

A
HISTORICAL COMMENTARY
ON
THUCYDIDES

BY
A. W. GOMME
A. ANDREWES
AND
K. J. DOVER

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND EDITORIAL NOTE

GOMME left only scattered manuscript notes on passages in book viii, fewer than for books v–vii. It was, again, uncertain how far any of these represented his considered or final view, but I have cited them where appropriate with the indication '(ms.)'. Further, in spite of his declared intention to include in the last volume an appendix on the problems of the composition of the *History*, he left no clear indication of the line he proposed to take, apart from what has been printed at various points in the *Commentary*. The Appendices we have written do not pretend to present his views, but they show that we share his belief in the importance of the subject.

The primary responsibility for the commentary on book viii is mine, but this has been, as with vol. iv, very much a work of collaboration, with full discussion between us of successive drafts. The same is true of both Appendices. After my collaborator, my principal debt of gratitude is to D. M. Lewis, who commented very fully not only on the whole of my first draft, but also on a second version of the excursus on the sources for the Four Hundred. I am grateful also to other colleagues who read this excursus, and principally to P. J. Rhodes, whose own commentary on Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* is now happily completed.

Mrs. Gomme regrets, as we do, that she is unable to draw the maps for this final volume. Instead, I must here express my gratitude to the helpful draughtsmen of the Clarendon Press; and indeed, as always, to the Press in general.

A. A.

The symbol 'Σ' has been used for the scholia, in the manner described in vol. iv, p. xv. Quotations from Valla's translation are again taken from Vaticanus lat. 1801. An asterisk (*) in the text indicates that the passage is referred to in the Addenda at the end of the volume.

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Reference to editions (*) of Thucydides and to commentaries (†) on his work is made by the editor's or commentator's name alone.

Reference to other works listed below is (i) by initials alone (e.g. 'ATL'), as stated, (ii) by the author's name alone (e.g. 'Adcock'). (iii) Where more than one work by the same author appears in the list, they are distinguished by the abbreviations stated (e.g. 'Andrewes, Causes'), but where no abbreviation is stated that work is referred to by the author's name alone (e.g. Canfora, *Tucidide Continuato*).

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
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
I. Ionia and Karia

Based on H. Kiepert (1894), with corrections



2. The Hellespont

Based on H. Kiepert (1894), with corrections



3. Eetioneia

Based on Curtius and Kanpert, Karten von Attika (1881), and the plans of G. von Alten in the Erläuterungen, vol. i, pp. 19–22

INTRODUCTION

THE special problems of book viii call for a brief separate introduction. It was noted in antiquity that it showed a different character from the rest of the work: if you compare the first and the last books, said Dionysios (*De Th.* 16. 349), they do not seem to have the same purpose or power. His concern there was the absence of speeches, a problem still much discussed (48. 7 n. below). Marcellinus cites more general judgments: he brushes aside (43) those who said the book was the work not of Thucydides but of his daughter or Xenophon or Theopompos, in favour (44) of the more sophisticated critics who thought it the historian's own work, but an unpolished sketch (*ἀκαλλάπτως, δι' ἐκτύπων γεγραμμένη*); and in view of the consistency with which the scholia treat Thucydides as a rhetorical author, rather than as a historian in our sense of the term, it is likely that the absence of speeches was again the prime consideration for these critics. They found it weaker in style, as if he were ill when he wrote it; but in this they were probably influenced by the belief that this book is the latest of Thucydides' writing and that its abrupt end marks the point where he was cut off by death. Modern critics, who mostly regard other parts of the work as written later than book viii, are more prone to complain that the book is imperfectly organized. There are passages which show the power and the vigour of Thucydides' mind undiminished, but some of them (e.g. 66. 5) encourage the suspicion that he had not finally determined the formulation of what he wished to say.

The nineteenth-century argument for long showed a philological bias. Goodhart's introduction, written as late as 1893, may serve as an example. He began from the absence of speeches, accepting rather too readily from Jebb that there was no occasion for them in this book. From that he moved on to a refutation of the argument that the vocabulary of book viii was un-Thucydidean. When he finally (p. xli) comes to the matter of lack of revision, his concern is still with style, and it is the abrupt transitions of the concluding chapters that suggest to him that they 'have something of the character of jottings to be worked up afterwards'. Problems arising from Thucydides' presentation of fact had been noted earlier, e.g. by W. Mewes, *Untersuchungen über das achte Buch der thukydideischen Geschichte* (1868) and by Classen in his edition of 1885, but with a tendency, still visible in Steup's comments of 1919, to alter the text on the basis of a belief that Thucydides must have known the facts and presented them coherently; Stahl especially was given to emendations designed to bring ship numbers exactly into line. The publication in 1891 of Aristotle's alternative account of the Four Hundred warmed up the

INTRODUCTION

argument about Thucydides' sources and his use of them, in the short run not always profitably.

Modern controversy about the structure of the book begins with L. Holzapfel's article 'Doppelte Relationen im viii. Buche des Thukydides', *Hermes* xxviii (1893), 435–64. His basic position was that the book consists of a series of separable reports not fully integrated into a continuous narrative. In particular he drew attention to the anomaly of the large jump backwards in time at 45. 1 (on which e.g. Goodhart had no word to say): the separation of 45 ff. from the preceding narrative was not methodologically unreasonable, but the departure from Thucydides' normal chronological order was excessive (e.g. 45–51 could have been inserted before 39), and there are some alarming failures of co-ordination (e.g. between 43. 2–44 and 52). 29–44 he assigned to a Peloponnesian source, 45–54 to an Athenian, and he distinguished among the Peloponnesian reports those which insisted that Astyochos had been corrupted by Tissaphernes from other passages which showed Astyochos active and competent, thereby implicitly acquitting him of corruption. At the end (457–63) he claimed to discover two actual doublets (63. 1–2 = 79. 1–5, 81–2 = 86) which have not recommended themselves to later critics, and controversy over these somewhat robbed the main thesis of its impact.

The powerful article of Wilamowitz, 'Thukydides viii', in *Hermes* xlvi (1908), 578–618 (= *Kl. Schr.* iii. 307–45), among much else took up again the problem of the overlap between 45 ff. and the preceding chapters. His solution rested in part on his belief that 18 and 21 were later insertions into the narrative as at first drafted: there was a stage in the composition of the book when Thucydides did not yet know of the treaties between Sparta and Persia, and to this early phase he assigned 45 ff. His bold interpretation involved him in some dubious treatment of detail (see esp. nn. below to 46. 3, 52), but if we reject these, or indeed his general thesis about these chapters, the problem is not exorcized. Much earlier, in *Aristoteles und Athen* (1893), Wilamowitz had maintained that the documents transmitted in 'Αθ. π. were of priceless value, while Thucydides, for all his devotion to the truth and the power of his judgment, had put more faith than he should in the reports of his informants (i. 106). It was in this context that Eduard Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte* ii (1899), 406–36, while accepting these documents as genuine, affirmed his belief that the narrative of Thucydides was a better guide to what actually happened; and the force of his argument is very little diminished by the eccentricity, recognized by himself, of his opinion (406) that book viii is as fully complete as any part of the work, even the Sicilian books, and stood in no need of revision by the author. The chapter devoted to book viii in Eduard Schwartz's *Thukydides* (1919), 72–91,

INTRODUCTION

inevitably discovers deeper incoherences and interventions by an editor: this book is a conglomerate of drafts, written soon after the events and left unfinished by the writer (89), and 45 ff. represent an attempt to elucidate or even to defend Alkibiades.

In recent years Alkibiades has been more than ever in the centre of the picture. P. A. Brunt in *REG* lxv (1952), 59–96 made a respectable case for regarding him as a direct source for Thucydides in those parts of the History in which he is an actor. E. Delebecque's *Thucydide et Alcibiade* (1965) is a more elaborate construction, which first stresses the chronological rigour of Thucydides' method elsewhere, the *récit ancien* divided into 'sections' dealing each with a single event or often with a single phase of an action, then contrasts with this the method of 45 ff., the *récit nouveau* derived from Alkibiades and divided into 'scenes' whose structure and arrangement differ from that of the sections of the old method. There is certainly a perceptible change of tone and procedure when we pass from 44 to 45, but that could be attributed to the difference in the material presented, analysis of motive as opposed to straightforward narrative, and the validity of Delebecque's construction turns on his ability to convince us that Thucydides has here abandoned his old methods altogether, rather than made a single unexampled jump backwards in time, involving an equally unexampled chronological overlap between 45–51 and 29–44. For this see nn. to 45. 1 and to subsequent sections: in my belief analysis of the detail does not sufficiently bear out Delebecque's thesis, and his distinction between Thucydides' two methods is too rigid. Again, it is a likely enough explanation of the dislocation at 45. 1 that Thucydides, having pursued a narrative taken from other sources down to the point when the Peloponnesians settled down in Rhodes, then acquired fresh material from a source concerned (to put it as neutrally as possible) with Alkibiades, and set this down side by side with the older narrative instead of working the two together so as to maintain chronological order. But Delebecque, having concluded that it is information from Alkibiades that is presented according to Thucydides' new method, inverts this argument and assumes that everything which is, in his belief, set out according to the new method is information coming from Alkibiades, and thus saddles the latter with responsibility for the earlier part of Thucydides' account of the revolution of the Four Hundred. Delebecque's tidy and inflexible pattern is produced by taking a single illuminating observation to prove more than it can. K. von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (1967), i. 778, concludes that Thucydides had not at the time of writing made up his mind about Alkibiades, and is sceptical about Alkibiades as a direct source; and this less spectacular view may be found more convincing (some ms. notes of Gomme's suggest that he shared it).

INTRODUCTION

Whatever may be the case for earlier books, the interpreter of book viii cannot stand aside from the question when the text we have was composed. It makes altogether too much difference, with regard to the structural anomaly discussed above and to many other problems, whether the book was written soon after the events it describes, as Wilamowitz and others have supposed, while Thucydides was still in exile and dependent on the reports he could in that condition obtain; or some years later and after his return to Athens, as Meyer and others have held, when information about events inside Athens would be more easy to procure, and he could freely meet Athenians who had participated in events outside Athens. Prolonged involvement with book viii has convinced me that the latter view is difficult to sustain, that some serious problems in the book are easier to solve on the assumption that Thucydides wrote a provisional account while his information was still incomplete, and indeed that the basic thesis of Holzapfel was correct, that the book consists of a series of reports not yet fully coordinated and showing traces of their independent origin. These beliefs depend in large part on the degree and kind of incompleteness that we find in the book, and on such phenomena as the evident failure to coordinate 45–52 with 29–44; Appendix 1 tries to assess the extent to which this and other books are unfinished. Appendix 2 will draw together the argument about the composition of the *History* in general, and passages which bear on the special problems of book viii will be discussed individually in the commentary. A substantial excursus (pp. 184–256) is devoted to our sources for the revolution of the Four Hundred, including commentary on 'Aθ. π. 29–33 and some discussion of the information likely to have been available to Thucydides. A briefer excursus (pp. 27–32) endeavours to tabulate, so far as our information permits, the number of ships available to either side at each stage of the conflict in the eastern Aegean.

BOOK VIII

YEAR 19: 413-412 B.C. (*continued*) (CC. 1-6)

1. *The news from Sicily reaches Athens*

1. 1. *τοῖς πάνυ τῶν στρατιωτῶν . . . ἀγγέλλουσι*: interpretation, ancient as well as modern, has been influenced by Xenophon's *τοῦ πάνυ Περικλέους* (*Mem.* iii. 5. 1), which distinguishes the great Perikles from his son of the same name. Hence LSJ *πάνυ* II, 'δὲ πάνυ . . . the excellent, the famous', Arnold's 'the most respectable of the soldiers', etc. Steup, Goodhart, and others saw that this was inappropriate, and that we require rather 'actual soldiers' as opposed to those who were not soldiers. At 89. 2 (for the text there see ad loc.) a similar phrase appears to distinguish actual members of the ruling oligarchy from the wider circle of their supporters; Dio Cassius' imitation (xxi. fr. 70. 6) contrasts ordinary soldiers with officers. Dio evidently took *τοῖς πάνυ τῶν στρατιωτῶν* closely together. M. D. Reeve (in an unpublished paper which he has kindly showed me) suggests that Xenophon alluded to the etymology of Perikles' name, 'the really famous one', in which case his phrase offers no support for the direct attachment of *πάνυ* to the noun *στρατιωτῶν* here; Reeve takes it to reinforce the idea expressed in the participial phrases, 'they disbelieved even those soldiers who had actually escaped from the very event and brought an unambiguous report' (cf. Jowett's translation). There is no need for Steup's transposition *ἡπίστουν πάνυ καὶ τοῖς*.

τῶν δητόρων: Thucydides has, characteristically, given us no names. Elsewhere we have only Demostratos from Ar. *Lys.* 391, identified by Plutarch with the anonymous speaker of Th. vi. 25. 1 (see ad loc., and vol. iv p. 224), but many others must have committed themselves to the original proposal in 415.

ώσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ Ψηφισάμενοι: for the argument that voters ought to be treated as equally responsible with their advisers, see esp. iii. 43. 4-5, where Diodotus notes that speakers could claim longer consideration of public problems and deeper insight into them, but does not draw the inference that they legitimately incur greater responsibility. See M. I. Finley, *Past and Present* xxi (1962), 3-4: and cf. Th. ii. 60. 4, 64. 1; Page, *Gr. Lit. Pap.* 45(a). 5-6 (p. 226)=adesp. vet. com. fr. 12b Dem.; [X.] 'Αθ. π. 2. 17. In this case however Thucydides has emphasized the commitment of the whole city to the enterprise, esp. vi. 31. 3.

τοῖς χρησμολόγοις, κ.τ.λ.: Thucydides has not dealt with this aspect at all, cf. vi. 1. 1 n. Plutarch's collection (*Nic.* 13) inevitably consists

mainly of unfavourable omens, but see 13. 1–2 for Alkibiades' alleged attempt to organize favourable prophecy. For *manteis* see Ziehen, *RE* xiv. 1351; for the meaning of *θειάσαντες*, vii. 50. 4 n.

2. *καὶ ίδιᾳ ἔκαστος*: families as well as the city felt the casualties; and for individual investment, merchants as well as trierarchs etc., see vi. 31. 5. Though only the city's losses are enumerated, there is no difficulty in understanding what the private losses were, and so no need with Steup to posit a lacuna.

ναῦς οὐχ δρῶντες, κ.τ.λ.: clearly the decree of 431 (ii. 24. 2) had not been maintained, to keep a reserve of a hundred triremes, the best of each year, in readiness with their trierarchs. This would have required continuous positive action, harder than leaving the reserve of money untouched (15. 1 n.).

οὐδὲ χρήματα: cf. 15. 1.

ὑπηρεσίας: cf. vi. 31. 3 n.

3. *ὅθεν ἀν δύνωνται ξύλα ξυμπορισαμένους*: we hear mainly of Macedon. Andokides (ii. 11) claims to have brought timber for oars from there to Samos in 411; Archelaos is praised in *ML* 91. 30 (407/6) for providing *χούλ]α καὶ κοπέας*. Cf. also Ar. *Lys.* 421–2.

τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, κ.τ.λ.: in the present shortage of ships, men, and money Athens could do little but watch, and hope that she would have the resources to intervene as and when it proved necessary; and in the winter (4, *ad fin.*) they were still searching for means (*διασκοποῦντες*) to prevent revolts.

καὶ μάλιστα τὴν Εὔβοιαν: cf. vii. 28. 1, viii. 95. 2.

ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν --- οἵτινες --- προβουλεύσουσιν: the title *πρόβουλοι*, here only indicated, finds contemporary attestation at Ar. *Lys.* 421, 467; their number, the standard ten and so perhaps in the democratic manner one from each tribe, is known from 'Αθ. π. 29. 2, and Harp. s.v. *συγγραφεῖς* suggests that Androtion (*FGrH* 324 F 43) and Philochorus (328 F 136) also gave the number. Ar. *Thesm.* 808–9, discussed more fully below (p. 188), speaks of the councillors of 413/2 handing their functions over to others, but the *βουλή* evidently still met, as late as the early months of 411 (66. 1, Ar. *Thesm.* 943); it is not clear how the functions of the two authorities were distributed. The two known *πρ.* were certainly elderly. Hagnon (*Lys.* xii. 65) had been general in 440 (i. 117. 2) and *oikistes* of Amphipolis in 437/6 (iv. 102. 3, v. 11. 1 with nn.); Sophokles (Arist. *Rhet.* 1419a 25) was over eighty.

Aristotle (*Pol.* 1298b 29, 1299b 31, 1323a 7) distinguishes *πρ.* as an oligarchic institution, *βουλή* as democratic. Here we have both; the new *πρ.* were clearly instituted in order to restrain rash decision, and *σωφρονίσαι* could have oligarchic overtones (64. 5 n.), though here the specific purpose stated, *ἐς εὐτέλειαν*, weakens the ideological flavour. Hagnon and Sophokles were not doctrinaire oligarchs. For Hagnon's

career and his part in Perikles' trial in 430, see ii. 58. 1 n. and vol. ii, pp. 187–9; Lysias' allegation that he forwarded revolution in 411 is hardly more than an aspect of his malice against Hagnon's son Theramenes, and X. *HG* ii. 3. 30 may fairly be set against it. For Sophokles see, in this context, esp. Arist. *Rhet.* l.c.; M. H. Jameson, *Historia* xx (1971), 541–68. Though the oligarchic plotters of 411 made use of the *πρ.* (67. 1 n., and p. 188 below), it would be an oversimplification to describe the appointment of such men as a step towards oligarchy; but the democracy's efforts for self-restraint inevitably have a quasi-oligarchic flavour. § 4 εὐτακτεῖν tells in the same direction: this is a virtue claimed by oligarchy (Arist. *Pol.* 1321a 3–4; cf. Isoc. xii. 115) and ἀταξία is a quality ascribed to democracy ([X.] 'Αθ. π. 1. 5), but the decision to εὐτακτεῖν is not simply a decision to have a more oligarchic constitution.

For the question whether Athens also recalled exiles at this time see Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F 137, and v. 26. 5 n.

4. ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν: similar parentheses at iv. 28. 3, vi. 63. 2, have ὄχλος as subject (cf. ii. 65. 4 ὄμιλος) and can be taken as observations on the behaviour of men in the mass rather than on the specific characteristics of democracy (so far as these can usefully be distinguished). Here Thucydides writes specifically δῆμος, and πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές underlines the volatility and short-term views of democracy. There is criticism here as well as description, but we must not hastily infer that Thucydides preferred some other form of government to democracy. For his politics see 97. 2 n.

2–6. *Preparations for renewed war*

2. 1. οἱ μὲν μηδετέρων ὄντες ξύμμαχοι: their attitude is elaborately described, as if Thucydides had specific examples in mind, yet he records no action by such neutrals and it is hard to see who they could have been. The clause νομίσαντες — κατώρθωσαν excludes reference to Sicilian combatants. Thouria might illustrate some of the feeling described, but that was a change of sides (35. 1, cf. vii. 33. 5–6, 57. 11), not the first entry of a city previously neutral. In the homeland the Thessalians, though not quite neutrals, had apparently sent no troops outside their borders since the cavalry sent to Athens' help in 431 (ii. 22. 2–3; for Daochos' 27 years of peace see iv. 78. 1, 3 nn.): if they had now, uninvited, joined Sparta that would illustrate Thucydides' point, but they conspicuously did not (3. 1).

This is a disturbing pronouncement. The chapter was not all written before the further outcome was known, for § 2 τό γ' ἐπὶ τὸν θέρος looks beyond summer 412. Though the feeling indicated by this sentence is natural enough under the immediate impression of

Athens' disaster of 413, as a statement of fact it is misleading. See also § 2 n.

οἱ δὲ αὖταν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι: the Boeotians were enthusiastic enough (5. 2–3), the Corinthians rather less so (9. 1–2). But Elis did not resume active membership of the alliance (Wade-Gery, 277 n. 2).

2. οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆκοοι: this is much firmer ground. Defection begins at once at 5. 1, and Chios showed zeal enough (e.g. 22. 1). But as G. E. M. de Ste. Croix has pointed out (*Historia* iii [1954], 6–9) many of Athens' subjects displayed striking loyalty. D. W. Bradeen (*Historia* ix [1960] 266 n. 52) ascribes this to compulsion, and takes c. 4 to imply garrisons sent out to Ionia in 413. This reads more out of c. 4 than is there; and there is no sign of the presence of such troops in the following narrative, nor could Athens have spared them (1. 2).

Thucydides says nothing here about Athens' independent allies. Argos held firm, for the angry defection of autumn 412 (27. 6) did not last (86. 8–9); and Archelaos (cf. 1. 3 n.) was a more constant friend than Perdikkas had been.

Athens was of course gravely weakened by the Sicilian defeat, in prestige as well as materially, but 2. 1–2 does not analyse this coolly. Thucydides' preoccupation with Athens' unpopularity (ii. 8. 4–5 n.) seems to have run away with him once more, and it gratified his pride in Athens to stress her long and impressive resistance by piling up the odds against her (cf. ii. 65. 12, vii. 28. 3). In the light of what is to come, one would expect to find here the most damaging factor of all, the intervention of the Persians, which instead is introduced in a not fully adequate manner at 5. 4–5.

διὰ τὸ δργῶντες κρίνειν: cf. iv. 108. 6 with n., and ii. 11. 7.

3. καὶ ἀνάγκην: the compulsion was Athens' attack, leading not so much to the building of ships as to the will to use them (cf. vii. 21). This was indeed a change from the situation of 431 (ii. 7. 2 n.), but it was still a question (ὡς εἰκός, below) whether the ships would come. ἄμα τῷ ἡρῷ: the first contingent, 20 Syracusan ships and 2 Selinuntine, in fact arrived at the very end of summer 412 (26. 1).

4. εὐέλπιδες --- λογιζόμενοι: Gomme (ms.) noted the contrast ἐκλογιζόμενος/εὐέλπις at iv. 10. 1 (see n. there).

τὸ Σικελικόν: edd. explain the expression as being wider than τὴν Σικελίαν and referring to the resources of Sicily, but the name would in this context have been understood to include the resources. So far as this is not just variation, this form treats the Sicilians as an ingredient, potentially, in Athens' total forces (cf. ναυτικόν, etc.).

τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος --- ἥγησεσθαι: Thucydides was less explicit for 431, recording only public promises to right wrongs and to free Greece, though no doubt some Spartans even then entertained wider ambitions. Since then we have had Sparta proposing shared leadership to Athens in 425 (iv. 20. 4), and echoes of this proposal in 421 (e.g. v.

29. 3); and Alkibiades' estimate of Sparta's prospects in winter 415/4 (vi. 92. 5 *ad fin.*). Here Thucydides speaks out in his own person; and it is noticeable that he now reports more about private ambitions and intrigues, e.g. 6. 2, 12. 1–2. What he reports may well be true for this time, and there is no reason to deduce that these words were written after the establishment of Sparta's post-war empire, or after Lysander's plans became plain: it should be noted that he does not, here or at vi. 92. 5, use the word *ἄρχειν*.

3. 1. Ἀγις μέν: for his powers while at Dekeleia see 5. 3 with n.
ἔς τὸ ναυτικόν: not necessarily for the main Peloponnesian fleet, for Agis seems to have ships of his own (5. 2, 7).

τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου: at Ar. *Lys.* 1169–70 the Athenian speaker asks for Echinous and the Malian Gulf, as well as the Megarian long walls, in exchange for Pylos. This is not to be taken too solemnly (the speaker, implausibly, has difficulty in finding anything suitable to demand, and the names are chosen for their double meanings), but these places should have some surface relevance apart from the underlying obscenities, and it can hardly be coincidence that Agis had been active here little, if at all, more than twelve months before. For the surmise that Thessaly asked for Athenian support in 411 see 92. 8 n.

κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἔχθραν: the Oitaioi had earlier oppressed both Doris, the traditional metropolis of the Dorians, and Trachis (iii. 92. 2–3), and this was the ostensible reason for the foundation of Herakleia Trachinia in 426. *παλαιάν* need not however take us back beyond 426: it means only that the enmity dated back to an earlier phase of their relations than the present one (cf. iii. 86. 3).

Nothing has been said about Herakleia since v. 51–52. 1, when she was defeated by her neighbours in winter 420/19, and in the next summer the Boeotians took the place over. Since then Sparta's position had very greatly improved, and the re-establishment of her authority at Herakleia probably antedates the present moment, for if it had remained in Boeotian hands till now Thucydides' silence about this would be hard to explain. This may be another item which he knew that he needed to insert in its chronological place (cf. 5. 4–5 nn.), but the intention was never fulfilled.

Xenophon (*HG* i. 2. 18) speaks on a later occasion of *ἐποίκους* at Herakleia, but these need not be 'additional colonists' (cf. vi. 4. 3 n.). **τῆς λείας:** not 'plunder' which the Oitaioi had taken from someone else (Classen), but removable property, primarily animals, which could be taken as plunder. Cf. X. *HG* i. 3. 2.

Ἀχαιοὺς τοὺς Φθιώτας, κ.τ.λ.: for the status of the Achaioi see iv. 78. 1 with n. *τοὺς ἄλλους* will be mainly the tribes named in v. 51. 1 (see n. there): Ainianes, Dolopes, Malieis.

μεμφομένων --- **τῶν Θεσσαλῶν**: cf. iii. 93. 2, v. 51. 1.

ἔς τε τὴν ἔνυμαχίαν: this goes well beyond what was done in 426, and amply explains the Thessalians' present hostility, also the distrust of Sparta shown in 404, for which see [*Ηρώδου*] *περὶ πολιτείας*, 25 ff., with J. S. Morrison, *CQ* xxxvi (1942), 65–76, and Wade-Gery 273–82. Agis' plans were carried further in the 390s, when we find a Spartan garrison in Pharsalos (*Diod. xiv.* 82. 6) and the tribes round the Malian Gulf following Lysander to Haliartos (*X. HG* iii. 5. 6): cf. *Phoenix* xxv (1971), 222–3.

2. **Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν**: Steup accounts for the article by supposing that this is the same fleet for which Agis was collecting money above, but that would be for the crews of ships in being, not for building new ships. Either there was some practical reason why Thucydides' readers should assume that there would be such a *πρόσταξις*, e.g. if the covenant of the Peloponnesian League contained provision for one, known but seldom invoked; or he had meant to refer to Sparta's naval plans earlier, e.g. at 2. 3, but failed to do so (cf. 4 *τὴν ναυπηγίαν* referring back to 1. 3).

ἔκατὸν νεῶν: contrast the much more ambitious programme of 431, ii. 7. 2. That was awkwardly expressed, for if the sentence is taken rigorously it means that the West was to provide only new ships, the Peloponnese only old ones, whereas we must allow for old ships and new construction in both areas. In that plan the overall total was to be five hundred ships (this is not the western quota alone, as P. A. Brunt takes it in *Phoenix* xix [1965], 261), and Gomme called this an 'impossible number'; but the Corinthians at i. 121. 3–4, and even Archidamos at i. 80. 4, 82. 1, contemplated that the Peloponnesians might eventually make themselves a match for Athens at sea, in which case the over-ambitious figure may really represent their aspiration.

There is no knowing how far the present smaller programme was completed, but ships from many of these states were present at Kynossema (106. 3). The proportions are interesting, 25 each from Sparta and Boeotia whose maritime activities we tend to underrate; Corinth's small quota of fifteen may be due to the fact that she already maintained a fleet of 25 or more in the Corinthian Gulf (vii. 17. 4), or to weakness from the damage the war had done to her (contrast the ninety ships at i. 46. 1).

Λοκροῖς: the northern Lokroi, cf. ii. 9. 2 n.

Ἀρκάσι: the inland Arkadians form a financial unit with their coastal neighbours, and probably provide timber (Widmann).

4. This chapter adds two new items, the fortification of Sounion and the evacuation of the fort opposite Kythera, but the degree of repetition from 1. 3 is striking (A. Momigliano, *Mem. Acc. Torino* lxvii

[1930], 17–18); ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν and the article in *τὴν ναυπηγίαν* show that this was not unconscious. Wilamowitz (578–81) blamed the book division; the break should come at the end of summer (i. 4), c. 1 could then be seen as completing the Sicilian story while c. 4 returns to the topic in the different context of war preparations. The duplication is parallel to that between i. 146 and ii. 1, and was intentional. Momigliano took c. 1 as an addition designed to connect viii, written soon after the events, with vi–vii, written after the war (cf. De Sanctis, 99); ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν is a harmonizing insertion which in fact does not improve matters. For argument about the date of composition of vi–vii, see Appendix 2, pp. 423–5. Even on Wilamowitz's view we may suppose that revision would have reduced the verbal echoes.

Σούνιον τείχισαντες: for the walls attributed to this occasion see W. Wrede, *Attische Mauern* (1933) 10f., pl. 26–7, 45–7, who draws attention to the hurried building of parts of them; R. L. Scranton, *Greek Walls* (1941), 170, 180; F. E. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (1971) 43, 161 n. 41. For the *περίπλους* see vii. 28. 1. A fort on land could not directly help ships attacked at sea, but it could provide a refuge and prevent an enemy landing in pursuit: so Winter, 43, 308 n. 60, comparing Thorikos (X. *HG* i. 2. 1) and the outer circuit at Rhamnous. See also C. W. J. Eliot, *Coastal Demes of Attika* (1962), 131–5, for other forts whose purpose may have been to watch and signal movements at sea.

Xenophon's later proposals for the continuance of mining in wartime (*Vect.* 4. 43–4) concern immediate refuge for the Laureion workers, so mention other forts but not the remoter Sounion.

τό τε ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ τείχισμα: vii. 26. 2–3. But Pylos was not sacrificed in the drive for economy, nor the Naupaktos squadron (13). **τὰ τῶν ξυμάχων διασκοποῦντες:** see i. 3, 2. 2 nn.

5. 1. Ἀλκαμένη τὸν Σθενελαῖδον καὶ Μέλανθον: Sthenelaidas should be the ephor of 432/1 (i. 85. 3) or a relative; Alkamenes was killed soon after at Peiraios (10. 4). Melanthos is not otherwise known.
νεοδαμωδῶν: see v. 34. 1 n.

2. ξυμπρασσόντων — Βοιωτῶν: cf. iii. 2. 3 with n., viii. 100. 3.
ἀρμοστήν: frequent in Xenophon but only here in Thucydides. He similarly avoids other special terms used by Xenophon, the Spartan φρουράν φαίνειν, Thessalian *ταγός* (i. 111. 1 βασιλεύς), even σατράπης (only i. 129. 1 σατραπείαν), but he has νεοδαμώδεις without explanation at v. 34. 1 and thereafter. (The range of Spartan military ranks at v. 66. 3 was unavoidable if he was to describe their chain of command.) This suggests a general but not fully consistent preference for common Greek vocabulary over special local terms.

Many Spartans called ἄρχοντες by Thucydides would have been harmosts to their countrymen; Alkamenes has just been called ἄρχων in respect of his exactly similar mission to Euboea (§ 1), and Pedaritos, ἄρχων at 28. 5, is ἄρμοστής in Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F 8. For this, and for harmosts in general, the best guide is still H. W. Parke, *JHS* 1 (1930) 37–79 and *Hermathena* xlvi (1931), 31–8; the survey of G. Bockisch, *Klio* xlvi (1965), 129–239, is more concerned with Spartan ideology than with technical detail about harmosts. The term was used for area or garrison commanders, and also for commanders of detached forces, and both senses probably go back at least to the time of Brasidas.

δέκα δὲ Ἀγις: cf. 3. 1.

3. ἀνευ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πόλεως: the despatch of the *neodamodeis*, and probably of Alkamenes and Melanthos (§ 1), must have had the city's consent, but the appointments and expeditions are Agis' own. For the powers of the king, once over the borders in command of an army, see v. 60. 2 with n. on διὰ τὸν νόμον. Agis' isolation with a permanent force at Dekeleia increased his independence, and there is no reason to suppose that he was granted special powers for this mission. His danger was that he might be called to account on his return home, as in 418 (v. 63; there is no trace now of the ten advisers then imposed on him); cf. also *Hdt.* vi. 82, X. *HG* iii. 5. 25.

κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρόν: strictly the present winter, not the whole period of his command at Dekeleia (*ὅσον χρόνον, κ.τ.λ.* above). ἔκασταχόστε δεινὸς παρῆν cannot carry him beyond Central Greece, and once the centre of the war shifted to Ionia he got less attention; the Euboeans' next application in winter 412/11 (60. 2) was made to the fleet at Rhodes, and Agis is not mentioned in connection with the fleet from the Peloponnese which liberated them in 411. Xenophon, *HG* i. 1. 35–6, credits him with one intervention further afield, proposing the despatch of Klearchos to Byzantium (in 409? see 8. 2 n.); but the decision to implement this (*δόξαντος δὲ τούτου*) was probably taken at Sparta.

4. Τισσαφέρνους: first mentioned here. From Ktesias, *FGrH* 688 F 15. 53(52), we learn that Pisouthnes, the satrap of Sardis known to us from i. 115. 4–5, iii. 31. 1, 34. 2, revolted against Dareios, and that Tissaphernes, Spithridates, and Parmises were sent against him and captured him after bribing his Greek mercenaries to desert; his satrapy was then given to Tissaphernes. Ktesias indicates no date for these events, except that another revolt, that of the king's brother Arsites, precedes this one; 108. 4 (see n. there) appears to imply Tissaphernes' presence in the area as early as 421 (see now Lewis, 80–1, who is cautious about an early date).

From the Lykian text of the Xanthos Stele (*TAM* i. 44. c 11) it seems that his father's name was Hydarnes. This is the name of one

of the famous seven conspirators against the pseudo-Smerdis (Hdt. iii. 70. 2); his son, another Hydarnes who might be Tissaphernes' grandfather, commanded the 'Immortals' in Xerxes' invasion of Greece (Hdt. vii. 83. 1), and at some time held a command in Asia Minor (Hdt. vii. 135. 1), for which see n. to *στρατηγός* below. See H. Schaefer, *RE suppl.* vii (1940), 1579–99; A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (1962), 563 n. 64; Lewis 83–4; for his portrait see Kraay and Hirmer, *Greek Coins* pl. 184. 621.

βασιλεὺς Δαρείω τῷ Ἀρταξέρξου: this is also the first mention of Dareios II; Thucydides said nothing of the succession when recording the death of Artaxerxes in winter 425/4 (iv. 50. 3). Gomme's n. there is too rough with Ktesias, whose account of the brief reigns of Xerxes II and 'Secundianus' (*FGrH* 688 F 15. 47–50 [44–8]; cf. Diod. xii. 71. 1, who has 'Sogdianos') contains circumstantial detail of a kind that cannot be merely dismissed, though neither king was recognized in Babylonia. There the remainder of the year in which a king died was called the 'accession-year' of his successor, whose 'first year' begins on the following New Year's Day; and Artaxerxes has a 41st year which merges into the 'accession-year' of Dareios. Cf. *Historia* x (1961), 1–2, where I should have added the evidence of Manetho's 27th (Persian) dynasty (*FGrH* 609 F 2–3 at pp. 50–1, and the table at p. 78). D. M. Lewis informs me of an important modification to the data given by Parker and Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology*, 3rd ed. (1956) 18. It is confirmed that the unpublished document BM 33342 there referred to is a contemporary document dated from Babylon on day 29 of the fourth month of Dareios' accession-year, i.e. 15 August 424; but it remains true that a document from Nippur dates by the 41st year of Artaxerxes on 24 December, and another from a still unlocated village as late as 26 February 423. The turmoil and uncertainty were clearly great (see now the detailed treatment of Lewis, 70–7), and the six months 15 days allotted by Ktesias to 'Secundianus' may overlap with the period within which Dareios was already strong enough to be recognized at Babylon; but the new date increases the probability that Artaxerxes died before the Babylonian new year of 22 April 424, in which case his '41st' year is a construct for the convenience of Babylonians who were not yet sure how to date their documents, and the *ὑστερον* of Thuc. iv. 50. 3 need not take us outside the limits of Thucydides' winter 425/4. It also makes it easier to suppose that an Athenian embassy visited Dareios, probably at Babylon, and concluded its business before the end of the Attic year 424/3 (Wade-Gery 209–10).

στρατηγός ἦν τῶν κάτω: two main interpretations of this are current: that it refers to Tissaphernes' position as satrap of Sardis (Steup), or that it describes a military commander with overriding powers in the western provinces (Ed. Meyer, *GdA* iv². 1. 69–70). The main

questions are (*a*) whether Thucydides would use *στρατηγός* to describe a normal satrap, (*b*) what *τῶν κάτω* might indicate.

(*a*) A clear distinction between general and satrap occurs in Xenophon's account of the interview between Pharnabazos, then satrap of Daskyleion, and king Agesilaos in winter 395/4 (*HG* iv. 1. 37). Pharnabazos sets out alternatives, ἐὰν βασιλεὺς ἄλλον μὲν στρατηγὸν πέμπῃ, ἐμὲ δὲ ὑπήκοον ἔκείνου τάττῃ and ἐὰν μέντοι μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν προστάττῃ: Xenophon believed that in the practice of the 390s (we need not here discuss the general statements in *Cyr.* viii. 6 and *Oec.* 4. 5 ff.) the king might appoint a general to whom a satrap might be subordinated, and who might or might not be a satrap himself. The clear case is Kyros in 407, sent down as *κάρανον τῶν εἰς Καστωλὸν ἀθροιζομένων* (*HG* i. 4. 3, *An.* i. 2, 9. 7), which implies a military area larger than any single satrapy (Meyer 65 n. 2, 69–70); Kyros was also satrap of Lydia, Great Phrygia, and Kappadokia (*An.* i. 9. 7), but not of Daskyleion, yet he could give orders to Pharnabazos (*HG* i. 4. 5. 7). Similarly Tiribazos later (iv. 8. 12 βασιλέως ὅντα στρατηγόν, cf. *Diod.* xiv. 85. 4 ὁ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσταν πεζῶν δυνάμεων ἀφηγούμενος), and Tissaphernes in 397 (*X. HG* iii. 2. 13 στρατηγὸς τῶν πάντων ἀπεδέδεικτο, to Pharnabazos' jealous resentment).

The series which Meyer (69) detected in Herodotus is more disputable. Herodotus has *σατραπήν* twice (i. 192. 2, iii. 89. 1, explained each time), but *ὑπάρχος* for satrap (in Thucydides of subordinate officers, viii. 16. 3, etc.); and he has many *στρατηγοί* who are not satraps. Megabazos, left as general in Europe after the Scythian expedition (*Hdt.* iv. 143. 1), reduced some of the Hellespontine area (144), then campaigned in Thrace (v. 2 ff.). Otanes, his successor in this command (v. 26), is also described as *στρατηγὸν τῶν παραθαλασσίων ἀνδρῶν* (25. 1); he fought in the Troad and has been taken as satrap of Daskyleion (P. Krumbholz, *De Asiae minoris satrapis* [1883], 23–4), and we know of no alternative candidate, though we may wonder why in the same sentence of v. 25. 1 Artaphernes is hyparch and Otanes general (Burn 136). Herodotus then jumps to the Ionian Revolt, with many Persian generals of a kind not relevant here. In spring 492 (vi. 43. 1), *τῶν ἄλλων καταλειμμένων στρατηγῶν*, Mardonios came down with an army, and in passing he set up democracies in the Ionian cities whose judicial arrangements and tributes had just been regulated by their satrap Artaphernes (42). Krumbholz (25) thought Artaphernes was among those deposed (he is not heard of hereafter), and Beloch (iii². 2. 134) argued that Mardonios' action in Ionia could have been taken only by a satrap. If that were right, this would be a certain case of a satrap included among *στρατηγοί*; but Mardonios' main business was the European campaign which came to grief round Athos, and in order to forward that campaign it was hardly necessary to retire the king's

brother from his satrapy; the installation of the democracies may have been entrusted to Mardonios by the king with the satrap's goodwill, or Artaphernes may have been ill or dead. Lastly Hydarnes is described at vii. 135. 1 as *στρατηγὸς τῶν παραθαλασσίων ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐν τῇ Ασίῃ* when the Spartans Sperthias and Boulis encountered him on their way to Sousa to atone to Xerxes for the murder of Dareios' heralds at Sparta. Burn (13, 321) makes him satrap of Daskyleion after 480, and it is not impossible that the tenure of Artabazos (Th. i. 129. 1) or his successor was temporarily interrupted; but there seems no solid reason why this Spartan mission should not be dated before 480 (Krumbholz 33). Hdt. vi. 133. 1 is more doubtful, where Miltiades has a grudge against Paros because a Parian had slandered him to 'Hydarnes the Persian'. Burn (259) wondered which Hydarnes: if the elder, the incident might date as far back as the Skythian expedition; if the son, there is not much room for him to hold a post suitably near the Chersonese before 493, unless he was already active there before the Ionian revolt.

(b) *τῶν κάτω* is not neut. (Tucker), for Herodotus and Thucydides use *στρατηγός* with a gen. of the persons commanded. *οἱ κάτω* are men by or near the sea (Th. i. 120. 2 and often), and in this context must be inhabitants of the coastal provinces of Asia Minor, or the forces stationed there; cf. *τὰ κάτω* and *τὰ ἄνω* of the Persian empire in Hdt. i. 177, and ML 12. 12. In Dareios' lists of his tributaries 'those on the sea' seem to be located in the north-west: so Kent, *JNES* ii (1943), 304 n. 12, 'this province is clearly that which had its capital at Dascylum', and his arguments are not affected by Cameron's persuasive thesis in *JNES* xxxii (1973), 47–56 that the lists are of peoples not of provinces. R. Schmitt in *Historia* xxi (1972), 522–7 suggests that the description of Artabazos in the 16th 'Letter of Themistokles' (Hercher 755. 36), *ὅντι σατράπη βασιλέως ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς θαλάσση ἔθνῶν*, goes back to a translation of this Persian phrase, and the same might be true of *παραθαλάσσιοι* in Hdt. v. 25. 1, vii. 135. 1 (above). The argument must not be pressed too hard, for *παραθαλάσσιος* is common enough in Herodotus in its untechnical sense, even in speaking of the Persian empire (vi. 48. 2 is not to be confined to the Hellespontine area); and at v. 30. 5 *τῶν ἐπιθαλασσίων τῶν ἐν τῇ Ασίῃ πάντων* are subject to the satrap of Sardis. Thucydides is not here saying that Tissaphernes was satrap of Daskyleion, and *οἱ κάτω* could not indicate the Sardis satrapy as opposed to that of Daskyleion. The phrase is more appropriate if it indicates a superior command, much as Kyros came down *ἄρξων πάντων τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττη* (X. HG i. 4. 3) though Pharnabazos retained his satrapy.

Like Herodotus, Thucydides does not use the word *σατράπης* (cf. § 2 n.): Artabazos at i. 129. 1 has *τὴν Δασκυλίτων σατραπείαν*, but his successor Pharnakes gets at most a patronymic (ii. 67. 1, v. 1) and we

are left to infer what his position was, while Pisouthnes is introduced at i. 115. 4 with ὅς εἴχε Σάρδεις τότε. We should thus expect a periphrasis of some kind here if Thucydides wanted to say that Tissaphernes was satrap of Sardis, but the passages reviewed do not encourage us to take *στρατηγός* as equivalent to 'satrap' in Classical Greek. Of the two doubtful cases in Herodotos, Otanes (v. 25. 1) inherited a specific war in Europe and probably pursued it in the lacuna in v. 27. 2 (cf. Burn 137); if he was also satrap of Daskyleion, the war is probably the reason why he is here called general not hyparch (above). Hydarnes (vii. 135. 1) can only remain a question-mark unless and until we learn what he was doing. (See Lewis, 84 with n. 12, for the suggestion that he may have been satrap of Sardis.)

It thus seems likely that Thucydides meant to say that Tissaphernes held a superior command in the west for the war against Athens. On the other hand Pharnabazos does not behave like a subordinate, especially in these opening chapters where the two satraps appear to compete on equal terms. But in the third treaty (58), while Pharnabazos is one of the participants (58. 1 τοὺς Φαρνάκου παιδαῖς), the operations and the forces are under Tissaphernes' control; and for some time back, at least since 45, he has been treated as if he were in charge. It is possible that his appointment as *στρατηγός* dated from summer 412 or the following winter, and that Thucydides here anticipates. See also nn. to 99, 108. 4.

5. ὑπὸ βασιλέως γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: R. H. Dundas, *CR* xlviii (1934), 167–8, and O. Murray, *Historia* xv (1966), 147–9, argue for different reasons that there cannot have been arrears of long standing. Since arrears of tribute were remitted at the accession of a king (Hdt. vi. 59) we need go no further back than 424 (§ 4 n.), and Murray opts for the time when Tissaphernes received his satrapy, 'after 420 and before 412'. But the run of the sentence and the word *νεωστὶ* very strongly suggest a recent demand which had altered an existing situation for Tissaphernes, and the obvious new factor is Athens' support of Amorges and breach with Dareios (see next n.). When Wade-Gery put this forward (223), he supposed that the Greek cities had had a treaty obligation to make some payment to the king, which ceased to be paid when Athens broke the treaty; that thesis was abandoned in *ATL* iii. 275, leaving a gap in the argument which has to be filled by some other hypothesis about the treaty. Murray (155–6), rightly following Gomme (*AJP* lxv [1944], 333 f.) in excluding Isoc. iv. 120 from consideration here, stressed the king's pride and refused to believe that the Peace of Kallias contained any provision about Persian tributes; but if the king agreed to a treaty at all there must have been some means to soothe his pride, and his intransigence after Athens' breach of the treaty is not relevant. The minimum supposition is that for the period concerned there was some reduction in the sum

demanded from the western satraps, and that the cut was restored some time shortly before 412; and we do not know enough about the financial arrangements of the Persian empire to say that this is impossible. The Sicilian disaster and the weakening of Athens must also have encouraged the satraps to take active steps to recover the cities, but see Lewis 87 n. 25 for the chronological difficulty of supposing that news of the Sicilian defeat had reached the king before he made his demand.

The king's policy and decisions play a noticeably larger part here than later in the book, e.g. in Thucydides' accounts of the matter of the Phoenician ships (46. 1, 87).

Ἀμόργην τὸν Πισσούνθου: this sequel to the revolt of Pissouthnes is not mentioned in the epitome of Ktesias. But Andokides (iii. 29) reports, as an instance of Athens' folly in rejecting strong allies and supporting the weak, that she abandoned her treaty with the king and took up instead with Amorges; as a result the king gave Sparta 5,000 talents and Athens' power was destroyed. The treaty with Dareios has been doubted, but there can be no doubt that Amorges appears as an Athenian ally in Thucydides, at 28. 2 more clearly than at 19. 2, and at 54. 3 Phrynicos is deposed from his generalship on the charge of having betrayed him. Amorges was then recognized as an Athenian commitment, and Andokides' story is thus far confirmed, explaining a situation which Thucydides has left obscure.*

For the date of Athens' breach with Dareios, Wade-Gery (222–3) found a clear indication in the payment made to a general ἐν Ἐφ[---] in the eighth prytany of 414 (ML 77. 79), where the place named can hardly be other than Ephesos. Another possible indication is Ar. *An.* 1027–30, performed a week or two later than Pryt. VIII. 2. In 1028, ἔστιν γὰρ ἀ δι’ ἐμοῦ πέπρακται Φαρνάκη, the dative should be of the agent, 'things which Pharnakes has done through me as intermediary'; and this leads into Peisetairos' description of the blow he gives the *episkopos* as 'ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ Φαρνάκου' (1030). Dover suggests that there had been an acrimonious debate 'about Pharnakes', in which blows had actually been struck. If that is right, (a) there is no need to suppose 'quite commonplace dealings with a Persian satrap' (*Historia* x [1961], 5) at this stage, (b) the meeting may be some time past, retaining its topicality because of a notorious incident.

The mention of Pissouthnes here makes it all the more remarkable that Thucydides has said nothing of his revolt and its fate.

περὶ Καρίαν: his base was Iasos, 28. 2.

Thucydides' introductory analysis in §§ 4–5 is curiously incomplete. His silence about Athens' break with Dareios, clearly of major importance for the war, has led some to conclude that there was no treaty to break (e.g. D. L. Stockton, *Historia* viii [1959], 66–7). But

this in some ways simpler solution brings its own difficulties; and other puzzles in the introduction are not to be conjured away, notably that Thucydides explains Amorges' position in relation only to Tissaphernes, not to Athens, yet he later assumes that his readers know most of what we find in Andokides (above). This is one of the main bases for the thesis advanced in *Historia* x (1961), 1–18, that §§ 4–5 are no more than a stopgap, Thucydides being aware that he needed to revise his narrative and insert the relevant material in its proper place. There is nothing about Persia in our text between iv. 50 and viii. 5, except the incidental reference to Pharnakes at v. 1. 1; Thucydides' revision, if he had begun one, did not get beyond the middle of book iv.

A similar explanation seems to be needed for his silence about the restoration of Spartan authority at Herakleia Trachinia (3. 1 n.); cf. also 16. 3 n.

6. 1. Καλλίγειτος—Μεγαρεὺς καὶ Τιμαγδρας—Κυζικηνός, φυγάδες: cf. Lewis 14; both otherwise unknown. An exile from Kyzikos, within the empire, is playing a natural part; the plural Kyzikenes who appeal to Sparta in Plu. *Alc.* 24. 1 are presumably just an expansion of Timagoras rather than evidence of a more widespread movement to revolt. An exile from the oligarchic revolution at Megara in 424 (iv. 74. 2) would more probably be pro-Athenian; Kalligeitos must owe his expulsion to a different cause, homicide or some other serious offence. He may well have had useful connections in the Megarian colonies of the Bosporos.

Φαρναβάζω τῷ Φαρνάκου: fresh light is thrown on the antecedents of this tenacious family by the *Persepolis Fortification Tablets* (ed. R. T. Hallock, 1969), where a Pharnakes appears as a very high official in the administration in the last years of the sixth century. See Hallock, *The Evidence of the Persepolis Tablets* (separate publication [1971] of a chapter of *Camb. Hist. Iran* vol. ii), 11–13, who argues that this is the father of Artabazos, given the satrapy of Daskyleion in 478 (Th. i. 129. 1). His father's name Arsames was also borne by the grandfather of Dareios I, which gives a link not previously known (cf. Burn 324) between this family and the royal house; we need not here pursue the possible chronological consequences, if he was actually Dareios' uncle. A second Pharnakes, son of a Pharnabazos who makes no appearance in history, was satrap in 430 (ii. 67. 1) and lasted till 414 (5. 5 n.); his son, this Pharnabazos, was prominent far into the fourth century. For Pharnakes' other sons see 58. 1 n.

The satrapy went far enough south to include Atramyttion (v. 1. 1); for Tissaphernes' interventions here and at Antandros see 108. 4 with n.

2. τῶν ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι: Steup thought that the Chians and

Erythraians of 5. 4 should have been mentioned among 'those in Sparta'. But there is no need for emendation or excision: the phrase simply contrasts the negotiations of these men with the parallel set at Dekaleia (5. 1-2).

3. ξυνέπρασσε γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης: no doubt Alkibiades' influence helped, but there were also practical reasons. Ionia offered a secure base now, with some sixty ships, whereas nothing comparable was promised from the Hellespont; the revolt of Abydos was not till spring 411 (61. 1, 62. 1), that of Byzantium still later (80).

'Ἐνδίῳ ἐφορεύοντι: one of the three Spartan envoys to Athens in 420, according to Thucydides dramatically tricked by Alkibiades (v. 44. 3-45); in these different circumstances they could be useful to one another, and the quarrel of eight years ago forgotten. Endios was not eponymous ephor (see the list in X. *HG* ii. 3. 10), but the five ephors appear to have held equal powers.

ὅθεν - - - ἐκαλεῖτο: Classen bracketed the whole of this, because of the position of *Λακωνικόν*, the plural *αὐτῶν*, the abruptness of the last clause, and a feeling that all this is superfluous information; Steup and others are less severe. We need a Spartan Alkibiades earlier than Endios' father to account for the introduction of the name into the Athenian family, but 'for Endios' father was called Alkibiades' will do as an example to show that the name was Lakonian and current in this family. *αὐτῶν* is justified only by the reference to Alkibiades' ancestors implicit in *πατρικός*, but this is enough; for a comparable ellipse cf. *αὐτόν* in Ar. *Nu.* 1079. For Alkibiades' ancestry and the family proxeny see v. 43. 2 n., to which add M. B. Wallace, *Phoenix* xxiv (1970), 197 n. 12.

4. περίοικον: for another perioikos, employed in a still more responsible position, see 22. 1.

τὴν λεγομένην δόξαν: Steup understands 'a widespread assumption', but the odd expression 'the reputation which it had in what was said about it' seems to be merely a tautology.

ἔξηκοντα: for the number of ships actually brought into action by Chios see below pp. 27-30.

5. σεισμοῦ γενομένου: an expedition might be abandoned altogether because of an earthquake, cf. iii. 89. 1, vi. 95. 1 with nn., and H. Popp, *Die Einwirkung von Vorzeichen...* (1957), 13-18, who argues that the omen was taken seriously but does not discuss this case. Normal practice would have been to start afresh on a later occasion, when the gods might prove more favourable; this case is highly unusual in that the expedition was not even temporarily given up, but modified and its commander changed. Melanchridas, otherwise unknown, is not heard of later, and there is no sign that he was replaced as nauarch—certainly not by Chalkideus, who is described throughout as *ἄρχων* (8. 2, 11. 3, 24. 1), whereas Astyochos is throughout *ναύαρχος*. Possibly

the omen was interpreted as showing divine displeasure with Melanchridas personally, not with the enterprise as such.

Hatzfeld identified this earthquake with that of X. *HG* iii. 3. 2, which drove the adulterer out of the room of Agis' wife; see 12. 2 n.

YEAR 20: 412–411 B.C. (C. 7–60)

7–15. Revolt of Chios; Spartan fleet blockaded

7. ἄμα δὲ τῷ ἡρι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους: so B, *τοῦ δ' ἐπιγ. θέρους* cett. Steup took B's reading as evidently right after the references to spring at 2. 3, 3. 2, but Sparta was not necessarily so prompt in performance. The connection with the Isthmia (9. 1, 10. 1 nn.) makes it unlikely that the conference of 8. 2 ff. began before June, and it would be surprising if the despatch of the three Spartans to Corinth, the event here dated, were as early as March. This is a case of B adding superfluous detail, here actually false.

ὑπερενεγκόντες — τὸν Ἰσθμόν: cf. iii. 15. 1 with n. Since Gomme wrote substantial stretches of the *diolkos* have been excavated, for which see N. Verdelis, *AM* lxxi (1956), 51–9, lxxiii (1958), 140–5. It was a stone causeway, with grooves cut for the wheels of the vehicle which carried the ship; the excavator argues that this was hauled with ropes by slaves. The question whether it dates back to the time of Periandros need not arise here, for it was certainly in operation long before 428.

ᾶς δ 'Αγις, κ.τ.λ.: from *αὐτόθι* below it looks as if Agis' ships, like the rest, were being got ready west of the Isthmos. Thucydides gives no indication whether any of these ships were newly constructed, or all drawn from a fleet already in being on the Corinthian Gulf. The home authorities were evidently prepared to dictate the route which Agis' ships should take, if not their destination (cf. 8. 2).

8. 1. ἔφ' ἁντων: not a private fleet, but a separate one financed by them. Their turn came later, in December (39. 1).

2. οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἄλλο τι ἐγίγνωσκεν: Agis could not of course ignore either the home authorities or this conference, and the comment is needed mainly to qualify the strong expressions used by Thucydides about Agis' independence at 5. 3.

καὶ Ἀλκαμένη ἄρχοντα: as the sentence stands, the subject of *πλεῖν* and *ἀφικέσθαι* is the unexpressed masc. plur. to which *ἔχοντας* is attached. If this is not just vaguely 'the personnel of this expedition', we should perhaps understand 'the allies' (Steup), with a not too harsh change of case from *αὐτοῖς* to *ἔχοντας* (CG *αὐτούς*, for *αὐτοῖς*, does not improve

matters). Alkamenes is then slipped in as a subsidiary subject to *πλεῖν*. Wilamowitz (614) excised *αὐτοῖς* (or *αὐτούς*), and in the belief that an infinitive was required for the second clause proposed *'Αλκαμένη ἄρχειν*. Alternatively we might excise the *καὶ* before *'Αλκαμένη*, still understanding *πλεῖν* as the verb, and leaving it undefined how many ships were to go with Alkamenes to Lesbos and still less definite who was to finish up in the Hellespont. The text we have, taken as a mixture of Thucydidean compression and variation, perhaps expresses the decision as clearly as the situation allowed. The conference could appoint commanders and assign priorities, but detail of actual operations must wait till a fleet was established across the Aegean.

In the event Chalkideus sailed separately from Lakonia (12. 3), as the conference presumably intended. If the fleet which left Corinth under Alkamenes (10. 2) had reached Chios, he would have handed it over to Chalkideus, and those on the spot would have determined what to do about Lesbos; compare the orders given later to Antisthenes' fleet (39. 2). Klearchos eventually sailed with Antisthenes (*ibid.*).

Κλέαρχος δὲ Ραμφίου: probably the Ramphias of i. 139. 3 and v. 12. 1, as Poralla and Gomme take it. Thucydides reports his arrival by land at the Hellespont (80. 3), but nothing further; for his later career see X. *HG* i. 1. 35–6, 3. 15–22, *An.* i–ii passim, Diod. xiii. 51. 1, 98. 1, xiv. 12. With the other leaders of the Ten Thousand he was killed after Kunaxa; Xenophon's obituary notice (*An.* ii. 6. 1–15) gives him a grim character, but he evidently admired him as an officer.

The puzzle is *HG* i. 1. 35–6, where to stop the flow of grain ships to the Peiraieus Agis proposes that Klearchos should be sent to Kalchedon and Byzantium. By the context, between Thrasyllos' preparations for his Ionian campaign (i. 1. 34) and his setting out (i. 2. 1), this might be early in 409. Diodoros has him still in the Hellespont at Kyzikos in early spring of 410 (xiii. 51. 1), and we hear nothing of a return to Greece. Xenophon presents Agis' plan as if it were an entirely new inspiration, and it is in this confused area of *HG* i that he has almost certainly misplaced the recall of Hermokrates (85. 3 n. below), so that we might suspect another mistake here. But the full and concrete detail of Klearchos' mission at i. 1. 36 is convincing, and bears no resemblance to that of his first mission in Th. 80, so it is simplest to suppose that he did come home after Kyzikos and that Xenophon ignores or forgets his earlier presence in the Hellespont. He adds that Klearchos was *proxenos* of Byzantium, but we do not know how or when he acquired this connection.

3. **ὅπως μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, κ.τ.λ.:** this clause has been suspected by Steup and others because § 4 explains it (*καὶ γάρ*) by saying that they made their preparations openly and thought the Athenians powerless, which seems inconsistent. But the open preparations serve to explain

how the Athenians would certainly notice their departure; if the Spartans also took measures to distract the attention of the supposedly powerless Athenian navy, their excess of caution need cause no surprise.

9. 1. τὰ Ἱσθμια, ἡ τότε ἥν: the festival itself had not yet begun, for there is still noticeable delay (§§ 2–3) and time for Aristokrates to go to Chios before 10. 1 τὰ Ἱσθμια ἐγένετο; there might be some overlap between 10. 1 (ἐν δὲ τούτῳ) and 9. 2–3, but it is not great, since the Chian ships are with the Athenian fleet immediately after the festival (10. 2). The hindrance was rather the truce, which will have begun some while before the festival, and perhaps earlier for Corinth than for others; cf. Elis and the Olympic truce, v. 49. 3. Thus ἡ τότε ἥν must mean, loosely, the season of the festival, and the conference may have begun some appreciable time before the actual celebration (10. 1 n.).

2. ἥσθάνοντο: this (B) must be right against ἥσθοντο (cett.), for the process still continues in 10. 1, κατάδηλα μᾶλλον ἐφάνη.

Ἀριστοκράτη: as Gomme said (v. 19. 2 n.), the name is not uncommon, but the prominent A. of this period is the son of Skellias (89. 2). For possible alternatives see Andrewes and Lewis, *JHS* lxxvii (1957), 179; but it is likely that all Thucydides' references are to this man, and it is no bar to the identification that a patronymic is given at 89. 2 but not here. For his father's name and his politics see 89. 2 n.

ἀρνουμένων τῶν Χίων τὸ πιστὸν ναῦς σφίσι ξυμπέμπειν ἐκέλευον: if the text is to stand, τὸ πιστόν must mean 'as a pledge of good behaviour' and stand in apposition to ναῦς σφίσι ξυμπέμπειν; and ΣΜνε² ὑπὲρ τοῦ πιστοῦς μεῖναι αὐτούς is probably intended as an expression of τὸ πιστόν in this sense. The word order is against this interpretation, as also the definite article with πιστόν: if this is the sense, πίστιν would render it better than to τὸ πιστόν. Stahl and others excise τὸ πιστόν, but offer no explanation how it came to be there. The sentence would run more easily if τὸ πιστόν covers an object for ἀρνουμένων, and Steup suggested that τῶν ἐγκλημάτων or the like had fallen out after πιστόν, the Chians 'denying the reliability of the charges'; Dover more simply suggests reading τὸ ἄπιστον, 'denying the alleged treachery'. Valla's *eisque pernegantes iusserunt ex formula naues mittere* shows that there was nothing in his text that he took as object to ἀρνουμένων, but his ingenious Latin technicality (cf. e.g. Liv. xxii. 57. 10) conceals from us what his text did have. There can be no doubt about the overall sense of the passage.

3. οἱ μὲν πολλοί . . . οὐκ εἰδότες: Chios was an oligarchy (14. 2 with n.; W. G. Forrest, *BSA* lv [1960], 180; contra, T. J. Quinn, *Historia* xviii [1969], 22–30), but the conspirators expected that the people would be pro-Athenian and they wished to avoid trouble till they were sure of practical support from the Peloponnesians. 38. 3 (see n.)

there) may suggest that there was a pro-Athenian faction among the upper class, which is likely enough. Chios like Mytilene (iii. 9. 3; 39. 2, 5) had been favoured by Athens in peace-time: Ar. *Av.* 880, unless it conceals some rather involved irony, supports the claim of Σ ad loc. that there was a special relationship, and Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F 104, quoted by the scholiast, fits better into the fifth-century context, *pace* Jacoby, than into the period of the King's Peace. The one sign of previous trouble is Th. iv. 51 in winter 425/4, which Thucydides does not explain apart from his mention of a 'new wall', for which edd. naturally compare Mytilene in 428 (iii. 2. 2). But that trouble was patched up and Chios had since given loyal support to Athens, six ships contributed to the Melos operation (v. 84. 1), an unstated proportion of 34 non-Athenian ships in 415 (vi. 43), five for the second expedition (vii. 20. 2); their losses will have rankled while Athens' disaster raised their hopes of successful revolt. Thucydides (viii. 24. 5) stresses the fact that they did not revolt till they felt certain it was safe to do so; that was their *σωφροσύνη*, which Gomme (iv. 51 n.) not unreasonably described as timidity.

10. 1. τὰ Ἰσθμια: this passage and X. *HG* iv. 5. 1–4 are the main evidence for the time of the Isthmia. For a clear statement see Beloch, i². 2. 146–7.

(a) *Σ Pi. N.* iii. 147 says that the Isthmia fell nine days after the Epidaurian Asklepieia; and in Pl. *Ion* 530b Ion has just won prizes at the Asklepieia and is shortly to compete at the Panathenaia. This suggests that the Isthmia could fall in Attic Hekatombaion, but divergent intercalation might disturb the equation.

(b) Xenophon leaves no doubt that the Isthmia of 390 came in full summer, cf. *HG* iv. 5. 4 ἔχοντες οὖα δὴ θέρους σπείρια. The *mora* shortly afterwards destroyed by Iphikrates had escorted the Amyklaians past Corinth on their way home for the Hyakinthia, and the best guide to the time of that festival is that it was being celebrated in 479 at the time when Mardonios had occupied Athens, and Sparta was being pressed to send out the force which fought at Plataia (Hdt. ix. 7. 1); cf. X. *Ag.* 2. 17, *HG* iv. 4. 19, where the Hyakinthia come after a very complete ravaging of the Argolid. Th. v. 41. 3, if that passage stood alone, would suggest that the Hyakinthia took place early in the year (see vol. iv, p. 485), but we should probably suppose that the negotiations of v. 41 took more time than Thucydides' account would suggest. Nothing certain can be extracted from Hesych. s.v. *'Εκαρομβεύς* μὴν παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, ἐν φὶ τὰ Ὑακίνθια (in spite of Busolt, i. 654 n. 1, ii. 722 n. 2, followed by Gomme, v. 23. 4 n.); in view of the existence of a Spartan month *Hyakinthios*, this may be an outright mistake. Other indications of an early date are still more flimsy.

(c) In our passage Alkamenes set out *μετὰ τὴν ἔορτήν* (§ 2), and there can be no long interval (§ 2 n.) before he was shut up at Peiraios. Chalkideus was anxious to reach Chios before the news of this setback (12. 1) and made a rapid voyage. The news of the revolt of Chios reached Athens quickly (15. 1) and induced the lifting of the ban on the use of the 1,000T set aside in 431 (ii. 24. 1). We know from Philochoros (*FGrH* 328 F 138) that the first use of this money belongs to the year of Kallias, i.e. after 1 Hekatombaion 412; this leaves some latitude, but the first item in the series, the Isthmia, should fall not more than a month before the start of Hekatombaion, and probably less.

On this evidence, the Isthmia should normally fall in July or late in June. This would be well away from the Olympia, in years when both festivals were held.

ἐπηγέλθησαν γάρ: *B17¹⁷* add *αἱ σπονδαί*; Valla's *indicta enim fuerunt federa dierum festorum* points the same way. To supply *τὰ "Ισθμια* as subject (Stahl, Goodhart, comparing v. 75. 2) is difficult in face of *τὰ "Ισθμια ἐγίγνετο* immediately above; *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι* (J. E. Powell, *CQ* xxxii [1938], 76–7) makes more sense if taken as 'the Athenians had been notified', but the construction is very difficult. *αἱ σπονδαί* is the natural subject, and it should be expressed.

2. ἀπετράποντο: the Athenians must retire all the way to the Peiraieus before they later (§ 3) man other ships and send them out; the Peloponnesians either 'turned back' to Kenchreai, or 'aside' to some other place of safety before setting out again (§ 3 *παραπλέοντας*). There is no reason to suppose a long interval.

3. ἄλλας --- ἐς ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα: *ἐς* had already been conjectured (Westermann) before it was found in *IT¹⁷* (om. cett.). Without it the Athenians man a disproportionate number of ships, 37 in addition to what they retained of the original squadron. *ἄλλας προσπληρώσαντες*, if closely connected with the preceding clause, means that the suspect Chian ships were now replaced; but at 15. 2 they are still with the Athenian fleet and are then removed. This is so clearly stated that we should probably take the apparent implication of 10. 2–3 as not intended by Thucydides.

Σπείραιον: here and below, codd. have *Πειραιόν* (*Πειραιῶ*) without variant; the reading of *IT¹⁷* is not certain. *IG* iv². 1. 71. 4, 18, a third-century arbitration between Epidauros and Corinth, gives us a *Σπίραιον*, close to the border but now adjudged to Epidauros; Ptolemy (*Geogr.* iii. 14. 33) has a *Σπείραιον*, Pliny (*NH* iv. 18) a *Spiraeum promonturium* here. Since K. O. Müller most edd. have printed *Σπείραιον* (*Σπειραιῶ*) in Thucydides, probably wrongly. Bölte, *RE* iiiA. 1592–9 (with map) hesitantly accepts the usual identification of Cape Speiraión, but argues that the harbour must be Frangolimáni, some 6 km. to the west, the only suitable harbour that can be watched

from a single island (11. 1); Leake, *Travels in the Morea* iii. 313, and Busolt iii/2. 1421 with n. 3, make the same identification. Bölte's specific argument, that the definite article in 11. 1 τὸ νησίδιον requires a single island and excludes the group of small islands off Speiraion, is not valid, since the article at 11. 1 is amply accounted for by the following relative clause. But Steph. Byz. s.v. *Πειραιός* --- ἔστι καὶ τῆς Κορινθίας λμήν is to be referred to our passage, for the Peiraios of the Perachora peninsula (X. HG iv. 5. 1-5) is not specifically a harbour; and Bölte rightly rejected Steup's argument that Thucydides must have added a specification if there were two places of almost identical name in the Corinthia. If we emend, we must emend in six places (10. 3, 11. 3, 14. 2, 15. 1, 2, 20. 1) where there is no variant. Since the nominative does not appear in any of these, Stephanus is our only clue to the gender.

11. 1. ἐς τὸ νησίδιον: see 10. 3 n. Stahl's *τι* for *τό*, adopted by Steup, is in any case unnecessary.

2. οἱ ἄλλοι πρόσχωροι: in this very broken country it would take time for even neighbours to collect, and there were not many of them. Since Corinth has been mentioned already and Argos is excluded, these men can only be Epidaurians.

Θέρμων: presumably to replace Alkamenes. He is not named in connection with the eventual break-out (20. 1), but nor is any other commander; nor is he mentioned anywhere else.

3. καὶ τινας προανηγμένας μετακαλεῖν: this is very obscure. Conceivably an order might have been sent to the ships blockaded at Peiraios, that they were not to proceed even if they effected an escape, but these have just been mentioned explicitly and it would hardly be possible to refer to them again here vaguely as *τινάς*. Perhaps some or all of the five that were being got ready in Lakonia (6. 5) were waiting for Chalkideus at some rendezvous from which they could be recalled, but nothing has been said of that.

12.1 καὶ αὐτὸς δταν, κ.τ.λ.: Steup preferred B's *αὐτὸς ὅτι ἦν προσβάλῃ* --- *πείσει*, as more emphatic and because it was uncertain whether they would reach Ionia, but Alkibiades was not the man to express doubt about that. It looks more like a conjecture designed to remove the transition from *ὅτι* with indic. to nom. and infin. (not that that is so uncommon, e.g. iii. 25. 1), but if so the 'correction' was not extended to cover *φανεῖσθαι* below. Alkibiades' confidence in his persuasive diplomacy is as great as ever: cf. vi. 16. 6, 48.

πιστότερος γὰρ ἄλλων φανεῖσθαι: B is certainly right here against C *πιστότεροι*, cett. *πιστότερον*. The point is partly that Alkibiades, from having held office at Athens, can speak with knowledge and

authority, but also his personal influence in Ionia; cf. 17.2 for his relations with leading men at Miletos. We have also the nearly identical catalogues in Plu. *Alc.* 12. 1, Satyros ap. Ath. xiii. 534d, [Andok.] iv. 30, in which Ephesos provides his *σκήνη* at Olympia, Chios fodder for his horses and sacrificial victims (Satyros attributes this last to *Kyzikos*), Lesbos wine. This may well go back to Theopompos; the details of Alkibiades' extravagance may need discounting, but there is no difficulty in believing that the Ionian cities paid court to him in the days of his power at Athens.

2. *δι' ἐκείνου*: some earlier edd. took this to be Alkibiades, but the echo at 17. 2 is enough by itself to show that Endios is meant.

τῷ Ἀγίδι αὐτὸς διάφορος ὁν: Steup referred this too to Endios, which is less certain. If Endios is meant, *αὐτός* is otiose; if Alkibiades, as many have taken it, *kai' αὐτός* would have been clearer. The fact of Alkibiades' enmity with Agis is however needed here to complete the story of the intrigue, so the reference is more probably to Alkibiades. Thucydides says nothing about the cause of the quarrel, but it has naturally been guessed that he here alludes to the famous scandal of Alkibiades' adultery with Agis' queen Timaia. Xenophon (*HG* iii. 3. 1 ff.) describes the contest over the succession at Agis' death, in which his half-brother Agesilaos brought up against his doubtfully legitimate son Leotychidas the earthquake which drove the adulterer out of Timaia's room. No name is given, and the earliest source which is known to have named Alkibiades is Douris of Samos in the late fourth or early third century (*FGrH* 76 F 69, from Plu. *Ages.* 3. 2), who had a special interest in that he claimed descent from Alkibiades (Plu. *Alc.* 32. 2 = 76 T 3); but Plutarch cites Douris only for a particular detail and his main source for the story was other and probably earlier, Theopompos being an obvious possibility.

The reticence of Thucydides and Xenophon does not by itself disprove the later story, which Hatzfeld defended (*Alcibiade* 217–9, more fully *REA* xxxv [1933], 387–95). But if Leotychidas was Alkibiades' son he can hardly have been born before 413, or if with Hatzfeld we identify Xenophon's earthquake with that of 6. 5 above, we should presumably come down to late 412. Agis died in spring 400 (Beloch i². 2. 186, iii². 1. 17–19), or less probably in spring 397, so Leotychidas would be not yet 13, or less probably approaching 16, when Agis died; Agis' first male child will have been born when he was near sixty; and Agesilaos, born c. 440, will have been the next heir to the throne for over 25 years, whereas Plutarch (*Ages.* 1. 2–5) claims that he was brought up as *ἰδιώτης*. None of this is quite impossible, but cumulatively it is not very probable.

H. D. Westlake, *JHS* lviii (1938), 33–5, suggests that Alkibiades went to Dekeleia with Agis, taking Diod. xiii. 9. 2 as literal truth, and that they quarrelled after the failure of Agis' northern plans (3. 1

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above); but Hatzfeld's objection (*Alcibiade* 214 n. 1) is decisive, that Alkibiades' very vocal Athenian enemies could hardly have kept silent about his presence with the enemy at Dekeleia.

For the further evidence of 45. 1 below, see n. there. It is not necessary to find a special or spectacular cause for Alkibiades' quarrel with Agis or for his attaching himself to the party of his relative Endios; if he spent many months in Sparta, so restless an intriguer was bound to become involved in the clash of factions.

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Chalkideus' five ships at 12. 3 are the first of many forces sent to Ionia. Thucydides gives enough precise numbers to suggest that he wished his readers to keep track of the main movements, and from time to time he gives a total for one side or the other; but it would be unreasonable to expect him to mention every movement of single ships or very small contingents, even if he knew them all, and we soon discover (see esp. § 8 below) that he missed out some more substantial items. The evidence is adequate to give us a rough idea of relative strengths at most times, and (e.g.) to test the validity of the argument of the Peloponnesian sailors at 78, but beyond that the most that can be done is to indicate where the main problems lie. The information given by Thucydides, and in the last phase also Diodoros, is as follows:

Summer 412

1. The crews of Chalkideus' five ships were later armed as land troops and replaced with Chian crews (17. 1), and these five with twenty Chian ships formed the first force at Miletos (*ibid.*).

2. The first Athenian contingents add up to 46: Strombichides with eight to Samos (16. 1), followed by Thrasykles with twelve (17. 3), Diomedon with sixteen (19. 2), and Leon with ten (23. 1). Strombichides also picked up one Samian ship (16. 1), which is not specifically mentioned again. Nineteen went to Lade (17. 3), and later (24. 1) we have 'the' twenty there, blockading 25 enemy ships. 25 went to Lesbos (23. 1), and then to Chios (24. 2). Strombichides disappears between 17. 3 and 30. 1, when he comes out with colleagues and a fresh fleet from Athens; evidently he had gone home, with one or more ships, but Thucydides has said nothing of this.

3. The Chians sent ten ships to Anaia (19. 1), which are stated to be additional to their ships at Miletos, so they now have thirty at sea. Four of the Anaia force were taken, but their crews escaped (19. 3).

4. Next the Chians sent thirteen to Lesbos (22. 1), and one more came with Astyochos (23. 2); Chios has thus 34 at sea and has lost

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four. Of those at Lesbos four stayed at Methymna (22. 2) while the rest went to Mytilene, where the Athenians took 'the' Chian ships, presumably nine (23. 3), and they then took one of the four at Methymna (23. 4).

5. Astyochos had come to Chios from Kenchreai with four (23. 1), and after the attempt on Lesbos he was joined by six more (23. 5).

6. At the end of summer Phrynicos, Onomakles, and Skironides arrived at Samos with 3,500 hoplites and 48 ships, some of them *hoplitagogoi* (25. 1). For troop-carriers see vi. 43 n. with vol. iv, p. 487; Morrison and Williams, 246–8. We are not in a position to calculate how many would be needed here, and comparison with the expedition of 415 is frustrated by our not knowing how many of the 34 allied ships in vi. 43 were transports (Morrison and Williams assume that they all were, which would be surprising, and their total of 'seventy-seven transports' [248] is not easy to explain unless they also include the two Rhodian pentekonters and the horse-transport). Further, for this shorter voyage a degree of crowding might have been tolerated which would not have been possible on the journey to Sicily. See also 25. 1 n. There should now be 68 Athenian ships off Miletos and some 25 at Chios, about 93 in all.

7. Shortly afterwards Therimenes brought 55 ships to Miletos (26. 1), making eighty in all with the twenty Chians; these were still present (28. 1), but it is the last time they are specifically mentioned and they could at any later time have returned to Chios, in whole or part.

Winter 412/11

8. Early in this winter Charminos, Strombichides and Euktemon arrived at Samos with 35 (30. 1; for Strombichides see § 2 above), which should give 103 at Samos and about 128 in all. The whole fleet now concentrated at Samos, 'the ships from Chios and all the rest' (30. 1), and a division of forces was agreed. Strombichides, Onomakles, and Euktemon went with thirty to Chios, plus 'part of the thousand hoplites that had come to Miletos' (the Athenian thousand? nothing more is heard of the thousand allied hoplites of 25. 1) in *hoplitagogoi*: we can only guess at the number of the latter, but let us take it as five, making 35 ships in all (cf. § 9 ad fin.). The rest, numbering 74, stayed at Samos (30. 2). That makes c. 109 in all, so some twenty are missing, and so are the commanders of the fleet previously at Chios, Leon and Diomedon (24. 2), who seem to be available at Athens in midwinter (54. 3, 55. 1); some ships may have gone home with them. Further, the Argive hoplites sailed home after the battle of Miletos (27. 6), and 1,200 men (25. 1, 3) cannot have needed much less than ten ships, which may have been absent when this count was taken; other ships may have taken the thousand allied hoplites home. It may be noted

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that when we are next given a total, which is not till well on in the summer of 411 (79. 2), it is larger than we should expect from Thucydides' record, so perhaps some ships, detached at the present time, had returned later. It is abundantly clear that Thucydides has not given us all movements in full detail. Note also 30. 1 τὰς ἄλλας, which implies that there were other ships in these waters besides those at Samos and Chios.

9. Next in the record, Astyochos took 'the' ten Peloponnesian ships (§ 5 above) and ten Chian from Chios to Klazomenai (31. 1-2). Since the Chians had lost ten of the fourteen that went to Lesbos (§ 4 above), either they had manned six fresh ships, or some of those at Miletos had now come home. Later passages do not further clarify the question how many ships the Chians put to sea altogether, so we may note here that they certainly provided 38 (§ 4 above), very possibly 44, and in addition furnished crews for five Spartan ships; quite a creditable proportion of the sixty Chian ships claimed at 6. 4. In spite of storms Astyochos' ships all got back to Chios (32. 1), and he then brought the Peloponnesian ten to Miletos (33. 1, 4). That would make ninety at Miletos, if the twenty Chians were still there, facing 74 Athenians; off Chios an uncertain number of Chians avoided conflict with (?) 35 Athenians, but the Athenians lost three in an incautious pursuit (34), and the number was 32 in the following spring (61. 3).

10. Still early in winter Hippocrates brought twelve from Peloponnese to Knidos (35. 1). The Athenians took six of these (35. 3), but it is not stated where the other six then went.

11. Late in December Antisthenes with 27 left Peloponnese (39. 1), and near Melos he encountered ten Athenians (who were not apparently there at the time of Hippokrates' crossing), and he took three but the rest escaped to Samos (39. 3). We are not told whether the ten came from Athens or from Samos: if the former, there is a net gain to Samos of seven ships, if the latter a loss of three. That makes 81 or 71 (with perhaps some returned from Argos, § 8 above), of which Charminos then lost six at Syme (42. 4); and 32 at Chios.

12. Antisthenes' 27 eventually reached Kaunos (39. 3), and Astyochos set out to join them (41. 1). From 61. 2 it appears (see n. there) that he left at least nine of his ships at Miletos, and on the way he lost three (42. 3), but at Knidos he might pick up Hippokrates' remaining six (§ 10), if they had not joined him already. Two uncertainties confuse the count: (a) there is no knowing whether the twenty Chians that took part in the original revolt of Miletos were still there (§ 7), and if they were it might be doubted if Astyochos, disposed as he was at 40. 3 to help Chios, would have taken these ships south and left others to guard Miletos; (b) the twelve guard-ships mentioned at 61. 2 left Miletos while Astyochos was still in

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Rhodes, and unless others besides the twelve had been left Miletos would have been totally denuded, if only for a short time. With Antisthenes' 27, the number under Astyochos at Knidos might have approached 111, or fallen below 91. The fleet that moved to Rhodes at 44. 2 numbered 94. It is not easy to say whether the discrepancy is substantial: Thucydides might have missed out some reinforcement, or some local ships might have been recruited (the ships left at Miletos included one from Miletos and one from Anaia). When we next get a total, in the middle of summer 411 (79. 1), it is higher by eight than we should expect from the intervening record (§ 16). If we take that to mean that ships to roughly that number remained at Miletos after the squadron mentioned at 61. 2 had left for Chios, that would not be unreasonable. It is still not fully explained how the figure of 94 at Rhodes is made up.

13. In a land fight on Chios Pedaritos took part of the Athenian camp, including 'some' ships hauled up on land, but these were presumably regained when he was repulsed and killed (55. 3). Still in the winter his successor Leon brought twelve from Miletos to Chios (61. 2).

Summer 411

14. In a sea battle off Chios, 32 Athenian ships (cf. §§ 9, 13) fought against 36 (61. 3), which could include some or all of the twelve brought by Leon (§ 13); the Chians therefore manned at least 24, but not necessarily more, and by now it is likely enough that the twenty from Miletos (§§ 7, 12) have returned to Chios.

15. On the news of the revolt of Abydos, Strombichides took 24 to the Hellespont, including some troop-carriers (62. 2). This should leave about eight at Chios.

16. Some while later (see 63. 3 n.) Astyochos came to Chios and fetched 'the' ships from there (63. 2); that should mean the ships from Miletos (§ 13), but probably he left Leon his own ship (61. 2), so this should add eleven to the 93 brought from Rhodes. A little later (79. 1) he has 112 at Miletos: the surplus may be due to his having left further ships behind at Miletos in the winter (§ 12), but other unrecorded additions are also possible.

17. If Peisandros took more than one ship with him on his first visit to Athens (53. 1: the text does not suggest that he did), such ships may be presumed to have returned with him. His second journey, with half the envoys going to Athens and half in other directions (64. 1), means the more permanent removal of more ships; Dieitrephe may well have taken more than one to Thrace (64. 2), and later the Paralos was sent to Athens (74. 1). We might estimate some ten ships in all lost to Samos. The total there should have been 75 or 65 (§ 11), less these ten, but at the time of the counter-revolution in Samos

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Thucydides gives the Athenians 82 (79. 2). We should therefore take the higher of the two figures suggested at § 11, and the discrepancy can be further reduced by supposing that ships sent to Argos or elsewhere (§ 8) returned after their mission; but it is clearly also possible that Thucydides has omitted some other movement. There were also some 32 at Chios and in the Hellespont, making 114 in all.

18. Strombichides then returned to Samos with 'the ships from the Hellespont', which had been 24 (§ 15), but the total is now 108 (79. 6), so he or the fleet at Samos has picked up two more from Chios or elsewhere. The forces at Samos and Miletos are now almost equal.

19. Immediately after this (80. 1) Klearchos set off with forty to the Hellespont, but his fleet was scattered by a storm. 'The majority' returned to Miletos (80. 3: presumably thirty of them, as there is no mention of any ships lost), while ten with Helixos reached Byzantium. That should leave 102 at Miletos. Thucydides does not here specify the number now sent off by the commanders at Samos (80. 4), but from 100. 5, 102. 1 it looks as if it was twenty, leaving 88 at Samos. Later Alkibiades took thirteen to Aspendos (88. 1), which did not return till 108. 1, so that the total at the point when Mindaros left Miletos (99) should be 75 at Samos.

20. On the Peloponnesian side the arrival of Mindaros and the departure of Astyochos and others (85) need not involve any change in numbers. At an unspecified point in the summer sixteen were sent to the Hellespont (99); Dorieus took thirteen to Rhodes (Diod. xiii. 38. 5, not in Thucydides: at X. *HG* i. 1. 2 he reaches the Hellespont with fourteen); and two went with Philippos to Aspendos (87. 6). If these last had returned to Miletos, that would give 73 ships there, the number that Thucydides gives Mindaros at his departure for the Hellespont (99); but it looks as if Philippos was still at Aspendos (*ibid.*) when Mindaros left. The discrepancy, if any, is this time very small.

21. Thrasyllos pursued with 55 from Samos (100. 1) and joined Thrasyboulos who had five at Eresos (100. 4); that might leave fifteen at Samos, and Alkibiades was able to man nine ships besides his original thirteen when he came back to Samos at 108. 1-2. The main fleet picked up two which were on their way home from the Hellespont, and some Methymnaians (100. 5); the total is then given as 67, which fits if we take the Methymnaians to be five, or supply that figure in the text.

22. The eighteen Athenian ships at Sestos escaped into open sea, but lost four to Mindaros' pursuit (102). Fourteen added to the 67 previously at Eresos would give 81, but the total at Kynossema was 76 (104. 2); the simplest solution (Arnold) is to suppose that the Methymnaians remained behind. Mindaros, after joining the sixteen at Abydos (99, 102. 2), is given 86. That seems three too few, but

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Thucydides now explains that the Athenians had taken two at the entrance to the Hellespont (103. 3); Diodoros (xiii. 39. 2) has the Athenians take three, which would set the count right, but his total for Mindaros is 88 (xiii. 39. 3) not 86, and we cannot assume that his source had exactly the same set of figures as Thucydides. For the casualties at Kynossema Diodoros (xiii. 40. 5) seems to have set out to give the same detailed catalogue as Thucydides (106. 3), but if so he missed out two items; for the Athenian losses he gives five where Thucydides (*ibid.*) has fifteen, and it is hard to say whether that is an error of Diodoros or his copyists, or a genuine divergence.

With that we may leave this review. The main uncertainty is the number of Athenian ships at Samos or further south during winter 412/11, which is likely to be higher than the 74 given at 30. 2 (see § 8 above); nevertheless it seems likely that the Peloponnesians had more ships in these waters at all times since the arrival of Therimenes (§ 7), and more ships overall after the arrival of Antisthenes (§ 12). Though the Peloponnesians avoided battle at all times except at 63. 2, 79. 1–4, there is that much justification for Tissaphernes' fear of them at 52, *ὅτι πλέοσι νανοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρῆσαν*, and for Peisandros' assertion at 53. 2 that the Athenians were faced by a Peloponnesian fleet not inferior in numbers. But there is nothing to be said for the complaint of the Peloponnesian sailors at 78, that they had been prevented from fighting while they were strong and the Athenian fleet was *ἀλιγον*; at no point was there a disproportion to justify that.

13. αἱ ... ἐκκαίδεκα νῆες: they have not been so named before as a unit, but they are a readily identifiable group and the definite article is natural enough. There had been seventeen: four with Gylippos (vi. 104. 1, see n. *there*), one with Gongylos (vii. 2. 1), then 'the remaining twelve' (vii. 7. 1). One may well have been lost; Plu. *Nic.* 19. 7 says that Gongylos was killed in battle (see vii. 2. 1 n.). Steup's proposal to read *ἐπτακαίδεκα* is not justified.

κοπεῖσαι: LSJ *κόπτω* I. 4 'shattered, disabled' is much too strong for an action in which only one ship was lost, against these odds. Given the basic sense 'cut, strike', this need mean no more than that an attack was made on them and some damage done. Cf. H. D. Westlake, *CQ* N.S. xxiv (1974), 212 with n. 3, on iv. 14. 1.

