 to 60. 3, would give us March 14, still 5 or 6 days later than the (so important) date of the attack on Plataia. A difficulty of another kind, at vi. 94. 1-3, explained easily by the adherents of elastic seasons (Beloch, ii. 2. 15-16), will also be discussed in the next volume.

The third difficulty is the most important. The patient and exacting labours of modern scholars¹ have led them to the conclusion that the year 423-422 was ordinary and 422-421 intercalary in Athens hardly parallel to Thucydides here; but *Soph.* 221 B and *Politikos*, 282 B are similar. Demosthenes, xix. 277, 'a statesman should not be only half honest', is not the same.

¹ Especially in more recent years Meritt in *Ath. Cal.* and *A.F.D.*, Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens*, 1931, and Pritchett-Neugebauer. See also G. Thomson, *J.H.S.* lxiii, 1943, 52-65 (who ignores Meritt, and is in turn ignored by Pritchett-Neugebauer).

I am not at all able to criticize them; but I will mention a doubt on one argument which is important for our present problem. The proof that 425-424 B.C. was an ordinary year depends (if I have followed the argument accurately) on the statement of the scholiast on *Clouds*, 584, that the eclipse of the moon of Oct. 9, 425, ἐγένετο τῷ προτέρῳ ἔτει ἐπὶ Στρατοκλέους Βοηδρομῶν. By certain calculations Meritt, *Ath. Cal.* 89-90, shows that had 425-424 been intercalary, the eclipse would have occurred in Pyanepson. I am doubtful about the value, for this purpose, of the scholion: it may be that the true date of the eclipse was known to later scholars by the aid of the astronomers, and that the name of the month was given only on the *assumption* that the year was ordinary, by calculation that is, not because the month was recorded in the tradition. This is in accord with Meritt's argument that 411-410 was intercalary and had 13 months, in spite of Aristotle, *Aθπ.* 33. 1, who says that Mnesilochos was archon for two months of that year and Theopompos 'for the remaining ten'. This figure, says Meritt, p. 96, was probably not in the tradition, but only obtained by subtracting from the conventional twelve; Theopompos must have been archon for eleven months. This is a reasonable argument; and one of the same kind *may* apply also to schol. *Nub.* 584.

The problem is important because, apart from other evidence brought forward by Meritt, if the three successive years, 425-424, 424-423, 423-422 were ordinary (there appears to be no doubt about 424-423 and 423-422), it would be to the last degree improbable, in the absence of direct statement, that 422-421 was also ordinary; and this is, to my mind, crucial for Thucydides.

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(and, therefore, that both years were ordinary in Sparta, and the month Artemisios there followed Gerastios); that is, that 738 days ($2 \times 354 + 30$) passed between Elaphebolion 14, 423, and the same day in 421; and that day in 421 was, therefore, 7 days later in the solar year than in 423 (not 8 days, because 422–421 is a leap year by the Julian calendar). Meritt makes it March 24 in 423 and March 31 in 421. The peace treaty came into force on Elaphebolion 25 (19. 1), which would by this reckoning correspond to April 11. Yet, as pointed out in the n. on v. 19. 1, Thucydides implies by *τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἀμα ἡρι*, v. 20. 1, if anything, a date earlier in the year than is indicated by iv. 116. 3–117. 1, *τοῦ χειμῶνος διελθόντος* —, *οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἀμα ἡρι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους*, not one 18 days later. Moreover, the beginning of the war, the Theban attack on Plataia, took place on March 6 or 7 in 431; by this reckoning, therefore, the war lasted 10 years and 35 or 36 days, and 35–36 is too many for the *ἡμερῶν δλίγων παρενεγκουσῶν* of v. 20. 1 (above, p. 705). Since Thucydides also says in this same passage that the treaty was made *ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθὺς τῶν ἀστικῶν* (i.e. immediately after Elaphebolion 13), and it was to be confirmed yearly probably at the Dionysia in Athens (23. 4 n.), he may have thought—before he had transcribed an exact copy of the document—that the treaty came into force, or at least the war ended, on, say, Elaphebolion 15, which may have been the day when the decree was voted in Athens. This would mean that the war lasted c. 25 days over the ten years; but even 25 are too many for *ἡμερῶν δλίγων*. It would be much easier for the interpreter of Thucydides if, as some earlier scholars had thought, both years, 423–422 and 422–421, were ordinary in Athens (and one of them intercalary in Sparta, and therefore Artemisios preceded Gerastios—this last point depends on our reconstruction of the Athenian calendar in these two years; it is not independently known): then Elaphebolion 25, 421, would be about March 12 instead of April 11 (if we accept Meritt's other calculations), i.e. c. 12 days earlier in the solar year than Elaphebolion 14, 423, and the length of the Archidamian war 10 years plus 4 or 5 days. These figures would suit Thucydides' language in both these passages very well; and I cannot agree with Meritt, *Ath. Cal.* 109, that “this date [Elaphebolion 25 = April 9 (revised to April 11 in *A.F.D.* 178)] agrees perfectly with the evidence of Thucydides as to the time of the year”. Whether v. 26. 3, the 27 years and a few days of the whole war, can be similarly explained is another question, which will be discussed in the note there.

Here let me repeat: the argument that “chronological difficulties have been created by the attempt to make it [the text of Thucydides] conform to a rigid calendar scheme” (*Ath. Cal.* 108), that “Thukydides wollte keine beengenden chronologischen Schranken” (Beloch,

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ii. 2. 228–9), fails because it is the historian himself who is rigid: rigid not only in his statement of fact, of the length of the ten years' war, but in his defence of his system. If his summers and winters were elastic, and if Meritt's dates for the beginning and end of the war are correct, Thucydides is misleading about the facts and misleading only in order to twist the facts to his (in itself quite unimportant) view of a war of just ten years and a few days. I find this hard to believe.

The opinion that Thucydides' year, like Hesiod's, was solar, and as exact as observation of the sun and of certain stars could at that time make it, is not at all inconsistent with supposing that when he was dealing with the past, and with long periods of time, he used the normal method of his day, namely archon-years, the lunisolar calendar: when he is stating the period of the Plataian-Athenian alliance (iii. 68. 5), or of the democracy at Athens (viii. 68. 4), or the dates of the attempts to found a colony at Ennea Hodoi (iv. 102. 2–3), he is not concerned with establishing their accuracy within a few days, nor in all probability could he have done so; and, secondly, since the Greeks, though all of them using a lunar calendar, yet by means of intercalation of a month at intervals calculated with greater or smaller skill, were always bringing it into line with the solar year, 100 years, or 93 years, and even the 27 years of the Peloponnesian war, were approximately of the same length by whichever of the two calendars it was calculated. Thucydides naturally in such cases used the method most readily to hand, known to most of his readers, and officially established.

A quite different, and less intractable and for us less important problem, is that of the state of the official calendar at Athens at this time, c. 424 to 421 B.C.: see *Ath. Cal.* 104–5; *A.F.D.* 149–51; and Pritchett–Neugebauer, chap. i, for the general problems involved. It is clear from iv. 118. 12 and 119. 1, where Elaphebolion 14 is the same day as Gerastios 12, that in the spring of 423 either the Athenian or the Spartan calendar was out of step with the moon by two days, or that both were, by more or less than two days; and it is equally clear from the equation Elaphebolion 25 = Artemisios 27 in v. 19. 1 (the Attic calendar now behind instead of in front of the Spartan) that a correction, more or less accurate, had been made in one or other or in both cities by 421. We know also from Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 607–26, and from the learned-looking scholion on 623, that in 423 B.C. the Attic calendar was out of step with the moon: just when the gods, by Selene's true time, of course, were ready for a feast the Athenians held no festival, but were busy with their work in the law-courts; and when the citizens *were* offering sacrifice and keeping holiday, they, the gods, were in mourning for Memnon and fasting; they blamed Selene, who herself now complained to the

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Athenians. A calendar two or three days out will suffice to explain this merry jesting; perhaps too

*ὑμᾶς δ' οὐκ ἄγειν τὰς ἡμέρας
οὐδὲν ὁρθῶς, ἀλλ' ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω κυδοιδοπάν*

implies that variation in the calendar had been common for some years, now behind, now in front of the moon. Some, if not all, of the changes will have been due to attempts to correct past errors; we are not compelled to assume political or other unworthy motives. It will be borne in mind that exact calculation of the time of the new moon was perhaps not attainable in the fifth century (Pritchett-Neugebauer, 10-11),¹ and that visual observation was fallible and dependent on the weather; a lunar year, moreover, of 354 days is short of twelve lunations by 0.36 of a day; variation therefore by one day was always happening, by two days always possible.² In 424-423, as Aristophanes shows, the calendar must have been noticeably out of step.