ῶν ἥρχεν Ἰπποκλῆς Μενίππου: Beloch ii². 2. 266 and Fornara 65 reckon him among the generals for 413/12, but by now we have probably reached the beginning of 412/11 (10. 1 n.), a year in which a considerable number of commanders are found operating abroad and the enemy occupation of Dekeleia clearly requires the retention of some generals at home. It now seems possible that further commanders besides the ten *strategoi* were formally appointed in the later years of the war. The new fragment of *SEG* x. 424 published by

D. W. Bradeen in *Hesp.* xxxiii (1964), 43–4 lists two casualties, Theoros and Pasiphon (for the identification of these men see Bradeen, 48–9), with the hitherto unknown title ἄρχον τὸ ναυτικόν, and they are placed at the head of the column, above two taxiarchs and four trierarchs. Bradeen (49–50) suggested that this was the title given to the generals elected by the fleet in 411 (76. 2 below) and the following years, but in a letter written shortly before his death he inclined to accept the alternative opinion, that these were officers sent out to commands for which, in this very scattered war, no στρατηγοί were available. If so, when our texts (as here) use ἄρχε or a similar term for the commander of a squadron and do not explicitly call him στρατηγός, we must allow for the possibility that he was not one of the board, and our lists for this period may need revision. For 412/11 the doubtful names, besides Hippokles, are Thrasykles (17. 3) and Eukrates (Ar. *Lys.* 103); see further 54. 3 n.

Hippokles is not otherwise known, but it is not a common name. At least two are attested in this period: *IG* i². 951. 10, a bare name on a casualty list; *Lys.* xii. 55, a member of the committee of ten appointed in the city after the collapse of the Thirty. The Menippos described by Plu. *Per.* 13. 15, in language unsuitable to the fifth century, as ἀνδρὸς φίλου καὶ ὑποστρατηγοῦντος to Perikles might be our Hippokles' father, making this a strategic family. Bare reference to a Menippos in Ar. *Av.* 1293 adds nothing, but the scholiast calls him ἵπποτρόφον, and since this cannot be deduced from *Av.* 1293 it is likely that some other reference in comedy gave more information; And. ii. 23 says that a Menippos carried a decree of ἀδειά for him which was later rescinded; for fourth-century Menippoi see Davies 10037.

For the squadron at Naupaktos, and for Diphilos as its commander for 413/12, see vii. 34. 3 n.; Diphilos had 33 ships, of which seven were badly damaged but not sunk in battle with the Corinthians (vii. 34. 3–5), and it looks as if we have here the same squadron under a new commander, probably for 412/11. Diod. xiii. 48. 6 has Konon at Naupaktos again (cf. Th. vii. 31. 4), during a stasis in Kerkyra placed under 410/09, but between Theramenes' voyage to Paros (47. 8) of autumn 411 and his collaboration with Archelaos at Pydna (49. 1) of winter 411/10; if his source had chronological reason to interrupt the recital of Theramenes' actions in this way, the stasis should be late in 411. In that case Konon should be the commander for 411/10 in succession to Hippokles. Konon is not referred to at all in connection with the events of 411 in Athens, where he next appears in 407 (X. *HG* i. 4. 10); probably he sailed out to his command before the revolution broke out and so escaped involvement.

It is somewhat surprising that so many ships should be maintained here when Athens had such need nearer home, but they were greatly

afraid that the Syracusans would follow up their victory by attacking Athens at home (1. 2) and they may have thought it the best strategy to intercept such ships from the West before they could join the Peloponnesians, as they unsuccessfully attempt to do here (cf. Iphikrates' interception of ten of Dionysios' ships in 372, X. *HG* vi. 2. 33–6). The squadron is not heard of after 411 and may finally have come home with Konon: it plays no part in the defence of Pylos later (*Diod.* xiii. 64. 5–7, etc.).

14. 1. Κωρύκῳ: the Erythrai peninsula opposite Chios contains two large mountain masses, in the north Mimas, in the south Korykos terminating in a headland westward across the bay from Teos: see Str. xiv. 1. 32, 644, who reports several harbours (cf. 33. 2 below). Here Chalkideus would be out of sight from the city of Chios, which is on the east side of the island facing Erythrai, but his approach would have been visible to look-outs on Chios or the mainland, and the oligarchs were evidently expecting him. No doubt other messengers had crossed since Phrynis' exploratory mission (6. 4).

αὐτοὶ μέν: this seems to look forward to a contrast between Chalkideus' actions and the Chians' reception of them, but the construction is then changed and the Chians subdivided. The sentence is awkward but not unclear; it would run no better with *αὐτόθεν* for *αὐτοὶ μέν*, a change which seemed 'evident' to Wilamowitz (614).

2. βουλὴν --- ξυλλεγομένην: W. G. Forrest (*BSA* lv [1960], 180) notes that 'the only surviving prescript of a state decree from the fifth century reads only *βολῆς γνώμην*' (*Syll³*. 986). This body then was competent to take political decisions in the Chian oligarchy, and by having it ready in session the conspirators could get a quick decision. See also 9. 3 with n.

3. Κλαζομενάς --- Πολίχναν: for Klazomenai, in the south-west corner of the Gulf of Smyrna, see Str. xiv. 1. 36, 645; Paus. vii. 3. 8–9; *ATL* i. 503–4; J. M. Cook, 'Εφ. Αρχ. 1953/4. 2. 149–57. Pausanias says they settled first on the mainland (according to Strabo at *Xύτριον*, see below) and migrated to their island for fear of the Persians (the archaeological evidence suggests the time of the Ionian Revolt rather than of the original conquest, see Cook 153–4); and that Alexander built the causeway which later connected them with the mainland. They cultivated the larger islands out to the north (31. 3 *νήσους*, contrast *νησίδος* here). On the mainland their territory reached westwards to Hypokremnoi (Strabo), at the northern end of the isthmus which leads to the Erythrai peninsula; there is no certain indication how far it reached east towards Smyrna, but see Cook, *BSA* liii–liv (1958–9) 4, 18 with n. 35, and plan on p. 6. To the south, over the low hills on which stands the modern town of Urla, is a plain which would be the richest part of their land.

This passage does not refer explicitly to the main internal division within Klazomenai, between the island and the mainland. Cook (155) stresses the importance of Aristotle's reference to this, *Pol.* 1303 b 9, in a discussion of stasis in states whose topography hindered unity, *οἷον ἐν Κλαζομεναῖς οἱ ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν νήσῳ, καὶ Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς*. The argument and the parallel with Kolophon suggest two groups with radically different situations and interests, and Cook argues that Chytr(i)on should be sought in the plain of Urla, and that the conflict was between agriculturalists there and the more maritime population of the island. This fits better than the alternative location at the mainland end of the causeway: Wilamowitz, preferring the form *Xυτόν* found in Steph. Byz. s.v. (*Ephoros, FGrH* 70 F 78) and *IG* ii². 28 (Tod 114). 9–10, connected the name with a mole (*Sb. Berl.* 1906. 57 = *Kl. Schr.* v. i. 150 n. 2), *ATL* i. 503 with the causeway itself, but apart from the question when the causeway was built this does not so well satisfy the conditions set out by Aristotle. On Cook's view the more exposed islanders might be expected to adhere to Athens, the mainlanders to prefer revolt, but nothing of that appears here; the position might be clearer if we had a location for Daphnous (23. 6, 31. 2 below). In the event Klazomenai was soon recovered for Athens (23. 6) and later resisted another Spartan assault by Astyochos (31. 2–3). Thucydides has nothing further, and in X. *HG* i. 1. 10–11 it is still in Athenian hands at the beginning of 410.

The text does not show where we should locate Polichna. There is no positive advantage in identifying it with the home of the *Πολιχναῖοι Ἐρυθραίων* of the tribute-lists (Köhler, cf. Keil, *Öst. Jh.* xiii [1910], Beibl. 21 n. 14, and Cook 157 n. 3; *ATL* i. 487). These Polichnaioi are closely linked with Erythrai by the wording of list 7. iii. 28–30, where Erythrai pays on their behalf while other members of the syntely make their own payment, and the site should probably be sought nearer Erythrai. The Klazomenians would more naturally seek a refuge on their own mainland. The name Polichne is not uncommon in this area: there are three in the tribute-lists (*ATL* *Πολιχναῖοι Ἐρυθραίων, Πολιχναῖοι Κάρες, Πολιχνῖται*) and one in Chios (*Hdt.* vi. 26. 2), cf. Kirsten, *RE* xxi. 1371–4, nos. 4, 8–11; and vol. iv, p. 480 above.

Ἐν τειχισμῷ: there was plenty of building to do. Thucydides' general statement about Ionia (iii. 33. 2 ἀτειχίστου γὰρ οὕσης τῆς Ἰωνίας, of 427) can be extended north and south by the particular instances he gives in book viii: Klazomenai itself (31. 3), Knidos (35. 3), Lampsakos (62. 2), Kyzikos (107. 1) are all said to be unwalled, and we may add from Xenophon Chrysopolis, fortified by the Athenians in 410 (*HG* i. 1. 22; the walls of Pygela, attacked by Thrasyllus in 409 [*HG* i. 2. 2] may have been built after its revolt from Athens; Phokaia had long been in revolt when Xenophon appears to have Thrasyboulos

fortifying it [i. 5. 11], and in any case the text has long been seen to need emendation*. The *διατείχισμα* at Notion in 427 (Th. iii. 34. 2) is explained by the situation there.

Wade-Gery (219–20) supposed that these cities had had their walls removed at the time of the Peace of Kallias, as a counter-concession in return for the withdrawal of Persian forces from the coast. He noted however (219 n. 1) that these demolitions were in Athens' interest too, and that islands also are said to be unfortified: in Thucydides we find Kos (41. 2, fortified by Alkibiades at 108. 2), Kameiros (44. 2), Samos (50. 5), and since the first action of the Thasians in revolt is to fortify their city (64. 3) they must also have been unwalled. Chios appears to have been an exception, for the order in winter 425/4 to pull down *τὸ τεῖχος* --- *τὸ καινόν* (iv. 51) could be held to imply that there were other and older walls which they were allowed to keep; and the fortification which was going on at Mytilene in 428 (iii. 2. 2) may similarly be only new work, for Kleon (39. 2) speaks of the city as having walls. Most subsequent scholars have been sceptical about Wade-Gery's hypothesis, and prefer to attribute to an Athenian decision the absence of walls in these cities: so recently R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (1972), 149–51, citing among other evidence Telekleides fr. 42 (*Plu. Per.* 16. 2) on the powers given to Perikles, including *λάνια τείχη*, *τὰ μὲν οἰκοδομεῖν*, *τὰ δὲ τάμπαλιν αὐτὸν καταβάλλειν*, the last clause of which is more easily understood of the allied cities than of Athens' own building programme. The Peace of Kallias is however relevant in that, so long as it was observed, the East Greek cities could be left undefended on the landward side, as was not the case with the cities of Thrace (e.g. Amphipolis, iv. 104. 1; Torone, iv. 110. 2 ff.) which had potentially hostile neighbours. (The walls of Byzantium are not attested till 408 [X. *HG* i. 3. 14 ff.], but it may be guessed that it retained its fortifications even after the revolt of 440 [Th. i. 115. 5], whereas Chrysopolis on the Asiatic shore was unwalled, and Xenophon's account of operations outside Kalchedon in 408 [*HG* i. 3. 4 ff.] does not specifically mention a city wall.)

For the wall the Athenians were building on the landward side of Teos, see 16. 3 below with n.; for the Athenian forts in the territory of Erythrai, 24. 2 with n.

15. 1. *τῆς μεγίστης πόλεως*: cf. 40. 1, 45. 4.

τὰ τε χίλια τάλαντα --- *κινεῖν*: *κινεῖν* appears to be needed much earlier in the sentence both to complete *τῷ εἰπόντι* ἡ ἐπιψηφίσαντι and to govern *τὰ χίλια τάλαντα*, which is otherwise left hanging. Steup followed Stahl and Cobet in emending to *λύσαντες* --- [καὶ] ἐψηφίσαντο (this now turns out to be the reading of J²), which makes it easier to supply *κινεῖν* as required; but the sentence is still involved enough,

and Goodhart contemplated removing *τῶι εἰπόντι η̄ ἐπιψηφίσαντι* as a gloss to *ζημίας* added by a reader who had looked back to ii. 24. 1 for the explanation. But the bold structure is characteristic of Thucydides (a like agility, though not on the same scale, is required of the reader at vi. 68. 3 ἐξ ή̄ς κρατεῖν δεῖ η̄ μὴ ῥαδίως ἀποχωρεῖν; and cf. vi. 79. 1 with 82. 4 n.) and the comment of *ΣΜνεύ*, ἀντὶ τοῦ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς χιλίοις ταλάντοις ἐπικειμένας ζημίας, suggest that he had a text which he thought in some need of rearrangement.

See ii. 24. 1 for the reservation of these 1,000T in 431, against the case of an enemy fleet attacking Athens; the penalty was death, and since no such fleet had attacked it needed to be lifted. From the amount of detail he repeats here it looks as if Thucydides did not expect his readers to have the earlier passage all in mind (cf. 69. 3 n.). Philochoros (*FGrH* 328 F 138) dates the use of this money to Kallias' year, 412/11; for the chronological implications see 10. 1 n. For the triremes reserved in a connected decree of 431 (ii. 24. 2), see 1. 2 n. above.

τὰς μὲν δικτώ: cf. 16. 1.

διώξασαι καὶ οὐ καταλαβοῦσαι: it is not surprising that they failed to catch them (cf. 12. 3), but note the implication that an effective watch was being kept elsewhere than at Peiraios (cf. 39. 3).

Στρομβιχίδης Διοτίμου: of the distinguished family from Euonymon (Davies 4386, with stemma), in which these and allied names recur; for his father see also i. 45. 2 n. (the Timaios fr. is now *FGrH* 566 F 98). Here we have only *ἡρχε*, for which see 13 n. above, but at 30. 1 he is explicitly *στρατηγός*. Frequent in this book, he is lost to us thereafter till 404, when he was one of the leaders of the democratic resistance after the surrender and was executed by the Thirty (Lys. xiii. 13 ff., xxx. 14).

Θρασυκλέους: presumably the Thrasylles of v. 19. 2, 24. 1, and the mover of *IG* ii². 82 of 421/0 in honour of Asteas of Alea; cf. Andrewes and Lewis, *JHS* lxxvii (1957) 178. He recurs at 17. 3, 19. 2, but in none of these passages is he described as *στρατηγός* (see 13 n. above).

2. *τὰς τε τῶν Χίων ἐπτὰ ναῦς:* at 10. 3 (see n. there) it seems to be implied that they had been removed earlier, but this passage is explicit and clear, and the apparent implication at 10. 3 should be disregarded.

τοὺς μὲν δούλους . . . ἡλευθέρωσαν: for slaves in the Chian fleet see L. Robert, *BCH* lix (1935), 453–9, where he discusses a list (E. Zolotas, *Ἀθηνᾶ* 1908, 219; Plassart and Picard, *BCH* xxxvii [1913], 221–4) of names, mostly evident slaves, arranged in *δεκάδες*. Since these tens are complete it is not a casualty list, and Robert suggested that they were slaves enrolled for naval service and later freed by the city; a reference to their liberation could be restored in the prescript. The list appears to belong to the early fourth or late fifth century, and Robert

favoured a date in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War. For Chian slaves see further 40. 2 n.

ἔτέρας δὲ <δέκα>: as Goodhart remarks, *ἀντὶ πασῶν* requires a definite number to be noted as equal to or different from the number removed; without *πασῶν* an indefinite *ἔτέρας δέ* would be acceptable. From the 37 ships of 10. 3, twenty left with Strombichides and Thrasykles, and the Chian seven also left; the remainder is ten, and when we next hear of Peiraios at 20. 1 the Athenian squadron is equal to the Peloponnesian twenty. *δέκα* (Stahl) is thus the right supplement, and it could easily have fallen out after *δέ*.

ἄλλας --- τριάκοντα: in fact the next reinforcement to Ionia was 26, sixteen with Diomedon (19. 2) and ten with Leon (23. 1). It is tempting to link this shortfall with the four lost at Peiraios (20. 1), and that may be right in spite of the fact that this loss occurred after Diomedon's departure.

δλίγον ἐπράσσετο οὐδέν: cf. ii. 8. 1, and a similar feeling is implied at 5. 1 above. Comment of this kind is unusual in Thucydides; he probably wished to impress us with the resolute reaction of Athens (cf. ii. 65. 12).

16–22. *Spread of the revolt: first treaty between Sparta and Persia*

16. 1. προσλαβὸν Σαμίαν μίαν: a Samian ship is unexpected, for the surrender of her fleet was one of the terms imposed on Samos in 439 (i. 117. 3), and at vi. 85. 2, vii. 57. 4, only Chios and Methymna are distinguished from the more subject allies as providing ships (see vol. iv, p. 434). The oligarchy overthrown this summer (21 below) can hardly have done much shipbuilding. There is however also a single Milesian ship at 61. 2 below, in winter 412/11, which might just have been built and a crew trained since the liberation; but it is more likely that major allies deprived by Athens of their fleets were nevertheless allowed to maintain one or two ships for local use. No other Samian or Milesian ship is mentioned in this book, nor these again.

Τέων: a little east of the southern end of the Erythraian isthmus, on the coast leading down towards Notion and Ephesos, a chersonese site where extensive remains have been found. See Str. xiv. 1. 30, 644; Béquignon and Laumonier in *BCH* xl ix (1925), 281–321; Ruge, *RE* vA. 539–70*. With Chios, Erythrai, and Klazomenai in Spartan hands, Teos was the obvious base from which to prevent the revolt from spreading to the south; for Persia's interest in it see § 3 n. It was also a fairly rich city with a regular tribute of 6T; its territory reached southwards at least to Myonnesos (iii. 32. 1, see n.) and westwards to Korykos (viii. 33. 2 n.), but it is not certain how far it reached inland towards Klazomenai. The Teians are not enthusiastic for either side, cf. § 3 and 20. 2.

2. ἐν τῷ πελάγει: Steup wished to remove this as a gloss, partly as being unnecessary, partly because Thucydides should have written *ἐσ τὸ πέλαγος*. Goodhart suggests that the point is that Strombichides put further out to sea than he needed to, but that point is made by *μετεωρισθείς*. At vii. 71. 6 *μετέωροι* is glossed by *Σ^{rec}*. *ῆγουν ἐν τῷ πελάγει ὄντες*, as if in his time the word needed that explanation, so Steup may be right.

3. καὶ Χαλκιδέα: Herwerden and Hude deleted *καὶ*, since there was no one else to wait for but Chalkideus; but common usage is not so pedantic, in Greek or in English.

τὸ τεῖχος --- τὸ πρὸς ἡπειρόν: this has been suspected because (a) if *ἀνωκοδόμησαν* means 'rebuilt', Thucydides has not told us of the demolition of the original wall; (b) the same building is called *τὸ ἐν τῇ Τέῳ τεῖχος* at 20. 2, which has been taken to mean 'the fort inside the city of Teos' (cf. 84. 4). Dobree therefore proposed *ἐνωκοδόμησαν*. But the building of a 'fort' has not been mentioned either, and 'on the landward side of the city of Teos' suggests a wall across the isthmus rather than a fort within; and there are clear cases where *ἐν* with a place-name means 'near' or 'in the territory of' rather than 'in' (cf. vi. 65. 3 n., vii. 29. 2 n., and ii. 31. 1). Hdt. i. 186. 2 shows that *ἀνοικοδομεῖν* can mean 'build' (or 'build up') rather than 'rebuild'.

Thucydides does not explain the purpose of the wall; as Wilamowitz (615) saw, the enemy is Tissaphernes. Since spring 414, when there was an Athenian general in Ephesos (ML 77. 79, see 5. 5 n. above), that city seems to have fallen to the Persians (19. 3); and still closer Kolophon, Teos' neighbour to the south-east but on the other side of the mountain and facing inland, was in Persian hands from 430 (iii. 34. 1) to 409 (X. HG i. 2. 4). For fortifications in Ionia see 14. 3. n. above. The present wall might have been begun at any time since Athens decided to support Amorges, and we need not suppose the presence of an Athenian force at Teos now or very recently.

Στάγης ὑπάρχος Τισσαφέρνους: B's reading (ό *Τάγης* vel sim. cett.) is confirmed by the recurrence of the name in X. HG i. 2. 5, where Thrasyllos advancing from Kolophon into Lydia was attacked by *Στάγης* --- ο *Πέρσης περὶ ταῦτα τὰ χωρία ὦν*. At 31. 2, 87. 1 Tamos appears as *ὑπάρχος Ιωνίας*; at 108. 4 Arsakes the Persian, *Τισσαφέρνους ὑπάρχον*, at Antandros; it has been noted that *ὑπάρχος* is found only in these passages of Thucydides, all subordinates of Tissaphernes, but he is the only satrap whose doings are narrated in any detail. If the term has a local reference, Stages might be hyparch of Lydia. Further Persian interest in this wall is shown at 20. 2.

17. 1. τοὺς ναύτας διλίσαντες; they may have been picked with this intention, cf. vi. 91. 4, vii. 1. 3, though Thucydides does not here say so explicitly. See also 32. 2 n.

2. ὃν ἐπιτήδειος, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 12. 1.

ὅσπερ ὑπέσχετο: this shows that Thucydides was conscious of the full recapitulation of 12. 2 (including the word *ἀγώνισμα*), whether or not he would have retained it in revision. But the reference there to alliance with the king is not repeated, and this makes the introduction to the treaty in § 4 still more abrupt.

3. λαθόντες οὖν τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ πλοῦ: presumably they kept well out to the west, outside Ikaria, and approached Miletos from the south; but they could not avoid being sighted in the last stage of the voyage. *ἀφίστασι τὴν Μίλητον*; the intrinsic importance of Miletos made this a heavy blow; further, it ended the hope of confining the revolt to the area of Chios and Erythrai, and endangered Amorges' position at Iasos.

μᾶς δεούσας εἴκοσι: by 24. 1 this has become a regular force of twenty.

Λάδη τῇ ἐπικειμένῃ νήσῳ: the scene of the last battle of the Ionian Revolt (Hdt. vi. 7); now a small hill in the alluvial plain, very close indeed to the harbour of Miletos.

4. καὶ ἡ πρὸς βασιλέα ξυμμαχία: for the treaties and their place in Thucydides' work see 58. 7 n. This is the most abruptly introduced of the three, with no mention of any preliminary contact between Chalkideus and Tissaphernes, who appears in person for the first time at Teos in 20. 2, or of any meeting in Miletos or elsewhere; and cf. § 2 n. Yet the definite article has suggested that the reader is supposed to know of its existence, and Wilamowitz (584) based on this and on the similarly abrupt introduction of the Samian revolution in 21 a theory that these were additions to a draft which had not originally contained them. The article here is justified by the following *ἡ πρώτη* (cf. vi. 31. 1 n.), which conveys the point that there are more treaties to come (and implies that Thucydides knew this when he wrote 17. 4), but Wilamowitz may nevertheless be right; and there is no comparable justification for the definite article in the first clause of 21.

This first 'treaty' is no more than a preliminary working arrangement between the forces on the spot. It takes care mainly of Tissaphernes' needs (5. 5) and the Spartans get nothing out of it, beyond the very general agreement to fight the war in common. Conspicuously, nothing is said about the promised subsidies (5. 5), but there are as yet no Peloponnesian forces present, only Chian crews, and Tissaphernes perhaps did not feel obliged to pay them (Kirchhoff 133); but see further nn. to 29 below.

18. 1. πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ Τισσαφέρνην: cf. 37. 1, the same more elaborately expressed, whereas in the more formal heading at 58. 1 the agreement is with the satraps *περὶ τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων*. See further 58 nn.

χώραν καὶ πόλεις: in Hellenistic Asia Minor the distinction was important between *χώρα* as the royal domain and the cities with their territories. Tod 185 shows Alexander making the same distinction in the area of Priene, and there can be no doubt that it was taken over from the Persians, with whatever modifications. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 313–14, makes the point that it is also found here and at 37. 2, 5, and may well have appeared in the Peace of Kallias. It is not one which the Greeks of the homeland would naturally make: there *χώρα* is simply the rural component of the state's territory (e.g. ii. 16. 1, and even in Asia Tod 185. 6–7 *τὴν χώραν* means the rural possessions of a citizen of Priene), and there are no areas with different juridical status intervening between city territories. To the king, the Asiatic cities are within his *χώρα* (as Miletos at 84. 5 below, and see 58. 2 n.); the question is, what more is claimed for him here.

During the liberation after Mykale, and while Athens continued active war against Persia, it is unlikely (cf. i. 96. 1) that the king or any Persian (or Themistokles) enjoyed peaceful possession of land round the shores of the Latmian Gulf; we cannot tell what difference the Peace of Kallias made in this respect (it cannot have gone into great detail), but it seems less likely that under this Peace citizens of Priene lost land which they had held for nearly thirty years, more likely that the land which Alexander claimed for himself there (Tod 185. 10–11) had been resumed by the king of Persia after the break-up of the Athenian Empire. On the Elaitic Gulf, Myrina and Gryneion may well have been lost to Gonylos and his family while they were tribute-paying members of the Delian League, but regained later (X. *HG* iii. 1. 6). Matters would be different where the Persians controlled the coast, as at Atramyttion (v. 1., viii. 108. 4). It seems probable enough that the Persian negotiators had in mind recovery of some lost parts of the royal domain, but their immediate concern here, as in 37. 2, is with the Greek cities.

καὶ οἱ πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον: cf. 37. 2. For Lichas' objection that this surrendered Greece as far south as Boeotia, see 43.3–4 with nn. The more real question of Spartan relations with East Greek states can be dealt with more easily at 37. 2, 5, where the formulation is different.

χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι: ἄλλο *τι* no doubt includes ship-building materials etc. (cf. [X.] *Aθ. π.* 2. 11), perhaps also crews (Steup). At 37. 2 only tributes are mentioned.

2. καὶ τὸν πόλεμον, κ.τ.λ.: the terms are anything but specific, but the style is that of Greek cities combining in a joint enterprise, in contrast to the Persian style of the large claims made for the king in § 1. Clasen's *τοῦ* (from B's meaningless *τούς*) before the second *πρὸς Αθηναίους* seems likely, but does not affect the meaning.

3. Ἡν δέ τινες ἀφιστῶνται, κ.τ.λ.: the advantage of this clause, though

it is nominally reciprocal, is all with Persia. Tissaphernes had the actual revolt of Amorges on his hands (5. 5), but Sparta was in no danger that the king could remedy. In later treaties, after the capture of Amorges (28), this clause does not reappear.

πολέμιοι ὄντων: ἔστωσαν codd., in both places, which should probably not be altered. See 58. 7 n. § 3.

19. 1. δέκα ἑτέρας: besides the twenty ships of 17. 1.

ἐς Ἀναια: in the Samian peraia, just north of Mykale and the Panionion. For the Samian exiles settled here after 439, see iii. 19. 2, 32. 2, iv. 75. 1, and 21 n. below; Thucydides says nothing here of them, but 61. 2 implies the continued existence of an organized community. This was as close to Miletos as the Chians could safely go; Priene, at no great distance over a low pass, probably held to Athens while the Athenian fleet was at Lade, just opposite.

περὶ τε τῶν ἐν Μιλήτῳ πυθέσθαι: the fact of the blockade was surely common knowledge, but they might wish to know how it was going and if their compatriots on the ships were safe. Given the ancient coastline of the Latmian Gulf, a message would have to go a long way round by land to reach Anaia; presumably the Chians sent a messenger and waited, unless something had been prearranged.

καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἄμα ἀφίστανται: possibly Marathesion, Pygela, and Isinda, between Anaia and Ephesos, about which we know only that Pygela was in Spartan hands in 409 (X. HG i. 2. 2). But Thucydides may mean the cities mentioned in § 4, dealt with on their return journey, the voyage to Anaia being solely for news of Miletos.

2. ἀποπλεῖν πάλιν, καὶ ὅτι Ἀμόργης, κ.τ.λ.: the change of construction, adding a report of fact to the command dependent on *ἄγγελίας*, need cause no trouble; the question is whether the report about Amorges is connected with the order to the Chians, as Steup and Wilamowitz (616) took the received text to imply. Valla did not translate *καὶ* (which Classen bracketed) and rendered *ὅτι* by *quoniam*, making Amorges' movement the reason why the Chians must withdraw. But Amorges' base was at Iasos, some way south of Miletos: his alleged movement was presumably to assist the Athenian force off Miletos, but it could present no threat to the Chians at Anaia. We should therefore dissociate the two items: the report about Amorges answers the Chians' question about the situation of Miletos, and Chalkideus' order to retire must have some other ground, probably that the Chians were too close to the main Athenian fleet—though Chalkideus could hardly know yet of the approach of Diomedon (below).

Διὸς ιερόν: *πολίχνιον Ἰωνίας μεταξὺ Λεβέδου καὶ Κολοφῶνος*, Steph. Byz. s.v. It is mentioned with Kolophon and Lebedos (the latter a certain restoration) in ML 47. 26; see their discussion of the question whether the Athenians had sent a colony to this area. A possible

habitation-site has been found, but not the temple, so the identification remains uncertain (ATL i. 483).

Διομέδων: the first appearance of this general (explicitly so described at 54. 3). His family connections are not known. Like Leon (23. 1 n.) he was against the oligarchs in 411 (73. 4); he was one of the generals appointed with Thrasyllus after Alkibiades' second exile (X. HG i. 5. 16, cf. JHS lxxiii [1953], 4), and one of the six executed after Arginousai (X. HG i. 7. 1, 34).

3. ἐς "Εφεσον: not mentioned by Thucydides since winter 425/4 (iv. 50. 3), when Athens held it. The stories of Alkibiades at Olympia (12. 1 n.), to the extent that they can be trusted, imply loyalty in 416; there was an Athenian general ἐν Ἐφ[--- early in 414 (5. 5 n.). Now, without explanation, it is a refuge for an enemy ship, and this (*pace* Weil) implies positive defection; it may well have fallen to Tissaphernes before this book opens. Cf. 16. 3 n.; and for the earlier history iii. 32. 2 n., ML 67.

ἐπὶ τῆς Τέω: see 16, and 20. 2 below.

4. ὁ πεζός: presumably the Klazomenians and Erythraians of 16. 1, since no other infantry has been mentioned since.

Λέβεδον: between Teos and Notion, Str. xiv. 1. 29, 643 (cf. § 2 n.).

καὶ αὐθίς Αἰράς: west of Teos, towards the Korykos promontory. The infantry must have come back to Teos before proceeding there. For the location see Str. xiv. 1. 32, 644; ATL i. 465–6; L. Robert, BCH lxx (1946), 512 n. 2. Strabo calls it *πολύχνιον Τηίων*, but it paid its tribute separately to Athens through the period covered by the lists. 'Epás codd. here and at 20. 2, except that K² has *Aipás* in the latter passage; *Γέραι* Str.; *"Αγρα Ps.-Skylax* 98; the lists have (*h*)αιραῖοι, (*h*)αιραιῆς; an inscription, probably of the fourth century (Wilhelm, *Beiträge* [1909], 175–7; Robert, loc. cit.), has ἐν *Αιρῆσιν*. It was then Airai to its inhabitants, the aspirate being an optional Atticism which Thucydides probably did not adopt.

20. 1. εἴκοσι: 21 originally (10. 2), of which one was lost (10. 3); the damage done to others (10. 4) was evidently reparable.

ἴσω ἀριθμῷ: see 15. 2 with n.

φέρετε έγίγνετο ἕδη πᾶσα ἡ ναυαρχία: we should now be well past midsummer (10. 1, 15. 1 nn.), but there is still much to come before the last period of summer (25. 1 τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος). For the time at which a *nauarchos* should take office see v. 36. 1 n.* Thucydides' narrative, as so often, leaves some chronological uncertainty; Astyochos' year might have begun with the new moon observable on 4 October (Parker and Dubberstein 33) next after the equinox, or with that of 4 September if the Spartan calendar allowed this. The earlier date would give a more even timetable, but either is possible.

The phrase *πᾶσα ἡ ναυαρχία* appears to contrast Astyochos' present

position with some position less than 'the whole nauarchy'. Steup, who also wished to explain the impf. ἐγίγνετο, took *nauarchía* here in a non-technical sense, i.e. Astyochos is here given command over the ships at Kenchreai and was only later to obtain the ships already in Ionia. As he recognized, this is awkward in view of the fact that Astyochos certainly held the official position of *nauarchos*. It is perhaps rather *nauarchos* in the main sentence that is used ambiguously: that is, *nauarchos αὐτοῖς* --- ἐπῆλθεν refers primarily to his taking over the command of the ships at Kenchreai (perhaps from Thermon, sent by Agis at 11. 2 after Alkamenes' death), and Thucydides adds to this the fact that Astyochos had been appointed *nauarchos* of the Spartan fleet as a whole. ἐγίγνετο can hardly imply a gradual process; Astyochos became official *nauarchos* at a specific moment. For his predecessor Melanchridas see 6. 5 with n.; if at that point he ceased to exercise his function, and only individual commanders were appointed to particular squadrons, that may have influenced Thucydides' expression here.

2. αὐτὸς στρατιῷ παραγενόμενος: as opposed to 16. 3, where his *ὑπαρχος* Stages commanded what non-Greek troops there were.
τὸ ἐν τῇ Τέῳ τεῖχος: 16. 3 with n.

ῶστε δέχεσθαι καὶ σφᾶς: now the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes have gone, they admit Diomedon for a short visit. This indeterminate attitude could not be maintained for long, and if the Peloponnesians returned, the Teians would be in trouble. Thucydides does not mention Teos again, but Diodoros (xiii. 76. 4, under 407/6: the events must belong to the early summer of 406) tells us how Kallikratidas took Delphinion in Chios (38. 2 below), then made a night attack on Teos and sacked it; Teos had evidently come under full Athenian control since Diomedon's visit. (In the more summary statement of X. HG i. 5. 15 Ἡώνα should be emended to *Τέων*; the operation is placed before the arrival of Kallikratidas at i. 6. 1, but here the more specific account of Diodoros should be preferred.)

21. ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς: the political situation in Samos is not wholly clear; see, most recently, E. Will, REA lxxi (1969) 305–19; R. P. Legon, *Historia* xxi (1972), 145–58.

(a) Thucydides tells us that in the first stage of the Samian affair (in 441/0) Athens imposed a democracy on Samos and took hostages (i. 115. 3). At the end of his account of the revolt he gives some detail of the terms imposed on Samos (117. 3), but does not say that the democracy was reinstated. Diodoros does say so (xii. 28. 4 τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταστήσας), but we cannot tell whether his source had independent information or just assumed this as likely. Thucydides' silence, due in any case to compression, would allow us to infer either that democracy was not restored (leaving us uncertain what sort of

government was set up), or that it was (and he expected that we would assume this).

(b) It is a widespread opinion (Steup, Busolt iii/1. 553 n. 2) that *ἐπανάστασις*, *ἐπανίστασθαι* in Thucydides always refer to a rising against an existing government, in which case the government against which the *δῆμος* now rose must be one distinguishable from plain democracy. The sense of *ἐπανάστασις* etc. is clear at i. 115. 5 (the internal aspect of the Samian revolt of 440) and at ii. 27. 2, iv. 56. 2, v. 23. 3 (helot revolt against Sparta). At iii. 39. 2 Kleon's distinction about the Mytileneans, *ἐπανέστησαν μᾶλλον ή ἀπέστησαν* (*ἀπόστασις μέν γε τῶν βίαιον τι πασχόντων ἐστίν*), is highly artificial ('a somewhat frigid conceit': Gomme), but the point is probably that the revolt of Mytilene, which kept its autonomy and was highly honoured by Athens, is more like a domestic revolution than the revolt of a subject previously held down by force. The remaining instances, viii. 63. 3, 73. 2, are references back to this chapter. The former is the crucial passage, *τοὺς δυνατώτατους -- καίπερ ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται*. Two opposed parties cannot rise against one another as against the established government; if the action described in 63. 3 is genuinely reciprocal, the verb must be capable of a looser meaning, and *ἐπανάστασις* in 21 might mean violent and unconstitutional action against a minority which was not formally in control of the city. But I do not believe that the reciprocal sense at 63. 3 can be maintained (see ad loc.), and in that case we have to suppose a non-democratic government in Samos before the present revolution. *τοῖς δυνατοῖς* does not in itself imply an oligarchy: the word can be applied to a group within a democracy (e.g. ii. 65. 2), and we might have here a rising of the lower classes against a wealthy and powerful group that had gained control of a governmental machine which was not in itself undemocratic. But in the last sentence it appears that the opposition is between *δῆμος* and *γεωμόροι* (see below), and the most natural interpretation is that this was an uprising of men who could be described as *ὁ δῆμος* against an oligarchy of *γεωμόροι*. (From 63. 3, 73. 2, it appears that the leaders of the revolution were describable as *δυνατώτατοι* and not irrevocably committed to democracy.)

(c) The government now deposed was one in which the Athenians could feel confidence, for they used Samos as their base from the start of the campaign (16. 1), and Strombichides, the first arrival, took a Samian ship into his squadron. But Athenians were present at the uprising, and the Athenian state welcomed the outcome; compare Rhodes in 396 where Konon, called in first by the Diagoreioi, then encouraged the democratic revolution which overthrew them (*Hell. Oxy.* 15 [10]).

(d) In 427 (iii. 32. 2) and 424 (iv. 75. 1) we hear of Samian exiles at Anaia (see 19. 1 n. above) who collaborated with the Peloponnesians,

disturbed the Samians at home, and received exiles; the appearance of a ship of Anaia at 61. 2 shows that the settlement was still in existence in 412, though Thucydides says nothing in viii of its inhabitants. It cannot strictly be demonstrated that they had been there since 439 (see Will 318), but it is a likely guess; men too much implicated in the revolt needed to leave Samos then, but no comparably strong motive can be alleged for a later date. Whatever their origins or political colour, these were embittered enemies of Athens, but there is no sign that the government of the city had recently or at any time been in contact or negotiation with them.

(e) This literary evidence has been variously interpreted. Beloch (ii². I. 197 n. 1) rejected Diod. xii. 28. 4 (above), supposed that Perikles recognized he had made a mistake in setting up the democracy of the previous year, and assumed an oligarchy of Geomoroi in power from 439 to 412 without interruption; Gomme (*CR* 1 [1936], 9 n. 1, not repeated in his n. to i. 117. 3) followed the same line, as also Will (above). Others, assuming that democracy was restored in 439, have then to assume also a brief oligarchic return to power shortly before this democratic uprising; so, recently, J. P. Barron, *The Silver Coins of Samos*, 81, 91–3, 100 (note also his suggestion that two coins of the last third of the fifth century were struck at Anaia, pp. 92–3). Busolt (iii/2. 1427–8) offered a compromise: democratic forms persisted but the oligarchs had achieved practical control, as at Athens in the stage preceding the coup of the Four Hundred (66. 1). Ed. Meyer (*GdA* iv². 2. 270; see also Legon, above) claimed that it does not follow from our passage that an oligarchy held power in 412: he did not explain, but perhaps thought that *ἐπανάστασις* could have a weakened sense (above).

(f) Will's argument against Barron rests in part on his belief that Thucydides, who says nothing of an oligarchic seizure of power shortly before 412, was well informed about Ionian affairs at this time; but the epigraphic evidence casts considerable doubt on this. *IG* i². 101 (D. M. Lewis, *BSA* xlix [1954], 29–31, gives an improved text; cf. *SEG* xiv. 9) carries no precise date, but ll. 2–3 praise the people of Samos *ὅτι σφᾶς αὐτὸς[---]*, which invites some such supplement as *ἀπελευθέροσαν*, and edd. inevitably connect this decree with the situation described in c. 21; ll. 3–4 refer to *Σαμίου τὸς ἐπάγοντας Πελοποννεσίος ἐπὶ Σάμον κ[---]*, and this invitation is not likely to antedate the Chian and other applications in winter 413/12 (5–6 above). The decree then proceeds to detailed arrangements about property and other matters, and there is no room at this point for the grant of autonomy to which Thucydides refers later in this chapter; it could however have come in the part of the inscription which is not preserved, perhaps in an amendment. *IG* i². 101 may thus not be the decree about which Thucydides had a report; and it

is in any case striking that he says nothing about the Samians who had called the Peloponnesians in, a fact very much relevant to his theme and to the decree of which he had been informed. Further difficulty is caused by the definite article with *ἐπανάστασις*, which suggests that the reader is supposed to know something about the position in Samos already, and encouraged Wilamowitz in his hypothesis that 18 and 21 were later additions to Thucydides' first draft; cf. 17. 4 with n. The article is more easily explained there than here (Steup's remark, that it is here due to the importance attached to the event in Athens, is inadequate), and the explanation might be that when Thucydides wrote this chapter he already knew that he would have to put in more about the antecedents of the Samian situation, but that he had not yet gathered the requisite information.

This case is one of the more important indications of the way in which book viii is incomplete (see Appendix I, pp. 370–4), and it certainly must not be argued from Thucydides' silence that there had not been an oligarchic seizure of power shortly before 412. It seems clear enough that there was an oligarchy in power before the event here described, but it is not easy to choose between the hypotheses of Barron and Will about the length of time it had held power. If anything, the numbers and prosperity here implied for the γεωμόροι rather suggest that their tenure had been of some duration.

Barron (100 n. 7) claims that Diod. xiii. 34. 2 'gives 412 as the date of a revolt against Athens'. Diodorus here says that on the news of the Sicilian disaster Chios, Samos, Byzantium, and many others at once revolted from Athens, and it is possible that Ephoros had fuller information than Thucydides, but equally possible that Diodorus is confused; note that the revolt of Byzantium came in fact much later (80. 3 below).

ὑπό om. F, secl. Stahl et al. The authority of F alone is not great, and ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου depends without difficulty on ἐγένετο — — ἐπανάστασις; γίγνεσθαι is treated as the passive of ποιεῖσθαι, as often (Steup).

ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ: Thucydides uses the simple dative with *παρεῖναι* etc. (e.g. 17. 3, 19. 2, 20. 2), and *ἐν* is inappropriate. Herwerden deleted it; Steup, followed by Weil, preferred to read *ἐτι*, with reference to the fact that out of Diomedon's sixteen ships (19. 2) ten had gone to Teos (20. 2). It is no objection that Thucydides has not told us where the remaining three had gone.

ἔς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς πάντας: 'up to some two hundred in all'. The wording implies no comment, neither 'as many as two hundred' nor 'no more than two hundred'; but the brutality is noteworthy, and regularly compared by edd. with that of the Kerkyra stasis.

δυνατωτάτων: B; δυνατῶν cett. (cf. 48. 1, 63. 3). Steup's objection to the superlative, that there could not be more than six hundred

δυνατώτατοι among the Samian oligarchs, does not amount to much (see below, on *τοῖς γεωμόροις*); and, as the sentence runs, the four hundred exiles might be counted merely δυνατοί. The superlative gives some point, whereas δυνατῶν adds nothing to δυνατοῖς in the previous sentence.

αὐτονομίαν . . . ψηφισαμένων: for *IG* i². 101, which may or may not have carried this provision, see p. 46 above. At vii. 57. 4 Samos is included among τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῶν, and distinguished from Chios which provides ships and is autonomous; this is compressed a little beyond accuracy, since Samos may still have been paying instalments of the indemnity imposed in 439 (below) but does not appear on the tribute lists, but it was natural to feel that Chios was more autonomous in 413 than Samos at any time after the suppression of her revolt. The explicit grant of autonomy would certainly have a large moral effect. Cf. *ATL* ii. D22. 12 (*IG* i². 60, Tod 63, cf. Meiggs 317), the revised settlement with Mytilene after the revolt of 428-7; Tod 110. 12, the guarantee of autonomy to τὸ Ἐπεικαρπαθίων κοινόν, now to be dated to the late fifth century (M. H. Jameson, forthcoming).

In more concrete terms it is not clear what Samos gained. Comparing the surrender terms of 439 (i. 117. 3): (a) the wall then lost had not been rebuilt by winter 412/11 (viii. 50. 5); (b) it is not likely that there were still Samian hostages in Athens; (c) there is no trace of a Samian fleet other than the single ship of 16. 1, which occurs before this decree (ships are sometimes a sign of autonomy, cf. vi. 85. 2, vii. 57. 4); (d) it is argued in *ATL* iii. 335 that the last instalment of the indemnity, at 50T a year, would have been paid in 414/13 (Gomme objected, ii. 13. 3, 5 nn., esp. p. 33), but if that is right the closeness of the dates can hardly be anything but coincidence. But Samos did probably regain the right of coinage, which has also been regarded as a sign of independence: cf. E. S. G. Robinson, *Hesp.* suppl. viii (1949), 331; Barron (above) 100-1.

τὰ λοιπά: edd. note that Thucydides does not elsewhere use the plural of τὸ λοιπόν to indicate time, as e.g. X. *HG* i. 1. 27. But it need not be a temporal expression here (the impf. διψήκουν by itself suggests duration): they managed their own affairs 'in other respects', sc. than the ones specifically mentioned.

τοῖς γεωμόροις: known also from Plu. *QG* 57, a story of the overthrow of their oligarchy, apparently in the early sixth century. Otherwise the title is recorded only at Syracuse early in the fifth century (Hdt. vii. 155. 2, Arist. fr. 586 Rose), where it is no doubt rightly taken to be the name for a landed aristocracy descended from the original colonists. (The archaic Athenian class called γεωμόροι in Plu. *Thes.* 25. 2 and in some lexica is not comparable.) The Samian γεωμόροι were presumably also a landed aristocracy, and singularly persistent,

having survived two tyrannies and the revolt of 440–439; and numerous, if after the executions and exiles enough survived to be worth this much further attention.

οὗτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ' ἀγαγέσθαι: the Bakchiadai of Corinth are reported to have forbidden marriage with outsiders (Hdt. v. 92. βι), and the ban on marriage between the Attic demes Hagnous and Pallene was an archaic matter inviting mythological explanation (Plu. *Thes.* 13. 4). No other instance of such a ban within a single community is reported from the Classical period. The ferocity of the democrats has been demonstrated already; the point of this particular measure may be to ensure that the separation was maintained, and prevent individual *γεωμόροι* from recovering their position by marriage into non-noble families.

Swoboda, *Festschr. für Otto Benndorf* (1898), 250–5, dates to this occasion the division of Samians by *φυλή, χιλιαστύς, ἐκατοστύς*, and *γένος* which appears in grants of citizenship after the restoration of Samos in 322. His problem was the total supersession of the kinship element in the *γένος*, to which the entrant was assigned by lot, and he argued that this could happen only at a time when the Samians were specially incensed against the aristocrats and their kinship organization; but that is to overestimate the stability of such organizations (cf. *BSA* lii [1957], 30–7 for a comparable reorganization in Hellenistic Rhodes; W. G. Forrest in *BSA* lv [1960] 172–81 for Chios). Swoboda's date may nevertheless be right.

22. 1. οὐδὲν ἀπολείποντες προθυμίας: the Chians share the feelings of urgency and enthusiasm expressed in 2, 5. 1 above; cf. 7 ἐπειγομένων τῶν Χίων, 12. 1 on the Spartan side, 15. 2 for Athenian *προθυμία*.

ἄνευ τε Πελοποννησίων πλήθει παρόντες: but Peloponnesian troops took part in the related land movement, and the ships themselves were commanded by a Lakonian; hence many emendations. For the motive cf. the Chian share in 17. 2, and 19. 1; by bringing over as many cities as they could, they strengthened their position for future dealings with Sparta (Wilamowitz 618). If the text is right, it disregards Chalkideus' small squadron and looks forward to the arrival of substantial Peloponnesian fleets (as also 17. 2); and the point of *πλήθει παρόντες* is that the Chians needed to commit a substantial force in order to succeed in their independent endeavour. If emendation is called for, the simplest is *παρόντων* (Wilamowitz 617–18), 'before the Peloponnesians arrived in force'. (Steup, reporting Wilamowitz's proposal, adds that *παρόντων* had already been conjectured by Gertz; more precisely, Hude, *Commentarii critici* [1888], 48, reported Gertz's suggestion as *παρόντ<ων δξιούντ>ες*; the apparatus to his 1901 edition ascribes to Gertz the conjecture *πλήθους θεραπεύοντες*.)

Wilamowitz also deleted $\tau\epsilon$, Herwerden wished to read $\betaουλόμενοι καὶ$. Neither is necessary: for the structure cf. vi. 15. 2 with n.

$\omega\sigmaπερ εἴρητο$: 8. 2.

Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων: the sailors from Chalkideus' ships, cf. 17. 1.

$\tauῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμάχων$: so far Klazomenai and Erythrai, cf. 16. 1. $\epsilon\piὶ Κλαζομενῶν τε καὶ Κύμης$: the direction is stated from the point of view of those who started furthest away, the Erythraians who would have to march through Klazomenai and round the Gulf of Smyrna to get to Kyme. It is not implied that the Klazomenians did not take part.

The most important cities to which the revolt might spread by land were Phokaia and Kyme. The former was aside from their route, over a low pass to a small peninsular site in a secluded bay opposite the north end of the Erythrai peninsula; Kyme is round the corner from Phokaia, its bay facing north-west over the Gulf of Elaia towards Lesbos. Thucydides gives no indication when these two revolted, but both gave shelter to Astyochos' fleet early in the winter (31. 3-4), and Kyme was a base for Lesbian rebels later (100. 3). This is the most likely occasion for their defection, and it would have been worth mention both as an indication of the Spartans' progress and for its relevance to later operations near Klazomenai (23. 6, 31. 2-4); but Thucydides gives no data about the doings of the land force (see 23. 5 n.).

Εὐάλας Σπαρτιάτης - - **Δεινιάδας περίοικος**: Deiniadas' status is given presumably because it was unusual for a *perioikos* to hold such a command*; unless there are other concealed instances, this is unique in Thucydides, for Phrynis (6. 4) did not command others. As a *perioikos*, D. was *Λακεδαιμόνιος*, and there is that much point in stating Eualas' status as a member of the citizen aristocracy, but it is hard to find any general principle in Thucydides' choice between *Σπαρτιάτης* and *Λακ.* to describe individuals.

The most obvious use for *Σπ.* is to distinguish full citizens from *perioikoi* and other categories, as X. HG iii. 3. 5-6; but its use as a distinction is blurred because *οἱ Λακ.* was the official name of the state and was the normal term for its inhabitants in general both in Thucydides and presumably in contemporary speech. Thucydides at iv. 8. 1 distinguishes the Sp. and the nearest of the *perioikoi*, who went straightway to Pylos, from the other Lak., who were slower, having just returned from another expedition; he cannot mean that there were no Sp. on the invasion of Attica, but this does recognise that there were many Lak. who were not Sp. It is natural to mark off the citizen prisoners from Pylos as *Σπ.* (iv. 38. 5, v. 15. 1), and to express the difficulty in dealing with Pausanias as reluctance to proceed *περὶ ἀνδρὸς Σπ.* without conclusive proof (i. 132. 5); in this story the state

is, abnormally, *οἱ Σπ.* at i. 128. 3, 131. 1, 132. 1*. Commissions of *ξύμβουλοι* are specified to be *Σπ.* at v. 63. 4, viii. 39. 2, as also the three envoys sent to Corinth at viii. 7.

Individuals prominent in the narrative are often introduced at their first appearance as *Σπ.*, e.g. Brasidas (ii. 25. 2), Knemos (ii. 66. 2), Eurylochos (iii. 100. 2), but also several who never appear again, as Ekkritos (vii. 19. 3) or Eualas here; and it is unlikely that others who are introduced as *Λακ.*, e.g. Salaithos (iii. 25. 1) or Ischagoras (iv. 132. 2), were of lower status. Brasidas himself is reintroduced, with patronymic, as *Λακ.* at iv. 70. 1; Lichas, introduced as *Λακ.* at v. 50. 4, is one of the commission of *Σπ.* at viii. 39. 2, both times with patronymic. It is unlikely that any distinction of status was intended at viii. 99 between Philippos (cf. 87.6) and Hippokrates. There is a slight preponderance of *Σπ.* over *Λακ.* in first introductions, and that may account for the increased frequency of *Σπ.* in viii, where so many new Spartan commanders make a first appearance.

2. *αἱ μὲν νῆες*: the preceding sentence would lead one to expect as correlate a statement about the land force, but when the δέ comes it is attached to Astyochos (23. 1) and a new sequence begins. See further 23. 5 n.

Μήθυμναν: the second largest city of the island, on the north coast, and the only one loyal to Athens in 428 (iii. 2. 1, cf. vi. 85. 2, vii. 57. 5).

καὶ καταλείπονται --- ἀφιστᾶσιν: B, and Valla; in the other tradition a copyist's eye had jumped from one *ἀφιστᾶσι* to the next. Steup required also, after *ἐν αὐτῇ*, some mention of the Euboulos of 23. 4, who otherwise appears without introduction; but that is to ascribe to the narrative more completeness and finish than it has.

23–8. Athenian counter-offensive. Battle of Miletos. Loss of Iasos

23. 1. ὕσπερ ὅρμητο: 20. 1.

ἐκ τῶν Κεγχρειῶν: there is no mention of Athenian interference either here or in § 5, so probably the Athenians had given up the attempt to blockade them (10. 1–2 etc.) in order to concentrate on establishing an adequate fleet in Ionia.

πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν: since Diomedon arrived with sixteen (19. 2) and Leon has ten, Steup again (cf. 13 n.) suspected the text, unnecessarily. **Λέων**: a common enough name. See Andrewes and Lewis, *JHS* lxxvii (1957) 179, where we argue that this is not the Leon of v. 19. 2, 24. 1, but probably to be identified with Leon the Salaminian, the victim of the Thirty. He is described as *στρατηγός* at 54. 3; for his politics see 73. 4.

2. **Πόρραν**: the south coast of Lesbos is broken up by two great inlets, narrow at the entrance but broadening out and reaching

far inland. Pyrrha lies on the western inlet, on its south-east shore; it was here that Alkaios retired during his first exile ($\Sigma E3$ [114], D2 [60]).

"Ερεσον: in the extreme west. Astyochos is moving clockwise round the island before he attempts the main city, Mytilene on the east coast.

3. ὥσπερ ἐπλεον: without reorganizing into battle formation, according to Steup, but one could hardly row 25 ships into Mytilene harbour in line of battle. The phrase merely refers back to the original description of their movement in § 1, as ὥσπερ ὄρμητο there refers back to 20. 1; they did not stop or turn aside.

τῶν τε Χίων νεῶν: there should be nine, cf. 22. 1–2.

4. μία γὰρ ἔλατο: their flight was westwards from Methymna, so the Athenians not only went straight on to Methýmna, some forty miles from Mytilene, but beyond it. Presumably they then gave up the chase and went back to Mytilene, for Astyochos (below) evidently did not expect to find them at Methymna.

ἀλλὰ τὴν "Ερεσον - - παρέπλει: the text is badly disturbed, the main problem centring round ὄπλίσας and the following words, where B's παραπέμπει is clearly right against cett. παρέπλει; for a comparable variation see vi. 62. 5 n., and here παρέπλει below no doubt affected the reading. Codd. show no other variant, but *IT*²⁴, though only the right-hand ends of the lines are preserved, certainly had no room for καὶ ὄπλίσας where codd. have these words, and Powell suggests that it may have had ὄπλίσας where they have ὄπλίτας. That gives τὴν "Ερεσον ἀποστήσας καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ νεῶν ὄπλίσας πεζῇ παραπέμπει, κ.τ.λ., a simpler sentence and much better sense. That is, according to the received text Astyochos, having procured the revolt of Eresos, then armed somebody; this can hardly be the hoplites next mentioned, so we need the comma which Stuart Jones put after the participle, and as object we must supply τὸν Ἐρεσίους from τὴν "Ερεσον. But Astyochos cannot have brought in his four ships arms sufficient for even a small city (iii. 27. 2, which Arnold cited as a parallel, does not present this difficulty); and nothing has been said of hoplites brought on his ships, either from Kenchreai or from Chios. Dobree had already proposed to delete ὄπλίτας, which disposes of most of the difficulty. With the text suggested by Powell, Astyochos arms the men from his own ships, like Chalkideus earlier (17. 1); they might have been selected with that in view, and a trireme could probably carry enough arms for its own crew, or Eresos might have been laid under contribution (cf. Himera at vii. 1. 3). Steup objected against Dobree that enough of the crews must be left to row the ships to Methymna and back, but for so few ships Astyochos could have got crews from Eresos, as Chalkideus from Chios.

For the rest, M omits everything from ἀρχοντα to (the second)

παρέπλει: after this *παρέπλει* ACEFG repeat ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀντισσαν καὶ Μήθυμναν, errors easily corrected.

Ἀντισσαν: on the north-west coast, nearer to Methymna than to Eresos.

Ἐτεόνικον: only here in Thucydides, but frequent in X. *HG* i–ii.

5. πάντα ἡναντιοῦτο: after the detailed description of Astyochos' dispositions at Eresos and his plans for Methymna, we expect to hear at least whether he got there and what he found, but all we are given is this general statement, and another below (§ 6) that Athens restored her position in Lesbos. This makes an odd lacuna, for an informant who knew as much as this of Astyochos' campaign must have known the rest; it may possibly be connected with Thucydides' silence about the actions of the land force (below). From 100. 2–4 it appears that Methymna was in Athenian hands in late summer 411, and that Eresos had revolted again, to all appearance recently. Thucydides does not again mention Antissa or Pyrrha.

τὸν ἑαυτοῦ στρατὸν πεζόν: *πεζόν*, found only in B and not in *IT*²⁴, should be deleted, cf. vi. 31. 5 n.

ὅτῶν ξυμάχων πεζός: all codd. have ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός, for which many remedies have been tried. It is true that the Peloponnesian component of this force (22. 1) must consist of sailors whom Chalkideus had armed (17. 1), but this phrase is neither clear nor appropriate to describe the whole force, still less to distinguish it from that of Astyochos. *IT*²⁴ has at the end of a line *]οτωνξυμ*, which Hunt restored as ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμ[μάχων, Powell as *]ό τῶν ξυμ[μάχων* which gives a slightly better length of line. This is a large improvement; and to call the force 'the allied infantry', neglecting the Peloponnesian element, is not unreasonable when opposing it to Astyochos' infantry. *ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν* may once have been a gloss, not altogether unwanted, on *τὸν ἑαυτοῦ στρατὸν* above. Valla's *peditatus sociorum, itemque classiarius* appears to be a conflation of the two traditions, but at least provides a second witness of a kind for the papyrus reading (Hemmerdinger, *Essai* 59; but 'la même tradition que le papyrus' is a little misleading). Poppe noted that from Valla one might conjecture ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμάχων καὶ τῶν νεῶν πεζός; Stahl abandoned this in favour of his deletion of *ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν*.

Thucydides has said nothing of this land force since it set out at 22.1, indeed it is only here that we learn that its objective was the Hellespont; the plan was presumably that the fleet, after bringing Lesbos over, should accompany them further north, but the failure of the fleet brought the land force back too. It would be most unlike Thucydides' normal practice to mention the setting out and return of this land force without saying what it did, or even that it achieved nothing, and in fact it probably did accomplish the defection of Phokaia and Kyme from Athens (22. 1 n.). At 22. 2 *αἱ μὲν νῆσες* suggests

that he was intending to say something of them before he turned to Astyochos; and the fact, not easily explained, that he here abruptly breaks off his detailed account of Astyochos' doings might be due to an impatient realization that he could not give a satisfactory narrative of this episode until he had fuller data about the land force. In any case this looks to be a clear instance of Thucydides starting to write before he had obtained information which he knew he would need (see Introduction p. 4).

This passage also offers the best support for the view adumbrated by Wilamowitz (585–6) that Thucydides' original draft, into which on his view 17. 4–18 and 21 were later insertions, was based mainly on information from Chios. It is certainly true here, as Wilamowitz claimed, that we hear nothing of Athenian operations or of the land force except what was seen by the Chians; and note that Astyochos had a Chian ship with him (23. 2). But we can hardly deduce more than that his still incomplete information included some from Chios. *ξυμμαχίδων Πελοποννησίων*: if one of these is to be removed, it should be *Πελ.* (Steup), for *ξυμμαχίδων* is not likely as a gloss.

6. Πολίχναν: 14. 3 with n. Klazomenians who favoured Athens would be dangerously exposed by land; at 31.3 they repel an attack by sea.

Δαφνούντα: the site is unknown; see 31. 2 n.

24. 1. ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσίν: 17. 3, where they were nineteen against Chalkideus' 25.

Πάνορμον: a harbour below Branchidai (Hdt. i. 157. 3), some way south of Miletos; hence *παραβοηθήσαντα*, 'along the coast'.

ώς οὐ μετὰ κράτους τῆς γῆς σταθέν: the conventions about *τροπαῖα* tend to be sentimentalized (e.g. Diod. xiii. 24. 5–6), and this unemotional statement of a fifth-century view is valuable. As F. Lammert argues (*RE* viiA. 663–73), Greek *τροπαῖα* were a phenomenon of hoplite warfare, which was expected to leave one side in definite possession of the field, which their opponents recognize by asking for their dead under truce. A doubtful battle might produce rival *τροπαῖα*, e.g. i. 105. 6, and counter-claims were specially likely after a sea battle, e.g. vii. 34. 7–8; a raid like this would fall outside the convention as here stated, but if the Milesians were consistent they will have left the *τροπαῖον* of 25. 5 standing. The fact that a trophy could be taken down tells very much against Nilsson's view (*Gesch. gr. Rel.* i². 134) that it was a dedication; and the standard verb with *τροπαῖον* is *ἰστάναι*, not *ἀνατιθέναι*. (On this last point W. K. Pritchett takes the opposite view. His study [*The Greek State at War*, pt. ii (1974), 246–75] covers much ground and raises more issues than can be discussed here: I would entirely agree with his conclusion that trophies were not objects of cult worship but symbols of prestige.)

2. Οἰνουσσῶν: off the north-east point of Chios, at the north end of the channel.

ἐκ Σιδούστης καὶ ἐκ Πτελεοῦ: the sites of the Erythrai peninsula were examined by J. Keil, the northern half (*Mimas*) in *Öst. Jh.* xiii (1910), Beibl. 5–22, cf. xv (1912), 49–50, but are now inaccessible in a military zone. Keil offers two possible sites on the west coast facing Chios, Meli just inside the northern lip of the bay of Erythrai, Denizgeren further north on the coast facing Oinoussai. *ATL* i. 486 rejects Meli as dangerously close to the enemy, between Chios and Erythrai, but accepts Denizgeren as Pteleon. The argument is not conclusive, for all places along this coast were accessible to attack when the Athenian fleet was absent (as 31. 2, Astyochos' unsuccessful attack on Pteleon), but safe when it was present, and the Athenians are not in this phase on the defensive. For Sidoussa, Wade-Gery in *AJP* lix (1938), 470–5 argued from the order of the islands named in Pliny, *NH* v. 137, three of which are identifiable from 31. 3 below, that it was on the east side of Mimas at the entrance to the Gulf of Smyrna, and *ATL* (l.c.) puts Sidoussa at Ahirli (Achyrl) and on the adjacent island, facing across towards Phokaia. This involves rejecting Stephanos' statement (s.v. *Σιδοῦς*) that there were villages of this name both near Klazomenai and in the territory of Erythrai, and in view of Stephanos' practice this is legitimate though not necessary; it might also be felt that a site facing Chios would be more suitable to the Athenians' purpose. These questions cannot be satisfactorily cleared up without fuller examination of the sites. On Pliny's lists of islands see also 101. 2 n.

From these stations, whatever their precise location, the Athenians could prevent the Spartans from moving further north by sea; by land the revolt had already spread further north, but by their actions in Chios and later at Miletos the Athenians stood a good chance of reversing this.

ἀ τῇ Ἐρυθρᾳ εἶχον τείχη: Thucydides gives no indication when these posts had been fortified. For fortifications in Ionia generally see 14. 3 n.; the Athenians had been active in this area in 414 (5. 5 n. above), and their wall at Teos (16. 3 n.) can be explained as being for defence against Persian attack, but forts on the Erythraian coast would not serve this purpose and it is more likely that they had just been built, after the recovery of Klazomenai (23. 6), for the use to which they were now put (cf. the fortification, a little later, of Delphinion on Chios itself, 38. 2).

καὶ ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου ὁρμώμενοι: Leon and Diomedon have 'the' ships from Lesbos, which should mean the whole 25 mentioned at 23. 1, and we expect now to hear how they began operations from the bases just listed, so it is disturbing to be told that Lesbos, which they appear to have left, was also one of their starting-points. After τείχη B has

ἀπῆραν, i.e. they left the nearer bases here mentioned for the first time and went back to Lesbos, as if it were better to conduct the campaign from a greater distance. Valla co-ordinated ἐκ τε Οίνουσῶν --- Πτελεοῦ with the preceding ἐκ Λέσβου, as other places from which the ships were drawn; he then takes a fresh start (translating τείχη καθεῖλον, Αὐρ.), *quos muros in Erythrea habebant diruerunt: atque e Lesbo*, etc. It looks as if, with the text as we have it, a new sentence was thought to begin at *καὶ ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου*; the preceding clauses then lack a main verb, and ἀπῆραν and καθεῖλον could be alternative ancient attempts, neither very sensible, to supply one. Classen's deletion of *καὶ ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου* has been widely accepted, and deals with the factual incongruity, but the resulting sentence does not run easily; Thucydides normally has ὄρμώμενος closely juxtaposed with ἐκ and its noun, whether it precedes these (e.g. i. 104. 1) or follows them (e.g. i. 64. 2), and the interposition of the relative clause breaks the connection. The remedy is to delete ὄρμώμενοι as well, leaving a straightforward statement that the Athenians conducted their war from their ships from the bases named. ὄρμώμενοι might be the note of some reader who wished to make plainer the connection between ἐκ τε Οίνουσῶν, κ.τ.λ. with πόλεμον --- ἐποιῶντο; the reintroduction of Lesbos is less easy to account for rationally.

ἐπιβάται --- ἀναγκαστούς: for ἐκ καταλόγου see vi. 26. 2 n.; for θῆτες ἐπιβάται distinguished from hoplites ἐκ καταλόγου, vi. 43 with n. This passage is one of the principal supports for the belief that *epibatai* were normally *thetes* (Busolt-Swoboda 575 with n. 1, 1206); and if this is right, we could expect that there was an organized pool of such *thetes*, heavily depleted by losses in Sicily, so that regular hoplites had now to be conscribed. Some uncertainty remains: Arist. *Pol.* 1327 b 9, cited in vi. 43 n.; Th. iii. 98. 4, the high praise given to Demosthenes' *epibatai* in Aitolia, puzzling to Steup and not satisfactorily explained by Gomme; Lys. vi. 46, where it appears that Andokides could have served either as hoplite or *epibates*—this is a rhetorical list of capacities in which he had failed to serve, but there would be no point in bringing up a category which did not apply to him at all. It may be that the class varied with the nature of the service required of them, and whether any substantial body of regular hoplites went on the expedition; the point of the phrase used here (for ἀναγκαστούς cf. vii. 13. 2 n.) would still be that the type of troops normal to this kind of expedition was in short supply, and perhaps that regular hoplites were not eager for such service.

3. Καρδαμύλῃ: on the north coast, near the north-east corner of Chios. It is otherwise mentioned only, and somewhat vaguely, by Stephanos, being overshadowed by its more famous namesake in Messenia; but the name of the Chian Kardamyle survives today.

Βολίσκω: B; *Βολίσσω* cett. B^{γρ.}; [Bo]λισσω ΙΙ²⁴. Herodian (i. 212, ii.

482–3) and Stephanos say that Thucydides used the form *Βολίσκος* in viii, and cite Androton (*FGrH* 324 F 64) for the form with one sigma; Stephanos is reported as using *Βολισσός* himself, the form that survives today, but Herodian insists on the proparoxytone accent. It seems slightly more probable that Thucydides wrote *Βολίσκω* than that this is a very early misreading of his text.

This is the next harbour as the Athenians circumnavigate, about a third of the way down the west coast. It is thus some distance from Kardamyle, but there is only one battle (Phanai below is the second, Leukonion the third), so presumably there was no resistance at Kardamyle. Androton's record for 412/11 was remarkably full if F 64 comes from his account of this campaign, as Jacoby suggests; the alternative, that he was writing about Homer (cf. Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F 103) seems less likely.

Φάναις: the southern promontory is *Φαναία ἄκρα*; just to the west of it is the deep harbour and the temple of Apollo referred to by Str. xiv. I. 35, 645.

Λευκωνίω: following the Athenians' course round the island, this should be on the east coast, south of Chios city; see Büchner, *RE* iii. 2293, D. W. S. Hunt, *BSA* xli (1940/5), 33. The story in Plu. 244F and Polyaeen. viii. 66 gives no help, even if their *Λευκωνία* is the same place; nor the *Α[...]μητίδαι Λευκώνιοι* of the Attalos inscription (see W. G. Forrest, *BSA* lv [1960], 176 n. 16, 178).

ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν: primarily the devastation in 493, after Lade (Hdt. vi. 31. 1).

4. μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους: *μόνοι* is treated as a superlative—"a compressed way of saying "the only people except the Lac. though in a less degree than they"" (Goodhart)—and there was no need for Steup's suspicion of *μετὰ Λακ.* See also next n.

ἡδαιμόνησάν τε ἄμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν; B17²⁴, clearly right against cett. *εὐδαιμονήσαντες ἄμα.*

Archidamos, himself introduced as *σωφρων* (i. 79), makes much of Sparta's *σωφροσύνη* *ἔμφρων* in i. 84: see H. North, *Sophrosyne* (1966), 100–4, who notes that Thucydides tends to avoid the word when speaking of Athens, though it would often be appropriate. Archidamos commends Spartan caution and discipline, which ensure internal stability and external security; in the context he is inevitably concerned mainly with the latter, and here too the argument of § 5 shows that Thucydides was thinking primarily of the external relations of Chios, i.e. her relations with Athens. For the record of Chios see 9. 3n. According to a conventional idea deeply rooted in Greek thought, prosperity would naturally lead the Chians into rash action and disaster, but they were saved by their *σωφροσύνη*.

But internal stability is not irrelevant for Chios, any more than for Archidamos. *κόσμος* in a political context refers in a very general

way to the character of the regime (48. 4, 67. 3, 72. 2; the verb does not occur elsewhere in Thucydides in this sense, but cf. e.g. Hdt. i. 59. 6), and the point here is that prosperity did not lead to internal insecurity either, so that the city's external policy could remain under firm control. Note the hesitation about antagonizing the people prematurely (9. 3), and the endeavour to deal with the conspiracy of § 6 below ὅπως μετριώτατα. For the link between *σωφροσύνη* and oligarchy see 64. 5 n. below.

5. *μετὰ πολλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων*: B has *μεθ' ὄν* after this, which would imply that the allies were already there before they revolted. This makes sense to the extent that they were already at that stage assured of Sparta and her league (6. 4), but it is an awkward phrase and the text without *μεθ' ὄν* runs more easily, referring to allies who at the moment of revolt were not actual but prospective (*ἔμελλον*).

[*βεβαίως*]: heavily loaded though the clause is, edd. commented on this word without suspicion till it was found to be absent from *IT*²⁴. *τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ταχὺ ξυναναιρεθήσεσθαι*: bracketed by Steup and Goodhart as an unnecessary and confusing addition, these words are present in *IT*²⁴, where the length of line favours B's *ξυναναιρεθήσεσθαι* rather than cett. *ξυναιρεθήσεσθαι* or Herwerden's and Wilamowitz's *ἀναιρεθήσεσθαι*. The sentence would be fully intelligible without this epexegetic phrase, but the subject is one on which Thucydides expatiates (cf. c. 2 above), and there is no need to excise, though the phrase would read more easily if the preceding words were *οὗτοι ταῦτα ἔδοξε*.

6. *οὐδὲ αἰσθόμενοι*: with this text we have to understand a participle, *ἐγχειροῦντας*. *οὐ* (Stahl) is much less harsh, but *οὐδὲ* should probably stand as the *lectio difficilior*.

ἔξ Ερυθρῶν: he was last seen returning from Lesbos to Chios (23. 5); his movement to Erythrai was no doubt with a view to dealing with the Athenian posts in Erythraian territory (cf. 31. 2). The four ships are presumably those of 23. 1.

ὅπως μετριώτατα: in marked contrast to the procedures described in iii. 82–3. Astyochos, still busy over these hostages at 31. 1, evidently approved such *μετριότης*, whereas a little later Pedaritos was more severe (38. 3, with n.).

25. 1. *τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος*: not necessarily the end of summer, but 'during the last part of the summer', as the whole last third of a month is *φθίνοντος*. We are certainly now in autumn, but we cannot tell exactly how close we are to the end of Thucydides' summer (28. 5); for the last implied note of time see 20. 1 n.

χίλιοι τῶν ξυμμάχων: outside the empire only Argos is likely to have provided hoplites in any numbers, so these are from the subject allies,

probably islanders (cf. vi. 68. 2, vii. 20. 2 with nn.) and picked up on the way. They make no further appearance after the battle (cf. 30. 2 n.), and may then have gone home.

ῶν ήσαν καὶ ὀπλιταγωγοί: for troop-carriers see vi. 43 n., with vol. iv, p. 487; and on the numbers p. 28 above, § 6. The phrase does not run quite easily, though it is intelligible ('also troop-carriers', sc. in addition to fast ships: cf. Denniston 293, but he does not classify the various nuances of 'also'), and there is some temptation to take *καὶ* as a mistake for *κ' = εἰκοστός*, since twenty is clearly within the range of possible numbers; but the same remedy could not be applied both to this and to the very similar phrase at 62. 2. To the extent that these were inferior as fighting ships, Thucydides' failure to give the number complicates the comparison of the forces available to each side.

Φρυνίχου: son of Stratonides (Σ Ar. *Lys.* 313), of the deme Deirades (Plu. *Alc.* 25. 6). Scarcely anything is known about his career before 411.

(a) *Lys. xx. 11–12* says his youth was spent in poverty among the herds, and he then became a sycophant in town; but the speaker is trying to dispose of the allegation that the defendant Polystratos was related to Phrynicos, a liability in the aftermath of the Four Hundred, and none of this can be trusted. Reference to an occasion *ὅτε* *ἔξετινε τῷ δημοσίῳ* looks like something more concrete, but if this had been seriously discreditable to Phrynicos the speaker would probably have been more explicit. But it is clearly implied that the two were roughly contemporaries, and since Polystratos was seventy at the time of his trial (xx. 10), the important fact emerges that Phrynicos too was old, probably in his sixties in 411.

(b) The speaker of *Lys. xxv. 9* wants examples of leaders *ἀμφοτέρων* *〈τῶν〉 πολιτειῶν* who changed sides, and he picks out *Φρύνιχος μὲν καὶ Πείσανδρος καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνων δημαγωγοί*, who (he says) because of their crimes against the people and their fear of punishment set up the Four Hundred. *δημαγωγοί* here is not necessarily pejorative (cf. *Lys. xxvii. 10* on 'good demagogues'), but the direction of the switch is clear and Phrynicos must at least have been fully acceptable to democratic electors, though there is nothing in his known record to compare with that of Peisandros.

(c) Again unlike Peisandros (49 n.), he was not a regular butt for comedy. *Φρύνιχος* in Aristophanes is almost always the early tragedian or the contemporary comic poet, perhaps also a homonymous actor (Symmachos in Σ *Vesp.* 1302, Σ *Av.* 750). It is just possible, but not (*pace* MacDowell) likely, that our Phrynicos is the centre of the disreputable drunkards called collectively *οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον* in *Vesp.* 1302; the first certain reference is *Ran.* 689 (51. 3 n. below).

All that we can certainly say is that Phrynicos was a man with a long public career, who could be labelled as a democratic leader and

inspired enough trust to be appointed general in 411 at an advanced age, presumably on the basis of his past record in office.

'Ονομάκλεους: Thucydides mentions him again only at 30. 2, but he has naturally been identified with one of the three extreme members of the Four Hundred whose trial is provided for in Andron's decree, [Plu.] 833 f. 834 a records the condemnation only of Archeptolemos and Antiphon, so Onomakles presumably escaped abroad, and returned to become one of the Thirty. Loeper from his place in the list of X. HG ii. 3. 2 assigned him to Kekropis.

Σκιρωνίδον: so cett., but *Κιρωνίδον* B; cf. 54. 3 *Κιρωνίδην* BEFM, *Σκιρόνιδην* cett. D. M. Lewis (*JHS* lxxxi [1961] 122) points out that 'Skiron is an unlikely patron for an Athenian', and that there is doubt about the reading at [Dem.] lviii. 17, the only other instance of the name at Athens. W. E. Thompson (*MH* xxii [1965] 238) suggests as a possibility that this is the *Κυρωνίδης Ξεναιέτου Ἀχαρνεύς* of Isaios x, a man of wealth and standing who might have been general in this year, when there is no other general known from Oineis.

He was deposed in the winter together with Phrynicos (54. 3); the charge against the latter concerned the loss of Iasos, but we have no means of knowing whether his colleague was specially implicated in this, or was otherwise a close associate of Phrynicos.

διαβάντες ἐς Μίλητον: on these data we cannot attempt to fix the exact landing-place, or the site of the battle.

2. **οἱ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσοι:** at 17. 1 it is stated that Chalkideus' sailors, when armed, were left in Chios, and it is not clear who these Peloponnesians can be. Steup thought of the epibatai on the ships, who would be a small number, fifty at the standard Athenian rate. But 32. 2 (see n. there) opens the possibility that 17. 1 is misleading.

[Ξενικὸν] ἐπικουρικόν: *ξενικόν*, a familiar term in the fourth century and later, is no doubt a gloss on *ἐπικουρικόν*, for which cf. 28. 5. They may well be Greeks (cf. § 5 n.), but *τι* does not suggest a large number; *ἡ ὕππος* more probably belongs to the barbarians of § 4.

3. **προεξάξαντες:** *προεξάρξαντες* (CG) would have to mean 'taking the initiative prematurely', but *ἐξάρχειν* is not likely in a military context and without an expressed object. *προεξαῖξαντες* B, *προεξάξαντες* cett. B^s, point to *προεξάξαντες*, 'darting forward out of formation', which is entirely suitable; cf. Hdt. ix. 62. 3, and Th. vii. 30. 2 *προεκθέοντες*. For the Argives' attitude see § 5 n.

4. **τὰ ὄπλα τίθενται:** see iv. 93. 3 n.

5. **τοὺς "Ιωνας - - τῶν Δωριῶν:** contemporary Dorians were sure of their superiority, cf. v. 9. 1 Brasidas, vi. 77. 1 Hermokrates, the Argives in § 3 above; and for the continuing importance of this racial feeling and for Thucydides' interest in it, vii. 57–8 with vol. iv, p. 433. The result here would not only interest him, but might give him

patriotic satisfaction. But it is a little artificial: apart from the Peloponnesians with Chalkideus (§2 n.) there can be none unless Tissaphernes' mercenaries included some (*ibid.*; cf. those of Amorges at 28. 4), and the total number cannot have been large.

ρρδίως ἄν - - προσχωρήσατ: Alkibiades agrees (26. 3), and down to this point the Athenians had well maintained the momentum of their counter-offensive; Lesbos had been recovered, the Chians were hard pressed, and Miletos was now in serious danger with no large force to defend it.

26. 1. τάς - - ναῦς: the article, which convinced Steup that this passage was corrupt, suggests that this numbered group is known to the reader, which it is not, though he has been informed of expectations (1. 2, 2. 3) and preparations (3. 2 etc.). The 22 ships from Sicily are explained here; the rest, 33, must be Peloponnesian, and *ἄς παρεσκευάζοντο, ἔτοιμαι ἦδη οὖσαι* below reads like a back-reference. There should be 28 still at Corinth (39 in c. 7, one lost at 10. 3, ten to Chios at 23. 1, 5), and we could add five being got ready in Lakonia (6. 5) to make up 33; but there are also the fifteen returned from Syracuse (13), we may presume that the Peloponnesian could find more ships than those assembled in the spring (cf. 39. 1), and the building programme of 3. 2 might by now have made some headway. The most likely explanation is that Thucydides had it in mind to insert earlier some reference to the preparation of this force.

Diod. xiii. 34. 4, 63. 1, has 35 ships sent under Hermokrates to help Sparta; at 61. 1 he has 25, which had been sent to help Sparta, now returning to Himera (this passage neglects the destruction of the original ships at Kyzikos and the building of new ships, X. *HG* i. 1. 18, 26). It is possible, as for books vi-vii, that Diodoros has genuine additional detail derived through Ephoros from Philistos, but mere muddle is also possible. Here 35 might be the number decreed at Syracuse, not the number actually sent; a likely parallel is the constant figure of three hundred Phoenician ships (xiii. 36. 5, 37. 4, 38. 4, 41. 4, 42. 4, 46. 6) in place of Thucydides' 147 (87. 3). Alternatively, 35 might be the sum of all ships sent at various times from Syracuse; in Thucydides only one reaches the eastern Aegean (35. 1) beyond the present twenty, but more might have come with Hermokrates' successors (85. 3, X. *HG* i. 1. 31) or on some other occasion, and note that there were some Sicilian ships with Agesandridas at 91. 2. There is certainly no need to question Thucydides' text here.

Ἐρμοκράτους - - ἐνάγοντος: the debate no doubt began in the previous winter, giving rise to the expectations of 2. 3 above.

Θηριμένει: so JK; **Θηραμένει** cett., but they have the correct form

elsewhere. Nothing is known of him but his brief career here, ending with his disappearance at 38.1.

Λέρον; B, 'Ελεόν or "Ελεον" cett., which suggests no known island; cf. 27. I **Λέρου** B, Δέρου cett. (it is not inevitable that this should refer to the same place, but it makes good sense if that is so). The only ground of doubt here is that Leros is forty miles away to the south-west and not visible from Miletos itself; but it is clear in view from Didyma, and from the point of view of their approach from the Peloponnese it could fairly be called *πρὸ Μιλήτου*. It is the natural place for the squadron to make for, and we should not expect their first call to be too close in or too visible from Miletos and the Athenian fleet.

Leros, with Teichoussa on the mainland (§ 3 n.), was in some sense Milesian territory. When Miletos was in revolt in 453 (*ATL* iii. 253) payments were made by *Μιλέσιοι [ἐχ]ς Λέρο* and [*ἐκ Τ*]ειχίσσοση[*s*] (list I. vi. 19–22; for other Milesians in the new fragment of list I, see Meritt, *Hesp.* xli [1972], 406–10), and thereafter the payments of Leros and Teichoussa are either included with that of Miletos or very closely associated with it.

2. τὸν Ἰασικὸν κόλπον: immediately south of the Miletos-Didyma promontory, between it and the Halikarnassos peninsula to the south. News could be procured in Leros, but for direct contact they had to put in to the mainland.

3. Αλκιβιάδον: he came to Miletos with Chalkideus (17. I), and had very likely been there ever since. This is his last appearance till 45. I, when he is with Tissaphernes.

Τειχιοῦσσαν: the site has usually been sought on the south side of the Didyma peninsula, though Karakuyu there has only medieval building and its inscriptions were brought from Didyma; cf. *ATL* i. 553–4. G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook in *BSA* lii (1957), 106–16 propose instead the site at Kazikh, further south-east towards Iasos, in a separate olive-plain on an inlet of the gulf; see their map (p. 107) of the whole area from Didyma to Iasos. The walls of its small akropolis might go back to the sixth century; it is the only Classical site known between Didyma and Iasos, and no other known name is available for it; its harbour is better than Karakuyu bay, and more obviously inside the gulf (*οἵτερ τοῦ κόλπου πλεύσαντες*); and the fact that it is slightly set apart from the other territory of Miletos suits the evidence of the tribute-lists on the nature of its association with that city (§ 1 n. above). L. Robert (*Rev. Phil.* xxxi [1957] 7–22) describes this area as he saw it in 1934, and on pp. 14–15 he argues that it belonged to the territory of Miletos rather than Iasos, from which it is separated by rather higher hills.

Teichoussa was under a perhaps independent dynast in the sixth century (*Syll*³. 3d), and we know nothing of the circumstances in which it became associated with Miletos.

27. 1. ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός · · · τῶν ξυναρχόντων: these words do not mean that his colleagues were in any way subordinate to Phrynicos, or even that he was their 'chairman'; for this see Dover, *JHS* lxxx (1960), 61–77, and for the faint possibility that he had in this year a colleague from his own tribe Lewis, *JHS* lxxxi (1961), 121–2. Phrynicos is necessarily the subject of the sentence, and the words ὁ τῶν Αθ. στρ., not needed to identify a man mentioned as recently as 25. 1, serve to effect a transition from the Peloponnesian to the Athenian side. It is clear from the whole chapter that Phrynicos had no weapon but his powers of persuasion; his age (25. 1 n.) may have added weight to his opinion, and so (for all we know) may his past career.

His colleagues certainly include Onomakles and (S)kironides (25. 1). Of the other commanders, Strombichides and Thrasykles (17. 1, 3) might be available, Leon and Diomedon having moved to Chios (24. 2), and someone must have commanded at the minor action of 24. 1 and remained at Lade till Phrynicos and his colleagues arrived (25. 1); but 30. 1 shows that Strombichides at some point returned to Athens, and Thrasykles is not named after 17. 3 (19. 2).

ἀπὸ τῆς Λέρου: Λέρον (B) is here clearly right against Δέρον (cett.). Cf. 26. 1 with n.; we can suppose that loyal Lerians brought the news when Therimenes had left.

2. ὅπου γὰρ [ξεστιν] · · · παρασκευασμένοις ἔσται ἀγωνίσασθαι: παρεσκευασμένοις ἔξεσται B. The received text can be construed if we supply ἀγωνίσασθαι after ἔξεστιν ἐν ὑστέρῳ, and take the whole of πρὸς ὄπόσας · · · ἔσται ἀγωνίσασθαι as an indirect question dependent on σαφῶς εἰδότας; so Portus, and the main objection made by his successors seems to be that καθ' ἡσυχίαν does not fit appropriately into the clause governed by εἰδότας, an objection which underrates Thucydides' habits of compression. Recent edd. are agreed that ἔξεστιν and ἔσται cannot both be right, and the former is generally taken to be a gloss on the latter; in that case we have to supply a verb (ἀγωνιοῦνται) for πρὸς ὄπόσας, κ.τ.λ., and to co-ordinate εἰδότας and παρασκευασμένοις after ἔσται. The change of case is hard to accept, and if ἔξεστιν is deleted it is probably best to adopt Stahl's παρασκευασμένους and to suppose that corruption was due to the expectation that ἔσται would need a dative (for the acc. cf. vii. 12. 4). If we retain ἔξεστιν, the variation, acc. after ἔξεστιν and dat. after ἔσται, makes a less violent clash. The present state of the text is more easily accounted for if we suppose that in this his first draft Thucydides wrote both ἔξεστιν and ἔσται, with a limited change of course during the sentence; he may have envisaged putting ἀγωνίσασθαι much closer to ἔξεστιν, but then expanded the clauses governed by εἰδότας until ἔσται demanded an ἀγωνίσασθαι of its own.

Against B's perf. part. it has been argued that this would describe

a continuing condition and that the aor. part. suits better with *καθ'* *ήσυχίαν*; the argument is less than conclusive. After *ἀγωνίσασθαι* B adds *ὅποι τε βούλονται*, which Classen accepted as it stands; Stahl's *ὅπότε βούλονται* might make better sense, but the syntax calls for *ὅπόταν βούλωνται*. It is not easy to imagine a reason why these words should be interpolated, but they do not fit well into our text.

However the sentence is left or restored, Phrynicos' argument is clear, that they must be better informed and prepared before they take so large a risk. *σαφῶς εἰδότας* reads a little awkwardly after § 1 *ἐπύθετο* - - - *σαφῶς*, which asserts that they did know the facts of this situation; but that is a purely verbal point.

τῷ αἰσχρῷ ὄνειδει: 'the reproach of acting shamefully', cf. Eur. *IA* 999 *ὄνειδος ἀμαθές*, 'the reproach of acting stupidly'. Deleting *ὄνειδει* (Krüger, Classen), *τῷ αἰσχρῷ εἴξας* by itself would express the meaning adequately (cf. vi. 11. 6 διὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν), or *τῷ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ὄνειδει* (Steup) could easily be corrupted to our text; but there is no need to deny this bolder expression to Thucydides.

2-3. *τῷ αἰσχρῷ* - - - *αἰσχρόν* - - - *αἰσχιον* - - - *τῷ αἰσχρῷ*: this hammering on the word recalls v. 111. 3. Phrynicos' opponents had evidently used the argument from *αἰσχύνη*, as the Melians did (v. 104), and he repeats their word to batter them into sense; cf. Ar. *Lys.* 428-32. There is also some equivocation on the meanings of *αἰσχρόν* (see v. 111. 3 n.). Here § 3 οὐ γὰρ *αἰσχρόν* may fairly be translated 'it is no disgrace'; *αἰσχιον* stresses rather the materially disagreeable result; *τῷ αἰσχρῷ*, contrasted with *τῷ μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ*, reverts to the notion of 'disgrace'.