What happened to cause the further divergence between the Spartan and Attic months in 422-421 is not known. We may guess, perhaps, and it is no more than a guess, that both calendars had been out of step with the moon in 424-423 (the Athenian by four, the Spartan by two days), that the conservative Spartans had remained in their error and the Athenians, aware, we know, of theirs, had corrected it by intercalating four days.³ The jesting in *The Peace*,

¹ Herodotus' statement, ii. 4. 1, "Ελλῆνες μὲν διὰ τρίτου ἔτεος ἐμβόλιμον ἐπεμβάλλουσι τῶν ὥρέων εἰνεκεν, Αἴγυπτοι δὲ τριηκοντημέρους ἄγοντες τοὺς δυώδεκα μῆνας ἐπάγονται ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος πέντε ἡμέρας πάρεξ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ σφὶ ὁ κύκλος τῶν ὥρέων ἐς τὸντὸ περιῶν παραγίνεται," shows that the idea of regular intercalation was a familiar one to the Greeks, but also that either its practice was rough and ready, or Herodotus misunderstood it, even if with Thomson, pp. 58-59, we think that διὰ τρίτου ἔτεος can mean 'every other or every third year'. Herodotus' purpose is not to give the detail of the Greek system, but to contrast the Egyptian system of intercalating five days annually with the Greek of intercalating a month not annually; the superiority of the former, in its much greater simplicity and regularity, is what he had in mind. The Greeks preferred to keep in with the moon, and did not always succeed.

² It is this which explains Thucydides' wording in ii. 28, *νομηριά κατὰ σελήνην, ὥσπερ καὶ μόνον δοκεῖ εἶναι γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν*. It was known well enough that the official day of the new moon was often, unavoidably, at fault, that there was an 'astronomical' new moon. It does not mean that in this year, 431 B.C., in particular the calendar was in confusion.

³ If this was done by a single action, it was presumably decided well in advance of the beginning of the civil year, so that the numbering of the days by backward count, in the last third of, perhaps, more than one month, could be fixed (Pritchett-Neugebauer, 23-25). Later, when the bouleutic year was the same as the civil, if a month was to be intercalated in the normal way, the lengths of the prytanies were arranged accordingly (Pritchett-Neugebauer, 36-37). It is this which makes me doubt whether intercalation of days was as frequent and as arbitrary as Pritchett and Neugebauer think (pp. 14-23); the evidence for the second century B.C. is not necessarily good for the fifth and fourth.

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403–16, equally light-hearted with that in *The Clouds*, differs in this, that now it is the Athenians who complain, and of both the sun and the moon, that, says Hermes, ‘they had been for a long time stealing days and nibbling off something from the cycle’,

ταῦτ’ ἄρα πάλαι τῶν ἡμερῶν παρεκλεπτέτην
καὶ τοῦ κύκλου παρέτρωγον ύφ’ ἀμαρτωλίας.

The use of the dual is noticeable: it seems to imply that with some months shorter than they should be, including the intercalated month or months, both lunar and solar years (or the solar year only, if *τοῦ κύκλου* means the solar cycle) had been short for some time; and, it may be, as the verbs are in the past tense, that this had now been corrected.

We might suppose from *Clouds*, 625–6,

μᾶλλον γὰρ οὕτως εἴσεται
κατὰ σελήνην ὡς ἄγειν χρὴ τοῦ βίου τὰς ἡμέρας,

that Hyperbolos had had something to do with the disturbance of the calendar; perhaps, as hieromnemon in 424–423 (or as candidate for the post if he was not chosen: schol. *ad v. 624*; Meritt, *A.F.D.* 149, n. 1), as conservative as Kleon—‘are we never to have an authoritative calendar?’—he had opposed making the necessary adjustment.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS 431-421 B.C.

<i>Thuc. year</i>	<i>Thuc. season</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Julian year</i>	<i>Athenian Archon</i>
				432 B.C.
				431 B.C. March 6 or 7	PYTHODOROS
1	14 years after Thirty Years' Truce; Pythodorus ἐτι τὸνοτ μῆνα ἀρχοντος, κτλ. ἀμα ἦρι ἀρχ. μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλ. εὐθύς c. 80 days μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλ., θέρους καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμ. ὅντων αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ	Beginning of the War. Attack on Plataia Pel. preparations and attack on Oinoe Invasion of Attica Ath. fleet round Peloponnese	ii. 2. 1 10-18 19. 1 23. 2, 25, 30; I.G. 1.2 296	towards end of May	EUTHYDEMOS
	ὑπὸ τ. α. χρ. τ. τ. α. θ.	Ath. fleet off Lokris Aigina settled from Athens	26, 32 27		
	τ. α. θ., νουμηνίᾳ ἐν τ. α. θ.	Eclipse of the sun Alliance with Sitalkes and Perdikkas	28 29	Aug. 3	
	π. τ. φθινόπωρον τ. ἐπιγ. χειμῶνος	Invasion of Megarid Corinthians in Akarnania	31 33		
	ἐν τ. α. χ.	Epitaphia End of first year <i>Hermippus' Moirai?</i>	34-46 47. 1 —	430 B.C.	[Gamelion or Elaphebolion?]
2	τ. θ. εὐθύς ἀρχ. ὅντων αὐτῶν οὐ πολλάς πω ἡμ. ἐν τῇ Α. ἐπι α. ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ ὅντων ἡμ. τεσσαράκοντα μ.	Pel. invasion of Attica The Pestilence Ath. expedition to Peloponnese Pel. in Attica	47. 2 47. 3-54, 57, 59 56 57		APOLLODOROS
	τ. α. θ.	Ath. exped. to Poteidaia Embassy to Sp.; Pericles' last speech	58 59-64		

Chronological Table (contd.)

<i>Thuc. year</i>	<i>Thuc. season</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Julian year</i>	<i>Athenian Archon</i>
	νῦστερον οὐ πολλῶ τ. α. θ. τ. α. θ. τελ.	Perikles dismissed; and reinstated Pel. fleet ag. Zakynthos Pel. ambassadors to Persia taken	65. 1-4 66 67		
	κ. τ. α. χρ. τ. θ. τελ. τ. ἐπιγ. χ.	Amprakia against Am- philochia Phormion to Naupak- tos	68 69		
	τ. α. χ.	Fall of Poteidaia End of second year <i>Kratinos' Nemesis</i> and <i>Dionysalexandros?</i>	70 70. 4 —	429 B.C.	[Gamelion or Elaphebolion ?]
3	τ. ἐπιγ. θ. τ. α. θ. καὶ ἄμα τῇ τῶν Πλ. ἐπιστρ.	Pel. siege of Plataia Campaign of Spartolos	71-78 79	 EPAMEINON
	τ. α. θ. οὐ π. νῦστερον π. τ. α. ἡμέρας	Pel. exped. to Akar- nania; battle at Stratos Phormion's victory	80-82 83-84 85-92	c. Sept. 20	
	π. ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολάς ἀρχ. τ. χ. ὑ. τ. α. χρ., τ. χ. τ. ἀρχ.	Second battle at sea Circumvallation of Pla- taia completed Death of Perikles Pel. raid on Salamis Thracian invasion of Macedonia	78. 2 65. 6 93-94 95-101		
	τ. α. χ.	Phormion in Akarn- ania; leaves for Athens End of third year	102 103. 1 103. 2	428 B.C.	
4	τ. ἐπιγ. θ., ἄμα τῷ σ. ἀκμ. μετὰ τὴν ἑσθίαν εὐθύς	Pel. invasion of Attica	iii. 1	c. May 20	
	κ. τ. α. χρ. τ. θ. τ.	Secession of Lesbos; Ath. attack at Myti- lene	2-6		
	'Ολυμπιάς	Ath. fleet round Pelo- ponnese	7	 DIOTIMOS
	κ. τ. α. χρ. περὶ τ. φθ. ἀρχ.	Myt. embassy to Pel. Pel. preparations for invasion of Attica; Ath. counter-attack Fighting in Lesbos; Paches sent from Athens	8-14 15-17 18. 1-3	c. mid- August	

Chronological Table (conid.).