3. *ἢ μόλις* - - - *ἐπιχειρεῖν*: the main sense is clear, that even after firm preparation Athens can now scarcely afford to take the initiative anywhere; Steup's proposal to read *⟨μή⟩* before *καθ'* *ἐκουσίαν* is based on misunderstanding of Phrynicos' argument. *ἢ πάνυ γε ἀνάγκη* would then add the alternative, that circumstances *might* compel Athens to take such an initiative even without adequate preparation, but this rather confuses the issue: 'or in case of absolute necessity' reads oddly after 'when it is only with the greatest difficulty (cf. vi. 23. 1), given the disasters that have befallen her, that she could take the initiative in attack with secure preparation in circumstances of her own choosing'. The omissions (*καθ'* *ἐκουσίαν* om. C, *ἀνάγκη* om. B) suggest some disturbance in the tradition: *ἢ πάνυ γε ἀνάγκη* may be part of a gloss on *μή βιαζομένη*, occasioned by the fact that it is here passive, not as more commonly middle.

ἢ πον: some correction is needed for codd. *ποῦ*, and i. 142. 3, vi. 37. 2 provide exact parallels for Lindau's *ἢ πον*, 'much less ...'.

αὐθαιρέτους κινδύνους: this echoes Perikles at i. 144. 1, and if Perikles used any such phrase in fact, Phrynicos was old enough to remember it.

4. ἐκέλευε: 'urged', not 'commanded'; cf. ML 73. 33 μὲ ἐπιτάπποντας, κελεύοντας δὲ ἀπάρχεσθαι, ἐὰν βόλονται. See § 1 n.

ξυναγαγόντας πάσας τὰς ναῦς: cf. 30. 1.

5. ὡς δὲ ἔπεισε, καὶ ἔδρασε ταῦτα: as ἔπεισε again shows, Phrynicos was a colleague not a superior. Wilamowitz (*Hermes* xii [1877] 335 n. 17 = *Kl. Schr.* iii. 10 n.2) therefore thought the execution of the decision ought not to be ascribed to him alone and proposed ἔδρασαν, which Steup adopted. This is too literal; the initiative was Phrynicos' (§ 1), and it is natural to write as if he carried it out.

καὶ ἔδοξεν, κ.τ.λ.: the two clauses οὐκ - - - ὑστερον and οὐκ - - - κατέστη express so similar a thought in different formulations that Wilamowitz (*Hermes* xii [1877], 335 n.17 = *Kl. Schr.* iii. 10 n.2) and Steup supposed them to be alternative versions, one of which Thucydides intended to delete. There seem to be no instances in this book of double recension in the normal sense (for 68. 2 see ad loc.), but there are certainly cases where it appears as if Thucydides had not finally made up his mind how to express what he wanted to say (e.g. 66. 3), and this might be another instance. But the two clauses do not say quite the same. The first means that Phrynicos' decision on this occasion seemed not only at the time, but thereafter, to have been intelligent, which is a little surprising in view of the losses to which his strategy condemned Athens in the next months (below), and of the fact that bolder action had paid off at Kyzikos, almost certainly before these words were written; but it could be argued that the Athenian commanders at Kyzikos did know (§ 2 above) about the numbers and fighting quality of the fleet they engaged. The second, claiming that all later decisions taken by Phrynicos were also intelligent is more obviously controversial, but this judgement need not be understood as approval of the general course Phrynicos adopted in helping to set up the oligarchy, only as a tribute to his tactical skill, and 48. 4-7 can certainly be taken as another instance of his correct insight. If both clauses are to stand the second οὐκ must be changed to οὐδ' (Krüger, Hude); but it remains possible that Thucydides was hesitating about the way to frame a judgement which he knew would be unpopular.

Thucydides' opinion of Phrynicos is not easy to control, since we have no detail of his earlier career (25. 1 n.) and are confined to what Thucydides records. He subscribed (48. 4) to Phrynicos' view of Alkibiades' political convictions, and surely also to his view of the oligarchs' policy towards the allies (48. 5-7 with 64. 5); the episode of his correspondence with Astyochos (50-1) showed adroitness, if not exactly what one expects Thucydides to mean by ξύνεσις; at 68. 3 his steadfastness is praised, not his intelligence. But Phrynicos, though he was not of such prominence as to be named in our meagre record of the period before 411, had had a long public career and could be

included among τοὺς προστάντας ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν (Lys. xxv. 9); Thucydides, his junior in age, had material enough to form a judgement and he was not the man to let this judgement be deflected because of the lurid end of Phrynicos' career.

For the present occasion, Thucydides' approval is explicit and emphatic; and Phrynicos' arguments accord well with warnings ascribed to Perikles (i. 144. 1, echoed verbally in § 3 above, cf. ii. 65. 7) which the historian surely approved. But the emphasis in itself shows that Thucydides knew his opinion was controversial, as was inevitable, and there is a morsel of further evidence in the scholia to Aristophanes which refer to Phrynicos' generalship at Samos. Some of these relate to his later part in setting up the Four Hundred (Σ Lys. 313), others to the correspondence with Astyochos (Σ Av. 750, Suda s.v. Φρυνίχου πάλαισμα), but Σ Ran. 689 (Suda s.vv. παλαιόσμασιν, Φρυνίχου πάλαισμα) is more relevant to our purpose, though not to the text on which it is a comment: στρατηγούντος αὐτοῦ ἡττήθησαν Αθηναῖοι, καὶ πολλοὶ αὐτῷ προσεκρούσθησαν, ὡς προδόντι τὸν πόλεμον. No Athenian force was defeated under Phrynicos' generalship; Charminos' loss of six ships off Syme (42. 4, alluded to in Ar. *Th.* 804, with a wildly errant schol.) was neither very serious nor Phrynicos' fault. The reference must be to the charge made by Peisandros at 54. 3, that Phrynicos had betrayed Iasos and Amorges, not a matter of revealing military secrets to the enemy but of taking the decision at Miletos to avoid a battle, which was directly responsible for the loss. Σ Ran. 689 is not based directly on Thucydides, and other historians must have mentioned this episode, certainly the Atticographers, and it would not be surprising if some of these had expressed an opinion opposite to that of Thucydides.

The latter in no sense conceals the grounds for criticism: 25. 5, 26. 3 for the critical nature of the occasion, 27. 1 the views of the other generals, 27. 6 ἀτελεὶ τῇ νίκῃ and the Argive reaction. For the forces available see p. 28 §§ 6–7 above, probably some 68 Athenian ships, not all of them fast (25. 1 n.), against some eighty Peloponnesian, of whom only the twenty Syracusans' crews had recent fighting experience, though under different conditions. But though the Athenians had lost their best crews in Sicily they had not lost all their skill, nor the Peloponnesians their sense of inferiority.

The defect of Phrynicos' strategy is that under the conditions he desires here Athens could never be sure of forcing a battle. When the Peloponnesians felt themselves inferior but had a secure base, they could decline battle with safety (e.g. 38. 5, 79. 6), while sending off detachments by land (e.g. 62. 1) or even by sea (80. 1) to stimulate fresh revolts from Athens; and the Athenians could not keep up with this (e.g. 44. 3). The victory at Kyzikos in spring 410 was made possible by luring the enemy out against an apparently inferior force

(Diod. xiii. 50. 2), or as Xenophon appears to have thought (*HG* i. 1. 16) by mere chance, and there were not many such opportunities. The present occasion offered such a chance in that Therimenes had to take some positive action to save Miletos (26. 3), and Phrynicos' colleagues expected that he would offer battle by sea. If they had been allowed to hang on and fight, the course of the war might have been very different.

We cannot weigh all the factors, and Thucydides has given us only the general arguments. But 30. 2 ἐθαλασσοκράτουν, with the numbers given there, suggests that Phrynicos was too pessimistic, and the Periklean model of caution, propounded in very different circumstances, may have misled Thucydides. One wonders how he saw Phrynicos' strategy in comparison with that adopted in the Hellespont in 410 and 408. This chapter seems to have been written after Phrynicos' death, but that is not far ahead; the judgement on Alkibiades at vi. 15. 4, written after 404, shows Thucydides rating a very different commander above Phrynicos. The *History* stops too soon for us to be sure how Thucydides saw the Ionian War as a whole, but from the contrast between this judgement and that of vi. 15. 4 it might be argued that viii. 27 was written before he could see the whole.

This is an unusually long passage of reported speech, and is one of those in book viii which it is thought Thucydides might later have worked up into speeches in *oratio recta*. On this question see 48. 7 n.

6. οἱ Ἀργεῖοι - - - ἀπέπλευσαν: there were 1,500 (25. 1), of whom nearly 300 were killed in the battle (25. 3). On the ships needed to take them home see p. 28 § 8 above. Their removal would make at least a temporary alteration in the balance of forces; the loss of the Argive land troops also hampered the Athenian effort, though when they were offered again at 86. 8 the offer was not taken up.

28. 1. τὰς Χίας ναῦς: 17. 1, twenty Chian, five Peloponnesian ships with Chian crews. It might seem risky to denude Miletos of defence, but if the Athenians refused to face Therimenes before, they were likely still to hold back while he was as close as Teichoussa, or even Iasos.

τὰ σκεύη ἡ ἔξειλοντο: primarily the sails, to lighten the ships when battle was in prospect; for a conspicuous case see X. *HG* ii. 1. 29.

2. *Ιασον: near the head of the gulf, on its northern shore; see G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA* lii (1957), 100–6, with a general plan of the country between Miletos and Iasos, fig. 13 on p. 107. The peninsular site, with a good harbour on its west side (Str. xiv. 2. 21, 658 and Steph. Byz. call Iasos an island), certainly held the Hellenistic-Roman city, and the site of the archaic and Classical city has been sought elsewhere, without success; but recent Italian excavations show early

occupation of the peninsula, including some Mycenaean traces (D. Levi in *ASAtene* xlv–xlvi [1967–8], 537–90; xlvii–xlviii [1969–70], 461–532).

The massive and elaborate wall enclosing part of the plateau west of the harbour does not look like a city circuit and contains no suitable traces of building, so Bean and Cook, observing no defences on the seaward side, attributed it to Amorges, building to protect his army which he supposed secure from naval attack (cf. *ATL* i. 491–2). This attractive theory breaks down on the dating of the wall, for which see F. E. Winter, *AJA* lxvii (1963), 374 n. 38 and *Greek Fortifications* 241–4, who also regards the wall as a fortification for a camp, but attributes it to an unknown builder of the Hellenistic period.

οὐ προσδεχομένων, κ.τ.λ.: this seems surprising, if two days earlier the Peloponnesian fleet had been at Teichoussa, not ten miles away in a direct line, and had left gear there so that it might be expected to return. But Amorges did not know of the Athenian decision not to fight; Athenian mastery of the sea had been an established fact all his life, and he perhaps did not realize the scale and the implications of the disaster in Sicily. Cf. at an earlier stage iii. 32. 3.

3. Πισσούθνου - - - βασιλέως: the placing of this note, here rather than at the earlier mention of Amorges in § 2, is not in itself suspicious since Thucydides is apt to postpone explanation till the moment when it is most relevant; but the exact repetition from 5. 5 is disquieting. If Thucydides had completed his revision and dealt more fully with the history of Pissouthnes' and Amorges' revolt (5. 5 n.), no doubt all these loose ends would have been tidied up.

εἰ βούλεται: not so much an indication that Tissaphernes might prefer not to execute the king's command, as the polite indifference of the Peloponnesians who did not mind what became of Amorges.

παλαιόπλουτον: Str. xiv. 21, 658 says that the Iasians lived mainly by fishing and that their land was *παράλυπρος*, which modern observers confirm. It might have been a more substantial place in the Classical period, but hardly so rich as this sentence implies; its annual tribute to Athens was one talent before the war, later raised to three. It looks as if Thucydides had been misinformed; perhaps the bulk of the money (cf. 36. 1) was booty taken from Amorges.

4. τούς τ' ἐπικούρους: Pissouthnes too had had Greek mercenaries (Ktesias 53 [52], *FGrH* 688 F 15; cf. 5. 4 n.), who were bribed to desert him and their leader, the Athenian Lykon, was rewarded; but we do not know what became of the men. Thucydides gives no direct indication of the number of Amorges' mercenaries, but when taken to Chios (§ 5) they do not seem to have reduced Athenian dominance by land (38, 40).

οὐκ ἀδικήσαντες: it would not have been obviously ‘unjust’ to treat them more harshly. *ἀδικεῖν* here means little more than ‘harm’; see also 51. 1 n.

τό τε πόλισμα: the buildings etc. as opposed to the inhabitants; the word carries no implication about the size of the town (*pace* Bean and Cook, § 2 n. above).

καὶ δούλα καὶ ἔλευθερα: a clear case of *ἀνδράποδα* used for captives enslaved in war, irrespective of their previous status; contrast 62. 2. **στατῆρα Δαρεικόν:** X. *An.* i. 7. 18 equates 3,000 darics with ten talents, which gives twenty dr. to the daric, the figure also given by Suda s.v. *δαρεικούς*, a surprisingly low sum. But they were not selling these persons (as Nikias the captives from Hykkara, vi. 62. 4) for what they could get; this is rather an arrangement with Tissaphernes about the booty, out of which the Spartans had in other respects done very well.

5. Πεδάριτόν τε τὸν Λέοντος: Thucydides’ practice in first introductions is so irregular (cf. G. T. Griffith, *PCPhS* N.S. vii [1961], 21–33) that we cannot assume that this is a Leon already known to us. Poralla s.v. finds no difficulty in combining the Olympic victor of 440 (Moretti 332; but he prefers the variant date 424, from *ΣΒ Eur. Hipp.* 230), the oikist of Herakleia (Th. iii. 92. 5), the envoy to Athens of 420 (v. 44. 3), the ephor of 419/8 (X. *HG* ii. 3. 10), the successor of Pedaritos in Chios (61. 2 below), and the father of the Antalkidas who negotiated the King’s Peace (Plu. *Art.* 21. 6). Though some of these may indeed be identical, this is excessive with a name so common in Greece; if the father had succeeded the son in Chios, we might almost expect to hear of this, in the sentence of 61. 2 where both are mentioned, or elsewhere. Harp. s.v. *Πεδάριτος* (cf. Suda s.v. *Παιδάριτος*) describes him further as *τῶν γεγονότων καλῶν*, which may be relevant for his performance later, and refers to Theopompos, *Hellenika* ii (FGrH 115 F 8). For his quarrel with Astyochos see 32. 3–33. 1, 38, 4, 39. 2, 40. 3; for his conduct in Chios 38. 3 with n.; his death in winter 412/11, 55. 3.

πεζῇ μέχρι Ἐρυθρῶν: on his way he would have to pass through or near several cities about whose present allegiance we are not informed, e.g. Myous and Notion; it would not be surprising if the Athenian withdrawal from Miletos had increased the area of revolt. Also by Teos (20. 2 with n.) and close to Klazomenai (23. 6, 31. 2–4). **αὐτοῦ:** the contention (Stahl, Steup) that Thucydides would have had to write *αὐτόσε* here goes too far. But *αὐτοῦ*, marking a contrast between Chios, to which they had to send, and Miletos, where they actually were, adds nothing at all; Stahl’s *αὐτοί*, contrasting Pedaritos’ appointment, ordained from Sparta, with that of Philippos, which was purely local, does make a point.

Φίλιππον: described at 87. 6 as *ἄνδρα λακεδαιμόνιον* (cf. 22. 1 n.).

**29–44. Miscellaneous fighting. Second treaty between Sparta and Persia.
Peloponnesian move to Rhodes**

29. 1. κατεστήσατο --- ἐς φυλακήν: this has caused unnecessary trouble. Classen took it to mean 'put the town under safe protection', but for this the active *καθίσταναι* would be needed. Steup proposed to delete ἐς φυλακήν, for *καθίστασθαι* by itself can mean 'set in order' (e.g. iv. 116. 3). But with this sense of *κατεστήσατο* no difficulty is caused by adding ἐς φυλακήν, organized it 'with a view to defence' (Goodhart). The town had been handed over by the Spartans to Tissaphernes (28. 4).

ώσπερ ύπεστη: at 5. 5 his agents in Sparta promised *τροφὴν παρέξειν*, but no figure was there named. See 45. 2 n. Thucydides writes here and in § 2 (later passages on pay are not specific) as if the money were not only calculated on a monthly basis but given as a lump sum for the month. The starting-point is not stated, but a reasonable point would be their arrival in Asia, when they might be thought of as entering into service with the Persians. For the bulk of the fleet, Therimenes' 55 ships, a substantial part of their first month must by now have elapsed, perhaps even all of it. It is less clear when the Chians might expect pay, which was not mentioned in Tissaphernes' treaty with Chalkideus (18), but they had taken part in the capture of Iasos, which was at his request (28. 1–2) and are presumably included in *πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ* below. Astyochos' ten ships (23. 1, 5) would probably not qualify before their arrival at Miletos (36. 1).

ἔως ἂν βασιλέα ἐπέρηται: the matter seems still to be in doubt at 45. 6 below, but 58. 5 refers to an agreed rate, which Thucydides does not state; from X. HG i. 5. 5 it appears that the king had by 407 laid down 3 ob. as a maximum.

2. Ἐρμοκράτους: 26. 1 told us that Hermokrates had urged the sending of ships, but this is the first indication that he commanded them himself.

παραδοῦναι: a striking extension of the use of the inf. with verbs of motion to express the purpose of the movement (Kühner–Gerth ii. 17).

ὅμως δὲ παρὰ πέντε ναῦς --- ἐδίδον τοῦ μηνός: it is clear that some small increase over 3 ob. was agreed, but the meaning of *παρὰ πέντε ναῦς* is not immediately clear, and in the explanatory clause which follows codd. *τρία τάλαντα* (*τρία* om. B) cannot be right for 55 ships.

Arnold, following Göller, kept *τρία* and deleted *καὶ πεντήκοντα*, and Böckh i³. 344 n. f argued forcibly for this solution. It gives an arithmetically easy result for the monthly pay per ship (forty minas in place of the thirty required for the three-obol rate) and per man (18 dr. in place of 15 dr.; the daily pay is a more awkward fraction at $3\frac{3}{4}$ ob., but that does not matter if payment was by the month); and it

allows Thucydides to state the agreement in straightforward and intelligible terms. The intrusion of *kai πεντήκοντα* is easily accounted for as due to a reader who thought that the second clause should refer to the 55 ships of Therimenes. But (a) though the reference of the number five is clear, *παρὰ πέντε ναῦς* does not fit easily where our text has it, so that Böckh hankered after Krüger's deletion of these words; (b) the number in *τούτου τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ* below can only be five, and the meaning must be that any remainder over a figure divisible by five will be treated in the same proportion, which was acceptable to Böckh but does not seem a natural way of describing the fairly simple operation involved.

Since Madvig most edd. have adopted Meibom's alteration of *τρία* to *τριάκοντα* (proposed in 1671), which means that 30T, which at the three-obol rate would pay for sixty ships, is to be spread over 55, giving fractionally more than 3 ob. per man per day. This would make sense of *παρὰ πέντε ναῦς* in its position in the first clause: 'they agreed (a total sum which was) more by a margin of five ships than three obols per man'; and *τούτου τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ* would now refer to the 55 ships of Therimenes' squadron, the main subject of the negotiation, and mean that any further ships (whichever they were: see below) would be paid at the same rate. But the arithmetic is now very unpalatable: $\frac{3}{5}T$, or $32\frac{7}{11}$ dr., per ship per month, $17\frac{3}{11}$ dr. per man per month. Much could be done with an abacus (M. Lang, *Hesp.* xxxiii [1964], 146–67, xxxiv [1965], 224–47), and stiffer arithmetical problems arise with ML 72; but these arise of themselves from calculating interest at fixed rates for odd numbers of days, and it is quite another matter to introduce complications like these into a negotiated agreement. The best that could be done for this solution would be to regard it as a compromise between stubborn negotiators and assume that the Spartans meant to use some of the money from Iasos to make the monthly total up to a more manageable figure.

W. E. Thompson (*Philol.* cix [1965], 294–7) describes the last solution as 'an arithmetical absurdity', and proposes to retain the whole of the received text. This is in effect a variant on the solution of Böckh and Arnold, yielding the same arithmetical result but making better sense of *τούτου τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ*. The trouble is to get this result out of the Greek: Thompson takes *παρὰ πέντε ναῦς* to mean 'according to units of five ships', and the reader has to realize that it is for such a unit that 3T is offered in the next clause. That is not easy, but Thompson accounts for the text by supposing that in the course of the discussion someone suggested that Tissaphernes should pay 3T for every five ships instead of the $2\frac{1}{2}$ T he had proposed, and that in the eventual agreement the five-ship unit took a prominent place. The text 'may represent Thucydides' first attempt to convert a written document into his own words', an attempt which might have

been improved in revision. This proposal, in spite of the difficulties which its text must cause to any reader, makes better sense than the others of the passage as a whole, but it would be rash to suppose that argument is at an end.

For a coin which may have been minted at this stage by Tissaphernes for use by Greeks, see Kraay and Hirmer, *Greek Coins* pl. 184. 621; E. S. G. Robinson in *Num. Chron.* 6. viii [1948], 48–55, with pl. v. 8.

ὅσῳ πλείους νῆσος ἦσαν τούτου τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ: for possible interpretations of this see the previous n. and § 1 n. The reference is probably to the Chian ships at Miletos.

30. 1. τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ Αθηναίοις: edd. compare i. 72. 1 and 115. 4, other passages where the main subject, which is for clarity placed at the head of the sentence, has been attracted into the case which would have been appropriate if it had belonged within an immediately following parenthesis. B's *οἱ . . . Αθηναῖοι* is no doubt an emendation intended to remove the anomaly.

Χαρμῖνος: the name does not recur at Athens, and we have no idea what his connections or past history were. See further 41–2, 73. 3; after the counter-revolution at Samos his position there cannot have been tenable, but we do not know what became of him.

Στρομβιχίδης: last mentioned at 17. 3 off Miletos, but he had evidently gone home since. See p. 27, § 2, and 27. 1 n.

Εὐκτήμων: a not uncommon name, and there is no special reason to identify this man with e.g. the archon of 408/7. Thucydides does not mention him again, but he mentions no Athenian commander hereafter in connection with Chios except for Strombichides' expedition from Chios to the Hellespont (62. 2), when some general presumably stayed in Chios with the remaining ships. It has been conjectured that Euktemon went home to Athens with the oligarchs (Busolt, iii/2. 1466–7 with 1412 n. 6), but there is no actual evidence, even of a negative kind.

τὰς ἀπὸ Χίου: the 25 which went to Lesbos (23. 1) and then attacked Chios (24. 2–3), or as many of them as were still there. Leon and Diomedon, who then commanded them, were in Athens later in the winter (54. 3), and from the present passage it looks as if they had already left, perhaps taking some of the ships. See p. 28 § 8 above.

τὰς ἄλλας: we have not been told of other detachments, and this is another indication that Thucydides has not tried to record all ship movements.

ξυναγαγόντες: this was Phrynicos' advice (27. 4).

διακληρωσάμενοι: cf. vi. 42. 1 with n.

2. Ὁνομακλῆς: 25. 1 with n.

τριάκοντα ναῦς . . . ναυσὶν διπλιταγωγοῖς: from the run of the sentence

it looks as if the troop-carriers are additional to the thirty (fast) ships, and at p. 28 § 8 above I have allowed for five of them; but the information we are given is so vague that this is a very random guess.

τῶν --- χιλίων δόπλιτῶν: these are generally taken to be the 1,000 Athenians of 25. 1. Nothing is said of the 1,000 allied hoplites (*ibid.*), and they may like the Argives have gone home, though on the face of it there would have been employment for them in Chios. If they went home, this again would have needed ships to carry them.

οἱ δ' ἄλλοι: see 27. 1 n. and § 1 above; the generals available are Phrynicos, (S)kironides, Charminos, and possibly Thrasylles.

τέσσαρι καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναυσὶν ἐθαλασσοκάτουν: the number is by some twenty less than we should expect from the data. Thucydides has explicitly provided; see pp. 28–9 § 8 above for ways in which we might account for this. With these reduced numbers they held the sea against the eighty now in Miletos, which speaks badly for Phrynicos' argument in c. 27.

ἐπίπλους: Krüger; **ἐπίπλουν** codd. The context calls for the plural.

31. 1. τότε --- καταλεγόμενος: 24. 6, but we have moved on in time since then, for there the Chians were still deliberating whether the taking of hostages was the best method of dealing with the plot. **τότε** thus quite naturally refers not to 24. 6 but to the time of the action of 25–30, and there is no need with Steup to alter *ώς* to *ὅς*.

τὴν ξυμμαχίαν: almost concretely, 'the allies' (cf. i. 118. 2).

βελτίω ὄντα: contrast 26. 3.

τάς τε Πελοποννησίων δέκα: 23. 1, 5 and 33. 1 with n.

2. Πτελεεῷ: 24. 2 with n.

Κλαζομενάς --- Δαφνοῦντα: at 23. 6 Klazomenai returned to allegiance to Athens, while the anti-Athenians went off to Daphnous; the site of the latter is not known, but it was presumably some distance away and it has been deduced, not very safely, from *ἀνοικίζεσθαι* here that it was inland. Now it is proposed that the pro-Athenian party shall retire there, presumably changing places with their opponents though Thucydides here gives no indication of that. He does not mention Daphnous again, but in 408 it was evidently occupied by pro-Athenians: ML 88 is the opening of a decree proposed by Alkibiades in summer 407, ratifying an agreement made by the generals [*τοῖς οἰκίσασι*] *Δαφνῶντα*, who are declared to have served Athens well, but the decree breaks off before it can tell us more detail. Klazomenai might have been lost to Athens again since 410 (X. HG i. 1. 10–11), but at the time of the battle of Notion, late 407 or more probably early 406, it is *σύμμαχος Αθηναίων* (Diod. xiii. 71. 1, wrongly placed under 408/7) and is suffering *ὑπό τινων φυγάδων πορθουμένη*.

This will be a pro-Spartan group somewhere on the mainland, whether or not at Daphnous.

With *προσχωρεῖν* we have to supply *τοὺς Κλαζομενίους*, but the shift of subject is easy and the clause does not call for emendation, as (probably) v. 81. 2. No simple emendation would reduce the confusing changes in the allegiance of Daphnous.

Τάμως Ἰωνίας ὥπαρχος ὅν: Tissaphernes' *ἥπαρχος* at 87.1; and cf. 16. 3 n. In the civil war between Kyros and Tissaphernes which preceded the Anabasis (X. *An.* i. 1. 6–8) Tamos commanded Kyros' fleet (*ibid.* i. 4. 2, where we learn that he was an Egyptian) and accompanied the expedition as far as Kilikia (*ibid.* i. 2. 21, Diod. xiv. 19. 5: but in 19. 6 he was appointed Kyros' governor of Ionia and Aiolis, which is not easily reconciled with 19. 5 or with Xenophon). For his later flight to Egypt and death, Diod. xiv. 35. 3–5.

3. *προσβολήν*: Cobet; ἐσβολήν codd. 'Invasion', 'entry' are clearly unsuitable to the context, and *προσβολήν* gives the required sense. At iv. 25. 8, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐσέβαλλον, LSJ allow the meaning 'make an assault' (Steup and Gomme prefer Poppo's *προσέβαλλον*); but it makes a difference that there the phrase indicates a direction. Here emendation is much more attractive. Cf. also 86. 3 with n.

ἀτειχίστῳ: see 14. 3 n. above.

ἀνέμῳ μεγάλῳ: the first of several winter storms (32. 1, 34. 42. 1), illustrating both the fact that triremes could carry on war in winter and the real danger of doing so.

Φωκαίαν καὶ Κύμην: evidently now in Peloponnesian hands; see 22. 1 n.

Μαραθοῦσσαν, κ.τ.λ.: see the map in *ATL* i. 486. The only pointer to precise identification is the order in which the islands are listed by Pliny, *NH* v. 137 (cf. 24. 2 n. above); the fact that Stephanos calls Pele *μικρὰ νῆσος* tells a little against the identification in *ATL*.

32. 1. αῦθις ἀποστῆναι: see 22–3.

οἵ τε Κορίνθιοι: half of Astyochos' ten ships were Corinthian (33. 1).

2. *Πεδάριος* --- καὶ ἡ στρατιά: 28. 5.

ἐς πεντακοσίους --- καταλειφθέντες: Cf. 17. 1; only about half the number one might expect from five ships. Casualties are possible on the expedition of 22. 1, and might have been heavy in the battles of 24. 3 (Arnold). But though 17. 1 *τοὺς ναύτας* --- καταλιμπάνουσιν clearly says that all were left in Chios, 25. 2 οἱ μετὰ Χ. ἐλθόντες Πελ. would be easier to understand (see n. there) if Chalkideus had brought some of these men with him to Miletos (Busolt iii/2. 1426 n. 1). 17. 1 may be wrong in this detail.

3. *ἐπαγγελλομένων* δέ τινων Λεσβίων τὴν ἀπόστασιν: the definite article (*τὴν ἀπόστασιν*) might suggest reference back to the offer already made in § 1, but in all other respects this vaguely worded gen.

abs. appears to take no notice at all of § 1. If these are the *πρέσβεις* we have met in § 1, *τινῶν* is an odd way to reintroduce them (contrast e.g. 14. 1 *τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τισί*, some but not all of a group already familiar); if they are different, it is odd that no notice is taken of the previous group. This does not seem to have troubled edd., but might well be taken as a sign of imperfect revision. Dover however makes the attractive suggestion that Thucydides wrote δ' ἔτι τῶν ('still' almost = 'again') or δ' ἔτι τινῶν ('some more Lesbians'), which would restore full sense here; Jowett's 'renewing their proposal' suggests that he (perhaps unconsciously) emended in this direction.

ἢν τι σφάλλωνται: edd. treat and translate this as if it were 'even if they failed', and Goodhart adduced 76. 7 ἢν ἀπάντων σφάλλωνται as a partial parallel. But apart from the absence of the expected *kai'* in the clause, it is not self-evident that a Spartan failure in Lesbos would damage the Athenians, indeed the damage would more probably be to the Peloponnesians. Astyochos might reasonably try to involve Pedaritos and the Chians by arguing that even an unsuccessful attempt on Lesbos would draw the Athenians away from Chios (cf. i. 105. 3), but no simple operation will make our text say this, and *kai'* is still required in the conditional clause. It is not clear what Thucydides intended.

οὐδὲ τὰς ναῦς --- προήσειν: Pedaritos was not subordinate to Astyochos (28. 5 with n.), and his standing in Sparta was such that his opinion was attended to (38. 4, 39. 2); hence his independent line. Astyochos at this stage shows more enterprise than we should expect in the light of later criticisms (e.g. 78), to which it could be replied that he had yet to be corrupted by Tissaphernes.

33. 1. τὰς τε τῶν Κορινθίων πέντε, κ.τ.λ.: detail of the composition of this squadron has no special relevance to this occasion, but does explain the Corinthians of 32. 1. The reason for this apparent dislocation may be that the report which Thucydides had of the present movement contained this analysis of the squadron, whereas his reports of the earlier movements did not; and that he had yet to settle such items in their most appropriate place. Stahl and Goodhart deleted *Λακωνικάς* on the ground that 20. 1, 23. 1 make no mention of Lakonian ships; but Sparta is a part both of the Peloponnese and of the alliance.

πρὸς τὴν ναυαρχίαν: Astyochos has been fully nauarch since 20. 1, but the ten ships he now has are a small detachment in comparison with the main fleet at Miletos, so in going to take over the latter he can properly be said to be going 'to his command'.

ἢ μὴν μὴ ἐπιβοηθήσειν: cf. 38. 4; at 40. 3 he is ready to relent, but is interrupted.

2. Κωρύκῳ τῆς Ἐρυθραίας: if Livy xxxvii. 12. 10 *Pelorum promun-*

turium is correctly emended to *Teiorum*, Korykos could also be spoken of as Teian. The promontory itself may well have formed the border.

οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Σάμου Ἀθηναῖοι: 30. 2.

καὶ αὐτοὶ . . . διείργοντο: to say that 'they too were separated . . . and anchored' is illogical, for the 'separation' was created by their anchoring where they did. Krtiger's διείργοντος for διείργοντο καὶ ('they also anchored, on the other side of the separating hill') makes good sense; the phrase is just awkward enough to give rise to misunderstanding and attempts at correction, but does not call for the further insertion proposed by Steup.

3. Ἐρυθραιῶν ἄνδρες αἰχμάλωτοι: there is no record of a clash between Athenian and Erythraian troops, but it is easy to imagine some minor incident. There might have been 'some Erythraians at Klazomenai, 23. 6.

ἐς τὰς Ἐρυθρὰς πάλιν: the site of Erythrai is not in doubt; Str. xiv. 1. 31, 644, and the inscriptions from İldır. The city was deep in the bay north of Arginon (34 with n.) and even in fair weather the Athenians might not have been able to see them from the middle of the channel.

34. Ἀργίνον: Str. xiv. 1. 33, 644–5 (*τὸ Ἀργεννον*), the westernmost point of the southern part of the Erythrai peninsula, and the nearest to Chios. As the Athenians rounded this, the main channel between Chios and Erythrai came into sight.

ναυσὶ . . . μακραῖς: for the distinction between 'long' and 'round' ships, see Morrison and Williams 244, the former meaning in effect ships of war (cf. iv. 118. 5). Thucydides' mind is more often on the distinction between 'fast' ships and troop-carriers (vi. 43), but 'long' occurs at i. 41. 2, referring to a time when Athens was short of warships though presumably not of merchant ships; the not very substantial point here is that the Athenians might have had the same trouble with the storm if they had been chasing merchant vessels, but these were in fact warships.

ώς εἶδον, ἐδίωκον: B's reading makes sense, which cett. B^{γρ} ὥσπερ ἰδόντες ἐπεδίωκον does not; and ἐπιδιώκειν, to pursue an enemy already in flight (e.g. iii. 33. 3), is less suitable than the simple verb. Stahl proposed ὥσπερ εἶχον, ἰδόντες ἐδίωκον, from which Steup preferred to remove ἰδόντες as a gloss, and ὥσπερ εἶδον is another possibility, but none of these attempts to account for the state of the text explains the prefix in ἐπεδίωκον. 'Continuing on the same course' (not, as Steup, 'without changing into battle formation', cf. 23. 3 n.) adds a fresh point, but not an essential one. Valla's *simulac conspexit* (sc. *classis Atheniensis*) shows B's text or one close to it.

ἐς τὸν ὑπὸ τῷ Μίμαντι λιμένα Φοινικοῦντα: in Livy xxxvi. 45. 7 this harbour appears to be south of Erythrai, but that would not be 'under

Mimas'; the wind was from the south and the Athenians cannot have doubled back round Arginon. J. Keil (*RE* xx. 384–5) suggests Egri Liman, between Meli and Denizgeren (24. 2. n), the best harbour along this coast but with only Byzantine remains.

ἔς τὸν τειχισμόν: nothing in the preceding or following narrative suggests that the Athenians proposed to fortify any place on Lesbos, and the reference must be to the immediately following fortification of Delphinion (38. 2); but the reader has not yet heard of this, as the definite article suggests he has (cf. vi. 98. 2 *τὸν κύκλον*; vi. 99. 2 *τοῖς σταυροῖς* is probably corrupt). Weil thinks he has been sufficiently prepared in general terms, and keeps the text; others have emended (e.g. Dobree *ώς ἔς τὴν Χίον*), posited a lacuna (Stahl), or deleted these three words as a gloss (Steup). The anomaly is perhaps rather another indication of the incomplete organization of the book; Thucydides may have intended to explain the plan earlier.

35. 1. Ἰπποκράτης δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιος: not a rare name in Greece, but this may well be the man in Phaselis in late summer 411 (99, where he is ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης, cf. 22. 1 n.), and the one who was sent to Euboea at 107. 2, Mindaros' ἐπιστολέν in X. *HG* i. 1. 23, and killed outside Kalchedon in 408 (*ibid.* i. 3. 5–6; *Diod.* xiii. 66. 2).

Θουρίαις: in 413 the pro-Athenian faction had recently expelled the anti-Athenian (vii. 33. 5), and Thouria joined the expedition against Syracuse (vii. 57. 11). A reaction after the Athenian defeat was only to be expected, cf. [Plu.] 835 d–e.

Δωριεὺς δὲ Διαγόρος: see iii. 8. 1 n.; an old enemy of Athens, now perhaps leading the reaction in Thouria. Thourian ships are mentioned again at 61. 2, and Dorieus' quarrel with Astyochos at 84. 2. For his mission to Rhodes in late summer 411 see p. 31 § 20; for his capture and release by the Athenians early in 406, X. *HG* i. 5. 19; for the story of his death at the hands of the Spartans, Androton *FGrH* 324 F 46 with Jacoby's nn. Paus. vi. 7. 6 says that he was away from Rhodes at the time when the Diagoreioi were overthrown in 395 (*Hell. Oxy.* 15 [10]).

Κνίδον: the long narrow peninsula has an isthmus at its junction with the mainland, and another midway along, the fertile territory being mainly to the west of this second isthmus. The Hellenistic city was certainly at the extreme end of the peninsula: G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook (*BSA* xlvi [1952], 173–9) describe the remains of an earlier city at Burgaz on the south coast a little west of the western isthmus, and argue (202–8) that this is pre-Hellenistic Knidos. The division here of Hippocrates' ships between Triopion and Knidos, and the Athenian movement in § 3, are among their strongest arguments (203); cf. also 43. 1.

ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους: Paulmier; *ἀπό* codd., which is not to be defended

(Krüger) by reference to 109. 1, the expulsion of Tissaphernes' garrison from Knidos, which clearly belongs to a later stage. At this time the important matter was revolt from Athens, opening Knidos to the Spartans.

2. *ταῖς δὲ περὶ Τριόπιον οὖσαις*: elliptically expressed, but it is easy to understand ἄλλαις or ἡμισείαις with *ταῖς δέ*. For Triopion see Bean and Cook (§ 1 n.), 208–10; its position at the end of the peninsula is clear from this passage, and the division of forces shows that contemporary Knidos was somewhere else.

τὰς ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου δικάδας προσβαλλούσας: *προσβάλλω* is sometimes 'make landfall', as iv. 53. 3 of Kythera, the first land that ships from Egypt and Libya would see after a long stretch of open sea; and vi. 44. 2. Here ships from Egypt would make landfall at Rhodes (cf. Diod. xiv. 79. 7), and if they passed between Rhôdes and the mainland they would have to pass Triopion wherever they were going. *προσβάλλω* then must here mean 'put in' at a port, and there is some indication that there was a port at Triopion distinct from that of Knidos (Bean and Cook, see previous n.). At this season a general watch was not likely to produce much; possibly the Peloponnesians had a particular known convoy in mind (cf. again Diod. xiv. 79. 4, 7).

3. *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι*: unusually, Thucydides here gives no number, but this presumably was not the whole fleet.

ἀτειχίστῳ: 14. 3 n.

4. *ἐπεσελθόντων, κ.τ.λ.*: another indication that Knidos was some little distance from Triopion.

36. 1. *ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον*: it is not possible to make this more precise. The conference of Athenian generals at Samos (30. 1) is on their side the first event of a crowded winter, and the events of 31–5 need not occupy much time; but nor is there much to come before the solstice at 39. 1. Thucydides seldom gives us much indication of the lapse of time within a summer or winter (cf. vol. iv, p. 20; and the difficulties discussed in 7, 10. 1 nn. above); here there is no knowing how long would be needed for the situation in Chios to develop as it is described in 38.

εὐπόρως ξτι: in contrast with the unsatisfactory provision later. When Thucydides wrote this he knew there was trouble ahead, but it does not necessarily follow that he had already received the reports on which 45–46 were based. See further 45. 2 n.

μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ἀρκούντως: since Holzapfel (436), many critics have seen here a contradiction with c. 29, where the pay was reduced from a full drachma to something over 3 ob. It would help if we had more exact detail of the chronology. Tissaphernes appears to pay by the month (29. 1 n.), and we do not know how long had elapsed since he paid at the rate of a full drachma for the first month; further, at 29. 1

as at 45. 6, it is still possible that the king may decide for the higher rate. The contradiction may be there, but it is not proved.

τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἰάσου μεγάλα χρήματα: 28. 3.

τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἔφερον: either 'they bore the burden of the war' or 'they contributed towards the war'. Since it does not appear that Milesian troops were employed except at the single battle of 25. 2-5, or that this was a siege involving hardships to endure, the latter sense is the more likely. 'Contribution' would no doubt include provision of lodging and services; if money is in question we can only note that Rhodes, whose total tribute to Athens amounted to nearly 40T, paid 32T to the Peloponnesians at 44. 4, whereas Miletos, which with its dependencies paid 10T during the period of the Peace of Nikias, could not presumably make a significant contribution to the pay of a fleet of this size.

2. ἐνδεεῖς: see nn. to 17. 4-18. This is no longer a question of pay, about which Chalkideus' treaty said nothing, but of politics.

Ἐτι Θηριμένους παρόντος: B; ἐπὶ Θ. παρόντος cett., but a formal dating by the period of Therimenes' command is inappropriate, nor is *παρόντος* the right word for this. It is unreasonable to complain (Wilamowitz 598, Steup) that ἐτι - - - παρόντος is unintelligible till we hear of his departure in 38. 1; this phrase adequately indicates that he is on the point of leaving. Cf. 48. 4 *Φρυνίχω δὲ στρατηγῷ ἐτι ὄντι*, where the reader has to wait much longer to hear of Phrynicos' deposition (54. 3), but edd. have not complained; and § 1 above *εὐπόρως ἐτι εἶχον*.

But there is some difficulty in the description of this treaty as *Θηριμένους σπονδαί* at 43. 3, 52. Thucydides has made it clear in another connection (29. 2) that Therimenes lacked authority as compared with Astyochos, and the latter has now arrived at Miletos; Steup's suggestion that in § 2 Thucydides goes back to the time when Therimenes was in charge, reading *ἄρχοντος* for *παρόντος*, is not tenable in view of the way in which the clauses of this chapter are connected. But the handover of the ships (38. 1) comes after the treaty, so it may be that Astyochos had only just arrived and that the negotiations had been carried through up to the last stage by Therimenes; and Wilamowitz (598) may be right in suggesting that later, when the treaty was found unsatisfactory, Astyochos preferred to put the blame on Therimenes, by then dead.

37. 1. ξυνθῆκαι - - - Τισσαφέρνην: a formal heading, unlike the opening of 18. 1, and Steup was right to put a full stop after *Τισσαφέρνην*. There is no change of substance, except that the treaty now extends to Dareios' sons; that may be an attempt to bind Dareios' successor in the event of his death (Arnold), or to ensure that the Spartans should still be committed in that event.

σπονδὰς εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν: this replaces 18.1 *ξυμμαχίαν. φιλία* is

common enough in the diplomatic language of the time, either alone (as v. 5. 1) or in combination (as vi. 34. 1), and probably adds little here, though states might sometimes be allies without being exactly friends (cf. vi. 78. 1 n.). But note the formula of 37. I in And. iii. 29, *σπουδὰς ποιησάμενοι καὶ συνθέμενοι φιλίαν εἰς τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνον*, of Athens' treaty with Dareios in 424/3; his 'friendship' with Athens, which can never have had much warmth, is now transferred to Sparta.

2. δόποση χώρα, κ.τ.λ.: the claim is not spelt out in the form *βασιλέως ἔστω*, as at 18. 1 (cf. 58. 2). Instead the clause uses the terms of a Greek treaty of non-aggression (e.g. v. 18. 4), but there is no doubt that the cities here described as belonging to the king are the Greek cities of mainland Asia Minor (see also next n.). For the ambiguities in their position see § 5 n.

ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τούτων: the cities of this clause are now identified as those from which the Spartans had taken or might take contributions, i.e. the mainland cities Sparta had liberated from Athens. (It suggests incidentally that the Persian negotiators were not thinking about reclaiming Thessaly etc. for the king, though Lichas' protest at 43. 3 could still be justified by the wording.) The provision about tribute is still unilateral, as at 18. 1, but here the Spartans are not just to prevent money going to Athens, but are forbidden to exact it themselves. If 36. 1 refers to money contributions from Miletos, these might be endangered by this clause: but cf. Alkibiades' argument on behalf of Tissaphernes at 45. 5.

3. ἢν δέ τι δέωνται, κ.τ.λ.: some matters might be left for later negotiation (as the rate of pay, § 4 below), and unforeseen questions might later arise. This clause recognizes such later agreements as valid, just as v. 18. 11, 23. 6, recognize that amendments might be needed and protect the parties against any feeling that amendment would be a breach of the original oaths. This again is Greek in style.

4. τὸν δὲ πόλεμον - - - ποιεῖσθαι: more succinct than 18. 2, but not in substance different.

μεταπεμψαμένου βασιλέως: though clearly restrictive in intention, this formally leaves open a possibility that the king or his satraps might send for more ships, which appears to be excluded at 58. 5 *ταῦς νῦν παρούσαις*.

τὴν δαπάνην βασιλέα παρέχειν: it is a change in Sparta's favour that pay should be mentioned explicitly, but the rate was not settled till the separate agreement alluded to at 58. 5: see n. there, and 36. 1, 45. 2 nn. This is clearly one of the matters left for later negotiation, cf. § 3 with n.

5. τῶν πόλεων δόποσαι ξυνέθεντο βασιλεῖ: § 2 has stipulated non-aggression between the parties as there defined, and it is not clear why a further non-aggression clause should be needed, or to whom it

is to apply. The clue is that the aggressor contemplated is a city, and the victim the king's *χώρα*, here standing on its own whereas in § 2 cities and *χώρα* go together. Given that distinction, this clause appears to safeguard the Persians against the possibility that one of the mainland Greek cities might attack royal territory outside city limits, a situation not covered by § 2, and not on the face of it an item logically to be included in the treaty, since it should be the king's business to control the cities assigned to him in § 2. But their position is ambiguous in that Erythrai certainly (6. 4), and very probably Miletos and others, had been taken into the Spartan alliance on their liberation from Athens, and at this time Miletos at least harboured substantial Peloponnesian forces. The incidents mentioned at 84. 4, 108. 5, 109. 1, though not attacks on the *χώρα*, show that the Persians had reason to fear hostile action from these cities, with possible support from the Peloponnesians. *τοὺς ἄλλους* then, which in spite of the gender might be taken to mean the other cities of the same group, probably involves the Spartans in the enforcement of this clause, which provides a reason for its inclusion in the treaty; and in fact Lichas did later (84. 5) ineffectually try to restrain anti-Persian action by the Milesians.

But if that is right it is still a question how we should take the description of these cities as 'those that have made an agreement with the king'. Conceivably the reference is to the treaty itself and the cities, though surrendered to the king, are treated as parties and are to swear to the treaty, and Dover prefers to take it this way; but to my mind this accords badly with the clear-cut distinction between the parties in §§ 1–2, the Spartans and their allies on the one side and on the other the king, to whom the cities here in question are clearly assigned. The alternative is to suppose that the reference here is to a separate agreement between these cities and the king, not recorded by Thucydides. The existence of such an agreement would help to account for the otherwise surprising fact that the treaties of Chalkideus and Therimenes do nothing to protect the interests of the allied cities which they surrender to Persia, and that these cities, far from resenting their treatment at Sparta's hands, support the Spartan side, notably Miletos (36. 1). It is also relevant that when Alkibiades calls for contributions from the cities, these are to be made *ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν* (45. 5). This interpretation of the phrase under discussion receives no direct support from any part of Thucydides' narrative, but it both removes an anomaly in the treaty text and helps to explain the attitude of the Greek cities. For the further question whether the agreement was cancelled by the third treaty, see 58. 2 n., and for the position thereafter see 84. 5, 85. 2 nn.

τῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ ή ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει: a simple *ὅν βασιλεὺς ἄρχει* was sufficient in § 2, and the disjunction here has puzzled

commentators. Steup suggested that *ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει* 'embraces the Greek coastlands, even if they were not in fact in the king's possession', and Weil also includes the Greek cities under this phrase. While it seems perverse to distinguish areas which the king did not control as 'those which he rules', this is on the right lines, if the suggestion put forward in the last n. is accepted. That is, the cities defined in § 2 as *ῶν βασιλεὺς ἄρχει* have a special status different from that of the inhabitants of his *χώρα*; the presence of Peloponnesian forces limits his control, but he continues to affirm his formal right. An alternative possibility is to delete *ἢ*: then, in a somewhat cumbrous phrase, the king's responsibility would be confined to those areas where his control was effectual; but this goes less well with § 2 where *βασιλεὺς ἄρχει* refers rather to his rights than to control. The reciprocal clauses do not balance very well on any interpretation, but the desire for an appearance of reciprocity has produced unreal provisions elsewhere in these treaties, e.g. at 18. 3.

This is, at least in its language, much more like a regular treaty between independent partners. 18.1 and 3, with their concentration on the interests of Persia, are replaced by provisions which are formally reciprocal, except on the financial side. The king's obligation to maintain the Peloponnesian fleet is now recognized, even if the terms remain unclear. It makes a difference that the Peloponnesians are now present in substantial force, and that with the capture of Amorges Tissaphernes has achieved his main immediate objective.

38. 1. παραδούς . . . τὰς ναῦς: for the implication that Astyochos had only just arrived, cf. 36. 2 n.

ἀποπλέων ἐν κέλητι ἀφανίζεται: for the small *keles* see Morrison and Williams 245. It might be safer in a storm than the very open trireme (X. HG i. 6. 36), and in any case the Peloponnesians could not afford to detach single triremes as the Athenians could; but any crossing of the Aegean at this season was of course dangerous.

2. οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου Ἀθηναῖοι: 34 *ad fin.* *ἢδη διαβεβηκότες* both reinforces the argument that the fortification spoken of in 34 was to be in Chios, and indicates some lapse of time since 34.

Δελφίνιον: see J. Boardman, *BSA* li (1956), 41–9, for description of the site and for the results of excavation. The identification is not in doubt. The coast north of Chios town has no harbour before this group of inlets, and the small akropolis shows traces of fortification associated with only fifth-century pottery; and the name persisted in one form or another. There is some fertile land behind it, enough to support the village on the inland side of the akropolis, where pottery of the fifth to third centuries was found. The name suggests a sanctuary of Apollo Delphinios, who was worshipped at Erythrai: see Boardman 45.

ἄλλως τε ἐκ γῆς καρτερόν: 'in any case', apart from the walls the Athenians built; Steup's proposal to insert another adjective between *χωρίον* and *ἄλλως* is unnecessary. The small hill which carried the akropolis projects into the harbour and divides it in two (hence the plur., *λιμένας ἔχον*). The ancient coastline is uncertain, and more of the akropolis may then have been surrounded by water; fortification was needed mainly on the landward side, but the remains show the hill also fortified on the side of the shallower western harbour. See Boardman (previous n.) 47–9.

οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον: 15 km.

3. πολλαῖς ταῖς πρὶν μάχαις: three were mentioned at 24. 3.

Τυδέως τοῦ "Ιωνος": for Wilamowitz's suggestion that this is the son of the tragic poet, Kimon's friend, see Jacoby, *CQ* xli (1947), I. 9 (*Abhandlungen* 145).

ὑπὸ Πεδαρίτου ἐπ' ἀττικισμῷ τεθνεώτων: a pro-Athenian conspiracy is mentioned at 24. 6, some time before the end of summer 412, which the authorities wished to deal with ὥπως μετριώτατα; and early in winter Astyochos was busy taking hostages (31. 1). Trouble had then broken out since his departure (33. 1), and Pedaritos looks to have been more severe. See further next n.

ἐς δλίγονς κατεχομένους: Dobree; δλίγον codd., which gives no satisfactory sense; cf. *ΣΜνο²*, ἦτοι ἀναγκαζομένης δλιγαρχεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ' δλίγον πειθομένης καὶ ἀκρωμένης ὁ καὶ μᾶλλον, where the preferred alternative implets δλίγον, and illustrates the difficulty of interpreting it. δλίγον is necessary if the reference is to oligarchy: cf. esp. v. 81. 2 τά τ' ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς δλίγονς μᾶλλον κατέστησαν, viii. 53. 3; and ii. 37. 1, viii. 89. 2. But Chios was already an oligarchy (9. 3, 14. 2 nn.), and we have not here μᾶλλον, as in v. 81. 2, viii. 53. 3.

Later events suggest a possible answer. Diod. xiii. 65, under 409/8, describes an Athenian victory outside Megara (1–2), then turns to Ionia and the Spartan nauarch Kratesippidas (3–4), whose activities should begin in spring 408 (for the chronology see *JHS* lxxiii [1953], 2 n. 1; D. Lotze, *Abh. sächs. Akad.* 57. I [1964], 72–86). Kratesippidas took money from Chian exiles, and seized the akropolis; and the returned exiles drove out some six hundred of their opponents (there is a lacuna here, but it does not look as if anything substantial is lost), who occupied Atarneus and fought against the faction now dominant in the city. Unless much is missing from the record, neither the exiles nor their opponents should be democrats or pro-Athenians, but two rival oligarchic factions. *Hell. Oxy.* 1–2 has the Megara battle in the first and largely complete column, the name Pedaritos twice in the second column, of which only the left-hand ends remain. Pedaritos was killed in Chios before the end of winter 412/11 (55. 3 below), so *Hell. Oxy.* refers back some two years or more, and so does Theopompos (*FGrH* 115 F 8, from book ii of his *Hellenica*; F 7, from

book i, deals with events of 410). It thus looks as if Diodoros preserves (through Ephoros) the sequence we find in *Hell. Oxy.*, Pedaritos being relevant to something that happened in Chios in 408, and a simple conjecture is that Pedaritos had exiled one faction of Chian oligarchs, who were restored in 408 by Kratesippidas. The δλύοι of our passage may then be the faction of the Chian oligarchy supported by Pedaritos, though Thucydides alludes to them very elliptically if that is what he meant.

Note also the story in [Plu.] 241d of Chian exiles at Sparta, examined by Pedaritos' mother, who then sternly wrote to him that he must do better or not come home; we need not believe every word of this, but some serious dissatisfaction is necessary as background for the story. Wade-Gery (verbally) suggested that *Hell. Oxy.* 2 spoke of the private empire-building of successive Spartan commanders (25–6 δν]ναστείαν, 26–7 φιλοτιμίας, etc.), illustrated by this case. It is peculiarly frustrating that we cannot make out the reference to Thucydides, 30–1 περὶ ἡς καὶ Θουκ[υδίδης. Pedaritos does not come well out of this; Isokrates' description of him sailing into Chios and saving the city (vi. 53) appears in the light of Thucydides' narrative merely irresponsible.

ὑπόπτως διακείμενοι: Steup discounted Classen's objection to the repetition of διακείμενοι at so short an interval, but it is disturbing. It would not be beyond Thucydides to have written ὑπόπτως ἀλλήλοις ἡσύχαζον, to which a puzzled reader then added διακείμενοι to make it plainer.

οἱ μετὰ Πεδαρίου ἐπίκουροι: 28. 4–5, 32. 2.

4. ὃς δ' οὐκ ἐσῆκουεν: 33. 1.

ἐπιστέλλει . . . ὁ Πεδάριος: evidently Pedaritos' word carried weight at Sparta, since the commission of 39. 2 was empowered, because of this letter, to depose Astyochos if they thought fit, which they did not; cf. also 28. 5 n.

5. ἐπίπλους μὲν ἐποιοῦντο . . . ἡσύχαζον: see 27. 5 n. for the strategic impotence which Phrynicchos' decision had imposed on the Samos squadron.

39. 1. αἱ τῷ Φαρναβάζῳ . . . παρασκευασθεῖσαι . . . νῆες: 6. 1, 8. 1. Kalligeitos and Timagoras took no part in the expedition to Chios and reserved Pharnabazos' money for a later venture. We have been told no more since 8. 1, but the present passage explains itself adequately.

περὶ ἥλιον τροπάς: at this period 24 December; περὶ would allow departure a week earlier or later, i.e. at any point in the second half of December. On the chronology of this period see 44. 4, 60. 3 nn., and pp. 185–7 below.

Ἀντισθένης: he plays no further part in this war, but he might be the

Antisthenes of X. *HG* iii. 2. 6, one of the three sent to Derkylidias in Asia in spring 398.

2. ξένοικα - - - ξυμβούλους: cf. the advisers sent to Knemos in 429 (ii. 85. 1), Alkidas in 427 (iii. 69. 1), Agis in 418 (v. 63. 4), all after enterprises which had not gone satisfactorily. Eleven probably implies one leading man with ten to assist him; cf. at Athens 54. 2, Peisandros and ten men with him.

Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάος: v. 22. 2, 50. 4, 76. 3 with nn., which deal inadequately with his wealth and position. Paus. vi. 2. 1–2 comments on the extreme zeal for horseracing shown by Spartans after the Persian Wars (on this see de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 137–8, 354–5), including among his examples the two victories of Arkesilas (Moretti nos. 305, 311, tentatively dated back to 448 and 444 on account of Lichas' age in 420) and that of Lichas in 420 (v. 50. 4; Moretti no. 339). The weight of this is shown by Kritias' πλοῦτον μὲν Σκοπαδῶν, μεγαλοφροσύνην δὲ Κίμωνος, νίκας δ' Ἀρκεσίλα τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου (fr. 8 West = B8 D-K, where codd. ἀγησιλά, ἀγησιλάου demand emendation, and Westermann's Ἀρκεσίλα can hardly be wrong); and for Lichas' legendary wealth see X. *Mem.* i. 2. 61, Plu. *Cim.* 10. 6. The name Arkesilas suggests a connection with Kyrene as well as the Argive proxeny attested at v. 76. 3.

Here his age and prestige, coupled with the fact that he alone is singled out for mention, show that he was the leader of the commission; and only his opinions are reported later (43. 3, 84. 5), evidently carrying great weight.

ἢ πλείους: this was the alternative eventually adopted, well on in the following summer, when forty ships were sent with Klearchos (80. 1), but only ten reached the Hellespont.

Κλέαρχον τὸν Ραμφίου: originally designated for this area in spring 412 (8. 2 with n.).

Ἀστυόχον - - - παύειν: see 38. 4. Thucydides says no more of this, but Astyochos was not deposed, so he must have defended himself successfully before the commissioners against Pedaritos' charges. See further 50. 3, 78, 83. 3–84. 3, and 85. 3 n. with X. *HG* i. 1. 31.

3. προσέβαλον: cett.; προσέβαλλον B. For the meaning see 35. 2 n.: Melos would be their landfall after a stretch of open sea (*πελάγαι*), and Steup and others prefer the impf. with the meaning 'make landfall', on the ground that the aor. with the meaning 'landed' would require *πλεύσασαι*. But the three Athenian ships which they took *κενάς* had presumably been beached, so Antisthenes must have put in to land somewhere, and though the run of the sentence (*καὶ περιτυχόντες*) might suggest that the encounter took place after they had passed Melos, the Athenian ships are then described as *ἐκ τῆς Μήλου*. The impf. may nevertheless be the right reading.

ναυσὶ δέκα Ἀθηναίων: Thucydides does not say where these ships came from or why, but it is likely enough that the Athenians knew of Antisthenes' preparations and were waiting for him (cf. 15. 1, 91. 2 nn.). For the bearing of this on Athenian numbers at Samos, see p. 29, § 11 above.

πλεῖω τὸν πλοῦν: the extra time to be taken into account in chronological calculations about this winter is no more than a day or two.

Καῦνον τῆς Ασίας: for the topography and history of Kaunos see G. E. Bean, *JHS* Ixxiii (1953), 10–19. The city was probably on the sea coast at this time, so that the navigable river nearby (*Str. xiv. 2. 2, 651*) is not relevant.

Wilamowitz (*Hermes* xii [1877], 366 n.52 = *Kl. Schr.* iii. 39 n.1) found *Ασίας* absurd and wished to read *Kapias*; and Valla has *ad Caunum Carie*. *Ασίας* could however be defended, making the point that they did reach Asia after all.

4. **ώς ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ ὄντες:** it looks as if Kaunos had seceded from Athens before they arrived, perhaps along with Knidos (35. 1); cf. 43. 1 with n.

τοῦ ξυμπαρακομισθῆναι: B adds *χάριν* before *τοῦ*, but this is not needed; see vii. 21. 3 n. Astyochos was to come in numbers sufficient to safeguard their joint passage along the coast.

40. 1. καίπερ διαμέλλοντα: cf. 33. 1, 38. 4. If *διαμέλλω* means delay over an action which one nevertheless intends to perform, there is a contradiction with § 3 οὐ *διανοούμενος*. Steup also complained that Astyochos' hesitation is not, as *καίπερ* would imply, a reason against renewing their application to him, and he suggested reading (e.g.) *δι’ ὅργης ἔχοντες*. But in i. 71. 1 *διαμέλλετε* seems rather to mean refraining from action that one ought to recognize as necessary, and with this meaning the text may stand.

2. οἱ γὰρ οἰκέται, κ.τ.λ.: for the slaves of Chios see Ath. vi. 265b–6f, citing (among others) Theopompos (*FGrH* 115 F 122), our earliest authority for the thesis that the Chians were the first Greeks to use bought barbarian slaves, as opposed to the Greeks enslaved by the Thessalians and Spartans; and Nymphodoros (572 F 4; cf. A. Fuks, *Athenaeum* xlvi [1968] 102–11), whose story from the Hellenistic period includes reference to the difficulties the Chians had had with their slaves, and to the severity of some of their punishments. For the Greeks everything must have a *εὑπερής*, including particular forms of slavery, and the choice of Chios points to an extreme situation there, as Thucydides has it.

πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πλεῖστοι: Chios was a rich and extensive island, but the absolute number of its slaves cannot have been greater than that of Attica. Thucydides presumably had in mind the proportion of

slave to free, the density of the slave population. See M. I. Finley, *Historia* viii (1959), 151, 163 (*Slavery in Classical Antiquity*, ed. Finley, 59, 71).

3. ἐρύματος μείζονος προσπεριβαλλομένου: see J. Boardman, *BSA* li (1956), 44, who argues that this extra wall ran south from the akropolis round the western harbour (38. 2 n.).

41. 1. ὅπως θαλασσοκρατοῖεν μᾶλλον: cf. 30. 2, 38. 5.

κατάσκοποι: this does not carry the implication of covert investigation that our 'spy' does (cf. e.g. iv. 27. 3), and here it stresses their role as judges rather than advisers. Guilty or not, Astyochos had to show solicitude for them.

Ἐπλει ἐς τὴν Καῦνον: unusually, as also at 35. 3, Thucydides gives no number, but from 43. 2 this should be the main body of the fleet (cf. Pedaritos' demand at 40. 1). See pp. 29–30, § 12 above, and 44. 2 below: whatever the precise figure, they far outnumbered Charminos' twenty (§ 3).

2. **Κῶν τὴν Μεροπίδα:** this is the town on the north-east coast, facing across the strait towards Halikarnassos, to which the Koans moved in 366/5 (Diod. xv. 76. 2) from their earlier centre Astypalaia (Str. xiv. 2. 19, 657) at the western end of the island; for these locations see the full discussion by G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA* li (1957), 119–26. Meropis had a Mycenaean settlement, whereas Astypalaia, more remote from the routes of commerce, was the centre of the Dorian colonists. Meropis gained in importance from the end of the sixth century or the beginning of the fifth, and here were found (a) the fragment, in Attic script, of a copy of the Athenian monetary decree, *ATL* ii. D14. II, and (b) a *horos* of a *temenos* of Athena Αἴθηνῶν μεδέσης, which J. P. Barron (*JHS* lxxxiv [1964], 43–4) dates to the middle of the fifth century, with an interpretation different from that of Bean and Cook. See further Barron in *Essays in Greek Coinage presented to Stanley Robinson* (1968), 81–9, who uses the fifth-century coinage of Kos to disentangle the complexities of Athens' relations with Kos in the Pentekontaeia.

The 'Kos' now used by Athens as a base against Rhodes (44. 3, 55. 1), and later fortified by Alkibiades (108. 2), was certainly Meropis (see Diod. xiii. 42. 3, discussed at 108. 2 n.). By 407 part or all of Kos seems to have gone over to the Spartans, cf. X. *HG* i. 5. 1, Diod. xiii. 69. 5.

ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν: see 14. 3 n.

3. ἀναγκάζεται . . . παραινόντων: a clear case of ἀνάγκη meaning much less than 'compulsion'.

ώσπερ εἶχε: cf. 23. 3, 34 nn.

εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Αἴθηναίων ναῦς: see 42. 1 n.

Χαρμῖνος: 30. 1.

4. ἐκ τῆς Μήλου: a_2 solus; *Μιλήτου* cett., which can be nothing but muddle. Cf. 39. 3.

Σύμην: the not very large or fertile island south and a little east from the city of Knidos (35. 1 n.), directly west of the end of the peninsula on which Loryma (43. 1) stands. See Zschietzschmann, *RE* ivA. 1097–8. Remains of akropolis walls show that the ancient town was on the site of the modern, at the head of a deep bay in the north coast, looking out to the north-east.

Syme first appears in the Athenian tribute lists in 434/3, under the rubric $\ddot{\alpha}\sigma\text{ oī iδῶται ἐνέγραψαν φόρον φέρειν}$, but it can hardly have been outside the empire before this; fragments of the Coinage Decree (*ATL* ii. D14. I, IV) provide positive evidence, if dated with the fragment from Kos to the early 440s (see R. Meiggs, *JHS* lxxxvi [1966], 96, 97–8 n. 44). *ATL* i. 553, iii. 210 with 211 n. 73, suggest that it had previously paid as part of the syntely *Χερρονήσιοι* on the Loryma peninsula. See further J. M. Cook, *JHS* lxxxi (1961), 59; F. A. Lepper, *JHS* lxxxii (1962) 41–2.

Χάλκην: the small rocky island west of Rhodes. It paid its tribute to Athens separately, and was still independent in the middle of the fourth century: cf. J. M. Cook, *JHS* lxxxi (1961), 58.

This is too far west to serve as a regular base to watch for ships coming from Kaunos; the places named, Syme included, are rather the limits of the area Charminos was to patrol.

Πόδον: the whole island, not a particular city; see preceding n.

περὶ τὴν Αυκίαν: Lykia begins some way east of Kaunos; Tel(e)messos was reckoned as the first city along its coast (Str. xiv. 3. 1, 664; 3. 4, 665).

42. 1. ὕσπερ εἶχε πρὸς τὴν Σύμην: Astyochos' objective was the ships (41. 3), which he hoped to catch at sea (*μετεώρους*, below) before they knew of his approach (*πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι*, in which case they might retire to Samos or some other secure harbour). He knew then, presumably from the Knidians, the area in which they might be found, but did not know precisely where; in fact they had come ashore for the night (§ 2 *ἐπανάγονται*) somewhere on Syme, to which they later returned to pick up their gear (43. 1). *πρὸς τὴν Σύμην* therefore gives the direction in which he set out, not his objective; but this is not a very helpful indication, for from Knidos at the location given by Bean and Cook (35. 1 n.) he must pass Syme whatever direction he took, and the only direction which might not be described as *πρὸς τὴν Σύμην* would be a detour to the south-west, a possibility which has to be considered (see next n.) but which Thucydides' wording discourages.

2. τοῦ μὲν φανεροῦ . . . -εῖ πλανωμένου: the problem is to find a position for the Athenians and a movement for Astyochos that will

produce this situation at dawn, and account for Charminos' belief (below) that these were the ships from Kaunos. Busolt (iii/2. 1448–9 with 1449 n. 1), placing Knidos on its Hellenistic site at the west end of the peninsula and giving Astyochos during this night a voyage to the east of some forty km, supposed that he tried to come at the Athenians from the south, and that his left (northern) wing came into sight of the enemy at Syme town while his right wing was still scattered round the south end of the island; his left might then look like ships from Kaunos which had come round the Loryma peninsula and were making for Knidos. With Knidos almost directly north of Syme and hardly more than fifteen km away, reconstruction in this form is less easy. If Astyochos came down the west side of Syme (sailing past the Athenians, even if he did not know that), his left would be closest to the island, his right more out to sea; but we could suppose (what is not in Thucydides) that after the storm he was trying to lead his scattered forces back towards Knidos, and on the way back the leading wing, which in the battle became the left, was sighted from Syme town. Alternatively the Athenians may not have been at the town but in some other harbour (Pliny *NH* v. 133 credits Syme with nine), perhaps on the south side; if Astyochos came down the east side through the channel between Syme and the Loryma peninsula, then turned west to try to regain contact with ships blown off course and round the west of Syme, his ships might be regarded as the left wing and have been taken as coming from the direction of Kaunos. But Thucydides has not given us detail enough for certainty. ἐλάσσοσιν ἡ ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσί: perhaps from hurry, or perhaps some had put in elsewhere for the night.

4. ἐς φυγὴν καταστάντες: this is the defeat alluded to in Ar. *Th.* 804 (see pp. 186, 188 below).

ἐς τὴν Τευτλοῦσσαν: so St. Byz. s.v. (*νῆσος Ἰωνίας Θουκυδίης*); *Τεύγλουσσαν* or *Τέγλουσσαν* codd.: *Seutlusa* Plin. *NH* v. 133. See J. M. Cook, *CQ* n.s. ix (1959), 123: this is the modern Séskli, a little east of Chalke (41. 4 n.), and Charminos must have broken out to the south. ἐς Ἀλικαρνασσόν: once Charminos had disengaged from the enemy he must retreat north towards Samos. Kos might seem uninviting (41. 2), but Halikarnassos was safe, and loyal (108. 2 n. below).

ἐς Κνίδον κατάραντες: it is natural that after the storm and the battle Astyochos should make for the nearest friendly harbour; and now that Charminos was out of the way it was safe enough for Antisthenes to come round the Loryma peninsula to Knidos.

43. 1. ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ναυσὶ πάσαις: at the last count (30. 2) they were 74, but since then others may have been added or have returned from other missions (pp. 28–31 above, §§ 8, 11, 17), and Charminos had lost six.

οὐδ' ἔκεινοι ἐπ' ἔκεινους: the construction is not quite logical, but the sense unmistakable. In spite of Astyochos' hopes at 41. 1 he was not yet ready to try conclusions with the Athenian fleet; and he had ships to repair (42. 3, 43. 2).

Λωρύμοις --- προσβαλόντες: on the south side of the peninsula. If [Λ]ορυμῆς is restored in *ATL* ii. list 9. v. 9 of 446/5 (cf. i. 514, iii. 211 n. 73), this is its only occurrence in the lists, and it probably there takes the place of the syntely *Xερρονήσου*, which normally covers the whole peninsula and includes Loryma.

M προσλαβόντες may be disregarded, and B's neutral προσπλεύσαντες looks like an attempt to explain the reading (cett.) προσβαλόντες; this need not imply a hostile approach, but in the context an attack seems more likely than an attempt at negotiation. If so, then J. M. Cook (*JHS* lxxxi [1961], 60) argues that Loryma cannot at this time have been dependent on Rhodes, for an attack at this point on a Rhodian possession would have been very undiplomatic; instead he suggests that its connections at this period were with Knidos. The whole peninsula, and Kaunos as well (39. 4 n.), may have revolted from Athens at the same time as Knidos (35. 1).

2. ἄπασαι --- αἱ τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες: in this context, ἄπασαι need not mean all the Peloponnesian ships under Astyochos' command (Stahl), only the total of the two contingents with which the narrative has been concerned. For the question whether the Chian ships were still with Astyochos' fleet, and what force may have been left at Miletos, see pp. 29–30 above, § 12. 94 ships move from Knidos to Rhodes at 44. 2.

ἐπεσκευάζοντο: cf. 42. 3.

3. τὰς σπονδὰς οὐδετέρας: 17. 4–18 (Chalkideus), 37 (Therimenes). The offending clauses are 18. 1, 37. 2, corrected in the third treaty (58. 2).

ἔνεῖναι: Bekker; ἐνῆν codd. If we keep the latter, this must be a parenthesis (as Steup prints it) giving Thucydides' own view; cf. vii. 42. 3 n. But it seems too rhetorical for this. Valla's *oportere*, though not a literal translation, may suggest that his text had an infinitive.

4. ή ταῦταις γε οὐ χρήσεσθαι: future, not present, so this inf. (and the following δεῖσθαι) does not depend directly on ἔκέλευε but on an implied verb of saying (as ἔφη above). ή ('failing which') is not quite logical: 'at any rate, he said, Sparta was not going to observe the present treaty'. This is proof that neither of the first two treaties had been formally ratified by Sparta; had oaths been sworn by her formal representatives, Lichas could not speak so. For the status of the third treaty see 58. 7 n. § 1.

οὐδὲ τῆς τροφῆς --- δεῖσθαι: cf. 44. 1.

ἀγανακτῶν --- ἀπρακτος: for the relation of this to the quarrel referred to in 52, see n. there. The quarrel seems a little artificial, for the terms

of the earlier treaties suggest that the Persian negotiators had only the Greek cities of Asia Minor in mind (37. 2 n.), and it should not have been too difficult for Tissaphernes to satisfy Lichas. This has a bearing on Tissaphernes' present intentions with regard to the Spartans (46. 5 n.).

44. 1. τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν: the word does not by itself identify these men as oligarchs (21 n.), but in the context this is inevitable, and H. van Gelder, *Gesch. der alten Rhodier* 77 ff., already in 1900 attributed a leading part to the famous athletic family to which Diagoras (*Pind. Ol.* 7) and Dorieus (35. 1 n. above) belonged; *Hell. Oxy.* 15 (10). 2 then confirmed this by using the name Diagoreioi for the regime overthrown by the democrats in 395. See further § 2 n.

The repetition δυνατωτάτων --- ἀδύνατον --- δυνατοί, in rather different senses, suggests that Thucydides had not given a final polish to this sentence.

νῆσόν τε οὐκ ἀδύνατον, κ.τ.λ.: the Rhodians sent two pentekonters and 700 slingers with the Athenian expedition to Sicily (vi. 43, but see n. there on the number). A decree of Lindos, to be dated late in the period of Athenian domination (see § 2 n.), republished with extensive new readings by S. Accame in *Clara Rhodos* ix (1938) 211–29, exacts for Enyalios through the *στραταγός* a proportion, probably a sixtieth (8–9), of the pay of those going on military service from Lindos either δαμοσίαι or *ἰδίαι* (6–7, cf. 46). Public service at this time presumably means service with Athens; there is no literary record of specifically Rhodian troops, but they may often have been found among the undifferentiated *σύμμαχοι*. Private military service no doubt means mercenaries, a natural outlet for surplus manpower among Athens' subjects. There is that much to support *πεζῷ* here. Rowers were to be expected: even after the revolt, we find two Rhodian oarsmen in *IG* ii². 1951. 251–2 (406 or 405), along with some Chians (40, 255–6), and perhaps men from other cities no longer loyal (rowers were presumably enlisted as individuals, whose personal loyalty was trusted).

Τισσαφέρνην μὴ αἰτοῦντες χρήματα: cf. 43. 4.

2. Καμείρω: on the west coast, the nearest of the three cities to Knidos; and the poorest, with the narrowest territory. See Hiller v. Gaertringen, *RE* suppl. v. 750.

ναυσὶ τέσσαρι καὶ ἐνενήκοντα: see p. 30 above, § 12.

τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας: as at Chios in the previous summer (9. 3), but the Rhodian cities were democracies (below), so this is a revolutionary conspiracy.

ἀτειχίστουν: 14. 3 n.

Λίνδου καὶ Ἰηλυσοῦ: Lindos (Hiller [above] 746–7) is about halfway down the east coast, Ialyssos (Hiller 748–50) on the west coast a few

miles from the northern point of the island. We are now close to the unification of the three cities into the single state of Rhodes in 408/7 (Diod. xiii. 75. 1, clearly from his chronographic source), and this meeting is the first joint action recorded. *Lindos* ii. no. 16 (*Syll*³. 110), a decree of the council dated by the prytaneis, making an Aiginetan *πρόξενον* - - - 'Ροδίων πάντων, also records joint action, and on the ground that the institutions of the new state have not yet been fully worked out it has been assigned to 411–408 as a transitional period (Hiller 763). The opening, ἔδοξε τᾶι β]ολᾶι, contrasts with that of the decree of Lindos republished *ibid.* as an appendix to no. 16 (text also in *Syll*³. 110 n. 4), which begins ἔδοξε τᾶι βωλᾶι καὶ τῶι δάμωι, then names *γραμματεύς* and proposer, and confers on one Damoxenos honours of roughly Athenian type; this cannot be much earlier in date, and it illustrates institutions closely modelled on the Athenian (the exact *stoichedon* style comes out clearly in the photograph, *Lindos* loc. cit.). The decree referred to in § 1 n., probably somewhat earlier in date, has a similar prescript, but also names an *ἐπιστάτας* (2–3, cf. 19 ff.); the body of the decree gives us *στραταγοί* (10, 21, 40, 47–8), a council with supervisory duties in finance and ritual (15–17, 31–5), and instructions to *τοὶ πρυτάνεις τ]οὶ τὸν [Ἀρ]γαμι[τον μῆν]α πρυτανεύοντες* about a sacrifice (25–7). There is no similar evidence for Kameiros and Ialyssos.

The policy of unification need not as such have been unwelcome to the democrats, but this was also an oligarchic revolution liable to create resentment; Diod. xiii. 38. 5 records trouble at the time of Mindaros' move to the Hellespont late in summer 411 (99 below), and its settlement by Dorieus (xiii. 45. 1).

3. *ὑστερήσαντες δέ*: cf. 27. 5 n. The Peloponnesians had the initiative in this phase, and Athens could not effectively guard all the weak spots.

Χάλκην: 41. 4 with n.

[*καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου*]: rightly deleted by Classen; *ὑστερον δέ* contrasts the bases they are now to use with the too distant base at Samos. It is tempting to compare 24. 2, but no explanation of the corruption here offers itself.

4. *δόνο καὶ τριάκοντα τάλαντα*: the tribute paid by the cities to Athens varies, but the wartime maxima are Lindos 15T, Ialyssos 10T, Kameiros 10T, and the smaller communities, Brikindarioi 1T, Diakrioi 2T, Pedieis 1T, bring the total up to nearly 40T; A. G. Woodhead (*Hesp.* xvii [1948], 56 n. 4), from the tributes last recorded before the revolt, calculates a total of 34T. The payment of 32T to the Peloponnesians was well within their means, but even at the 3-obol rate (½T per ship per month) this would not pay 94 ships for a month, much less for eighty days.

ἡμέρας δύδοήκοντα: on the date of Astyochos' junction with

Antisthenes (42. 4, cf. 39. 1), see p. 186 below. It cannot be placed earlier than the end of December, and we then have to allow an interval before the arrival of Tissaphernes at Knidos (43. 2), time for his conference with the Peloponnesians (43. 2–4), and perhaps a further interval before the latter moved to Rhodes. None of this need take long, but with the utmost compression the eighty days cannot start earlier than 15 January 411, which means that the return to Miletos (60. 2–3) took place not earlier than 5 April, which thus becomes the earliest possible date for the end of Thucydides' winter (60. 3). This is incompatible with the thesis that his winter ended at an astronomically fixed point early in March (vol. iii, p. 711; cf. vol. iv, p. 20), and is surprisingly late on any reckoning. For discussion, and for emendations proposed for δύδοήκοντα, see 60. 3 n.

45–52. Alkibiades and Tissaphernes. Beginnings of the Athenian oligarchic movement at Samos

45. 1. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πρότερον: it is here stated explicitly that we are to go back in time, but the distance is not defined. The following sentence makes the battle at Miletos, late in summer 412 (25. 1), a *terminus a quo*; and Alkibiades was last mentioned at 26. 3, riding to Teichioussa to summon Therimenes to the rescue of Miletos, showing that he then still felt himself to be on the Peloponnesian side. The growth of distrust thus begins, at the earliest, when the Peloponnesians were at Iasos at the end of summer (28. 3–5), but we are left to guess how long it took to develop to the point where Alkibiades felt himself unsafe with them. So far the text does not justify Delebecque's claim (82, 94) that Thucydides has here gone back into summer and broken through that 'limite infranchissable de la saison' which Delebecque rightly detects in Thucydides' usual procedure; indeed, 50. 3 might suggest that Alkibiades was only in the process of disengaging himself from the Peloponnesians at the time of Phrynicos' correspondence with Astyochos. On the other hand if the reduction of the fleet's pay to 3 ob. (§§ 2–3) is the same reduction described in 29, then Alkibiades' withdrawal to Tissaphernes must be placed much earlier, for 29 is the first item in a crowded winter and Alkibiades must be given time to establish himself with Tissaphernes before he could exercise the influence here described. But the doublet is not certain: see § 2 n. below.

In any case 50. 2 assures us that the start of the sequence 45 ff. was well before the departure of the Peloponnesians from Miletos (41. 1), so that the overlap between this sequence and the preceding narrative is certainly greater than Thucydides normally allows. In itself the procedure is reasonable, as Wilamowitz (588, 595) and others have maintained: this is a different aspect of the story, analysis of motive

and description of secret proceedings which might properly be relegated to a separate section; but it is contrary to the established habits of our historian, normally so careful to save us from uncertainties of relative chronology. It has been conjectured that we here see Thucydides experimenting with a new method (Wade-Gery, *OCD* s.v. *Thucydides*, suggests that he 'experimented to the end'), in which his own analysis of motive etc. would take the place of the speeches of earlier books. For Delebecque (see *Introd.* p. 3) 1–44, 55–56. 1, 57–63. 2 belong to a *récit ancien* composed on Thucydides' familiar principles; 45–54, 56. 1–4 to a *récit nouveau* based on information from Alkibiades and composed on new principles. It is of course possible that Thucydides contemplated new methods to deal with the intricacies of this tangled period; but that does not account for the striking lack of co-ordination between 29–44 and 45 ff. (e.g. 45. 2, 46. 1, 5 nn.). Nor can that be attributed to the complexity of the material, sometimes given as a reason for the peculiar features of book viii (e.g. Weil, *introd.* p. xxviii): if Thucydides had marked in the preceding narrative (e.g.) the point at which Tissaphernes first mentioned the project of bringing up ships from Phoenicia (46. 1), the over-all picture would have been clearer, and the addition of very few words would have solved our problems about 29 and 45. 2–3.

The thesis that large tracts of 45 ff. depend on information derived from Alkibiades has been argued comprehensively by Brunt (72–96), and there are some features that are most easily explained by the hypothesis that Thucydides had been in contact either with Alkibiades himself or with someone who was in his confidence, though there is in this book no general bias in favour of Alkibiades comparable with the favourable elements in Thucydides' judgement at vi. 15. 4—here he was more disposed to underwrite the views of Phrynicos (esp. 48. 4). It would not be an unreasonable guess that a quantity of material from this source came into his hands at the time when he had completed, or was in process of completing, 43–4. We should have to suppose (see *Introd.* pp. 3–4) that he was in the habit of putting into literary form various reports as they reached him (for a probable example see 23. 5 n.), but had not reached the stage of integrating these pieces fully in a finished narrative with a consistent point of view. Such passages as 45. 2–3 and 46. 1 demonstrate clearly the need for revision, and we must not argue from the present shape of this part of the book that its elements would have been separated in the same way in a revised version.

There remains the question where, after the regress here indicated, the narrative regains the point where it was broken off at the end of 44. The join seems to be complete by 55. 1, which picks up threads both from 44. 3–4 and from 54. 3. But we must not treat this

'digression' too rigidly as a unit slipped entire into a previously written text; problems on the dating of individual chapters (e.g. 56) will be treated as they come.

μετὰ τὸν Χαλκιδέως θάνατον: 24. 1, some way back into summer 412. It is not so closely connected with the battle of Miletos that the two could be taken together as a single event, and if the latter is a *terminus a quo* the former appears otiose. Thucydides perhaps meant the former not as an indication of time but as part of the reason: that is, Alkibiades may well on the record have had a closer relation with Chalkideus than with his successors, so that his position was weakened by his ally's death. There is no indication in Thucydides that any feature of the battle of Miletos helped to impair Peloponnesian trust in Alkibiades.

τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις . . . καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν: Hatzfeld (225 n. 7) argues that the usage of book viii compels us to take *τοῖς Πελ.* as the allied contingents in Asia; this is too rigid, but after mention of Chalkideus and Miletos it is certainly these Pel. who first come to mind. They cannot however send a letter *ἐκ Λακεδαιμονος*, and Hatzfeld's explanation that they instigated it, comparing 48. 7 *τῶν ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου*, is not in the context easy. The difficulty might be reduced by taking *αὐτῶν* as neuter, 'as a result of this', as *αὐτά* at v. 27. 1, vi. 10. 2 (see nn. there); but this is less easy here, owing to a tendency to avoid indefinite neuter plurals in cases where they are formally indistinguishable from masculines, and the sentence would still not run easily. In fact the trouble presumably began in the fleet, and was relayed from there to the Peloponnesians at home, if they enter into the matter at all.

ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς . . . ὥστ' ἀποκτεῖναι: if 29 and 45. 2-3 are a doublet (above, and § 2 n.), this letter would have to have reached Astyochos before he arrived in Miletos (36. 1); if not, then Hippocrates is a possible messenger (35. 1), or the letter could have come separately in a ship not mentioned by Thucydides.

In view of the considerable services that Alkibiades had very recently rendered, in the first revolt of Chios and Miletos, this is a most striking and dramatic turn, explicable only on the assumption that the Spartans had full and conclusive evidence against him, and it would not have been out of place to give us a hint of its nature. It is equally striking that Astyochos shows no sign of trying to carry out the order, indeed the relations between them as described at 50. 3 are barely compatible with Astyochos' receipt of such an order. If however this is information derived from Alkibiades (above), the simple answer is available that the story was untrue.¹ His reasons for

¹This suggestion was due to D. M. Lewis, who now retracts it (96 with n. 62). The arguments set out above still seem to me to make it probable, though of course not certain.

dissociating himself from the Peloponnesians may well have been discreditable, and it would be like Alkibiades' boldness to cover this up by inventing the story of this order (he would have to say it was a secret order, which is not stated by Thucydides). That Thucydides set down the story as fact need not mean that he accepted it more than provisionally.

ἢν γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἀγιδὶ ἔχθρος: *καί* B solus, but omission from cett. is more likely than interpolation in B. It might be taken with what precedes ('to Agis as well as to the Pel.'), or more probably with what follows ('enemy to Agis and generally untrustworthy'). For the fact cf. 12. 2 n. The influence of Alkibiades' partisan Endios may be less now that his ephorate had ended; Astyochos' nauarchy (20. 1) gives the point in the narrative at which a Spartan new year began.

ὑποχωρεῖ δείσας παρὰ Τισσαφέρνην: cf. 50. 3 οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐς χεῖρας ιόντα.

2. τὴν τε μισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεμεν, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 29, 36. 1 with nn. This reduction in the satrap's payments has often been identified with the reduction made at 29 at the beginning of winter (Holzapfel 436–7; Wilamowitz 589; Busolt iii/2. 1436–7; Delebecque 94; etc.: *contra* Kunle, *Unters. über das achte Buch des Thuk.* [1909] 22 ff., and Steup). The fact that Hermokrates' resistance is mentioned in both passages has helped the identification.

The correspondence is not quite exact: (a) here we have a straightforward reduction from 1 dr. to 3 ob., in 29 Tissaphernes is induced to grant slightly over 3 ob.; (b) Hermokrates at 29. 2 objects to the reduction itself, here (§ 3) he resists Tissaphernes' attempts at bribery, in a passage also concerned with irregularity of payment; (c) there is not the least hint of Alkibiades in 29. The strongest reason for taking these two passages as a doublet is the fact that Thucydides writes here as though the proposal to reduce the payment were being made for the first time, and the reduction is from the full drachma originally promised (29. 1, cf. 45. 6), not from the 3+ ob. of 29. 2. The argument will not stand. One of these passages was written before the other, and whichever was written second takes no account at all of the one which was written first; and this incoherence favours the hypothesis of a doublet no more (and no less) than it favours the belief that 45. 2 refers to a stage of the negotiation later than that recorded in 29. It is an important point that with this latter belief it is possible to accept 36. 1 *μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ἀρκούντως*, which is not compatible with irregularity of payment on the scale envisaged here (esp. 46. 5); the evidence of 36. 1 is rejected by Holzapfel and others only because they assume the doublet.