Thuc. year	Thuc. season	Event	Reference	Julian year	Athenian Archon
	δέ χρ. ἡρχετο γ.	Mytilene besieged First <i>eisphora</i> at Ath.; tribute-collecting fleet in Karia	18. 4-5 19		
	τελ. α. χρ. τελ. α. χρ. τελ.	Escape from Plataia Salaithos reaches Mytilene from Sparta End of fourth year	20-24 25	427 B.C.	
5	τελ. ἐπιγ. θ.	Pel. fleet to Mytilene Invasion of Attica Surrender of Mytilene	26 27-28		
	ἐνδιέτριψαν, σχολαῖοι κομισθέντες	Pel. fleet reaches Ionia, and returns in haste Paches at Notion and in Lesbos; debate in Athens; second debate Ath. capture Minoa	29-33 34-35 36-50		EUKLES
	ἐν. τελ. α. θ. μετὰ τῆν Δ. ἀλωσιν	Fall of Plataia	51		
	ὑπερβ. τελ. α. χρ. τελ. θ. τ.	<i>Stasis</i> at Kerkyra	52-68		
	τελ. α. θ. τελ.	Ath. fleet to Sicily	69-85		
	τελ. ἐπιγ. χ.	The pestilence returns to Ath.	86		
	τελ. α. χ.	Ath. in Sicily End of fifth year	87 88	426 B.C.	
6	—	<i>Aristophanes' Baby-lonioi</i>	—		[Elaphebolion 10]
	τελ. ἐπιγ. θ.	Earthquakes, etc.	89		
	τελ. α. θ.	Sicily: Messene joins Athens	90		
	τελ. α. θ.	Ath. fleets round Pel. and ag. Melos	91		
	ὑπερβ. τελ. α. χρ.	Sparta establishes colony at Herakleia Trachinia	92-93		
	περιτελ. α. χρ.	Demosthenes with Ath. fleet round Pel. in Akarnania and Aitolia, where he is defeated	94-98		EUTHYNOS
	ὑπερβ. τελ. α. χρ.	Skirmish at Lokroi in Italy	99		
	τελ. α. θ.	Peloponnesians through Ozolian Lokris ag. Naupaktos	100-2		
	τελ. ἐπιγ. χ.	Fighting in Sicily	103		

Chronological Table (contd.)

Thuc. year	Thuc. season	Event	Reference	Julian year	Athenian Archon
	τ. α. χ. τ. α. χ.	Ath. purify Delos Pel. and Amprakiots attack Akarnanians, and are defeated by Demosthenes	104 105-14		
	τ. α. χ. —	Fighting in Sicily. Ath. prepares larger expedition <i>Aristophanes' Acharnians</i> <i>Kratinos' Cheimazomenoi</i> End of sixth year	115 — 116. 3	425 B.C. [Gamelion]	
7	π. α. τ. ἑαρ. τ. ἐπιγ. θ. π. σίτου ἐκβολῆν ν. τ. α. χρ. τ. ὥρος πρὶν τ. σίτου ἐν ἀκμῇ εἶναι	Eruption of Mt. Etna Athens loses Messene Pel. invasion of Attica Ath. fleet leaves for Sicily and takes Pylos on the way Ath. reverse at Eion Spartans fail in attack on Pylos. Ath. naval victory in the harbour Truce and Sp. embassy to Ath. Fighting renewed Fighting in Sicily Siege and capture of Sphakteria	116. 1-2 iv. 1 2. 1 2. 2-6. 2 7 8-14 15-23 24-25 26-40	c. end April .. c. end May (39. 2) c. 20 July (39. 2)	
	κ. τ. α. χρ. ἐν τούτῳ	Ath. attack in Corinthia	42-45	STRATOKLES
	κ. τ. α. χρ.	Ath. fleet from Pylos in Kerkyra; thence to Sicily	46-48		
	ἀμα τελ. τ. θ.	Ath. and Akarnanians take Anaktorion	49		
	— τοῦ ἐπιγ. χ.	<i>Reassessment of tribute</i> Ath. capture Persian ambassador to Sp. Death of Artaxerxes	I.G.i. ² 63 50. 1-2 50. 3		
	τ. α. χ. —	Chios and Athens <i>Aristophanes' Knights</i> <i>Kratinos' Satyrs</i> End of seventh year	51 — 51	424 B.C. [Gamelion]	

Chronological Table (contd.)

Thuc. year	Thuc. season	Event	Reference	Julian year	Athenian Archon
8	τ. ἐπιγ. θ. εὐθύς ἐ. τ. α. θ. τ. α. θ.	Eclipse of the sun Fighting in Aktaia Ath. capture Kythera, and raid Peloponnese Peace conference at Gela: Ath. withdraw from Sicily	52. 1 52. 2-3 53-57 58-65	March 21	
	τ. α. θ.	Ath. attack on Megara; frustrated by Brasidas	66-74		ISARCHOS
	τ. α. θ. ἐν τ. α. θ. κ. τ. α. χρ. τ. θ.	Fighting in Aktaia Ath. plans ag. Boeotia Brasidas marches from Megara to Thrace Brasidas and Perdikkas in Lynkestis	75 76-77 78-81 82-83		
	ἐ. τ. α. θ. εὐθύς, ὀλίγον πρὸ τρυγήτου τ. ἐπιγ. χ. εὐθύς ἀρχ.	Brasidas wins Akanthos and Stageiros Campaign of Delion: Ath. defeat	84-88 89- 101. 4	early Sept.	
	τ. α. χ.	Death of Sitalkes Brasidas captures Am- phipolis; Eion saved by Thucydides	101. 5 102-8		
	τ. α. χ.	Brasidas takes some places in Akte, and Torone End of eighth year	109-16	423 B.C.	
9	—	Kratinos' Pytine Aristophanes' Clouds Ameipsias' Konnos	—		[Elaphебolion 10]
	ἄμα ἡρι τ. ἐπιγ. θ. εὐθύς	One year's truce	117-19		Elaphебolion
	π. τ. α. ἡμέρας	Skione and Mende join Brasidas	120-3		14
	ἐν τούτῳ	Brasidas and Perdikkas in Lynkestis; Per- dikkas changes side	124- 128. 4		Elaphебolion
	ὑ. τ. α. χρ.	Ath. recovers Mende and besieges Skione Sp. reinforcements for Brasidas frustrated by Thessaly	128. 5 129-31 132		12 (122. 6)
	ἐν τ. α. θ.	Thebes reduces Thespiae Heraion in Argolid burnt down	133. 1 133. 2-3		AMYNIAS

Chronological Table (contd.)