The remainder of the text gives the impression that Alkibiades' withdrawal to Tissaphernes did not begin anything like as early as the doublet hypothesis requires (§ 1 n.). This is not quite decisive, but

I find it more likely that 45. 2–3 represents a separate and later stage of the argument about pay, and that the reduction proposed by Alkibiades was not from the full drachma, but merely the cancelling of the small concession made at 29. 2. If this information derived from Alkibiades, it would not be surprising if he exaggerated the effect of his intervention. It is clearly not impossible that controversy should have continued after the provisional settlement of 29.

However we take this passage, the lack of co-ordination with 29 is very striking, an indication that Thucydides had not yet got far with the integration of material from different sources.

Αθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου, κ.τ.λ.: Gomme in iii. 17. 4 n. accepted from this passage that 3 ob. was the standard Athenian rate, referring to Böckh i³. 342–5; Dover in vi. 31. 3 n. argued that the 1 dr. rate had been ‘customary for a generation’; W. K. Pritchett, *Anc. Gr. Mil. Practices* (= *The Greek State at War*) i (1971), 14–24, assembles and discusses the fifth-century evidence, and at 24–9 deals with irregularity of pay, concluding that 3 ob. was standard, 1 dr. exceptional. Outside this passage, the evidence supports Dover. In spite of Pritchett’s reservations (9 n. 25), the large sums paid out for the Kerkyra expedition in 433 (ML 61. 12, 24) are easier to understand with the higher rate; note that the alternative restoration epigraphically possible in l. 12 gives a very much larger sum (ML ad loc.). At iii. 17. 4 Pritchett (15–16: he accepts the genuineness of this chapter; cf. Gomme’s n. at the end of it) takes the high rate as special to the ships at Poteidaia; but the author’s mind is on naval expense generally (§ 3 καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ὑπαγήλωσε μετὰ Ποτειδαίας), and I take it that in § 4 νῆσες τε αἱ πᾶσαι include all the ships listed in § 2, i.e. this is a general rule. In 415, if vi. 8. 1. properly sets out the intentions of the Segestan envoys, they expected their 60T to be used for sixty ships for a month, i.e. they assume the higher rate, which rather suggests that it was known as normal. Similarly it is more likely that Tissaphernes first offered the standard Athenian rate (at 29. 45. 6), then reduced it when the Athenian rate dropped to 3 ob., than that he began by offering double the standard rate. That the Athenian rate did drop to 3 ob. after 413 is likely in itself, and confirmed by Plu. *Alc.* 35. 5, and the argument of Lysandros at X. *HG* i. 5. 4. I leave out of account here (a) the three Aiginetan obols agreed for a hoplite in the alliance of 420 (v. 47. 6), since this was a figure agreed between four states by no means equal in wealth and need not follow the standard Athenian rate; (b) Ar. *Ve.* 684–5, for which see Pritchett 17–18, Dover vi. 31. 3 n.; (c) Ar. *Ve.* 1188–9 and Theopompos Com. fr. 55, which however we interpret them do not support a standard rate of 3 ob.

The present passage is thus of crucial importance. If we confine our attention to the clause *ὡς Αθηναῖοι - - - διδόασιν*, the plain meaning is

that the Athenians have long paid at the 3 ob. rate: *ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου* ought to take us well back before 413. *οὐ τοσοῦτον πενίᾳ* however points to the period of financial stringency after the disaster in Sicily (1. 2) etc.); there is no point here in mentioning, only to reject it, the possibility that Athens before 413 paid this rate because she was poor. H. D. Westlake (*CQ N.S. viii* [1958], 104) argues, against Steup, that in clauses of this type *οὐ τοσοῦτον* does not entirely negative the first member, i.e. here the poverty of Athens is not entirely denied, and Westlake's other instances support this. Further, while the first part of the explanatory clause (*οἱ μέν — — ξυμβαίνει*) could be taken to mean that Athenian experience suggested that it was unwise to pay sailors at too high a rate, the second part (*οἱ δέ — — τὸν προσοφειλόμενον μισθόν*) clearly refers to the danger of paying them their full amount at the time when it was due and not holding something back; and indeed the first part could be taken in the same sense, that it would be unwise to give them too much of their money before the cruise was ended. The notion of withholding part of the sailors' pay, highly relevant for Alkibiades' advice to Tissaphernes (*καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ξυνεχῶς*) but not present in the clause *ὡς Αθηναῖοι, κ.τ.λ.*, has thus crept into the sentence by the time it ends. Many edd. therefore follow Stahl in positing a lacuna in which this practice as well as the 3 ob. rate was ascribed to the Athenians (Steup in his appendix lists several proposals, all of which he regards as uncertain), and this would produce a logical sentence, though it would not clear up the contradiction between *ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου* and *οὐ τοσοῦτον πενίᾳ*.

Demos' promise in Ar. *Eq. 1366–7, πρῶτον μὲν ὅπόσοι ναῦς ἐλαύνοντιν μακράς, καταγομένοις τὸν μισθὸν ἀποδώσω ὑτελῆ,* shows that in the 420s Athens withheld part of the sailors' pay till the expedition came home (and the sailor might not get it all then), and Pritchett (24–29) gives a useful collection of further examples and discusses them. As he points out, Greek armaments expected their men to pay for their food in money, even when the expedition carried food with it, and the men therefore needed some money while on service, but the balance might be withheld till later for the reasons advanced in our text. Some, including Morrison and Williams (258–9), have concluded that the regular Athenian practice was to pay 3 ob. a day in the field and the other 3 ob. on return home; but that will not help here, for Alkibiades is urging Tissaphernes both to keep the total down to 3 ob. a day and to pay that irregularly. What is needed to support Alkibiades' argument is a clause in the form 'the Athenians from their long experience of naval matters (withhold part of the pay, and now) give their men three obols, not so much because of their (present) poverty as...'.¹

A supplement of this form, though not widely different from those that have already been proposed, would more effectively bring this

sentence into line with other evidence on Athenian pay, some of it (much of it, if we allow his authorship of iii. 17) derived from Thucydides himself. It is not of course necessary that the information supplied here by Alkibiades should be in all respects correct, but it must be plausible enough for Tissaphernes to be able to base his argument on it. But the first necessity is to restore internal coherence within the sentence.

τὰς ναῦς ἀπολιπώσιν οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες: B; **τὰς ναῦς ἀπολιπόντες** cett. The negative *οὐχ* involved earlier edd. in tangles, adequately sorted out by Stahl (cf. Goodhart's n.): 'and that others might not desert the ships, for <in so doing> they would not leave behind ...'. Morrison and Williams (273 n.) find both *ὑπολιπόντες* and *ἀπολιπόντες* unsatisfactory and propose *οὐχ ὑπομένοντες*, but do not explain their reasons.

3. **καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους,** κ.τ.λ.: *αὐτὸν* (sc. Tissaphernes) is the subject to *πεῖσαι*, and *τοὺς τριηράρχους*, κ.τ.λ. the object, brought to the start of the sentence for emphasis, with some loss of clarity. Reiske's deletion of the first *ώστε* is certainly right: *διδάσκειν* governs an infinitive directly in Thucydides, but there are ample examples of *πεῖσαι* *ώστε* (iii. 31. 1, etc.). *πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων* is tacked on to the end somewhat loosely, though the meaning is clear, that the Syracusans (alone) resisted. There is (*pace* Steup) something of an ellipse, but the phrase is intelligible and there is no need to insert (Stahl) *ξυνεχώρησαν* δέ before *πλὴν*; everything from *πλὴν τοῦ ξυμμαχικοῦ* should be treated as a parenthesis, which makes the loose construction easier and leaves Alkibiades as the subject of § 4 *ἀπήλασεν*.

τούτων δὲ Ἐρμοκράτης, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 29. 2, 85. 2. After 'Ερμοκράτης, *τε* (cett.) is clearly wrong; *στρατηγὸς ὅν* (B; *quorum dux* H. Valla) is dismissed by most edd. on the ground that Hermokrates' generalship has been mentioned already at 29. 2, but the lack of co-ordination between 29 and 45 deprives that argument of any weight. Wilamowitz (611–12) defended B's reading partly as improving the sense ('for their general was H.', sc. whom we know already as a steadfast character, from vi–vii if not from viii. 29), partly on the ground that *ὅν* is unlikely in an interpolation; an indication of his standing is by no means out of place here. *μόνος*, omitted by B but translated by Valla, is not merely superfluous (Steup); the contrast with *παντός* makes a point. *ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς ξυμμαχικοῦ* presumably means that he did not demand the full rate merely for his own men, but for the other contingents too whose leaders had not spoken up for them.

4. **αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνοντος:** whereas most of 45–6 recites the private dealings of Alkibiades with Tissaphernes, 45. 4–6 show Alkibiades acting in public, where statements could be checked. This is the most solid evidence of his standing with Tissaphernes, as his mouthpiece in dealing with the Greek cities: as regards advice

given privately, Thucydides had to have recourse to inference (46. 5). **πλονσώτατοι ὄντες** --- ἀξιοῦσι: the co-ordination of a participial with an indicative clause is not uncommon in Thucydides; edd. compare i. 132. 5, vii. 15. 2. The device can clarify the sense when the second member of the contrast is syntactically complicated; and here, though the structure is relatively simple, ἀξιοῦντες would be awkward after *σωζόμενοι*. With Bauer's *εἰεν* ⟨ει⟩ *πλονσώτατοι*, both *πλονσώτατοι ὄντες* and *ἐπικουρίᾳ σωζόμενοι* qualify *Χίοι* as the subject of ἀξιοῦσι, and are contrasted, but the contrast is unreal since it is precisely the rich cities that can afford mercenaries; the point is that though so rich they demand that others should help them with money as well as with troops, and that point is made by contrasting *πλονσώτατοι ὄντες* with *ἐπικουρίᾳ δ' ὅμως* --- κιρδυνεύειν as a whole. Delebecque's point (*REG* lxxvii [1964] 47) that the Chians are not being rescued but are in dire straits (40 above) is not very substantial, for there were mercenaries defending them and they did hope to be saved, so that his more complicated interpretation is not needed.

For Chios' wealth and power see 24. 3–4, 40. 1–2. Its separate treatment here is due to the fact that Chios had not, like the other cities (§ 5), paid tribute to Athens.

5. **ἐθελήσουσιν ἐσφέρειν:** Miletos (36. 1) had contributed already, and Rhodes will do so (44. 4). It is not clear how many cities are now available to contribute; no running list can be constructed from Thucydides (for his silence about the revolt of Phokaia and Kyme from Athens, see 22. 1 n.), and it may well be that everything from Kyme to Kaunos was by now in Peloponnesian hands, except for Halikarnassos, Klazomenai, Teos, and the forts in the Erythraia. Even so, and even if they increased their payments (*καὶ ἔπι πλείω*), they could not support this fleet for long. One might expect that the mainland cities had now to pay direct tribute to Persia, but instead they are here described as begging from the Persians.

ἢν δέ ποτε --- τὸν μισθόν: the question referred to the king at 29. 1 had evidently not yet been answered; contrast 58. 5. Whether there was any real prospect of financial aid to the cities (*καὶ τὰς πόλεις* --- ὡφελήσειν) may well be doubted, but Alkibiades may have held out hope of this.

46. 1. ναῦς Φοινίστας ἄσπερ παρεσκευάζετο: this is a curiously off-hand way to introduce for the first time these ships, which are to play so large a part in the rest of the book. The project must be of high importance in the relations between Tissaphernes and the Spartans, and must have affected the unsuccessful negotiations of 43. 3–4 (which at this point are still ahead of us, cf. 50. 2). We need to know at what point the plan was first brought forward, and the place for that is in the main narrative, 29–44—a further indication that that

narrative was based on information still very much incomplete. The cryptic brevity of *ἄσπερ παρεσκευάζετο*, with no further detail, suggests that this is another stop-gap account (cf. 5. 5 n.), and that Thucydides was aware of the need to complete his narrative. That would imply that 29–44 were written before 45 ff.

Tissaphernes 'was having them made ready for him'; and elsewhere, especially in 87, Thucydides writes as if they were wholly in Tissaphernes' control. That can hardly be quite right. Phoenicia was inevitably the scene of Persian naval preparations for action in the Mediterranean (cf. those reported in winter 397/6 at X. HG iii. 4. 1, there attributed to 'the king and Tissaphernes'), but Phoenicia was not part of Tissaphernes' satrapy; nor did he obtain the ships solely by his own negotiation, for the third treaty (58. 5–7) describes them as 'the king's ships'.

ἢ Ἐλληνοι πλέοσι μισθὸν πορίζοντα: this is pay for a fleet, not assistance to Greek cities as in 45. 4–5; the two kinds of subsidy are clearly distinguished at 45. 6. The question is thus whether Tissaphernes is to pay for more contingents of Peloponnesian ships than he was paying for at the moment, whenever that was. The clause on pay in the second treaty (37. 4 *μεταπεμψαμένου βασιλέως*) gave the Persians the option of refusing to pay new arrivals, and though we are not told in 38–44 that Tissaphernes had tried to exercise this option, he may have threatened to do so. The only new arrival mentioned in the text between 37 and 46 is the squadron of Antisthenes (39: that is for 46. 1 still in the future, but the matter may have been discussed in advance, and the analysis in 45–6 may sometimes get ahead of its supposed date [cf. § 5 n.]), and this would be a suitable case for Tissaphernes to withhold payment in that Pharnabazos' money had been used for these ships and they were provisionally destined for his service (39. 1–2). This again would be very relevant for the quarrel of Tissaphernes and Lichas (43. 3–4: see preceding n.).

τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῆς τε γῆς καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τὸ κράτος δοῦναι: Alkibiades speaks in Greek terms, for Tissaphernes did not propose to tolerate Greek control anywhere on the Asiatic mainland (cf. § 4). The danger to the king is that the Greek land power should be able to transport its forces without opposition from a Greek naval power.

καὶ βασιλεῖ ἔξειναι: edd. have been troubled that *ἔξειναι* cannot be directly dependent on *παρήνει*, as are the preceding infinitives; but this is part of the situation which is to be brought about by Alkibiades' advice, and Thucydides need not be so rigid as his edd. demand. But codd. *αὐτοῦ* is not to be defended as an adverb ('in Asia' Krüger) or by treating *λυπηρούς* as a substantive (Poppo, Boehme), and Duker's *αὐτῷ* or Classen's *αὐτῷ* is a necessary correction. B's *δέι* (om. cett.) might be misplaced: *ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰεὶ αὐτῷ λυπηρούς* would sharpen the expression a little (cf. iv. 68. 1).

2. μεγάλη δαπάνη καὶ κινδύνῳ: the expense might be considerable, as with Konon's fleet in the 390s, but 'danger' is exaggerated. Again, Alkibiades' mind is on the area which interested the Greeks, and on the forces the king might employ there; the performance of the Ten Thousand changed and enlarged Greek ideas, but there is no trace of that in Thucydides' treatment of the Persians.

3. ἐπιτηδειότερος τε ἔφη τοὺς Αθηναίους, κ.τ.λ.: this second stage of Alkibiades' advice follows naturally from his quarrel with the Spartans, but his full intention is not explained till 47. i. 46. 4 shows the limit of what he could achieve; in effect he can only claim that, if Persia was to give full support to one side, it had better be the Athenian.

τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ξυγκαταδουλοῦν ἄν: supply *τοῖς Πέρσαις* or the equivalent; the following datives go only with *καταδουλοῦν*, not with *ξυγ-* (contrast § 2 *οἷς* --- *ξυγκαθαιρήσει*). Alkibiades could not seriously pretend that the king would help Athens to subdue the islands, and he was taking much on himself in suggesting that Athens would surrender her claim to the mainland cities, let alone help him to conquer them. The reader is probably meant to take the point that Alkibiades here says more than is quite plausible.

τοὺς δέ --- ἐλευθερώσοντας ἤκειν: there had been much talk of liberation at the start of the war (i. 139. 3, ii. 8. 4, etc.), but Thucydides reports the opening of this phase differently, with the accent on the end of long toil (2. 1, 4), and Sparta's prospects of hegemony for herself. No doubt Chios, and even Miletos (cf. 84. 4), hoped for liberty, and they need not have been more realistic than the Melians about Sparta's intentions (v. 105. 3); on the position of these cities see 37. 5 n. Wilamowitz (589) deduced from the contrast between 46. 3 and the explicit surrender of territory by Sparta at 18. 1, 37. 2, that Thucydides was unaware of the treaties when he wrote 46, but the valid answer has often been given that Tissaphernes could be trusted to know how little security the treaties gave (for Lichas at 84. 5 see n. there).

Alkibiades' argument is by no means merely specious, as we can see from Sparta's performance in the 390s, when her quarrel with Artaxerxes was for the time being beyond repair and it suited her to play the part of liberator.

σφῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων --- ἐκείνων [τῶν βαρβάρων]: τῶν βαρβάρων om. B, and many edd. have bracketed *τῶν Ἑλλήνων* as well; Valla translated both. *σφῶν* can only be the Athenians; they were not 'the' Greeks, but the repetition of 'Greeks' is needed to make the point that Sparta, if she liberates Greeks from Greeks (for the reverse side of the coin cf. ii. 64. 3 *'Ἐλλήνων τε ὅτι "Ἐλληνες πλειστων δὴ ἥρξαμεν*), is all the more likely to liberate them from barbarians. Arnold compared i. 144. 2, which is not irrelevant, but there the addition of *τοῖς λακεδαιμονίοις*

το σφίσι serves a somewhat different purpose (cf. Steup and Gomme ad loc.). Here we have not straightforward apposition, but definition of the classes to which Athenians and Persians belong; Steup called these partitive genitives, which is near the mark. To make the required point we need *τῶν βαρβάρων* as well as *τῶν Ἑλλήνων*; but the definite articles remain a stumbling block, and the sentence would be much easier if it had 'Ἑλλήνων (βαρβάρων) ὄντων.

ἢν μή ποτε αὐτοὺς μὴ ἔξελωσι: ἀντὶ τοῦ καταδουλώσωνται τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, $\Sigma^{Mv\epsilon_2}$, evidently taking the Spartans as the subject and the two negatives as cancelling out, 'unless they should fail to remove them'. So Haacke and Stahl, and Kühner-Gerth ii. 206 allow this as one of the exceptional cases where the second negative cancels the first. But in other examples the structure is usually more complicated and there is some positive reason for the abnormal construction (e.g. at ii. 13. 1 the positive *παραλίπῃ* has to be negated before we come to *μὴ δηγώσῃ*); and the sense 'unless they (the Persians) get them (the Spartans) out of the way' is far more satisfactory. To take the second *μή* as reinforcing the first would be to introduce an inappropriate rhetorical or dramatic usage; the choices are to excise the second *μή*. (Madvig) or to emend it (as Tucker's *πῃ*).

4. ἀποτεμόμενον ὡς μέγιστα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων: Alkibiades cannot disguise the fact that Athens is Persia's first and most obvious enemy, for two generations the *de facto* occupant of territory which the king claimed as his own. But he judged that the Athenians with whom he now proposed to negotiate (47–48. 3) would be prepared to surrender the Asiatic mainland, and so it proved (56. 4); it took 25 years and another war before the Athenian demos could resign itself to accept this.

5. καὶ διενοεῖτο . . . ἢν εἰκάσαι: Tissaphernes' thoughts are deduced from his immediate actions, in matters which are here taken to be under his control. The king is not quite absent from Thucydides' mind in §§ 1–3, but the decisions seem to be taken by Tissaphernes (cf. § 1 with nn.). In fact he must have had to take more account of the central government: see esp. 57. 1 n., 58. 7 n. § 4.

τὸ πλέον may mean either that he did not accept the whole of the advice here attributed to Alkibiades (e.g. he did not accept the whole of 46. 3), or that he did not follow it all the time (e.g. 56. 2).

τῷ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ . . . ἐς πίστιν: if we look only at this participial clause, Thucydides might mean that, since the advice coincided with Tissaphernes' own inclination, its effect was not to influence his conduct but simply to give him confidence in Alkibiades. The passage as a whole shows that Thucydides rated Alkibiades' influence higher. We are to judge Tissaphernes' mind *ἀπὸ τῶν ποιουμένων*: these show him following the advice, and Thucydides seems to accept that Alkibiades did give such advice, and Tissaphernes had indeed

modified his policy since the original invitation at 5. 5. But the terms in which the *ποιούμενα* are now given do arouse some disquiet (below). *τήν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε*: cf. 45. 2–3. If 36. 1, *μισθὸς ἔδιδοτο ἀρκούντως*, had already been written and was present to Thucydides' mind when he wrote 46, he must envisage this process as starting after Astyochos' arrival in Miletos, and there is not much time for the new policy to show its effects, especially if Tissaphernes paid by the month (29. 1 n.). If we identify the reductions of pay mentioned at 29 and 45. 2–3, and reject (with Holzapfel and others) the information given in 36. 1, there is a little more time. But it may be (cf. § 1 n.) that this analysis in places looks further forward than the date to which it appears to be assigned.

ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἴσα: this is a fresh point, a more precise example of the general advice (§§ 1–2, 4) not to let either side win outright. Since the battle of Miletos, confrontation between the two main fleets has been contemplated at 30. 2, when 74 Athenian ships faced some ninety Peloponnesian and *ἐθαλασσοκράτουν*; and at 38. 5, when Athenian numbers might have risen a little (see pp. 29–31 above, §§ 11, 17) and the Peloponnesians refused an Athenian challenge. Tissaphernes cannot have been involved at 43. 1, where neither side wanted a fight (but it was still the Athenians who took the open sea and the Peloponnesians who stayed in harbour); and the further refusal of Athenian challenges at 44. 3–4 comes after the Peloponnesian quarrel with Tissaphernes. This clause can then refer only to 30. 2, 38. 5, and possibly other unrecorded occasions between Therimenes' arrival and Astyochos' departure from Miletos. There is no hint in 29–44 that the Peloponnesians were eager to fight or that Tissaphernes restrained them, but he may have advised caution; the real difficulty comes below at *τὴν ἀκμὴν - - - πάνυ ισχυράν*.

τὰς Φοινίσσας - - - ναῦς: § 1.

ἐκ περιόντος: 'from a position of superiority'; the noun, *ἐκ περιουσίας*, is more common, e.g. vii. 13. 1. Compare the similar injunction laid by Kyros on Lysandros in 405 (X. HG ii. 1. 14), in very different circumstances and by a very different person.

τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, κ.τ.λ.: cf. Nikias' *βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος*, vii. 14. 1. with n. Enforced inaction would have this effect in time, but Thucydides has so far given us no evidence to suggest that *γενομένην καὶ πάνυ ισχυράν* is a fair description. It is not merely that no hint has been given in 29–44; passages such as vii. 34. 7 are also relevant, and no reader of Thucydides down to this point will expect to find the Peloponnesians eager to take on an Athenian fleet not much inferior to their own in numbers.

The Peloponnesian fleet is again represented as formidable at 52, 56. 2, 57. 1. At 78 we have an exaggerated version of what is given at 46. 5; the effect of the uproar was to induce Astyochos to challenge

the Athenians at Samos with 112 ships against 82, and the Athenians declined it (79. 1–2), but immediately afterwards the Peloponnesians refused to fight with 112 ships against 108 (79. 6–80. 1). 85. 2 gives a more sober variation on the same theme, this time incriminating Alkibiades but not Astyochos. These passages do not make it clear how far Thucydides endorsed the information given in 46. 5. At 78 ἔως - - - τὸ ναυτικὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγον ἦν is unrealistic on the figures provided by Thucydides himself, and the reader is probably meant to take this as partisan and tendentious. Here there is no comparable hint, and the language, especially *καταφανέστερον* ή ὥστε λαυδάνειν, lends considerable weight to what is, after all, presented to us as matter of fact.

It is another question whether Thucydides' conclusions about the mind of Tissaphernes were correct. Hints in the treaties (37. 4, 58. 5–6) and his later behaviour (87, cf. 99n.) suggest that his real intention may have been to fight Athens with a Phoenician fleet under his direct command, and that he hoped to get rid of his Peloponnesian allies as soon as he had enough other forces at hand. This could have been an integral part of the project of bringing up a Phoenician fleet, and we must ask the question, even if we cannot clearly answer it, how far the king was involved in the line Tissaphernes was now taking. The decision to send the ships was the king's (§ 1 n.), and it must have been taken on the basis of reports or even proposals submitted by Tissaphernes (and Pharnabazos). None of this is within Thucydides' view, but we should be better off if he had told us what he probably did know, the point at which the Phoenician fleet project was made known to the Greeks. As it is, we can only note that the first mention of the project at § 1 is closely followed by Alkibiades' advice to reduce support to the Spartans and increasing difficulties over *τροφή*, which could be blamed on Tissaphernes' own desire to economise (cf. 45. 6) but need not be due only to that.

The grievances of the Peloponnesians are a fact, and comparison with 78 might suggest that the source here is likewise a disgruntled Peloponnesian; but Alkibiades had a clear interest in magnifying the strength of the Peloponnesian fleet and his achievement in persuading Tissaphernes to restrain it. It might be that 45–6 form a solid body of information which came from Alkibiades or his entourage, whereas 47 ff. come in whole or part from an Athenian present in Samos at the time. Thucydides would have set 45–6 down in formal prose, not necessarily embodying a final opinion on the matters related; even at this stage there is play for his own judgment (§ 5 οὐα γε ἀπὸ τῶν ποιουμένων ἦν εἰκάσαι), and later in the book he is more sceptical about Alkibiades' claims to influence over Tissaphernes (81. 2: cf. 88, esp. ὡς εἰκός).

47. 1. ἄμα μέν --- ἄμα δέ ---: Thucydides' first comment on Alkibiades at v. 43. 2 is similar in structure and content, i.e. it is allowed that his advice was honestly given, but more weight is attributed to his private motives. The estimate implied at vi. 15. 2 is very similar, but at 15. 4 the balance is different; 15. 3-4 represent Thucydides' later verdict (see ad loc.).

ῶν παρ' ἔκεινοις: he was not literally 'with' the king, but expression is natural enough and there is no need (Schwartz 358) to emend to **ἔκεινω.**

εἰ μὴ διαφθερεῖ αὐτήν: he had gone far along this road, especially in the use of his personal influence at Chios and Miletos (12. 1, 17. 2), and if he now encouraged Tissaphernes to assist the Peloponnesians wholeheartedly that might finish Athens. This again rates his influence with Tissaphernes high (cf. 46. 5 n.).

ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο: as explained in the following sentence (**ἐπειδὴ γάρ, κ.τ.λ.**), this relates only to the success of his current approach to the Athenians at Samos; but Thucydides possibly looks further ahead, as in the first sentence of 48. 1. Alkibiades continued to use the impression of his influence with the Persians, e.g. 81. 2.

2. οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ Αθηναίων στρατιῶται: the wider subject, the whole force at Samos, is in place here, for it is essential to the plan that the value of Alkibiades' Persian connection should be widely appreciated (48. 2-3). The subsequent narrowing of the subject to trierarchs and **δυνατώτατοι** is not abnormal for Thucydides, but the repetition of **ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ** and **τῶν Αθηναίων** is at least untidy. Krüger's deletion of **Αθηναίων στρατιῶται** would not help. See further 48. 1-2 n.

προσπέμψαντος: cett.; **προπ.** B, which is less suitable. Alkibiades cannot use his Persian asset till it has been seen to exist.

δυνατωτάτους - - - βελτίστους: Madvig noted that Thucydides does not use **βέλτιστοι** in a political sense, and edd. compare 108. 4, vii. 19. 3, which however are not quite parallel; and Madvig's **ώς βελτίστου** gives a very weak sense. The political sense of **βέλτιστοι** is common in Xenophon, and was already established in Thucydides' time ([X.] **Ἀθ. π. I. 5. 3. 10, 11**), so it must not be denied as a possibility to Thucydides; but there is no need to take it here as a mere cant term. **δυνατοί, δυνατώτατοι,** are often used of men who were in fact oligarchs, but do not in themselves mean that (21 n.); here, the men of most weight and influence in the fleet are asked to recommend Alkibiades and his plans to what is evidently a wider circle (cf. 48. 3 **τοῦ ἑταϊρικοῦ τῷ πλέοντι; ἀνθρώπων** may mean 'other ranks' as opposed to officers, as vii. 73. 2), and are to start with the 'best men', the ones whom the rest will naturally follow. No doubt also there is some overtone, hinting that such men are not going to be doctrinaire democrats, but that is not the main point. There is no reason to despair of the whole passage with Schwartz (48. 1-2 n.).

οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ: though the phrases are not completely parallel, the reference of *πονηρία* no more needs explanation here than at vi. 92. 3. Many edd. follow Herwerden in deleting οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ as a gloss, and the phrase is stronger without these words.

τὸ δὲ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν: whatever Thucydides thought about Alkibiades' influence with Tissaphernes (46. 5 n.), his intervention at Samos is not rated too high among the causes of the Athenian oligarchic movement. The motives of the trierarchs etc. are not expounded, apart from the brief statement at 48. 1; but there must have been much argument at the time and it is easy to imagine that Thucydides would eventually have wanted to go more deeply into it. See further 48. 7 n.

48. 1-2. διαβάντες τινές --- οἱ δυνατώτατοι --- ἐς τε τὴν Σάμον ἐλθόντες: down to βασιλέα everything is appropriate to the *τινές* who crossed to confer with Alkibiades; then we have the hopes of a whole class, *οὕπερ καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα*; with *ἐς τε τὴν Σάμον* we return to the *τινές*, who are now treated as the leaders of the whole enterprise. The shifts of subject are somewhat confusing. Steup proposed to cut out *ἐς τε τὴν Σάμον ἐλθόντες* as a gloss, but it hardly reads like one. Schwartz (358-60) found 47. 2-48. 1 full of dittographies and obscurities, and thought that *αὐτοί θ' ἔαντοις --- περιποιήσειν* belonged with the last sentence of 47. 2 and not in the context of negotiation with Alkibiades; the editor, he concluded, had failed to construct an intelligible text out of the fragments left by Thucydides. But the shifts of subject are more formal than substantial: Thucydides' mind is throughout on the leaders of the movement, some of whom crossed to the mainland, and the action of the group as a whole was not taken till they came back. This passage might have looked different after revision, but it is hard to feel confident even of that.

1. αὐτοί θ' ἔαντοις --- ἐς ἔαντοὺς περιποιήσειν: *τε αὐτοῖς* (cett.) has no satisfactory reference; *θ' ἔαντοις* (B) has, but *ἐς ἔαντούς* duplicates this disagreeably, and the explanatory clause *οὕπερ --- μάλιστα* is too short to call for a resumptive phrase (Stahl) at the return to the main sentence. *αὐτοί θ' ἔαντοις* conveys all that is needed, in the usual form for this idiom, but *ἐς ἔαντούς* could be excised (Steup) without damage. But cett. *δυνατοί* may well be right (Stahl, Steup) against B *δυνατώτατοι*, i.e. not the (comparatively few) leaders as at 47. 2 but the whole class on whom the burden fell. The active *περιποιεῖν* means 'rescue', in Thucydides (ii. 25. 2, iv. 105. 1), the most serious objection that Schwartz made to this passage, which led him among other complications to posit a large lacuna after *ἐλπίδας εἶχον*. The meaning which we seem to require is 'to get affairs into their own hands', and Goodhart thought our text could mean that, comparing vii. 18. 3 *ἐς τοὺς Αθηναίους τὸ αὐτὸ περιεστάναι* (this being the passive of *περιποιεῖν*).

If emendation is needed, a simple remedy would be *περιποιήσεσθαι*, since the middle has almost exactly the sense needed (i. 9. 2, 15. 1), and corruption might be due to the following active *ἐπικρατήσειν*. *οἵπερ καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα*: the complaint of the *δυνατοί* at ii. 65. 2 is different, loss of estates into which they had sunk much money. The situation has changed after Sicily: besides the liturgies which are common to both periods, they are now in danger of frequent *εἰσφοραί*.

τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατήσειν: here, and elsewhere down to 70. 2, it is assumed that Athens will carry on the war. The conspirators had to pretend this, since the hope of Persian help was their lever with the people, but Thucydides writes as if they genuinely intended this, as the Five Thousand certainly did later.

2. *τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἐπιτηδέους*: perhaps including the 'other ranks', cf. 47. 2 *τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων* with n.

φανερῶς ἔλεγον: this raises a question which will arise again, how far events at Samos were known and clearly understood at Athens. The open proclamation of oligarchy in the fleet could not be concealed when Peisandros (and his ship's crew) came to Athens (53. 1). But the fleet had not voted, merely accepted the pronouncement without mutiny (§ 3 *ἡσύχαζεν*—it was only at a later stage that the sailors organized themselves as an *ἐκκλησία*, 76. 2), just as the assembly at Athens did not vote for oligarchy at 54. 1–2, only that Peisandros should pursue the negotiation with Tissaphernes and Alkibiades. At Samos as at Athens the emphasis in public is all on possible help from the king; as regards the constitutional corollary, however, *μὴ δημοκρατουμένων* here is blunter than Peisandros' *μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατουμένοις* (53. 1, cf. 53. 3).

3. *ἐκοίνωσαν*: 'communicated', clearly right against ABFM *ἐκοινώνησαν*, 'made common cause with'.

κἀν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς: Dobree's *κἀν* is necessary; *καὶ* (codd.) is barely translatable.

τοῦ ἐταιρικοῦ: for *ἐταιροί*, *ἐταιρεία*, see 54. 4 n.

4. *στρατηγῷ οὗ ὄντι*: he was shortly to be deposed by the assembly at Athens (54. 3), which the reader does not as yet know; but edd. do not complain, as at 36. 2, that Thucydides is unintelligible.

ὅπερ καὶ ἦν: the author expressly sides with Phrynicos. For Thucydides' high opinion of Phrynicos' intelligence see 27. 5 with n.: here it is easier to agree. The language of §§ 5–7, with 64. 5 below, suggests that Thucydides would underwrite most of the views here expressed by Phrynicos.

The blunt parenthesis agrees in tone with the judgments on Alkibiades at v. 43. 2, viii. 47. 1, which though not violently hostile do deny him weight and solidity. We should not however read too much into *ὅπερ καὶ ἦν* here: it asserts only that Alkibiades gave higher

priority to his own return than to the form of the constitution, and is compatible with a high estimate of his abilities, though the feeling behind vi. 15. 4 is clearly different.

οὐδέν --- δεῖσθαι: a development of the meaning 'had no need of', already a little stretched at 43. 4, here practically 'had no interest in'. **ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος κόσμου:** 'the existing order'. Sometimes the word contains a suggestion that the order is good, and this is developed by Alkibiades at vi. 18. 6; but here and at 67. 3 it seems quite neutral, and it would be rash to extract approval of the oligarchic order from 72. 2.

ἄπὸ τῶν ἐταίρων παρακληθείς: Steup preferred ACEF *ἐτέρων* (the 'other party' to whom control would now be transferred), on the ground that recall of an exile is a matter for the state, not for a 'club'. But *ἐταῖροι* need not imply a club (54. 4 n.); Alkibiades may be allowed to have friends in Athens who want to 'call him in' (*παρακληθείς*, not the right word for formal recall), and *κάτεισι* adequately describes the formalities. *ἐτέρων* is not impossible, but *ἐταίρων* is more natural and the corruption from *αι* to *ε* easy.

περιοπτέον: edd. compare iv. 124. 4, *τῆς τε Μένδης περιορώμενος*, 'taking thought for Mende'; and cf. ii. 43. 4, with n. 'Overlook' or 'allow' is a more frequent sense for *περιοράω*: hence presumably B's *οὐ περιοπτέον*, under a confused impression that Thucydides meant to say that they 'must not let themselves fall into stasis'.

βασιλεῖ τε οὐκ εὔπορον εἶναι: it was not the easier way for him, a different sense from that in §§ 3, 4 init, where it means rather 'productive'. This is intrinsically more plausible than Alkibiades' contention (46. 3) that Athens was the more suitable ally for the king, and it is likely enough that Thucydides meant to underwrite this too (above).

δομοίως ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὄντων: not 'being on an equality at sea' (Arnold) but 'being just as much on the sea' as Athens, i.e. the Peloponnesians had now a fleet in being in waters where down to now only Athenians' ships had been seen. For the figures see pp. 28–30 above.

πόλεις --- οὐ τας ἐλαχίστας: B; cett. *οὐκ ἐλαχίστας* gives a much weaker sense. Erythrai, Miletos, and Knidos are enough to justify the assertion; for the question, how much further the revolt had by now spread, see 45. 5 n. The statement that the Peloponnesians 'have' cities in the king's *ἀρχή* need mean no more than that their Greek connection is now with Sparta and not with Athens, but cf. 37. 5 n.

ὑφ' ὅν κακὸν οὐδέν πω πέπονθε: Athens' activities since 478 may be allowed, in this context, to obliterate the memory of Plataia; and the statement is true for Dareios personally.

5. αἰς ὑπεσχῆσθαι δή: no such proposal has been mentioned, and no such promise can yet have been conveyed to the cities, for the oligarchs' mission to the cities does not set off till 64. 1. Böhme

therefore, followed by several edd., proposed to read ὑποσχήσεσθαι. This does not help at all, for the phrase as emended is too brief for a first introduction of the plan and would still presuppose that it is already known to the reader; and Phrynicos' concern is surely about a decision already taken. This must be taken as a back-reference to something which Thucydides intended to put into his text, but never actually put there.

οὐ γὰρ βουλήσεσθαι αὐτούς, κ.τ.λ.: Phrynicos' argument is about the action to be expected from the oligarchs whom his colleagues propose to put into power in the cities, and it would be clearer if he had concentrated on their specific views and feelings. As it is, τάς τε ξυμαχίδας πόλεις above and αὐτούς here treat the cities as undifferentiated wholes, eager to escape from slavery under whatever constitution they may have. It seems as if a generalization about the unpopularity of the empire with all classes has been superimposed on an argument to which it is only partly relevant. For Thucydides' tendency to overestimate the hatred felt for Athens, see G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *Historia* iii (1954), 1–42 (this passage is discussed at 37–8). For a detailed but perhaps over-subtle discussion of this sentence see C. H. Grayson, *CQ* n.s. xxii (1972), 65–73; it is to be noted that the generalizations as he takes them are very much of the kind that Thucydides in earlier books would have put into a speech (see § 7 n.).

6. τούς τε καλούς κάγαθούς, κ.τ.λ.: the subject αὐτούς is still the allied cities, but we turn now from their internal constitutions to the parties at Athens; Thucydides does not explicitly mark the transition, but the development of the sentence shows that the καλοὶ κάγαθοί and the δῆμος are those of Athens. The conspirators believe, too simply, that the natural sympathy of oligarch with oligarch will bind the regimes set up by them in the cities to their own regime in Athens; and Phrynicos punctures this by pointing to the record of the Athenian upper class in its treatment of the allies.

Thucydides has καλοὶ κάγαθοί only here and at iv. 40. 2: see n. there and Gomme's full discussion in *CQ* n.s. iii (1953), 65–8, esp. 66. On the expression in general, see Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* 41–5. Thucydides' sparing use of it in contrast to Xenophon is not significant of a change in the vocabulary of politics, since the term is well established in the earlier plays of Aristophanes. ὄνομαζόμενος, like the commoner καλούμενος, is used preponderantly with the less familiar geographical names (and often means very little), or with unfamiliar terms, e.g. the five Argive *lochoi* at v. 72. 4. Here there can be no question of unfamiliarity, and ὄνομαζομένους can only express scepticism about their possession of the qualities implied. The only close parallel in Thucydides is v. 111. 3, τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλούμενον, where ὄνόματος ἐπαγγειοῦ δυνάμει shows (v. 85 n.) that this use of αἰσχρόν is being treated as somehow fraudulent.

ποριστάς ὄντας --- **αὐτοὺς ὡφελεῖσθαι:** *πορισταί* is not a common word, and edd. have naturally thought of the Athenian financial officers first mentioned in Antiphon vi. 49, cf. Ar. *Ran.* 1505 with schol. The name suggests that they were somehow concerned with the provision of money (and so perhaps with measures to screw more out of Athens' remaining allies), but the evidence is extremely meagre and does not support the view of Beloch (*Rh. Mus.* xxxix [1884], 249–59, *Att. Politik* 78) that the office was powerful and was the basis of Kleophon's political position. It is immaterial whether they had been instituted before Thucydides' exile, or had somehow come to his notice since, for they are inappropriate here where Thucydides is describing the behaviour of a social and economic class; the word is here simply the *nomen agentis* from *πορίζειν*. Thucydides uses *ἐσηγεῖσθαι* untechnically to mean 'suggest' or 'instigate' (iii, 20. 1 etc.). For the sequence *ποριστάς* --- *ἐσηγητάς* --- *σωφρονιστήν*, cf. Antiphon v. 94 *γνωρισταί* --- *δικασταί* --- *δοξασταί* --- *κριταί*.

The *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* are then 'providers and instigators of evils'. The *κακά* are not inflicted on the Athenian demos (that would be irrelevant, and not straightforwardly true) but on the allies, so *τῷ δῆμῳ* is the agent of infliction, to which the upper class suggest these evils. That can only mean suggestions to the demos as assembly, so that here (as perhaps at vi. 90. 1) *ἐσηγηταί* can hardly avoid some overtone of its technical sense of introducing a measure to the assembly. It could indeed be objected that many of the most notorious and drastic decrees were proposed not by men of the upper class but by demagogues, as the massacre at Skione by Kleon (iv. 122. 6). But as regards the collection of tribute we have Kleinias (ML 46. 5) to balance Kleonymos (ML 68. 5), and the tribute paid by the cities spared the pockets of the Athenian rich; that might indeed be alluded to in *αὐτοὺς ὡφελεῖσθαι*.

A major opportunity for the Athenian upper class to exploit the city's imperial position was by the acquisition of land in allied territory, overriding local rules about *ἔκκτησις*, as D. M. Lewis points out to me. This was briefly suggested by Max Weber in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* ii, Eng. tr. edd. Roth and Wittich, 1361; and see now the careful investigation by P. Gauthier, *Problèmes de la terre en Grèce ancienne* (ed. M. I. Finley, 1973) 163–78. The most extensive evidence is of land, some of it very valuable, confiscated from the Hermokopidai: W. K. Pritchett, *Hesp.* xxii (1953) 240–92 (cf. ML 79), *stelai* II. 90, 178, 312, IV. 18, VI. 55, 133, 151, VII. 78, VIII. 4, X. 11; from the literary record we can add the family of Euthyphron (Pl. *Euthyphr.* 4 c) and Charmides (X. *Symp.* 4. 31). The strength of allied feeling about this is shown by the stringent provisions of Tod 123. 35 ff.; it was the cleruchies that came first to the mind of Diodoros' source (xv. 29. 8), but he then adds *καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο μηδένα τῶν Αθηναίων γεωργεῦν*

ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς; and cf. And. iii. 15, Isoc. xiv. 44. There is no record of decrees directly concerned with such acquisitions, and one would imagine that the main lever was simply fear of Athens and reluctance to offend important Athenian individuals; cf. the argument of [X.] Αθ. π. 1. 18, that if the allies had not to come to Athens to attend the lawcourts, they would do honour (*ἐτίμων ἄν*) only to those who sailed out from Athens, the generals and trierarchs and ambassadors—his point is that as things are they have also to flatter (*κολακεύειν*) the demos, but it remains true that they do have to attend to these imposing official visitors, who have the backing which their appointment by the people gives them.

There may also be other areas where positive decrees of the demos would have assisted the upper class in making material gains from the empire, and it would be helpful if we could give more body to what is, in the whole of ancient literature, a unique statement by a very weighty witness about Athens' treatment of her subjects. It completely reverses the conventional picture of an empire exploited primarily by the democrats to safeguard public pay, and de Ste. Croix (§ 5 n., 37–8) rightly emphasizes its importance.

καὶ ἀκριτοί ἄν, κ.τ.λ.: as if the introductory verb had been in the indic., *νομίζουσι* not *νομίζειν*. Steup rightly distinguishes this from cases such as 104. 4, v. 41. 2, where Thucydides starts with a gen. abs., then switches to a nom. without strict attachment. That more striking irregularity is due to the fact that continued genitives, as those sentences developed, would be awkward or difficult. The same cannot be said here, for if he had written *ἀκρίτους* the reference would not be harder to pick up than many in the work; but the nom. does serve to distinguish the subject here from the accusatives at the end of the previous clause, showing us that we still have the thoughts of the allied cities. Emendation to more conventional syntax, along Steup's line, might be unwise.

For *ἀκριτοί* cf. the rule enunciated in Antiphon v. 47, *ἄνευ Αθηναίων οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιώσαι*, which restricted the rights of a city; and it is in this sense that the demos (i.e. the democratic courts of Athens) are a *καταφυγή* for the allies. We should think here of those who were sent out from Athens to exercise authority in the cities, *archontes* and phrourarchs. Some of these may have been hangers-on of the demagogues, but the bulk of them, especially those with military responsibilities, will have come from the upper class, and there may have been good reason to fear them, e.g. notorious cases, unknown to us, when one of them had taken arbitrary action or with difficulty been prevented from doing so. J. K. Davies further suggests to me the possibility of incidents on military service; there is no evidence available, but upper-class Athenian commanders must have had some powers of discipline over allied troops in the field, and may

have been restrained from abusing them by the thought that such abuse could count against them at a later trial. Though the allies had as yet no experience of the way an oligarchic government in Athens might deal with them, there were probably symptoms enough to afford them a good guess.

τὸν δὲ δῆμον --- σωφρονιστήν: when we remember that the argument is, or should be, specially concerned with the oligarchs among the allies, this is paradoxical, calling up a picture of rich men in the cities being protected by an honest Kleon against the rapacity of a Thukydides. Contrast [X.] *Aθ. π. I.* 14–15: the *χρηστοί* at Athens protect their counterparts in the allied cities, the *δημοτικοί* only want the allies' money in their pockets and are content that the allies should live on the edge of starvation and be unable to plot against Athens. We cannot be sure that Thucydides would fully have endorsed Phrynicos' views here, but given his general opinion of him and his direct support for his view of Alkibiades (§ 4), we are surely meant at least to take § 6 seriously.

7. παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων: *ἀπό* would be more usual with an impersonal noun, but Classen held that the *ἔργα* are here personalized as teachers (cf. *πόλεμος* at iii. 82. 2); there is no need to emend (Stahl *et al.*). Phrynicos' claim to superior 'clear knowledge' may rest on his longer experience (25. 1 n.); for all we know, his career may have given him closer acquaintance with allied affairs than the others had. **τῶν --- πρασσομένων:** they had met to discuss the proposals of Alkibiades (§ 3), but in §§ 5–7 Phrynicos has brought up a subject not referred to in 47. 2–48. 1. It is thus possible (*pace* Steup) to make a distinction between *τῶν ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου* and *ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρασσομένων*; but they overlap and are closely connected, so that there is no difficulty in the *καί* (neglected by Valla) or in the absence of a second *τῶν* after it.

This is a striking stretch of reported speech, longer than that given to Phrynicos at 27. 2–3, with less rhetorical artifice and more argument; and it raises more acutely the question whether Thucydides intended speeches for book viii, and if so whether this passage and one or two others are preliminary sketches for such speeches.

The most sensational piece of ancient evidence alleged is from Dion. Hal. *de Th.* 16, 349, where Dionysios cites Kratippos (*FGrH* 64 F 1), described as a contemporary of Thucydides and his continuator, on the speeches: οὐ μόνον ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτὰς ἐμποδὼν γεγενῆσθαι λέγων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀκούοντιν ὄχληρᾶς εἶναι, and Thucydides realized this and put no speeches into the last book, though there were many occasions for them. As it stands, this is indeed 'a foolish criticism' (Gomme, *CQ* N.S. iv [1954], 55), and no one is likely to accept that Thucydides himself realized that his speeches were tiresome to the reader; but *ὄχληράς* may well be Dionysios' own word (cf. the opening of 46, 402).

and even if we were certain of the identity and date of Kratippos, we have not his actual wording and cannot be certain of the opinion he attributed to Thucydides or deduced from his practice. That they might interrupt the flow of the narrative is a less disreputable idea, which appears also in Diod. xx. 1. 1–2, and if that goes back to Ephoros (cf. Jacoby's n. to *FGrH* 70 F 111) it represents one facet of fourth-century discussion of the function of speeches. They are to be allowed only in fully appropriate places, assemblies, embassies etc.; but already here the issue has shifted to questions about the value of epideictic oratory which are not wholly relevant for us. In any case it cannot be maintained that there are no places in book viii where the narrative could be interrupted appropriately. Again, we should like to know exactly what Kratippos said. .

For modern discussion of the problem, see most recently Weil's introduction (xxii–xxiii), which briefly puts the important questions but leaves the answers mostly open. Ed. Meyer drew attention (*Forsch.* ii. 407–8) to the uneven distribution of speeches in earlier books—just as most of the numerous speeches in the Sicilian books are given in the first year of the expedition (vi. 1–93), so as the *History* in general proceeds there will be fewer occasions for the discussion of basic principles—and he poured scorn on the notion that Thucydides might later have added speeches in *or. recta* to decorate work which he had already finished. That will commend itself only to those who share Meyer's unusual belief that book viii is fully finished (see Introd., p. 2), but in H. D. Westlake's distinction between the two halves of the *History* (see esp. *Essays* ch. i) a similar doctrine may be found, more moderately expressed.

But the majority of modern critics (e.g. Steup, *Einleitung* to viii, pp. iii–v; Gomme, *More Essays* 161–2) treat the absence of speeches as one sign of the incompleteness of book viii, or indeed as the most important sign. Once we allow that different parts of the *History* show different stages of finish, we have to admit the possibility that in some parts Thucydides had not yet decided what should be illustrated by speeches in *or. recta*; it would be absurd to demand that he should have made up his mind about that as soon as he first began to put his draft together. Believing as I do that book viii represents a very early stage in his procedures of composition, I would certainly allow that speeches may have been intended for a later version of the book; and beyond that, given the importance which Thucydides evidently attributed to the speeches as a means of elucidating history, it would need some very strong reason to suppose that he abandoned speeches at a point when there was much to elucidate. On the further possibility that Thucydides, after he for whatever reason gave up composition of the draft we have as book viii, spent his time composing speeches for the earlier books or revising those that were

already there, I would express less confidence than I did in *Phoenix* xvi (1962), 64–79; but that he did this is not at all a remote possibility, and if book viii as we have it was written soon after the events it describes, there is a lot of Thucydides' time to account for before his return to Athens and his death. It is clearly in principle possible that 48. 4–7 is a preliminary sketch which would later have been turned into a full-scale speech.

There are not many passages of continuous *or. obl.* of any length in Thucydides. ii. 13 may fairly be excluded as exceptional: for that unique mixture of advice and statistics a unique form is not inappropriate (and it may be noted that here Thucydides puts in a series of varying introductory verbs, *παρήνει* (§ 2), *ἐκέλευε* (§ 3), *προσετίθει* and *ἀπέφανε* (§ 5): this is not a continuous series of acc. and inf.). In various accounts of debates or embassies we find short pieces of *or. obl.* summarising what was said, and this is the obvious way to deal with such matters where Thucydides did not feel that a speech in full dress *or. recta* was called for; Steup (p. iv) was wrong to be surprised that Nikias is not given such a speech at v. 46. No such consideration however will account for the very long piece of *or. obl.* in the exchange between the Athenians and Boeotians at iv. 97. 2–4, 98 and 99: that contains discussion of principles as well as concrete proposals, and if Thucydides meant to leave it so, it stands as evidence that he was prepared to put in indirect speech topics that he elsewhere developed in direct speech.

Nevertheless, the subject-matter encourages belief that 48. 4–7 might have become a full-dress speech. It would be rash and arrogant, deserving all Meyer's censure, to attempt to determine the places where Thucydides would have put in a speech if he had continued work on book viii: if our text of the whole *History* had contained only the narrative, none of us would have guessed correctly all the places where Thucydides in fact put in speeches. But the judgement may be risked that the speeches were for Thucydides illustrative, of situations or types of temperament, in the sense that he seldom gives us two of the same kind: it is exceptional that Euphemos in vi. 82–7 should touch on topics of empire that had already been treated elsewhere, or that we should have two portraits of a demagogue, in iii. 37–40 and vi. 36–40. The topic of oligarchy has not been dealt with so far, nor the question special to this passage, the relations between democrat and oligarch in the cities of the empire and the bearing of this ideological difference on the cities' loyalty to Athens (with the partial exception of iii. 47), and it would not be arrogant to suggest that these are topics which Thucydides might think worthy of a speech. The developments of 411 in Athens are different in kind from anything that he had so far described, and though it is true that statements about motive are more frequent in this than in previous

books, there is ample room for the kind of further elucidation that Thucydidean speeches could give; but at a stage when he was still summarizing contradictory reports about the moderate wing of the oligarchs (pp. 252–4 below) he fairly clearly had not yet decided what to say about many aspects of the revolution. Had he proceeded further, no doubt elucidation of the kind Thucydides would provide would present us with a new series of problems.

It is already paradoxical that the oligarchic leader Phrynicos should be given the task of unmasking the pretensions of the Athenian upper class, a counterpart of a kind to the assignment of an apparently reputable account of democracy to an Athenagoras (vi. 39, cf. vol. iv, p. 301); is it perhaps true (*Lys.* xx. 11) that Phrynicos was of humble birth? His argument at 27. 1–4 might also have been put into direct speech, though the discussion of Athenian strategy could not in the context look forward to future events; the brief speech of Teutiaplos at iii. 30 has often been suggested as a possible model. viii. 53, being as much description of a scene as presentation of argument, is rather less suitable, but 76. 3–7 might be a sketch for a speech, and there will of course be many places where there is no hint of this kind, but Thucydides might eventually have decided for a speech.

49. ὕσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει: the reference is presumably to the first clause of 48. 4, and we are still in the relatively full meeting suggested by *τοῦ ἔταιρικοῦ τῷ πλέονι*. Nothing can be made of codd. *ξυμμαχίᾳ*; Haacke's *ξυνωμοσίᾳ* is clearly right.

Πείσανδρον: see A. G. Woodhead, *AJPLxxv* (1954), 131–46; Reincke, *RE* xix. 142–4, summarizes the ancient evidence without argument. Lysias xxv. 9 (for the character of this speech see Dover, *Lysias*, esp. 188 f.) picks out P. and Phrynicos as conspicuous examples of demagogues who changed sides; and P. the demagogue, unlike Phrynicos, was a regular butt of the comic poets. The earliest allusion, Ar. fr. 81 from the *Babylonioi* of 426, accuses him of promoting war for his own gain, a familiar charge against demagogues, still usable against P. early in 411 (Ar. *Lys.* 490–1, see p. 189 below). More distinctive is the charge of cowardice, first in Eupolis *Astrateutoi*, fr. 31, and often thereafter; *δειλότερος Πεισάνδρου* rated as a proverb, and it was effectively current long enough to provide a casual allusion in X. *Smp.* 2. 14. Grote pointed out (vi. 239, n. 1, followed by many since) that his recorded behaviour in 411 was firm enough, and it may be that the stock jibe was founded on some isolated and untypical incident. Ath. x. 415 d says the comedians mocked him and Kleonymos for gluttony (cf. Ael. *VH* i. 27), and the charge was alive as late as 412 in Eupolis' *Demoi* (fr. 7. 1–4 Dem.=Page, *Gr. Lit. Pap.* i. p. 206); this looks like a comic stereotype,

not necessarily more significant than the modern cartoonists' exaggerations of identifiable characteristics. Plato Com. devoted a whole comedy to him, as he did to Kleophon and Hyperbolos. Sober evidence of his public activity is confined to And. i. 27, 36, his part as *ζητητής* in the investigations of 415 (vol. iv, p. 283 f); he might, but need not, be identified with the proposer of *IG* ii². 93, for Lykon of Achaia. We cannot show tenure of other specific offices, though his record in comedy implies much other public activity; Nepos *Alc.* 5. 3, describing him as general (*praetore*), is inaccurate in other ways, and Thucydides' silence is against this.

Nothing is on record about his origins or social standing, not even his father's name. I do not see how we can tell whether he was earlier a sincere democrat (Woodhead 137) or a dishonest member of the upper class on the model of [X.] *Aθ. π.* 2. 20; nor whether his support of Alkibiades now arose from the present situation or was rooted in some earlier alliance. The dangerous course he now took suggests that his oligarchic convictions were genuine, and a position on the extreme wing of the revolutionaries does not encourage one to think in terms of a cool and reasoned reaction to the disaster of 413.

For the chronology of his mission see 50. 2 n., and pp. 186–7 below.

50. 1. γνοὺς δὲ δό Φρύνιχος, κ.τ.λ.: this odd incident is analysed by H. D. Westlake, *JHS* lxxvi (1956), 99–104; see also Brunt 76–7; for the question of sources, 51. 3 n. below.

2. ξι ὄντι τότε περὶ τὴν Μίλητον: we have not yet reached 41. 1 of the main narrative; that is, the winter solstice (39. 1) is not many days past, or may still be ahead. Preparations for Peisandros' mission to Athens (49) had already begun, and it looks as if his departure took place before the end of this episode, which regained Phrynicchos some credit with the oligarchs and lost Alkibiades some (51. 3), and thus might have deterred Peisandros from obtaining the deposition of Phrynicchos (54. 3) if he had known of this development.

ξυγγνώμην δὲ εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.: *ξυγγνώμη* may be accorded not only to honest mistake (i. 32. 5) or to forced action (iii. 39. 2), but to surrender to temptations of the kind which Greeks found especially formidable, e.g. Athens to her imperial ambitions (*Hermokrates* at iv. 61. 5). In the heated atmosphere of Greek politics, doing evil to an enemy constituted such a temptation; the city's *ἀξύμφορον*, in the context, must be the loss of its chance of help from Persia, a chance in which Phrynicchos did not believe (48. 4); but it is true that the elimination of Alkibiades might result in closer cooperation between Tissaphernes and the Spartans. Phrynicchos here addresses his excuse to Astyochos, who might feel the standard distrust for those who turn against their own side (cf. iii. 9, vi. 92. 2–5 with nn.); but no doubt Thucydides himself felt a need to justify this dubious action by a man whose

judgement, on all occasions, he had so strongly praised (27. 5). The tone of vi. 92 is very different, though it hardly makes a more favourable impression on the reader.

3. οὐκέτι δύοις ἐς χεῖρας ιόνται: for the meaning edd. compare X. *An.* i. 2. 26, 'put oneself into the power of'. The wording suggests, though it does not quite prove, that the change was recent, i.e. that down to (say) the middle of December Alkibiades had consorted more freely with the Peloponnesians; for the bearing of this on the chronology of 45 f. see 45. 1–2 nn. It is remarkable that the alleged order from Sparta to Astyochos to kill Alkibiades (45. 1) seems to be wholly ignored here, and that may have a bearing on the question of sources.

ἐς Μαγνησίαν: Goodhart took this to be the city on the Hermos, apparently because it was on the way to Sardis; but Thucydides would almost certainly have added some qualification to distinguish this less important city (i. 138. 5 n.) from the greater city on the Maiandros, once ruled by Themistokles, a more likely scene for this meeting.

ὡς ἐλέγετο: except where the fact that something was said is in its own right part of the narrative (e.g. vi. 103. 4), *λέγεται* and *ἐλέγετο* are almost always used to suggest an inferior grade of certainty, whether because the story is a legend too old for checking (e.g. ii. 102. 5) or for some other reason (e.g. geographical remoteness, ii. 48. 1; ii. 77. 6, and perhaps ii. 93. 4, both items which should have been verifiable, suggest a reluctance to underwrite occurrences which might be claimed as miraculous interventions); and ascriptions of motive and items of backstairs history are often thus qualified (e.g. ii. 18. 5, 20. 1, iii. 79. 3, vii. 86. 4). The only other instances of the impf. in this use are v. 74. 3, vii. 86. 4; it is not clear that there is any distinction of meaning, at any rate with latter*. The most strongly worded statement of Astyochos' corrupt submission to Tissaphernes comes at 83. 3, in the mouth of discontented Peloponnesian sailors, and the present passage probably comes from a similar source, distrusted by Thucydides and not identical with the source for the main story. Cf. 46. 5 n., and for the facts 85. 3 n. *ad fin.*

κοινοῦσθαι: B solus, but it is not a likely interpolation and the sentence is more awkward without it; its apparent absence from *Στ*cc. is not decisive. (Arnold's objection to this sense of the middle appears to overlook 82. 3).

διόπερ --- ἀνθήπτετο: Steup excised this clause, on the ground that the definite statement conflicts with the doubt expressed by *ὡς ἐλέγετο*; but the qualification easily covers both clauses. If we keep *περὶ* (om. B) we must understand with *ἀνθήπτετο* some general word such as *τοῦ πράγματος*; to understand *Τισσαφέρνους* (LSJ) is much harder. Without *περὶ*, easily slipped in after the two preceding clauses,

τῆς μισθοφορᾶς may comfortably be taken (*pace* Steup) as the object of the verb; this is an easy extension of such usages as ἀνθάπτεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων (97. 3). For *μαλακωτέρως* cf. 29. 2 on Therimenes; ‘softness’ about pay has not so far been attributed to Astyochos, but it is easily supplied in the context of 45. 2–3.

4. *τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὄντας*: see v. 27. 2 n.

5. *καὶ νῦν ὅτι . . . διαφθεῖραι*: Grote (vi. 243) took it that Phrynicos never intended to carry through this second treachery, but was extricating himself from his dangerous situation by a manœuvre which he expected to turn out as in fact it did (51). Steup (see also 51. 1 n.), Brunt, Westlake (§ 1 n.) and others concur. Westlake (101 with n. 17) rightly notes that Thucydides did not take this view: Phrynicos decided to reveal the danger of a Peloponnesian attack only just before the arrival of Alkibiades’ second letter (51. 1; so also Plu. *Alc.* 25. 9–13). We are hardly in a position to pronounce on the fact. It may be assumed that by now Phrynicos could assess correctly the position in the enemy camp—the messenger who took his first letter to Astyochos could probably report a good deal, and 51. 1 *σαφῶς πεπυσμένος* implies a fair amount of correspondence across the lines—but he ran the risk that Astyochos might seize the chance and attack Samos at once. The strongest argument against Grote’s interpretation is that Thucydides thought Phrynicos capable of the proposed treachery. It is a striking indication of the lengths to which a Greek might expect personal feuds to be taken in politics, and what Thucydides was prepared to classify as *οὐκ ἀξύνετος* (27. 5).

ἀτειχίστου οὖσης Σάμου: see 14. 3 n.

ἀνεπίθθονον: circumstances might excuse conduct that would otherwise be reprehended and resented, cf. i. 75. 5 (echoed in vi. 83. 2), i. 82. 1; other instances (vi. 54. 5, vii. 77. 2) refer to straightforwardly virtuous conduct. Cf. § 2 n. on *ξυγγνώμην*, and 51. 1 n. below. This second defence, against a much more damaging charge, rests on Phrynicos’ immediate personal danger, but again Thucydides is no doubt concerned with his own judgement on Phrynicos.

δι’ ἔκείνους: the Spartans according to Classen and Goodhart; Astyochos and Alkibiades, according to Poppe and Stahl. These had contributed to his present danger, but they are not relevant to his defence against the charge of betraying Athens. The reference must be to Phrynicos’ Athenian enemies, as Steup saw.

51. 1. *προήσθετο αὐτόν . . . ἀδικοῦντα*: ‘after his previous experience, Phrynicos foresaw that Astyochos would betray him again’, according to Steup, and this would bring Thucydides into line with Grote and others (50. 5 n.). But this cannot be right: Phrynicos here takes a fresh decision, only just in time to anticipate Alkibiades’ letter (*προφθάσας*; the prefix in *προήσθετο* makes the point that he realised

in time what was coming). As to how he knew, see again 50. 5 n.; the messenger who took the second letter may have perceived the danger and hurried back. *ἀδικοῦντα* is an odd description for Astyochos' action: the verb can be used for the breach of even a disreputable compact (as Lys. i. 15), but here Astyochos has made no compact, merely disappointed Phryничос' hopes of one, not reacted in the way Phryничос thought appropriate. Cf. also 28. 4 n.

σαφῶς πεπυσμένος: he could not of course expound the real reasons for his certainty, but this seems to have roused no suspicion. It must be assumed that secret communication of this kind was common (cf. Nikias at vii. 48. 2 and elsewhere), and that commanders were felt to have some discretion in what they did or did not reveal.

κύριος ἦν αὐτὸς πράσσων ταῦτα: edd. compare v. 34. 2; there seems to be no difference between this and *κύριος* with inf. The passage does not show that Phryничос was commander-in-chief (Hatzfeld 233); as one of the generals he had 'in himself' the right to urge this measure.

3. δόξας δὲ δ' Ἀλκιβιάδης οὐ πιστὸς εἶναι: this is not yet a total breach; till 56. 5 the oligarchs and Alkibiades maintained relations, however uneasy. But there was a change as regards Phryничос: it was no longer an object, as it had been when Peisandros and his colleagues set off (49, 53. 1, 54. 3), to gratify Alkibiades by removing Phryничос.

Critics (see 50. 1 n.) have naturally hoped to gain from this story light on Thucydides' sources, since 'the full facts can at first have been known to very few' (Brunt 77). See Delebecque 98–9, who rounds up the possibilities and brings out the point that Alkibiades himself would not be eager to publish the fact that he had been outwitted by Phryничос; and neither Astyochos nor Phryничос could safely reveal the whole story. We need not however confine our search to the principals: an associate of Alkibiades might have been ready to tell a story which in the end went against his friend, nor need we suppose that Phryничос acted without consulting friends who might have survived him (but such a source would tell against Grote's interpretation, 50. 5 n.). There will have been other Greeks at Tissaphernes' court, where the story could have leaked out. Total security is unlikely in a Greek intrigue, and Brunt is clearly right to say that Thucydides could have learned the story at second hand. The friendly relations between Alkibiades and Astyochos in this story (50. 3 n.) are however surprising in view of the order said at 45. 1 to have received by the latter, which is wholly neglected here, and there is that much indication that 50–1 come from a source different from the main source of 45–6.

There is no evidence, how soon the story became known at Athens. Ancient commentators on Ar. *Ran.* 689, *κεῖ τις ἡμαρτε σφαλεῖς τι Φρυνίχου παλαιόμασιν*, among many wild interpretations, sometimes

found there a reference to this episode (Suda s.v. *Φρυνίχου πάλαισμα* gives a full summary of cc. 50–1), and some modern critics have accepted this. But Hatzfeld (235 n. 2) was right to reject it: Aristophanes' allusion is to men who have somehow been tricked by Phrynicos into action hostile to the people, and there is nothing like that in our story. But Hatzfeld carried too far his 'réserves' about the story as a whole (235–6).

52. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο: this must be the incident narrated in 50–1, which was finished before Astyochos left Miletos (50. 2; we cannot shift him to Knidos in the middle). The imperfects *παρεσκεύαζε καὶ ἀνέπειθεν* allow us to suppose that 52 covers an appreciable time (below). Alkibiades now shifts away, in accordance with his plan of 47. 2, from his earlier advice to wear both sides out (46. 4), but that advice survives to frustrate his new plans (56. 2, 57. 2).

Ἀλκιβιάδης μέν: this looks forward to 53. 1 *οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου,* by which time the *μέν*-clause has gone on so long that a resumptive phrase is needed at the end of the chapter.

δεδιότα μέν --- παρῆσαν: this element, not so far brought into the argument, recurs at 56. 2 (see n. there), 57. 1. *πλέοσι ναυσὶ* is true of overall numbers only after the arrival of Antisthenes' squadron (39: probably very near the beginning of the period covered by 52), and only if we include the Chian ships (which at this stage is reasonable); but throughout the winter the Peloponnesians had some local superiority in the waters round Miletos and Samos (see pp. 29–30 above, §§ 9, 11–12).

βουλόμενον δὲ ὅμως --- πεισθῆναι: to make a contrast with the preceding clause this must convey an inclination towards the Athenian side. *πεισθῆναι* (cett.) is thus inevitable: *πιστευθῆναι* (CG) makes no sense as it stands and could only be accommodated by supposing a lacuna (cf. Wilamowitz 592 with n. 1). This is the only passage in the whole book where a positive desire to help the Athenians is attributed to Tissaphernes, and this suggests, if not Alkibiades himself, at least a source close to him; it was essential for Alkibiades, now and later (81. 1, 88, etc.), to maintain that it was possible to persuade Tissaphernes to change sides, though he might want also to magnify the difficulty of the task he had set himself.

ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ --- τῶν Πελοποννησίων: there is no trouble in understanding how Lichas' objection to the earlier treaties reinforced Alkibiades' argument of 46. 3, that Sparta's attitude conflicted with Persia's interest, but the structure of this long clause is hard to make out.

(a) Lichas' remark, *οὐ φάσκων --- ἥρχον*, is a condensed version of the argument given him at 43. 3, which creates a presumption that the quarrel here referred to is the quarrel of 43. 2–4, which also took

place at Knidos. For διαφοράν --- τῶν Πελοποννησίων in the sense 'quarrel of the Peloponnesians (as a body) with someone else', edd. compare vii. 57. 11 κατὰ διαφορὰν Συρακοσίων.

(i) The difficulty then is that Tissaphernes, who was present at Knidos, cannot easily be made the subject of ἤσθετο; 'perceived', 'observed', or any other sense that could reasonably be given to the verb (even Delebecque's 'il a constaté' [117], which stretches it very far), is not a fair description of the way Tissaphernes acquired knowledge of a quarrel to which he was directly a party. Steup, keeping Tissaphernes as the subject, wished to emend to τῇ --- διαφορᾷ --- ἤχθετο, 'he was angry because of the quarrel', which at least preserves the syntax.

(ii) Most prefer the alternative of making Alkibiades the subject. This makes possible sense, though one is rather expecting to hear of considerations that would influence Tissaphernes; but the reader would have to read at least twice and to think hard before he grasped that Tissaphernes was no longer the subject. Wilamowitz (592–4), who posited a first draft written before Thucydides learnt of the Spartan–Persian treaties, and therefore of the objections of Lichas to the first two, necessarily took this clause as a later addition; on his view a shorter μέν-clause, ending at πεισθῆναι, had originally been followed directly by 53. 1, and when Thucydides added his new information he failed to notice how the new clause disrupted the structure of the sentence. A first draft in the form posited by Wilamowitz is not very probable (cf. 46. 3 n.; Brunt 81–8), and it is not easy to imagine Thucydides inserting a new clause without noticing what had been the subject of the original sentence. Nevertheless, if the διαφορά here is identified with the quarrel of 43. 2–4, we must either in some way remodel Wilamowitz's hypothesis, or contrive to brush the difficulty aside (Brunt 87; Goodhart noted the change of subject without apparent uneasiness).

(b) The alternative is to reject the identification. Carl Meyer, *Die Urkunden im Geschichtswerke des Thukydides* 83 n. 1, noted the possibility that one might understand 'quarrels of the Peloponnesians among themselves' (the more straightforward interpretation of the words), but did not develop this, as D. M. Lewis suggests to me might be done. The Peloponnesian fleet had operated for some while under the treaty of c. 37, and though Therimenes himself was dead he doubtless left colleagues who had helped him to negotiate it, so that Lichas' objections might well have provoked an internal Peloponnesian quarrel. That is something that Tissaphernes might 'hear of', and he thus becomes a possible subject for ἤσθετο, to the great improvement of the syntax. That means that Lichas' opinion, quoted just below in terms that so much resemble 43. 3, must be referred not to the quarrel with Tissaphernes which Thucydides has described,

but to a different occasion (or occasions: the frequentative *οὐ φάσκων* ('he kept on saying this') may not refer to a single notorious confrontation) which he has never mentioned at all; that is a notable incoherence, but not substantially worse than those already noted at 45. 2 and 46. 1. The reader will indeed have much greater difficulty now in understanding the sentence in its present form, and it is a necessary part of the hypothesis that Thucydides knew he had to rewrite this passage and the corresponding part of the main narrative, and tolerated the incoherence meanwhile. But this interpretation gives a straightforward structure to the sentence, and as regards the composition of book viii it raises no difficulties that were not already apparent.

ἢδη γάρ --- ἐγεγένητο: Thucydides cannot be saying that what happened at Knidos happened at Rhodes, and the parenthesis has naturally been suspected; Wilamowitz (593) deleted *ἐν τῇ Ρόδῳ δύντων αὐτῶν*, Steup the whole passage. The objection to this is that it is no more easy to imagine a reader, however stupid, assigning to Rhodes what has just been described as occurring at Knidos. The intention was perhaps rather to tell us that the story, in this sector, has now been brought down to the point where the 'main narrative' broke off at the end of 44 (the move to Rhodes can be taken to follow very quickly after the *διαφορά* which is the subject of *ἐγεγένητο*, whichever quarrel is meant). If that is the point, it is put somewhat obscurely, and obscurity of this kind is perhaps more easily attributed to Thucydides than to the author of a marginal note.

Delebecque (118) supposes that the parenthesis contains a correction of the main narrative. The Peloponnesians had prudently secured their position at Rhodes before breaking with Tissaphernes, the quarrel at Knidos took place literally while the fleet was at Rhodes, and Thucydides here unobtrusively notes that the main narrative was wrong on this point. On this ingenious, and by no means impossible, hypothesis Thucydides, again, had some rewriting to do.

53–60. Peisandros' mission to Athens. Athenian conference with Tissaphernes. Third Treaty between Sparta and Persia

53. 1. *οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, κ.τ.λ.:* this answers the *μέν* at beginning and end of 52, and gives us developments at Athens which overlap with Alkibiades' efforts to reorientate Tissaphernes' policy. Stahl, Steup, and others follow Dobree in deleting *τῶν Ἀθηναίων*, on the ground that the embassy is not official but proceeds from a group of conspirators; Poland more pedantically still objected to *πρέσβεις* on the same ground, here and in 49. Goodhart thought the point might be to underline a change of subject and scene, and Steup's

objection seems arbitrary, that such a contrast would have to be formulated differently. *καὶ* (ABEFM) before ἀφικόμενοι was defended by Classen on the ground that in 49 we hear of preparations, not of actual despatch, so that both ἀποσταλέντες and ἀφικόμενοι can be predicative here; the sense is not affected.

This sentence gives a strong impression that Peisandros addressed the assembly as soon as he arrived. For the chronological difficulties of this see 54. 4. n. and pp. 186–7 below.

μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατοῦμενοις: Peisandros anticipates the euphemism familiar from the fourth century (e.g. Isoc. vii. 16 ff.), when opponents of the established regime could not openly support oligarchy but called instead for return to a purer form of democracy. The conspirators at Samos had spoken more bluntly, according to Thucydides (48. 2).

2. **τῶν Αλκιβιάδου -- - ἐχθρῶν:** cf. vi. 29. 3, 61. 1, where again they are not named; and 65. 2 below where Thucydides does pick out Androkles. From the tenses *βιασάμενος κάτεισι* Weil deduces that we should understand 'return after having broken the law', not 'return in violation of the law'; the protest here concerns the case of Alkibiades, not as yet the constitutional proposals.

Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ Κηρύκων: the two *gene* which provided the officiants for the Eleusinian mysteries. Thucydides said nothing of them when describing the investigation of 415, his mind being then on the popular reaction, but it is natural that they should be professionally concerned, producing an odd combination of enemies for Alkibiades. (The most prominent personality, Kallias son of Hipponikos, the current head of the Kerykes and extravagant patron of the sophists, was a law unto himself and anything but a party man.) At 97. 3, where the Five Thousand decreed the return of Alkibiades and others, Thucydides mentions no opposition; when he did return in 407, Xenophon (*HG* i. 4. 20) says no opposition would have been tolerated, and Plutarch (*Alc.* 33. 3) mentions a state decree ordering the Eumolpidai and Kerykes to lift their curses.

ἔνα ἔκαστον παράγων: Peisandros is making a formal speech (*παρελθών* is the regular word for a speaker 'coming forward', common from i. 79. 2 onward), and his opponents interrupt from the floor; he then 'calls them forward' individually (for *παράγων* cf. e.g. v. 46. 5) and questions them, much as a speaker in a lawcourt may interrogate his opponent during his speech (e.g. Pl. *Apol.* 24 c ff.). The same language is used at the trial of the Plataians, iii. 68. 1 *ἔνα ἔκαστον παραγαγόντες καὶ ἐρωτῶντες -- - ὅποτε μὴ φαῖεν -- -*: the procedure there is easy to visualize, but Peisandros in the assembly cannot in the same way take each objector at leisure. Further, it is hard to imagine that no one attempted an answer, given the continuing Athenian success in Chios (40, 55. 2–56. 1) and the Peloponnesian fleet's reluctance to attack

(46. 5 n.); Athenian demagogues were not usually so easy to silence. The scene has been dramatized, one might guess by an oligarchic exile from Athens who relished describing to Thucydides how Peisandros had routed the demagogues.

ναῦς τε οὐκ ἐλάσσους, κ.τ.λ.: see pp. 29–30 above, §§ 9, 11–12, and 48. 4, 52; and for the cities 45. 5 n.

3. δόποτε δὲ μὴ φᾶτεν: § 2 n. above.

σωφρονέστερον: for the political connotation of this word see 64. 5 n. **ἐς δλίγους μᾶλλον τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσομεν:** for **ἐς δλίγους** cf. ii. 37. 1, v. 81. 2. Thucydides here records no precise proposals (see 54. 1 n.), but it is worth noting that the phrase used here suggests a system in which the assembly would retain its powers and existing membership, but eligibility for office, no doubt including the council, would be restricted (de Ste. Croix 3 with n. 14).

ίνα πιστεύῃ ἡμῖν βασιλεύς: the king's alleged preference for oligarchy is also unobtrusively assumed at 48. 2, though the emphasis there is more on oligarchy as a condition for Alkibiades' return. When he is instead adopted by the fleet at Samos (81. 1), it is assumed that he is still able to bring the Persians over to the Athenian side, the preference for oligarchy being quietly forgotten. The king might indeed be dissatisfied with the recent record of the democrats at Athens (5. 5 n.), but his real preference is not here in question and need not be pursued.

καὶ μὴ περὶ πολιτείας, κ.τ.λ.: he does not of course deny that a constitutional change is proposed, but he puts the emphasis on **σωτηρίᾳ**, for which cf. v. 87–8, and in the context Arist. *Aθ.* π. 29. 2, 4 (p. 214 below). **βουλεύσομεν** is found only in B, though E's **ἔβουλεύσομεν** suggests that this reading coexisted elsewhere with **βουλεύωμεν** C?G, **ἔβουλεύσαμεν** cett. Dobree wished to read **βουλεύσωμεν**, taking this clause as an exhortation in parenthesis, but this is extremely hard.

ὑστερὸν γὰρ ἔξεσται, κ.τ.λ.: according to Thucydides this did reassure the people (54. 1), a surprising innocence when we remember their usual suspicion about tyranny and oligarchy, even if they understood that the assembly was to continue in being (above).

54. 1. ἐπελπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται: at 1. 1 **ἐπῆλπισαν** meant 'caused them to hope', but 'hope', with little difference of sense from the simple verb, is certainly possible (cf. E. *H. P.* 1011) and there is no need to read **ἐλπίζων** with CG. **μεταβαλεῖται** might be impersonal (Steup), or we might understand **ἡ δλιγαρχία** (Dukas), but hardly **ὁ δῆμος** (Classen). **ἐνέδωκεν:** M. O. B. Caspari (M. Cary), *JHS* xxxiii (1913) 2, assumed without argument that Arist. *Aθ.* π. 29. 1 dates the setting up of a constitutional commission of thirty to the time of this first visit of Peisandros to Athens, and he held that Aristotle was right, Th. 67. 1 wrong. M. Lang, *AJP* lxix (1948), 272–89, ingeniously suggested that

there were two commissions set up at different stages: see also Cary, *JHS* lxxii (1952), 56; Lang, *AJP* lxxxviii (1967), 176–87. For these theories see p. 255 below; in fact ἐνδωκεν implies no more than the abandonment of ideologically based resistance to the proposed embassy, and even that degree of resignation must be thought of as provisional, to depend on the outcome of the negotiations (Hignett 270). The people had not positively voted for oligarchy, any more than the fleet at Samos at 48. 3 (see 48. 2 n.), but περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας above shows that Thucydides thought that they understood what was at issue. The fact that oligarchy had been proclaimed at Samos among the fleet must have leaked out, especially if Peisandros' crew was at Athens for any length of time (cf. 48. 2 n.).

2. καὶ δέκα ἄνδρας μετ' αὐτοῦ: no doubt one per tribe in the usual Athenian fashion. A total of ten would have been more normal, but this ten is no doubt thought of as a committee from the city to assist Peisandros and his colleagues at Samos.

ὅπῃ [ἂν] αὐτοῖς δοκοίη, κ.τ.λ.: Steup retained ἃν (om. C; there is space for it in *IT²⁴*), taking it with δοκοίη and comparing 50. 5. That is not parallel: here we have the report of a decree, in the original ὅπῃ ἃν --- δοκῆ. The decree gives them a free hand, which the oligarchs could interpret as giving them the right to promise a constitutional change at Athens. In normal circumstances such a 'free hand' would not allow the envoys to commit the city to much (cf. v. 45. 2–4 n.); in this case too the people no doubt supposed that they retained the final decision (and cf. Peisandros' assurance at 53. 3).

3. ὁ δῆμος: om. C; *IT²⁴* has no room for this, and could have read παρέλυσαν, parallel with the other verbs. The variation is more probably due to Thucydides than to a later hand.

Σκιρωνίδην: AC⟨G⟩; *Kιρωνιδην* cett.; the traces of the initial letters in *IT²⁴* are very slight; see 25. 1 n. We have had no previous indication that he was more implicated than others in the decision taken by Phrynicos.

Διομέδοντα καὶ Λέοντα: see nn. to 19. 2, 23. 1. Both were round Chios at 24. 2, late enough in summer to show that they were generals for 412/11, but they have not been heard of since and now appear to be at home and disposable. For their politics see 73. 4; the assembly thus appointed reliable democrats to the vacancies Peisandros had induced them to create, though the envoys sent with the latter appear to be of his own way of thinking (64. 1).

If Diomedon and Leon were already in office, nothing is said here of replacements for Phrynicos and (S)kironides, but the current requirements of the war make it certain that they were replaced. The disposition of those explicitly described as *strategoi* (13 n.) is at this time as follows:

(a) Chios. At 30. 2 Strombichides, Onomakles and Euktemon were

sent there. No general is named in connection with operations there at 38, 55. 3, 61; Strombichides left for the Hellespont at 62. 2. Onomakles, if correctly identified with the oligarch of [Plu.] 833 f. (cf. 25. 1 n.), returned to Athens before the fall of the Four Hundred, probably at an early stage. Nothing is stated about Euktemon's movements (or certainly known about his politics, cf. 30. 1 n.), and it is likely that at least one general remained at Chios in Strombichides' absence. Dieitrepes, probably not a general of 412/11, was at Chios, but left for Thasos before Strombichides returned (64. 2 with n.).

(b) *Samos*. In the division of forces at 30. 2 (see n. there), Phrynicos, (S)kironides, and Charminos appear to be available for this station, and possibly Thrasykles. The deposed Phrynicos returned to Athens in time to take a major part in the oligarchy (68. 3), but we have no information about (S)kironides, or about Thrasykles (who need not have been a general, nor still present). Charminos was at Samos when Hyperbolos was murdered (73. 3); we do not know what became of him after the counter-revolution there. Leon and Diomedon went now (55. 1) to conduct operations off Rhodes, but they evidently returned to Samos with the fleet at 60. 3, and were there at 73. 4–5 but apparently deposed soon after (76. 2).

(c) *Thrace*. The commander defeated by Timolaos near Amphipolis is described by *Hell. Oxy.* 7(2). 4 (a source from which we expect precision) as *τὸν στρατηγὸν [τῶν Αθηνα]ίων* (for the date of this action see 64. 4 n. below). Eukrates, not necessarily a general, had been five months in Thrace when Ar. *Lys.* was acted (103 with Σ); *Εὐκράτη* would not be a plausible emendation for *Hell. Oxy. σιχιον.* Dieitrepes was destined for Thrace (64. 2), but did not go to Thasos till the time of Peisandros' second voyage to Athens.

(d) *Naupaktos*. See 13 n.; Hippokles (or Konon) need not have been a general.

(e) *Athens*. Down to the time of Phrynicos' deposition there were certainly seven generals abroad, leaving a maximum of three at home, of whom Leon and Diomedon were two till now, and if there was a third he is unknown. With the enemy established at Dekeleia and the possibility of other emergency arising, Athens needed three generals at home, and we may assume that successors were appointed to Leon and Diomedon for service there. These were probably men Peisandros approved: *Αθ. π.* 29. 4 (see p. 230 below) implies that the revolutionaries felt confidence in the generals available then, who by that time might well include Onomakles also.

"Ιασον προδοῦναι καὶ Αμόρυην: not a matter of treacherous communication with the enemy in the style of 50–1; the charge is rather that by persuading his colleagues not to fight Therimenes (27) he was responsible for these losses to Athens. *προδοῦναι* in Greek covers this without difficulty (cf. vi. 103. 4 n.).

οὐ νομίζων, κ.τ.λ.: the real reason, as opposed to what Peisandros told the assembly. διαβάλλειν can mean simply 'attack', but more often than not it has an overtone of slander or trickery, as v. 16. 1 on Kleon (see Gomme's nn.). Favour to Alkibiades continued as a main motive after Peisandros had left Athens (65. 2: cf. 50. 2 n.).

4. τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας, κ.τ.λ.: the word *έταιρεία* is nowhere directly used of these groups in the preparatory stage of the revolution, though 65. 2 τοῖς *έταιροις* refers to them and at 48. 3 τὸ *έταιρικόν* has been used of the conspirators at Samos; but there is no doubt that it applies. The evidence has been collected, almost too comprehensively, by G. M. Calhoun, *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* (1913); F. Sartori, *Le eterie nella vita politica ateniese* (1957). The main question is of the part that may have been played in certain periods by organised secret clubs. Apart from the difficulty of getting secure information about secret activities even in periods better documented, confusion is caused by the fact that *έταιροι* was at all times a word in common use for persons engaged in any sort of joint enterprise, and not only for the members of a *έταιρεία* or *έταιρικόν*, words which acquired a restricted and semi-technical meaning. Some distinctions must be made.

(a) Harmless associations for mutual benefit or social ends flourished in great variety; their general nature is clearly indicated by Thucydides' comment on their opposites, iii. 82. 6 οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὥφελίας αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστώτας πλεονεξίᾳ.

(b) Young men of the upper class might band themselves together in associations with deliberately shocking names, like those with which the speaker of [D.] liv tries to make the jury's flesh creep (esp. 14–17: 39 *έταιρος* must not be taken to imply political activity of the kind here discussed). Their purpose was social rather than political, though one can imagine them being used for political purposes. Andokides studiously obscures the general purpose of the *έτ.* of Euphiletos, to which he belonged, and says that the proposal to mutilate the Hermai was introduced 'while we were drinking' (i. 61: cf. MacDowell 190–2); but i. 41 ἐὰν δὲ κατάσχωμεν, κ.τ.λ. suggests a less innocent role. Cf. vol. iv, pp. 285 f.

(c) Though it is true and important that under the Athenian system of direct government there could be no political parties organized in the way to which we are accustomed, the leaders had their regular associates and did not work in a total vacuum. So Kleon in Ar. *Ve*. 1033–4 = *Pax* 756–7, ἔκατὸν δὲ κύκλῳ κεφαλαὶ κολάκων οἰμωξομένων ἐλιχμάντο περὶ τὴν κεφαλήν, but these (pace R. Sealey, *Hermes* lxxxiv [1956] 241 = *Essays in Greek Politics* 66) were open adherents not secret conspirators. In general, as Sartori (53) allows in spite of his anxiety to discover democratic *έτ.*, the democrats being in control of

the state machinery had no need for secrecy. But the abnormal circumstances of 411 called for conspiracy, and Sartori (123) agrees with Calhoun in attributing the murder of Phrynicos to a democratic *ēt*.

(d) The *ξυνωμοσίαι* of which Thucydides speaks here seem to exist not for the general furtherance of a political principle but for the benefit of their members in elections and lawsuits under the existing regime. Similarly Plato (*Tht.* 173 d) speaks of *σπουδαὶ δὲ ἔταιριῶν ἐπ’ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι* as things from which a philosopher might hold aloof, along with Council and legislation—but also along with *δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμαι*. The element of secrecy is stressed in *Rep.* 365 d. For the lawcourts cf. [D.] liv. 31–7 (organization of false witness); lviii. 42 (intimidation of a litigant's supporters; cf. 39–40 for collusion between apparent enemies; but 42 denounces not so much individual *ēt* as the general behaviour of the inner ring of *πολιτευόμενοι*). For politics cf. [And.] iv. 4 on ostracism: *ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οἱ τοὺς ἔταιρους καὶ συνωμότας κεκτημένοι πλέον φέρονται τῶν ἄλλων*. Since ostracism depended on an open vote it might seem unlikely that *συνωμόται* could affect the issue. But large new finds of *ostraka* (ML pp. 42–3) have shown that ostracism was not a straightforward confrontation of two major opponents; voting was widely scattered, and after the decision to hold an *δοτρακοφορία* (in *Pryt.* VI, cf. *Aθ.* π. 43. 5) organization and propaganda would be needed to protect a prominent 'candidate' against various dangers, notably that his side might split its vote. The well-known find of Themistokles *ostraka* (ML *ibid.*) shows one way in which organization could help, and also that the need for it was recognized early. Plutarch's account of the ostracism of Hyperbolos (*Nic.* 11, *Alc.* 13) speaks once (*Alc.* 13. 8) of the *ēt* of Phaiax, but talks of Nikias and Alkibiades uniting their *στάσεις*: and while it is relatively easy to accept stories, however flamboyant, of Alkibiades conspiring (*Polyaen.* i. 40. 1; cf. *Isoc.* xvi. 6) it is harder to visualise Nikias in this role, and in any case the closing stage of such a campaign was necessarily open. For ordinary elections there is less direct evidence, and it would be hard to get a major post filled by a candidate of really doubtful loyalty, but in the preparatory stages of an election it might help to have *συνωμόται*. Further, not all elections will have engaged the full attention of the electorate: Ar. *Ach.* 598, D. xviii. 149, are not to be taken too literally, but it is significant that such charges could be made. Cf. also *Isoc.* iii. 54, iv. 79.

(e) Peisandros here unites scattered *ξυνωμοσίαι* to forward constitutional change, and *ēt*. with such a purpose are recognized as a danger later. Hypereides' catalogue of offences subject to *eisangelia* cites (iv. 7–8) *έάν τις — συνίη ποι ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου ἡ ἔταιρικὸν συναγάγῃ* (sc. *ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου*, cf. the law in [D.] xlvi. 26). Only enemies of democracy needed secret organisation in normal times,

and *Aθ. π.* 34. 3 distinguishes among the *gnorimoi* of 404 the members of ἑτ., and the returned exiles who wanted oligarchy from those who belonged to no ἑτ., ἀλλως δὲ δοκοῦντες οὐδενὸς ἐπιλείπεοθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, who sought the *πάτριος πολιτεία* with Theramenes as their main leader. Calhoun (20–1) resisted the inference that ἑτ. were distinctively extremist; Sartori (42–3) was more cautious but insisted that there were ἑτ. of moderates; but there can be no doubt that Aristotle meant to distinguish the sort of politicians who joined ἑτ. from another class of opponents of democracy who did not. This is not unreasonable, and other texts cause no difficulty provided we remember that not everyone described as a *έταιρος* has to be a member of a secret association. *έταιρεία* indeed is not always and everywhere such a club: in the Cretan cities (*IC* iv. 72 [Gortyn Code], ii. 5, x. 37–9) and in Kyrene (ML 5. 15–16) it was the name for a kinship group with some of the functions performed at Athens by the phratries, and the Theban *έταιρίαι* of X. *HG* v. 2. 25 look like open parties (cf. the use of *στάσις* in Th. ii. 22. 3).

There is no unequivocal evidence to show when the word acquired its more sinister ring at Athens. *έταιρος* in the skolion *αἰαῖ Λεψύδριον προδωσέταιρον* (*Aθ. π.* 19. 3 = *PMG* 907) is non-technical and close to the Homeric sense; Sartori (54) rightly distinguishes the *έταιρην τῶν ἡλικιωτέων* which Hdt. v. 71. 1 ascribes to Kylon from the ἑτ. here discussed; Aristotle, writing of Kleisthenes (*Aθ. π.* 20. 1), may use *έταιρεῖας* anachronistically; Plutarch's language is certainly not to be pressed (Sartori 62). Ar. *Eg.* 589–90, *Νίκην, ἡ χορικῶν ἔστιν έταίρα τοῖς τ' ἔχθροῖσι μεθ' ἡμῶν στασιάζει*, in a play otherwise full of accusations of conspiracy, might be held to mean that such ἑτ. were known to exist in Athens in 424, but the casual and light-hearted tone suggests that the chorus is merely expressing hopes for success over its competitors; but *έταιρεία* and *έταιρικόν* are pervasive evils in Thucydides' analysis of stasis during the Archidamian War in iii. 82. He does not indeed say that they first appeared during the war, but he was sure that they, like other symptoms, had multiplied and grown worse under wartime stress. He emphasises the overriding loyalty which their members felt towards them (iii. 82. 4, 6; and note how Andokides feels the need to apologize for the betrayal of his *έταιροι* even on the grave issue of sacrilege, i. 54). By the middle of the fourth century, when serious attempts to overturn the democracy were not to be contemplated, the charge of organizing or belonging to a ἑτ. had begun to degenerate into a meaningless stock charge, cf. Is. fr. 22. 2; D. xxix. 22–3, etc.; xxi. 139 *μαρτύρων συνεστῶσ' έταιρεία* is pejorative in intention but has almost denuded the word of meaning.

Herodotos' *συνωμόται* 'Ελλήνων ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ (vii. 148. 1) has an echo in Th. ii. 74. 2, but *συνωμότης* has usually the unpleasant flavour

of our 'conspirator'; the word was a favourite with Kleon, Ar. *Eq.* 257, 452, etc. The *ξυνωμοσίαι* of this passage are minor affairs with limited objects, but Peisandros' exhortations produced effective action (65. 2–66).

καὶ τὰλλα παρασκευάσας --- διαμέλλεσθαι: we are given no help towards guessing what these other preparations were or how long they might take. *μηκέτι διαμέλλεσθαι* suggests that the terror described in 65. 2–66 was to start at once, and that Peisandros did not expect to be long away from Athens, and this raises acutely the question when he left. Thucydides' description reads as if he addressed the assembly as soon as he arrived in Athens (53. 1) and left as soon as his embassy to Tissaphernes was decreed by that same assembly; but his departure from Samos should be before the end of December (50. 2 n.), and his conference with Tissaphernes is closely linked (57. 1 *εὐθὺς μετὰ ταῦτα*) to the treaty concluded between Persia and Sparta late in March (58. 1 n.). In face of this alarming discrepancy M. Lang (*AJP* lxxxviii [1967], 180–3) suggested that the order of events in 49–54 is disturbed, and that Peisandros' departure from Samos (49, 53. 1) in fact came well after the episode described in 50–1. But Peisandros' attitude towards Phrynicos and Alkibiades (§ 3 above) strongly suggests that he left Samos at the point Thucydides indicates (see 50. 2 n.); an alternative solution, that he spent some time intriguing in Athens before the assembly of 53. 1 was called, will be argued below, pp. 186–7; and it will be argued at pp. 190–3 that the oligarchic terror had not yet broken out at the time of the Dionysia, though Peisandros had left Athens before that.

τὸν πλοῦν ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ποιεῖται: he had presumably to meet his colleagues first, to discuss recent developments before the actual conference, but we are not told where those colleagues now were. 44. 3 *ταῦς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου νανούιν* suggests that the whole fleet left Samos, presumably with all its generals, when the Peloponnesians went to Rhodes, but not all need have stayed, especially after the arrival of Leon and Diomedon, who will have brought the news that two of them had been deposed. Nor does Thucydides say where the eventual conference took place. Magnesia is the only location we have been given for Tissaphernes recently (50. 3), and that could be approached by way of Ephesus if the coastal cities further south were by now hostile (45. 5 n.). After the conference (56. 4 *ad fin.*) the Athenian envoys went to Samos, which may suggest that the centre of the conspiracy was currently there.

55. 1. ἀφιγμένοι ἦδη: showing how rapidly they moved, according to Steup, but that probably over-interprets *ἦδη*, which e.g. at 27. 4 hardly means more than 'then'. If there is more to it than that, the

point is more probably just that they had arrived before Peisandros set out.

μᾶλλον <ἢ> ἐκ τῆς Κῶ: at 44. 3 they had based themselves on Chalke (cf. 41. 4 n.) and Kos; here εὐφυλακτότερα, κ.τ.λ. makes sense if they left the more distant Kos and went to Chalke, from which enemy movement would more easily be observed, especially if Kameiros were their base (44. 2); and at 60. 3 the Athenian fleet comes from Chalke. All this speaks for a movement now from Kos to Chalke, and Palmerius' <ἢ> gives the sense required.

This chapter takes up the story where it was left at the end of c. 44, as well as continuing directly from 54. 3; the backward excursus which began at 45. 1 is now at an end (see n. there).

2. **Ξενοφαντίδας Λάκων:** nothing further is known of him.

τὸ τεῖχος τῶν Αθηναίων: Delphinion, see 38. 2 with n. 40.

πάσαις ταῖς ναυσίν: so also 40. 1; Pedaritos seems exorbitant. When the Peloponnesians had returned to Miletos and the Athenians to Samos, the passage was not so easy (cf. 60. 3), but at 61. 2–3 a force of only twelve ships got through from Miletos and greatly helped the Chians.

οἱ δὲ διενοοῦντο: cf. 40. 3, 60. 2.

3. **τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἐπικουρικόν:** 28. 5, 32. 2, 38. 3.

τῷ περὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐρύματι: 40. 3.

56. 1. **ώς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην:** the location is uncertain, cf. 54. 4 n.

2. **οὐ γάρ αὐτῷ πάνυ τὰ ἀπὸ Τισσαφέρνους βέβαια ἦν:** a remarkable understatement in view of what follows. The allusive phrase shows that Thucydides expects us to have in mind what was said in 52 about Alkibiades' diplomatic exertions, and he now prepares us for his own interpretation (§ 3 δοκεῖ δέ μοι) of the following scene, that Alkibiades knew in advance that his efforts had failed.

φοβουμένου τοὺς Πελοποννησίους μᾶλλον: this must be read (cf. preceding n.) in the light of 52 ὅτι πλέοσι ναυσὶ τῶν Αθηναίων παρῆσαν; that is, μᾶλλον certainly means 'more than the Athenians', and the relative strength of the Peloponnesians is the main part of Tissaphernes' fear. Wilamowitz (594) found here a contradiction with 57, in that 52 and 56. 2 assume the Peloponnesians to be the stronger whereas at 57. 1 Tissaphernes is afraid that the Athenians will defeat them. If not an absolute contradiction (the Athenians might win even if numerically inferior), there is certainly a wide difference of emphasis, enough to raise the possibility that the two chapters were written at different times: 56. 2 goes with 45 f. and 52, but 57 might be earlier (for the relation between 57 and 58, see 58. 1 n.).

The main point is not that the Peloponnesians might plunder Tissaphernes' satrapy for their maintenance (57. 1, *ad fin.*), for they might do that even if they were not numerically superior to the

Athenians, and it is in any case put in as an additional point (*ετι δὲ ἐφοβεῖτο*). Tissaphernes' basic fear, in Thucydides' view, was that the Spartans might turn on him and champion the freedom of the Greek cities, the prospect adumbrated by Alkibiades at 46. 3 and later confirmed by Lichas (52). As Spartan power grew, with the possibility that it might defeat the Athenians outright, Tissaphernes grew more apprehensive of starting a quarrel which might push Sparta into an actively anti-Persian policy (this is the consideration behind the *εἰ δύναται πως* of 52); but short of such a quarrel he would do what he could to reduce the absolute power of the Peloponnesians (Hatzfeld [240] is no doubt right to stress that Tissaphernes' own forces were minimal, and this is implied in 46. 2). Hence the policy *τριβεν ὀμφοτέρους*, attractive in itself to his temperament as Thucydides saw it. Again, as at 46. 5, it is a question whether Thucydides saw far enough into his mind. If Tissaphernes' eventual aim was to be rid of the Peloponnesians (46. 5 n.) and the quarrel at Knidos was a manoeuvre towards this (43. 4 n.), he may simply have thought (with or without direction from the king) that the breach had widened too rapidly, so that he was in danger of losing the Peloponnesian fleet for this season before its replacement had arrived.

καθάπερ καὶ ὑπ' ἔκείνου ἐδιδάσκετο: 46.

ῶστε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην - - μὴ ξυμβῆναι: as at vi. 77. 2, the *ῶστε*-clause in effect defines the *εἶδος*; this is the policy to which Alkibiades turned, 'that Tissaphernes should put his demands on Athens as high as possible and not come to an agreement'. In treating this as Alkibiades' manoeuvre Thucydides somewhat equivocates, as at 46. 5. In his opinion (§ 3) Tissaphernes wanted to adopt this policy in any case, and Alkibiades realised that his efforts to turn the satrap towards Athens had failed; but still this sentence treats the initiative as coming from Alkibiades, and in § 4 it is the latter's personal reasons that determine the raising of Persian demands to a point where the Athenians cannot accept them. But (also in § 4) Alkibiades is the spokesman of Tissaphernes, speaking in his presence, and it is hardly possible to suppose that Alkibiades put forward demands which were to any substantial extent his own rather than his principal's, though he was no doubt responsible for the way in which they were formulated. See further next n.

3. τὸ αὐτὸ βουληθῆναι: sc. μὴ ξυμβῆναι. In Thucydides' view this was due to fear, and his main concern was to avoid a total rupture with the Peloponnesians and the trouble that might result. Critics have questioned this: Wilamowitz (604) held that Tissaphernes could not have asked less from Athens, Hatzfeld (238–9) argued that he could not make friends with Athens except on the basis that she resigned her dangerous power. This must be right, in general outline. Tissaphernes' first concern was (5. 5) to recover for Persia the cities

which Athens had so long defended. He did not wish simply to substitute Sparta for Athens as their protector, and he wished even less to reinstate Athens, though she might be used to curb the growth of Spartan power. Thucydides was not unaware of this Persian interest (note Alkibiades' earlier advice to Tissaphernes [46. 3], where it is even contemplated that Athens might help the king to enslave the Greeks of Asia, and cf. 48. 4), but it has a little slipped from his mind here, where his prime interest is in the manœuvre by which Alkibiades tried to rescue himself from the imputation that his influence with the satrap was less than he had boasted, and in the way in which he exploited Tissaphernes' attitude since he could not change it.

πεῖσαι --- πεπεισμένῳ: cf. 52 *βουλόμενον --- πεισθῆναι*.

4. *λέγων αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ παρόντος τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους*: see §2 n. The demonstration of Alkibiades' standing as the satrap's spokesman appears (see below) to have impressed the audience, however little they liked the demands that were made.

Ίωνίαν τε γὰρ πᾶσαν --- καὶ αὐθις νήσους τε τὰς ἐπικειμένας καὶ ἄλλα: not formal language, nor entirely specific. Ionia must here include the whole western coast, as sometimes in Herodotos (cf. i. 89. 3 n.). Of the islands, the Athenians had lost Rhodes, and also Chios, though at this time they were in a fair way to recover the latter; to give up Samos would be a very striking concession. *ἄλλα* is merely vague. Thucydides' concern, even if he knew all the detail, is not with this but with the point at which the Athenian negotiators stuck.

δείσας --- ἀδύνατος ὥν: see §§2–3 nn. on the question whether this final demand can have been due to Alkibiades rather than Tissaphernes.

ναῦς --- ποιεῖσθαι καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν ἔαυτοῦ γῆν: the verbs must be taken closely together and understood as *ναῦς ποιησάμενον παραπλεῖν* (Krüger); the king's right to build ships elsewhere is not in question. *ἔαυτῶν* (C) was accepted by Krüger and Hude, and by Hatzfeld (238 n. 4), on the ground that the king's right to navigate along the coasts of Persia is self-evident; and since the coasts of Asia would now belong to Persia, *τὴν ἔαυτῶν γῆν* could only mean Attica itself. The trouble with this is the reference of the reflexive *ἔαυτῶν*, neither to the subject of the verb (*ἡξίου*) nor to that of the relevant inf. (*παραπλεῖν*) but to the unexpressed and relatively remote subject of *ἔαν*; if the reference was to the Athenians, one would expect *σφετέραν* (cf. 74. 3, 96. 4). For the king to demand an explicitly stated right to sail past Thorikos or Salamis 'with as many ships as he liked' no plausible precedent or excuse could be alleged, and this has been rejected even by some (e.g. Steup) who reject the Peace of Kallias. It could be defended only by supposing that Tissaphernes and Alkibiades despaired of finding a proposition that Peisandros and his

colleagues would not accept, and it has recently been revived on this supposition by M. S. Goldstein, *Calif. Stud. Class. Ant.* vii (1974), 156–62.

With *έαυτοῦ* (cett.) the reference is not to the other dominions of the king, but to the Ionian and other coasts which will belong to him by the concession the Athenians have just agreed. The right to sail ships along these coasts might be expected to go automatically with the possession of them, but the Athenians treat this as a separate issue, important enough for success of the conference to turn upon it. If this is the right reading, we therefore need to explain how the Athenians came to conceive of the issues as separable, and no more plausible answer has been suggested than that a clause of the Peace of Kallias had forbidden Persian warships to sail west of Phaselis, the Chelidonian islands, and the Kyaneai, that is, to sail into the Aegean. Tissaphernes then is here trying to ensure that no comparable restriction is incorporated in the new agreement, and this is the point at which the Athenians stick.

The existence of the Peace of Kallias is still a matter of fierce controversy: there is perhaps no area of Greek history where more various propositions, many of them mutually contradictory, have been proclaimed as self-evident. The strongest argument of the sceptics has always been the fact that Thucydides did not mention the Peace in its place in the excursus in book i (after i. 112. 4), and no passage of his work down to the present could be held to imply it; but here, if there is a reference to the Peace, Thucydides seems to assume the reader's knowledge of the particular clause, and it is hard to resist Steup's contention that Thucydides would not have introduced such fresh matter without explanation. But some general considerations weigh heavily in favour of the authenticity of the Peace: the development of the Athenian empire is easier to understand if there had been a formal peace, and it is most unlikely that the state of Athens ever inscribed on stone for public view a document which was merely spurious, and could be discovered to be so. My own belief is that the Peace is authentic, and if that is so, it provides much the easiest explanation of the present passage. Thucydides' failure to orientate the reader can to some extent be explained along the lines suggested in 5. 4–5 nn. above. The case cannot be argued here in full: for a recent general survey see Meiggs, 129–51, 487–95, 598–9; for this passage, Wade-Gery, 213–4, 224; Andrewes, *Historia* x (1961) 15; Gomme, vol. i, p. 332.

[5.]¹ ἐνταῦθα δὴ οὐκέτι, κ.τ.λ.: ἀπὸ κοινοῦ τὸ συγχωρούντων ἀκουστέον Σ^GΜνε₂, suggesting a text without *τι* (after *οὐκέτι*, ABEFGM) but with ἀλλ' (om. B). This is rough, though Arnold accepted it (and cf. Ar. *Ach.* 471), and there is no mental supplement we can make without effort;

¹ In most editions, but not in Arnold or OCT, a separate § 5 begins at this point.

Lindau's οὐκέτι ἄλλ' ἥ saves us that effort, but the phrase does not run easily. Other edd. prefer the suggestion that *τι* is a remnant of some lost verb (Goodhart's *ἐτρυχε*, with Alkibiades as subject, is less unattractive than Classen's *ἔλεγον*) or adjective (Steup suggested *ἀνεκτά*, a common enough word in Thucydides, Weil οὐχ *ἔτοῦμα*); and these produce a smoother sentence. No critic has doubted the sense required.

ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐξηγαπήσθαι: the phrase does not make it clear whether they thought he had deceived them about the extent of his influence over Tissaphernes, or that he had the influence but had chosen not to use it in the way he had promised. 63. 4 *ἐπειδήπερ οὐ βούλεται* strongly suggests that the latter is the right interpretation, and later Alkibiades found no difficulty in continuing to make use of this supposed asset (e.g. 81. 2–3). The view that Alkibiades' influence was much less than he claimed, put in stronger terms at 81. 2 and clearly visible in 88, may well be Thucydides' own insight, and he certainly claims as his own (§ 3 δοκεῖ δέ μοι) his interpretation of Alkibiades' role at this conference.

57. 1. εὐθὺς μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι: the order is unusual, as also the *καὶ*; for the normal order cf. e.g. 80. 1 *ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει μετὰ τοῦτο εὐθύς*. It is hard to see any special point that could be made by this variation; conceivably Thucydides was hinting that this winter had gone on unusually long, but this would not be an efficient way of conveying such a hint.

If Tissaphernes went at once from the meeting of 56 to his conference with the Peloponnesians, and his treaty with the latter was concluded after the beginning of Dareios' thirteenth year (58. 1, see n. there), it follows that the meeting with the Athenians took place near the end of winter. For the chronological problem involved, see 54. 4 n., 60. 3 n. and pp. 186–7 below.

ἐξ τὴν Καῦνον: a convenient meeting place, in that the Peloponnesians could leave Rhodes in this direction with the minimum risk of interception by the Athenians at Chalke (55. 1).

πάλιν — — — ἐξ τὴν Μίλητον: this was not for operational reasons, for Tissaphernes did not propose military action (cf. 78, 85. 2), and it did not obviously help him if the Athenians returned from Chalke to Samos. But Miletos was in his territory and in some degree under his control (cf. 84. 4), whereas Rhodes was neither.

ξυνθῆκας ἔτι ἄλλας — — ἃς ἂν δύνηται: cf. Lichas' declaration at 43. 4. If Tissaphernes had decided to repair his relations with the Peloponnesians a fresh agreement was desirable, but the urgency of *ἃς ἂν δύνηται* is not fully explained. Possibly he had positive information of desperate action contemplated by the Peloponnesians (see next n.). The reader may by now legitimately begin to suspect

that he was under other pressure besides his own fears, viz. orders from the king to prosecute the war against Athens more vigorously (cf. 58. 7 n., § 4), but Thucydides does not present this aspect; the report he received perhaps indicated Tissaphernes' feeling of urgency without fully motivating it.

τροφήν τε παρέχειν: at 43. 4–44. 1 the Peloponnesians renounced aid from Tissaphernes and decided to try instead the resources of their allies. We are now near the end of their eighty days in Rhodes (44. 4, 60. 2), so they have certainly now completed two months without Persian help. They had 32^T from Rhodes (44. 4), whatever they might from this more distant station have been able to collect from other allies, and anything that might still survive from the proceeds of the capture of Iasos (28. 3, 36. 1). They must have been very short by now, which might prompt them to turn to local plunder, as Tissaphernes feared (below), but it was just as likely to make them more ready to accept his terms, as in fact they did.

ἀναγκασθέντες ναυμαχεῖν ἡσσηθῶσιν: the expectation that they would lose such a fight is *prima facie* at variance with Tissaphernes' belief in their superiority at 52, 56. 2, and there is at least a serious change in emphasis (56. 2 n., cf. 57. 2 n.). The point is not that he feared that shortage had already weakened them to the point of cancelling out their numerical superiority, for the shortage cannot have been significantly less at the stage represented by 56. 2; it is that shortage may drive them to fight in unfavourable circumstances, or if they do not fight they may lose their crews.

ἄνευ ἑαυτοῦ: i.e. without the help which he had, at least for a time, contemplated giving to the Athenian side.

Ἐτι δὲ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα: this rates very high (*μάλιστα*) among his fears, and would account for *μὴ παντάπασιν ἐκπεπολεμώσθαι*, for which *δειδώς* — — *βούλονται* hardly gives adequate grounds; and it would go some way to explain the urgency of *ὅς ἂν δύνηται*. But **Ἐτι δέ** somewhat separates this from Tissaphernes' main fears, on which see also 56. 2 n.

2. ὥσπερ ἐβούλετο — —, μεταπεμψάμενος οὖν: Herwerden deleted the second *οὖν* as a mistaken repetition of the first; so also Steup, finding the interval between them too short and unparalleled in Thucydides. The text was accepted by Arnold, Stahl, Goodhart and Weil; and though Denniston did not cite this passage, his list of examples of resumptive *οὖν* after a parenthesis (429) included Pl. *Chrm.* 157 c with a more awkward repetition of *οὖν*. Wilamowitz (595) pronounced the double *οὖν* a sign that the sentence had been reworked, to bring in from 46 and 56. 2 the concept of balancing the Greek powers, which was foreign to the original version of 57. This will not do, for if Tissaphernes thought (§ 1) that the Peloponnesians were now at a disadvantage, to renew his assistance is on any reckoning a measure

to equalise the two powers. The second *οὐν* is there because Thucydides, having begun the sentence with a heavily-weighted formula of summation which might be expected to lead directly into the action which it introduces, then added a further and slightly different formulation of Tissaphernes' motive, 'wishing as he did ...', after which a second resumptive *οὐν* is tolerable if not very elegant. It is not quite the same as the policy given at 46. 4 and 56. 2, where *τρίβειν ἀμφοτέρους* means keeping both down to the lowest level feasible, whereas here *ἐπανισοῦν* means bringing the Peloponnesians up to the level of the Athenians; but Thucydides surely had the policy of attrition of both sides in mind, and here explains why, in spite of that policy, Tissaphernes now gave positive help to one side. This sentence in itself offers no support to Wilamowitz's view that 46 and 56 belong to a later stratum than 57 (cf. 56. 2 n.).

58. 1. τρίτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει Δαρείου βασιλεύοντος: the date on the Persian side is surely given in Persian terms (*pace* W. K. Pritchett, *CP* Ix [1965] 259), by which Dareios' thirteenth year began on 29 March 411 (Parker and Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology* [1956], 33). We do not however reach the end of Thucydides' winter till 60. 3: for the bearing of this passage on that problem, see next n. but one and 60. 3 n.

ἔφορεύοντος δὲ Ἀλεξιππίδα: see the list of eponymous ephors in X. *HG* ii. 3. 10. His year should start and end in or near October (v. 36. 1. n.), and it is thus no help with the chronological problem mentioned above.

ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ: not, presumably, Magnesia (Goodhart) or any place of importance; otherwise one would expect the name. Here we have the most striking divergence between 57 and 58. In 57 Tissaphernes went to Kaunos, sent for the Peloponnesians, and made his treaty; and no reader, at that point, could think that the treaty was made anywhere but at Kaunos (Wilamowitz 596–7). Two consequences follow, one more certainly than the other:

(a) Thucydides cannot have had the treaty text before him when he wrote 57. That the treaty should be negotiated in one place and the formalities concluded in another is natural enough, but *σπονδάς* — — — *τάσδε σπένδεται*, with every presumption that it refers to Kaunos, cannot be immediately followed without explanation by a document which states in its first clause that the treaty was made elsewhere. But the course of the narrative demands a treaty here (Wilamowitz 597–8); 57 leads up to one, and from 60. 2 onwards the Peloponnesians are back in their previous relation with Tissaphernes. There must then have been some account of the content of the treaty at this point, but not the text we now find: see further § 7 n. § 2.

(b) It would not be impossible for the Peloponnesian delegates to

travel with Tissaphernes by land from Kaunos to the plain of the Maiandros, but the latter is very much more accessible from Miletos, and we should at least allow for the possibility that the formalities were not completed till after the return of the Peloponnesians to Miletos (60. 2). We have to consider, among other things, the possibility that this treaty was actually ratified by Sparta (note that Lichas' attitude to this agreement [84. 5] is very different from his attitude to the two previous drafts [43. 3–4]), in which case we could suppose that a treaty, negotiated at Kaunos at the point indicated in this narrative, was ratified in the Maiandros plain later, when Sparta's consent had been obtained; and opinions will differ about the time this would take. Reference back to Sousa, involving still longer delay, is less certainly necessary: Tissaphernes, we may suppose, had his instructions, and if Sparta accepted an agreement based on those instructions the satrap could conclude the formalities, especially since the king is not here formally a party to the agreement. This means that the date of the formal treaty (after 29 March, see above) could be later than the end of Thucydides' winter. See further 60. 3 n.

Ιεραμένης: presumably the Hieramenes of X. *HG* ii. 1. 9. The interpolator there dates to 406/5 Kyros' execution of two nephews of Dareios (there is some doubt about text and relationship): *Ιεραμένης μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἔλεγον πρὸς Δαρειάδον δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ περιόψεται τὴν λίαν ὕβριν τούτου· ὁ δὲ αὐτὸν μεταπέμπεται ὡς ἀρρωστῶν, πέμψας ἀγγέλους.* Xenophon himself reports the summons at ii. 1. 13, at an uncertain date during summer 405, with no hint of any cause other than the king's illness; and in fact Dareios died in spring 404. We are in no position to sort this out. Hieramenes' wife appears to be a person of importance; his own standing is obscure. His name has also been found in the Lykian text of the Xanthos stele (*TAM* i. 44. c12), which contains various names prominent in the last fifteen years of this century (see comment to ML 93, and for Melesandros W. E. Thompson, *Hesp.* xxxvi [1967] 105–6). Nothing certain can be deduced while the Lykian text remains beyond translation, but if the name is correctly identified this is further evidence of his presence or influence in western Asia Minor at about the relevant time.

τοὺς Φαρνάκου παῖδας: see 6. 1 n. A brother of Pharnabazos named Bagaios appears in X. *HG* iii. 4. 13 (there *νόθος*), Plu. *Alc.* 39. 1 (N: here and at 39. 3 UA have Magaios), cf. Nep. *Alc.* 10. 3; and there may well have been others. No other evidence suggests that his brothers were associated with Pharnabazos in his satrapy, and Krumbholz (39 n. 3) argues that these are all suitable witnesses to the treaty rather than the highest Persian officers in the area, a view which makes it easier to accommodate Hieramenes. But cf. Lewis, 52 n. 17.

Though this is described as an agreement of the Spartans and their allies with the Persian parties named about the king's affairs, it has

often been noted that only Tissaphernes is mentioned after the preamble and that the practical arrangements of §§ 5–7 are wholly in his hands. A squadron of 27 ships had recently been fitted out in the Peloponnese with Pharnabazos' money and provisionally destined for his service, so critics expect that he too should be concerned with the maintenance of the fleet; but it should not be deduced too quickly that our text is only an excerpt, omitting those parts of the document that concerned Pharnabazos (Wilamowitz 597, 600). Tissaphernes has here a special position in that the king's ships were entrusted to him, not to Pharnabazos or another (the situation is clearly set out by D. M. Lewis, *Historia* vii [1958], 392). Earlier, during the negotiations of winter 413–12 (5.4–6.2), the two satraps were in competition, among other things on the issue, which could bring about an alliance between Sparta and the king. Tissaphernes had won that race: for the position now assigned to him see 5. 4 n., where the very relevant passage X. HG iv. 1. 37 is quoted.

περὶ τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων: the earlier treaties are described (18. 1, 37. 1) as made (or to be made) with the king and Tissaphernes. The formula used here perhaps made it easier for the Persians to meet the objection made by Lichas at 43. 3: to the extent that Persian claims on European territory are renounced (but see next n.), the concession is made not by the king in person, but as part of a practical arrangement between his agents and the Spartans. See also n. on ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ above.

2. χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, δοση τῆς Ἀσίας ἔστι, βασιλέως εἶναι: the odd phrasing also (see preceding n.) helps to take care of the king's pride, in that it allows that there is still territory in Europe which he may regard as his, but for purposes of present collaboration his agents no longer demand that Sparta should admit this, and Lichas' objection is to that extent met.

καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἔαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται: it should be self-evident that the king may do as he will with his own, and some reason has to be found why this should be secured explicitly in the treaty; a likely answer is that in the course of the negotiations some possible limitation on his powers had been discussed. (a) In the Peace of Kallias the king had almost certainly covenanted not to do some things within territory recognised as his, particularly not to bring his troops close to the Aegean coast (see the discussions cited in 56. 4 n., esp. Wade-Gery 224). The Persians might wish to ensure that there should be no comparable restriction in this treaty; but the present situation is not closely comparable and it is not obvious how this point would have arisen (in *Historia* x [1961], 15–16 I supported this solution too confidently). (b) The clause 'may be a precaution against Sparta' (Meiggs 142 n. 2). The most likely ground for friction here is over the Greek cities which were or had been allies of Sparta,

for which see 37. 5 nn., and below. (c) The simplest and perhaps the most probable solution is that this is the king's reaction to the limitation of his claims to Asia. He must have been informed of Lichas' complaint at 43. 3-4, and Tissaphernes had evidently been empowered to make the necessary concession, but it would not be surprising if at the same time the king had indicated that there must be no further question about his full rights in Asia.

That raises a question about the standing of the agreement between the king and the cities referred to at 37. 5; and here we must also take account of the curious fact that this clause and the following non-aggression clauses (§§ 3-4) speak only of the king's *χώρα*, whereas the previous treaties (18. 1, 37. 2) give him *χώραν καὶ πόλεις*. It is entirely natural that the king should regard the cities as being within his *χώρα* (de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 313-4), and the reason for the change of terminology may be simply that, with the firm assertion of the king's sovereignty in this clause, it was no longer felt necessary to complicate the phraseology with a separate reference to the cities. It does not follow that the agreement with the cities was automatically and immediately cancelled, or that the Spartans thought it was, though the Persians no doubt took the view that the king was now entitled to cancel it if he wished. Hence the trouble that arose later (84. 4-85. 2) when the Milesians thought that Tissaphernes had encroached on their rights.

Neither party was here quite negotiating from strength: the Spartans were desperately in need of money (57. 1 n.), Tissaphernes was in danger of finding himself with no fleet to use against Athens (56. 2 n.). The Persian advantage lay in the prospective arrival of the king's ships, in formidable numbers (87. 5 with n.), but the present position for Sparta was not so bad that Lichas, after the rhetoric attributed to him at 43. 3, need now knowingly accept the cancellation of all safeguards for Sparta's mainland allies; nor would the Spartan assembly have accepted this if it had been presented in this light (if they did discuss or ratify the treaty, see § 1 n.).

3. *μὴ ιέναι - - - ἐπὶ κακῷ μηδενί*: this essentially repeats the first clause of the second treaty (37. 2), without the specific reference to tribute; and § 4 here corresponds to 37. 5. As noted at 18. 2, 37. 2-3, the obligations are expressed in the familiar terms of a Greek treaty. v. 18. 4, 47. 2, are close though not identical, and in the homeland, as here, the first question is of aggression against the land of the other party: cf. i. 44. 1 with 45. 3. 53. 4; v. 27. 2; vi. 105. 1 n. Contemporary Greek treaties offer no parallel for the stress here (37. 5, 58. 4) on preventing one's allies from harming the other party (Athens' treaty with Halieis comes close, however; *SEG* x. 80. 10-12, 15-16); for the significance of the difference between 37.5 and 58.4, see § 2 n. above.

5. *ταῖς νῦν παρούσαις*: the formulation of 37. 4 allowed for the

possibility that the king might send for more Greek forces, but that seems now to be excluded.

Τισσαφέρνην παρέχειν: he is naturally the agent, but the text does not make it clear whether or not the money was the king's. The money brought to Sparta or promised there at 5. 5–6. 2 was presumably the satraps' own, and at 45. 6 Tissaphernes was still paying out of his own resources, but hoped for money from the king. Now there appears to be an agreement about this (see next n.), and it is likely enough that the king had now taken over the expense.

κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα: at 29. 1, 45. 6, the king had not yet ruled on the rate of pay; by now he has done so, but the fact is not noted in its place by Thucydides. The agreement referred to in X. HG i. 5. 5 lays down a rate of 3 obols, but that is for any number of ships that the Spartans wish to maintain, and therefore belongs not to this situation but to that produced by the negotiations of winter 408/7 (HG i. 4. 2; see Lewis 124). The agreement mentioned here may also be for a 3-obol rate.

αἱ νῆσαι αἱ βασιλέως: so also in §§ 6–7; see § 7 n. § 4.

6. **τρέφειν ἐφ' ἔαντοῖς εἶναι:** many edd. seem to regard this clause as giving the Spartans permission to provide for their own fleet ('may, if they wish', i.e. *εἶναι* = *ἔξειναι*), but if permission is in question it would be less inappropriate with the next clause. Classen's 'es stehe bei ihnen' ('it should be their responsibility') makes more sense, but Steup objected that this requires *ἐπ'* *αὐτοῖς*, and he followed Herwerden in deleting the last three words. In order to account for the received text Weil emended to *ἀφ'* *έαντῶν εἶναι*, but this again introduces the notion of permission. Dover (*JHS* xciv [1974], 188) proposes instead to take *εἶναι* as an example of the kind of inf. ('der formelhafte Infinitiv') discussed by Kühner-Gerth, ii. 18 f., a better way of arriving at Classen's translation.

If the free subsidy was to cease altogether on the arrival of the king's ships, that is the clearest indication we have that at this point the Peloponnesian fleet is regarded as dispensable, and that the Persians believe they can finish off the war with their own ships. This is not negated by the provision in § 7 for continuing the war jointly, for the treaty must provide for the possibility that the Spartans will take up the option of *τροφή* with later repayment, though experience to date might discourage them from this. The narrative continues to assume that the Phoenician ships are to be brought up to help in a joint war, but any or all of this narrative may have been written before Thucydides had seen the text of the treaty; and the issue is further confused by the fact that the ships never did arrive.

7. **καθ' ὅπι ἀν Τισσαφέρνει δοκῆ:** this confirms Tissaphernes' position as the commander on the Persian side, and his control of the ships; but as the clause is framed none of this comes into effect till the

arrival of the king's ships, which in the event never did reach the scene of action.

The three treaties between Sparta and Persia recorded in this book raise difficult problems. Hereafter, I = Chalkideus' treaty (18); II = Therimenes' (37); III = the present agreement (58).

1. *Status as agreements.* Without the formal backing of the king and of the home government at Sparta, no one of these documents could have more than local and provisional validity. We do not know what latitude Tissaphernes enjoyed, but 29. 1 shows at any rate one point that had, at that stage, to be referred back to the king; for Spartan practice cf. (e.g.) X. *HG* iii. 4. 26. Apart from a very general provision for the common conduct of the war, I is concerned entirely with Tissaphernes' immediate needs and it can be regarded simply as a working arrangement between the commanders on the spot: the fact that it uses the term *ξυμμαχία* need mean no more (cf. vi. 6. 2 n.). By the time of II the Peloponnesian forces were substantial and the question of their maintenance accordingly more urgent, but apart from the brief clause about *τροφή* II contains only very general provisions for non-aggression and common action. 43. 4 (see n. there) shows that neither I nor II was formally sworn to by Sparta. III repeats the generalities of II in simpler and neater terms; it refers outside itself to *ξυγκείμενα* which must have been negotiated earlier and separately, but that tells us little about the status of the treaty itself; plans for the war are more concrete and responsibility is delimited, but none of this can become fully effective till the arrival of the king's ships. The inclusion of other Persians besides Tissaphernes, the elaboration of the preamble, the date given in both Persian and Spartan terms, all suggest a more resolute attempt to draft a document for formal ratification. If there was an interval between the negotiation at Kaunos and the meeting in the Maiandros plain (§ 1 n.), there could have been time for the proposals to be considered at Sparta, and Spartans to be empowered to swear to the treaty. If so, Sparta now formally acknowledged that the Greek cities of mainland Asia were to be surrendered to the king, but since the practical arrangements of §§ 6–7 never came into effect no other important consequence followed. Tissaphernes continued to support the Peloponnesians, by Thucydides' account very intermittently (78, 87. 1–3), till their final quarrel (99).

2. *Relation to surrounding narrative.* I is hardly at all rooted in its context; there is no preliminary negotiation, and the following narrative takes no notice of it at all until 36. 2 (for the possible implications of the definite article at 17. 4, see n. there). II is introduced by 36. 2, a passage which causes some difficulty, but this would not be eased by taking 37 as a later insertion; and the content of both I and II is clearly referred to at 43. 3. There is no positive

conflict between these treaties and their immediate contexts, but nothing forbids, or even in the case of 18 at all discourages, the notion that the actual texts came into Thucydides' hands after his first drafting of his narrative. With III this hypothesis is unavoidable. The discrepancies discussed in § 1 nn. are not to be reasoned away, and they suggest that 58 may be in a sense misplaced: that is, what we have is the text of the agreement sworn in the Maiandros plain, not an account of the negotiations at Kaunos indicated at 57. 2. If the Spartans at home accepted without substantial change the propositions brought to them from Kaunos, the content of 58 substantially reproduces what was agreed at Kaunos, but the date indicated by 58. 1 might be appreciably later than that of the meeting at Kaunos. If we suppose that Thucydides' earlier draft consisted of 57, a statement about the content of the treaty, and 59–60, and that 58 was later inserted in place of the original summary, that would fit the facts we have. It is not evidently necessary to assume a similar development for I and II.

3. *Sources.* The argument has turned mainly on the dialect: thus Kirchhoff (143–4) conjectured that the treaties had been formulated in Attic by Alkibiades, and that he was Thucydides' source. The large finds of administrative documents at Persepolis show that such speculation is out of place. Orders etc. delivered in Old Persian were taken down by secretaries in Elamite or Aramaic, which could be turned back into Persian by similar secretaries of a distant recipient (see I. Gershevitch, preface to R. T. Hallock, *The Evidence of the Persepolis Tablets* [1971]). Individual Greeks are detectable high up in the central administration by the end of the sixth century, and there can be no doubt that the western satraps would have Greek secretaries capable of formulating in Greek any text required of them (Lewis 12–15, 95 n. 57). That would further account for the Greek flavour of some of the provisions in these treaties (18. 2, 37. 2, 58. 3 nn.).

Tissaphernes' secretary might be one to whom Attic came most naturally, but it remains true that negotiations with Persia would most probably be formulated in Ionic, the dialect of the Greeks with whom the Persians had most contact. For possible traces of Ionic see Wilamowitz, 601 n. 1. (a) At 18. 3 an Ionic ἔστων might have given rise to codd. ἔστωσαν (twice), whereas an Attic ὄντων might be less liable to alteration; but in view of the instances of ἔστωσαν cited by LSJ Suppl. s.v. εἴμι, and of Hdt. i. 147. 1, this point cannot be pressed and 18. 3 should probably not be emended. (b) 58. 6, 7 ἐπήν was claimed by Wilamowitz as un-Attic, and the combination of ἐπεί and ἀν is not there common (Thucydides uses ἐπειδή much more than ἐπεί, especially in strictly temporal senses, and ἐπειδάν), but ἐπήν is found at Ar. Av. 983, Lys. 1175, and in another treaty text at Th. v. 47. 6;

Ionic varies between ἐπέάν (frequent in Hdt.) and ἐπήν. (c) 18. 1 ἐφοίτα χρήματα is paralleled from Hdt. iii. 90. 3 etc., but also from Lys. xxxii. 15. This is not an impressive harvest, and when Wilamowitz returned to the matter in *Gesch. d. gr. Sprache* (= *Kl. Schr.* iii. 480), though he still insisted that the first formulation must have been in Ionic, he argued that by this time the two dialects were in most respects indistinguishable, a view which has since become less plausible in the light of ML 83 and other material from Thasos.⁷

In any case transcription from Ionic into Attic was easy, and it was probably to Thucydides' taste, for the short remarks of his non-Attic speakers are never in their own dialect (but see v. 63. 3 n. for a possible small exception), in contrast to X. *HG.* iii. 3. 2, iv. 4. 10. Note also that Pausanias' letter (i. 128. 7) and Xerxes' reply (129. 3) are in Attic, and suspect though these documents are it has not yet been suggested that they were Athenian forgeries. The dialect of these texts does not help us to discover what kind of source transmitted them to Thucydides.

There is little substance in the contention of De Sanctis (93) that the first two treaties were kept secret and were thus hard for Thucydides to obtain. As Wilamowitz remarked (600–1), the non-aggression clauses of II are pointless if they were to be concealed from those who were to be bound by them; and while the Spartans had no reason to boast of I, Tissaphernes would not wish to hide the provision about the tributes of the Greek cities. There is thus no positive reason to doubt that these texts were freely available, but it remains likely that the text of III did not reach Thucydides' hands till after the composition of the first version of 57–9.

4. *The king and Tissaphernes.* The ships are called 'the king's ships' three times in 58. 5–7, whereas in the narrative (incl. 59) they are 'the Phoenician ships'. Thucydides was not unaware of the king's authority (e.g. 87. 5), but this did not prevent him from treating the problem of their non-arrival in the Aegean as a problem about the motives of Tissaphernes (87), and at their first appearance (46. 1) it is Tissaphernes who is preparing to bring them up. The tactical use of the ships clearly fell to Tissaphernes once they reached him (58. 1, 7 with nn.), and it is natural that he should use his control over them as a bargaining point in his dealings with the Peloponnesians; but their withdrawal from the Greek war was not a matter of his choice (87. 2 n.).

Tissaphernes must have received general instructions about the use to be made of the King's ships, and in view of §§ 5–6 it is clearly likely that he had been told to make it up with the Spartans, at least until the ships arrived. We do not know what the king thought about Tissaphernes' rupture with the Peloponnesians, still less what he would have made of a proposal to support Athens in return for such

concessions as Tissaphernes sought at the conference of 56; but by spring 410 the latter claims he has explicit orders to fight Athens (*X. HG* i. 1. 9), and by 407 the king's support of Sparta is certain and wholehearted (*ibid.* 4. 2, 5. 2–3). It is likely that he throughout considered Athens as his main enemy: cf. 46. 3, 48. 4 with nn. Thucydides' concentration on Tissaphernes is misleading.

59. ὥσπερ εἴρητο: ἐν ταῖς σπουδαῖς δηλονότι Σ^{recc.}, which is more probable than a reference back to his original promise at 46. 5. The ships are now called 'Phoenician' again (58. 7 n., § 4), as perhaps they has been in the original version which 58 replaced (*ibid.* § 2).

παρασκευαζόμενος γοῦν δῆλος εἶναι: the ironical point made by *γοῦν* (BC: *οὖν* cett.) is clear, and this may well have been written after it was known that the ships never in fact came further than Aspendos (87).

60. 1. Ἀθηναίων ἐμφρουρούντων: nothing has been said of this before, but a garrison was probably always needed because of the Boeotians, and more than ever now the enemy were established in force at Dekelia.

μὴ οὐ μεγάλα βλάπτειν: sc. once a revolt has succeeded.

2. ἀφικνοῦνται ἐξ Ρόδον οἱ Ἐρετριῆς: Steup bracketed *οἱ Ἐρετριῆς* on the ground that not they but the Boeotians now held Oropos, which is no more sensible than his rearrangement of the previous sentence on the ground that Oropians would not be plotting the revolt of Euboea. The Eretrian rebels 'had' Oropos in the sense that it was now in friendly hands and a danger had been averted.

It is more of a question why they went this time to Rhodes. With the development of the fleet in Ionia Agis, to whom they had applied in winter 413/12 (5. 1), was no longer a main centre for plans of revolt. The fleet which eventually secured their revolt came from Lakonia (91. 2), but that was several months later and the Eretrians may have known that at this time there was no prospect of help from that quarter. It is not however likely that they had been encouraged to apply at Rhodes, for that fleet was barely adequate to safeguard gains already made (cf. § 3), and could not spare any substantial detachment.

πρὸς τὴν τῆς Χίου κακομένης βοήθειαν: their intention earlier (55. 2), and the situation of Chios had worsened since (56. 1). It looks here as if they meant to sail direct to Chios, not to Miletos (cf. 57. 1), but that may have been by agreement with Tissaphernes.

3. ἀπὸ τῆς Χάλκης: cf. 55. 1. *πελαγίας* must mean that the Athenians went outside Kos, and were sighted through a gap between the islands.

ώς οὐδέτεροι ἀλλήλοις ἐπέπλεον: cf. 43. 1, and 46. 5 n. The

Peloponnesians, who by the new treaty should for the moment be taking seriously the prospect of the Phoenician ships, might be excused for not risking a battle now; the Athenians, who had few opportunities of catching their enemy at sea and had several times tried to provoke a battle, appear to have missed a chance here. The tactical position may have seemed unfavourable.

οἱ χείμων ἐτελεύτα: the late date at which this winter appears to end is an important element in the controversy over Thucydides' dating system; cf. vol. iii, p. 711, and vol. iv, p. 20.

(a) At 44. 4n. it was argued that the eighty days spent by the Peloponnesians at Rhodes could not start earlier than c. 15 Jan. 411, and that they cannot end before 5 April; the end of winter appears to follow immediately on their return to Miletos.

(b) The treaty of 58 is dated to the thirteenth year of Dareios, which began on 29 March 411 (58. 1 n.), and this is placed in our text at a point before the end of winter.

Neither of these data is compatible with the view that Thucydides' winter ended at an astronomically fixed point in the solar year, early enough to put the attack on Plataia in 431 (c. 8–9 March, see v. 26. 3 n.) into his spring; and if this view is to be maintained, both must in some way be modified.

(a) For the eighty days no remedy is possible but emendation. Gomme (vol. iii, p. 711) noted, and may have intended to adopt, Wilamowitz's conjecture πεντήκοντα for ὁγδοήκοντα at 44. 4 (*Curae Thuc. 19 = Kl. Schr. iii. 83 n. 1*, later withdrawn [*Thukydides VIII*, 582 n. 2]); W. K. Pritchett (*CP* ix [1965], 260) prefers forty on palaeographic grounds. Numbers are indeed often corrupt in our texts, and it is sometimes justifiable to alter them for the sake of the sense (e.g. at ii. 2. 1): in this case the emendations proposed do not conflict with facts known to us from Thucydides or elsewhere, but it must be remembered that they are proposed not to resolve an acknowledged factual difficulty, but in defence of a theory about Thucydides' chronological system which is by no means uncontested.

(b) The Persian date at 58. 1 cannot be altered except by emendation, e.g. δωδεκάτῳ to give a date before, not after, 29 March. But the date is that of the ratification of the treaty in the plain of the Maiandros (58. 1 with n.), not of the negotiations at Kaunos (57), and it was argued above (58. 7 n., § 1) that there may have been an interval between these negotiations and the ratification of the treaty, long enough for reference back to Sparta and for discussion there, and that the ratification itself may have come after the beginning of Thucydides' summer. If this were accepted, we should have to consider how long the interval was, and whether it would permit us to place the negotiations at Kaunos, and following them the end of winter, far enough back in the calendar year to satisfy Gomme and

Pritchett. This would also give an earlier calendar date for the conference of 56, and this would somewhat reduce the chronological difficulty discussed at 54. 4 n., though it would correspondingly lengthen the gap between Peisandros' departure from Athens and the outbreak of the terrorist campaign described in 65–6, which (as will be argued below, pp. 190–3) seems not to have broken out before the City Dionysia.

Gomme (vol. iii, pp. 709–10) inclined to date Thucydides' spring from the evening rising of Arcturus, which he gave (after Unger) as 4 March. Pritchett and van der Waerden (*BCH* lxxxv [1961], 49–50) give 6 March, and argue for the 'true' evening rising as opposed to the 'visible' rising on 24 Feb.; and they sensibly allow that variations 'of a few days only' were immaterial for Thucydides' purpose. We cannot in any case end winter 432/1 more than a day or two later (ii. 4. 2, see vol. iii, p. 705). Taking the date most favourable for Gomme's hypothesis we should have to allow a minimum interval of 21 to 23 days between the meetings at Kaunos and in the Maiandros plain, but this assumes that the Peloponnesians left Rhodes immediately after the meeting at Kaunos, that they did so on the last day of Thucydides' winter, and that the later meeting took place on the first day of Dareios' thirteenth year. It is most unlikely that all three assumptions are correct, and it would be more realistic to allow 30 to 35 days as a minimum. That, indeed, is not too long for reference of the terms back to Sparta, discussion there, and the journey of envoys back to Asia, though the process might be accomplished appreciably quicker. The problem of the eighty days remains, soluble only by emendation; and if we once cut 58 loose from the context in which it stands in our text, there is no knowing how far down into Dareios' thirteenth year, or into Thucydides' summer, we ought then to go. It may be noted, though this is not a decisive consideration, that there is very little to occupy the early summer of 411 in Thucydides' account, and by 63. 2 we appear to have reached a date in June (63. 3 n.).

For recent contributions to this controversy see B. D. Meritt, *Hesp.* xxxiii (1964), 228–9; W. K. Pritchett, *CP* lx (1965), 259–60; Meritt, *CP* lxi (1966), 182–4; M. Lang, *AJP* lxxxviii (1967), 176 n. 1. If this were the only case recalcitrant to Gomme's view, there would be more temptation to accept special hypotheses to make it conform. But no other Thucydidean year since 431 allows of so close an approach to the date when it begins or ends, except for summer 424, whose start is fixed by the eclipse of 21 March (iv. 52. 1, see vol. iii, p. 705), and the transition from winter 422/1 to summer 421; and in the latter case the theory of astronomically fixed seasons runs into difficulties which I find intractable: see v. 19–20, 27. 1 nn., and vol. iii, pp. 711–12. On balance it seems to me decidedly better to abandon

the view that Thucydides' seasons had these fixed beginnings and ends, to leave the text of viii. 44. 4 unemended, and to allow that the return of the Peloponnesians to Miletos may have occurred as late as the end of the first week in April.

The view of Thucydides' chronological system which this entails was discussed in vol. iv, pp. 18–21, and I have nothing fresh to add.

YEAR 21: 411–410 B.C. (UNFINISHED). (CC. 61–109)

61–63. 2. *Operations in Chios and the Hellespont*

61. 1. Δερκυλίδας: his first appearance, and he is not mentioned again during this war, except that he was harmost in Abydos ἐπὶ Λισάνδρου ναυαρχοῦντος (*X. HG* iii. 1. 9) and quarrelled with Pharnabazos. He commanded the Spartan forces in Asia in the years 399–397, and rallied the local Spartan officers at Abydos and Sestos in 394 after the battle of Knidos (*HG* iv. 8. 3–6). Xenophon records his nickname Sisyphos, given because he was μάλα μηχανητικός (iii. 1. 8; cf. Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 71) and remarks on his fondness for foreign service (iv. 3. 2), but it is not known if he had any previous connection with the Hellespont area; Plu. *Lyc.* 15. 3 adds the odd detail that he was unmarried.

στρατὰν ἔχων οὐ πολλήν: few Peloponnesians had been available in 412 (25. 2, 32. 2 nn.), and it is not recorded that Antisthenes brought troops, but Derkylidas may have recruited locally (cf. 22. 1, 25. 2).

πεζῇ: as far as Kyme (31. 3) Derkylidas' route led through territory now friendly (cf. 45. 5 n.), and the Athenians hardly had the forces to organize resistance further north. The *παρά* in *παρεπέμφθη* does not compel us to suppose that he followed the coast the whole way.

Ἄβυδον: Str. xiii. 1. 22, 591; Leaf, *Strabo* 117, quoted by *ATL* i. 463; Cook 56–7. The site is not in doubt, just below the bend to the south that the Hellespont makes between Sestos and Madytos, and facing westward, though several maps (e.g. Murray; *CAH* vi, opp. p. 25) perversely place it above the bend, facing north towards Sestos. Its remains were early identified (see Cook), but are now inaccessible in a military zone.

Μιλησίων ἄποικοι: so also Strabo (above), and others. See 62. 1 n.

2. ἔτι ἐν 'Ρόδῳ ὄντος Ἀστυόχου: Thucydides here breaks back past the year-division just noted (60. 3–61. 1), much more clearly than at 45. 1 (see n. there). This is an introductory item, to explain the force with which the Chians took the field after the beginning of summer, but there is no apparent reason why Leon's arrival should not have been recorded 'after Pedaritos' death at 55. 3, and this would have been in accordance with Thucydides' normal practice (e.g. the events

at Herakleia split between winter 420/19 and summer 419, v. 51–52. 1; the journey of Ramphias and his colleagues split between the seasons, v. 12–13. 1). This is probably another case (cf. 33. 1 with n.) where Thucydides put his information down as it came to him, and had not yet sorted the items out into their appropriate places (cf. also 99, 100. 4 below).

Λέοντα: see 28. 5 n.

δις Ἀντισθένει ἐπιβάτης ξυνεξῆλθε: οὐ τριήραρχος οὐδ' ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἔχων Σ^{Myc_2} , unhelpfully. The phrase suggests an official position, and edd. compare X. *HG* i. 3. 17, *Hell. Oxy.* 22 (17). 4, both cases of an officer in charge of a small separate detachment. See Busolt–Swoboda 717 with n. 2; Kahrstedt, *Gr. Staatsrecht* 235–6: the evidence is not enough for certainty, but this suggests that ἐπιβάτης in the Spartan system means a detachable subordinate, not unlike a harmost, rather than the next in command after the ἐπιστολεύς (see esp. X. *HG* ii. 1. 7; and for Spartan care to provide a succession of commanders, Th. iv. 38. 1).

τὸν Πεδαρίτου θάνατον: 55. 3.

ναῦς δώδεκα, αἱ ἔτυχον φύλακες Μιλήτου οὖσαι: Stahl assumed from the wording of 43. 2 that Astyochos took all his ships from Miletos to Knidos and Rhodes, and that these twelve were sent back to Miletos in a later movement not mentioned by Thucydides; but it is not likely that Miletos had been totally denuded while the Athenians were based on Samos, even for a short period. See pp. 29–30 above, § 12. It is possible that the detail about this detachment reached Thucydides in a report later than that on which 41–4 were based (cf. first n. to 61. 2, above); and it may be significant that he gave no figure at 41. 1 for the fleet which Astyochos took to Knidos.

Θούριαι πέντε: cf. 35. 1.

Συρακόσιαι τέσσαρες: 26. 1, 35. 1.

μία Ἀναιτίς: as at 19. 1 Thucydides gives only the bare name. There the reference might be no more than topographical, but here the ship is evidence of a community, friendly to Sparta, no doubt the oligarchic exiles from Samos (19. 1 n.).

μία Μιλησία: cf. the single Samian ship at 16. 1 (see n. there).

Λέοντος μία: one of the 27 brought by Antisthenes (39. 1, 61. 2).

3. Ἐξ καὶ τριάκοντα: allies as well as Chians (below), so these include some of the twelve from Miletos, and the Chians provide at least 24. **δύο καὶ τριάκοντα:** for the number see pp. 29, 30 above, §§ 9, 14. Some of the 32 were troopships (30. 2, 62. 2) and thus somewhat inferior fighters (25. 1 n.), but the change in Athenian fortunes may reflect political trouble impending (cf. 63. 2).

62. 1. Ἀβυδος ... ἀφίσταται πρὸς Δερκυλίδαν καὶ Φαρνάβαζον: Thucydides begins this sentence by telling us, not quite necessarily,

that Derkylidias had marched from Miletos; and at 61. 1 he remarks that Abydos was a Milesian colony, which may be significant. He often mentions colonial connections, some relevant (e.g. through the whole story of Corinth, Kerkyra, and Epidamnos), some not (e.g. the Parian origin of Thasos at iv. 104. 4), and the latter are frequent enough to show that he found the matter interesting in itself, which squares with the attitude shown in vii. 57. Here there could have been contacts between Milesians and Abydenes which would help the enterprise; but the same might be true for Lampsakos (below), yet he says nothing of the origin of this, or of Sestos (§ 3). For the involvement of Pharnabazos cf. 35. 1, where the initiative for the revolt of Knidos from Athens is ascribed to Tissaphernes. It is not clear how either city envisaged its future relations with Persia (for Knidos see 109. 1 below), but cf. 37. 5 n.

Abydos remained a loyal centre for the Peloponnesians, the one Hellespontine town not retaken by Athens in 408 (Diod. xiii. 68. 1; cf. later X. *HG* iii. 1. 9). In its fifth-century silver coinage two groups can be distinguished, one of Aiginetan weight, and E. S. G. Robinson (*Am. Num. Soc. Centennial Vol.* [1958], 593) suggests that this belongs to the time after the revolt, with a standard familiar to Peloponnesian sailors; the related gold stater with which he was concerned is of Attic weight.

Λάμψακος: Str. xiii. 1. 18, 589; Leaf, *Strabo* 92–7; *ATL* i. 509–10; Charon, *FGrH* 262 F 7–8, with Jacoby's comment. The site is certain, on the Asiatic shore a short distance downstream from the entrance to the Hellespont. The tradition that it was a Phokaian colony (*Ephoros FGrH* 70 F 46; Charon F 7) remained dominant: cf. *Syll.³* 591. 26 of 196 B.C. or shortly after, a decree in which the Lampsakenes refer to the Massaliots as their brothers. F. Bilabel (*Die ionische Kolonisation* 50) used the names of Lampsakene months to confirm this, but Jacoby urged caution; see further J. Tréheux, *BCH* lxxvii (1953), 435–8. Str. xiii. 1. 19, 589, assigned the colony to Miletos, which Jacoby takes to be a genuine rival tradition, not a misunderstanding (Bilabel) by Strabo of his source for Lampsakos' absorption of Milesian Paisos. In either case Derkylidias might have used contacts in the mother-city (see previous n.).

Lampsakos had a wide territory and was relatively rich (X. *HG* ii. 1. 19); for its wine see Th. i. 138. 5, Str. xiii. 1. 12, 587. Its fifth-century electrum coinage was copious and varied (Kraay and Hirmer, *Greek Coinage* p. 371; pl. 202, no. 727), in this trading context second only to that of Kyzikos. Its tribute to Athens is steady at 12T in the middle of the century, but appears irregular just before and during the Archidamian War (for Athenian problems in dealing with Hellespontine electrum, see S. K. Eddy, *AJP* xciv [1973], 49–53); the new fragment of List 37 (B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia* xli [1972], 418–20) shows

that the sum paid for 418/17 was simply expressed in few figures, probably the 12¹ of earlier years. There is no later information; the sequel does not suggest that Lampsakos was enthusiastic about revolt.

2. Στροφικίδης: 15. I, 30. 2. See also 54. 3 n.: this is the first time, since they left Samos at 30. 2, that one of these commanders has been mentioned by name.

ναυσίν --- τέσσαρι καὶ εἴκοσιν: leaving only eight at Chios (cf. 61. 3), but the Hellespont was essential to Athens' survival.

στρατιώτες --- ὄπλιτας ἄγουσαι: again (cf. 30. 2) it would have been helpful if Thucydides could have given figures, of ships or men. Steup followed Krüger in excising ὄπλιτας ἄγουσαι as a gloss; but the words are not otiose, for without them it might have been supposed that he took troopships to act as warships or to carry troops other than hoplites.

ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν: see 14. 3 n. above.

σκεύη μέν --- κατοικίσας: this is not very different from the treatment of Mende in 423 (iv. 130. 6–7). The revolt could hardly go quite unpunished (and here the Athenians had not been helped, as at Mende, by local democrats), but in the precarious situation terror on a large scale would obviously not have paid. Cf. the still milder treatment accorded to Kyzikos next spring (X. *HG* i. I. 20). Lampsakos held to Athens after this till stormed by Lysandros in 405 (*HG* ii. I. 19).

ἀνδράποδα: here simply equivalent to δοῦλοι, as at i. 139. 2, vii. 27. 5. Contrast viii. 28. 4 (see n. there), which LSJ s.v. treat as the standard usage.

3. προσβάλλων: B's reading, which implies a number of assaults, is marginally preferable to cett. *προσβαλών*.

Σηστόν: not exactly opposite, but upstream from Abydos and round the corner, a little east of the European end of Xerxes' bridge; Str. xiii. I. 22, 591; ATL i. 547. Strabo (whose main description of it is lost) calls it ἀριστη τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ πόλεων, and quotes Theopompos' (*FGH* 115 F 390) βραχεῖαν μὲν εὐερκῆ δέ. Its importance was its strong position rather than great wealth; Gomme (vol. i, pp. 277–8) was perhaps unduly surprised by its low tribute, 500 dr., later doubled.

ἵν ποτε Μῆδοι εἶχον: B; cett. *τότε* was defended by Arnold and Steup, the latter comparing i. 101. 2 where the reader has even less guidance to the chronological reference of *τότε*. Here however he would be bound to take it as referring to 411, whereas *ποτέ* would call up without difficulty the well-known occasion when Xanthippos besieged it in winter 479/8; Thucydides probably expects the reader to remember i. 89. 2.

φυλακὴν τοῦ παντός Ἑλλησπόντου: cf. 102. 1; X. *HG* i. I. 7, 11 etc.

Coupled as it is here with *φρούριον*, this is a very clear instance of the abstract sense of *φυλακή*: see D. M. Lewis, *BSA* xlix (1954), 24–5.

63. 1. πυθόμενος --- ἐθάρσησεν: with the subject given in this order, *οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ καὶ ὁ Αστυόχος*, the singulars are not exceptional, cf. (Steup) 74. *Ι ἀπαγγελοῦντα*, etc.; *ἀπεληλυθότα*, immediately following *τὰς ναῦς*, is a little less easy, and since Astyochos has become the sole subject of *ἐθάρσησεν*, the repetition of his name in § 2 was not necessary. This is a note that called for further polishing. The point is amply clear, that Astyochos now had two good reasons to feel more hopeful than he had at 60. 3.

2. δυοῖν νεοῖν: two ships might slip past the Athenians at Samos more easily than the entire fleet (cf. 60. 3), as Goodhart notes, but this does not apply to the more substantial squadron returning from Chios. Perhaps Astyochos already knew enough of the situation in Samos (below) to expect that his movement would not be opposed.

κομίζει αὐτόθεν τὰς ναῦς: the definite article implies a distinguishable group already known to us, and this must be the twelve of 61. 2 (less Leon's own ship?), not the whole 36 of 61. 3. Neither will give exactly the total of 112 stated at 79. 1: Stahl altered *τὰς* to *τριάκοντα* to suit his own arithmetical system, but I believe that tidiness in that style is out of place (see p. 30 above, § 16).

διὰ τὸ ἀλλήλοις ὑπόπτιως ἔχειν: their mutual suspicion might be thought to end with the successful counter-revolution (73. 6), or at latest with the arrival of Alkibiades (81. 1) and the enthusiasm then generated. This is not a very helpful indication of time, but the plupf. *κατελέλυτο* of the next sentence (see next n.) implies that we have now reached the end of May or the beginning of June, which we should not have guessed from the content of 61–63. 2. For the question whether 63. 2 and 79. 1–4 form a doublet, see 79 nn.

63. 3–72. Revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens

3. καὶ ἔτι πρότερον: the same formula as at 45. 1, and again we are not clearly told how far back we have to go. With *κατελέλυτο* (cett.) the reference must be to a specific event, and this can only be the meeting at Kolonos of 67. 2–68. 1; the language of 68 makes it clear that this is for Thucydides the decisive moment, and a reference to the preparatory stages (65–6) would be chronologically indeterminate. *κατελύετο* (C) would allow us to suppose that only the initial steps had been taken at the stage we have reached in 63. 2. The issue is complicated by the fact that the sentence apparently sets out to explain (*γάρ*) mutual suspicions among the Athenians at Samos (§ 2), but this sentence, unless emended, refers only to the event at Athens;

and the next only glances at the situation in Samos, which is then left to be followed up in 73, before the narrative is diverted towards Athens. It was mainly with a view to establishing a clear connection between §§ 2–3 that Krüger wished to read *ἡ ἐν τοῖς Αθηναῖοις* (i.e. the Athenians at Samos, but the phrase would be obscure without explicit mention of Samos) *δημοκρατία κατελύετο*; and J. Brandis (*Rh. Mus.* ix [1854], 636–7) ingeniously suggested *πρότερον ἡ ἐν ταῖς Αθήναις ἡ δημοκρατία κατελέλυτο*. The possibilities need closer analysis.

With the Athenian armament at Samos the process of dissolution of democracy was well started in the preceding winter (48. 1–3), and is here intensified on the return of Peisandros from his conference with Tissaphernes. That should be roughly at the end of March, or possibly (60. 3n.) some weeks earlier; and if the meeting of the Athenian assembly at Kolonus is rightly dated to early June (pp. 187, 234–7: it can hardly be much earlier), he left Samos again in the middle of May or thereabouts. This relatively long period is chronologically apt and might indeed produce the mutual suspicion referred to in § 2; the atmosphere was probably still worse after he left, when the planned revolution among the Samians was impending, but it should clear after the failure of that plan, and with the return of Strombichides the Athenian fleet was once more ready for action (79. 6). *κατελύετο* might thus stand with Krüger's emendation, provided we do not object to the vagueness of a reference which might equally cover 48. 1–3; the plupf. (Brandis) is less appropriate, for there is in Thucydides' account no specific moment later than proclamation of 48. 2 when it could be said that the democracy had been abolished in the fleet.

As to events at Athens, the impf. would naturally refer to the preliminary reign of terror, organized by Peisandros earlier (54. 4) and described in 65–6; the plupf. to the coup itself (67. 2–70). But in neither case does the explanation connect easily with the phenomenon it is to explain: Steup, keeping our text with plupf., argued that it referred to the effect of the completed revolution at Athens on the fleet at Samos and pointed to 75, but the disturbance reported in 75. 1 was a temporary outbreak caused by Chaireas' inflammatory report, and through most of that chapter Thucydides is concerned to emphasize the democratic solidarity of the fleet. 65–6 have no bearing at all on the situation at Samos.

Reviewing that situation, it stands out that the second sentence here (*ἐπειδὴ γάρ — — κατέλαθον*) provides a more effective explanation of the phrase used in § 2 than does the first; and that if this first sentence is emended, as by Krüger, to make it more relevant to Samos, the result is only a paler and more general version of the second sentence. It thus seems better to keep the text here, including *κατελέλυτο*, referring the opening sentence to Athens. Thucydides has

then given his explanation in two stages. The first sentence, which also assists the transition back from Samos to Athens, tells us that the state of suspicion in Samos was a product of the revolutionary movement which he has already up to a point described; the second tells us in slightly more detail what was happening in Samos at the time referred to in § 2. Denniston 64–5, on 'successive γάρ's', may be relevant.

It follows that the time of suspicion referred to in § 2 is after Peisandros' departure for Athens, and, if not literally after the time of the Kolonus meeting at Athens, still only just before the events at Samos described in 73.

αὐτῷ --- αὐτῶν: it seems illogical to stress both the individuality of the fleet as opposed to the Samians, and *vice versa*. Classen preferred to delete *αὐτῷ* and there is little to choose between the two, but most edd. delete *αὐτῶν* (om. M).

Ἐτι βεβαιότερον κατέλαβον: Thucydides leaves us to guess what they actually did, which might include arrest of malcontents, placing of reliable men in key posts, imposition of oaths, etc. On the chronology argued above they had plenty of time for these measures, indeed it is a problem why they delayed their move to Athens so long; but reasons could be imagined, e.g. that they were waiting on developments at home.

προυτρέψαντο: *B solus*, and clearly right. The gen. abs., formed when corruption to *προτρεψάντων* (AG) was complete, may have helped to create the confusion at the end of the sentence.

δυνατωτάτους: *B, δυνατούς* cett.; cf. 21, 48. 1. At 73. 2 it appears that there were three hundred of them, which may favour *δυνατούς*: certainly we must not argue (Stahl et al.) that *B* is right because *δυνατούς* would mean 'the oligarchs' and *δυνατωτάτους* would not.

καίπερ ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις: *ἐπαναστάντας αὐτούς* (BC) must be right against cett. *ἐπαναστάντες αὐτοί* or *αὐτοῖς*, where the nom. could only refer to the Athenians and this makes no sense; prior loss of the main verb *προυτρέψαντο* (above) might have produced the impression that everything after *κατέλαβον* belongs with § 4 *ἐσκέψαντο*. The convolutions of Samian politics are dealt with more fully at 73. 2: these are the same Samians who had conducted the *ἐπανάστασις* of 21 against the then *δυνατοί*, and they were then counted democrats, but Peisandros has now persuaded them; the *καίπερ*-clause here makes the point that one would not have expected such men to join an oligarchic plot. The sense of this is clear, but it is hard to see how *ἐπαναστάντας* can be given a meaning which would make *ἀλλήλοις* tolerable; however much we water it down towards 'Samians fighting with one another', *ἐπαναστάντας* suggests an initiative taken by one side and not a fully reciprocal action, nor can we suppose that the two sides were each trying to prevent an oligarchy. We must

therefore either excise ἀλλήλοις (Herwerden), or preferably replace it with an adverb of time (Steup).

4. ἐσκέψαντο -- ἔτιν: unusual sense and construction. The verb may be used for 'considering' possibilities as well as facts, but the element of decision here has no good parallel in Classical literature, nor the dependent inf.; a clause beginning ὅτῳ τρόπῳ (as with ὅρᾳ below) would be normal. Both compression and the desire for variation may be at work here. Stahl may well be right to derive Hesych. ἐσκέψαντο· ἔγνωσαν from this passage.

ἐπειδήπερ οὐ βούλεται: this is most easily understood if we supply something like Steup's *σφίσι προσθέσθαι*, from the general context rather than from any neighbouring expression in the Greek; Thucydides' use of *ταῦτα βούλεσθαι* in a political context (vi. 74. 1 n.) is a similar phenomenon. The reference must be to Alkibiades' attitude at the conference in 56, and it shows that the conspirators understood him to have been unwilling, not unable, to influence Tissaphernes: see 56. 4 n.

ώς ἡδη καὶ κινδυνεύοντας: after an open declaration such as that of 48. 2 the known leaders would have difficulty in resuming a normal career under normal democracy.

τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, κ.τ.λ.: this is the attitude described at the start of the conspiracy (48. 1: note the echo of *ταλαιπωροῦνται*), but at that time they had hopes of Persian aid which have now been wholly dashed (56); the reaction might well have been to give up and to seek accommodation with Sparta, but instead we find this striking readiness to carry on the war and even to contribute from their own pockets to its cost. No doubt there was always a faction among the anti-democrats which wished to go on fighting, as the Five Thousand did later when they took over, and this view may have predominated in fact at Samos. This is however the last passage where the conspirators are described as taking this line; once the Four Hundred have got into power, they seem united in favour of peace with Sparta, and there is no hint of a contrary attitude till we reach Theramenes' protest over Eētioneia (90. 3). See further 70. 2 n. and p. 252 below.

64. 1. τῶν πρέσβεων: these must be the envoys sent from Athens with Peisandros (54. 2), and they are evidently oligarchs, in contrast to the generals Leon and Diomedon appointed to replace Phrynicos and (S)kironides at Samos (54. 3 with n.).

δλιγαρχίαν καθιστάναι: though Phrynicos had been to some extent rehabilitated (51. 3), his advice on this point (48. 5–7) was still not taken.

2. Διειτρέφη: it is natural to assume that this is the Dieitrephe of vii. 29. 1, who escorted the Thracian mercenaries home in 413 and had

at least that much experience of the north. We have also: (a) Dietrephe son of Euthoinos, named on ostraka of the second quarter of the fifth century. See E. Vanderpool, *Hesp.* xxxvii (1968), 118–19, with a stemma; this is probably the father of the general Nikostratos (Th. iii. 75. 1 etc.) and of Hermolykos (*IG* i². 527). (b) Ar. *Au.* 798 with schol., quoting Ar. fr. 307, Plato fr. 31; cf. Σ *Au.* 766, quoting Kratinos fr. 233. This D. is represented as a newly rich upstart of foreign birth who has contrived to raise himself to high military rank and general importance. (c) *IG* i². 950. 174, a casualty from Kekropis late in the war. The attribution of this list to Kynossema in *IG* has no good basis; for the difficulties of dating lists of this time see D. W. Braddeen, *CQ* n.s. xix (1969), 146, 158. (d) ML 90. 6, the proposer of the decree for Oiniades of Skiathos in 408/7.

The name is rare, and the chances of a genuinely upstart D. are not high (see W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* 156–7); cf. the charges made against Hagnon in Kratinos' *Ploutoi* (Page, *Gr. Lit. Pap.* i. p. 200. 29 ff.=Austin 73. 66 ff.). A younger member of the family might have attracted the hostility of the comic poets in various ways, e.g. by prominent adherence to the radical democrats; the military ranks mentioned in *Au.* 799 encourage identification of this man with the D. of Th. vii and viii. His election to a post in Thrace (not necessarily a generalship: see 13 n. above) may or may not antedate the time when the oligarchs were in effective control (66. 1); as with Peisandros, good standing with the democracy would not preclude his then joining the oligarchs. He is not mentioned in connection with the eventual revolt of Thasos (§ 4 n. below), and we do not know what became of him later.

His actions at Thasos in 411 do not rule him out as the proposer of a decree of the Athenian democracy in 408/7, but they make that less likely; homonyms in the family are always possible (and cf. W. E. Thompson in *ΦΟΡΟΣ* 144–9). Against identification with the casualty in (c) above is the possibility that Nikostratos belonged to Skambonidai (see, recently, C. W. Fornara, *CQ* n.s. xx [1970], 41), and the certainty that he had a colleague from Kekropis among the generals of 424/3 (Demodokos, cf. Th. iv. 75. 1, Pl. *Thg.* 127 e); but the patronymic of the younger D. is not known, and if his connection with the family is through a female line (e.g. a sister of Nikostratos) he could belong to a different deme and tribe.

δύτα περὶ Χίον: it is not clear why. If he was to take over ships from Chios, there were at present only about eight (62. 2 n.) and it might seem better for him to wait for the return of Strombichides (79. 5); the latter might indeed not sympathize with his mission, but the oligarchs did not know that they were to lose control of the fleet so soon.

3. δευτέρῳ μηνὶ μάλιστα: Peisandros' departure from Samos, and

consequently that of Dieitrephe, cannot be later than the middle of May (63. 3 n.), so the revolt of Thasos cannot be later than the middle, or at most the end, of July. For the consequences see § 4 n.

τετέχιζον: see 14. 3 n.

τῆς μὲν μετ' Ἀθηναίων, κ.τ.λ.: the symmetry of these two clauses is striking, and the echo προσδεόμενοι—προσδεχόμενοι. Most of the parallels (cf. Steup on i. 33. 4) come from speeches, and it is possible that Thucydides contemplated a speech in which the generalizations of §§ 3–5 would play a part. See 48. 7 n.

ἀριστοκρατίας: otherwise only at iii. 82. 8, ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, where the irony is explicit (μετὰ ὄνόματος ἐκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς). Here too the context leaves no doubt of the irony, and cf. § 5 ὑπούλου.

4. **φυγὴ αὐτῶν:** Σ^{Myc} spells this out, φυγάδες αὐτῶν; for this concrete use of φυγή cf. X. HG v. 2. 9.

ναῦς τε κομίσαι: *Hell. Oxy.* 7(2). 4, reciting the past career of Timolaos of Corinth, says that at one time he ravaged the islands under Athens' control with a squadron of five ships, and at another sailed to Amphipolis with two ships, manned an additional four from there, and defeated an Athenian commander whose name appears in the papyrus as *σιχιον*, adding ὥσπερ εἴρηκ[ά π]ου καὶ πρότερον; after this, with a squadron whose number is lost in a lacuna, he sailed into Thasos and caused its revolt from Athens. This is clearly the revolt which Thucydides here describes in anticipation. For the chronology see § 3 n.; the language here (όσημέραι, etc.) shows that there was no long interval after the start on the walls δευτέρῳ μηνὶ, and I do not see how Ed. Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika* 47 n. 2, came to place Timolaos' arrival at Thasos at the end of the year, after the fall of the Four Hundred at Athens. There can, on the chronological data given, be no question of rescuing Thucydides from the charge of failing to narrate this event in its proper place, and in a completed narrative we ought to hear also about the earlier action off Amphipolis, which the author of *Hell. Oxy.* thought worth inclusion. If the latter had spoken of the Amphipolis action already, it is clear that he concerned himself with items which belong to the time covered by Th. viii but were not included, and εἴρηκα may well mean a continuous narrative in which this event figured. There are other possible indications that *Hell. Oxy.* overlapped with Th. viii, in supplement or correction (95. 2, 99 nn.), and this instance suggests that the author began as far back as the middle of this summer.

Fuhr identified the Amphipolis action with the defeat recorded in Σ Aeschin. ii. 31 of an Athenian general whose name Sauppe tentatively restored as *Σιμίχου*, from codd. *σιμιχου*, *συμβιχου*; and the identification is surely correct. None of these are known Athenian names, and W. E. Thompson (*Hesp.* xxxvi [1967], 106–7) suggested

Strombichides. This is not likely, for though the end of the sentence in *Hell. Oxy.* leaves some area for doubt, it is clear that the defeated general had only five triremes, all of which were taken, whereas Strombichides, whose mission was to the Hellespont not to Thrace, appears from 79. 3, 5 to have brought back all his ships.

The activities of Timolaos reveal an aspect of the war which does not figure in Thucydides' narrative, from which we should rather gather that the Peloponnesians did not risk small detachments in this way. It might be argued from *Hell. Oxy.* that Timolaos was a man of unusual enterprise, but equally there may be other corners of the war which Thucydides did not explore.

5. δοκεῖν δέ μοι: earlier edd. contented themselves with the philological point, preferring B's δοκεῖν to cett. δοκεῖ; Steup was the first to express surprise at the content of this clause, on the ground that we expect Thucydides to have known the facts. He suggested that some word like εἰκότως had dropped out, and that Thucydides was saying that the reaction of the other cities seemed to him as reasonable as that of Thasos; and so far as the outcome consists of thoughts and motives, an expression of opinion might be in place. But τὰναντία - - - ἐγένετο must refer primarily to the factual outcome, and we must allow the possibility that Thucydides wrote this at a time when he had information about Thasos but not about other cities. The case in favour of the conspirators' policy has still not been set out, only the criticism of it by Phrynicos (48. 5-7) which this chapter so effectively bears out.

σωφροσύνην γάρ λαβοῦσαι: this is an extreme instance of the oligarchic colouring of this word; we must either allow a measure of irony (the nuance which we should express by using inverted commas), or accept it as here practically equivalent to δλγαρχία.

On Thucydides' treatment of the word see H. North, *Sophrosyne* 100-15. As background, it must be kept in mind that in the great majority of instances the adj. means 'prudent', 'sensible', in a sense politically (and almost morally) neutral: so the orators' tag *εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν* (iii. 44. 1 and often), the objection to sending Alkibiades to Sicily while still under a charge (vi. 29. 2), even the advice to the Melians to be 'sensible' (v. 101, III. 2). *σωφρονίζειν*, *σωφρονιστής*, referring to the disciplining of bad behaviour, is not a specifically oligarchic activity: cf. the Athenian demos at viii. 48. 6. At 24. 4 *ἐσωφρόνησαν* is a description of the way the Chians behave, not directly a statement about their constitution; and at iii. 62. 3 the Theban δυναστεία δλγων ἀνδρῶν, which must technically be classified as an oligarchy, is the opposite of *σώφρων*.

But there is no doubt that this virtue is often specifically associated with oligarchy, especially with the Spartan system. There is a notable cluster of instances at i. 80. 2, 84. 2-3, in the speech of Archidamos,

himself introduced as *σώφρων* (79. 2). Here there is a necessary qualification (North 104), in that the Corinthians have just attacked characteristics associated with Spartan *σωφροσύνη* (the virtue itself cannot of course be attacked directly) at i. 68. 1-2, and Archidamos has to defend his city against the charge of excessive *βραδυτής* (i. 71. 4: and at 83. 1 Archidamos even mentions *ἀναδρία*, for which cf. iii. 82. 4). It is thus inevitable that he should dilate on the positive aspect of Spartan *σωφροσύνη*, livening it up with the adj. *ἔμφρων*. But the case is completed by North's observation that *σώφρων* etc. are not used in passages commending Athens: one might disagree about particular contexts in Perikles' speeches and elsewhere, but it can hardly be coincidence that Thucydides, whose Perikles is praised for his capacity to restrain the intemperate optimism or despondency of the Athenians, never employs this appropriate word in such a context, but instead his Athenians lay claim to *μετριότης*, *εὐθουλία*, or the like.

Given this pattern, Thucydides' use of these words can be explained without difficulty, except here and at iv. 28. 5. Unless the word is used ironically as a label, *σωφροσύνη* can only convey approval, and if it is used here objectively (as the following *ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων*) it implies that Thucydides approved of the course which Peisandros and his colleagues were pursuing; but the indications are clear that in this matter he sided with Phrynichos against the majority of the conspirators. I would therefore conclude that the word is here an ironical label for the sort of oligarchy that Thasos and other cities would get from a reformed Athens (see also next n.). There is no doubt about the irony at iii. 82. 8 (quoted in § 3 n. above). At iv. 28. 5 Gomme took *τοῖς σώφροσι* to be 'sensible men', not 'the conservative party', but (as he also notes) their view was not very sensible; and the men most opposed to Kleon would have no hesitation in describing themselves as *οἱ σώφρονες*. It seems just possible that Thucydides again uses the word not in its primary meaning but as a label, and that he was not much more satisfied with these men's 'prudence' or 'good sense' than he was with Kleon's *κουφολογία*. If that is wrong, and we have instead to suppose that at iv. 28. 5 Thucydides' judgement was warped by his contempt for Kleon, it remains likely that *σωφροσύνη* is ironical in the present passage.

τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες: so B, with the marginal correction *αὐτονομίας*; *τὴν ὑπὸ τ. Ἀθ. ὑπούλου αὐτονομίαν* cett. (except *εὐνομίαν* C). Dionysios (*Amm.* 2. 11, 431R) complains of the gen., which must therefore have stood in his text, and his quotation has *ἀπό* and *εὐνομίας*; Σ^{Mvo} interprets *προτιμῶ* with the gen. correctly (*οὐδὲν φροντίσαντες τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι τὸ προτιμήσαντες*), and has *ὑπό* and *εὐνομίας*. *αὐτονομίας* has recently been defended by M. Ostwald (*Nomos* [1969] 176-7), who notes (with Goodhart) the inaccuracy of

many of Dionysios' quotations, and argues that ὑπούλου αὐτονομίας balances ἀντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν better; and it would indeed be unsatisfactory to say that 'they went straight to (external) freedom in preference to (internal) good order'. But the qualification ὑπούλου makes a substantial difference: once free from Athens they could hope to attain real εὐνομία as opposed to the spurious (or certainly suspect) kind the Athenian oligarchs would give them. As edd. have noted, there is no record of any offer of autonomy made at this time, whereas εὐνομία is an acceptable label for the oligarchy that was offered. As Thucydides later notes (91. 3), the Athenian oligarchs wanted, if possible, to retain the empire, and this intention was no doubt clear to the cities at this time. εὐνομίας is backed by impressive authority, and good sense can be made of it.

65. 1 τοὺς δῆμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυνον: some months later Theramenes put down an oligarchy in Paros (Diod. xiii. 47. 8) which we may fairly attribute to Peisandros; and if Paros, then probably also neighbouring Naxos. The hoplites from Andros, Tenos and Karystos at 69. 3 suggest that Peisandros had called also at these places, which were on the line of his voyage. The voyage must therefore have taken some time.

2. τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἔταιροις προειργασμένα: the members of the ξυνωμοσίαι to which Peisandros gave instructions at 54. 4. For the question how soon after his departure from Athens they began the terrorist campaign now to be described, see pp. 190–3 below.

'Ανδροκλέα: Thucydides' phrase puts him into the succession after Kleon and Hyperbolos; And. i. 27 shows him claiming for the Council the reward for information about the profanation of the Mysteries in 415 (see MacDowell ad loc.); Plu. *Alc.* 19. 1, 3 hardly adds to these. Ar. *Ve.* 1187 is not much help, but the scholiast quotes from several comic poets abuse suitable for a demagogue. For other references in comedy see *PA* 870. If he is the orator cited in Arist. *Rh.* 1400 a 9 (but the name is common), his demotic was *Πιτθεύς* (so the literary texts: epigraphically the demotic is always *Πιθεύς*). His impact seems curiously small. *τοῦ δήμου μάλιστα προεστώς* would presumably be said of Hyperbolos till his ostracism in 416 (for the date see 73. 3 n. below), so there were at most five years when it could apply to Androkles; and Kleophon, who on the record seems a more colourful personality, was already prominent by the time of Hyperbolos' exile, as the ostraka show (ML pp. 41–2).

ὅσπερ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, κ.τ.λ.: at vi. 28. 2, viii. 53. 2, Thucydides speaks of the enemies of Alkibiades without naming any. His reluctance to enter into political detail, which contrasts oddly with his readiness to describe minor military operations, does not in this instance arise from ignorance (cf. also 73. 3 n.).