Thuc. year	Thuc. season	Event	Reference	Julian year	Athenian Archon
	τ. θ. ἡδη τελ. ἐν τ. ἐπιόντι χ.	Circumvallation of Skione completed Truce continues; fighting betw. Tegea and Mantineaia	133. 4 134		
	τ. α. χ. τελ. καὶ πρ. ἔαρ ἡδη	<i>Aristophanes' Wasps</i> Brasidas fails to take Poteidaia End of ninth year	— 135	422 B.C.	[Gamelion?]
10	τ. ἐπιγ. θ. ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ	End of year's truce; but armistice continues to Pythia (?) Further purification of Delos	v. 1 I		[Elaphebolion 13]
	μετὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν	Kleon's expedition to Thrace; he recovers Torone	2-3	
	ὑ. τ. α. χρ.	Boeotians take Panakton	3. 5		
	ὑ. τ. α. χρ.	Phaiax sent to Sicily Ath. defeat at Amphipolis	4-5 6-II		
	ὑ. τ. α. χρ. τ. θ. τελ.	Sp. reinforcements for Brasidas stay at Herakleia; then return home	12		
	τ. ἐπιγ. χ.	<i>Eupolis' Marikas</i>	13		
	τὸν τε χ. τ. καὶ πρ. τὸ ἔαρ ἡδη	Peace-feelers and negotiations <i>Eupolis' Kolakes</i> <i>Aristophanes' Peace</i>	14-17. I, 17. 2	421 B.C.	[Gamelion?]
	τελ. τ. χ. ἄμα ἦρι, ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθὺς τῶν ἀστικῶν, αὐτόδεκα ἐτῶν διελθόντων καὶ ῆμερῶν ὀλίγων παρ- ενεγκουσῶν ἡ ὥσ τὴ ἄρχῃ τοῦ πολέμου ἐγένετο	Peace made	17. 2- 20. I		[Elaphebolion 10]
	μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ π. ὑστερον	Difficulties in Amphipolis; and in Boeotia and Peloponnese	21 22. I-2		Elaphebolion 24
	τ. θ. ἡρχε	Alliance betw. Sp. and Ath. The eleventh year begun	22. 3-24 24. 2		

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

Book ii

P. 2 (2. 1). ἐφόρου ἐν Σπάρτη: see W. den Boer, *Laconian Studies*, Amsterdam, 1954, 35–38, 82–88.

P. 9 (8. 4–5). ἡ δὲ εὔνοια, κ.τ.λ.: see for a clear and detailed statement about the attitude of the majority in the subject-states of Athens, G. de Ste Croix, *Historia*, iii. 1 (1954), 1–40. I do not at all agree with his conclusion about Thucydides' political philosophy.

P. 10 (9. 2). Αχαιῶν - - - νοτερον καὶ ἀπαντες: see J. K. Anderson, 'A Topographical and Historical Study of Achaea', *B.S.A.* xlix, 1954, 72–92 (esp. 80–85).

P. 24 med. (13. 5). "that of Ares in the agora": read "that of Ares which was later re-erected in the agora".

P. 25 (13. 5). The lowest possible figure, based on Dinsmoor's calculation of 23 letters to the line, is ΠΗΗ[ΤΤΤΤXXXX]ΠΔΔ, i.e. 704 tal., 4520+dr., as Dinsmoor states, and mine is to be corrected. This may be near the true cost of the statue. (This is the figure for the receipts by the epistatai, ll. 3–5; but the heading ἀναλόματα, in l. 10, without addition, does not seem to be the right word for 'total expenses over a period of years'; and the figure belonging to that may be no more than 200 tal. *plus*.)

Pp. 26–33. *The Text of ii. 13. 3–5*. See now Meritt's reply to my article, *Hesperia*, xxiii, 1954, 185–231, and my rejoinder to that, *Historia*, iii, 1955, 333–8.

P. 28 (13. 3–5). *Anonymous Argentinensis*: thanks to the kindness of M. Cotton, Administrateur de la Bibliothèque nationale et universitaire de Strasbourg, I have since had the opportunity of examining the papyrus, and as well a recent photograph of it which was kindly sent to me by Mr. R. Sealey. These confirm my doubts about the reading μετ' ἔτη ΛΒ (which is not impossible, but extremely doubtful); other restorations are also practicable.

P. 40 (13. 8). ξὺν ἵπποτοξόταις: see Meritt, *Hesp.* xxi, 1952, 340–2; and *Bulletin épigraphique*, 1954, no. 76.

P. 42 (13. 8). No numbers given for *thetes* (sailors and light-armed): see Jacoby's commentary on Philochorus, F 119.

P. 44, line 13 from bottom (13. 9): for "in the course of the Archidamian war", read "in the course of the eleven years from 433–432 to 423–422".

P. 51, n. 1 (15. 4), τὸ <τοῦ> ἐν Λιμναις Διονύσου: II⁸ has a quotation

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from Kallimachos' *Hekale* (fr. 305, Pfeiffer), *Λιμναίω δὲ χοροστάδας ἥγον ἑορτάς*, and the explanation [.....]ος δὲ οὐτ[ω]ς φησὶν [καλεῖ-σθαι δι]ὰ τὸ ἐκλελ[ι]μνάσθαι [τὸν τόπον. ἔσ]τι δὲ καὶ ἐν [τ]ῇ Λακων[ικῇ τόπος, ὅπ]ου Λιμνᾶτ[ι]ς ἐστιν Ἀρτ[έμις]. Strabo, viii, 5. 1, p. 363, says that though no part of Sparta is now marshy (*λιμνάζει*), it once was, *καὶ ἐκάλουν αὐτὸν Λίμνας, καὶ τοῦ Διονύσου ἱερὸν ἐν Λίμναις ἐφ' ὑγροῦ βεβηκὸς ἐνύγχανεν· νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ ἔγρον τὴν ἔδρων ἔχει.* It is clear that in Strabo we should read (or at least, the meaning is) *⟨ῶσπερ⟩ καὶ ⟨ἐν Αθήναις⟩ τοῦ Διονύσου, κ.τ.λ.* It is not certain that Kallimachos identified Dionysos in the marshes with Dionysos Eleuthereus; see Pfeiffer ad loc., and Jacoby, iii 8, Commentary, p. 594 (with the Notes, p. 486).

P. 55 (15. 5). Pickard-Cambridge, *Dramatic Festivals*, pp. 17–22, has a defence of Dörpfeld's view of the site of the sanctuary of Dionysos *ἐν Λίμναις*; and for a summary of views on Eleuthereus and 'the oldest sanctuary', see his *Theatre of Dionysus*, pp. 4, 18, 28.

P. 55 n. ad fin. (15. 5). Recent plans of the agora are most conveniently to be found in *The Athenian Agora: a Guide to the Excavations*, pp. 18 (the agora c. 500 B.C.) and 20 (the agora c. 300 B.C.). The 'S.W. Fountain-house' is now said to date from the end of the fifth century.

P. 58 (15. 5). Add the following brief summary of the older buildings in the agora: (1) the earliest public building is perhaps that one the remains of which were found beneath the Metroon, *temp. Solon*; (2) in the north-east corner there was a building (the Heliaia?) of the third quarter of the sixth century; and (3) the 'S.E. Fountain-house', which is Peisistratean. Many wells of the geometric period, with contemporary pottery, suggest that the area was inhabited, though no remains of houses have been found. See the *Guide* mentioned in addendum to p. 55 n., above.

P. 60, top (15. 5). For Hellanikos, F 1 read Hellanikos, F 38. (It is re-numbered as *1 in *F. Gr. Hist.* iii B, 323a, p. 41.)

Pp. 66–69 (18. 1). *ἔς Οἰνόην πρῶτον*: see now Hammond's valuable article, *B.S.A.* xlix, 1954, 102–38, on the North Megarid, between Megara and Boeotia, and especially the routes from the Isthmus to Erythrai (which he, like others, places at Kriekoúki, the village on the main Eleusis–Thebes road, just east of Plataia). He travelled by a road fit for wheeled vehicles in antiquity from Kriekoúki over Kithairon by the pass west of Dryoskephalai, thence west of Villia through the district known as Vathikhória, in what is now uninhabited country, over Mt. Kandíli to Tripodiskos (passing west of Megara itself, between it and Pegai). The district lacks water, though conditions may, he thinks, have been better in classical times. (This

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seems doubtful to me.) He calculates—for a very fast walker (above, p. 427, n. 1)—the time from Megara to the Isthmus, by the Geraneia pass, to be 8 hours, from Kriekoúki to Megara $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours; and argues that the march-times indicated in iv. 68–72 require a road in good condition. He puts Oinoe at Villia, which is in a fertile valley, and he maintains that the fortress at Gyptókastro was Eleutherai, not Panakton.