οιόμενοι . . . χαριεῖσθαι: Thucydides and his readers know that this plan had already broken down (56), but these young men do not; and the sailors at Samos are similarly ignorant at 81. Total concealment can hardly have been practicable, but in a flood of rumour a true statement might not have made much impact; and it was a help to the conspirators to keep the breakdown as secret as possible till they had secured their grip on the city.

μᾶλλον τι: the murder is not a matter of degree, and these words must make a distinction among their reasons; he rated assassination in any case as a demagogue, but his enmity to Alkibiades was a further and stronger motive. The comma after *χαριεῖσθαι*, necessary if we punctuate after *ἀμφότερα*, obscures the point; both commas are better away.

3. λόγος τε ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ προείρυαστο αὐτοῖς: CG; *προείρυαστο* ABEFM. Steup found -*έργαστο* unsuitable for *λόγος* and adopted Herwerden's *προείρητο*: the metaphor is not too bold, but the repetition from § 2 *προειρυασμένα* is surprising and the word is to that extent suspect.

It is clear from this sentence and the next that 'publication' was effective. Though there was still no certainty about the extent of the conspiracy (66. 2–3), some of the oligarchic leaders had declared themselves and were in a position to make policy statements; 66. 1 allows us to imagine assembly speeches following up Peisandros' declaration at 53, to say nothing of less formal methods of dissemination. It should be borne in mind that this programme represents what the people expected to have imposed on them when the moment came; on the extent to which the decree passed at Kolonus did follow this *λόγος*, see 67. 3 n. and pp. 217–18 below on *Aθ. π. 29. 5*.

μεθεκτέον τῶν πραγμάτων: in *Aθ. π. 29. 5 τὴν δ' ἄλλην πολιτείαν ἐπιτρέψαι πᾶσαν, κ.τ.λ.*; and cf. X. HG ii. 3. 18. This and similar phrases are discussed by de Ste. Croix (3): 'all such phrases signify essentially *control of affairs*: the whole context must be examined before we can tell what political rights, if any, are possessed by those who are not members of the governing body', which is clearly right in principle. **πλέοστν ἢ πεντακισχιλίοις:** here a maximum, this number is a minimum for *Aθ. π. 29. 5*; see below, p. 218. We have no good way of guessing how many Athenians might genuinely support such a programme; neither Lys. xx. 13 nor Th. viii. 92. 11 give certain guidance (see pp. 205–6 below). To pitch the number high would help the conspirators by suggesting wide support (Hignett 274).

τοῖς τε χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι: a favourite pair with Thucydides, either in contrast or in combination; cf. i. 121. 3, 141. 5, ii. 53. 2, vi. 12. 1, viii. 45. 4. It reappears in *'Aθ. π. 29. 5*, and no doubt was actually used in this context.

66. 1. εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους: this sentence amounts to a statement that there were no 'moderate oligarchs' who actually believed in the programme set out in 65. 3, which is improbable in itself (cf. 67. 2 n.) and inconsistent with what is described at 97. 1 and highly praised at 97. 2. Very much the same is asserted again at 87. 3, and throughout this section of the book (66–92) Thucydides seems to treat the Four Hundred as a monolithic group of extremists. The explanation is most probably to be found in the character of his sources: see pp. 252–3 below.

ἔβούλευον δέ, κ.τ.λ.: CG; Steup preferred ABEFM ἔβουλεύοντο, but recognised that either might stand. It is not indicated what sort of decisions were being taken, but at this stage, down to 67. 3 λαμπρῶς ἐλέγετο, the conspirators presumably kept within the lines of the programme of 65. 3.

2. δεδιώς καὶ δρῶν: as if the sentence had begun with a positive statement, not a negative οὐδείς. If not quite logical, the construction is natural enough, and need not be taken (Steup) as a sign of incomplete revision.

δικαιώσις: ἀντὶ τοῦ κόλασις ἡ εἰς δίκην ἀπαγωγή $\Sigma^{GM_{VC_2}}$. In Thucydides it normally means 'claim' or 'demand' (e.g. v. 17. 2), but at iii. 40. 4 the verb means 'punish', and cf. Hdt. i. 100. 2, iii. 29. 3.

3. ἔξευρεῖν αὐτό, κ.τ.λ.: αὐτοί ABEFGM; and at the end of the sentence αὐτό M, αὐτοὶ ἔξευρεῖν om. CG. The paraphrase in $\Sigma^{M_{VC_2}}$ leaves it uncertain what the scholiast read. The omission of αὐτοὶ ἔξευρεῖν in CG has encouraged edd. to regard this as a gloss, but if it is excised, then, at least at first reading or hearing, the remaining ἔξευρεῖν will seem to depend on ἀδύνατοι ὄντες, and ἔξευρεῖν --- ἀγνωσταν to be a phrase complete in itself, leaving οὐκ εἶχον without an object. A puzzled reader might then write in αὐτοὶ ἔξευρεῖν to show that in his view these words must also be taken with οὐκ εἶχον; but this underlines the basic difficulty that ἀδύνατοι ὄντες and οὐκ εἶχον merely duplicate one another. Either, then, the inf. which originally completed the sense dropped out (Stahl, but his remedy is in detail unattractive) and was replaced by the gloss αὐτοὶ ἔξευρεῖν; or we have here a conflation of two alternative drafts for this sentence (Classen, followed by Steup). Steup objected against αὐτό, taken as referring to the number of the conspirators, that it breaks the connection between this and the next sentence (§4 κατὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτο), which is hardly serious.

4. ὥστε ἀμύνασθαι ἐπιβούλεύσαντα: the absence of the article makes it clear that ἐπιβούλεύσαντα belongs to the subject (*pace* Arnold) not the object of the inf.; and this creates no difficulty (*pace* Stahl) if we take ἀμύνασθαι to mean 'requite', 'avenge' (i. 96. 1 and often).

5. ἐνῆσαν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: Lys. xxv. 9 picks out Phryничος (25. 1 n.) and Peisandros (49 n.) as the conspicuous examples, but there will have

been many others. Anyone who had been elected general by the people will to some extent qualify, e.g. Onomakles (25. 1 with n.), Laispodias (vi. 105. 2, viii. 86. 9), perhaps Dieitrepes (64. 2 with n.). **καὶ τὸ ἄπιστον οὐτοί, κ.τ.λ.:** the repetition between the beginning and end of this led Stahl to bracket **καὶ τὸ ἄπιστον** --- **ἐποίησαν**; but, apart from the objection (Classen) that **οὐτοί** is needed for the sense, **τὸ ἄπιστον** is Thucydides' language (Steup) not a glossator's. Dobree's **ἄπορον** (for **ἄπιστον**) removes only the formal duplication. Further, **πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς** should indicate distrust felt by others for the many (cf. **τὴν ἀπιστίαν τῷ δῆμῳ πρὸς ἑαυτόν**, below). Both the paraphrases in Σ^{Myc_2} employ the reciprocal (**ἀπιστεῖν** --- **ἀλλήλοις**): the second certainly refers to **βέβαιον** --- **καταστήσαντες**, but the foolish alternative given in Σ^{vc_2} (**ἢ ἀπιστεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐποίησε ὅτι ἔστι συνωμοσία**) shows that the first refers to **τὸ ἄπιστον** --- **ἐποίησαν**. Goodhart proposed to read **ἄλλους** for **πολλούς**, which removes this difficulty (the discovery that these men were oligarchs made everyone else suspect) and provides a clause distinct enough in meaning from **βέβαιον** --- **καταστήσαντες** to stand with it in the same sentence. Steup however preferred to suppose that we have here again (§ 3 n. above) two alternative versions, the first of them incomplete.

In spite of its unfinished look in some places, 65–66 gives us one of Thucydides' most powerful pieces of political description. There is however no decisive indication of the character of the source, as there is in the passages discussed below at pp. 252–3.

67. 1. ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ καιρῷ: as at 5. 3, **καιρός** refers not to a single moment but to an extended period.

τὸν δῆμον ξυλλέξαντες: no doubt they employed the usual machinery, but we see from 66. 1 that the **prytaneis** etc. were now under their control.

δέκα ἄνδρας ἐλέσθαι ξυγγραφέας: Harp. (Suda etc., cf. *FGrH* 324 F 43) s.v. **συγγραφεῖς** quotes **ἐν δὲ (sic) τούτῳ** --- **οἰκήσεται** without material divergence from our text, then adds **ἥσαν δὲ οἱ μὲν πάντες συγγραφεῖς λοι τότε αἱρεθέντες, καθά φησιν Ανδροτίων** (*FGrH* 324 F 43) **τε καὶ Φιλόχορος** (328 F 136), **έκάτερος** **ἐν τῇ Ατθίδι.** **ὁ δέ Θουκυδίδης τῶν ἡ ἐμνημόνευσε μόνον τῶν προβούλων;** and *Aθ. π.* 29. 2 has twenty others over forty years old to be added to the existing ten **probouloί**. Since Aristotle and Philochorus both used the work of Androtion, this is not necessarily more than one witness, but a witness of great weight, likely to have sought out the text of the decree if it survived, and the language of *Aθ. π.* 29. 2–3 (pp. 214–15 below) suggests that this had been done. Most edd. are prepared to believe that Thucydides' information was at fault in this detail. The text of Harpokration's quotation, at the essential point guaranteed by his comment, tells heavily against Hermann's proposal to emend **δέκα** to **τριάκοντα**,

though Steup accepted it on the ground that Thucydides would have been bound to search out the facts.

Thucydides does not identify his ten with the *probouloī*, as Harpokration's comment suggests (he did not even give the number at 1. 3), but it is certain from Arist. *Rhet.* 1419 a 26 ff., Lys. xii. 65, that they were involved at some stage in the setting up of the Four Hundred. We know the names only of Hagnon and Sophokles (1. 3 n. above), neither likely to prove an enthusiastic oligarch; others might have been more sympathetic, but they were all elderly and it is intelligible that the conspirators supplemented them. The *probouloī* gave an air of respectability; the twenty will have included some of the extremist leaders, probably enough Peisandros himself.

αὐτοκράτορας: see vi. 8. 2 n.; as always, we must ask what particular restriction is being lifted. These commissioners were not empowered to impose anything of themselves, for their proposals are to be brought before the assembly, and it is hard to see what special powers they can have been given except that of bringing the proposals direct to the assembly without submitting them to the Council first. The word need mean no more: cf. its use of ambassadors, where it sounds impressive but in practice means only that they were empowered to give formal assent to provisions previously accepted by the assembly (v. 45. 2–4 n.: i. 126. 8 n. is in this respect misleading). The democracy itself might on occasion bypass the Council (ML 73. 61; Rhodes 56–7), but it did not normally do so, and the proposals of this commission would be more complicated and of more fundamental importance than those of Lampon in ML 73. *Aθ. π.* 29. 2 does not mention this feature.

οἰκήσεται: cf. ii. 37. 1 with n.

2. *ξυνέκλησαν*: ξυνέλεξαν C (*γρ.* in AMS) is not likely to have been corrupted to the more colourful and unexpected *ξυνέκλησαν*, and the same may be said of Herwerden's *ξυνεκάλεσαν*. The question is whether we can give a good explanation of *ξυνέκλησαν*.

Arnold compared Poll. viii. 104 *σχωνίον μιλτώσαντες διὰ τῶν τοξοτῶν συνῆλανον τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν*, but that refers to the clearing of the agora at assembly time (cf. Ar. *Ach.* 22 with Σ), and we cannot imagine the voters being chased all the way to Kolonus with a reddened rope. We hear nothing elsewhere of barriers of any kind round the assembly-place, and there was no obvious need for them, though screens were erected in the agora for an ostracism (Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 30, etc.), presumably to help ensure that no one voted twice, or round the courts for a case concerning the Mysteries when non-initiates had to be kept out (Poll. viii. 141). A more probable explanation is that the temenos of Poseidon was an enclosed place (Steup), perhaps one too small to hold an assembly of normal size. *ἐς τὸν Κολωνόν*: called Hippios to distinguish it from Kolonus

Agoraios (or Misthios) within the walls. See Soph. *OC* 14–63 etc. (Jebb's introduction, 3rd ed. [1900] xxvi–xxxvii, gives the most thorough account of the topography; see also E. Simon, *AJA* lxvii [1963] 52–3); and Paus. i. 30. 4. Besides the temple of Poseidon Hippios, there was a grove sacred to the Eumenides (*OC* 39–43, not in Paus.), and an altar to Prometheus (*OC* 55–6) which Paus. i. 30. 2 places in the nearby Academy, where there were many other altars.

The assembly might meet elsewhere than on the Pnyx, and from the latter part of the fourth century it increasingly did so: cf. D. xxi. 9, xix. 60, and Lys. xiii. 32 has a meeting *Μονυχίασιν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ* (cf. 93. 1 below) as early as 404, where the only business recorded had no connection with the Peiraeus or the navy. No other meeting at Kolonus is known, and I know of no attempt to explain the choice on this occasion (though a ms. n. by Gomme at least raises the question), but two possible lines of explanation suggest themselves:

(a) There might have been an important precedent, not known to us. In *IG* i². 114 (I use Wade-Gery's numbering of the lines, *BSA* xxxiii [1932/3], 119–22), after the inscription of the bouleutic oath (Wade-Gery 117–19; Rhodes 195 ff.), there appears to be a fresh prescript at l. 34. D. M. Lewis kindly informs me that the most recent reading, to be followed in *IG* i³. 105, is *τάδε ἔδοχοσεν ἐλ Λυκείῳ τῷ δέ[έμου τῷ] Α]θ[ε]ρ[να]ίον*: there is no room now for the tentative suggestion of Wade-Gery that the prescript might include the name of a prytany, and the main body of the decree appears to start at once with the reservation to the people of the right to declare a war or bring it to an end, and the following lines probably dealt with matters almost as fundamental. There are not many occasions when such matters were likely to be spelt out in a formal decree, and the chances are that this is a copy of a very early decree of the Kleisthenic democracy (see also Lewis, *JHS* lxxxvii [1967] 132, for a very odd phenomenon in l. 43 which may be an indication that this was a very literal copy). We know from no other source of such a meeting at the Lykeion, and it is clearly possible that another meeting unknown to us, this time at Kolonus, may have played an important part in the early history of the democracy; and the meeting-place might have been named in the resulting decree, as with the Lykeion meeting.

(b) A temple site might add solemnity. At 93. 3 the assembly *περὶ ὄμονοίας* was to meet *ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ*, and again we do not know why this was specially appropriate. There is nothing to suggest that Poseidon Hippios had a special responsibility for the constitution, or any other local deity, and Sophokles offers no hint. The best hope along this line of enquiry would be to find a festival or other regular occasion which might make the place appropriate. Nothing is known that points specifically to Kolonus, but Lewis points out to me a minor occasion which might be relevant, a sacrifice to Hermes

Hegemonios which from *IG* ii². 1496A. 81-7, 112-7, seems in the 330s to come at the right time of year; the cult is earlier, since the title is known from Ar. *Plut.* 159-60, where the scholiast asserts that the Athenians founded it on account of an oracle. The occasion might have had military associations not known to us.

It has often been noted that in 411, with the enemy established at Dekelia, a meeting outside the walls might well have to be held under arms or with an armed guard, restricting the attendance to hoplites or increasing the opportunities for intimidation. This must not be pressed too hard, since Kolonos is very close to the city where the enemy would not normally venture: cf. Lys. vii. 6, P. A. Brunt, *Phoenix* xix (1965) 267 n. 47. The stade is a variable measurement (vol. iv, pp. 467-8), but the distance as Thucydides gives it cannot be much more than 1·5 km, and the distance on the ground cannot be much increased whatever terminal points are taken.

On the inventories of Poseidon Hippios, see W. E. Thompson, *Hesp.* xl (1971), 232-4. It appears that the cult equipment was transferred to the Akropolis as a result of the occupation of Dekelia; Kolonos was not a safe place to keep Poseidon's property, even if a meeting of the assembly was at no great risk.

ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο: there is some temptation to find in this a polemical tone, i.e. to suppose that Thucydides knew and wished to contradict a version in which the commission did more than this; cf. *Aθ.* π. 29. 5, διέταξαν (p. 217 below). The emphatic phrase may however simply underline the fact that the commission failed to produce the constitutional proposals it had been told (§ 1) to bring forward (cf. Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F 347 b, where a similar phrase implies 'not as you might expect'). The obvious explanation would be that they had failed to agree, that some of them genuinely believed in the programme of 65. 3 while the extremists would have none of it (66. 1, 92. 11); and some of the *probouloi* may not have wanted oligarchy at all (§ 1 n.). Thucydides, who has written as if none of them believed in the 'moderate' programme (66. 1 with n.), cannot take this line and simply notes the oddity.

Ἀθηναίων ἀνατεῖ εἰπεῖν: ἀνατρέπειν ACEF, Suda s.v. ξυγγραφεῖς; ἀνειπεῖν cett.; the former makes no sense at all, and the latter is not normal usage, which is invariably εἰπεῖν γνώμην. **Ἀθηναίων** has also come under suspicion because of its remoteness from the *τις* to which it looks forward, and Stahl bracketed it. Wilamowitz's ingenious ἀζήμιον εἰπεῖν (*Hermes* xii [1877]. 336 = *Kl. Schr.* iii. 10 n. 2) removes **Ἀθηναίων** and gives a wholly satisfactory sense, but does not account for the reading ἀνατρέπειν. Further, there is no need to remove **Ἀθηναίων**, which would not be felt as superfluous (cf. **Ἀθηναίοις** at the end of vi. 8. 2; *Aθ.* π. 29. 4), nor is its position in the sentence inappropriate, since in effect it covers the (unexpressed) subject of

εἰπεῖν as much as the later *τις*. Sauppe's *ἀνατέλει εἰπεῖν* does account for *ἀναρρέπειν* and gives the same sense, 'propose without penalty'. Though the word is rare in prose it is hardly beyond Thucydides, and cf. Pl. *Legg.* 871 e, Is. fr. 1.

γράψηται παρανόμων: the procedure, very familiar from the fourth century, by which a proposal could be indicted as illegal, either before or after a vote was taken. See Lipsius, *Att. Recht* 383–96; Hignett 210–2. Two cases previous to 411 are attested, And. i. 17 dated to 415, [Plu.] 833 d ascribed to Antiphon but not otherwise dateable; since no one before Antiphon published lawcourt speeches, earlier instances might have been lost. Since Thucydides singles out this *γραφή* for mention, and *Aθ. π.* 29. 4 puts it at the head of a list of safeguards, it looks as if it already held a central position in the defence of the constitution, but H. J. Wolff, "Normenkontrolle" und Gesetzesbegriff, *Sb. Heidelb.* 1970. 2, argues convincingly that it was in 415 of recent institution.

ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τρόπῳ: fuller detail in *Aθ. π.* 29. 4.

μεγάλας ζημίας: death, according to *Aθ. π.* 29. 4.

3. **ἐνταῦθα δὴ λαμπρῶς ἐλέγετο:** *ἐνταῦθα δὴ* brings us to a climax, as at 53. 3, iv. 22. 2, vii. 44. 1. *λαμπρός* in Thucydides may have the literal meaning 'bright' (vii. 44. 2) or the metaphorical meaning 'glorious', 'splendid' (iii. 59. 2, etc.), but the meaning 'manifest', 'clear beyond doubt', is also certain, notably at ii. 7. 1, viii. 75. 2 (cf. vii. 55. 1 n.). The contrast here is with the previous stage when the intentions of the extremists were still concealed (66. 1).

μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔρχειν μηδεμίαν ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κόσμου: this is a decree (68. 1), and no decree about the constitution could confine itself to the general negative proposition that nothing is to be the same as it had been. This is not paraphrase but description, and Steup's comment is inept, that there is no corresponding clause in *Aθ. π.* 29. 5. The actual decree must have been expressed as a series of positive and concrete proposals, which did not interest Thucydides because for him the only, and basically important, result of this meeting was the following provision for the appointment of the Four Hundred on the spot and their immediate assumption of power. Further, the reference to the Five Thousand below presupposes that they have been defined already within the decree, and indeed that some provision had been made to constitute them, however much this remained a dead letter (89. 2, etc.). The reader is not told of this, and his only reference for *τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους* is the programme of 65. 3. It follows that Thucydides believed that this programme was now formally enacted, and that he meant the reader to assume this; but in his hurry to get on to what really mattered, and unwilling to repeat what had been said in 65. 3, he did not make this explicit and leaves us to pick up the implication. The positive clauses masked by his negative description

must have been quite substantial, and may have looked very like those of *Aθ. π. 29. 5*.

μήτε μισθοφορέν: this is again very summary. At 65. 3 pay is allowed for military service; and at *Aθ. π. 29. 5* archons and *prytaneis* may be paid. Thucydides is impatient of the detail.

προέδρους τε ἐλέσθαι πέντε ἄνδρας, κ.τ.λ.: *πρόεδροι* should literally preside, and usually do, so that the word does not quite fit the purely temporary function given them here. For the question whether five *πρόεδροι* were a regular part of the governmental machinery of the Four Hundred, see ML 80 with comment, and pp. 196, 226 below. When the Four Hundred are installed at 70. 1, Thucydides mentions the appointment of *πρυτάνεις*, but no other officers, and he tells us nothing later of their formal procedures.

This is the point at which the account of *Aθ. π.* diverges decisively from that of Thucydides, whereas up to here they can be supposed to be describing the same events with somewhat different colouring. *Aθ. π.* has now some leisurely constitution-making, and leaves us to suppose, though there is no explicit statement, that the Four Hundred were eventually set up according to the provisions of 31. I.

ἔκατὸν ἄνδρας: *Aθ. π. 29. 5* has a hundred men elected to draw up a list of the Five Thousand, and 30. 1 a constitutional commission of a hundred appointed by the Five Thousand. Critics anxious to reconcile the two sources have identified either or both of these with the hundred mentioned here: see pp. 204–5 below.

ἄρχειν δη τὸν ἄριστα γιγνώσκωσιν αὐτοκράτορας: Steup compared i. 126. 8 τὸ πᾶν αὐτοκράτοροι διαθεῖναι ἢ τὸν ἄριστα διαγιγνώσκωσιν; and both have some flavour of the documentary style. Since no one can suppose that i. 126. 8 (the siege of the Kylonians) reposes on a documentary text surviving into Thucydides' time, this illustrates how easy it is to fall into this style when writing about decisions of the state. There are grounds (§ 1 n.) for thinking that Thucydides had not seen the text of the previous meeting's decree, and his account of this one may rest on an oral report, though there is no reason why that should not be an accurate one. Here *αὐτοκράτορας* does convey very wide independent powers: the Four Hundred need not refer to the democratic assembly which had voted itself out of existence, or to the full body of the Five Thousand which they need not summon until they wish.

τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους δὲ ξυλλέγειν: see n. to *μήτε ἀρχήν* above. Though this presupposes that machinery has been voted for the creation of a Five Thousand, the clause protects the Four Hundred from any need to use it.

68. 1. **ἢν δέ - - - Πείσανδρος:** for *Aθ. π. 29. 5 διέταξαν*, and the degree

to which that need be taken as contradicting the ascription here to Peisandros, see p. 217 below.

δέ μέντοι ἄπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ξυνθείς, κ.τ.λ.: Antiphon's long-term study would not have been conducted in total isolation. We may suppose that he had discussed the possibilities earlier with some of those who came out as oligarchs in 411, and with Peisandros during his winter visit to Athens; but he was not present at Samos when Alkibiades made his first overtures to the leaders there. Here Thucydides' phrase *ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη ἐς τοῦτο* (Steup compared 38. 5) could be taken as inviting us to see Antiphon's hand in the turn which the revolution now took, sc. the victory at this point of the extremists; there was certainly a change of policy with respect to Sparta and the war (63. 4, 70. 2 with nn.) and there may have been others. But Thucydides shows no other sign of wishing to present the revolution as changing course at the moment of transition to Athens, and he need mean no more than that Antiphon managed the mechanics of the business.

Ἀντιφῶν: son of Sophilos, of the deme Rhamnous (doc. ap. [Plu.] 834a); Pl. *Mnx.* 236a; etc.). This passage of Thucydides is by far the most important testimony we have. The main value of the *Life* in [Plu.] 832b–834b lies in the two documents cited at the end from Caecilius for Antiphon's trial and condemnation. Otherwise this is an unhelpful witness, liable to confuse the orator with *A. Λυσωνίδου*, executed by the Thirty (832f–833b: X. *HG* ii. 3. 40) and the tragic poet at the court of Dionysios (833b–c: Nauck², pp. 792–3). In 832f *ὅτε μὲν δυοί — — πληρῶν ἔξήκοντα*, a passage noted as remarkable but not further discussed by Gomme (ms.), the two trierarchies clearly belong to the son of Lysonides (X. l. c.), and some of the rest may derive from Lysias' speech for his daughter (if this Antiphon were her father: see Blass [below] 94 n. 2, Davies p. 327); it is hard to see how this (or any known) A. was ever in a position where he could be described as 'manning sixty triremes', but multiple confusions are possible in the mind of a writer who could insert this catalogue into the record of 411, between the establishment of the Four Hundred and the orator's embassy to Sparta.

Among modern estimates Blass, *Att. Beredsamkeit*² (1887) 91–148, is fundamental, fuller than Jebb, *Attic Orators* 1–43; L. Gernet's brief introduction to the Budé edition is sensible and still eminently useful; Schmid–Stählin, I. 3. 97–126 (1940), describes the works clearly and reports the controversies.

The name Antiphon was common, and the two problems of identity remain contentious:

(a) Ancient critics sometimes distinguished (esp. Hermogenes, *περὶ ἴδεῶν* ii. 11. 400R, citing Didymos among his authorities) but more often identified the orator with the sophist (Diels–Kranz no. 87; Schmid 157–69) of whose *περὶ ἀληθείας* we have an extensive

fragment (44) on papyrus. Modern critics mostly separate the two (Schmid 98–100, and others); E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* 132–3, n. 100, argued from X. *Mem.* i. 6. 13 that the sophist was not an Athenian (see J. S. Morrison, *CR* N.S. iii [1953], 5–6; Dodds, *CR* N.S. iv [1954], 94–5; the point does not seem to have been taken up since). Morrison put the case for identity in *PCPhS* N.S. vii (1961) 49–58; the reply of S. Luria, *Eos* liii (1963), 63–7, makes insufficient allowance for the difference of genre between the works concerned; I would however agree with Gernet (175) that the onus is on the supporters of identity to prove their case, and that it has not yet been sufficiently made out. See also W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* iii. 292–4. In any case the surviving fragments of *περὶ ἀληθείας* (cf. G. B. Kerferd, *PCPhS* N.S. iv [1956–7] 26–32) and other works attributed to the sophist do not suggest that these works contributed anything to Thucydides' estimate.

(b) The surviving speeches include the three tetralogies (ii–iv), exercises in the prosecution and defence of three imaginary cases. Dittenberger's attack on their authenticity went too far (*Hermes* xxxi [1896], 271–7; xxxii [1897], 1–41; partly withdrawn, xl [1905], 450–70), but grounds for suspicion remain (Gernet 6–16); Dover (*CQ* xliv [1950], 56–9) leaves the conclusion open, but his investigation of their language shows that the tetralogies, if they are Antiphon's, are not characteristic of his mature style; G. Zuntz (*Opuscula Selecta* 35–6, 38–42), who favours their authenticity, assumes a long gap between these and the court speeches. It is the latter which are relevant here, with certain of the fragments and one or two phrases from the ancient critics, for Thucydides was concerned with the help which Antiphon gave to real persons in real courts. Dover (*ibid.* 44–56) examines the language of the three surviving court speeches to establish vi–i–v as the order in which they were written.

ἀρετὴ τε οὐδενὸς ὕστερος: Arnold and others were troubled that Thucydides should speak with such approval of one who was both a subverter of the constitution and a traitor. The praise is indeed striking: there are very few whom Thucydides thought worth analysis at this length; the emphatic phrase devoted to Phrynicos at 27. 5 lifts him above the ordinary run but does not put him in Antiphon's class (cf. § 3 below); there are others whom Thucydides appears to have found admirable but whose qualities do not receive explicit comment, as Hermokrates (cf. vi. 32. 3, 77. 2 nn.). Such analysis is not given to all the pivotal figures in the narrative, only to those who exhibited the force of character or intellect which specially moved Thucydides. This is true of Alkibiades at vi. 15. 4, at least by implication, and *δραστήριον* is the first epithet given to Brasidas at iv. 81. Force of intellect is more apparent in Perikles and Themistokles, with whom we move nearer to Antiphon; the quality

commended here in *κράτιος* --- *εἰπεῖν* could, like the somewhat different quality of Themistokles, be called *φύσεως ἴσχυς* or *δύναμις* (i. 138. 3). Morals apart, *ἀρετή* is an entirely appropriate word for this (cf. A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, esp. 226–32, though he does not discuss this passage; note the criticism of J. L. Creed, *CQ* n.s. xxiii [1973], 213–31, who does discuss it on p. 222), whereas unselfish goodness (cf. v. 105. 4 n.) is not a necessary element in *ἀρετή* (cf. Dover, *GPM* 165), so there was no need for Arnold's forlorn hope that Antiphon's private life kept up a high moral standard. But there is a moral point which may have influenced Thucydides' judgement, Antiphon's loyalty to his associates, probably one of the factors that led him to his death when he might have escaped into exile; Gomme (ms.), in connection with Thucydides' conception of *ἀρετή*, noted that 'Antiphon was honest and stood his trial'.

In that small society Antiphon must have been personally known to Thucydides, and this passage has naturally stimulated speculation about the closeness of the relation; Marcellinus 22 (cf. *Vit. anon.* 2), going beyond the ancient critics' assumption that they were teacher and pupil (for which see below), argues that Thucydides suppressed some facts unfavourable to Antiphon. The latter's birth is usually placed c. 480, partly on the doubtful testimony of [Plu.] 832 f, partly in order to accommodate both the allegation that his grandfather was an adherent of the tyrants (fr. 1 Th = Harp. s.v. *στασιώτης*) and his own activity in 411. The allegation need not be true (cf. Ar. *Eq.* 447–9: one may suspect that a link with the tyranny was standard slander in fifth-century courts, as a link with the Four Hundred or Thirty in those of the fourth century), and if it contained any truth it does not compel us to suppose that the grandfather married before 510. Unless Antiphon wrote the tetralogies, nothing in the meagre evidence suggests that he published speeches written before the 420s (Dover, *CQ* xliv [1950], 53–6); and there is no suggestion that he was conspicuously old in 411. He may thus have been no more than ten or fifteen years older than Thucydides (for whom see v. 26. 5 n.), and close friendship between them is easier to imagine than intimacy between Thucydides and Perikles, older and aloof by temperament. That can be no more than speculation: but there is no doubt at all of Thucydides' disapproval of Antiphon's extremism in politics (97. 2 shows where his sympathies lay, and ii. 65. 11–12 his feeling about internal strife and deviation from Perikles' line). It is no surprise that he should, in spite of this, have admired Antiphon's gifts, and perhaps valued his company. Further, the whole passage in some degree looks forward to the summation in § 4, that it needed men of the highest quality to overthrow the well-established democracy of Athens.

ὑπόπτως --- *διακείμενος*: 'the object of suspicion'. So i. 75. 1 *ἐπιφθόνως*

διακεῖσθαι, whereas viii. 63. 2 ὑπόπτως ἔχειν is active, 'were suspicious of one another'. For 38. 3 see n. there.

διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος: a charge always useful in court against an opponent with any experience, cf. D. xviii. 277, xxxv. 40–43, and xxii. 4 where the word is not used but Androtion is to be discredited as *τεχνίτης τοῦ λέγειν*. In public affairs, cf. Th. iii. 37. 5 (and the whole chapter); D. v. 11.

τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους, κ.τ.λ.: ἀγών is often used of lawcourt trials (so Antiphon vi. 21), but any argument can be an ἀγών (so iii. 37. 5 of debate in the assembly) and we need not restrict ἐν δήμῳ here to legal procedure such as *eisangelia* (Stahl). Antiphon did not confine himself to private clients, as we see from his speeches *περὶ τοῦ Λινδίων φόρου* (frs. 25–33 Th) and for Samothrace (49–56).

On Antiphon's speech-writing and the fees he charged, see his *Defence* (fr. 1a Th., cols. ii–iii) and Plato Com. fr. 103. Thucydides' form of words shows that the profession was already well established; Antiphon's innovation was to publish his speeches ([Plu.] 832c and others say he was the first to write them, but Diod. ap. Clem. Al. *Sir.* i. 79. 3 (365P) is more precise, *πρῶτον δικαιικὸν λόγον εἰς ἔκδοσιν γραψάμενον*). 'Publication' (Diodoros' *ἔκδοσις*) implies some positive act of the writer; Gomme (ms.) argued that his *Defence* 'must have been carefully written down ... to be published after his death'. Sixty works of his, substantial enough to be called *λόγοι*, were known to Caecilius ([Plu.] 833c: he rejected 25 as spurious, on grounds not known to us), and from Harpokration and others we have the titles of at least twenty speeches besides the ones preserved.

Thucydides of course compares him with contemporary speakers whom he heard before his exile in 424, not with the next generation. But the development of style and technique was rapid, and the speeches of his contemporaries were not preserved; and later Greek critics were little interested in pioneers before Lysias. Dionysios (*Is.* 20, i. 123R) passes over him quickly, *τὸ αὐστηρὸν ἔχει μόνον καὶ ὀρχαῖον*. Elsewhere (*Comp.* 10, ii. 36–7R) he brackets him with Thucydides as writing notably *καλῶς* but not altogether *ἥδεως*; Ktesias and Xenophon the other way round, Herodotus has both virtues. Only Demosthenes (*Th.* 53, i. 412R), not Antiphon, Lysias, or Isokrates, shows the speed and other special virtues of Thucydides. The extant speeches show a clarity and force which, we may think, would have appealed to Thucydides, and a consciously elevated style with free use of words from the poets' vocabulary. Antiphon, like the historian, shows the impact of the sophists, and some of the characteristics the two writers share (e.g. verbal substantives, and substantival use of neuter adjectives and participles) were probably widespread at the time. The notion that Thucydides was the 'pupil' of Antiphon was one that came easily—Caecilius inferred it from the present passage

of Thucydides ([Plu.] 832 e), Hermogenes (above) contrived to take Pl. *Mnx.* 236 a as a reference to Thucydides—but obviously oversimplifies. I share Dover's doubt (*CQ* xliv [1950], 59) if Antiphon actually taught oratory; his motive for 'publishing' his speeches need be no more than pride of authorship, likely enough in that age when prose writing was expanding rapidly and epideictic speeches had already begun to be published.

2. *καὶ αὐτός τε:* *τε* (om. M) is defended by Steup (i. 9. 3 n.). The combination *καὶ* - - - *τε* is doubtfully attested (Denniston 535-6), and the effect here, treating *τε* as the connective and *καὶ* as an adverb, is to give *αὐτός* an emphasis of a kind which it does not need. *καὶ* - - - *δέ* (Haacke) runs more easily, and gives the point (cf. Denniston 199 ff.) that Antiphon continues the series of successful speakers, but is contrasted with them as speaking in his own name.

ἐπειδὴ τι μετέστη, κ.τ.λ.: the shorter reading of CG, *ἐπειδὴ τὰ τῶν τετρ.* - - - *ἐκακοῦτο*, is intelligible and says what appears to be needed, but it is not easy to believe that *μετέστη* - - - *κατέστη* is wholly the work of a later interpolator or glossator. The longer text of ABEF, with *μετά* for *τά*, cannot be translated as it stands and raises alarming difficulties:

(a) *μετέστη ἡ δημοκρατία* should mean 'the democracy was removed', but this is not the right note of time; we need 'when the democracy was restored' (or 'the oligarchy removed'). Holzapfel (*BPW* 1888, 1266-8) cited E. *Hcl. 796* (*νέος μεθέστηκ'* ἐκ γέροντος) and Pl. *Rep.* 553e, 571a as instances where the intransitive verb has the new state of affairs as subject, 'brought into being as the result of change' (and Arist. *Pol.* 1301 b 6 ff. for a corresponding use of the active verb), so that our passage could mean 'when democracy was brought into being as the result of change'. But in all four instances the meaning is made clear by stating explicitly the condition from which the change is made, as *ἐκ γέροντος* in *Hcl. 796*. Where there is no such indication, the presumption is that the subject of the verb is that which is removed or changed: Thucydides has many examples of the intr. meaning 'remove' or 'change sides', and several of the act. meaning 'change' (66. 1, 75. 2, 81. 1, etc.), corresponding to the intr. use here. If *μετέστη ἡ δημοκρατία* normally would, or even could, mean removal of the democracy, it is very unlikely that Thucydides would use this phrase without qualification to mean the exact opposite. It is hardly more likely that a later reader thought he could improve understanding of any part of this passage by adding these words in the margin; Holzapfel indeed took the opposite line, that *ἐν θέστερω* - - - *ἐκακοῦτο* was the gloss of a reader who found *μετέστη ἡ δημ.* difficult, but this is not the language of a gloss, and *κακοῦν* is a word favoured by Thucydides (cf. 45. 1). If Thucydides wrote something from which these words are derived, the passage is corrupt

and there is little to indicate how it should be emended; *μετέστησεν* would be an easy alteration, though calling for further change to provide it with an object, as in the gloss which Stahl supposed, *ἐπειδὴ μετέστησεν ἡ δῆμος τὰ τῶν τετρ.*

(b) *ἐσ ἀγῶνα καθίστασθαι* is in common use for a man 'brought to trial' in a court. The expected subject is thus Antiphon, and that would be simple if *μετέστη - - καί* were out of the way; but the plural *ἀγῶνας* is unexpected. Stahl supposed there were several accusers and cited Pl. *Rep.* 494e, which is not helpful; M. H. Jameson, *Historia* xx (1971), 554 n. 38, cites Lys. iii. 48, where *εἰς τοιούτους ἀγῶνας* could be said to correspond to 20, 38 *εἰς τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα*, but (as he remarks) Thucydides has no occasion for this rhetorical use of the plural. Others (e.g. Classen) by changing the text lightly made *τὰ τῶν τετρ.* the subject of *κατέστη*, but the phrase as commonly used requires a personal subject, and it would be surprising if Thucydides used it more vaguely to mean that the Four Hundred were in trouble. Jameson (552–4), arguing that the transition to the Five Thousand involved many trials (Lys. xx. 14, cf. 98. 1 n. below), takes *ἀγῶνας* to include others besides Antiphon; but we need a personal subject, and *τὰ τῶν τετρ.* cannot easily be taken to mean 'some of the Four Hundred'. A more drastic solution has been suggested by Valla's translation, *et qui postmodum (cum statu quadringentorum collapso, acta illorum populus ultum iret, ipseque in iudicium vocaretur, tanquam unus ex istarum rerum auctoribus) videtur mihi optime*, etc. This is not quite straightforward translation, but most of it is identifiable and Valla's text clearly did not have *μετέστη ἡ δημοκρατία. ipseque ... vocaretur* has been taken to represent *καὶ ἐσ ἀγῶνας (ἀγῶνα?) κατέστη*, which Krüger wished to retain but to transfer to this position in the sentence, and if that were right Valla's text would have differed from any of ours. But given the continuation *tanquam unus ... auctoribus*, which is clearly *ὡς ξυγκατέστησε*, the phrase could well be Valla's version of *αἵτιαθεις* which he has not otherwise translated; and in that case he had the text of CG.

(c) All versions which retain *ἡ δημοκρατία* come up against the difficulty that Antiphon was tried under the Five Thousand, not under full democracy; and this may also arouse doubt about *ἕπο τοῦ δήμου* which is common to all texts. It is true that 92. 11 attributes to the oligarchs the view that a number so large as 5,000 amounted to outright democracy, and G. E. M. de Ste. Croix (97. 1 n.) argues that the constitution of the Five Thousand included an assembly in which the whole demos voted: but the question here is how Thucydides saw it, and there is no doubt (see esp. 92. 11, 97. 2) of his belief that the Athenians at the time distinguished between the two regimes. He may well have thought that popular feeling provided the impetus for the downfall of the Four Hundred and for the prosecution of their

members, and this might explain *ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐκακοῦτο*; reference to *ἡ δημοκρατία* as subsisting at the time of the trial is very much harder. On all counts, it is unlikely that Thucydides wrote *μετέστη ἡ δημοκρατία*.

Attempts to trim the longer version of ABEF into acceptable syntax have not so far produced a clause with an acceptable sense, but it is not easy to reject it altogether. It is relevant that G has in the margin *κείμενον μετέστη ἡ δημοκρατία καὶ ἐσ ἀγώνας κατέστη*; and that M, which has the short version, gives ABEF's *μετά* for CG's *τά*. Much of the difficulty is due to the fact that the short version gives an adequate account of the setting of the trial, and when the longer version is remodelled it is apt to result in mere duplication of this. Hence the tendency of edd. to take one part or another of the clause as a later gloss, and Stuart Jones's view that two versions have been conflated. One could perhaps suppose that the process of conflation combined the opening letters of *μετέστη* with *τά* to produce ABEF *μετά*, which edd. have otherwise been puzzled to explain (see Goodhart's n.). Nevertheless, *μετέστη - - - κατέστη* cannot have stood by itself in this form, and *ἡ δημοκρατία* is intrinsically unlikely. The problem may be insoluble on present evidence (Steup): we cannot therefore use this passage for Thucydides' views on the process by which the Four Hundred collapsed, but must look elsewhere.

ἄριστα φαίνεται τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ, κ.τ.λ.: what Thucydides heard in Athenian lawcourts before 424 will have given him adequate material for comparison, and *τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ* throws in for good measure speeches from earlier generations which could be known only by general repute. (Cic. *Brut.* 12. 47 refers to this passage, adding by a very natural error *se audiente*.) Gomme (ms.) noted the possibility that Thucydides had not read the speech but heard about it; but a text was available later which must (if genuine) have been in circulation in 411, and Thucydides' emphatic praise reads as if he had seen it. Common friends would be likely to send him a copy early, and his possession of a text would not imply that these words were written long after the event.

ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων αἰτιαθεῖς, ὡς ξυγκατέστησε: the formal charge was treachery ([Plu.] 833d–834b), the embassy to Sparta reported at 90. 1–2 below. Since more than one of the accusers, and many of those in authority under the Five Thousand, were implicated in the movement which set up the Four Hundred, his part in that movement could not be the formal charge, but there was no doubt in anyone's mind about the real substance of it and the speech later went under the title *περὶ τῆς μεταστάσεως* (Harp. in frs. 1, 2–6 Th). On the surviving fragments see pp. 198–201 below.

3. πάντων διαφερόντως: to be taken with the verb *παρέσχε*, not with *προθυμότατον*, according to Steup and Goodhart, comparing Pl. *Cri.*

52 b; but it cannot modify the one without modifying the other. Pl. *Prt.* 349d, ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας κ.τ.λ., ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως, makes the point clear: these men earned their superlatives in injustice etc., but their superiority in courage was greater and clearer. So here Phrynicos surpassed others who might have been called *προθυμότατοι*. Thucydides does not here recur to the intellectual quality praised at 27. 5 and implied in 48. 4-7; that judgement is not cancelled, but at this stage Antiphon overshadowed him intellectually and his steadfastness was what mattered.

δεδιώς τὸν Αλκιβιάδην, κ.τ.λ.: 48. 4, 50-51. The conspirators had dropped Alkibiades at 63. 4 as unsuitable for an oligarchy, and there was still less chance for him now that the extremists were in control, led by Antiphon the author of the *Αλκιβιάδου λοιδορία* (fr. 66-7 Th=Plu. *Alc.* 3, Ath. xii. 525b).

πρὸς τὰ δεινά: the main danger was before the Four Hundred established themselves; note their cautious dealing with the democratic Council (69). Phrynicos also took on posts such as the embassy to Sparta (90. 2) which would damn him in the event of a counter-revolution, and his murder shows the risk he ran. For Arist. *Pol.* 1305 b 27 on his conduct within the Four Hundred, see pp. 211-12 below. **ἐπειδήπερ ὑπέστη:** when he had got over the reservations expressed in 48. 4, 7. Thucydides does not clearly mark the point at which he was reconciled with the other conspirators, or when he left Samos for Athens.

4. Θηραμένης ὁ τοῦ "Αγνωνος: of Steiria; *S Ar. Ran.* 541; *Page, Gr. Lit. Pap.* i. p. 200, ll. 29ff. (Austin 73. 66ff.), a fragment of Kratinos' *Ploutoi* which confirms the identification of this Hagnon with H. son of Nikias, known to us from i. 117. 2, ii. 58, etc. as a general and colleague of Perikles; see now also the ostrakon 'Αγνων Νικίου Στειριεύς reported by Willemsen, *Ἄρχ. Δελτ.* xxiii (1968) 2. 1. 28. There is no good ground for supposing that 'in 430 he fell foul of Pericles' (Page, p. 197); his intervention at the trial (Plu. *Per.* 32. 4) helped Perikles by substituting normal procedure for that proposed by Drakontides. Membership of the *probouloi* (i. 3n., Lys. xii. 65) does not prove that he had become an oligarch in his old age, unless we are prepared to say the same of Sophokles. X. *HG* ii. 3. 30, οὐτος γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τιμώμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου κατὰ τὸν πατέρα "Αγνωνα (taking the words κατά --- "Αγνωνα with what precedes: they do not go well with what follows, cf. Hignett 272 n. 5), shows that his family background was an asset to him under the democracy, not a handicap, and that he had held public office before 411, as was likely though he does not appear earlier in our records. What deflected him into oligarchy we do not know, but in that age of ferment such conversion was likely enough, and it is clearly possible that he sincerely believed that a constitution of the type of the Five Thousand was best for

Athens (cf. X. *HG* ii. 3. 48, *Αθ. π.* 28. 5, and 89. 3 n. below). His character is discussed in most modern histories of the period; Schwahn, *RE* vA. 2304–20 (1934) is not much help.

ἐν τοῖς ξυγκαταλύουσι τὸν δῆμον πρῶτος ἦν: edd. remark that this is close to the expression *ἐν τοῖς πρῶτος*, but see discussion of this idiom at 89. 2 n. below. This passage cannot mean that Theramenes was absolutely 'the first' of the revolutionaries, either in importance or temporally; this is a weak superlative, putting him high in the class to which he is assigned but not at the top of it.

οὐτε εἰπεῖν οὐτε γνῶναι ἀδύνατος: the double negative is warm praise from Thucydides (cf. ii. 34. 6 *μηδ ἀξύνετος*) and *γνῶναι* is a capacity he greatly valued. Theramenes has less space here than Antiphon or Phrynicos, but this strong expression must not be forgotten when we speculate about Thucydides' eventual verdict on him (cf. 89. 3 n.). **ἐπ' ἔτει ἑκατοστῷ μάλιστα:** edd. remark that the exact count from 510 to 411 is 99 years, and LSJ (*μάλα* III. 5) even call this '99th'. But by the inclusive count regular with ordinal numbers this is exactly the hundredth year, whether we reckon 'natural' years or count archons from Harpaktides (511/10) to Kallias (412/11). Some other explanation is needed for *μάλιστα*; perhaps Thucydides was concerned here not with the exact number but with the order of magnitude.

ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου: from 478/7 would be a good deal more than half, but at i. 97. 2 (*ad fin.*) Thucydides appears to date Athens' ἀρχή later than this, perhaps from the 'enslavement' of Naxos, the point where he inserted his excursus on the loss of the allies' freedom (i. 99). But his language is not rigorously consistent: cf. i. 99. 2, where the Athenians are *ἀρχοντες* before the time of Naxos.

69. 1. οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος, ἀλλὰ κυρώσασα ταῦτα: edd. have objected that there is no real antithesis. Steup's *ἄλλα* (with *ἀντειπόντος*) is awkward, and no previous objection has been mentioned. Wilamowitz (*Hermes* xii [1877], 336 = *Kl. Schr.* iii. 10 n. 2) favoured *ἄμα* ('was dissolved as soon as it had ratified this': the Four Hundred did not want anyone to speak after Peisandros); Goodhart and others adopted this, and Steup's objection to the word-order is not strong. But *ἀλλά* is not always strongly adversative (Denniston 1, 21), and the text may stand.

ἥδη ὕστερον: see § 2 n.

ἥσαν [δ'] Αθηναῖοι, κ.τ.λ.: Classen kept δ' on the ground that this is a parenthesis, not the expansion of *τρόπῳ τοιῷδε*; but it is a necessary part of the explanation and δέ would be out of place.

Cf. vii. 28. 2, daytime guard of the walls in relay, the whole body of Athenians at night either *ἐφ' ὅπλοις πον* or on the walls. Steup pointed out that Thucydides uses *ἐν (ξύν) ὅπλοις, μεθ' ὅπλων*, for 'in arms', and has *ἐφ' ὅπλοις* only here and at vii. 28. 2. The difference

appears to be that men *ἐφ' ὅπλοις* need not be continuously in or with their arms, but may disperse as they do in § 2 below. At vii. 28. 2 *ποι* (or *ποι*: see ad loc.) implies a specific post where the men spent the night: cf. Lys. xiii. 12, the charge against Kleophon ὅτι οὐκ ἥλθεν εἰς τὰ ὅπλα ἀναπαυσόμενος, where *ὅπλα* is almost ‘the place where the arms were’ (cf. LSJ *ὅπλον* III. 5). Here Thucydides describes daytime service as likewise universal: those on the walls presumably serve in relays as at vii. 28. 2, those *ἐν τάξει* should be ‘in formation’ (so normally, e.g. v. 66. 1, but at X. *Cyr.* viii. 3. 34 billeting in houses is contrasted with camping *ἐν τάξει*, presumably a camp organized militarily). We should then imagine daily parades under arms in places spacious enough to take a regular hoplite formation; and that when the men dispersed they left their *ὅπλα* there (Grote [vi. 267] suggests ‘under comparatively thin watch’), but still *ἐφ' ὅπλοις* in the sense that they have an assigned station at which to find their arms and their comrades in case of alarm. Ar. *Lys.* 557–64 need not be taken to mean that all Athenians wore their armour all day.

At X. *HG* ii. 3. 20 *κελεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα* appears to be addressed to men who then disperse and leave their arms. Cobet supposed a lacuna and Hatzfeld obelised the passage, but the text may be complete and correct; *ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα* need not be the same command as *εἰς τὰ ὅπλα* (e.g. X. *An.* i. 5. 13) but may mean that the men were free to go about their business subject to recall; in which case this would be strictly parallel to the usage suggested here.

Thucydides’ writing might suggest a single parade-ground for all Athenian hoplites, which would be surprising; one would rather expect ten tribal stations, and all that is required for Thucydides’ account is one such station within reach of the Bouleuterion.

2. τῇ οὖν ἡμέρᾳ ἔκείνη: Steup took this to mean the same day as the Kolonus meeting (67. 2–68. 1), the intervening passage being parenthetic, and Hignett (360) argued that the words ‘have more point if they mean that the expulsion... took place on the same day’; but their function is to bring us back from the general practice described in § 1 to the day of the event now to be dealt with, and no more need be intended than that. § 1 *ἡδη ὕστερον* is indeterminate and could mean either later on the same day, or on a later day, according to the time-scale in Thucydides’ mind (the position is not altered if we read *ὕστερον ἡδη* with ACEFGM).

Steup’s belief that *ἀπελθεῖν* refers to citizens leaving the assembly to go to their military posts is clearly wrong; the context requires that they should leave the place where the arms are, while those *ἐν τῇ ξυνωμοσίᾳ* remain *ἄπωθεν*, but not too far away to take up their arms if necessary. One would expect, according to normal Athenian practice, that both the daily parade and the assembly meeting would take place early in the day, and if there is only one day in question the

parade must either precede or follow the assembly. Thucydides' wording rules the former out; to go no further, *ῶσπερ εἰώθεσαν ἀπελθεῖν* could not refer to leaving the parade-ground to go to Kolonos. The latter runs into the objection that, if the Four Hundred were expecting resistance (*ἥν τις ἐνιστῆται*), it was curiously rash of them to allow the citizens to go and take up their arms immediately after the meeting at which they had for the first time revealed their full plans (67. 3). If the Bouleuterion was taken over on a later day, one may still think that the Four Hundred were taking something of a chance, but by the day after Kolonos they would have a clearer idea whether trouble was likely, and it is not impossible that they took precautions on this day which were not strictly necessary. But the precautions would be more intelligible if we adopt a widespread theory (p. 254 below), that the decree of Peisandros (67. 3) did not specify a date when the Four Hundred were to take over, and that the general expectation was that the existing Boule would be allowed to finish out the remainder of its year; consequently, when the Four Hundred acted sooner there was some danger of resistance. The interval since Kolonos was presumably short.

The eight-day interval in 'Aθ. π. 32. 1 is between the dissolution of the democratic Boule and the formal installation of the Four Hundred, and thus cannot be relevant here unless there has been considerable confusion.

3. *"Ανδριοι καὶ Τήνιοι καὶ Καρυστίων τριακόσιοι:* see 65. 1 with n. It seems that Thucydides knew the number of the Karystians but not of the others, which in the patchy state of his information from Athens is possible enough; cf. also vi. 67. 2 n.

καὶ Αἴγινητῶν - - - οἰκήσοντας: strictly the gen. should depend, with *Καρυστίων*, on *τριακόσιοι*, but these would hardly be combined in a single contingent which excluded the others, and it would be odd if Thucydides knew the sum of these two but not the figures themselves. To take the gen. in any other way involves some incoherence, even if we suppose that the Aiginetans are a later addition. This passage however, unlike vi. 67. 2, allows the possibility that a numeral has fallen out: Stahl suggested ν' (50), lost after *ἐποίκων*.

For *ἐποίκων*, κ.τ.λ., see ii. 27. 1, vii. 57. 2, with nn.; they also fought at Mantinea in 418 (v. 74. 3). The relative clause seems redundant if the reader is expected to remember ii. 27. 1, and not informative enough if he needs to be reminded; at v. 74. 3 they are simply *Αἴγινήταις* without further explanation. Some edd. excise the clause, Steup preferred to excise *τῶν ἐποίκων*; but it is notoriously difficult to estimate how much back-reference is needed for clarity, and the text may well be what Thucydides wrote.

4. [“Ελληνες] νεανίσκοι: “Ελληνες (om. BC) is retained by Arnold and others as distinguishing these youths from the Skythian slaves

used in Athens for police functions. Grote (vi. 261 n. 1) objected that Thucydides would not designate Athenian citizens so and took 'Greek' to be contrasted with 'Athenian', 'strangers got together from different cities'. The close parallel is X. *HG* ii. 3. 23, the *νεανίσκοι* used by Kritias and his party to overawe the Boule. Here as in Xenophon, *νεανίσκοι* without qualification would be immediately intelligible; no reader would need to be told that they were not Skythians, and if they were non-Athenians they would need less laconic description. It is not clear how "*Ελλῆνες*" got into the text, but it is better away.

τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου βουλευταῖς: so also 66. 1. In official documents and in normal practice *ἡ βουλή, οἱ βουλευταί* were sufficient, but when it is necessary to distinguish this from some other form of Council the 'bean' appears to be a standard phrase: so Demophontos' decree of 410 in *And.* i. 96, and *Aθ. π.* 32. 1.

τοῦ ὑπολοίπου χρόνου παντός: according to *Aθ. π.* 32. 1 the democratic Boule was removed on 14 Thargelion, but would otherwise have continued till 14 Skirophorion. If this is right, the Four Hundred paid the outgoing Councillors for a full month. By the time of *Aθ. π.* 62. 2 the rate was 5 ob. a day, plus an obol for *σίτησις* to the tribe in prytany; the fifth-century rate is not known (this is the earliest secure reference to the Boule being paid at all: see Rhodes 13–14), but it will hardly have been lower than the 3 ob. of the dikasts. *ἐδίδοσαν* could no doubt be said of a payment out of public funds: *ἔφερον*, with the emphatic *αὐτοί* at the end of the clause, suggests rather that the Four Hundred found the money themselves (but it would be surprising if they did not recoup themselves once in power); an expensive gesture but it eased the departure of the old Boule, and no doubt these oligarchs shared the contempt of [X.] *Aθ. π.* 1. 3 for office which was sought *μισθοφορίᾳς ἔνεκα* (but cf. Arist. *Aθ. π.* 29. 5).

Gomme (ms.) raised the question whether Councillors were paid whether they attended or not, and referred to A. H. M. Jones, *Past and Present* i (1952), 27 (= *Ath. Democracy* 136–7) n. 10, who suggested that *παντός* here means that they were now paid for all possible attendances in the coming month, whereas normally they would have been paid by the day when they turned up.

70. 1. *τότε μὲν πρυτάνεις, κ.τ.λ.:* they carried out these formalities at once, and this contradicts *Aθ. π.* 32. 1 with its eight-day interval between the expulsion of the old and the inauguration of the new Council. *πρυτάνεις* need not imply rotating tribal prytanies (the accounts of the Four Hundred [ML 81. 15–17] date by the day of the month), but may be the name for their presiding officers; if so, note that they are not called *πρόεδροι*, cf. 67. 3 with n., ML 80. 5 and *Aθ. π.* 30. 5 (pp. 196, 226 below). It is interesting that they were appointed

by lot. This and their sacrifices were conventional, as opposed to the large changes they are then said to have made *ὕστερον*.

ὕστερον δὲ πολὺ μεταλλάξαντες, κ.τ.λ.: the only documentary evidence is from their accounts (ML 81), dating by the day of the month (15–17), *ψηφισαμένης τῆς βολῆς* (14–15), and the Ionic alphabet. It appears (pp. 194–5 below) that the financial officers of the democracy for 412/11, and probably the archon Kallias also, remained in office till the end of their year. But Thucydides no doubt refers to more radical changes.

τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἔνεκα: a formula could have been devised to recall others but to exclude him, for instance by reference to the curse (53. 2); but this would have advertised the loss of their hope of Persian aid to be negotiated through Alkibiades, the *bait* originally held out to the people (53. 1).

2. *ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολλούς, κ.τ.λ.:* contrast Chaireas' account (74. 3), and cf. Thucydides' conviction that he was lying (*ibid.*). He clearly had great confidence in his source at this point, whatever its nature.

διαλλαγῆναι βούλεσθαι: in marked contrast to the attitude of the oligarchs at Samos as recently as 63. 4 (see n. there).

σφίσι καὶ οὐκέτι τῷ ἀπίστῳ δῆμῳ: compressed, but not so illogical as to call for emendation (Steup). This is a compact description of the present situation in Athens: 'it was reasonable that he should be more ready to make concessions, now that they were in power and not the unreliable demos'. For this conventional oligarchs' view of the demos cf. [X.] *Ἀθ. π. 2. 17.*

71. 1. *οὐχ ἡσυχάζειν - - - οὐκ ἀν ἡσυχάζειν:* the most striking but not the only sign of disarray in this sentence. Dobree excised *τὴν πόλιν οὐχ ἡσυχάζειν* and altered *οὐδ'* to *οὔτ'*; and this, followed by Stahl and others, removes much of the formal offence. But the sequence of Agis' thought is not quite satisfactory, and if a solution on these lines is sought, there is more attraction in Goodhart's proposal to alter *οὐκ ἀν ἡσυχάζειν* (he suggested *ἀναστασίασειν*, plausible enough as a Thucydidean coinage).

The trouble seems more diffused. *οὐδ'* *ἐν τῷ παρόντι - - - αὐτούς*, in form a somewhat awkward afterthought, adds virtually nothing to *οὐχ ἡσυχάζειν*; the repetition of *ταράσσεσθαι* in *ταραχθέντας* below is unattractive; and though *ἔλπισας, κ.τ.λ.*, at the end adds some new detail (*αὐτοβοεί*, the Long Walls) it also repeats Agis' thoughts at the beginning of the sentence in a way uncharacteristic of Thucydides' compact style. One cannot neatly separate this out into alternative recensions, but it is possible that he made several attempts to put this sentence into the form he wanted, and that the editor kept too much from his various drafts. Cf. 66. 5 n.

οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον: the negotiations and the summons must nevertheless have taken some time, and by the end of § 3 we have moved still further forward, as also at the end of 70. 1. Cf. 72. 2 n.

ἢ καὶ αὐτοθοεί --- ἀμαρτεῖν: as the text stands we must supply χειρωθῆναι again in the second half of the clause, and τῶν γάρ --- ἀμαρτεῖν expounds the means by which Agis hoped to take Athens αὐτοθοεῖ. Edd. argue that χειρωθῆναι σφίσιν ἢ βούλονται means capitulation without fighting, and that the same verb cannot also express the forcible element in λήψεως: since Bauer's γοῦν for γάρ, most have simply excised γάρ (Arnold), with or without the addition of τῆς before τῶν (A² has τῆς τῶν, with γάρ deleted). This hardly seems necessary: χειροῦσθαι is entirely suitable for forcible capture, and if there is an element of zeugma in the uses of the verb here it does not impede understanding.

The point is presumably that the guards will leave the walls to take part in the *stasis*, and that when Agis' approach was seen there might be time to man the city walls, but not the more distant Long Walls.

2. τοὺς δὲ ἵππας ἐκπέμψαντες: there seems to be no question that they would fight the Spartans.

γνούς: sc. the situation in the city. Thucydides often uses the participle without expressed object, e.g. 12. 1 above, v. 59. 1; there is no need for Haase's ἀπογνούς.

72. 1. πεντακισχίλιοί τε δτι εἶεν, κ.τ.λ.: the decree of Peisandros (67. 3) could be shown, and at that distance it might pay off, at least for a time, to pretend that its provisions about the Five Thousand were to be carried out. Thucydides is clear that this was fraudulent (66. 1, 70. 1): Goodhart's n., 'the Middle Party ... still seemed to have the revolution in their hands', is simply wrong.

καίτοι οὐ πώποτε --- ξυνελθεῖν: this is presented as the assertion of the envoys and is not expressly backed by Thucydides, but the figure was not worth inserting if it was too evident a distortion. The trouble is that 6,000 votes were necessary for a valid ostracism (Plu. *Ar.* 7. 6, to be preferred on this point to the text, as we have it from the lexica, of Philochoros, *FGH* 328 F 30: see Jacoby ad loc.); for a νόμος ἐπ' ἀνδρί (And. i. 87, D. xxiv. 59); for a grant of citizenship ([D.] lix. 89); and for other matters, not all of them of the first importance (D. xxiv. 46). But these speakers probably have wartime conditions in mind, in spite of their emphatic οὐ πώποτε, for στρατεῖαι are a wartime handicap, and if ὑπερόριος ἀσχολία means official business (cf. the numerous ἀρχαὶ ὑπερόριοι of Ηθ. π. 24. 3), that would increase with the war. The argument need not be quite honest, but this must be the right order of magnitude; and the implication of laying down a quorum is that even questions of importance might not attract as

many as 6,000 voters. The difficulty of collecting a quorum in the period immediately after the war (*Aθ. π.* 41. 3) was no doubt specially acute for that period, but the passage is not irrelevant.

Distance might deter voters from outlying demes, though there is little direct evidence, but many more than 6,000 must have lived within easy walking distance. Passages such as X. *Mem.* iii. 7. 6 shows that economic necessity did not deter small traders and craftsmen, and it is clear from various sources that the assembly was not dominated by the class which had full leisure to attend. In spite of the Athenians' reputed passion for politics, and of the practical experience so many of them had in the Boule, it seems that the proportion sufficiently interested to come to the Pnyx was not all that high; which is not surprising but is often forgotten. .

2. εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἔσυνθων κατάστασιν: in order to take up the Samian thread of the story, we are brought back in time from the point reached at the end of 71. But 86. 3 (see n. there) suggests that the envoys did not leave Athens till after Agis' attempt against the city (71. 1-2).

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We are here in the unusual position of being able to set beside Thucydides' narrative a substantial alternative account, from Aristotle's *Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ*; and we have as well two plays of Aristophanes produced shortly before the coup, a speech from the *Corpus Lysiaca* delivered not long after the downfall of the Four Hundred, and other material. The main bulk of this excursus will necessarily be concerned with Aristotle, but *Aθ. π.* was written nearly ninety years after the event and our estimate of the value of 29-33 must depend on what we conclude about its sources and about the mind and intention of the author. The nature of the tradition available to him may be seen more clearly if we discuss first the earlier sources, starting with Aristophanes.

I. Aristophanes

The hypothesis to *Lysistrata* gives the year of its performance, 412/11, but does not tell us at which festival it was produced. The date of *Thesmophoriazousai* has to be deduced from allusions in the play and from scholiasts' notes. Earlier editors assigned it to spring 410 in the belief that *Th.* 809 referred to the take-over of the Four Hundred from the democratic Boule of 412/11, which took place after the Dionysia of spring 411; since Wilamowitz (*AuA* ii. 343-52) most critics have preferred 411. Not all of his demonstration will hold. He accepted too easily arguments for 412/11 from Σ 190,

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Euripides' death ἔκτῳ ἔτει ύστερον, for the scholiast might have dated this to 406/5 with Timaios (*FGrH* 566 F 105), Eratosthenes (241 F 12) and Apollodoros (244 F 35), not to 407/6; and from Σ 841, Lamachos' death τετάρτῳ ἔτει πρότερον, for it is not clear under which archon he died (v. 25. 3 n.). But 1060 places *Th.* in the year immediately following Euripides' *Andromeda* (cf. Σ ad loc.), which Σ *Ran.* 53 dates to 413/12; indeed, if Σ *Lys.* 963 is right in seeing an allusion to *Andr.* fr. 116 N² in *Lys.* 963 ff. no other date is possible. It will be argued below that *Th.* 808–9 almost certainly refers to the Councillors of 413/12 handing their powers over to the *probouloi* (*Th.* 1. 3 with n.), and this would also be decisive for 411. If both plays belong to this year, the probability is that *Lys.* was produced at the Lenaia, *Th.* at the Dionysia, as further discussion will show.

Lenaia fell in Gamelion, but the evidence which has been adduced to fix the date within the month (e.g. Deubner, *Att. Feste* 123) amounts to very little and is rightly ignored in Gould and Lewis' second ed. of Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (1968) 36. We can only try to guess the limits of Gamelion 412/11, bearing in mind that unsystematic intercalation of days by the archon may throw the calculation out. The main indication for the calendar of this year comes from *Aθ. π.* 32. 1, that Pryt. I. 1 of 411/10 was due to fall on 14 Skirophorion (cf. vol. iv, p. 269, and pp. 234–7 below); and it is significant that this could be known in advance. Skirophorion then came comparatively late this year, and therefore also Gamelion unless some large disturbance of the calendar intervened: 27 January, suggested for 1 Gamelion in the 'ideal' table of Meritt, *AFD* 179, may be too early rather than too late, and we should probably place the Lenaia of this year somewhere in February 411. The City Dionysia is firmly dated to 10–13 Elaphebolion, and a similar calculation would bring this out as the middle of April.

Thucydides' narrative affords few relevant chronological landmarks:

(a) Phrynicos and his colleagues came out from Athens to Samos towards the end of summer 412 (25. 1), and before the summer ends (28. 5) we have still the battle outside Miletos, the capture of Iasos, and the Peloponnesian return to Miletos. If the beginning of Thucydides' winter is 'not earlier than November 1' (vol. iii, p. 706), the Miletos battle should be late in September or early in October, but a variation of some weeks either way would be acceptable on this evidence.

(b) Antisthenes set out from the Peloponnese περὶ ἡλίου τροπάς (39. 1), for which one might allow a week either way from 24 December, the date of the solstice at this epoch. The summons of Astyochos to Kaunos (41. 1) should follow not more than ten days later. He was still in Miletos, and Alkibiades already with Tissaphernes, at the time

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of the correspondence with Phryничος (50. 2). Peisandros' departure for Athens was in preparation before the start of this episode (49), and from his action at Athens (54. 3) it looks as if he left Samos before the rehabilitation of Phryничος at the end of the correspondence (51. 3). These data leave some latitude, but the eighty-day stay of the Peloponnesians at Rhodes (44. 4), ending before the start of Thucydides' next summer (60. 2–61. 1), unless it is removed by emendation (60. 3 n.), carries the implication that events before the move to Rhodes should be dated as early as possible. We should then place Astyochos' departure from Miletos at the end of December, and Peisandros' departure for Athens at least ten days earlier. At that time the estrangement of Alkibiades from the Peloponnesians, though well advanced, was not complete (50. 3), though 45. 1 dates the beginning of suspicion to the time after the battle of Miletos (if 29 and 45. 2 are a doublet, Alkibiades went to Tissaphernes early, see 45. 2 n.). We cannot attempt an exact timetable, but as the narrative runs one would not expect a long interval between the proclamation of oligarchy in the fleet (48. 2–3) and the despatch of Peisandros, so the proclamation might be assigned to the beginning of December, leaving plenty of time in November for Alkibiades' first approaches to the Athenian leaders in Samos (47). Charminos' encounter with Astyochos off Syme (41. 3 ff.) would belong to the end of December.

(c) From 53. 1 one would guess that Peisandros and his colleagues put their policy to the assembly as soon as they arrived in Athens, which seems the natural course, so that the oligarchs' proposals would be public property early in January. 54 gives almost as strong an impression that Peisandros left Athens again soon after this meeting, to negotiate with Tissaphernes, and it is not easy to see how he could have remained in Athens for many weeks after his appointment to this embassy. However, his conference with the satrap (56) is closely linked (57. 1 *εὐθὺς μέτα ταῦτα*) to Tissaphernes' meeting with the Peloponnesians at Kaunos near the end of winter. For the possibility of dating this meeting early in March rather than at the beginning of April, see 60. 3 n., but even on this dating there is a remarkable gap between Peisandros' arrival at Athens and his departure. M. Lang (*AJP* lxxxviii [1967] 180–3) proposed to deal with this difficulty by dating Peisandros' voyage after, not before, the episode described in 50–1. This solution does more violence to Thucydides' narrative than an alternative hypothesis, that Peisandros spent some time after his arrival in Athens in negotiating with individual oligarchs and revolutionary groups before he declared his plan in open assembly. He must presumably have made some public statement on arrival, and it seems most natural to place the deposition of Phryничος and (S)κιρονίδες and the despatch of Leon and Diomedon to Samos at the beginning of his time in Athens. This would mean that Thucydides'

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account of his mission is telescoped, and that one item is probably out of order, so that this hypothesis too does some violence to Thucydides. But Thucydides himself has tied the arrival of Peisandros to the solstice (emendation of the eighty days of 44. 4 would make no difference here) and his departure to the end of winter, so that the impression of a brief visit given by 53-4 cannot be entirely right; and it was argued at 53. 2 n. above that Thucydides' source in another respect over-dramatised his account of the assembly which Peisandros addressed. The data provided by Ar. *Lys.* (below) fit most easily if Peisandros had arrived in Athens before the Lenaia, but had not yet revealed his plan in public.

(d) By any chronology Peisandros must have left Athens well before the Dionysia in the middle of April, and before he left he gave his instructions to the *hetaireiai* and made other arrangements *ώστε μηκέτι διαμέλλεοθαι* (54. 4). This suggests *prima facie* that the terrorist campaign described in 65-6 began relatively early.

(e) *Aθ. π.* 32. 1 tells us that the democratic Boule was dissolved on 14 Thargelion and that the Four Hundred were installed on the 22nd. There is something wrong here (pp. 234-7 below), but a date within this area is also indicated by 33. 1, and a date substantially earlier would substantially increase the cost of paying off the deposed Boule (Th. 69. 4). Without claiming great precision, we may put the meeting at Kolonus (67. 2-3) in the early days of June. Peisandros had reached Athens again shortly before the previous meeting which appointed the constitutional commission (67. 1), but we are not told the interval between these meetings, though we might expect it to be relatively short.

Since we cannot imagine that Aristophanes composed his plays entirely at the last minute—as Dover remarks (*AC* 170), the plot of *Th.* may have begun to take shape immediately after the performance of *Helen* and *Andromeda*—the situation over the whole summer of 412 will be relevant for the background: the revolt of Chios and Miletos (14, 17), the easy recovery of Mytilene (23. 2), the largely successful campaign in Chios (24, 38, 40, cf. 55. 2-56. 1), the land victory outside Miletos (25. 2-5), the subsequent withdrawal (27. 6) and the loss of Iasos (28. 2). Though Athens lost important territory in 412, the prospect was less gloomy at the end of summer than it had been, and the loss of Iasos and Amorges could be blamed on Phrynicos (54. 3) rather than on inherent Athenian weakness. *Lys.* 313, *τις ξυλλάβοιτ'* ἀν τοῦ ξύλου τῶν ἐν Σάμῳ στρατηγῶν; may be relevant for the current mood. This line has no close connection with what precedes or follows, and appears to be simply part of the old men's complaint about their burden. Didymos (see Σ) took it as an allusion to the anti-democratic activities of Phrynicos, but he was surely wrong (cf. Jacoby on *FGrH* 342 F 17): the simpler explanation

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is that there was a widespread feeling that the generals at Samos were less active than they should be (cf. 38. 5 *ἥσυχαζον*).

Another relevant part of the background is the board of *probouloi* set up late in 413 (1. 3). They certainly played some part in setting up the oligarchy (67. 1 n.), but in these plays they are not formidable. It need not mean much that a *proboulos* is roughly handled in *Lys.* 387–610, for anyone in authority is liable to this kind of indignity in comedy, but at least the *probouloi* are no exception. In the scene which begins at *Lys.* 980 the Athenian speaker is identified by the sigla of the MSS. as a *proboulos*, and he plays a more dignified part, but the identification is very insecure (see Dover, *AC* 156–8) and it would not be safe to infer anything from this passage about the functions taken over by the *probouloi*. There may be more to *Th.* 808–9:

ἀλλ' Ἔνβούλης τῶν πέρυσίν τις βουλευτής ἐστιν ἀμείνων
παραδοὺς ἔτέρῳ τὴν βουλείαν; οὐδὲ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γε φήσει.

(It makes no great difference for our problem what text is adopted for the last five words. Maas' *'Ανυτος*, in some ways attractive, rather weakens the point, even if we could be sure what line Anytos would take at this stage. Kuster's *φήσει* is an improvement on *φήσεις*, for it is not clear to whom a 2nd pers. sing. would be addressed in this context.) Reference here to the usurpation of the Four Hundred is unlikely: in spring 410 the Five Thousand were still in power, among them men who had taken a leading part in the deposition of the Boule in 411, and the tone of this passage does not suit that situation. Other passages of *Th.*, to be discussed below, suggest rather conventional sentiments about democracy uttered under a democratic regime. It is reasonably certain that these lines refer to the surrender of some functions to the *probouloi* late in 413, and the question is how we should take them. For some ten lines here Aristophanes plays a game with names, contrasting ideal females (as Euboule) with men from real life. The game need not in every case involve strong condemnation of the men named, but Charminos' defeat is certainly criticized (804 δῆλα δὲ τἄργα) and there is no doubt of Aristophanes' hostility to Kleophon (805). So, though in the remaining instance there need be no special venom in the confrontation of *ὑμῶν οὐδεὶς* with Aristomache and Stratonike (806–7), it is reasonably sure that the action of 'last year's Councillors' is being treated as reprehensible or ridiculous. It was not indeed to be expected that the mood of late 413 would last, and that the Athenians would long remain patient with the restraint imposed by this elderly board; this passage suggests a feeling that their appointment had been a mistake, inhibiting vigorous conduct of the war.

The directly relevant passage of *Lys.* comes from the scene where

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Lysistrata argues to the *proboulos* that the war is fought entirely for the sake of money: 490-1

ἴνα γὰρ Πεισανδρος ἔχοι κλέπτειν χοὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπέχοντες
ἀεὶ τίνα κορκορυγὴν ἔκύκων.

This has been taken as a reference to Peisandros' proposals for an oligarchy, and 'those with their eyes on office' identified as oligarchic conspirators. This is not the most natural interpretation of *οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπέχοντες*, and the reference to Peisandros fits much more easily with his previous record in comedy as a war-mongering demagogue (49 n.). The decisive word is *ἀεὶ*. Peisandros and the others are up to the same tricks they have 'always' played: he is to be seen in his established character (so A. G. Woodhead, *AJP* lxxv [1954], 138), and the others are the professional politicians who monopolize office and evade military service, the familiar target of *Ve.* 682 ff. and other passages. A little later Lysistrata's elaborate metaphor from the preparation of wool for spinning includes (577-8)

καὶ τοὺς γε συνισταμένους τούτους καὶ τοὺς πιλοῦντας ἑαυτὸὺς
ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖσι διαξῆναι καὶ τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀποτίλαι.

The tangles in the wool are to be combed out, and the ones that are beyond combing (*τὰς κεφαλάς*) must be pulled off, and these tangles represent men who bind themselves together for the sake of office. *συνισταμένους* has again suggested conspiracy, but the verb can refer to combination of any kind, not only to illegal conspiracy, and the reference here is to the same category of office-seekers alluded to at 490.

Peisandros, a regular butt for the comic poets, might have served at any time as an example of a politician who made money corruptly out of the war, but it cannot be mere coincidence that he appears here in that role: that is, he did not turn up in Athens with a scheme to get money out of the Persians just before or after the performance of *Lys.*, in which Aristophanes happened to pick on him as an example. Equally, since Aristophanes saw him as performing in his regular demagogic role, he had not as yet made his oligarchic proposals in the assembly (cf. Busolt, iii/2, 1471 n. 1); or if he had, the impression made on Aristophanes, and therefore on the public generally, was very different from that which Thucydides conveys in 53-4. These conditions are most adequately met by supposing that Peisandros reached Athens about the time that Thucydides suggests, but did not at once put the proposal for an oligarchy to the assembly; that at first all that was generally known was that he had a plan to obtain money from the Persians, and Aristophanes introduced an allusion to this into *Lys.* at the Lenaia in February, treating it as the usual demagogue's racket.

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The play as a whole seems singularly free of foreboding about the city's internal affairs. It would be wrong to read much into 614 ff., where the chorus says it is no time for free men to sleep, *ἢδη γὰρ ὅξει ταῦτι πλειόνων καὶ μειζόνων πραγμάτων μοι δοκεῖ*; this is indeed the kind of phrase which Athenians used for plots against the constitution, but in fact the old men go on to speak of Hippias' tyranny, and then about treasonable contacts with Sparta, and there is no hint that they are alarmed about oligarchic plots. Nor should we take the play too solemnly as a plea for a negotiated peace. Peace and its blessings were always an acceptable subject for comedy, and this is not a pacifist play in the sense that the Athenians are here urged to make any substantial sacrifice for the sake of peace; the negotiations at 1112–88 are markedly unrealistic (the obscenities are there, in part, to prevent the scene from becoming too realistic); Lysistrata's conjugal strike affects Sparta as much as Athens (see Dover, *AC*, 158–61). It is arguable (but it is hard to be sure about such things) that a play which included negotiations for peace, however frivolous, might have been felt to be unsuitable early in 412 under the more immediate impact of the news from Sicily, but that the partial recovery of Athens during summer 412 would make the theme more palatable.

Two passages in *Th.* call for attention, apart from 808–9 discussed above. At 295 Aristophanes converts the meeting of the women at the Thesmophoria into a burlesque meeting of the ekklesia. The main joke, long drawn out, is to give feminine names and terminations where masculine would be expected, and no doubt in that masculine world it was very effective. At 331 the female herald launches out into her version of the *arai* formally pronounced at the opening of a session (cf. Rhodes 36–7), and curses among others those who negotiate with Euripides or the Mede. This has been seen as a topical reference to Peisandros' mission to negotiate with Tissaphernes, and if this play belongs to the Dionysia when the mission had already left, it cannot fail to glance at that, not favourably; but the curse on treating with the Mede was a standing item, still incongruously recited as late as 380 (Isoc. iv. 157), and the main point here is the inclusion of Euripides along with the national enemy. The treatment of other clauses of the *arai* in 338–48 warns us not to take this item too solemnly.

In the lyric version of the *arai* which follows at 352–71 there is no such burlesque element, but a more serious mood and some hint of trouble. 356–60, *ὅπσαι δ' ἔξαπατώσιν παραβαίνουσί τε τοὺς ὄρκους τοὺς νενομισμένους κερδῶν οὐνεκ'* ἐπὶ βλάβῃ, is not very specific, but again, if these lines were spoken in April when the plan for a change of constitution cannot still have been secret, the poet must to some extent have that plan in mind. In that case this phrase, conventional enough in normal circumstances, amounts to an exhortation to

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maintain the existing democratic order, with a suggestion that the would-be reformers have corrupt motives. That would be hard to imagine at a stage when the reformers already held Athens in the kind of grip described in Th. 65–6. In 361–2, ἡ ψηφίσματα καὶ νόμον ζητοῦσ' ἀντιμεθιστάναι, even the surface meaning is far from clear. Dover (*AC* 171) argues that the two prepositional prefixes in ἀντιμεθιστάναι must be given their full force (replace ... by each other), and that the sing. abstract *nόμος*, meaning ‘the inherited democratic constitution’, is contrasted with decrees such as those by which this constitution would be annulled in June. It would however be surprising if the poet here turned his attention to the means by which the reform was to be effected, and it is also surprising to find decrees treated here as somehow inferior or illegitimate. (It is generally agreed that the fourth-century Athenian distinction between *nόμοι* and *ψηφίσματα* was not clearly felt in the late fifth century [cf. M. Ostwald, *Nomos* 1–3], and the difficulty is not entirely removed by taking the sing. *nόμος* more generally, in the sense ‘traditional usage’; to go no further back, Perikles made a substantial change in ‘traditional usage’ by his decree of 451/0, and I doubt if objection could have been made to his procedure.) These difficulties would be removed if the phrase could refer to some threat against both decrees (the normal legislative process of the democracy) and the democratic way of life in general. That would involve finding another meaning for ἀντιμεθιστάναι. This is the only known occurrence of the active verb, and by some distance the first surviving occurrence of the word in any form. ἀντιμεθίσταοθαι and ἀντιμετάσταοι are found in Arist. *Phys.* 208 b 2, 209 b 25, 211 b 27 in the sense required by Dover (the verb helped out by ἀλλήλοις at its first occurrence, but not at its second), and *Meteor.* 366 b 20, 386 a 25, 32, have roughly the same sense; but at 367 b 24 ἀντιμεθισταμένου appears to mean ‘moving in the opposite direction’, and (at a much later date) Dion. Hal. *AR* iii 19.2 εἰς τὸ ἀντίπαλον αὐθις ἀντιμεταστάσεις (of military retreats) is perfectly clear. If these instances are enough to establish the possibility that ἀντι- here has the sense ‘opposite’, this curse might be directed against ‘those who seek to move decrees and law in the reverse direction’, sc. reverse to the normal, or perhaps, taking this clause more closely with the last, the reverse of that implied in τοὺς ὄρκους τοὺς νενομισμένους. Dover maintains his own view, but either interpretation presupposes that plans to change the constitution were a matter of public knowledge; and also that the situation was not yet so threatening as to prevent the poet from taking the conventional democratic attitude to such plans. 363–4, τὰ πόρρητά τε τοῖσιν ἔχθροῖς τοῖς ἡμετέροις λέγοντα’, looks like a conventional reference to giving secrets away to the enemy; in Thucydides’ account it has not yet been suggested that the conspirators contemplated treachery, but the

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suspicion would easily arise in democratic minds. 365–6, ὥ *Mήδους ἐπάγουσι τῆς χώρας οὗνεκ' ἐπὶ βλάβη*, can be reduced to sense by adopting the emendations of Velsen and Reiske (*κερδῶν οὗνεκ' ἐπὶ βλάβη* as in OCT), and the repetition from 360 is perhaps tolerable; but it is more likely that the repetition of *οὗνεκ' ἐπὶ βλάβη* is accidental and has displaced from 366 six syllables which would have completed the sense. If we keep *τῆς χώρας*, that should mean the homeland, and *ἐπάγουσι* is not a good description of anything that Alkibiades and Peisandros actually tried to do, but the words might still be taken as a hint at their negotiations. 367, *ἀσεβοῦσιν ἀδικοῦντιν τε τὴν πόλιν*, is all that we get for a main clause, and it is oddly tame (Wilamowitz, *AuA* ii. 355; contrast *Th.* 349–50): the proposal of C. Austin (*PCPhS* N.S. xx [1974], 1–2) to read *χώρας <οὐ μεμελημένοι>* in 366 does not meet this point. We may suspect that the text has gone wrong, but we cannot use what we have here for the further interpretation of the song as a whole.

We have to ask how closely the chorus here paraphrase the *arai* really delivered before a meeting, or depart from the norm. Reference to deceiving the people (357), to revealing secrets to the enemy (363–4) or negotiating with the Mede (365–6) seem conventional enough (Rhodes 37); that the *arai* should include curses against those who try to subvert the constitution is probable enough, but it is not easy to say whether or to what extent this chorus varies the wording to suit the special situation of spring 411. The important point is that at the festival at which *Th.* was produced it was still permissible and appropriate for the poet to reflect the conventional attitudes of the democrats. The same question is raised in a more general form by the assembly scene as a whole. *Th.* 66. 1 tells us that Council and assembly still met as late as the time of Peisandros' return to Athens, but under the strict control of the conspirators, and opposition brought sudden death. It seems hardly conceivable that Aristophanes could compose a parody of the procedure of the assembly at a time when it was thus terrorized and expecting immediate dissolution, but composition must have been earlier, and it is likely enough that the structure of the play was settled and the assembly scene at least roughed out before there was a serious threat of oligarchy. The issue is then whether at the time of the Dionysia it would be felt tolerable to retain such a scene (Lenaia would not present the same problem). Judgement on this can only be subjective, and it must be remembered that the substitution of a new scene of some 300 lines would be more difficult than the adaptation of single lines; but neither this scene nor the play as a whole suggests that a full-scale campaign of terrorism had yet begun.

There remains the invocation to Athena at 1136–47. Most of this is quite normal, but a less usual note is struck by 1143–6, *φάνηθ' ὁ*

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τυράννους στυγοῦσ' ὥσπερ εἰκός. δῆμός τοί σε καλεῖ γυναικῶν. As Dover points out (*AC* 171–2), hatred of tyranny is not a normal component of such invocations. The metre of 1143–4 is also unusual, running counter both to the metrical pattern and the tone of the song as a whole: bacchiacs in comedy are normally mock-solemn or paratragic, and a row of four is unique, the effect here being to heighten the emotional charge. The reappearance of the *δῆμος* — *γυναικῶν* is another odd feature, since the burlesque assembly is long past. The following reference to peace and festivals is unremarkable; not so the hatred of tyrants, which Aristophanes seems to argue (*ὥσπερ εἰκός*) Athena must feel, i.e. if she is to remain in character as the patron of democratic Athens. Once more it is hinted that democracy is in danger, and comedy rallies as usual to conventional defence of the existing order; but the hint of menace is here a little darker.

This review supports the widely accepted view that *Lys.* should be assigned to the Lenaia, *Th.* to the Dionysia*. By the middle of April it would not be possible to treat the proposals of Peisandros as the manœuvre of a known demagogue, as at *Lys.* 490–1; and the play shows no sign elsewhere of impending political trouble. This is a serious objection to the view of C. F. Russo (*Aristofane, autore di teatro* [1962], 298) that both these plays belong to the Dionysia, a view which in any case rests on shaky foundations (see Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*, 2nd ed. 39–40). *Th.* on the other hand shows some awareness of a threat to the democratic constitution (356–62, 1143–4): the problem here is rather that Thucydides' account (esp. 54. 4 *ὥστε μηκέτι διαμέλλεσθαι*) suggests that soon after Peisandros' departure the situation was radically changed through his instructions to the *hetaireiai*, so that some of the sentiments expressed in *Th.* would be wholly inappropriate or likely to cause trouble. But the indications for the Dionysia are clear enough, and we must suppose some further telescoping in Thucydides; Peisandros' departure must be put as late as possible; and there must be some interval between this and the outbreak of the terror. This is not an altogether unwelcome conclusion. The outright oligarchs, as appears later, were too small a group to keep up for long full-scale terrorism in the style of *Th.* 65–6, and their campaign is more easily understood if the beginning of it is postponed as late as possible.

Aristophanes' two plays, contemporary documents which we cannot neglect or dismiss, do thus invite us to modify the account given in Thucydides 53–4. In the light of other evidence about his sources and about the structure of this book, that is not especially disquieting.