See also Philippson's *Die Griechischen Landschaften* (below, on p. 396), i, pt. 3.

Pp. 71–72 (19. 2). The wall from Aigaleos to Parnes. This has recently (summer, 1955) been the subject of further, and, it would seem, fruitful study, by W. Eliot (of the American School at Athens) and Ellis Jones and H. Sackett (students of the British School at Athens). It is to be hoped that the results will be published soon.

P. 77 (22. 1). On the close relation between speech and narrative in Thucydides, see L. Bodin in *Mélanges O. Navarre*, Toulouse, 1935, 47–55.

P. 78 (22. 3). *Ἀριστόνος:* I should have referred to the Athenian decree in honour of Aristonous, *I.G. i. 2* 55 (*S.E.G. x. 50*), which most scholars date c. 431–430 (but it may be c. 424, after Brasidas passed through Thessaly?). D. M. Lewis, *B.S.A. xl ix*, 1954, 29, has suggested changes in its text.

He also, pp. 25–29, argues for some important changes in tribute-list 9 (*I.G. i. 199*: above, p. 30 with n. 1).

P. 86 (27. 1). Aigina. On *I.G. i. 18* (= *S.E.G. iii. 5*: see vol. i, p. 319), see D. M. Lewis in *B.S.A. xl ix*, 1954, 21–25; who dates it in 445 and argues that it includes the terms of the clause in the Thirty Years' Peace treaty relevant to Aigina—that it was to be autonomous, paying an agreed tribute to Athens (cf. above, v. 18. 5, with nn.). This may be right; but some of his restorations of the inscription [(*κατὰ τὰ δύνατα* *χωνυκεῖμενα* in l. 5, and *ἐν οὐέλαις*] *εἰπει* λ[*ιθίνει* -|- *τέλεσι*] *τοῖς Αἰγαίοις* [*νετῶν*·, ll. 1–2]) are not acceptable, the latter because the following κ] *ακορύϊατ* δέ does not seem to fit.

Pp. 98–99 (34. 1). The 'Marathon' epigrams. See *S.E.G. xii. 68*, and W. Peek in *Robinson Studies*, ii. 305–12, who argues that the stele, together with a fragment of another, which he publishes, belongs not to a memorial of victory nor to a cenotaph, but to a monument put up later, perhaps soon after Kimon's return to Athens c. 475 B.C., and celebrating the one Marathon, the other Salamis and Plataia.

P. 108 init. (37.1). For v. 89. 6 read vi. 89. 6.

P. 115 init. (37. 3). The reference to de Jouvenel is to his book, *Le Pouvoir*, translated by D. Brogan; that to Constant, below, is to his

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lecture given at the Paris Athénée in 1819, published in his *Oeuvres politiques* (ed. Ch. Louande: Paris, 1874, 258–85).

P. 143 (45. 2 ad fin.). A parallel to this cold personal approach, perhaps contemporary, may be found in Erechtheus' speech in Euripides' play of the name, fr. 360, esp. ll. 28–42.

P. 147 (47. 4). *μαντεῖοις*: it is possible that an inscription discovered in the agora at Athens (Pritchett, *Hesp.* xi, 1942, 230–1) is in honour of some Delphians, and perhaps connected with consultations of the oracle during the pestilence. See Meritt, *Hesp.* xxi, 348–51, though all his restorations are not acceptable. (*S.E.G.* x. 54, xii. 22.)

Pp. 150–1 (48. 3). The pestilence. The case for ergotism has recently been put very clearly in an article by P. Salway and W. Dell in *Greece and Rome*, ii, 1955, 62–70. Some of the objections I have raised on p. 151 are answered; but the argument (on p. 70) against MacArthur's case for typhus, that it must often have occurred in Greece, before and after 430, whenever military campaigns made conditions suitable, is a weak one; for obviously ergotism, caused by infected flour (from wheat as well as rye), but not known to be so caused, would be even more likely to recur. We cannot indeed say that the pestilence of 430 was the first instance of the disease experienced by Greek, even by Athenian troops; for who would deny that the disease from which Kimon died in Cyprus may have been the same? It was only the first time it had been experienced, and carefully observed, at Athens. Whatever its nature, the non-recurrence of the pestilence of 430 and 427, if it did not recur, is remarkable.

P. 153 (48. 3). For further expert support of the view that the pestilence was louse-borne typhus, see Dr. C. Wilcocks's note in *Tropical Diseases Bulletin*, lii, 1955, 524.

P. 186 (65. 4). For the contrary view, which rejects the evidence of Philochoros on Pheidias' trial (and puts his Olympia statue a good deal earlier than 438), see C. H. Morgan, 'Pheidias and Olympia', *Hesp.* xxi, 1952, 295–339, esp. 322–5 and 328–32.

P. 203 (70. 1). *ἀναγκαῖς*: two other clear instances in Thuc. of *ἀνάγκη* meaning moral, not at all physical, compulsion are iv. 87. 3 and v. 104; in the latter Sparta, it is said, will be *compelled* to action by a sense of shame.

Pp. 237–8 (93. 2). The trireme. Add reference to Morrison's article, cited on p. 448.

Pp. 247–8 (99. 6, 100. 3–4). *Ἀνθεμοῦντα, Ἀταλάντη, Κύρρος*. See C. F. Edson's article on the via Egnatia in Macedonia, *C.P.* xlvi, 1951, 1–16. In this he discusses the sites of these three places (see his nn. 71, 72,

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77), and of Strepsa, and the land-route not only from the west (the via Egnatia) through Berroia and Pella to Thessalonike, but also from Pydna and the south. This last, he maintains, was in classical times also via Berroia and Pella, and then in an easterly direction to Strepsa (north-west of Therme) and Therme, the long detour to the north being due to the need to find suitable crossings of the Haliakmon (at Aloros, south-west of Berroia) and the Axios, and to avoid the marshlands of the coast. For Therme, see above, p. 91. This is a valuable study; but his support of Geyer's view (see vol. i, p. 216 n.) that in 432 (i. 61. 4) the Athenians went from Pydna by land, via Berroia, all the way to Poteidaia, I find no more convincing than before (vol. i, *ibid.*, and *C.R.* i, 1951, 137-8); and Woodhead's conjecture of *Bρέαν* for *Βέρροιαν* (*C.Q.* ii, 1952, 57-62) may be right.

See also U. Kahrstedt, *Hermes*, lxxxii, 1953, 85-111, noted below, addendum to p. 612; S. Pelekídes, *Γύρω ἀπὸ τὰ Ποτειδεατικά*, from *Mνημόσυνον Ν. Γ. Παππαδάκι*, University of Thessalonike, 1950, 1-47; and now Edson, in *C.P.* i, 1955, 169-90.

Book iii

P.P. 260-1 (8. 1). Olympic games. At the beginning of his admirable article on a bronze helmet dedicated by Athenians at Olympia ('Eine Waffenweihung der Athener in Olympia', *Festschr. f. C. Weickert*, 7-21), E. Kunze comments on the considerable part played by Athenian athletes at Olympia up to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. He has, as well, an excellent note, p. 19, on the difficulties of precise dating of archaic script. (This helmet has as its inscription *Ἀθεναῖοι [τ]ῷν ἐγ Λέμνῳ*; on the analogy of *τῶν Κορωθότευ* on the helmet dedicated by the Argives (now in the British Museum) Kunze takes *τῶν* to be neuter—sc. *λαφύρον* or the like; and shows that this means that Athens was fighting *against* Lemnians, or against some group of Lemnians. It may be that we should take *τῷν* masculine, 'Athenians of those in Lemnos'—though they may still be dedicating booty won by fighting Lemnians.)

P. 271 (16. 1). *πλὴν ἵππεων καὶ πεντακοσιομεδίμων*: Kahrstedt argues that these words are interpolated [but by whom?], *Stud.* i (1934), 235 n. 5. Jacoby appears to approve, *F. Gr. Hist.* iii B, Suppl. ii, Notes, p. 379.

P. 279 (19. 1). *ἀργυρολόγους ναῦς*: Meritt in a recent article (*Robinson Studies*, ii, 298-303; see *S.E.G.* xii. 26) argues that *I.G.* ii² 97, hitherto supposed to be a decree relating to preparations for the Melian expedition of 416, in fact deals with a tribute-collecting fleet and belongs to the early years of the Archidamian war. There is mention of thirty triremes, of *ἐθελονταί* (perhaps epibatai) in addition to 1,200 hoplites, and of toxotai and peltastai from Athens and the

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allies. The main purpose of the decree is the orderly and complete collection of tribute.

P. 286 (24. 1). *'Eρύθρας καὶ Υσίας*: see Hammond's article, above, addendum to ii. 18. 1 (p. 724).

Pp. 289–90 (26. 3). On Theopompos F 94, see below, addendum to p. 502 (iv. 51).

P. 292 (30. 4). “κενόν and καινόν both pronounced alike”. I should have said rather that the vowel sounds and the accent were the same in both words; I do not mean that already by the second century B.C. all distinction between long and short syllables was lost.

P. 298 (36. 5). ἀναψήφισις: see also K. J. Dover, *J.H.S.* lxxv, 1955, 17–20, on the legality of ἀναψήφισις and the use by the orators of ψῆφισμα and νόμος (see n. on 37. 3).

P. 302 (37. 4). τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος: Stobaios' readings are not very reliable; he has in this section, οὐκ ἀν δηλώσοντες and διορθοῦνται. (But, I may note, his best manuscripts, according to Hense, have ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον at the end of § 3, not ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον as reported in O.C.T.)

P. 306 (38. 7). καθημένοις: cf. another picture in Aristophanes, Kleon's

οὐ δέδοιχ' ὑμᾶς, ἔως ἂν ζῆτι τὸ βουλευτήριον
καὶ τὸ τοῦ δήμου πρόσωπον μακκοῦ καθήμενον (*Equit.* 395–6).

P. 313 (42. 1). βραχύτηρος γνώμης: “a great empire and little minds go ill together” (Burke, *On the Conciliation of the American Colonies*).

P. 322 (47. 2). ὁ δῆμος - - - εὗνος ἐστί: see de Ste Croix's article, above p. 723.

P. 325 (49. 4). ἐπικατάγεται: the distance from Peiraeus to Mytilene is, in the direct line taken by the second trireme, c. 200 miles; this might be done in c. 35 hours, with no stops *en route*, but it would be very hard going. For the first trireme, which did not hurry, assuming that it started in the afternoon of the day on which the ekklisia had met, the night stations might have been at Sounion (c. 35 m.), north-east Andros (55 m.), Psyra (60 m.) or north-east Chios (65 m.), and Mytilene (70 or 65 m.)—220 m. in all. If they did not stop at Andros the second night, they had a long day's row to Psyra; if they did, as is probable, they arrived *τεταρταῖοι*. This would give the second ship some 50 hours to get to Mytilene on the heels of the first; which is much more reasonable.

The man who hurried from Athens to Mytilene via Geraistos (3. 5, above), and got there *τριταῖος*—perhaps in 60 hours—had 140 or 150 miles to sail, with a favourable wind. This is not much less than the normal 1,300 stades (c. 160 m.) of a 24 hours' sail (above, p. 243); but he had, too, well over 20 miles to go by land, and the sea journey

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from Attica to Euboea, and delays, doubtless, at embarking, as well. For the Athenian naval base on Chios, see below, addendum to iv. 51 (p. 732).

Pp. 329–31 (50. 3). *I.G.* i.² 60: my article is in *Robinson Studies*, ii. 334–9. See also Meritt, *A.J.P.* lxxv, 1954, 359–68, who accepts some of my suggestions, including the return of the land to the Mytileneans, but still dates the decree in 427/6, and thinks that the *klerouchoi* stayed in Mytilene after it, drawing each 2 minae a year from the *kleroi*.

He also discusses *I.G.* i.² 53 (*S.E.G.* x. 46) again, maintaining his view that it is an agreement, *ξυνθῆκαι*, between Athens and Mytilene (see above, p. 331, n. 1), and suggesting that its first clause dealt with the return of the land.

P. 365 (76). For this part of the mainland in general see also Hammond's paper, 'The Colonies of Elis in Cassopaea', in *Ἄριστα Αρχαίων εἰς τὴν Ἡπειρον* (*eis μνήμην Xρ. Σουλῆ*), Athens, 1954, pp. 26–36.

P. 383 (84). I have not seen M. Untersteiner's book, *The Sophists* (trans. K. Freeman: Blackwell, Oxford, 1954), who maintains that *Hippias* wrote what we have as Thuc. iii. 84. See G. B. Kerferd's review, *J.H.S.* lxxv, 1955, p. 166.

P. 393 (91. 1). *ἐς Μῆλον*: according to M. Treu, *Historia*, ii, 1954, 253–93, Melos became an ally of Athens in 425 B.C. See also, id. *ibid.* iii. 58–59.

P. 396 (92. 6). The Spercheios valley. See, too, vol. i, pt. 1 of A. Philippson's last work, *Die griechischen Landschaften* (Frankfurt, 1950), pp. 234–58. The rest of this part of vol. i deals with Thessaly, west, north-east, east, and south.

P. 397 (92. 6). Dover, *C.Q.* iv, 1954, 79, says that *ἥρξαντο* is right, not *εἱρξαν τό*; but he does not say how he interprets it. For my part I now incline to the latter reading, while maintaining the view that the Spartans at Herakleia and the Phokians had very different problems to face.

Pp. 402–3 (95. 1). Through Aitolia to Boeotia. See also Philippson's *Die griechischen Landschaften* (above, on p. 396), i, pt. 2.

Pp. 409–10 (101. 2). Ozolian Lokris: see L. Lerat's more recent book, *Les Locriens de l'ouest* (Paris, 1952), which gives a very full account, archaeological (with good photographs), geographical, and historical, of the country from Antirrion to Amphissa.

P. 414 (104. 1). *Δῆλον ἐκάθηραν Αθηναῖοι*: a pit on Rheneia island found by Stavrópoulos in 1898 contained almost certainly contents of graves removed from Delos on this occasion (*Délos: explor. archéologique*, etc.; fasc. xxi par Ch. Dugas, Paris, 1952, pp. 15–16).

Pp. 416–17 (105. 1). *ὅ ποτε Ακαρνᾶνες, κ.τ.λ.*: A. Wasserstein points

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out to me that ὁ (instead of ὡς) supports the view that ποτέ belongs with τειχισάμενοι.

Book iv

P. 441 (7). Chalkidike. I have used *Chalkidike* often in this volume loosely for the peninsula now generally known by this name; but T. J. Cadoux reminds me that in Thucydides and other Greek writers it means 'the territory of the Χαλκιδεῖς', i.e. of the Olynthians or the Olynthian federation. See esp. i. 65. 2, ii. 70. 4. The adjective Χαλκιδικός is used of the ἔθνος within the 'Chalcidic' peninsula, iv. 109. 4, as well as in Sicily (iv. 61. 2, *al.*). (There is a misprint in the entry Χαλκιδική in the O.C.T. index, line 2: read 'IV' for 'VI'.)