2. Documents

(a) *Accounts and Inventories.* For the stele which contained the

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accounts of 411 and some preceding years, see ML 81. (In what follows '411' refers to the term of office, whatever the exact dates, of the treasurers of the Four Hundred, '411/10' to the term of the treasurers of the Five Thousand who succeeded them.) *IG i². 307*, probably from the accounts of 413/12 or 412/11, is too small a fragment to help us much, and is chiefly remarkable for the expenditure of a very large number of non-Attic staters, accumulated over the years and not spent while Attic currency held out; there is obvious attraction in Ferguson's suggestion (75 n. 3) that they were used before the special reserve of 1,000 Attic talents was freed for use (Th. 15. 1 with n.), but 412/11 can clearly not be ruled out. ML 81 is headed [*Αθηναῖοι ἀνήλω[σαν ἐπὶ Μνασιλόχου ἄρχοντος*], and contains a large part of the record of the first payment in this period, a substantial sum paid to the hellenotamiae '*Ἐκατ[ο]μβαιῶνος ἐνάτει [φθι]νοντος*'. In *Ἄθ. π.* 33. 1 Mnasilochos, the archon of the Four Hundred, is given two months *ἐπὶ Θεοπόμπου ἄρχοντος*, <ö>ηρξε τὸν ἐπιλοίπους δέκα μῆνας (sc. of 411/10), so it looks as if he took office at the start of the civil year, 1 Hekatombaion; we are not told whether the Four Hundred installed an archon of their own for the last few weeks of 412/11 or left the democracy's archon Kallias to finish out the year under supervision. The period covered by these accounts thus began not earlier than 1 Hekatombaion or later than 21 or 22 Hekatombaion, and the latter date is still a week earlier than the normal change of treasurers at the Panathenaia. It is inconceivable that the Four Hundred paid nothing in the last weeks of 412/11, but ML 81 tells us nothing about that.

The inventories give more help. For the Pronaos, *IG i². 250* shows the treasurers of 412/11, Kallaischros and colleagues, handing over to a board whose secretary, [*Εὐανδρος Ἐριθαλίονος Εὐονυμεύς*], is the secretary of the treasurers of ML 81; for the Parthenon, *IG i². 288* names the treasurer, *Ἀσοποδ[όροι] Κυδ[αθεναιεῖ]*, who appears in ML 81. 5-7; for the restorations to be made in the Hekatompedon records, see W. E. Thompson, *Hesp.* xxxiv (1965), 304, and B. H. Hill (ed. D. W. Bradeen), *Hesp.* xxxv (1966) 340. Thus the democratic board published in the usual form its handing over of the treasures to its oligarchic successors. We are given no date, but it is certain that no other board intervened between that of Kallaischros and that of Asopodoros. The alternatives are discussed by Ferguson, 145 n. 1: his tentative conclusion seems on balance the most likely, 'that in 411 B.C. the Tamiae entered upon office at the same time as the archon, that is to say, on Hekatombaion 1st'. That would imply that the treasurers of 412/11 were continued in office after the coup of the Four Hundred, and that the expenses of the remainder of the year were recorded by them, probably on the back of the stele below *IG i². 307*; and if so, it is that much more likely that the archon Kallias was

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also continued. But it was an innovation, perhaps seen as a desirable simplification, that the treasurers should take office at the same time as the archon and not wait till the Panathenaia. Other innovations in ML 81 are that authority for payment comes from the Council (14–15) not from the people; that payment is dated by month and day (above) not by prytany and day (see Th. 70. 1 n.); and that the script is Ionic (but 11, 15 have Attic lambda against 1, 9 Ionic: see Meritt's photograph in *AFD* 91, and his drawing, *ibid.*, pl. 1). We have no evidence to determine the purpose of the payment of over 27T in the middle of August.

For the small fragment which probably represents the accounts of 411/10, see Wade-Gery, *JHS* liii (1933) 136, and ML 81; the few surviving letters do not even determine whether Ionic script was again attempted. *IGi²*. 251, a small fragment of two lines in which enough of the patronymic and demotic survives to identify Euandros, the secretary in ML 81.8–10, seems to belong to a prescript in normal form to the handing over of the Pronaos treasures by the treasurers of 411 to those of 411/10 (Ameiniades and colleagues, *IG i²*. 253); on the (lost) record for the Parthenon, see W. E. Thompson, *CQ* n.s. xvi (1966) 288–9; for the Hekatomedon, Thompson, *Hesp.* xxxiv (1965) 306, Hill (above) 341. Little as this is, it throws some light on the confused circumstances of the transition from the Four Hundred to the Five Thousand. The latter, having at the time of their installation ten months of the year still to go, made a cleaner sweep than the Four Hundred seem to have done in June (above). The outgoing officers were not necessarily in trouble. Asopodoros and his colleagues handed over the treasures in their charge in a normal way and put up a record of their accounts, which implies that they passed their *euthynai* under the new regime, which included survivors from the Four Hundred; for all we know, these treasurers may have been respected members of the Five Thousand. M. H. Jameson (*Historia* xx [1971], 541–68, esp. 550–3) argues that on the political side the downfall of the Four Hundred was less sudden and cataclysmic than it might appear from Thucydides, and the evidence of these documents supports him.

On the transition in summer 410 the evidence is more mixed. The decree of Demophantos (And. i. 96–8) treats the restoration of the democratic Council as an epoch and fiercely denounces those who dissolve the democracy or hold office when it has been dissolved. A similar impression is given by Lys. xxv. 25–6 and by the texts relating to the *atimoi* of these years, esp. And. i. 75–6; and I have argued in *JHS* lxxiii (1953), 2–9 that there was for some years a political split between the city democracy and the generals in the Hellespont, some of them closely associated with the Five Thousand.

On the other hand Theopompos the archon of the Five Thousand

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was left undisturbed in office for a period, probably of some weeks, after the democratic restoration (Meritt, *AFD* 106 ff.), and ML 84 suggests an untroubled hand-over by the treasurers of 411/10 to their democratic successors (see their p. 258; Pritchett's objections to this reconstruction are reiterated in *The Choiseul Marble* [1970], 104–16; on this see also Meritt, *Proc. Am. Phil. Soc.* cxv [1971], 105–7, 114–15). It may further be noted that *IG i²*, 253, where the treasurers of 411/10 hand over to the board known from ML 84, omits the clause usual at the end of the prescript, *παραδεχομένοι παρὰ τὸν προτέρον ταμιῶν, κοῖς ὁ δεῖνα ἐγραμμάτευε*, as if by midsummer 410 it was no longer in order to mention officers of the Four Hundred, though earlier these treasurers had set up their record along with the rest. Again, if *IG ii²*, 1498, 6–8 refers to a dedication set up [*ὑπὸ*] *τῶν τεττάρων ἀρχῶν* [v] of the penteteris 414/13–411/10 (Ferguson 100–1), then not long after the democratic restoration the imperfectly democratic treasurers of 411/10 were accepted among these four *archai* along with the democrats of 414/13–412/11, but the treasurers of 411 were excluded, though their accounts had to remain on the stele (ML 81). It seems that for some reason the archon and treasurers of 411/10 were able to make their peace with the democrats, whereas not only Theramenes, Alkibiades, and Thrasybulos but also many less prominent persons could not (*JHS* lxxiii [1953], 2–9). The survival of Aristokrates (Th. 89, 2 n.) affords a parallel.

(b) *The decree for Pythophanes* (ML 80). The abnormal prescript shows that this belongs to an abnormal period. After a named *epistates*, we have (5) *καὶ μετ' αὐτῷ π[- - -]* with space for some four names thereafter. Wilhelm (see ML) pointed out the apparent conformity of this with *Aθ. π. 30.5, τὰς δὲ χειροτονίας κρίνειν πέντε τοὺς λαχόντας ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἔνα κληροῦσθαι καθ' ἕκαστην ἡμέραν τὸν ἐπιψηφιοῦντα*. Those who believed with Ferguson that *Aθ. π. 30* describes the constitution actually in force for 411/10 naturally assigned the decree to that time; the case against this equation was restated by de Ste. Croix (14–20), who assigned the decree to the Four Hundred (17–19). Argument based on the restoration of Pythophanes' ethnic as [*Kαρυτίων*] (ibid. 18) collapses with ML's demonstration that it should not be so restored. But there is great attraction in Wilhelm's view that line 5 (quoted above) refers to officials entitled *πρόεδροι*; and the original enrolment of the Four Hundred begins in Th. 67, 3 with the election of five *proedroi*. Further it is only by an expedient which ML distrust that this prescript can be brought partly into line with that of Andron's decree (below), which certainly belongs to the early days of the Five Thousand.

One may note that Pythophanes is called the benefactor of the city of Athens (11), not of the people; and we learn something about the

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officials of the regime. But the main contribution of this document may be rather to enlighten us about the status of *Aθ. π. 30* (below).

(c) *The decree of Andron* ([Plu.] 833 d–834 b = Krateros, *FGrH* 342 F 5 b). The decree provides for the arrest and trial of Archeptolemos, Onomakles, and Antiphon; thus it comes after the downfall of the Four Hundred and is rightly dated to the archonship of Theopompos, 411/10. Since the text is quoted from Caecilius of Kale Akte, the critic of the Augustan period, it will not have been affected by the wilder confusions of the ps.-Plutarch's mind (*Th.* 68. 1 n.), though it was of course exposed to the ordinary perils of manuscript transmission.

The prescript is again abnormal: ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ μᾶς καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτανείας. Decision lay with the Council and apparently no sort of assembly was involved, but de Ste. Croix (17) has argued that in the *eisangelia* procedure the Council would at all times have been thus competent (cf. Rhodes 166). But the date by numbered day of the prytany is abnormal for this period; the fact that the prytany itself is not in any way identified (so that we learn only that there was a system of prytanies but nothing of its character) is still more surprising, but if the formula was meant as a date the prytany must have been identifiable and it is permissible to guess that something has fallen out of the text (cf. Rhodes 29 n.7), perhaps an ordinal number. There follow the names and demotics of *grammateus* and *epistates*, from the same tribe, which would not be possible under democratic systems of this period. The proposer Andron is said by Harpokration (s.v. "Ανδρων", citing Krateros, *FGrH* 342 F 5a) to have been one of the Four Hundred, so it seems there was more information to be found than the bare name in this document. Probability is in favour of the widely accepted identification of this Andron with Andron Androtonos Gargettios, father of the politician and Atticographer Androton (see Jacoby's introduction to the latter, p. 87) and companion of the sophists (Pl. *Gorg.* 487c, *Prt.* 315c). The generals have denounced the three men named for their embassy to Sparta, and they are to be arrested and handed over to the court by the generals, with the help of up to ten others co-opted from the Council, for speedy trial for treason. Caecilius (i.e. Krateros) subjoined the verdict: Archeptolemos and Antiphon, both present, were convicted of treason and were to suffer death, confiscation of property, and other penalties, and this was to be recorded on a bronze stele in the place where the decrees relating to Phrynicos were set up.

The document gives no detail on the nature of the court, though the *thesmoothelai* were to summon the defendants and bring them into court, from which one might surmise that the old forms were being to some extent observed, even if the jurors were now to be drawn from a higher income class. But it could not afford to be too

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democratic in composition when Theramenes was one of the accusers (Lys. xii. 67), and others implicated in the setting up of the Four Hundred. The charge that the embassy to Sparta was an act of treason was formally convenient, since the new regime proposed to carry on the war, but Thucydides was in no doubt that the accusers laid most weight on the constitutional charge (68. 2: ὡς ξυγκατέστησε appears to be outside the area of corruption in that sentence), and Antiphon's speech went later by the title *περὶ τῆς μεταστάσεως* (fr. 1, 2–6 Th., all from Harpokration). The prosecution must therefore have taken a line which would incriminate Antiphon without damaging Theramenes or Andron (see § 3 below).

The most surprising fact here revealed is that Antiphon was there to be tried at such a late date. Before this decree there had been time to set up a constitution, appoint generals and other officers, and run through twenty days of a prytany (one would guess, the first); yet all three men were still at liberty in Athens, and only Onomakles escaped after the order for his arrest (see Jameson, *Historia* xx [1971] 553). On this, see § 3 below; for Phrynicos, Th. 92. 2 with n.

3. *Antiphon*

Harpokration's quotations from *περὶ τῆς μεταστάσεως* give no clear indication of the line his defence took: Eētioneia and the Four Hundred (fr. 5–6) were bound to be mentioned whatever case he made. The argument of the Geneva papyrus is more interesting: J. Nicole, *L'apologie d'Antiphon* (1907); Thalheim (1914) prints the whole, cols. iv–vii with Nicole's adventurous restorations relegated to the apparatus; Gernet (1923) only cols. i–iii and part of vii. The speaker runs through the reasons why men want to overthrow the constitution, and claims that none apply to himself: he had not held financial office and did not fear *euthyna*, he was not *atimos*, he had done the state no wrong and was not afraid of an impending lawsuit, the state had not deprived him of money, his ancestors had done the state no wrong. But, he says, the prosecutors say that he wrote speeches for litigants and made money from that: but this trade could be pursued only under democracy, not in an oligarchy. Thus far the text can be restored continuously, with controversy only over a few details; the rest is more fragmentary.

There can be no doubt that Antiphon is cast as the speaker: for his activity as a speech-writer see Th. 68. 1 with n.; Theramenes appears as one of his accusers in col. iv. 6–8 (cf. Lys. xii. 67); and in col. vi. 17–18 *ρυνίχος η πει ... τραπός* the restoration of Phrynicos' name is inevitable, and Nicole was surely right to see in the second name Peisandros corrupted to Peistratos. Doubt about the attribution

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was expressed by G. Pasquali (*Stud. stor. per l'ant. class.* i [1908] 46–57) and P. Roussel (*REA* xxvii [1925], 5–8), on grounds of the content. They were justified in reacting against Nicole's interpretation, that Antiphon admitted guilt as an oligarch but stressed that he had no personal interest in promoting revolution (as Roussel says, that was no defence but defiance of the court); and both, noting that this line of argument is found elsewhere (e.g. *Lys.* xx. 3–4, xxv. 7–12), hoped that there might be some other defendant of this period to whom the conditions imposed by the papyrus might apply, but they underrated the difficulty of this. The possibility that this is a school exercise, an imaginary speech written (so to say) in parallel with the genuine speech, should perhaps not be rejected out of hand, but this expedient will be unnecessary if it can be shown that the difficulties raised by Pasquali and Roussel are not insuperable.

It was argued in 2(c) above that the prosecutors, in dealing with the original revolution, must have differentiated between the positions of Theramenes and Antiphon; and that explanation is needed for the fact that the three named in Andron's decree stayed in Athens so long. On the first point, the prosecution can only have argued that reform of the democracy was salutary and necessary, but stressing the need to be on good terms with the fleet and Alkibiades (who was ready to tolerate the Five Thousand [Th. 86. 6, 89. 1–2] and still made large claims for his influence over Tissaphernes [108. 1]); and that Antiphon and the extremists had perverted the course of the reform, setting up an arbitrary government which was bad in itself and had alienated the fleet. In a defence against such charges we can find a place for the papyrus fragments, though conjecture is needed to complete the argument. That is, Antiphon did not need to deny that he had a large share in setting up the oligarchy, but he must claim that he was the right kind of oligarch and to this end it would do him no harm to maintain that he had no personal interest in overturning the democracy. The hurdles he had to surmount were the belief that he did belong to the extremist wing of the oligarchy, and his part in the embassy to Sparta. That seems to entail that he alleged, however implausibly, that others had been responsible for the turn that the revolution took at Kolonus, and here the reference in col. vi. 17–18 to Phrynicos and (Peisandros) may be relevant: the former, given first place on the extremist wing by Thucydides (90. 1), was conveniently dead, while the latter, who had taken the lead at Kolonus (68. 1), had discredited himself by flight, giving Antiphon a free hand for allegation. (There is perhaps an echo of this in Arist. *Pol.* 1305 b 24: see below § 7(a) for this.) It remains hard to see how Antiphon could have hoped to persuade a contemporary jury that Phrynicos and not himself was to blame for what he was in fact

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charged with; but it is hard to imagine any defence by Antiphon that had any chance of success, yet he did defend himself and his defence was admired by judges who knew the situation.

Here the fact that he did not make his escape is relevant. If Antiphon alone had stayed, one might regard that as a decision of principle, to stand his ground and take the consequences; but it is not so easy to imagine that all three, Archeptolemos and Onomakles as well as Antiphon, were courting danger in this way. A more attractive line of explanation was adopted by Jameson (*Historia* xx [1971], 541–68), that it took some time before it was clear what character the new regime would exhibit. The Four Hundred were formally deposed (Th. 97. 1), but that might be taken as not much more than a formal response to Alkibiades' demand (86. 6), which had to be treated respectfully (89. 2). Developments in the preceding days had not been altogether favourable to the democrats, in spite of 92. 11: at 93. 3 the hoplites appeared ready to do some kind of a deal with the Four Hundred, and even when the hoplites came out on top after the battle of Eretria (97. 1 ὅποσοι καὶ σπλα παρέχονται), the survivors of the Four Hundred might again hope for compromise. It must be kept in mind that no one had practical experience of 'moderate' oligarchy, as they had of the workings of democracy, and for the last few months of tight oligarchy; and even when the constitution had been worked out it was probably still unclear in what spirit it would be administered. The archon and other officers had to be changed, but as argued in 2(a) above the treasurers survived an audit; and it may well be that the numerous acquittals of guilty oligarchs mentioned in Lys. xx. 14 included some that took place under the Five Thousand (Jameson 553, with n. 35). The big difficulty for Antiphon was that the new government decided to carry on the war, and from the circumstances in which it was set up this must have been obvious from the start, so that the negotiations of the previous regime with Sparta could not but damage his cause. It would be clearer if we had that part of his speech which dealt with the formal charge of treachery: as it is, we can only note again that he did offer a defence, and speculate that he might have made use of the fact that the negotiations failed.

Some disquiet may still be felt because in the papyrus fragments Antiphon, detailing his hypothetical grounds of quarrel with the existing constitution, speaks of 'you' (*ὑμεῖς*) as if the regime under which he was standing trial were continuous with the deposed democracy, and this jury with the old democratic juries; and this could be the slip of a later writer unfamiliar with the situation. But it may be no more than an extreme example of the tendency of Attic orators to equate the jury they are addressing with the state of Athens.

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Antiphon's speech has sometimes been suggested as a source for Aristotle: see below, pp. 247-8.

4. *Lysias*

Lysias xx *pro Polystrato* is wholly concerned with the defence of an admitted member of the Four Hundred. An unattractive speech, it raises a number of problems.

The first is, how much we have of how many speeches. As Wilamowitz noted (*AuA* ii. 363-4), there is an abrupt break at § 11, where the first sentence beginning *καίτοι* does not carry on the argument but starts an entirely fresh subject. His contention that a new speaker takes over at this point is convincing. (a) The defendant is *οὗτοι Πολύστρατος* in § 1, and *οὗτος* five times in 2-8; at § 11 he is suddenly *ὁ πατήρ* (twice), and thereafter *ὁ πατήρ* alternates with *οὗτος*, whether the relationship is relevant or not. (b) § 4 speaks of the sons in the third person, while 24-27 describe the actions of the son in Sicily in the first person: the straightforward explanation, that the speaker of § 4 is not the son, is much easier than any alternative. For a possible parallel, Libanius in the hypothesis (§ 5) to D. xxxiv claims a concealed change of speaker there (he places the change at § 21 of the speech: for alternative theories see Paley and Sandys ad loc.), and notes the contrast with D. lix where the change is marked explicitly. If there are two speeches here, neither is complete. The second has a clear peroration, but § 11 cannot be its opening; the first breaks off before the end, and we should at least consider the possibility that § 1 is not its beginning. On fragmentary speeches see Dover, *Lys.* 160. Someone wanted these pieces to have a continuing circulation, possibly the 'consultant' if P. was acquitted, but one may doubt if a speech-writer at any stage of his career would wish to put them out as an advertisement of his powers, whereas P.'s family might wish to give wider circulation to his justification. Neither fragment gives a consecutive account of P.'s activities in 411, which may have stood in the lost sections of the first speech, or in another speech altogether spoken by P. himself (Wilamowitz, *AuA* ii. 362). What we have is comment and argument, and his sons' services, and we have difficulty in making out all that happened.

P. was over seventy (10) and wealthy, with two sons in the cavalry (24, 28: see Davies 12076, with the probable identification of the sons), and it is represented that he lost heavily by the war (33); his deme was that of Phrynicos (12), Deirades. Such a man might indeed have been caught by the initial propaganda of the revolution, and have been drawn in further than his son wishes us to believe. § 5 introduces the charge that he had 'held many offices'. The brief reference does not exclude routine office under the democracy, but

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§ 6 in fact begins (*πρῶτον μέν*) with office held at Oropos at the time when it was betrayed (winter 412/11, see Th. 60. 1) or shortly before. The text thereafter, *οὐτε προέδωκε καὶ ἔτέραν πολιτείαν κατέστησε*, is plainly wrong: the anomalous *οὐτε* --- *καὶ* can be removed by emendation (Taylor's *οὐθ'* for the *καὶ*, which he explains as duplication of the preceding *-κε*; or *οὐδέ* for *οὐτε* could be defended in the sense 'it is not the case that he did A and B'), but the trouble at Oropos was not constitutional and it is easier with Wilamowitz (*ibid.* 365–6) to posit a lacuna.

There was no denying P.'s membership of the Four Hundred. The first speaker (§ 2: see below) puzzles us with the assertion that P. was elected by his tribesmen. The son lays more stress on his appointment as *katalogeus* and his unwillingness to serve (13–14). Eight days after his entry into the Bouleuterion he sailed out to Eretria, was wounded in the sea-battles there, and returned to Athens only after the fall of the Four Hundred (14). Mention of the battles has suggested that P.'s eight days came late in the period, that he went out in the final crisis with Thymochares (Th. 95. 2–3: he must then have been co-opted into the Four Hundred to fill a vacancy); but § 17 rebuts the hypothetical charge that he sailed out to make money, *ώσπερ ἔνιοι ἥρπαζον καὶ ἔφερον*, which was hardly a prospect for Thymochares' emergency squadron (Wilamowitz, *ibid.* 359 n. 6). The next sentence makes it clear that he sailed out to his *ἀρχή*, and that sends us back to the *ἀρχαι* of § 6, where *ἔτέραν πολιτείαν κατέστησε* inevitably reminds us of Th. 64–65. 1, the mission of Peisandros and others to set up oligarchies in the cities. An officer sent out to Eretria by the Four Hundred near the beginning of their rule might well have been instructed to set up or support an oligarchy there; and the continuation, *τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, οἵσοι ἥρχον, καταπροδόντων τὰ πράγματα*, probably means that other officers sent to Euboea did alter constitutions and that this contributed to the Athenian defeat (for the behaviour of the Eretrians see Th. 95. 6, ML 82). The guilty fled, but P. trusted in his innocence and stood trial. It has been suggested that he was *φρούραρχος* in Eretria (Wilamowitz, *ibid.* 358–9), but then it would be much harder to deny responsibility; command of the *τείχισμα* of Th. 95. 6, which did save some Athenian lives, would be more in his favour, but no such credit is claimed for him. Since he fought in the battles it is more likely that he commanded one or more of the ships that were at Eretria before Thymochares arrived (Th. 95. 2–3), but his responsibility in the battle cannot have been great or he would have suffered a heavier penalty than a money fine, however large (14, 18). If P.'s eight days came at the start of the regime, the Four Hundred sent a *katalogeus* out of town before he had time to carry out his task, and that fits well with Th. 92. 11.

P. underwent two trials (11, etc.). The first was *εὐθὺς μετὰ τὰ*

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πράγματα (22), so still under the Five Thousand when, it is claimed (18), men were afraid to speak the truth. The formal charge is nowhere stated, but it is a natural guess that it arose from the εὐθυναι for his office in Eretria: note the people whose name was cleared ἐν τῷ λογιστηρίῳ (10: cf. the decree in And. i. 78). The one thing we certainly know about the first trial is that an attempt was made to associate P. with Phrynicos (11), i.e. with the now discredited right wing of the oligarchs. He was condemned to a large fine (14, 18: the amount is not given), but it is not said that he paid it, only ὥφλε, nor is there reference to complaint that he had not paid it, and the ingenious suggestion has been made that the restoration of democracy came in time to rescue him (Gernet, introd. p. 58, 59 with n. 3); the fourth-century system would have given him till the ninth prytany to pay (A.D. n. 54. 2), and the Five Thousand possibly waited till the corresponding time of year. The restoration, though it took place before the end of the archon-year (2(a) above), can hardly have come so early as the first day of prytany IX in a normal year; but by then, or at any time after the victory of Kyzikos early in the spring, the regime was crumbling and may have left P. in peace.

The second trial, for which these speeches were composed, came after the restoration: 17 νῦν δὲ ἡνίκα αὐτὸς ἐννούστατός ἔστιν ὁ δῆμος suggests that the restoration was very recent (de Ste. Croix 13). There is no need, with Thalheim, to come down to 409 on the ground that the middle son, the speaker of 11 ff., would not have been released from his service at Katane (24–5) before fighting between Syracuse and Katane came to an end (Diod. xiii. 56. 2). The charge, again, is not stated clearly, but evidently P.'s membership of the Council of the Four Hundred is important. His conduct had been objectionable enough to the 'moderates' of the Five Thousand to earn him a substantial fine, and it is not surprising that the democrats liked him even less and wanted to increase the fine to a sum which, the son claims (33–6), would have the effect of disfranchising the whole family; but he did not rate instant death on the lines of Demophantos' decree of summer 410 (And. i. 96) and it is clear that no one took him seriously as a prime instigator of the revolution. We have no means of inferring the verdict at this trial, but the family survived. (The eldest son had the unusual name Philopolis [see Davies 12076]; did Polystratos feel it prudent to advertise his patriotism, at a date which cannot be later than 440?)

These speeches yield us two certain facts of importance.

(a) The Kolonus meeting did vote to hand power over to a body of Five Thousand. The vote in § 13 cannot have been passed at any later meeting of the people during the time of the Four Hundred, nor at the meetings after their fall (Th. 97. 1–2) since P. was not present (14); his tenure of the office of *katalogeus* must precede his departure

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for Eretria. That certifies the interpretation given above for the content of the main body of Peisandros' motion at Kolonos (Th. 67. 3 n.), and it raises the probability that *Aθ. π. 29. 5*, so far as it goes, has the main facts of that motion right.

(b) It shows that *katalogeis* were in fact appointed at this early stage (13–14), and thus confirms the provision for their appointment in the decree of *Aθ. π. 29. 5*.

After that the difficulties multiply. According to his son (14) P. did not want to swear or to become *katalogeus*; the oath here must be the one imposed on the *katalogeis* in *Aθ. π. 29. 5*, and the oath two lines later (*ὤμοσε τὸν ὁρκὸν*) must be the same oath. After swearing it P. entered the Bouleuterion, and the passage reads as if his entry were in some way the consequence of his swearing. Wilamowitz (*ibid. 357*) argued that the only explanation was that appointment as *katalogeus* carried with it membership of the Four Hundred, and later critics have followed him (Hignett 365, more correctly than on p. 361). This in turn might offer help with § 2, where it is said that P. was elected by his tribesmen, who knew the sort of man he was; and in the context that appears to mean election to the Four Hundred. This does nothing to rehabilitate *Aθ. π. 31. 1*, where the Four Hundred are to be chosen from *πρόκριτοι* elected by their tribesmen; other objections apart, the argument of §§ 1–2 is that we must distinguish, among the Four Hundred, those who like P. were really loyal to the people. The proof of his loyalty is this election, and if they had all been elected his opponents had a very easy answer; but if the elected *katalogeis* automatically became members of the Council, they form a body which could be distinguished from the rest by the criterion of election. Relating this to Thucydides, the ingenious solution has been found, that the hundred *katalogeis* were identical with the first hundred chosen in Th. 67. 3 by his five *proedroi* (Wilamowitz, *ibid. 357–8*: but he thought that Aristotle was right and Thucydides wrong). According to this theory, it was pretended that the choice of this first hundred was a free choice made by those of the tribesmen who were present at Kolonos.

Not all of this elaborate structure is sound. The decree in *Aθ. π. 29. 5* provides for election from the tribes but not by them; that however might be casual omission by Aristotle. It is a little more serious that §§ 13–14 give no hint that P. was *katalogeus* by election, and the whole pressure to accept office comes from an unspecified 'them'; and if the identification of the *katalogeis* with Thucydides' first hundred is correct, the pretence of election by the tribe was a surprisingly thin pretence to offer to a jury little more than a year later. Further, P.'s defence would be equally valid for the other 99 *katalogeis*, and if they were all men of known loyalty, what sort of men would they co-opt for the remaining three-quarters of the Four Hundred? It is true that

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these are not particularly lucid speakers, and need not be supposed logical enough to see where their argument led or honest enough to draw the consequences; but with such speakers we cannot be sure either of the apparent implication of § 14, that P. entered the Council as a consequence of swearing the oath of the *katalogeis*, and this is the main foundation of Wilamowitz's case.

The difficulties would be less if we could suppose that P.'s defence would be valid for less than a whole quarter of the Four Hundred. The unclear allusion in § 2 cannot have been the first mention in court of P.'s election by his tribe, and things might look different if we had a connected narrative in either speech, or the possibly lost beginning of the first. The possibility might be considered, that the tribal election was to some post quite unconnected with the Four Hundred, and is twisted by the speaker into a criterion to distinguish P. from the guilty men; but the language of §§ 1-2 is very much against separation of this election from the context of the revolution. In that case election as *katalogeis* is still the most probable, but the consequent difficulties can be avoided if we refuse the apparent implication of § 14 that the post carried with it automatic membership of the Council. We may also abandon the identification of the *katalogeis* with Thucydides' first hundred, which was never more than a by-product of the belief that they were Councillors. Instead we may suppose that the Four Hundred did hold a tribal election of *katalogeis*, no doubt still at Kolonos after the adoption of Peisandros' motion, and that it was coincidence, not in the circumstances an unlikely one, that P. (and no doubt others) were found on both lists. Such election would not be worth much as evidence of the esteem in which his tribesmen held P., but to bring this forward would be less ludicrous than to bring forward, as if it had been genuine election, the fact that the five *proedroi* had picked on P. In the present state of our information no solution of this puzzle can be anything but speculative.

There remains the weird assertion in § 13 that P., in the bare eight days available, had drawn up a list of 9,000 in his desire to quarrel with none of his demesmen but to include all who wished and to excuse all who thought it better to stay out. Behind this there might lie some genuine attempt by his demesmen to negotiate with their local *katalogeis* (Wilamowitz's contention [356 n. 1] that $\delta\eta\mu\sigma\tau\alpha$ here means the whole people can hardly be right), but it is not likely that the figure has any relation with any real activity by P.: that is, the speaker did not do a calculation for the whole catalogue based on any principle adopted by P., or even simply multiply by 100 a list which P. had really produced. It is possible, as is often assumed, that 9,000 was the real total of a list drawn up in the autumn, when the 'Five Thousand' were actually constituted, and Thucydides' phrase at 97. 1 suggests that no regard was paid to the number which had now

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become merely their name; but it would be unwise to build much on the hypothesis that '9,000' has this origin in real life, for the speakers of Lys. xx need have no better source than rumour or invention.

The useful and reliable information we get from them is confined to the two points noted above. Neither depends on their veracity or intelligence: § 13–14 could never have been written unless P. had been appointed one of the *katalogeis*, nor would the latter have been set up to make a list of 5,000 unless the assembly had voted to hand power over to such a body.

The denunciation of Theramenes in xii. 62–78 gives us some scraps of information: Hagnon's membership of the *probouloī* (65), the joining of Kallaischros with Peisandros as one of Theramenes' principal opponents within the Four Hundred (66), Theramenes' part in the trial of Antiphon and Archeptolemos (67). As an estimate of Theramenes' career and character its bias is evident, like that of xiii. 9 ff. There are other scraps elsewhere, of which the most important is xxv. 9, the description of Phrynicos and Peisandros as demagogues who changed sides in fear of punishment for their crimes against democracy. The case of the latter is clear enough (Th. 49. n.); Phrynicos has not a comparable record, so the appellation 'demagogue' and the ascription of motive here need not be trusted implicitly, but we can take it that his appearance as an oligarch was a surprise to the people.

We are compelled by the thinness of our sources to comb the Lysian corpus for data, but it is *prima facie* unlikely that writers of the fourth century would do the same, for there were from an early stage enough straightforward histories and other literature. The Michigan papyrus published by Youtie and Merkelbach in *ZPE* ii (1968) 161–9 does indeed show a later author quoting *Lys.* xii. 69 almost verbatim. But though the author has been taken for a historian, he need not have been: I have set out a case (*ibid.* vi [1970], 35–8; but see R. Sealey, *ibid.* xvi [1975], 279–88) for supposing that this is a defence of Theramenes against his detractors, which quotes from Lysias only to rebut him. It is not to be expected that speeches like those for Polystratos would attract the same attention as Lysias' own speech against Eratosthenes, and it would be surprising if a writer of the time of Aristotle or earlier had gone to them for information.

5. General Histories

(a) The most remarkable contribution made by Xenophon comes at *HG* ii. 3. 45: whereas Thucydides and Aristotle are agreed that the proposal for constitutional change was recommended to the people as a means to conciliate the king of Persia, Theramenes is here made

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to say that the demos itself voted the constitution of the Four Hundred, διδασκόμενος ὡς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ δημοκρατίᾳ πιστεύσειαν. The continuation (46) leaves no doubt that this is what Xenophon meant to say. His editors seem to accept this without surprise and the passage has attracted little notice: Busolt (iii/2. 1459 n. 3) cited it, without comment on its oddity, in connection with the approaches of the Four Hundred to Agis (Th. 70. 2): Grote however (vi. 244 n. 2) saw the point and denounced Theramenes for transferring to 411 what belonged in 404. Possibly Theramenes, speaking to a Council dominated by the Thirty about his own share in setting up the Four Hundred, did have the temerity to pretend that the movement was begun in order to make peace with Sparta, and has been correctly reported; but the point adds little to his argument, which is in any case neither very lucid nor very logical, and it remains possible that the confusion is in Xenophon's own mind.

Since the regime of the Five Thousand had still several months to run from the point where Xenophon takes over from Thucydides, the *Hellenica* should have told us something about the course of this regime and its abolition in summer 410. In fact Xenophon reports nothing from Athens attributable to this summer except Agis' foray up to the walls of Athens and Thrasyllos' share in the defence (i. 1. 33-4): probably, as in some later instances, he merely shut his eyes against a development which he found personally distasteful. As a result he gives us almost nothing of importance: Kritias' attack on Theramenes does something to balance that of Lysias, especially as to the political standing of his father Hagnon (*HG* ii. 3. 30; *Lys.* xii. 65); Theramenes' reply defines his own political position (ii. 3. 48) in terms which would allow us, if we accept them, to give an intelligible account of his career, and also to understand his failure; Xenophon also lists the generals of the Four Hundred who had particular responsibility for building the Eētioneia fort (ii. 3. 46; see Th. 90. 1 n.), and Euryptolemos' speech at i. 7. 28 tells us that Aristarchos, after his escape and the trick that he played at Oinoe (Th. 98), was put on trial in Athens before autumn 406, in circumstances which are not explained.

(b) We know from *Hell. Oxy.* 7(2). 4 that the author at least concerned himself with events of summer 411 earlier than the latest that Thucydides describes: see Th. 64. 4 n., and also 95. 2, 106. 3 nn. for other possible indications that his narrative did not, like Xenophon's, begin where that of Thucydides left off, but overlapped with some part of book viii. If the author was Kratippos of Athens, a question which cannot be discussed here, we know from Plu. *mor.* 345d (*FGH* 64 T 2) that he made much of Theramenes' part in overthrowing the oligarchy. Whether he was Kratippos or not, this

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was a sober and well-informed historian, positively greedy for facts, who might well feel that the omissions in Thucydides' account of the latter part of this summer called for a full-scale narrative to replace it, not for occasional retrospective supplement; the back-reference at 7(2). 4 is not certainly to such a narrative, but that is very much more than a bare possibility. Unhappily the surviving fragments give us no direct information about the revolutions of 411, and the possible reflections of this version in Diodoros are excessively meagre.

(c) For many years after 411 the version epitomized by Diodoros differs in many factual details from that given by Xenophon, and the London fragments of *Hell. Oxy.* left no doubt that this history was the ultimate source for Diodoros' account of the operations of summer 395: the relevant passages of Diodoros (and others) are conveniently set out in Bartoletti's Teubner edition of *Hell. Oxy.* If we accept the prevalent view that Ephoros was the immediate source for this part of Diodoros' work, we may legitimately infer that over the whole period from 411 to 395, and indeed further, Ephoros followed the version of *Hell. Oxy.* in preference to that of Xenophon. The influence of this source is most easily traceable in the military narrative for 395, and it was probably always greater in the field of war than in that of politics, where the material available to Ephoros is likely to have been more varied, and his own tastes and prejudices might have more effect: cf. e.g. Diod. xiii. 102, xiv. 4-5 (*Phoenix* xxviii [1974], 119-20).

Diodoros gives us the Four Hundred and the defeat off Eretria twice, at xiii. 34. 1-3 and 36, both under the year 412/11, separated by a section on Syracuse and the lawgiver Diokles. Both versions are scrappy in the extreme (there is so much Syracusan history in these years that Diodoros' attention to Greece greatly varies), and they constitute a doublet of an unusual kind: not, that is, two versions of the same event presented by two sources in such a way as to deceive the author into thinking they are two separate events, but here Diodoros seems by some kind of inadvertence to have summarized the same source twice. The versions are not quite identical: 34. 2 gives revolts in the Athenian empire as the cause for the oligarchic revolution, whereas 36. 1 stresses Athenian determination and is close to Th. viii. 1, and the revolts in the empire are here postponed (36. 5) till after the battle of Eretria. The accounts of the battle, short as they are, are so close that we are almost bound to take both as derived from Ephoros. They do not yield much: 34. 2 tells us that the people in their despondency handed over power voluntarily to the Four Hundred, while 36. 2 gives a military motive, that they thought the oligarchy would conduct the war better. Had Diodoros given us more material we might be able to determine the views of his source, but as it is we can only note that any account of the Four Hundred

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is likely to begin, as Th. 53–4 or *Aθ. π.* 29. 1, with the oligarchs persuading the people that they cannot continue the war without Persian subsidies and that they must change their constitution to please the king. The battle of Eretria differs in at least one substantial point from Th. 95, the quarrel of the two Athenian generals (unfortunately not named), but the figure for Athenian losses agrees with Th. 95. 7. For the detail see Th. 95. 2 n.: we have no other account of the battle and so cannot tell what further influence the non-Thucydidean version had.

The overthrow of the Four Hundred comes at xiii. 38. 1, after which our texts give *καὶ τὸ σύστημα τῆς πολιτείας ἐκ τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστήσαντο*; in view of Th. 97. 1 and *Aθ. π.* 33. 1, Krüger's *όπλιτῶν* is here an almost inevitable correction. 38. 2 gives high praise to Theramenes as the introducer of this, and the praise recurs at 42. 2. For his role at the trial of the generals after Arginousai, and argument that Diodoros' version of this comes from the Oxyrhynchus historian, see *Phoenix* xxviii (1974), 112–22; the account of Theramenes' end at xiv. 3. 6–5. 4 evidently comes from a less reputable source. Diodoros' version also rates very highly the abilities of Alkibiades, his potential and actual services to Athens (xiii. 37. 2–5, 38. 2, 42. 1, 53. 4), but charges against him are also listed (73. 3–74), and pride of place is given to the wrongs of Kyme, the native city of Ephorus.

It is regrettable that we can come no closer to the version of the Oxyrhynchus historian, who would certainly have added to our store of credible fact. But it is important also to know what Ephorus made of these events, in view of the general influence which his history exercised in antiquity, and of the probability that it was known to Aristotle. Diodoros has left us virtually nothing by which we could judge his treatment of the central episode, and what has been discussed above is not reassuring. For detail of Athenian history, however, the local historians were probably more influential than universal historians.

6. *Atthidographers*

The earlier members of this group must have told the story, but we have little idea what they said. Hellanikos reached the year 407/6 (*FGrH* 323a F 25, 26), but nothing survives from his record of 411, nor have we the means to identify his influence on any later writer. Even less is known of the work of Kleidemos of Athens in the middle of the fourth century: if he was 'a staunch democrat' (Jacoby, *Atthis* 75), his account would have been solidly hostile to the oligarchs and is not likely to have had much influence on a mainly anti-democratic tradition.

Androtion is less shadowy and altogether more important. The

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fullest recent discussion is Jacoby's introduction to *FGrH* 324. He had a long and active political career: Demosthenes (xxii. 66 = 324 T 3) gives him already 'more than thirty years', which on any dating of the speech *against Androtion* takes his beginnings back to the early 380s. For the epigraphic record, on *IG* ii². 61 (=T4) see D. M. Lewis, *BSA* xlix (1954), 34; on *IG* ii². 216/7 (=T5), Lewis *ibid.* 34–49; on *IG* xii. 7. 5 (=T7 = Tod 152), see Tod's comment, though there is no need to endorse his exact date. Eventually he was exiled, in circumstances not certainly known (for a speculative answer see Jacoby, pp. 90–3), probably late in the 340s; and he wrote his *Attis* in Megara (*Plu.* 605 c = T14), when he must have been at least well on in his sixties.

This was a more extensive work than that of his predecessor Kleidemos (*FGrH* 323), and much more political in content (Jacoby 102–3 with n. 118). Though like other *Attides* it was largely superseded by the fuller and greater work of Philochoros (*FGrH* 328) written in the early third century, its reputation remained high, and Androtion was often enough cited, alone or in conjunction with Philochoros, as authority for political or constitutional fact. We cannot put a precise date on its publication (Jacoby 103 suggests c. 340), but it was less than twenty years old when *Aθ. π.* was composed, and a very obvious source to use. Whatever reservations one may have about Jacoby's estimate of Androtion's political position, he was probably right in his guess that Aristotle would find him sympathetic (n. 127, end); the work of Phanodemos (*FGrH* 325), the only other *Attis* that can plausibly be dated before *Aθ. π.*, is cited mainly for matters of cult and probably contained less of political interest. General probability thus supports the widely held opinion that Androtion was the source for the annalistic items in *Aθ. π.*, and indeed much else in the historical section of the work (see Jacoby's long n. 127: the detailed re-examination of the case that he and Bloch called for is as much needed as ever). It is as certain as anything in this field can be that Aristotle consulted Androtion's account of the revolution, and F43 offers confirmation (Th. 67. 1.n.); but this, the only fragment surviving from the entry for 412/11, does little to show where Androtion's sympathies lay or how he treated the revolution as a whole.

If however we identify his father Andron with the proposer of the decree ordering the trial of Antiphon ([*Plu.*] 833 e; 2(c) above; Jacoby 87 with n. 25), we can speculate further. Though the decree dissociated Andron from the extreme oligarchs, he had nevertheless been an original member of the Four Hundred, and his adherence to Theramenes and the Five Thousand would do him little good with out-and-out democrats. His son might find it politic to extenuate the activities of the more moderate reformers in the early stages of the revolution; later on, it could be maintained, Antiphon and his like

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ran away with the reform, and Andron in his decree had shown what he thought of that. If this was Androton's line, he could be Aristotle's source in *Aθ. π.* 29, a possibility which will be further discussed below.

7. Aristotle

(a) *Politics*

Before turning to *Aθ. π.* we should examine the two brief references to the Four Hundred in the earlier work:

(i) 1304 b 10, on revolutions achieved by deceit: ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἔκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἰθ' ὕστερον βίᾳ κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάγησαν φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, ψευσάμενοι δὲ κατέχειν ἐπειρώντο τὴν πολιτείαν. That fits well enough with Thucydides. It might refer to the (qualified) acceptance of oligarchy by the assembly at the time of Peisandros' first visit to Athens (Th. 54. 1); but as it appears from Thucydides (65. 2 with n.) that the expectation of help from Tissaphernes was still alive in Athens shortly before Peisandros' return there, the argument could have been employed at a later stage. If the reference is to the beginning of the movement, Aristotle differs from Thucydides in making the promise of Persian aid consciously deceitful from the start, but otherwise the scene described in Th. 53–4 is the most likely occasion. Cf. *Aθ. π.* 29. 1, discussed below.

(ii) 1305 b 24, on demagogogy within an oligarchy: ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ δημαγωγὸς κανὸν πάνυ δλίγοις ὡσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα Αθήνησιν οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα ἵσχυσαν τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Other accounts of the Thirty make it likely that Aristotle here refers to the shift of power within their own body after their installation. (From Xenophon's account we should expect Kritias here in place of Charikles, but cf. Lys. xii. 55, X. *Mem.* i. 2. 31. Neither is named in *Aθ. π.* 34. 3–38, and in view of *Rhet.* 1416 b 29 it is possible that Aristotle and his school disputed the conventional view of Kritias: cf. Wade-Gery 280 with n. 1.) In the case of the Four Hundred Aristotle presumably again refers to a change of direction after the beginning of the movement, but he says too little for us to determine the occasion at all exactly; and Thucydides, who in 65–88 writes as if the movement had been monolithically extremist, does not help us to detect any such development.

The story behind this brief allusion looks to have been a realistic political account very unlike the formal constitutional analysis provided by *Aθ. π.* (the difference is underlined by the absence of Phrynicos' name at *Aθ. π.* 32, 2, on which see below). As to the

source of the story, anyone who was charged after the fall of the Four Hundred with complicity in their coup had a motive for making Phrynicos his scapegoat, by claiming that it was he who had perverted the course of what was intended as an innocent or worthy reform. An obvious possibility is Antiphon (above, p. 199), but by no means the only one: it would be helpful if we knew what Ephoros had made of Phrynicos.

(b) Αθηναίων πολιτεία

In the course of argument about the nature and structure of Aristotle's account of the revolution, and its value relative to that of Thucydides, almost every section of Aθ. π. 29–33 has been scrutinized for the indications it might give, and without detailed scrutiny it is not possible to form a responsible judgment on this part of the work. There is at present no adequate up-to-date commentary (M. A. Levi's *Commento storico* of 1968 does not greatly help). Accordingly, though it may from time to time involve topics not directly relevant to the elucidation of Thucydides, I insert here a commentary on these chapters in the hope that a systematic treatment of them may prove helpful to others, as it has been to me. Lemmata are taken from Kenyon's Oxford text of 1920.

(i) *Commentary*

29. 1. ἐπεὶ δέ - - - πρὸς βασιλέα συμμαχίαν: the mention of the Sicilian defeat is no more than a rough indication of context, contrasting this phase of the war with earlier phases when things were more equal. If he has in mind any specific treaty between Sparta and Persia, it must be the third (Th. 58), for only that is likely to have been formally ratified; but this is rather a general reference to the help which the king gave to Sparta, as And. iii. 29.

ἡναγκάσθησαν: contrast Diod. xiii. 34. 2 ἔκουσίως. The only such 'pressure' to be found in Thucydides is the need for Persian money, and consequently for constitutional reform, expounded at the end of this long sentence in terms which do not suggest any desire here to contradict or supplement Thucydides. Aristotle's mind is probably on the general effect of failure in the war, the sort of pressure that is visible in Thucydides' analysis at 1. 3–4.

τὸν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ Ψηφίσματος λόγον: from the general indication of context we go straight on to 'the' decree, which turns out to be the one which set up the constitutional commission, not the decree defining the new constitution, which comes at § 5. Aristotle is not much concerned with the niceties of narrative presentation.

Μηλοβίον: it is natural to identify him with the later member of the Thirty (X. HG ii. 3. 2; Lys. xii. 12; Harp. s.v.=Hyp. fr. 61). The fact that he made the main speech in the assembly would not appear in

any record published on stone, and it is not very likely that it would be recorded in the archives; Aristotle probably takes this from a narrative source.

Πυθοδώρου τοῦ Ἀναφλυ[σ]τίου: earlier attempts to restore the mutilated word as his patronymic did not fit the traces and have been abandoned in favour of the demotic restored by Blass. The name is common, but most holders of it known from the late fifth century are excluded by this demotic: see Andrewes and Lewis, *JHS* lxxvii (1957), 178. There is no serious doubt that this is *Πυθ. Πολυζήλου*, εἰς τῶν τετρακοσίων, the accuser of Protagoras (D.L. ix. 54); the archon of the Thirty (X. *HG* ii. 3. 1; Αθ. π. 35. 1) may well be the same man. The demotic, again, would not appear on an inscribed decree of this period, but here it is easier to imagine that this detail might be preserved in the archives.

μάλιστα δὲ συμπεισθέντων τῶν πολλῶν, κ.τ.λ.: cf. *Pol.* 1304 b 10, above. If Aristotle meant to indicate any specific occasion, that of Th. 53–4 is again the most likely. (In view of the certain echoes of Thucydides in 33. 1, there is some temptation to detect here in ἐὰν δι' ὀλίγων ποιήσωνται τὴν πολιτείαν an echo of Peisandros in Th. 53. 3, εἰ --- ἐσ ὀλίγους μᾶλλον τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσομεν: but the echo is not close and phrases like these are in any case likely in the context). Caspari (Cary) in *JHS* xxxiii (1913), 2 says of the commissioners, without argument, that 'Aristotle connects them with Peisander's previous visit ... (end of 412)'; M. Lang. *AJP* lix (1948), 275–6, argues the case, on the assumption that these grounds for the people's consent were operative only at the time of this first visit and not later. The assumption is not valid (Th. 65. 2 n.), and there is in any case no reason to suppose that in this brief phrase, or at the start of the chapter, Aristotle wished to correlate the decree of Pythodoros with one part rather than another of Thucydides' narrative: rather, this is a general statement of the reasons why the people ever listened to the conspirators at all. On Lang's ingenious hypothesis see further p. 255 below.

2. μετὰ τῶν προϋπαρχόντων δέκα προβούλων: our only extant authority for the number of the *probouloi*; Th. 1. 3 gives no number, and Σ Ar. *Lys.* 421 + Suda s.v. *πρόβουλοι* is confusedly based on Αθ. π. It is clear from Harp. s.v. *συγγραφεῖς* (see Th. 67. 1 n.) that Androtion and Philochorus also gave the number.

ἄλλους εἴκοσι, κ.τ.λ.: see Th. 67. 1 n.

οἵτινες ὅμοσαντες, κ.τ.λ.: an oath would be almost automatic for such an appointment, and the content of the oath could almost be predicted. Thucydides naturally omits what he would see as the merest formality. Aristotle's formulation is close to that of the bouleutic oath (Rhodes 194, cl. 2) and may come from the decree; in that of Th. 67. 1 *καθ' ὅτι ἄριστα* is attested in documents, but *ἡ πόλις*

οἰκήσεται has no clear parallel, unless Aeschin. i. 22 ad fin. derives from a document.

περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας: see Rhodes 232–4. The clearest indication of what this phrase might imply is Ar. *Eccl.* 396–7,

ἔδοξε τοῖς πρυτάνεσι περὶ σωτηρίας
γνώμας καθεῖναι τῆς πόλεως,

with the proceedings that follow; cf. also Isokrates' fiction, vii. 1; Is. v. 37, also cited by some, has no bearing on the procedure. Wilamowitz (*AuA* i. 102 n. 7) half suggests that the initiation of a debate by this formula would of itself affect the normal constitutional safeguards, but § 4 shows that more specific action was needed for that. The point is rather the feeling thus evoked: cf. Th. 53. 3, Lys. xii. 74, or Ar. *Lys.* 29–30, *Eccl.* 202 (the instances from *Eccl.* suggest that it was easy to trivialize the phrase, as our own 'crisis'). Aristotle's version, repeating the formula in § 4, takes care to represent the situation as one of emergency, as the conspirators no doubt did in fact; Thucydides, who sees here the carrying out of a plot, omits the phrase.

էξεῖναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, κ.τ.λ.: not in Thucydides, but possible in fact (cf. And. i. 84), and the language raises no difficulty.

3. **Κλειτοφῶν:** a Kl. is named, again without qualification, at 34. 3 as one of the group, led by Theramenes, who wanted the *πάτριος πολιτεία* in 404; and cf. the Kl. coupled with Theramenes ὁ κομψός as a disciple of Euripides in Ar. *Ran.* 967. These go well together as a single well-identified person, and there is no reason not to identify him further with Kl. son of Aristonymos who makes a brief appearance in *Rep.* i (328b, 340a–b) and gives his name to the *Kleitophon*. For his politics see Wade-Gery 140–1, and below.

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Πνθ. εἶπεν: this copies closely the standard formula for amendments to Attic decrees. For Aristotle's purpose this copying was not material, and it is one of the stronger reasons for supposing either that he had seen the decree himself, or that his source reproduced much of it verbatim.

προσαναζητῆσαι: the regular meaning of ἀναζητεῖν (the compound with *προσ-* is found only here) is to investigate something whose existence is already known or presupposed; so Th. 33. 4, and ii. 8. 3 (less clearly but no less certainly—portents are not being sought out, but when they occur people are worrying about them, as Lysistrata in Ar. *Lys.* 26 about her plan); Hdt. i. 137. 2; etc. The meaning 'search for' occurs later and less commonly: so ἀναζήτησιν in Memnon, *FGrH* 434 28. 7 (41), of Herakles' search for the lost Hylas. It is thus more probable than not that Kl. here assumes that the 'laws' of Kleisthenes were available in 411. He might have been insincere (so Hignett

15, 130), or even mistaken, but in his favour are those features of *IG* i². 114 (see Th. 67, 2 n.) which suggest that it contains a very literal copy of at least one decree from the early days of Kleisthenic democracy. Hignett (154) says that 'the original may have been no earlier than the revolution of Ephialtes in 462', and the bad condition of the stone leaves some uncertainty, but wording and context suggest a date nearer Kleisthenes himself. See also Jacoby, *Atthis* 206.

πατρίους νόμους --- Κλεισθένης --- τὴν δημοκρατίαν: the wording is meant to reassure those who felt uneasy about the abandonment of the democratic tradition. For the tendency of *πάτριος*, see esp. A. Fuks, *The Ancestral Constitution* (1953), whose first chapter is devoted to this rider; and in *Aθ. π.* 34. 3, when (according to Aristotle) the *πάτριος πολιτεία* was imposed formally on Athens as a term of peace in 404, the π.π. *par excellence* is the 'moderate' constitution pursued by Theramenes and his group, but the parallel passage in *Diod.* xiv. 3. 3 shows us both oligarchs and democrats claiming that their constitution is 'ancestral'.

In treating Kleisthenes as founder of 'the' democracy, the rider is closer to Herodotus (vi. 131. 1 ὁ --- τὴν δημοκρατίην Αθηναῖοισι *καταστήσας*) than to the fourth century, which increasingly tended to revere Solon as the founder.

ώς οὐ δημοτικήν, κ.τ.λ.: down to this point there is no great obstacle to supposing that Aristotle has kept close to the actual wording of the rider, but this acc. abs. is stylistically very improbable. Fuks (see previous n.) 6–7 discusses the possibilities, that the phrase belongs to the rider and has been reworded (but the examples in his n. 18 of statements of motivation in decrees, mostly honorific, provide no close parallel), or that it was taken from the speech in which Kleitophon proposed his amendment. Jacoby (*Atthis* 384 n. 30) suggested that this is the comment of Aristotle's source, but the source(s) for this chapter seem in general to try to exculpate the reformers, and to add that the constitution of Kleisthenes was not really *δημοτική* would spoil the effect. I therefore prefer the view of Wilamowitz (*AuA* i. 102 with n. 8), to which Fuks inclines, that it is Aristotle's own estimate of Kleitophon's motive. It is not an objection, that *Aθ. π.* 22. 1 describes the constitution of Kleisthenes as *δημοτικωτέρα πολὺ τῆς Σόλωνος*: there Aristotle stated his own view, here he interprets Kleitophon, about whom the school of Plato might have information (Wilamowitz), and Aristotle also claimed to know his views in 404.

To call for return to an older and purer form of democracy was a familiar device of the enemies of democracy after 403, and we see its beginnings here. The Thirty began by repealing the laws of Ephialtes (*Aθ. π.* 35. 2), in effect a return to the constitution created by

Kleisthenes; for this constitution described as *ἀριστοκρατία* see Plu. *Cim.* 15. 3.

4. *ἐπάναγκες εἶναι . . . ἐπιψηφίζειν*: not quite the same point as Th. 67. 2, but at the same stage of the proceedings, and it equally ensures that no proposals are to be barred by the usual restrictions. The formula of Αθ. π. looks rather to the *prytaneis* and their oath; it is by no means unnecessary and may well be genuine.

τὰς τῶν παρανόμων γραφάς: as Th. 67. 2. For all these sanctions see D. M. Lewis in *ΦΟΡΟΣ* 81–9, esp. 87–8.

καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας καὶ τὰς προσκλήσεις: more specific than Th. 67. 2 *ἢ ἄλλω τῷ τρόπῳ*, but not in conflict. The article, here and with *γραφάς*, makes the point that these are the normal and expected procedures for dealing with an illegal proposal.

On *εἰσαγγελία*, literally ‘information’ or ‘denunciation’, see most recently Rhodes 162–71. This procedure, which could be initiated either in Council or Assembly, was the natural remedy, going back (if Αθ. π. 8. 4 can be trusted) to a Solonian law. In the fourth century the Council was limited to fines up to 500 dr., but for a higher penalty the case could be sent to a lawcourt (D. xlvi. 43; cf. Αθ. π. 45. 2); the more serious cases must always have gone to the full Assembly.

πρόσκλησις is the summons issued before witnesses to the defendant which initiated most types of case (Lipsius 804 ff.); this is less specific, a prohibition of all ordinary procedures.

ὅπως ἀν οἱ ἔθελοντες Αθηναίων, κ.τ.λ.: here there are some clear divergences from the decree style. *ἀνεῖλον* at the end of the previous clause is description rather than citation; *ἄν* however after *ὅπως* is normal in inscriptions (though omitted in our text of § 3, perhaps by accident); but *βουλόμενοι* is normal in clauses of this type rather than *ἔθελοντες*; in the next clause, *χάριν* with gen. is not known to occur in inscriptions before the end of the first century B.C. and is most unlikely even for Aristotle’s own day. But the content of these clauses is plausible, including the motivation given in *ὅπως ἀν . . . προκειμένων*: it would suit the revolutionaries to represent a clause, which in fact allowed them to put forward proposals normally illegal, as a benevolent provision for freedom of speech.

ἔνδειξιν . . . καὶ ἀπαγωγὴν: summary procedures, often thus linked; see Lipsius 317 ff., A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* ii. 221–31, and Lewis (above). *ἔνδειξις* is information to a magistrate calling for an immediate arrest by him, *ἀπαγωγὴ* direct hauling of an offender before the authorities*. Both are used mainly for *κακοῦργοι* caught in the act, and unless they denied their guilt (which would be impossible with a public act such as is contemplated here) they could be dealt with, even executed, summarily. *πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγούς* is unique in our record for these procedures, and may be an innovation of these commissioners, presumably justified on grounds of emergency.

5. διέταξαν: on the assumption that the subject is *oi aἰρεθέντες*, from the beginning of §4, it is often argued that this constitutes a contradiction of Th. 68. 1 where the motion which seems to correspond to this is said to have been proposed by Peisandros; and the contradiction certainly occurs at 30. 1, where *oi aἰρεθέντες* are unequivocally made responsible for the content of the decree given in 29. 5. Since it is at least possible (below, p. 241) that Aristotle changed sources between 29 and 30, it is also possible that the source used for 29 intended no contradiction. *διατάττειν* should refer to a completed transaction, that is, in legislation to a transaction completed by a vote of the sovereign assembly, and the subject should be *oi Αθηναῖοι*. This is the unexpressed subject of many sentences in the treatise, especially in the second part: for *διατάττοντος* with this subject see 61. 1. Used of Solon at 7. 2 (cf. 11. 1), *διέταξεν* is not a counter-instance since he had been given full powers; and [*διατάξα】σα* at 8. 2, if that is the right restoration, refers to action within the competence of the Areopagus. If that is right, there is no necessary contradiction between the source of 29 and Thucydides, except over the number and composition of the constitutional commission.

τὰ μὲν χρήματα, κ.τ.λ.: substantially the same as in Th. 65. 3, but *Aθ. π.* adds (a) the time-limit *ἔως ἀν ὁ πόλεμος ἔῃ*, (b) the exception made for the nine archons and the *prytaneis*. The latter is somewhat surprising in a reform which was to give power to the class which could afford to serve for nothing, whereas pay for office is reckoned democratic (e.g. Arist. *Pol.* 1317 b 35); but pay for archons and *prytaneis* was of marginal importance once jury-pay had been abolished, by the provision that all income was to be spent on the war.

τρεῖς ὄβδολους: we know nothing of the normal pay for archons, which this passage seems to assume; *Aθ. π.* 62. 2 tells us only of the ration allowance of 4 ob. which they received in Aristotle's own time.
τὴν δ' ἄλλην πολιτείαν ἐπιτρέψαι πᾶσαν: the decree appoints the Five Thousand as the exclusive governing body, defines one of their most important powers, and lays down the method for their appointment; but the very general terms here reported make it easy to suppose that the Five Thousand then needed to work out a detailed constitution, as in 30-1. The addition, here again, of *ἔως ἀν ὁ πόλεμος ἔῃ* amounts to a promise that at the end of the war Athens shall revert to democracy: and according to Thucydides (53. 3-54. 1) Peisandros had in the winter offered the possibility of reversing the reform if the Athenians disliked it. Something like this may have stood in the decree, but the text is not Aristotle's only source and this may be colouring from a literary account. *ἄλλην* indicates that the Five Thousand were not empowered to alter the financial provisions of the previous clause, which thus becomes an 'entrenched clause' of their constitution.

ληπτουργεῖν: normally of the financial obligations imposed by the state on wealthy citizens, but cf. Lys. xix. 58, xxxi. 15; D. xxi. 165; and Th. 48. 1, 63. 4 with nn. Associated as it is with wealth, this word would be inappropriate for poorer men who had only their *σώματα* to offer, and its use here is to that extent tendentious; the effect of the phrase as a whole is to stress that power is to be reserved to those with this kind of stake in the state.

μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ πεντακισχίλιοις: contrast Th. 65. 3, where this number appears as a maximum in the published programme of the revolutionaries. It is possible, though we cannot confirm this, that the number had become a minimum by the time the decree was actually put forward.

συνθήκας συντίθεσθαι πρὸς οὓς ἀν ξθέλωσιν: in the decree which begins at l. 34 of *IG* i². 114 (see Th. 67. 2 n.), the archaic-sounding prescript is followed immediately by a clause which restricts to the assembly the right to start or end a war. It may be picked out here simply as the most obviously vital element in the sovereignty of the sovereign body. If a more topical reference was in anyone's mind, a treaty with Persia may still have been held out as a possibility; settlement with Sparta was undoubtedly the policy of a section of the conspirators (Th. 70. 2), but this cannot have been presented explicitly to a meeting of the still nominally democratic assembly. The actual decree may have specified other powers which Aristotle has omitted.

ξλέσθαι δέ, κ.τ.λ.: *καταλογεῖς* were in fact appointed. For Lys. xx. 13–14, and for the suggestion that the hundred *καταλογεῖς* were identical with the first hundred members of the Four Hundred in the version of Th. 67. 3, see pp. 204–6 above.

30. 1. κυρωθέντων δὲ τούτων εἶλοντο — — οἱ πεντακισχίλιοι: we jump suddenly from the ratification of the decree to the first action of the Five Thousand; the actual appointment of *καταλογεῖς* and their performance of their function are taken for granted. Aristotle's lack of interest in the presentation of narrative has been noted at 29. 1; and in view of the weight of documentation he is about to throw in, he might well want to compress here. But it is also possible that at this point he changed from one source to another (below, p. 241) and refrained from filling a gap between them. So far Aristotle and Thucydides can be seen as moving in parallel, if not exactly on the same course, but from here till 32. 1 they diverge greatly.

τοὺς ἀναγράψοντας τὴν πολιτείαν: the commissioners set up at 29. 2 are throughout *συγγραφεῖς* (29. 2 twice, 30. 1), whereas the activity of this new commission is throughout *ἀναγράφειν* (30. 1, 31. 1, 32. 1). The former is the regular fifth-century word for those who draft proposals to be put before a ratifying body (after the Thirty, who according to X. *HG* ii. 3. 11 were appointed ἐφ' ὧτε *συγγράψαι νόμους*, the procedure

and the name were discredited), whereas ἀναγράφειν means 'record', 'inscribe'; the main instance in this period is the work of Nikomachos and his colleagues in codifying the law of Athens (*Lys.* xxx. 2 etc.; *ML* 86. 5–6; see the discussion of *syngrapheis* and *anagrapheis* in R. S. Stroud, *Drakon's Law on Homicide* 20–8). The main distinction is observed in *Aθ. π.* as elsewhere (see Sandys' index), but we cannot accept a commission of a hundred set up only to 'record' what had been worked out by some other body to which no reference is made anywhere; decisive for the meaning 'draft' here is their procedure, ἔξινευκαν here and ratification ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους at 32. 1, which is exactly that of *συγγραφεῖς*. See the comment of *ML* at p. 265; and perhaps ἀναγράφοντες in Teisamenos' decree of 403, if that is the right reading at *And. i.* 83 (see MacDowell ad loc.); also Rhodes 83 n. 6 on the wording of proxeny decrees (there publication is an essential element in the honour conferred). Writing long after the event, Aristotle (or his immediate source) may have had in mind the fourth-century procedure for proposing new laws.

2. βουλεύειν, κ.τ.λ.: the concern of this long section is with the magistrates and the field from which they are to be drawn; detail of the Council itself does not begin till § 3, but the qualifications for membership of it are needed here since they apply to magistrates as well as to the Council. Those listed are to be taken from the Council currently in office: *τὰς δ' ἄλλας ἀρχάς* — — μὴ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς below can hardly mean that the lesser magistrates are to be taken exclusively from those under thirty, not yet qualified to sit on the Council, and consequently ἐκ τῶν ἀεὶ βουλευόντων must, as is most natural, mean 'members of the current Council' rather than 'those currently qualified to be Councillors'. Straightforward translation is best: 'those over thirty years old to sit on the Council, a year at a time'; the slight confusion arises from the way that these elements are fed into the sentence one at a time—term of office, age-qualification, service without pay.

ἄνευ μισθοφορᾶς: not strictly necessary after the first clause of the decree in 29. 5, but repetition would do no harm and the source of 30 seems to have a special interest in finance.

τούτων δ' εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.: as argued above, the reference is to the Councillors of the current year, not (as from this phrase alone one might take it) to all full citizens over thirty. It follows that the city's choice of generals was confined to one quarter of the qualified Councillors, and that an individual could hold the office for only one year in four. This provision, supposedly put forward in time of war, is in itself enough to justify the strictures that have been pronounced on this constitution; its purpose is obscure, unless it is simply an academic preference for rotation among equals (so J. A. O. Larsen, *Representative Government* 197 n. 30, part of a weak defence of the

theory, for which see below, that this is the constitution actually put into practice by the Five Thousand in the autumn).

τοὺς στρατηγούς: we are left to assume that 'the' generals will be the normal ten, one from each tribe.

τὸν ιερομνήμονα: two officials with this title were sent annually to Delphi by every member of the Amphiktiony, Athens sending one of the two representatives of the Ionians: Aeschin. iii. 115, D. xviii. 148, and the Delphic lists, e.g. Tod 172A. For the fifth century see Ar. *Nub.* 623–5 (which shows that he was chosen by lot), and fr. 322 from *Th. deuterai*. He is not prominent in our records, except in special circumstances such as the meeting of 339 to which Aischines refers; but the oath of the *heliastai* in D. xxiv. 150 again puts him next after the archons, which suggests that he meant more to the Athenians, practically or as a symbol, than surviving literature reveals.

τοὺς ταξιάρχους, κ.τ.λ.: it is again assumed that we know the numbers of these officers. Cf. Aθ. π. 61. 3–5: ten is likely at all times for taxiarchs and phylarchs (i.e. one per tribe), but the three hipparchs of *IG* i². 400 leave some doubt whether the two of 61. 4 go back as far as the late fifth century.

ταμίας τῶν ιερῶν χρημάτων τῇ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς δέκα: previously there had been separate boards for Athena and (since 434/3, see ML 58A) for the other gods. Here one board is to deal with both: the form of the next items makes that clear, *έλληνοταμίας* --- *εἴκοσιν*, and *δέκα ἑκατέρους*. The amalgamation of the two boards had in fact been effected by 403/2, but the record of dedications by the two sets of treasurers shows that this did not take place before 406 (Ferguson 4–7; W. E. Thompson, *Hesp.* xxxix [1970], 61–3). That tells against the never very plausible theory (among others, Ferguson *CP* xxi [1926] 72–5, *CAH* v. 338–40; *contra* Hignett 376–8, de Ste. Croix 14 ff.) that 30 gives the constitution actually enacted by the Five Thousand in autumn 411; but the fact that this reform was carried out so soon after encourages belief that this document is in some way contemporary.

έλληνοταμίας --- *οἱ διαχειριοῦσι*: the slightly odd expression does little to support Wilamowitz's contention (below) that the last two words are corrupt. *έλληνοταμίας* has (a) to call up for us the imperial revenues dealt with by the previously existing board of ten, contrasted with *τῶν ἄλλων ὁσίων χρημάτων* dealt with previously by the *kolakretai*, whose abolition is here merely implied, (b) to provide a name for the board of twenty who will now manage both funds: *ταμίας* *οἱ διαχειριοῦσι* *τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ τὰλλα ὅσια χρήματα*. For the omission of *ταμίας* with the second category of funds, cf. the suppression of *-ετής* in Theocr. xv. 129 *δέκτωκαιδεκετής η ἐννεακαΐδεχ' ο γαμβρός*.

For description of the system and discussion of the effects of the

measure see *ATL* iii. 359–65. Meritt (*AFD* 98–103) has shown that a board of twenty *hellenotamiae* was in function in the first year of the restored democracy, 410/09: see *ML* p. 258, and p. 196 above where Pritchett's dissent is mentioned. It is reasonable to suppose that this reform was in fact carried out by the Five Thousand and maintained thereafter by the democracy, and this makes another link between 30 and what actually happened in this period. The view of *ATL* iii. 364, that the *kolakretai* were restored in 410 to pay juries, has found little support: see *ML* loc. cit., Rhodes 99 n. 4. Pritchett, *The Choiseul Marble* 111, argues that we only know that the *kolakretai* were abolished between 417 (*IG* i². 94. 28) and 410.

ἱεροποιοί: there were *hieropoioi* of many kinds; these are presumably the ten *κατ' ἔνιαυτὸν καλούμενοι* of *Aθ. π.* 54. 7, who in Aristotle's day were chosen by lot, and he does not in their case (see next n.) record any change in the manner of their appointment.

ἐπιμελητάς: there were, again, many officials with this title; these are probably the ten who managed the procession at the Dionysia (*Aθ. π.* 56. 4), who had been elected by the people and had borne the expense themselves, but in Aristotle's time they were chosen by lot, one from each tribe, and the state assigned them 100 minas.

αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ πάντας τούτους ἐκ προκρίτων, κ.τ.λ.: where the subject is not expressed in a clause of a decree, it is normally the whole sovereign body, i.e. here the whole Five Thousand; but nothing is said elsewhere in 30. 2–6 of an assembly of the whole Five Thousand, and no duties are assigned to such an assembly, whereas § 5 rather suggests that decisions of state are to be taken by the Council. However, in this account the Five Thousand have already acted as a body to appoint the hundred commissioners (§ 1), and they will meet again to ratify these proposals (32. 1: see n. there). It is thus possible, in spite of the absence of any clear statement, that in this constitution the totality of the Five Thousand had a function in elections if not elsewhere. *προκρίνοντας* must agree with the subject, but *prōkrisis* is not normally performed by the same body that makes the final choice, and the most obvious alternative here is that it should be done by the Council from which the *πρόκριτοι* were to be taken. The Greek practice of using an active or middle verb without a subject where we would use a passive verb allows ambiguity of this kind, but whatever the arrangement proposed, it could have been described more lucidly; Aristotle may be condensing a more extensive original which made matters plainer (cf. 31. 1 n.).

πάντας τούτους . . . τὰς δ' ἄλλας ἀρχάς: the wording suggests that the list above is intended as more or less complete enumeration, and it does include the principal executive, military, and financial officers. Within this list detail is given only where changes are to be made, in the financial sphere where the author evidently had a special interest;

otherwise it is assumed that generals, archons etc. will continue as before, though now drawn from a narrower field.

τούς δὲ Ἑλληνοταμίας, κ.τ.λ.: we have just been told that they are to be elected *ἐκ τῶν ἀεὶ βουλευόντων*, and now they are to be excluded. The apparent contradiction troubled Kenyon, who resolved it by supposing a rotation, the exclusion to apply only to the few *hellenotamiae* who were at the time actually handling the money; and Wilamowitz (*AuA* ii. 117 n. 12), who also took *οἱ ἀν διαχειρίζωσι τὰ χρήματα* in this way, supposed that the earlier passage about them was corrupt and that *οἱ διαχειριοῦσιν* there concealed a provision about rotation. Rotation is certainly a possibility under normal democracy for one set of financial officers, the *kolakretai*, since forward references to duties to be imposed on them used an indefinite formula like that used for a prytany later in the year whose name is not yet known: see ML 71. 9–10, *SEG* x. 84. 27–8, 96. 1–3, with Wilhelm, *Att. Urk.* iv. 61–5. Wilhelm and others have supposed that a different section (*Ausschuß*) of an annual board served in each prytany—an awkward arrangement, and it would not be markedly less odd if a separate board of *kolakretai* was created for each prytany. For the *hellenotamiae* no such formula is known, and the whole board was certainly appointed for the whole year; and where several individual *hellenotamiae* are mentioned by name in the course of a single year, no pattern of rotation can be discerned. It is thus doubtful if there is anything in normal Athenian practice to parallel the arrangement proposed by Kenyon and Wilamowitz, but the Five Thousand might have adopted an abnormal scheme.

Alternatively we may take *οἱ ἀν διαχειρίζωσι* to mean 'those who at any given time...', i.e. the *hellenotamiae* of the year in question, and in that case the whole twenty are excluded. There is no necessary contradiction: they are to be elected from within the current Council, but once elected they no longer actually sit on it. There is some redundancy or tautology, but we may understand 'the *hellenotamiae* (as defined above, viz.) those who handle the (tribute and all other secular) funds', the repetition from the earlier phrase serving to remind us that these *hellenotamiae* will be dealing with other funds besides those that their predecessors had controlled. The purpose of the provision is less clear: Wilamowitz (*ibid.* 119) suggested that since the Council would have overall supervision of finance it ought not to include the officials it supervises, but I do not know why that should not also apply to the treasurers of Athena and the other gods.

3. βουλάς δὲ ποιῆσαι τέτταρας, κ.τ.λ.: this section is somewhat back to front, in that we hear that there are to be four *βουλαί* and that one of them is to be chosen by lot to hold office, before we are told of the division of the qualified citizens into four and the casting of lots

between them; but the structure is clear enough except for the clause *νεῖμαι* - - - *ἐκάστην*, for which see below.

Thucydides' reference at v. 38. 2 to *ταῖς τέσσαροι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν* - - - *αἵπερ ἄπαν τὸ κύρος ἔχονσιν* suggested Boeotia as a model even before *Hell. Oxy.* 16(11) gave us fuller information. 16(11). 4 does not actually say anything about the structure of the federal Council, a surprising omission, but in view of Th. v. 38 the economical assumption, made by most scholars but resisted by E. M. Walker (*The Hell. Oxy.* 139 ff.), is probably correct, that the author meant us to understand that it was a quadruple Council like those described at 16 (11). 2 for the individual cities. If so, one of the four federal Councils acted in turn as the probouleutic body and introduced measures to the other three as a kind of assembly, and the consent of all four was thus needed for a valid decision. That is a considerable difference from the constitution of *Aθ. π.* 30, where there is no joint action by the four Councils, indeed (§ 4) it is explicitly stated that, if wider consultation is required, the current Councillors may each co-opt an additional adviser from the age-group laid down; and there is only the most tenuous indication (§ 2 n. above) that an assembly of the whole Five Thousand might have some function. The authors of the constitution of 30 did not slavishly imitate the Boeotian model, but rotation among four divisions is a point in common, striking enough to show that this model was in their minds. The principle of rotation is also embodied in the constitution of Drakon at *Aθ. π.* 4. 3; the parallel was occasionally noted earlier, but is most fully worked out by J. A. O. Larsen in *TAPA* lxxxvi (1955), 46–7, who treats rotation as a distinctive feature of oligarchic thinking in this period and argues for links of doctrine between the neighbouring oligarchs of Attica and Boeotia. The size of the Council of *Aθ. π.* 30 constitutes another substantial difference. No age-limit is mentioned for the Boeotian Councillors, likely as such a limit is in fact, nor are we told how long they served; it may seem most natural that all four Councils should be appointed for a year, each serving its probouleutic term for a quarter of the year, but it is also often thought that each quarter served for a full year so that the whole cycle took four years. For *Aθ. π.* 30 a complete year for each Council seems to be implied, though Beloch (*Gr. Gesch.* ii². 2. 318, cf. Sartori 108) gave them a quarter-year only and compared this with the democratic prytany-system; but this is a less natural interpretation of the phrases in § 2–3, and the rotation of office (§ 2 n.) would take on a giddy rapidity.

εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον: a new constitution is necessarily 'for the future', so this can only be a specific reference to the *μέλλοντα χρόνον* of 31. 1, though the reader has not yet been told of this.

νεῖμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πρὸς τὴν λῆξιν ἐκάστην: the word *λῆξις* is not very common in Classical Greek, where it is most frequently concrete,

'portion assigned by lot' (e.g. Hdt. iv. 21, Pl. *Lg.* 740a), but it may also refer more abstractly to the process or occasion of assignment (e.g. Pl. *Lg.* 765d). At Athens it had also a specialised sense, from *λαγχάνειν δίκην*, to 'obtain leave to bring a suit', and another may lurk in *ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον*, the name given to the register of its members kept by each deme; ancient explanations of the latter (Harp. s.v., Pollux viii. 104) do not look very promising, and I do not see much likelihood that further investigation would help with the present passage. At 31. 3 below *τὰς τέτταρας λῆξεις* is usually taken concretely, to mean the four groups into which the citizens are here divided.

The possibility must be examined that *λῆξιν* here has a similarly concrete sense, but in that case it is not easy to understand what is the reference of *τοὺς ἄλλους*. If the antithesis is to citizens who have reached the qualifying age, then this clause deals with the assignment of men between twenty and thirty prospectively to the divisions which they will later join, and it has been taken so (Köhler, *Sb. Berlin* 1895/1. 454; Wilamowitz, *AuA* ii. 116 n. 10; Busolt iii/2. 1487); but there is no obvious advantage in this, and it seems odd to provide for the prospective assignment of the unqualified before the substantive assignment of the qualified; nor is it clear why we have *λῆξιν* here rather than *μέρος*, the word twice used in this sentence for the four divisions. Antithesis to *τὸ λαχὸν μέρος* makes even less sense, for the next clause makes it clear that the division was a single process carried through at one time.

We should then take the alternative abstract meaning: that is, they cast lots in the first instance for the first year's Council, and also to determine the order in which the rest are to serve. It would have been possible to cast lots among the whole body to select the members of the first year's Council, then next year to cast lots among the remainder for the second year's Council and so forth; this clause lays down that a different method is to be followed, division at once of the qualified citizens into four groups, the lot to be cast at once to determine which of these groups shall form the first year's Council, the lot to be cast again next year to determine which shall be the second year's Council, and so forth. Roughly, 'and also allocate the rest (sc. other than the first year's Council) for each <subsequent> casting of lots.' On this rendering no provision is made for those not yet of age, and none for those who may come of age in the course of the four-year cycle, but it would not be difficult to provide for this. Once the abstract rather than the concrete meaning of *λῆξις* is accepted, the clause makes sense without too great difficulty.

τοὺς δ' ἐκατὸν ἄνδρας: the last 'hundred men' mentioned as such were the *ἀναγραφεῖς* of § 1, but the *καταλογεῖς* of 29. 5 were also a hundred, and since (in this version) they made up the original list they are the suitable body to perform the division.

τέτταρα μέρη ὡς ισαίτατα: if we allow those under thirty to be about 30% of the Five Thousand, each Council will number some 875 (Hignett 368), or 855 if we deduct all *hellenotamiae*. This is a very unwieldy body to meet every five days (§ 4): the four Boeotian Councils numbered 660 at joint meetings, but the probouleutic quarter, which presumably met more often, was only 165. The fine for failure to attend (§ 6) shows that it was intended that the whole body should regularly meet.

καὶ διακληρῶσαι, καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν βουλεύειν: *διακληρῶσαι* should mean 'distribute by lot'; so *Syll*³ 531.29, and this is the probable restoration in ML 23. 26. (In *IG* xii. 5. 595. 14 *διακληροῦν* is not distributive but refers to the archon's casting vote in case of a tie; but nothing of that kind is in question here.) Since the division itself is dealt with by *διανεῖμαι*, *διακληρῶσαι* should refer to the distribution of the four *μέρη* over the years, but on the interpretation given above for *νεῖμαι* --- *ἐκάστην* that has been laid down already. The term of a year has also been laid down already (§ 2 init.). These repetitions are probably due to the back-to-front way in which the process has been described.

4. **〈βουλεύεσθαι〉:** this provides the sense required, and its omission after *βουλεύειν* would not be surprising. Thalheim's alternative, to punctuate after *διακληρῶσαι* and change *βουλεύειν* δέ to *βουλεύεσθαι*, is less attractive.

περὶ τε τῶν χρημάτων, κ.τ.λ.: money was the first concern of the decree in 29. 5, but there all income with trifling exceptions was to be reserved for the war, which gets no mention here. Possibly it was contemplated (cf. 31. 1 n.) that this constitution would not come into force till the war had been ended; but economy was a general concern of this time, and the author's special interest in finance has already been shown in § 2.

ἐπεισκαλεῖν --- ἐπείσκλητον: not elsewhere in this sense, but it is an easy formation and the sense is clear.

κατὰ πενθήμερον: at X. *HG* vii. 1. 14 this phrase indicates that command is to be exercised by Athens and Sparta in alternating periods of five days' duration. If the meaning is similar here the instruction is incomplete, since it does not specify the interval between the five-day periods, and edd. are probably right to understand here a provision for meeting once in every five days, though *κατά* + acc. is not a normal way to express this. The democratic Council met every day, *πλὴν ἔαν τις ἀφέσμος ἦ* (*Aθ. π.* 43. 3), and it would be hard to carry on efficient government with less frequent meetings than are here prescribed; but again, the strain on a body of this size would be considerable.

5. **κληροῦν δὲ τὴν βουλὴν τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας:** clearly the Council is not to appoint the archons by lot (see § 2). If the archons are to *κληροῦν* the Council, that could only mean deciding by lot the order in which

the four Councils are to serve, which appears to have been settled already; and the provision would be out of place at this point. Kaibel's *πληροῦν* fits much better: they are to see that the Councillors attend, by giving the notice and exacting the fines referred to in § 6. For *πληροῦν* in this sense the parallel usually cited is Ar. *Eccl.* 89, *πληρουμένης* - - - *τῆς ἐκκλησίας*, but that cannot mean that every qualified voter was present, and the natural implication of *πληροῦν* is rather that a total has been reached sufficient for effective working; clearly a Council such as this could work well with less than complete attendance, but § 6 shows that this was required.

τὰς δὲ χειροτονίας - - - *τὸν ἐπιψηφιούντα*: for the relation of this to the prescript of ML 80, see 2(b) above, p. 196. If the decree is rightly dated to the time of the Four Hundred, they adopted machinery very like what is here proposed, in which case it is hardly possible that their successors, the Five Thousand, had the same scheme or one closely similar. But here again the document shows contact with something that actually happened in this period.

πρῶτον μὲν ιερῶν, κ.τ.λ.: a normal and unremarkable order, cf. Αθ. π. 43. 6, Aeschin. i. 23.

τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου: since there was a war in progress at the time when these proposals are supposed to have been made, and almost certainly (below) when this document was composed, the needs of that war must have been present to everyone's mind. But if the constitution of 30 looks forward rather to normal peace-time (cf. 31. 1 n.), this will be a general priority for military business whenever that arose; for *πόλεμος* with the article in this sense see vi. 72. 2 n.

χρηματίζεσθαι: the active is normal both for the body deliberating and for the persons doing business with it, whereas the middle is commonly to 'make money'; but cf. Hdt. vii. 163. 1. Here, with the 'five men' as subject, it probably means to cause or enable the generals to do their business: cf. *IG* ii². 1. 49–50 (Tod 97. 9–10), [Xen.] Αθ. π. 3. 3.

6. δΦΕΙΛΕΙΝ ΔΡΑΧΜΗΝ: fines for non-attendance are mentioned in Arist. *Pol.* only as a tactical device used by oligarchs against the poor, under a constitution which evidently allowed the latter a larger place than they get here: see 1294a 38, 1298b 17, for attendance in law-courts, 1297a 17 for a wider application. There is no suggestion there that they might be a matter of principle, but the fact that they are found also in Αθ. π. 4. 3 suggests that they had played a part in oligarchic theory, around 400 if not in Aristotle's time.

εὐρισκόμενος: for the unexpected tense cf. ML 89. 56, SEG x. 80. 20.

31. 1. ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ τήνδε: apart from the unexplained *eis* *τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον* at 30. 3, this is the first indication that the constitution of 30 was not for immediate use. Aristotle makes no

attempt to explain why two constitutions were necessary: the 'future constitution' could be regarded as a concession to the 'moderates', and it may have been represented that 30 was meant for more settled times (30. 4, 5 nn.), whereas in the present political and military crisis a stronger form of government was needed. From § 3 it appears to be contemplated that the emergency would last more than a year.

κατὰ τὰ πάτρια: going at least one step further than Kleitophon (29.3), these oligarchs appeal to the tradition of a time before Kleisthenes and the familiar Council of five hundred. If the document is contemporary, it is the earliest testimony we have for belief in a pre-Kleisthenic Council of four hundred. Hignett (93) thought it 'far more probable' that the oligarchs first chose the number they wanted and then fabricated the 'tradition'; but if they thought an appeal to tradition would help them they would have done better to choose one that was genuine, at least in the sense that it was believed at the time by others than themselves. So far as it goes, this passage tells more in favour of Solon's four hundred than against.

ἐκ προκρίτων, κ.τ.λ.: this is the only passage in this version that says anything whatever of the way in which the Four Hundred might have been appointed. It seems to follow that Aristotle thought they were in fact chosen as this clause prescribes, i.e. nothing was done till the ἀναγραφεῖς had reported and their constitutions had been accepted, and then the tribes had still to choose their *πρόκριτοι*. The contrast with Th. 67. 3 is extremely striking. This is a crucial point in the presentation of the whole episode as legally enacted reform, not as a revolutionary coup, and it is the more surprising that nothing is said here of the method, who was to select the Four Hundred from the *πρόκριτοι* or how, or even how many *πρόκριτοι* there were to be. The omission might be deliberate, either if this document was issued before the seizure of power and its authors did not want to tie the hands of the revolutionaries too closely, or if it was issued later and they wished to avoid careful comparison with what had actually happened. Neither consideration applies to Aristotle in the formulation of his version of the story, and if he really believed that he had found in this text the method by which the Four Hundred had in fact been chosen it would be charitable to him to assume that his original went into more detail and made the process sound more convincing; and he himself would then be responsible for curtailing it and leaving out these details.

We should perhaps also consider Th. 93. 2, where the Four Hundred, on the point of collapse, promise to declare the membership of the Five Thousand, *καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει ἡ ἄν τοῦς πεντακισχιλίους δοκῆ τοὺς τετρακοισίους ἔσεσθαι*: this was for Judeich (*Rh. Mus.* lxii [1907], 301) the moment for which the constitutions of Αθ. π. 30–31 were fabricated. That sentence says no more than this clause about

the method of appointment, indeed it implies that this had yet to be worked out to the satisfaction of the Five Thousand (who in Thucydides have as yet no corporate existence); but a fuller version of our clause might at that time have been acceptable. See further pp. 243–6 below.

οἱ φυλέται: presumably those members of each tribe who had been listed among the Five Thousand. For the relation of this to Lys. xx. 2 see pp. 204–5 above.

τάς τε ἀρχὰς καταστήσαι: not, as appears below, the military offices, but if they had the direct appointment to all non-military offices (including the archons?) the power accorded to them is already very extensive, which may encourage us to find very wide powers in the rest of this sentence.

περὶ τοῦ δρκού, κ.τ.λ.: the text cannot stand; the simple remedies are to delete *γράψαι* (Wilcken 41–3), or to add *καὶ* after it (Kenyon: *περὶ δὲ τῶν νόμων* would have the same effect). On Kenyon's text the powers given to the Four Hundred are much larger than with Wilcken's.