Pp. 467, 473 (26. 3 and 31. 2). Drinking water on Sphakteria. The problem remains a difficult one. Leake, i. 408-11, says that Thucydides' description of the island and its water-supply fits most satisfactorily: "the principal source of water is towards the middle of the island, at an excavation in the rock 20 ft. deep, which seems to be more natural than artificial" (p. 410); but he does not locate it more precisely, nor state whether he found the water fresh or salty. He adds that in the spring there was good pasture for horses, but nothing for them to drink. Professor Meritt has recently (27 Feb. 1955) visited the island, and has most kindly put the following data at my disposal. Near the Russian memorial (which is quite close to the Panagía landing, above it to the south) is a cistern, "not a well or self-supplying source". Over the low ridge which connects the southern and northern heights of the island, and on the level ground towards the western side—Thucydides' μέσον δὲ καὶ ὀμαλώτατόν τε καὶ περὶ τὸ ὄδωρ—about in its centre, "well inland from the western coast, is a dry well. . . . I judged it to be really more of a cistern than a true well, and I question whether it ever contained water unless some surface flow could have been caught in it after rain. There was no sign that I could see that it is ancient. . . . About 15 or 20 ft. deep.

"There were goatherds on the island. With one of them I visited a cleft in the rock near the shore toward the southern side of the level area. This cleft was entirely natural, 10 or 15 ft. long. . . . Near the middle the aperture was wide enough so that a pail could be let down into the water, perhaps a dozen ft. below the surface. The guide told me that this water was slightly salty; . . . we lowered a pail and drew up a full measure. I tasted it and, to my surprise, found it perfectly sweet. The guide said that the salty flavor would be more pronounced after the water had stood for a while. . . . He told me that there was one other similar cleft in the rock near the shore further north and still down in the level area. I did not visit this. Thucydides says that the men on the island had only brackish water to drink.

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Perhaps if many people used the water [from these clefts] and the supply ran low, then seepage from the sea may have made the water more brackish than I found it to be.

"On the map in the Loeb Thucydides (vol. ii, facing p. 219) my recollection is that the dry well is not far from the R in *Spartans*, and the cleft rock about under the N, but nearer the shore. I think this cleft is Leake's 'principal source of water' (cf. Frazer, *Pausanias* iii, p. 461), and that the 'well' marked on Frazer's map (iii, facing p. 460) is too far north."

Grundy's "only supply of water" seems to have been the cistern to the south of the Russian memorial. See also Frazer, iii, pp. 456, 460 and v. 608-12.

I am most grateful to Professor Meritt for sending me this account of his search.

P. 480 (40. 2). καλοὶ κάγαθοί: there are two passages in English literature which illustrate well one of my reasons for thinking that 'gentlemen' is a most misleading translation here, and are sufficiently illuminating to be worth quoting. They are, (1), from *Persuasion*, c. iii, where Mr. Shepherd the lawyer is adding to his recommendations of Admiral and Mrs. Croft as tenants of Kellynch Hall: "She is sister to a gentleman who did live amongst us once. . . ." (Sir Walter): "I have no conception whom you can mean, Shepherd; I remember no gentleman resident at Monkford since the time of old Governor Trent." . . . "Mr. Wentworth was the very man. He had the curacy at Monkford, you know, Sir Walter, some time back." "Wentworth? Oh! ay,—Mr. Wentworth, the curate of Monkford. You misled me by the term *gentleman*. I thought you were speaking of some man of property." (2) From Trollope's *Dr. Wortle's School*, pt. ii, c. viii (Dr. Wortle, to his daughter): "A gentleman can do no better than marry a lady. And though it is much to be a nobleman, it is more to be a gentleman." What a mistake it would be to suggest καλὸς κάγαθός as an equivalent, or near-equivalent, to *gentleman* in either of these passages (it might, as well as εὐπατρίδης, be used to translate *nobleman*, except that *nobleman* is defined and formal).

Καλὸς κάγαθός, in fact, like *nobleman*, is an exclusive term, applied to a small body of *οἱ βέλτιστοι λεγόμενοι*; *gentleman* is a comprehensive one (in nineteenth-century England particularly), excluding indeed the majority of Englishmen, but inclusive of a great variety of men, from landed gentry to merchants of London. The Greeks did not draw their dividing line in any such place, between gentlemen and others, but between free and slave; so that the corresponding phrase for 'no gentleman' or 'no lady would do such a thing' is ἀνδρὶ ἐλευθέρῳ οὐ προσήκει τοιοῦτο, and Menander's

πέρας γὰρ αὐλειος θύρα
ἐλευθέρᾳ γυναικὶ νενόμιστ' οἰκίας (fr. 592),

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and *rōn ἐλεύθερον δεῖ πανταχὸν φρονεῖν μέγα* (*Heros*, fr. 2) or *Epitr.* 147. *Gentleman* in these passages from Jane Austen and Trollope is in fact untranslatable into ancient Greek, which is not surprising; but 'he was a gallant gentleman' is a possible translation of Plato's words in praise of Theaitetos, *ἄνδρα --- καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν* (*Theait.* 142B); which has a very different meaning from *καλοὶ κἀγαθοί* in our passage in Thucydides.

Crawley's translation, 'men of honour', reminds me too of *Troilus and Cressida*, v. iv. 25 (Hector to Thersites):

What art thou, Greek? Art thou for Hector's match?
Art thou of blood and honour?

Thers. No, no. I am a rascal; a scurvy, railing knave; a very filthy rogue.

This is near to *Equit.* 185–6.

P. 482 (41. 4). Archeptolemos. I now, with Diels, doubt the identity of the Archeptolemos of *Equit.* 704, with 'the son of Hippodamos' of l. 327, and that of Hippodamos the Milesian architect with the father of the Archeptolemos who was an active supporter of Antiphon in 411. I cannot discuss this here; I will only say that I suspect that the 'War-beginner' of *Equit.* 704 is really an Athenian term for, first, Archidamos, and then for Spartans generally (cf. *Thuc.* i. 144. 2 and vii. 18. 2).

P. 496 (48. 4). *ἡνδραποδίσαντο*. A. Wasserstein points out to me that the middle voice may be only the result of dittography, before *τοιούτῳ* of the next sentence.

P. 499 (51). Chios. The site of an Athenian naval base on the north-east coast of the island has been found (Archaeological Report for 1954, p. 23, in *JHS*, lxxv, 1955); but, according to a later statement in *The Times*, 24 Aug. 1955, it was the one established in 412 B.C.

P. 502 (51). Kleon and the Assessment of 425 B.C. It should be stated that Theopompos F 94 (cf. above, pp. 289–90) does not at all support the view that Kleon was responsible for the increase in tribute, still less that he proposed it to relieve the rich of Athens from *εἰσφορά*. Theopompos said, according to the schol. on *Ach.* 6, that Kleon was bribed by the 'islanders' to persuade the ekklisia to lighten their tribute (called *εἰσφορά* instead of *φόρος* in the scholion), and that the Knights attacked him for it and forced him to disgorge.

For the decree of assessment see Béquignon et Will, *Rev. Arch.* xxxv, 1950, 5–34; *S.E.G.* xii. 28. See also above, addendum to p. 393 (iii. 91. 1).

P. 509 (54. 1–2). Kythera. I was able in the summer of 1955 to pay a very brief visit to the island. The capital city is, as so often in the islands of the Aegean, called Chóra (or Kýthera, according to the

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War Office map); it is situated towards the southern end of the east coast, high above the harbour (a bay with a small mole as a protection from the north-east winds in particular), and 4 to 5 km. distant from it by a very winding road, but not much more than a mile in a straight line. The name of the harbour is Kapsáli. These two should be ἡ ἄνω πόλις (*ἡ π. τῶν Κυθηρίων*) and Σκάδεια (*ἡ ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ π.*).

Farther north and facing Malea, towards the north-east end of the island, is another bay visited by coastal steamers, now called H. Pelagia. This must be where Nikias landed; but he will have had a march of some 20 km. to reach the capital.

P. 523 (end of n. on 64. 5). I should have mentioned Theophrastos' statement that Herodotos and Thucydides began a new kind of historical writing (Cicero, *Orator*, 39). It may be that already in Polybios' time Thucydides was accepted as the great master, and that Polybios takes his supremacy for granted.

P. 525 (65. 4). The high tide of Athenian success. Nothing could go wrong; even sprats were cheap:

οἱ δὲ ἔξ οὐνὸς στόματος ἀπαντεῖ ἀνέκραγον.
“ νῦνὶ περὶ σπονδῶν; ἐπειδὴ γέ μὲν
γῆσθοντο τὰς ἀφύας παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀξίας.
οὐ δεόμεθα σπονδῶν· ὁ πόλεμος ἐρπέτω.”

(Equit. 670-3.)

P. 529 (67. 2). Peripoloi. H. D. Westlake in his recent paper on Ar. *Birds*, 1360-71 ('Overseas Service for the Father-beater'), *C.R. iv*, 1954, 90-94, takes the poet much too literally. The young man is being offered a hoplite's panoply like a war-orphan; but

φρούρει στρατεύον μισθοφορῶν σαυτὸν τρέφε,
τὸν πατέρ’ ἔα ζῆν· ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ μάχιμος εἰ,
ἐς τὰπὶ Θράκης ἀποπέτου κάκεῖ μάχον

is not to be interpreted to prove that young men of hoplite status in Athens were encouraged to volunteer for foreign service (for which they were too young to be drafted) by the offer of a free panoply and special rates of pay, and that such volunteers were at the time (414 B.C.) much needed to help maintain Athenian influence in Thrace; still less that such volunteers would have had no training, beyond some "instruction in the use of arms as part of their physical education", and that the fact that the father-beater is asked to volunteer for service shows that he was under 20 (for otherwise he would be liable for ordinary service in the army) and that there could therefore have been no compulsory training of the youths of 18 and 19 (whether called the *ἔφηβεία* or not). Westlake leaves the well-disciplined Athenian hoplites (well-disciplined at least since Marathon)

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with no training *in the ranks*, as a military force, at all. I see no reason to believe that 'join some garrison, go on a campaign, support yourself by soldiering—go off to Thrace' has any special reference to Athenian needs in 414; it is the ordinary advice to a young man to go away to the discomforts of a professional soldier's life, Thrace being well known for its discomforts. *μισθοφορῶν σαυτὸν τρέψε* may mean 'be a *professional* soldier', ἐπειδὴ μάχμος εἰ, even though *μισθοφορία* is used of Athenian citizens in the service of Athens, as in Thuc. vi. 24. 3.

P. 551 (84. 1). See above, addendum to p. 441, for the proper use of the word Chalkidike.

P. 554 (86. 4). οὐδὲ ἂν σαφῆ. The O.C.T. *app. crit.* has ἂν σαφῆ . . . fort. legit Schol. . . . ἀσφαλῆ recc. et γρ. f. According to Hude the schol. has γράφεται ἀσφαλῆ· καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἔχει ὥδε· οὐδὲ γάρ φανερὰν ἐπιφέρειν νομίζω τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κ.τ.λ.

P. 563 (93. 3). πελασταί. At iv. 123. 4 and v. 6. 4 there is mention of Chalkidian peltasts, who will certainly be Greek, and part of the city's regular force; it is possible therefore that the peltasts ἐκ τῆς Κρονούδος γῆς of ii. 79. 4 were also Greek. See also addendum to p. 279 above, for some Athenian peltasts.

Pp. 579 (106. 4), 586 (108. 7). Signalling between Amphipolis and Thasos. T. J. Cadoux suggests to me in a letter that a boat could have done the journey from Amphipolis to Thasos in about five hours, and Thucydides have got to Eion in another five, completing the ten hours of a winter's day. Since the messenger may have taken six hours, for he could have left Amphipolis before dawn, I suppose this is just possible; but if so, we must adjust our notions of the possible speed of a trireme over a long row and of a *κέλης*, if it was not a trireme that left Amphipolis. We must remember that the harbour at Thasos was on the northern coast, and away from the Eion direction; and we are not allowing time for preparation for either journey.

P. 600 (118. 4) καὶ τὴν νῆσον. If the island is Minoa, we need, besides [καὶ] τὴν ν., suggested above, a colon after *μηδετέρωσε*, and in the next clause ὅσαπερ νῦν ἔχουσιν, ⟨ἔχειν⟩ (or ⟨ἔχοντας⟩) καθ' α, κ.τ.λ.

P. 606 (119. 2). Copies of documents in the Metroon. See A. R. W. Harrison, *J.H.S.* lxxv, 1955, 28–35.

For a good general discussion of Thucydides' use of documents, see Carl Meyer, *Die Urkunden im Geschichtswerk d. Thukydides (Zetemata, Heft 10)*, München, 1955.

P. 612 (124. 1). The Greeks in Macedonia. Kahrstedt in the article cited above, addendum to pp. 247–8, observes that Thucydides, so careful to note elsewhere, esp. in the Thraceward region, the mother-cities of Greek colonies (see e.g. iv. 104. 4, 109. 3 nn.), does not do so

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for Pydna, Methone, or Therme, nor for any other city within Macedonian territory; nor does he for the Chalkideis and the Bottiaioi. He concludes that all these were not more, and not less, Greek by origin than the Macedonians themselves, and had been settled long before the period of 'colonial' expansion (he compares iv. 120. 1 on Skione); and that the former, the cities in Macedonia, had developed separatist tendencies, and had, with the occasional aid of Athens and with varying success, secured a certain independence of the land-owning kings. They were culturally *πόλεις*, and so more like Greek cities than the rest of the Macedonians; and they would (when the king's power over them could exert itself) form a regular force of hoplites, fighting in the Greek manner, by the side of the differently organized peasants, *έταιροι* and cavalry of the Macedonian army. He regards this development as parallel to the growth of cities side by side with the land-owners and dependent peasantry of Thessaly, and to that of the cities of Germany, such as Hamburg and Cologne, which had freed themselves from the princes.

This is an interesting thesis; but not much can be concluded from the omission by Thucydides of the colony-origin of the Bottiaioi and Chalkideis, except that they had been Greek from very early times, for he does not give this kind of information about the islands of the Aegean nor the cities of Ionia, though he believed in the colonization from the mainland (i. 12. 4); the same omission in the stories of the 'Macedonian' cities may be of no more significance. (Strabo, x. 1. 8, p. 447, does speak of colonization of Chalkidike by Euboean Chalkis.) And it is difficult to believe that in this sentence, iv. 124. 1, *δν ἐκράτει Μακεδόνων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τῶν Ἐλλήνων ὄπλατας*, there is as little distinction between the two sections of Perdikas' army as Kahrstedt supposes. Kahrstedt is certainly wrong in inferring from the use of *τὸ χωρίον* to describe Strepsa (as he holds) in i. 61. 4, that Thucydides means that it was not a Greek *πόλις* in the strict sense; it has a general meaning, and he can use it of Corinth, i. 13. 5, Epidamnos, 26. 5, Kerkyra, 31. 1, etc.

Book v

Pp. 632-3 (3. 5). Panakton. In the article cited above, addendum to pp. 66-69 (ii. 18. 1), Hammond has argued that Gyptókastro is Eleutherai, not Panakton.

P. 668 (18. 4). *δικαίω χρήσθων καὶ ὄρκοις*: C. Meyer (above, addendum to p. 606, iv. 119. 2), p. 25, says that this clause is the equivalent of iv. 118. 8, *δίκας τε διδόναι, κ.τ.λ.*, and that vii. 18. 3, *ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων, κ.τ.λ.*, is a precise reference to v. 18. 4. This seems only possible if we read *δίκαιοις* here, with the *recentiores*; *δικαίω χρήσθων καὶ ὄρκοις* is more general, 'honourably in accordance with our oaths'.

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