There is some ambiguity in *γράψαι*. At Athens it regularly means to 'propose' a measure which others will then vote on, and that might suggest that these matters, whatever they are, are to be referred to the Five Thousand; but in this context it is easy to suppose that it means 'prescribe' (it might indeed be the *vox propria* for prescribing an oath), and then nothing is being left to the full Five Thousand. 'The' oath is again ambiguous. One would think first of the oath of the Councillors themselves, which might well differ from the traditional democratic form; but magistrates also swear oaths (as do jurors, but these documents ignore the judicial system: see next n.). Further, these were times when an oath might be more generally administered: Th. 75. 2 gives us a democratic oath sworn a little later by all the *στρατιώται* at Samos, and Demophantos' decree at the democratic restoration in 410 (And. i. 98) revokes anti-democratic oaths sworn 'at Athens or *ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ* or elsewhere'. Choice is open, but the oath of the Council seems the most probable; again it is likely that Aristotle's original was more specific.

The ingenious hypothesis of Wilcken (43) is that the Four Hundred, having appointed the magistrates, are then empowered (omitting *γράψαι*) only to 'do as they think best about the oath which is to be sworn about the laws and the *εὐθυναι* and the rest'; so no absolute power in these fields is conveyed to them. This is not an easy hypothesis. It is not clear why anyone should have written *γράψαι* in the margin of his text; Kenyon's emendation is linguistically and textually far easier. *πράττειν* *ἡ ἄν ἡγάνται συμφέρειν* is an odd way to describe the activity of persons framing an oath; it is not clear what sort of oath could be *περὶ --- τῶν εὐθυνῶν*; given *περὶ A καὶ B καὶ τῶν*

ἄλλων, one expects the formula *πράττειν, κ.τ.λ.*, to give freedom of action in all these fields to the body which is the subject of the infinitive. Kenyon's sentence runs more easily (though in a text so often obscure as this that is not decisive); the oath is a simple matter and is disposed of quickly; the rest of the clause gives the Four Hundred wide and only partly defined powers. For the difficulties that have been raised over the next clause see below; if they can be resolved, Kenyon's text is certainly to be preferred.

τῶν εὐθυνῶν: not necessarily the *εὐθυναί* of offices held under the new regime; there could be questions about the conduct of democratic magistrates now deprived of office or allowed to complete their term. Alternatively *εὐθυνῶν* might have the wider sense implied in *Aθ. π. 8. 4 ηὔθυνεν*, and perhaps found in *ML 52. 71*; but these constitutions otherwise take no notice of ordinary judicial procedure. That is indeed a very odd omission in view of the stress regularly laid on the courts as the foundation of the democratic regime (e.g. *Pol. 1274a 4–5, Aθ. π. 9. 1.*). We should no doubt think of the courts as included among the *πράγματα* handed over to the Five Thousand in the decree of Lys. xx. 13, and the Four Hundred will have usurped control here as elsewhere. From their time we hear only of proceedings in the Council itself: And. ii. 13 ff., and M. H. Jameson locates the prosecution of Peisandros in the Council (*Hist. xx [1971]*, esp. 557–8). From the period of the Five Thousand we have the trials of Antiphon and Polystratos: from Lys. xx and the fragments of Antiphon (cf. also Andron's decree, p. 197 above), it looks rather as if the old forms were to some extent observed, though no doubt with a different class of juror, but the detail escapes us. Given Aristotle's normal concern with the judicial aspect, we must assume that he would have reproduced in some form anything that the source of 30–1 said about courts, and the omission is thus significant for the nature of these documents.

2. τοῖς δὲ νόμοις, κ.τ.λ.: the qualification of *οἵ ἀν τεθῶσιν* does not specify by whom these laws will be laid down. If they are the *νόμοι* of the last clause, then on Kenyon's text the legislators are the Four Hundred, and Wilcken (42) made much of the point that one does not instruct a legislative body to adhere to its own laws or forbid it to amend them; this was the main reason why he treated the previous clause as he did, so that these could be laws passed by the Five Thousand and not by the Four Hundred themselves.

However, the clause is not merely general but specifies laws *περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν*. At 8. 4, the only passage in *Aθ. π.* where this word is (by Richards' emendation) used in a possibly comparable sense, *τῶν πολιτικῶν* has a very wide sense, including the constitution. The contrast between *πολιτικά* and *ἴδια*, public and private affairs, is clear in such passages as *Th. ii. 40. 2, viii. 81. 2*, but still gives *πολιτικά* a

wide range; however, at viii. 89. 3 σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου - - κατ' ἴδιας δὲ φιλοτιμίας contrasts the private motives of Theramenes and his group with the views they expressed in public specifically about the constitution. It thus seems possible that this phrase might indicate 'laws about the πολιτείᾳ', i.e. in this case they are the laws embodying the two constitutions (so Busolt iii/2. 1489), and once these have been endorsed by the full Five Thousand (32. 1, see n. there) the Four Hundred may not alter them. The only plausible alternative would be 'laws about the πολῖται', i.e. about the qualifications for citizenship, and I doubt if the neut. pl. τὰ πολιτικά would be a natural way to express that. This clause does not necessarily, or even probably, favour Wilcken's interpretation of the preceding clause.

τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν, κ.τ.λ.: the obscure sentences which deal with military office raise difficult problems. The first is whether a temporal contrast is intended between τὸ νῦν εἶναι and ἐπειδὴν καταστῆ (ἡ βουλῆ), in which case we have two elections, one ad interim to provide generals for the remainder of 412/11, followed shortly by another which will provide generals for 411/10 (for the meaning of τὸν εἰσιόντα ἐνιαυτόν see vol. iv, p. 276). The alternative is to suppose that the contrast is between τὸ νῦν εἶναι and § 3 τὸ δὲ λοιπόν, with only a single election at the present juncture, by a method which is contrasted with that of 30.2 when that constitution shall have come into force.

On the former view, the election for 411/10 causes no difficulty; in this version the Council is established by 22 Thargelion and has ample time to carry out the procedure laid down. The interim election is much more questionable, with nothing said about the method of appointment or the authority which is to appoint, indeed on this interpretation the appointment is explicitly to take place before the installation of the Council to which § 1 gives a virtual monopoly of power. It is of course conceivable in fact that the Four Hundred might have wished at the moment of their coup to install generals of their own choosing, and might have done so at the Kolonus meeting; but in interpreting this text we must in the first instance take its account literally, as Aristotle evidently did. If we do, then time had already been spent in compiling the list of the Five Thousand, and by their commission of a hundred in drawing up these constitutions, and it is only after the ratification of these constitutions at 32. 1 that anyone can proceed to carry out the provisions of 31. 2. In the meantime, if Aristotle or his source gave any thought to the matter, they must have supposed that the existing generals continued in office; and, to turn a moment from Aristotle to what we know of the facts, this is unlikely to have presented any danger to the Four Hundred. In the review of the generals of 412/11 given at 54. 3n., it was concluded (*ad fin.*) that there were probably three generals in Athens in the winter, two of whom were replacements for the deposed

Phrynicos and (S)kironides, appointed while Peisandros was in Athens and probably acceptable to him. Since then they will have been reinforced, at some stage, by the return of Phrynicos and Onomakles to Athens, of whom the latter was still a general and the former's authority must in practice have been restored. It may be added that, if the conspirators were dissatisfied with the available generals, they had opportunity to replace them during the time when, according to Th. 66. 1, they were already in control of the proceedings of Council and assembly before their actual coup. It seems that in fact it was not urgent for the Four Hundred to hold interim elections to the generalship at this point, and apart from this interpretation of 31. 2 there is nothing in the account of *Aθ. π.* to suggest that they did.

The alternative is more attractive. The formulation supposed, the general order for an election followed in *τὴν δὲ βουλήν, κ.τ.λ.* by some detail of the procedure, is not uncommon: cf. e.g. ML 46 where 5-11 state the general principle that tribute must be collected and brought to Athens, and the method is detailed in a series of δέ-clauses in 11 ff. The single election takes place in an orderly manner after the establishment of the constitution and its Council, in the leisurely way that characterizes Aristotle's whole account of these events. Further, if *τὸν νῦν εἶναι* is equivalent to § 1 ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ and the contrast is between this procedure and that of 30. 2, the sentence gains notably in coherence. ἐξ ἀπάντων, made prominent by being separated from its noun and placed before the verb, makes the point that under the provisions of 30. 2 choice is confined to men over thirty in only one quarter of the Five Thousand, whereas now the whole body is available, a welcome concession to the needs of the war; and the statement about the generals' power has its logical place at the end of the sentence.

αὐτοκράτορας: they are not to be quite independent of the only other constituted authority, the Four Hundred, for in the next clause they are almost encouraged to consult that body, and at 32. 3 they are again closely associated with it. The point is perhaps just to bolster their authority and discourage ordinary men from questioning it.

3. **ἱππαρχον ἔνα:** see 30. 2 n. There they were plural, though the number was not stated; the point of this small variation is unclear. Wilamowitz (*AuA* ii. 115 n. 9) thought the taxiarchs were needed here, and his proposal to add *<καὶ ταξιάρχους δέκα>* after *ἔνα* is easy enough.

τὸ δὲ λοιπόν - - - κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα: see § 2 n. On the view there preferred, with a temporal contrast between § 2 *τὸν νῦν εἶναι* and § 3 *τὸ δὲ λοιπόν*, the latter will refer to the time when the constitution of 30 will be in force and *τὰ γεγραμμένα* are the provisions of 30. 2. The alternative is that *τὸ δὲ λοιπόν* should refer to future annual elections under the (continuing) regime of 31, and *τὰ γεγραμμένα* to the

procedure ordered in § 2 τὴν δὲ βουλὴν, κ.τ.λ. The wording of this clause is not in itself decisive for the interpretation of § 2.

τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀρχῶν: reading straight on from the last sentence, one would take this to mean 'other than those just mentioned', but as the exception of Council and generals is then made explicit, ἄλλων should be taken as referring forward to πλήν (cf. e.g. *Meteor.* 379 a 15). This need make no practical difference: Beloch (ii². 2. 320) was very likely right to assume that the cavalry officers are here tacitly included with the generals as iterable, as they are included at Αθ. π. 62. 3.

μήτε τούτοις μήτε ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ: the reference of *τούτοις* is as obscure as anything in these chapters. No persons have been mentioned recently except the Councillors and military officers, and all or most of these are explicitly excluded. The text has a rhetorical ring, as if it were a device, of the kind that does not bear strict examination, to increase the weight of *μηδενί*, but such devices are out of place in this compressed document. If the point is to stress that 'not even these, sc. the Councillors and military officers just listed, are to be exempt' from the provision against iteration of other offices (their range may be wide, as in 30. 2), it does not seem that much is gained by adding *μήτε τούτοις μήτε ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ*, which by itself would adequately make the point; see however the last n. to § 2 for an item which may have been added merely to impress.

Alternatively we may suppose that Aristotle has here (as probably at 31. 1 and elsewhere) condensed excessively a document which went into greater detail; that is, *τούτοις* in the original may have had an intelligible reference to details which the condensed version has omitted. But the text gives us no way to reconstruct such an original. **πλέον ἡ ἀπαξ:** rules against iteration are common in any kind of constitution, but to insert one into a constitution ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ serves notice in the most blatant manner that the *παρὸν καιρός* may be going to last more than a single year. It might be easier to assess this if we knew how the original document justified (if it did) the fact there was to be a separate provisional constitution at all; the prospect could have been held out that the oligarchs intended to prosecute the war against Sparta, and they could have argued that this required a strong government, with effective provision to fill military offices with the best candidates, for a period which might be longer than a year.

εἰς δὲ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον: the mention of the four λήξεις below, with its clear cross-reference to 30. 3, for once makes it certain what sort of future is meant, i.e. the time when the regime of 30 will take over.

ἴνα νεμηθῶσιν, κ.τ.λ.: apparently a reminder to the Four Hundred that, when the new regime starts, they are to be treated like everyone else.

τὰς τέτταρας λήξεις: see 30. 3n. Here they are usually taken in a

concrete sense, the 'four divisions' of the citizen body. But at 30. 3 these divisions are called *μέρη*, and *λῆξιν* has a more abstract sense; that would also be possible here, 'for the purpose of the quadruple casting of lots'.

τοῖς ἀστοῖς - - - *τῶν ἄλλων*: Wilamowitz (*AuA* ii. 121), Beloch (ii². 2. 320) and others take this to mean the citizens at home contrasted with 'the others', those at Samos and elsewhere. Some of the thousand hoplites brought out in winter 412/11 (Th. 25. 1) were still on service (62. 2), and not all the *δυνατώρων* who began the revolution had come home, so that there were men abroad who should be on the list of the Five Thousand. (Beloch indeed took *ἄντοις* to be the overseas members, which involved him in a notably contorted interpretation of *ἴνα νεμηθώσιν, κ.τ.λ.*)

Others, from the start, protested: Köhler, *Sb. Berl.* 1895/1. 460 n. 1) made the essential point that a man would be just as much *ἀστός* when in Samos as he was at home. *ἀστοί* are 'citizens' as opposed to foreigners or slaves; the distinction in LSJ, '*ἀστός* being *one who has civil rights* only, *πολίτης* *one who has political rights* also', is positively contradicted by the instances cited, and would not help Wilamowitz if it were correct. *ἀστν* is opposed to the countryside of Attica (e.g. Th. ii. 52. 1) or (topographically) to the Peiraeus (viii. 92. 7); but, very noticeably, in 404–403 the 'city' party is never called *οἱ ἀστοί*. For *ἀστός* as a term of status cf. the formula *ἐξ ἀστῆς γυναικὸς καὶ ἔγγυητῆς* in D. lxx. 60 and elsewhere.

Emendation is thus necessary. Tyrrell's *τοῖς αὐτοῖς* (*CR* v [1891], 181: 'the same senators, the old members') is an unnatural way of referring to the Four Hundred in comparison with Sandys' straightforward *αὐτοῖς*, which has been widely accepted. This allows us to give the clause *ἴνα νεμηθώσιν, κ.τ.λ.*, its plain meaning: when the time comes for them to step down to the level of the rest, the Four Hundred are to be assigned to their *μέρη*. It remains uncertain when that will be. This clause is written as if the original Four Hundred will retain office till the changeover, but above the exemption of the Council from the rule against iteration presupposes annual tenure and allows the possibility, at least in principle, that another year might produce a different Four Hundred. Here then, perhaps, *οἱ τετρακόσιοι* means 'the current Councillors'.

32. 1. ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους: since this commission was appointed by the Five Thousand, it should report back to them and *τὸ πλήθος* should therefore be the full Five Thousand. Wilamowitz (*AuA* i. 103) and many after him have asserted, usually without argument, that the word can only refer to the democratic assembly. Again, protest was early (e.g. Köhler, *Sb. Berl.* 1900/2. 813) and frequent, even from those who doubted or denied the statement: so Busolt in *Gr. Staatsk.* i. 73

(a partial withdrawal from *Gr. Gesch.* iii/2. 1484 n.), De Sanctis 111. In the context of normal Athenian democracy *τὸ πλῆθος*, *τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος*, etc., naturally refer to the main body of voters and mean either the assembly or 'the common people'; but the word can always be used for the 'main body' or the 'majority' of whatever is indicated by the context, the main body of an army (*Hdt.* i. 82. 3) or the majority of Sparta's allies (*Th.* v. 30. 1). Here, in the framework of Aristotle's narrative, there can be no doubt that it means the main body of the Five Thousand: the democratic assembly lost its powers at 29. 5–30. 1, and in the first sentence of 32. 1 it has just been restated that the commission was appointed by the Five Thousand. The view of Wilamowitz is greatly facilitated by the assumption, derived from Thucydides, that the Five Thousand had not come into existence at this stage. But Aristotle thought they had (on § 3 λόγῳ μόνον ἡρέθησαν, see below).

ἐπιψηφίσαντος Αριστομάχου: although the name is common, no public figure of this period can be identified here. One possibility is from the casualty-list *IG* i². 951. 32, where the presence of two trierarchs and the style of lettering suggest a naval battle late in the war.

In democratic decrees of this period the presiding officer is named by the formula *ὁ δεῖνα ἐπεστάτει*. Though *ἐπιψηφίζειν* is at all times the standard word for putting a matter to the vote, the first appearance of *ἐπεψήφιζεν* in a prescript is Tod 124. 6 of 377, linked with the first appearance of the fourth-century *πρόεδροι*; ML 80. 4, probably a decree of the Four Hundred (above p. 196) and Andron's decree under the Five Thousand ([Plu.] 833e: above, p. 197) both have *ἐπεστάτει*, so 30. 5 above should not encourage us to think that *ἐπιψηφίζειν* might occur in a prescript of this time either. But a writer who had the text of a decree would know who had put it to the vote, and would very naturally use the expression we find here. The question is, what kind of text.

As Aristotle's story runs, this is a meeting of the Five Thousand with Aristomachos presiding. If we decide that this meeting is fictitious, then his presidency is a fiction also, a detail invented to make the story more plausible; if we abandon Aristotle's framework other possibilities arise, which will be discussed later.

μηνὸς Θαργηλιῶνος τετράδι ἐπὶ δέκα - - - ἐνάτῃ φθίνοντος Θαργηλιῶνος - - - δὲ πί δέκα Σκιροφοριῶνος: the standing of the first two dates is from the start questionable, since it is hard to believe that Athens was literally without a Council (or assembly) for a whole week at this critical moment; the democratic Council met almost daily (30. 4 n.), and Th. 70. 1 more plausibly says that the Four Hundred took over at the moment when they expelled the old Council. This raises at once the speculation that the two dates do not come from a single continuous account, but are the result of some combination. The

third gives an oddly inessential detail, hardly worth the trouble of invention, and we may note that it involves the making of an equation at some stage between the Council's own calendar, a year of 365 or 366 days divided into ten prytanies (cf. vol. iv, pp. 264-70), and the lunar calendar of twelve months which regulated the dates of festivals and the term of office of the archon and others. Only a contemporary is likely to have known that the end of the year did not at this time coincide for the two calendars, or to have produced so likely a date for Pryt. I. 1 of the Council's year 411/10.

14 Thargelion has most often been taken as the date of the meeting at Kolonus. Thereafter some (Judeich, *Rh. Mus.* lxii [1907], 305-6; Beloch ii². 2. 323) suppose that the old Council continued in fact till 21/22 Thargelion when the Four Hundred took over, and for them *κατελύθη* has to mean that the dissolution of the old Council was decreed, not that it was carried out; Meyer (*Forsch.* ii. 424 ff.) thought that the Four Hundred took over *de facto* on 14 Thargelion but formally inaugurated their rule on 21/22, while Hignett (359-60) supposed that the latter was the day on which the two constitutions of *Aθ. π. 30-1* were promulgated. Solutions of this second type give a more natural sense to *κατελύθη*.

The basic question is of the nature of a source that could have transmitted such dates. It will be argued below (pp. 243-6) that the most probable hypothesis on the origin of the two constitutions is that of Hignett, that they were issued by the Four Hundred not long after their establishment in power, with a view to bolstering their position by the pretence that it rested on a decision of a real Five Thousand. Their proclamation should include the validation of the constitutions, probably by means of a purported decree of this Five Thousand, and the prescript of such a decree could have given most of the details found in 32. 1: the commission of a hundred *ἀναγραφεῖς*, the acceptance of their report by the main body, the presidency of Aristomachos, and also a date, expressed in the manner of the Four Hundred according to the lunar calendar (cf. ML 81. 15-17), and mistakenly understood, perhaps by Aristotle himself, to be the date when the Four Hundred actually took over.

The proclamation would give only one date, 21/22 Thargelion, and the source of the other two must be sought elsewhere. They may come from the same source, between them defining the period for which the term of the democratic Council had been cut short, thus accounting for the irrelevant 14 Skirophorion. The latter, as argued above, should come from a contemporary source, and a speech from one of the many trials of the period, perhaps Antiphon's famous speech, is more likely than a document of the time ferreted out by later research. An orator will sometimes give dates by the lunar calendar, as D. xix. 57-60, or in a non-political case Antiphon vi.

42–4, and we have to imagine this orator making a point which depended on the length of time by which the deposed Council had been cut short: that might e.g. be a reference to the length of time for which they had been paid (*Th.* 69. 4). We should then have to suppose that Aristotle, or perhaps his source, combined this datum with what he extracted from the proclamation of the Four Hundred, thereby producing the anomaly of a week in which Athens had no Council. Certainty is naturally impossible, but this relatively economical hypothesis would account for the otherwise puzzling fact that Aristotle bothered to mention the date at which a new democratic Council would have entered office but for the intervention of the oligarchs.

The alternative, that these dates were extracted by some later researcher from the archives, is less likely. The objection, that events in the history of the Council should be dated according to the Council's calendar, is not insuperable. It is true that documents inscribed on stone continue well into the fourth century to give only dates by the conciliar calendar, but the accounts for 407/6 (*IG* ii². 304B: for recent readings, which do not affect this issue, see Pritchett, *The Choiseul Marble*, and Meritt, *Mélanges Daux* 255–67) and 406/5 (*IG* ii². 305) give throughout dates on both systems, as earlier accounts do not, nor those of 405/4 (*IG* ii². 1686). We do not know the reason for this two-year deviation from normal practice, but it is obviously unlikely that it involved the treasurers of those years in separate calculation of each calendar equation at the time when they were preparing their document for inscription; much more probably the double dating was already given in the day-to-day entries from which the consolidated account was made up. The earliest surviving decree with full double dating is *IG* ii². 404 of 356 (see E. Schweigert, *Hesp.* viii [1939], 14 n. 1; D. M. Lewis, *BSA* lvii [1962] 4), but the accounts of 407/6 and 406/5 open up the possibility that double dating was used already in the late fifth century in the working records of the authorities most concerned, probably the *thesmophetai*. It is thus conceivable that a later researcher could have discovered from such records that a new Council had been due to enter office on 14 Skirophorion, but extremely hard to understand why he should have troubled to do this. The date of the Kolonus meeting could also have been found, in terms of day and month, but this was not the day on which the old Council was dissolved (*Th.* 69. 2 n.), though it might erroneously have been taken so. No surviving record is likely to have dated exactly the day of the Council's dissolution as such.

For these reasons reference in a non-documentary but contemporary source seems more probable. 14 Skirophorion may stand as a genuine date, with all the consequences that has for the reconstruction of the Athenian calendar of these years. 14 Thargelion is more

doubtful as a date for Kolonus, but if my guess above is correct it becomes a firm date for the dissolution of the old Council, and we can be reasonably certain that the Kolonus meeting came a few days earlier in Thargelion.

2. ἐπὶ Καλλίου --- μάλιστα ἔκατόν: in view of the clear echoes of Thucydides below (33. 1 nn.) it is certain that ἔτεοι --- μάλιστα ἔκατόν, though it is a calculation that anyone might have made, was written with Th. 68. 4 in mind. μάλιστα may be significant (see Th. 68. 4 n.): with a cardinal number it is more appropriate, in so far as 510–411 or 511/10–412/11 is not exactly a hundred years. The archon's name, not in Thucydides, could have been preserved elsewhere, but it would be reasonable to attribute this, like the data at the beginning of 33. 1, to the source which provided Αθ. π. with its many archon-dates.

αἰτίων μάλιστα γεγενημένων, κ.τ.λ.: this again must have been written with Th. 68 in mind. For the three here named see Th. 49, 68 nn.; the surprise is the absence of Phrynicos, duly present in Th. 68. 3 and given a leading part in *Pol.* 1305 b 24 (above). Wilamowitz (*AuA* i. 100 n. 4) suggested that he was omitted because, according to the view represented in *Pol.*, he was the destroyer rather than the creator of the Four Hundred; but that ought not to exclude him from a leading part in setting them up. Alternatively Aristotle, converted by a new source to a new view of the Four Hundred, jettisoned Phrynicos along with the account which lies behind *Pol.*, preferring to leave out all personal jostling by individual politicians: it has often been remarked as odd that he contrived to say nothing of Alkibiades in his version, though he refers (29. 1) to the negotiations with the Persians.

γεγενημένων εὖ: Hignett (272) gave the movement an aristocratic base, nobles who 'had had their country houses destroyed and their estates ravaged'; but G. Méautis, *L'aristocratie athénienne*, to whom he refers, provides no serious argument, and there is no hint in Thucydides or elsewhere that birth was an issue. The charge that Antiphon's grandfather was a supporter of the tyrants (Th. 68. 1 n.) takes his family back into the sixth century; in Kratinos' *Ploutoi* (Page, *Gr. Lit. Pap.* i. p. 200, 29 ff.=Austin 73. 66 ff.) we should pay more attention to the character who thinks that Theramenes' father was ἀρχαιόπλοντος etc. than to the one who makes his grandfather a hired porter (cf. Davies 7234); Peisandros' demagogic past (Th. 49 n.) does not rule out good birth, but in fact we do not even know his father's name. Lys. xx. 11, if we were prepared (having in mind the allegations of Aischines and Demosthenes about each other's boyhood) to believe it, would convict Phrynicos of humble origin, and that might even be taken as a reason for the omission of his name in the previous clause. But it is more probable that Aristotle or his

source meant only to represent the revolutionary leaders as respectable and responsible men (cf. Ar. *Th.* 329–30 Ἀθηναίων εὐγενεῖς γυναικες, where the point seems to be unimpeachable citizen status: cf. vi. 56. 1 n.). *συνέσει καὶ γνώμῃ* are more Thucydidean virtues (combined at i. 75. 1), but the nearest to an echo in this context is viii. 68. 4 οὕτε γνῶναι ἀδύνατος of Theramenes.

3. λόγῳ μόνον - - - οἱ δὲ τετρακόσιοι: an antithesis which has *λόγῳ* in its first clause, whether or not the second clause contains *ἔργῳ*, contrasts the real fact with what was said, and in almost all cases this entails the denial of what was put forward *λόγῳ*. Further, Aristotle must have in mind *Th. 89. 2 τὸν πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὄνόματι χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύναι*, which (in combination with 92. 11) certainly means that down to that point the Four Hundred had only said, falsely, that the Five Thousand existed. The natural implication of this sentence is that the Five Thousand had not yet been appointed in fact; and the contradiction with what precedes is far more gross than any other that has been detected in *Ἄθ. π.*, since the last mention of the Five Thousand in action is only some twelve lines back in a modern text. Those who on other grounds take a low view of the work as a whole may up to a point be excused for taking the passage so. But it is astonishing that others should acquiesce when there is an alternative available: the only traces of opposition I have found are an undeveloped hint in Kriegel, *Der Staatsstreich der Vierhundert* (diss. Bonn, 1909) 34–5, and a doubtful alternative interpretation in Busolt, *Gr. Staatsk.* 73 n. 2.

In a minority of cases the second clause of such an antithesis denies not the truth but the importance of what is asserted *λόγῳ*. One instance is so conspicuous that it is odd that it should have been overlooked: *Th. ii. 65. 9 ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή*, which does not deny that Athens was a democracy but argues that this was unimportant in face of the personal ascendancy of Perikles. Again, vi. 78. 3 does not deny that the other city addressed will be helping to save Syracuse, but puts the stress on the fact that it will be securing its own safety; Isoc. v. 6 urges Philip to hand Amphipolis over, but argues that his control over it will in fact be just as effective when he has done so; cf. also Lys. ix. 21. It would require some effort to bring any of these into line with the majority of instances: one might take *Th. ii. 65. 9* to mean ‘it is not true that ὁ δῆμος κρατεῖ, in fact Περικλῆς ἀρχεῖ’, but this sounds strained, and this is the chapter in which Thucydides tells us how the people deposed and fined Perikles. For a similar alternative to the use of *ὄνόματι* in *Th. 89. 2*, cf. vi. 10. 2 *ὄνόματι σπονδαὶ ἔσονται*, where the treaty is a fact but Nikias argues that Alkibiades and others are reducing it to a mere name.

Since the phrase can be interpreted in a way which does not

involve the author in a glaring contradiction, he should be given the benefit of the doubt, even by hostile critics; and see also next n. But if there is no formal clash, this sentence nevertheless represents a shift towards the position of Thucydides; the constitutions on which so much space has been lavished were not effective; 31. 1 may have provided the means by which the Four Hundred were (in Aristotle's view) appointed, but once appointed they left the Five Thousand no function or power (cf. 33. 2).

τῶν δέκα τῶν αὐτοκράτορων: the only persons qualified as *αὐτοκράτορες* in this version are the ten generals of 31. 2, and they must be meant here (M. Cary, *JHS* lxxii [1952], 60, following a suggestion thrown out tentatively by van den Ploeg, *Theramenes en zijn Tijd* 57–8, took them to be the ten *ξυγγράφεας αὐτοκράτορες* of Th. 67. 1, but *Aθ. π.* 29. 2 rules this out). Rhodes (43–8) argues against the prevalent view that the generals of the democracy had a regular privileged position in relation to the Council of Five Hundred, but here 31. 2–3 shows a close connection between the generals and the Council of Four Hundred, which this clause continues. This comparatively allusive cross-reference to 31. 2 is important: the author, who on the usual interpretation of the previous clause is supposed to have forgotten what he wrote at 32. 1, shows that he remembers, and expects us to remember, 31. 2.

ἢ φ' οἵς ἐκάτεροι τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες: cf. the almost identical phrase at 34. 1. Thucydides does not at any stage specify the terms offered by the Four Hundred (70. 2, 71. 3, 86. 9, 90. 2), nor any Spartan counter-proposal; though at 91. 3 he notes the oligarchs' desire to retain the empire if possible. This is from a non-Thucydidean source, but the detail is not enough to establish its character—or even which embassy Aristotle has in mind, though Th. 90. 2 shows that it was not the last desperate mission of Phrynicos.

33. 1. μῆνας μὲν οὖν ἵσως τέτταρας: if the Four Hundred took office on 22 Thargelion and lasted only two months into the new year, the total is less than four months; but this is an approximate figure (*ἵσως*) and *δύμηνον* might cover a little more than two months. These details probably come from the annalistic source used elsewhere by Aristotle—Androtion or any Atthidographer will have had to sort out the archons of 411/10 in roughly this manner—and this need not be the same source that provided the dates in 32. 1.

Μνασίλοχος: if he is to be identified with the member of the Thirty, his position in the list of X. *HG* ii. 3. 2 probably assigns him to the tribe Pandionis. The list names him *Μνησίλοχος*, but the Doric form in *Aθ. π.* (corrected from *Μνασίμαχος*) is the more likely to have been corrupted; in ML 81. 2 the first six letters of his name are lost, but this still excludes *Μνασίμαχος*.

τῆς Εύβοιάς ἀποστάσης δλῆς πλὴν Ὄρεοῦ: cf. Th. 95. 7 *Εὕβοιάν [τε]* ἄπασαν ἀποστήσαντες πλὴν Ὄρεοῦ. The retention of Oreos is of no importance for the history of the constitution; this is a verbal echo, and a close one.

χαλεπῶς ἐνεγκόντες ἐπὶ τῇ συμφορᾷ μάλιστα τῶν προγεγενημένων: the echo of Th. 96. 1 ἔκπληξις μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸν παρέστη is not this time so close, but the sentiment is the same; and the words γεγενημένα and ξυμφορά are close by in Thucydides' text.

πλείω γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Εύβοιάς ἡ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐτύγχανον ὠφελούμενοι: very close to Th. 96. 2 *Εὕβοιαν* --- ἐξ ἣς πλείω ἡ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὠφελούντο. Again, not an essential point for the history of the constitution.

κατέλυσαν τοὺς τετρακοσίους, κ.τ.λ.: given the series of echoes noted above, we may take this as a paraphrase of Th. 97. 1, though many possible sources could have reported this phase of the revolution in much the same terms. Aristotle's verbal dependence on Thucydides in this section compels the inference that in 32. 2-3 the passages parallel to Thucydides were written in full awareness of what Thucydides had written, and that all earlier divergences from him were fully deliberate.

2. Ἀριστοκράτης καὶ Θηραμένης: Th. 89. 2 names these two as the leaders of resistance within the Four Hundred, but Theramenes first, and in the following narrative he plays much the larger part. Lysias (xii. 66) claims that Theramenes from jealousy and fear *μετέσχε τῶν Ἀριστοκράτους ἔργων*, which is deliberately tendentious in making Aristokrates the principal, with Theramenes following him for merely corrupt reasons. This was certainly not Aristotle's view about Theramenes, for which *Aθ. π. 28. 5* is clear evidence.

οὐδὲν ἐπαναφέροντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις: the point might conceivably have been so phrased by a writer who believed, with Thucydides, that the Five Thousand had not been appointed at all at this stage: but Aristotle took a different view, and this passage must be taken to mean that they did exist, and nothing was left to their decision. That introduces no new element into the argument about sources: Aristotle merely continues, on this point, his established divergence from Thucydides.

δοκοῦσι δὲ καλῶς πολιτευθῆναι, κ.τ.λ.: this must in some degree reflect Th. 97. 2. Aristotle, not surprisingly, lays more stress than Thucydides on the hoplite franchise; he refrains from rendering Thucydides' phrase about the *μετρίᾳ ξύγκρασις*.

(ii) *General structure of the account*

As a first step we may consider whether the detail set out above allows us to distinguish within 29-33 any large blocks whose character might assign them to distinct sources. The process must not be too mechanical, for Aristotle was not an epitomator and may be

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allowed to have amalgamated elements from different sources at any point, but one possibly useful distinction does stand out.

As analysed above, 29 follows much the same course as Thucydides down to the point at 67. 3 where the latter reports the actual appointment of the Four Hundred, but with some differences: probably closer adherence to the text of the two decrees (however transmitted), certainly a marked difference of tone, a tendency to excuse the initiators of the change as neither so extreme in their intentions nor so violent in their actions as they appear in Thucydides. In 33 we find some dependence on Thucydides, very close in some passages but not complete, and Thucydides' influence also affected the latter part of 32. What comes in between is not Thucydidean at all, nor reconcilable with his account. At the point of transition at 30. 1 we have the jump in the narrative noted ad loc., and it is an obvious first hypothesis that 30-1 and probably the first part of 32 come from a separate source; that 31. 1 determined Aristotle to disregard Thucydides' version of the actual appointment of the Four Hundred at 67. 3; and given the differences between *Pol.* and *Aθ. π.* we may further argue that the source here followed had not been known to Aristotle before he came to compose *Aθ. π.*

Beloch (ii². 2. 312-13) supposed that 30-1 were derived from bare documents and were inserted 'quite mechanically' into a report which was otherwise based on an *Athis*, probably Androtion's; $\pi\lambda\hat{\eta}\thetaos$ in 32. 1 meant the democratic assembly, and that sentence originally followed straight on after the first sentence of 30. 1. This is too crude as it stands—Beloch attributes far too much to the 'usual negligence' (311) of the author in combining his sources, and the cross-reference noted at 32. 3 tells heavily against him—but it would clearly be possible to construct a version of the hypothesis which would stand up better, and we have throughout to bear in mind the possibility of taking the elements of the Aristotelian version apart and recombining them in a different order.

In a sense the crux is the interpretation of 32. 1. A meeting of the $\pi\lambda\hat{\eta}\thetaos$ there ratifies the constitutions drawn up by the hundred men appointed by the Five Thousand, and the explicit mention of these hundred sends us back to 30. 1; it appears to be all part of the same story, suggesting that the constitutions of 30-1 came to Aristotle not as naked documents (Wilamowitz *AuA* i. 103, De Sanctis 111, and others) but in a context which gave some indication of their origin. It is as it stands a leisurely story, and not in the least probable; and if like most historians we accept from Thucydides that no Five Thousand were appointed at this stage, then these Five Thousand and their $\delta\alpha\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\epsilon\varsigma$ are plain falsehood, and with them the meeting of 32. 1 and all concomitant detail. Alternative theories presuppose that the appearance of leisurely reform is due, one way or another, to

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misunderstanding or outright falsification: that everything in fact went very much faster, and that at 32. 1 we are still really at Kolonos, the *πλῆθος* is still the democratic assembly, and Aristomachos was its *ἐπιστάτης*, his name preserved on some document of the meeting. The details vary from one theory to another, and some will be discussed below: meanwhile the next step is to consider the nature of the two constitutions and the occasions when they might have been promulgated, if indeed they ever were.

33 gives no comparable trouble. Some of it is recognizably from Thucydides; the dates probably come from the annalistic source which Aristotle used elsewhere in *Aθ. π.*; there is no difficulty in supposing that the result is Aristotle's own combination of these elements.

(iii) *Nature and occasion of the constitutions 30-1*

The mere obscurity of these chapters is a fact which we have to take into consideration. The bulk of *Aθ. π.*, as befits an exoteric work, is at least intelligible; its statements may be suspect or their co-ordination imperfect, but we do not have to grope for the meaning. The closest parallels seem to be 21. 2 *ὅθεν ἐλέχθη, κ.τ.λ.*, and 21. 5 *οὐ γὰρ ἄπαντες, κ.τ.λ.*, where the syntax is not in the same way in doubt but there is uncertainty about the bearing of these statements and their place in the argument; and this could well be due to excessive condensation by Aristotle of his account of the reforms of Kleisthenes. It would be fair to add 15. 1 (cf. vol. iv, p. 199), where the uninformed reader could not easily see why Peisistratos' treatment of Megakles' daughter embroiled him with *both* the other factions. For failure to elucidate documents cf. 39. 2, where the reader is given no help with *τὸ συμμαχικόν*: and at 39. 3 the meaning of the last sentence is clear on brief reflection, but *οὗτοι* are not the same as the *οὗτοι* of the previous clause. No explanation at all is given for 29. 2 *τῶν προϋπαρχόντων δέκα προβούλων*. The order of explanation is erratic at times in the analytical part of the treatise, e.g. 48. 5 *τοῖς δικαισταῖς τοῖς κατὰ δήμους* is not elucidated till 53.

These are for the most part unremarkable instances of the difficulty of condensing materials in such a way as to leave them still fully intelligible, and they open the way to explain some of the obscurities of 30-1 as due to excessive condensation: the lack of definition in the list of offices at 30. 2, the incomplete description of processes of election at 30. 2, 31. 1, 31. 2-3, the reference of *τούτοις* at 31. 3, and perhaps the obscure clause beginning *νεῦμαι δέ* at 30. 3. The alternative is to suppose that the obscurity was in the original source, which in that case can hardly have been more than a series of notes not fully worked out by the author(s). Such notes might have been preserved in private hands, and it is conceivable that they might later have

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been dressed up as constitutions produced by a committee of the Five Thousand, and impressed Aristotle enough so that he accepted them as a basis for correcting Thucydides; but it is simpler and easier to suppose that the text we have results from condensation by Aristotle of a fuller and more coherent original.

Given that the original of 30 may have been more coherent and more intelligible, there remain large defects not to be eradicated in this way: the high number of Councillors combined with their compulsory attendance, and the discontinuity in tenure of the generalship; and the failure to define a judicial system probably goes back to the original (31. 1 n. above). This looks like the work of a not very practical doctrinaire, and it is not easy to imagine that many people contemplated putting it into effect; at most, one could suppose that the men behind the constitution of 31 allowed it to be put forward as a concession to more moderate oligarchs, with the firm intention of seeing that it never became effective. At the same time the two financial reforms embedded in 30. 2 (see ad loc.) connect the document with changes actually carried out in this period and strongly suggest that it originated in or near 411; and the prescript of ML 80 may similarly be connected with 30. 5.

Considerable supplement would be needed to make 31 fully intelligible, and even with all its clauses thus filled out it would still have a scrappy appearance. That is no great matter, for a measure whose purpose was to concentrate power in very few hands could afford to be brief and to neglect detail. But the method of appointing the Four Hundred at 31. 1, a double process starting with *πρόκρισις* in the tribes, would not be a secure way of ensuring the concentration of power in the 'right' hands, and to that extent it is unlikely that this measure was passed at Kolonus as the basis of the take-over by the Four Hundred (V. Ehrenberg, *Hermes* lvii [1922], 617 = *Polis und Imperium* 318–19). On the other hand the reference to *τὸν εἰσιόντα ἐνιαυτόν* in 31. 2 is a realistic detail which might not occur to a later forger, and there is nothing specific that points to a date later than 411. The cross-references to 30, certain at the end of 31. 3 and probable at the beginning, show that 31 was designed to go with 30, which makes it likely that the two were contemporaneous. (Beloch's hypothesis [ii². 2. 311 ff.], that 30 and 31 are wrongly separated and really form a single constitution, that 'of Theramenes' set up in the autumn, was carefully rebutted by Hignett [367–75] and need not be further considered here.)

We have thus two documents probably originating in 411, but it is not likely that either was put into effect in all its provisions at any time during that year. Hignett (358 ff.) lists the occasions when such constitutions might have been formally promulgated:

- (a) At the Kolonus meeting. The content of 30–1 is no bar to this

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if we adopt the hypothesis, of Wilcken (44) among others, that the motion of Peisandros in Th. 67. 3–68. 1 was formally an amendment to a decree which ratified the two constitutions. Since the main decree had no practical effect, it is easy to understand why Thucydides should neglect it and attend only to the amendment (unless indeed the first two clauses of 67. 3 refer to the main decree and what follows to the amendment: cf. Sartori 35–7). Aristotle's version will need more complicated explanation. There is now no difficulty in taking 32. 1 as referring to the meeting at Kolonos, but a genuine record of that meeting should have included the amendment (Hignett 359), and we may wonder how constitutional proposals put forward at Kolonos came to be described as the work of a commission of the Five Thousand, whose activities cannot precede the decision of that meeting to create them. Wilcken (53) suggested that the constitution of 30, carried at Kolonos, was identical with that established after the fall of the Four Hundred, and that the heading in 30. 1 belongs in reality to this later occasion. That somewhat artificial explanation does not cover all the ground, and it will not stand at all if we reject the equation of 30 with the autumn constitution (*Aθ. π.* 30. 2 n. above).

The matter need not rest there. Any theory which does not accept Aristotle's account as it stands must posit some kind of falsification somewhere, either in the course of the transmission of the documents down to Aristotle or committed by the oligarchs themselves in 411. If the former, we might suppose that a later writer, from whatever motive, separated the two constitutions from the amendment which cancelled them, and dressed them up as the product of a commission of the Five Thousand. If the latter, we could suppose that the meeting at Kolonos consisted mainly of citizens of the class that might expect to become members of the Five Thousand, and that after voting to hand power over to the body so named they proceeded to regard themselves as being in effect that body. This has served as the basis for many theories (cf. Hignett 361 as well as 358–9), and often includes the identification of the hundred *καταλογεῖς* with the first hundred of Th. 67. 3, as a help to reconciling Thucydides and Aristotle. We should have further to suppose that at Kolonos two previously prepared constitutions were brought out, voted on, and proclaimed as the work of this 'Five Thousand'. The basic hypothesis cannot be ruled out as impossible. It has the advantage, if it is one, of allowing 32. 1 to refer to the meeting at Kolonos; but by turning the citizens at Kolonos into a putative Five Thousand it runs seriously counter to what Thucydides says and implies, and there will have to have been some remodelling of the account before it reached Aristotle.

(b) Soon after Kolonos. Ed. Meyer (*Forschungen* ii. 433–5) took the

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constitutions as formal justification issued by the Four Hundred not long after their coup, and Hignett (360, 373) followed this line, adding that justification would have been more urgent when they heard, at an early stage, of the failure of the oligarchic coup at Samos. A development of this kind would be somewhat more likely to have earned a mention from Thucydides, but his silence cannot rule it out; and the version of Aristotle becomes altogether more manageable, since the fraud which we have to posit somewhere is here perpetrated at the start for a rational motive by the Four Hundred themselves. According to Th. 92. 11 they concealed the non-existence of the Five Thousand, and they were to that extent in a position to pretend that the constitutions were the work of a commission of that body. The meeting which ratified the proposals will have to be a fiction, along with Aristomachos' presidency and the week's delay in entering the Bouleuterion, and the fiction must have been apparent to Athenians who were in a position to check whether any such meeting could have taken place; but it will have had its impact on ordinary men (note Th. 92. 11, where some months later men are still uncertain whether the Five Thousand exist or not), and it could be useful in dealings with the fleet at Samos (cf. Th. 72). If there is fiction there is no conflict with Thucydides, and the only other problem to exercise our imagination is the process by which an 'authentic' document of this promulgation got into Aristotle's hands without, to the best of our knowledge, having had any effect on the tradition down to his time.

(c) Shortly before the fall of the Four Hundred. It was noted at *Aθ. π. 31. 1* that Judeich found a context for these documents in Th. 93. 2, the last-minute promise to produce a list of the Five Thousand and to leave it to them to determine how the Four Hundred should be chosen in turn from among them in the future; and this passage and 86. 3 were taken by Meyer (435) and others to show that Thucydides knew the documents which Aristotle provides. They hardly prove anything so precise as that, and there is no room for their formal promulgation in Thucydides' narrative between 93. 2 and the final crisis; and at this stage 31. 2 τὸν εἰσιόντα ἐμαυτὸν loses its special appropriateness. This is thus a less satisfactory context than (b) above. The suggestion of Cary, *ap. G. H. Stevenson in JHS lvi (1936)*, 57 n., that the proposals were put to 'some sort of meeting' at this late stage, and that their obscurities are due to the fact that they were 'drafted by desperate men in a blazing hurry', is less attractive still. Men in such a situation might indeed make serious mistakes, but this was a subject already much discussed and hurry would not be a good explanation of the kind of incompleteness that we meet in 30-1; nor does it explain the way the documents are presented in *Aθ. π.*

(d) Under the rule of the Five Thousand. For the suggestion that

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30 represents the constitution actually set up in the autumn, see *Aθ. π. 30. 2* n. above; it need not detain us further here. 31 can only be so dated if we accept Beloch's thesis (above, p. 243) that the two chapters present a single constitution wrongly divided into two.

Of these possibilities (b) is certainly the least vulnerable. It is not of course essential to suppose that the constitutions had been formally promulgated, for many drafts will have been circulated in 411, especially at the early stage when the commissioners of Th. 67. 1 and *Aθ. π. 29. 2* were deliberating; and such drafts might have been preserved in private hands, not necessarily carrying any clear indication of their standing or what had happened to them. The falsification in that case would be the work of their eventual publisher. Even immediately after the event a partisan and untruthful account would have its value for those who sympathized with its point of view, and the fact that so many contemporaries could refute it from their own experience would not stop its circulation. Later, in spite of the amnesty of 403, a connection with the Four Hundred or the Thirty could for long be exploited to make prejudice against a litigant or a candidate for office, and a man whose father or relative had been involved with them might want to argue, as the speaker of Lys. xx. 1 does, that the bulk of them had innocent intentions. But publication of the constitution of 30 might not do much to soften the hearts of fourth-century democrats: it is probably better to seek the origin of the falsification in the context of 411, though invention at a much later date remains a possibility.

(iv) Possible sources

The first question is the one passed over in the previous section, the chances that the original documents of any phase of the upheavals of 411 were officially preserved. In the first excitement of the discovery of *Aθ. π.* it was naturally assumed that the decrees of 29 and the constitutional proposals of 30-1 were in the full sense documentary; but already in 1907 Judeich (*Rh. Mus.* lxii [1907], 306) at least asked if such documents would still have been there when Thucydides returned to Athens after the war.

Athenian decrees show examples enough of instructions to cancel or destroy (*ξαλείψαι, ἐκκολάψαι*) records which were no longer valid or positively embarrassing. Some refer explicitly to records on stone: Tod 123. 31-5; 147. 39-40; *IG i². 106. 21-3* (*ἐκκολαφσάντον*, from a stele). But in ML 94. 28-30 the record *ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ* (for this see A. L. Boegehold in *AJA* lxxvi [1972], 23-30) of the debts of the trierarchs, which is to be deleted *ἀπανταχθέν*, was surely not all on stone; nor ML 87. 38-42, the names of the hostages from Selymbria (here, and restored in ML 94. 30, *ξαλείψαι*). The decree of Patrokleides (And. i. 79) goes into more detail: the thesmothetai and other

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authorities are to provide for cancellation of all records *πανταχόθεν*, *ὅπου τι ἔστιν ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ, καὶ εἰ ἀντίγραφόν που ἔστι*, and no one is to be allowed to keep such records in private; this is an amnesty, and nothing detrimental to the amnestied must survive to give an opportunity for *μνησικακία*. At another level, in *IG ii²*. 1237. 18–22 the name of a rejected phrater is to be expunged from *τὸ γραμματεῖο* *τὸ ἐν Δημοτικῶν καὶ τὸ ἀντιγράφῳ*, leaving no loophole for the reject to claim that his name was still somewhere on the books.

None of these is exactly parallel to the present case, and for 411 another consideration enters in, the need for a minimum of administrative continuity. The treasurers of the outgoing democracy seem to have been kept in office for the short remainder of their year (above, pp. 194–5), and they inscribed their accounts etc., as did also their successors the treasurers of the Four Hundred, and these records were not destroyed. The archon Kallias probably also stayed in office, and some of his records might survive even if not inscribed. Thus if the restored democracy destroyed documents from the time of the oligarchy, they did so selectively and could not make a clean sweep.

If the Four Hundred had inscribed on stone documents relating directly to their take-over, or later the constitutions of *Aθ. π.* 30–31, we can be sure that the democracy would have destroyed such stones. But it is not likely that they did inscribe anything of this kind; the question is rather about paper records and the extent to which the democratic Council of 410/09 would feel it necessary to purge such records. The tone of the decree of Demophantos (*And. i.* 96–8) might suggest a severe purge (but *And. i.* 78, *pace* Boegehold 27–8, surely refers to later documents which incriminated individuals, not to destruction of the oligarchs' own records). But we have no means of estimating how much trouble would be taken with records not on public display, though one might guess that the chances of survival were higher for the decree of Pythodoros (29. 2), passed by what was formally a normal meeting of the assembly, or even for decree(s) passed at Kolonus, than for the constitutions of 30–1. It is certain however that it would need some research to find anything that did survive, and we must consider other possible channels of transmission.

The question of Aristotle's literary sources must be approached with a decent humility: by his time there were in circulation enough general histories, Attitudes, speeches, pamphlets, etc., and there can be no guarantee that all his sources were writers whose names are known to us. We have however no option but to confine ourselves to those we know, and those who wrote before Aristotle have been reviewed above: the present issue is only, which of them is likely to have transmitted documents.

If Antiphon in his famous speech claimed that the original intentions of the revolutionaries were good (above, p. 199), he had a

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motive for examining the two decrees of *Aθ. π. 29*; and it might be relevant that one of his accusers, Apolexis, had been a member of the commission set up by the first of these decrees (Harp. s.v.). Whether or not Aristotle's text of the speech contained copies of the decrees, an orator will often cite verbatim the relevant parts of a document (e.g. D. xxiii. 16, xxiv. 41); and a speech would be likely to add the doubtfully documentary details in 29. 1, the name Melobios and Pythodoros' deme.

Antiphon might thus be the source of the documents used in 29, but it is harder to imagine him as the source of 30-1. If these proposals had in fact been put forward seriously at an early stage of the revolution, whether ratified or not, a general reference to 30 could have helped his case, argued as it was under the Five Thousand; detail of the kind we find in *Aθ. π.* would not much help him, and it is stylistically improbable that he recited the text *in extenso*. Hignett indeed (374), following Meyer and Stevenson in their belief that Thucydides knew the content of *Aθ. π. 30-1*, remarks that 'he must have known them if they were used by Antiphon in his defence'; but it is disquieting that Th. 67. 1 conflicts in detail with *Aθ. π. 29. 2*, the decree which Aristotle's source is most likely to have cited verbatim. Further, if we are looking for a source which led Aristotle here to give an account of the Four Hundred different from that which lies behind the allusion in *Pol. 1305 b 26*, Antiphon is not a good candidate, for the famous speech had presumably been known to Aristotle all his reading life and would not be new to him when he came to write *Aθ. π.* But Dover suggests the interesting possibility that some oligarchic partisan of the late fifth or early fourth century thought it might help himself or his friends if he 'edited' Antiphon's *Defence*, inserting extensive 'documents' of the kind found in And. i, with a view to demonstrating Antiphon's legality and patriotism. Readers familiar, as Aristotle was, with speeches thus documented might be tempted to treat the 'documents' as authoritative: we have still to explain how this edition reached Aristotle only at this late stage, but that is not inconceivable.

The source most frequently proposed for these chapters is the *Attis* of Androton*. It was suggested above (pp. 210-11) that, if his father Andron was the member of the Four Hundred who survived their fall and proposed the decree for the trial of Antiphon, the line he took about the revolution could well have been that which we find in *Aθ. π. 29*. Jacoby (introd. to Androton, n. 86) treats it as 'fairly certain' that 'A. supplied the documents for the reform of the constitution in 412/11 B.C. (*Aθ. π. 29-33*) in detail and evidently with approval as a kind of model constitution'; but some doubts creep in.

One, not perhaps the most important, is the question of scale. Jacoby, discussing the economy of the work, conjectures (introd.

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p. 105) that book iii covered the period 463/2 to 405/4. F 64 shows that the military narrative for the summer of 412 went into more detail than we might have expected (Th. 24. 3 n.); perhaps he treated the earlier years more cursorily and gave more space to his father's active lifetime, especially to the Four Hundred with whom the latter had been involved. Nevertheless the two constitutions in full make a large block of material, and the proportions are still more surprising if we suppose (above, pp. 242–3) that Aristotle curtailed the source he used for 30.1.

The question of the authenticity of 30–32.1 may also be relevant. Writing seventy years after the event, Androton might feel a certain freedom with the facts (F 34 shows him ready to deviate from standard tradition about Solon). For us, tending as we do to treat the version of Thucydides as canonical, it looks bold to bring the Five Thousand into premature activity and to credit them with ἀναγραφεῖς and two constitutions; but there will have been many and various accounts current in Androton's time, some perhaps still less responsible, and we cannot rule him out on this ground as the author behind 30.1 and 32.1.

More serious is the matter of his access to authentic records, and of the likelihood that he would turn to them at all. Writing in exile at Megara in his sixties, he could not consult Athenian records directly. His political activity led Jacoby (introd. p. 103) to reject the view that he began his work before his exile; that may be too absolute, but no doubt his opportunities were limited while he was still in Athens. In *Atthis* 207 ff. Jacoby discussed more generally the use of documentary material by the Atthidographers, concluding (209) that 'they did not search systematically for documents'; but he has to allow that for the fifth century they made increasing use of psephisms, and the decrees of 411 may be admitted as an exception specially interesting for Androton personally. It remains as before an open question what records survived for study; but if any did, Androton from his experience as Councillor and administrator would know how to find them.

The chances do not seem very high that Androton worked from copies of decrees officially preserved in Athenian archives, but that leaves wide open the possibility that any or all of the documents under discussion had been preserved not in public offices but in private hands. Copies could be made, as they surely were in some cases for Thucydides, and it is possible that Andron kept, and his son inherited, a substantial body of papers relating to these events; he would be specially likely to have a copy of his own decree, and even some non-documentary details might derive from notes made by him. A private collection is however much more vulnerable than a public archive. We need not suppose that Andron himself was

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conspicuously dishonest, though he would no doubt keep most carefully what showed him in a favourable light; but by the time Androton came to write the status of some of the documents might no longer be clear (Androton could have no personal memory of 411, even if he was born by then), and many kinds of misunderstanding would be possible. If they came to Androton in some such way, we can do no more than look at the content of the various documents and see how plausible they look.

The wording of 29. 2–3 (see ad loc.) suggests an original in the form and language of a decree, and there are no positive grounds for suspicion; and the same is true of the detail additional to Thucydides in 29. 4, though here the language has been a little more remodelled. As for 29. 5, it is a large ground for confidence that the conspicuous non-Thucydidean detail, the appointment of *καταλογεῖς*, is confirmed by Lys. xx. The colouring of the account may be tendentious, but on grounds of content there seems no obstacle to taking the underlying documents as genuine copies of decrees of 411, and some argument in favour; and the coincidence of F 43 with 29. 2 tells much in favour of Androton as the source.

30–32. I offer fewer handholds. If all this was transmitted by Androton, the easiest explanation would be that the constitutions were put out by the Four Hundred not long after their coup (above, pp. 244–5), with a spurious claim that they were the work of a commission set up by the Five Thousand; and that they survived among Andron's papers together with a spurious decree which provided some of the detail found in *Aθ. π.* Presented in such a form the two constitutions might have deceived Androton himself, working over the records so many years later, and have been transmitted by him in all good faith. In that case most of the doubts expressed above fall away, but it is still surprising if Androton found room in his account of these two years for documents of such length. But there is nothing here, as there is in 29, that points positively to Androton, and if the relevant documents were preserved in private hands, the hands need not have been those of Androton's family. See also p. 248 above for the possibility that they were incorporated in an 'edition' of Antiphon's *Defence*, which would leave the question of their authenticity still unresolved.

Inevitably, no very firm conclusion emerges from this review. We cannot rule out the possibility of research carried out in the latter part of the fourth century into documents preserved in official archives ever since 411, but the chances do not look to be high. Contemporary copies kept by private persons seem the most likely mode of transmission, with all the risks of error that that implies, and one can only guess from the content how authentic the documents are. Given the virtual certainty that Aristotle would have consulted

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Androtion, and the particular coincidence of F 43 with 29. 2, my own guess would be that Androtion was the main source for 29 and that the decrees there cited are genuine. The chronographic material in 33. 1 would be most easily found in an *Atthis*, and if that of Androtion was used at all by Aristotle, that is the likely source, which leaves it probable that it is also the source for other parts of 32. 2–33 which do not derive from Thucydides; but there is no direct clue to the reliability of these few sentences. I would take 30–32. 1 to be based on a distinct document, preserved in private hands rather than published by Androtion, derived either from a proclamation made by the Four Hundred, or less probably from drafts circulating in Athens at the time of the revolution. Whether or not these particular guesses are correct, we can no longer feel the confidence of early critics that *Aθ. π.* provides us with securely based documents which can be used to correct Thucydides.

8. *Thucydides*

In the course of the commentary attention is drawn to several points which suggest that book viii was written soon after the events which it describes. That would mean that Thucydides, still in exile when he wrote this book, depended on such information as could be brought to him from Athens. Down to the formal resumption of the war in 413 it would be possible, though maybe not always easy, for Athenians to travel to wherever Thucydides was, but one could imagine that the Athenians whom he most encountered were those who had, like himself, been exiled from Athens. When the war began again, barriers to communication will have been less complete than in modern war (the episode of Phrynicos and Astyochos described in 50–1 shows how easy communication across the lines was even in the area of operations, and there are other cases), but the flow will have been in some degree restricted and we cannot reconstruct in detail the ways in which he might have been able to organize it. For the revolution the particular point arises of the degree of ease with which he could obtain copies of documents, especially of decrees of the state. See 21 n. for his claim to know of an Athenian decree which granted autonomy to the Samians, and for the fact that (whatever the cause) he shows no awareness of the facts alleged in *IG* i². 101. It is likely that the first large flow of oral information about the revolution came from the refugees referred to at 98. 1, and it may prove relevant that these were the irreconcilable extremists who had to flee at the fall of the Four Hundred. In 92. 2 n. it will be argued that his information about the murder of Phrynicos came from such a refugee, who knew nothing of developments since he had left Athens, and that Thucydides when he wrote 92. 2 did not know of the series

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of decrees honouring the murderers, of which ML 85 (spring 409) was not the first; [Plu.] 834b shows that some decrees concerning Phrynicos had already been inscribed at the time of Antiphon's trial.

In all the circumstances it is easy enough to believe that Thucydides fell into an error of detail in reporting a decree of the assembly at 67. 1, and the many historians who accept this have not in general felt that his credit was much damaged by that. A more serious ground for disquiet is a certain discontinuity in the attitude which he adopts towards the revolutionaries. To put it schematically, neglecting other passages which are less distinctive and do not in the same way encourage speculation about their source, we have the following:

(a) While the headquarters of the conspiracy were still at Samos there is heavy stress on their intention to carry on the war more effectively. This is given as the main reason for their acceptance of the overtures of Alkibiades in the first instance (48. 1); the prospect of survival in the war underlies Peisandros' appeal to the Athenian assembly in the winter (53–54. 1); just before the scene shifts to Athens we find them proposing, since their hopes from Alkibiades have failed, to contribute toward the costs of war from their own pockets (63. 4), a striking sign of determination. When the Four Hundred are established in power, almost the first thing they do is to open negotiations with Agis (70. 2), and Thucydides makes no comment on this complete reversal of policy.

(b) The conspirators' *λόγος ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ* at 65. 3 outlines a scheme of moderate oligarchy, but Thucydides adds at once at 66. 1 that this was merely specious, since the initiators of the movement intended to take control themselves. This comment appears to exclude the possibility that there were more moderate men involved who believed in the published programme, and in the following chapters (69–72) we find no sign of internal dissension among the Four Hundred. Yet it appears in the sequel (89 ff.) that there was a substantial minority that opposed the faction of Phrynicos and Antiphon, and at the next stage they were strong enough to set up the regime of the Five Thousand. It is unlikely in fact that the original conspirators included no 'moderates'; Thucydides seems to express surprise at 67. 2 over the failure of the commission set up at 67. 1 to produce a constitution, but he offers no explanation, though disagreement among the commission would provide an easy one.

(c) At 89. 2 Theramenes and Aristokrates are introduced as leaders of a party opposed to the extremists, and in spite of textual corruption it is clear that they called for a more moderate constitution and a real Five Thousand. It is then explained that this, again, was mere window-dressing, the real motive being private ambition (89. 3); they saw that the oligarchy was collapsing and each was in a hurry

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to turn himself into a *προστάτης τοῦ δῆμου*. This judgement is passed on *οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν*, not on the whole group, so that here we are allowed at least some sincere supporters of the programme of the Five Thousand; but the general tone is hostile, to an extent that is surprising in view of the praise their constitution is to receive at 97.2.

(d) At 89. 4 Thucydides writes as if the Four Hundred were to be succeeded immediately by outright democracy; at 68. 2 ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου points the same way (whatever we make of the rest of the sentence); and at 98. 4 the statement that 'the oligarchy' now ended is at least ambiguous. Yet there is no doubt that Thucydides distinguished between democracy and the rule of the Five Thousand (92. 11, 97. 2).

These ambiguities or contradictions are very unlike Thucydides' usual magisterial firmness. A possible explanation (see Introd. p. 4) is that book viii is unfinished in a deeper sense than that of breaking off in the middle of an episode, that Thucydides was still at the stage of writing up each separate report as it came in and had not yet fully co-ordinated these reports or imposed a uniform judgement on them. A clear case of this kind of incompleteness appears in the narrative at 22-3; some small dislocations of the normal chronological arrangement (e.g. at 99) point the same way; some statements (most obviously at 5. 4-5) might be taken on other grounds as only provisional. If we could suppose that in the same way he used reports of individuals about the revolution to construct a series of provisional accounts of the various phases, that might account for his uneven treatment of these phases. If extremist refugees were his first informants, these were men who regarded a Five Thousand as *ἄντικρυς δῆμον* (92. 11), and had every inclination to question the sincerity of Theramenes and his group; from such a quarter the assertion that these men wanted to pose as *προστάται τοῦ δῆμου* is just a symptom of their bias. My hypothesis would be that Thucydides 'wrote up' this report in literary form without necessarily meaning to endorse it permanently: it afforded him an opportunity for a psychological generalization of the kind he liked (89. 3), but 97. 2 is more likely to express his eventual opinion about the 'moderates'.

A reporter of similar sympathies might have described to Thucydides, with relish but some distortion, how Peisandros silenced the demagogues in the winter (53-4); another, from a different point of view, have told him about the beginnings of the movement at Samos; yet another have given him a favourable account of the regime of the Five Thousand, this last very much confirmed for Thucydides by the successes of that regime and its leaders. I do not at all mean to suggest that all his informants can be labelled in this way, and I take it that they were as many and various as he could make them; my concern here is with the anomalies in his account, and I suggest that these are most easily explained if we ascribe them to

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variety in his immediate sources, not yet ironed out as it would have been when he had finally made up his mind.

That, as it seems to me, is the special problem presented by Thucydides' account of the revolution. Within the framework which I propose, his credibility as a witness rests on his contemporary knowledge of his countrymen and their situation, his particular acquaintance with many of the individual actors, and that powerful and restlessly critical mind which we believe that we see him exercise elsewhere. Two modern scholars emphasise the subjective character of our trust in his accuracy: M. I. Finley in the *The Greek Historians* (1959), introd. p. 8, and P. A. Brunt in his introduction to the translation in *The Great Histories* (1963), p. xxiii. Both stress just as strongly the extent to which his claims have been accepted, and a subjective impression felt so strongly and widely as this is not merely negligible; and there is no doubt at all of his superiority to those of his successors whose works survive even in part. If exile denied him direct experience of the events of 411 in Athens, so that in places he suspended judgement for a time, that does not mean that his critical faculties were in general in abeyance. If extremist refugees were an important source for the period when the Four Hundred were in power, then as regards the main disagreement between him and Aristotle, Thucydides' denial that the Five Thousand were constituted in this period is all the more weighty, coming from such a source. However unfinished book viii may be, it must still be treated with respect.

9. *Modern theories*

Many of the salient points have been noted already, and a further full-scale review would serve no useful purpose. Wilamowitz (*AuA* [1893], esp. ii. 113–25) and Köhler (*Sb. Berl.* 1895/1. 451–68, 1900/2. 803–17) may be taken as representative of that first reaction to the new discovery which gave the documents in *Aθ. π.* precedence over the statements of the exile Thucydides. Ed. Meyer in *Forschungen* ii (1899), 406–36 took the opposite line, that what happened in 411 was a revolution and not a careful legal reform; while accepting the documents as authentic, he argued with a wealth of parallels that the formal acts are likely to be a most misleading guide to the actual course of a revolutionary movement. A similar feeling that the element of force must not be eliminated underlies the theory (69. 2 n.) that a reform intended to take effect at the beginning of the new year was overtaken (on 22 Thargelion) by an extremist coup.

These have been the poles of the subsequent controversy, and solutions of varying virtuosity have been found to the problems,

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how much of Thucydides or Aristotle has to be jettisoned and how far the two accounts can be reconciled. Meyer (412) commended Beloch (ii². 2. 311–12) for basing himself firmly on Thucydides, but the details of his cavalier treatment of Aristotle did not command Meyer's support, nor that of the sceptical historians who usually follow Beloch: De Sanctis (97–125) as late as 1930 found a surprising proportion of error in Thucydides, while Hignett in 1952 adopted a position very close to that of Meyer. The attempt of F. Sartori in 1951 to show that there is no contradiction between Thucydides and Aristotle glides very superficially over many difficulties and is likely to convince nobody. On a higher level is the intricate theory of M. Lang (*AJP* Ixix [1948], 272–89) which deals with the problem by suggesting that Th. 67 and *Aθ. π.* 29 deal with two separate series of events. *Aθ. π.* 29. 1–3 belongs with the meeting of Th. 53–4, and 29. 5 with one held in Peisandros' absence and omitted by Thucydides because its measures had no effect; whereas Th. 67 gives us two later meetings omitted by Aristotle, from whose account 'not only everything which happened on a purely diplomatic or political level was omitted, but also any legislative action resulting from these moves' (289). Hignett's criticism (362–4) devoted most space to the chronology, and this she answered in *AJP* lxxxviii (1967), 176–87 (see Th. 54. 4 n.). She does not however answer the more substantial point that the measures of *Aθ. π.* 29 and Th. 67 are not so easily separated: it is natural, if not quite inevitable, to take 29. 4 and 67. 2 as describing the lifting of constitutional safeguards on the same occasion, and it is certainly possible to take 29. 5 as an incomplete account of what was passed at the meeting of 67. 3. Lastly, while it is easy to accept Lang's reasons for Thucydides' disregard of her 'second meeting', her explanation of Aristotle's omissions is extremely forced.

While most historians now accept that Thucydides' account of a genuinely revolutionary coup is to be preferred to Aristotle's very legalistic reform, attempts on a smaller scale at partial reconciliation continue (e.g. P. J. Rhodes, *JHS* xcii [1972], 117 n. 21), by the hypothesis that the Kolonos meeting regarded itself as being somehow, in advance of the work of the *καταλογεῖς*, equivalent to the Five Thousand, with or without identification of various bodies of a hundred. This trend is in a measure encouraged by the interpretation of 32. 3 as a retraction by the author, which I do not accept (see *ad loc.*), but even so I find it surprising. If one does not propose to rehabilitate Aristotle to any substantial extent, I see little advantage in trying to reconcile details; provided there is a reasonable possibility of envisaging a unitary origin for 30–32. 1 as a block of fiction (pp. 247–51 above), it appears more economical to suppose that Aristotle was deceived by a single deceitful document.

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He was surely capable of being deceived by a spurious document. In this treatise the conspicuous instance is the constitution of Drakon (4), unless that is an insertion by some later hand. The attraction of that forgery was presumably that it presents a hoplite constitution of the kind that Aristotle would approve, and here 30, as an attempt to modify radical democracy, would at least interest him (cf. also the last sentence of 33. 2). The same feeling would account for the tone of 29 and the choice of a source which up to a point exculpated the reformers. Indeed we are forewarned by 28. 5, the judgment that Theramenes promoted all constitutions *ἔως μηδὲν παρανομοῖεν*, which implies that there was a stage at which it was virtuous to encourage the changes made in 411.

Aristotle's familiarity with the text of Thucydides would tell him that the historian was absent from Athens during the revolution, and this would encourage him to prefer a source whose detail, with some technical minutiae, suggested closer contact with the actual constitutional proceedings. It has also been held that he positively enjoyed correcting Thucydides, with his claim to superior accuracy (cf. 18. 4, and Wilamowitz, *AuA* i. 117); indeed Wilamowitz (*ibid.* 104) thought that we owe much of the detail in 29–33 to just this desire to put Thucydides right. He noted that this impression is strengthened when we contrast Aristotle's close dependence on Thucydides in 33. 1, but he appears not to have asked why Aristotle should have gone over to Thucydides at this point, when the version of Androton must still have been available. A. v. Mess (*Rh. Mus.* lxvi [1911], 378), a devout believer in a Theramenean source for Aristotle's version, argued that the need to contradict Thucydides was greatest over the period when the Four Hundred were set up, when Theramenes' conduct was open to criticism; for their downfall, Theramenes was in the clear and Thucydides could therefore be used. That neglects Th. 89 and *Aθ.* π. 32. 2, and the 'Theramenean source' is no longer much credited; but it is possible that Thucydides became more acceptable because of his praise at 97. 2 of a constitution which Aristotle found sympathetic. But that does not explain why Aristotle deserted Androton: it may be that the latter's version of this phase was for some reason unacceptable, a point which we cannot verify in the present state of our knowledge.

The basic issue between Thucydides and Aristotle is the existence or non-existence of the Five Thousand during the time when the Four Hundred were in power, and on that there can be no compromise. It is easier to see how Aristotle could be misled on this, and we should accept Thucydides' view, with the consequences that flow from it. In comparison with this it is hardly of great importance whether certain details can be bent into agreement, and to me the effort does not seem worth while.

73–77. Counter-revolution at Samos

73. 1. τὰ περὶ τὴν δλιγαρχίαν: the Athenian fleet at Samos had reluctantly accepted oligarchy at an early stage (48. 3); the Samians had so far done nothing, though encouraged to join (63. 3). Thucydides' vague phrase refers to the Athenians, as the connection with 72. 2 shows, though the narrative sequence compels him to take the Samian plot first (Steup and others, against Classen).

ὑπ’ αὐτὸν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, κ.τ.λ.: this takes us back to the time of 70. 1, early in June.

2. ὄντες δῆμος - - - ως δῆμοι ὄντι: τότε refers us back to 21, and those who rose up against the then δυνατοί thereby classed themselves as democrats. These three hundred belong to the new ruling class (δυνατοί or δυνατώτατοι in 63. 3, see n. there), and after their change of heart (*μεταβαλλόμενοι*) they are ready to attack the rest 'as being the demos'. To describe the conspirators themselves as *δῆμος* sharpens the antithesis, but the feeling that *δῆμος* ought to mean the whole people has troubled critics: some speak of a narrowing of the subject (frequent enough in Thucydides, e.g. 47. 2, 48. 1), Steup suspected that something had fallen out. Neither is quite satisfactory, and we may allow that Thucydides has a little warped the language to make his point more strongly: that is, the three hundred 'were *demos*' in the sense that they had been leaders of a faction identifiably democratic, whereas *τοῖς ἄλλοις* may be either the people as a whole, or other leaders of the faction who were genuine democrats ready to resist the plot of the three hundred*.

ὅτε ἥλθε: an unusually shorthand back-reference to 63. 3. The co-ordination of these two passages is not quite complete.

3. 'Υπέρβολον: son of Antiphanes, of Perithoidai, according to Androtion (*FGrH* 324 F 42). The father's name is now confirmed by two ostraka (*Hesp.* viii [1939] 246, xvii [1948] 186; cf. *ML* p. 46); for Theopompos' statement that he was the son of Chremes see W. R. Connor, *Theopompos and Fifth-Century Athens* (1968), 59–60.

The surviving record contains little but personal abuse from the comic poets, in quantity suitable for Kleon's successor but no help towards precise assessment. He may, like others, have begun his public career in the lawcourts: Ar. *Ach.* 846–7, according to the scholiast one of many references to his fondness for lawsuits (cf. *Nub.* 876), marks his earliest datable appearance. *Eq.* 1303–4 produces a rumour that he wanted a hundred triremes *ἐς Καρχηδόνα*: that is evidence of the kind of thing Aristophanes thought he could attribute to him rather than of any strategy proposed in fact, but it is likely enough that he supported the expedition of 427–424 to Sicily, and war in general. His appointment as *hieromnemon* (*Nub.* 623–4) and *IG* i². 84. 5 suggest an interest in religion; *IG* I². 95 (see A. G. Woodhead,

Hesp. xviii [1949], 78–83) is less revealing. But there is nothing to compare with Kleon's raising of jury-pay or the tribute, with Pylos or Skione or Amphipolis. H. was perhaps unlucky in the circumstances in which the lead fell to him. Kleon's last campaign discredited the active war-policy and his death opened the way for Nikias' peace (v. 16. 1), and in the next few years the limelight is on Alkibiades' opposition to the maintenance of this peace. Contemporary reaction shows that H. was a figure of importance in Athenian politics, but it is intelligible that the list of *προστάται* in *Aθ. π.* 28. 3 should miss him out, passing directly from Kleon to Kleophon who could be debited with the diobelia and the rejection of an offer of peace.

ωστρακισμένον — αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως: as with Kleon (v. 16. 1), Thucydides' hostility is open and total; and again he echoes Aristophanes (*Eq.* 1304 *μοχθηρὸν πολίτην*). The contemptuous phrase dismisses, along with H., everything we wish to know about the transaction. Plato Com. (fr. 187) also found H. below the dignity of ostracism:

καίτοι πέπραγε τῶν τρόπων μὲν ἄξια,
αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν στιγμάτων ἀνάξια·
οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων εῖνεκ' ὥστραχ' εὑρέθη.

Thucydides' formula expresses the conventional view about the institution. On its real use and purpose see G. R. Stanton, *JHS* xc (1970), 180–3: the major ostracisms of the fifth century turned not on the fear of *δύναμις* and *ἀξίωμα* as such, but on conflicts of policy between parties whose strength was dangerously equal. The decision to hold an *δοτρακοφορία* was taken not because the mass of the citizens was seized with a wholly uncharacteristic desire to purge the city of shame (however much this may have weighed with members of Thucydides' own class), but to resolve a deadlock.

Plutarch tells the story in three places. (a) *Arist.* 7. 3–4: in a brief forward reference we hear of the rivalry between Alkibiades and Nikias, an impending ostracism, and the surprise manœuvre by which they combined their *στάσεις* against H. (b) *Nic.* 11 tells essentially the same story at greater length, but at 11. 10 Plutarch adds that he knows that according to Theophrastos (fr. 139 W) Alkibiades' opponent was not Nikias but Phaiax; but the majority told it Plutarch's way. (c) *Alc.* 13 speaks of an *ἀγών* against both Nikias and Phaiax, describes the latter, then (§ 3) mentions a speech of Phaiax against Alkibiades which it is tempting to identify with [And.] iv. By § 7, however, the pact before the ostracism is with Nikias, but § 8 records the variant opinion of some that it was with Phaiax (this is presumably Theophrastos).

For the relation between these accounts, and between them and [And.] and Theophrastos, see A. R. Burn, *CQ N.S.* iv (1954) 138–42;

A. E. Raubitschek, *Phoenix* ix (1955), 122–6; Connor (see previous n.) 64; vol. iv. above, pp. 287–8. Raubitschek, *TAPA* lxxix (1948), 191–210, wished to rehabilitate [And.] iv as a genuine speech of 415, but some of the anomalies are beyond remedy: see Burn 138–9; v. 116. 4 n. above; vol. iv, pp. 287–8 (but the suggestion that Andokides might still have been the author is withdrawn in Dover, *GPM* 8 n. 1, in face of S. Feraboli, *Stud. it. fil. class.* xliv [1972], 5–37). The view that the supposed speaker was Phaiax seems to rest on §41, his embassies to (among other places) Italy and Sicily, identified with the embassy of Th. v. 4–5, which is tenuous enough. What Plutarch cites from his speech about Alkibiades' use of Athenian civic plate is very close to [And.] iv. 29 but not identical; that discrepancy might be due to Plutarch citing from memory, but the material about Phaiax in *Alc.* 13. 1–2 is not from [And.] iv, and there is something to be said for Burn's view that Plutarch and [And.] derive from a common source; but *Alc.* 13. 1 shares with [And.] iv. 2 the view that there were three 'candidates', whereas Theophrastos seems simply to have substituted Phaiax for Nikias in the story of the pact. We do not know exactly what Theophrastos said, but from these texts it looks as if he did not depend on [And.] and there is no knowing whether his evidence was good or bad (ostracism was not of course a closed contest and Phaiax may well in fact have had a part in this one: four ostraka with his name have so far been found, ML p. 46).

If Theophrastos were right in making Phaiax the main opponent of Alkibiades, this was a feud between two upper-class aspirants to the political leadership, and we cannot quite rule this out; the 'corruption' of Phaiax into Nikias in the majority tradition is easier than the reverse change, since the quarrel of Nikias with Alkibiades was notorious but Phaiax was less well known, and H. might have had tactical reasons for inflating such an issue to the point where ostracism seemed the remedy. On the other hand we know of no issue of policy between Alkibiades and Phaiax, and (on the flimsy evidence we have) it might be doubted whether Phaiax was substantial enough to rival Alkibiades; but we do know that the issue between Nikias and Alkibiades, the question whether the peace with Sparta should be maintained (for the special relevance of this in spring 416 see below), was a major issue at Athens, indeed we know no other of comparable importance before 415. Historians have naturally taken this to be the issue which brought on this ostracism, and this is probably right.

Discussion of the date has centred round Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F 96: ὅτι ἐξωστράκισαν τὸν Ὑπέρβολον ἐξ ἔτη· ὁ δὲ καταπλεύσας εἰς Σάμον καὶ τὴν οἰκησιν αὐτοῦ ποιησάμενος ἀπέθανε, κ. τ. λ. Literal translation makes no sense: whatever one may think of the possibility of a five-year term of ostracism (Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 30; Diod. xi. 55. 2),

a formal sentence of six years is unlikely. But the source (*ΣV Ar. Ve.* 1007), whose mind was mainly on the casting of H's body into the sea, might have garbled the beginning of his quotation, and there is that much to be said for Cobet's conjecture that the six years were really the interval between the ostracism and the murder—but no more, for even in a garbled quotation the six years should come after, not before, H. settled in Samos. Reckoning six years back from June 411, the ostracism would fall in spring 417; that (for all we know) might be a plausible date if Phaiax was Alkibiades' main opponent, but not if the contest was mainly with Nikias, since the Spartan victory at Mantinea in summer 418 and subsequent developments at Argos (v. 80–81) must for the time being have discredited Alkibiades' Peloponnesian policy and taken the heat out of this controversy.

A. G. Woodhead in *Hesp.* xviii (1949) 78–83 re-examined *IG* i². 95, the fragmentary decree to which H. proposed an amendment, and concluded that he was still in Athens in the last prytany of 418/17 and so could not have been ostracized in the spring of that year; M. F. McGregor, in *Phoenix* xix (1965), 31–2, 43–6, supports him. As both stress, the conclusion is conjectural. The crucial tip of a *phi* in the break at the end of l. 12 is attested by an impressive galaxy of epigraphists (McGregor 45), and if ἐπὶ Ἀντιφ[ι] is the correct reading the chances are high that this is a date, ἐπὶ Ἀντιφῶντος = 418/17, in which case the decree can belong to no earlier year; but the stroke in McGregor's drawing and photograph appears to exclude the reading τεῖ βολ]ὲι [τ]ὲι ἐπὶ Ἀντιφ[ῶντος, and this reduces the strength of the argument that it belongs to the end of Antiphon's year. This must be left in suspense, but legitimate doubt has been cast on 417 as the date of the ostracism.

A. E. Raubitschek, *Phoenix* ix (1955), 122–6, suggested that the six years of Theopompos F 96 are not the time H. had spent in exile but the time before exile during which he had been the reigning demagogue; and this is easily reconciled with the text on the supposition that some word such as δημαγωγήσαντα has fallen out (or still more simply, <*μεθ'*> ἔξ ἔτη, Connor 160 n. 36). This proposal is supported by (a) F 92 *Κλέων δημαγωγὸς ἦν Αθηναίων προστὰς αὐτῶν ἐπτὰ ἔτη*, (b) *Σ Ar. Pac.* 681 *Υπέρβολος --- οὗτος μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Κλέωνος δυναστείαν διεδέξατο τὴν δημαγωγίαν*; the latter is not ascribed to Theopompos, but so much of its content coincides with that of F 95–6 that it is reasonable to assign the whole to him (H. Bloch, *HSCP* suppl. vol. i (1940), 355 n. 1; Connor 63). These passages suggest that in *Phil.* x (περὶ τῶν Αθήνησι δημαγωγῶν) Theopompos constructed a serial list of demagogues with regnal years like a king-list (cf. Diodoros' formula, e.g. xv. 60. 5 διαδεξάμενος τὴν δυναστείαν). Connor's difficulty about the exclusive count (160–1 n. 37) is unnecessary: the

inclusive count is regular with ordinals, but a continuous list in cardinal numbers imposes its own system, as in Diodoros. The trouble is rather that such lists normally operate in whole years and have different ways of disposing of the fractions which occur in real life (the basic discussion is Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. 440–53). Here I would disregard Perikles' forty years (*Plu. Per.* 16. 3): this figure would exclude Ephialtes from the list (not explicitly attested for Theopompos, but not likely to have been omitted), and there are other reasons for doubting if it comes from Theopompos. Perikles died in autumn 429 (ii. 65. 6), Kleon in autumn 422 (v. 11. 2 n., cf. 12. 1), so seven years is right in fact for Kleon, and the simplest way of tabulating that would be to assign to him the archon-years 429/8 to 423/2, with 422/1 as the first year of H. His sixth is then 417/16, excluding ostracism in spring 417, leaving 416 as the most likely and 415 just possible. If Theopompos reckoned on some other system, choice between 416 and 415 would be more open; but an ostracism in spring 415 is in fact unlikely, for by that time the Sicilian expedition was under active discussion and Thucydides is concerned to delineate for us the relations between Nikias and Alkibiades (Raubitschek's answer in *Hesp.* xxiii [1954], 68 n. 2 to Hignett [395–6] does not really meet this point).

The date 416 could have produced the scheme which Raubitschek attributes to Theopompos, and this is a likely time for the renewal of controversy between Nikias and Alkibiades. The restoration of democracy at Argos brought about a renewal of the alliance with Athens, which Thucydides notes (v. 82. 5) after the Spartan Gymnopaidiai and before the end of summer 417. For the fragments of this treaty see *IG* i². 96; Meritt, *Hesp.* xiv (1945), 122–7; *SEG* x. 104; Bengtson no. 196: they show that it was not voted at Athens till the prytany of Aiantis, the same in which the first payment for Melos was made (ML 77. 29), so several months after the counter-revolution, and the treaty has some odd features about which more should have been said at v. 82. 5 n.

Fragmentary as the text is, the following is certainly recoverable:

(a) *4 πε]ντέκοντα ἔτε* is the period for which the alliance was made; cf. Th. v. 23. 1, 47. 1, which start similarly. (In 3 χου[— I would prefer, *pace* Meritt 125, to find a reference to *syngrapheis* and not leave the decree without a proposer.)

(b) The first intelligible provision concerns invasion of the Argolid: 6 ἐὰν ἑσβά[λλοσιν is clear, and]είον ἐπὶ πο[shows that this is not invasion of Attica but ἐς τὸν γῆν τὸν Αργ]είον; in the corresponding clause for Attica, 14 Λακε]δαιμόνιοι ἐ ἄλλος τις is clear and justifies introducing this formula into 6–7. Naturally enough, the Argives' first concern is with Spartan invasion.

(c) The first details of the obligation undertaken by Athens are

almost entirely lost, but ιο χρέμασι δὲ ἡόπος ἄν[---] marks a turn from military to financial aid, and is quickly followed by ιι]εν ἐ[κ τ]ῷ φόρῳ μ[---] τάλαντα ἐς τὸν πόλεμον: money from the tribute of the Athenian empire is to be used to help Argos against invasion.

(d) ι2]ρενεν βολον[presumably turns to the possible alternative, that the enemy wish to make peace, Αργείοις καὶ Αθε[ναι]ο[ις]; though we began from a (Spartan) invasion of the Argolid, Athens is involved in virtue of the alliance, and the end of the clause seems to say that the Argives are to refer peace proposals ἐς τὸν βολὲν καὶ τὸν δέμον τὸν [Αθε]ναι[ον].

(e) At ι4 begin provisions for the corresponding case, that the Spartans or anyone else invade Attica, but what can be read or supplied here does not so much further the present argument; note however ι9 τὸν [π]όλεμ[ον, 20 τὸν πρὸς Λακε[δαμ]ον[ίον, 22 μεδὲ ἐκεχ[ερίαν.

Compare Thucydides' record. Already before the end of summer 417 craftsmen had come from Athens to help the Argives build their long walls (v. 82. 6), though it is not stated that this aid was sent formally by the city. In the winter the Spartans invaded (83. 1-2). In summer 416, possibly before the vote on the treaty but more probably after, Alkibiades sailed to Argos and concerted measures against Spartan sympathizers there (84. 1). Later in the summer an Athenian raid from Pylos took much booty, but the Spartans declined to treat this as a final breach of the peace (115. 2). In winter 416/15 the Spartans invaded again, settled some Argive exiles at Orneai, and left after a truce of limited duration had been made between these exiles and the Argives; soon after an Athenian force arrived, evidently in compliance with the treaty but inevitably too late to encounter the invaders (vi. 7. 1-2). In spring 414 an invasion of the Argolid was halted by an earthquake (vi. 95. 1). Later in the summer the Spartans came again, and an Athenian force which thereafter raided Lakonian territory, giving the Spartans an unimpeachable *casus foederis*; and Thucydides remarks that the Argives had often before urged the Athenians to take this hostile action (vi. 105).

The delay in the formulation and acceptance of the treaty is surely significant. That very many Athenians would wish to help the Argive democrats was predictable, and equally that the Spartans would intervene in force. A treaty obligation to Argos would thus mean either a clash between Athenian land troops and the Spartan invaders, an uninviting prospect after Mantinea, or that these troops would be involved in reprisals conducted by the Argives, with the result that ensued in 414. It is easy to understand that many Athenians would hesitate before committing the city to such prospects, and that debate would be heated. The treaty, when it came, imposed more than a minimum obligation on Athens; though

the details are mostly lost, it looks as if the military commitment on both sides was more specific than the vague *κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν* of v. 47. 3–4, and the explicit commitment to supply a specific sum from the tribute goes well beyond anything in the treaty of 420. The document has in general a belligerent tone, almost assuming that war with Sparta has already begun. When Thucydides' Nikias complained (vi. 10. 1) of Athenian politicians who had undermined the peace, he was not thinking only of the period before Mantinea; the quarrel was more topical.

On this issue we should expect to find H. ranged with Alkibiades against Nikias; H. is not regularly incriminated as a warmonger, but Kleon's successor is likely to have been hostile to Nikias' peace. It is no surprise that he should have pressed for an ostracism on this issue, but to explain what then happened we have to suppose that the two parties were estimated to be very evenly balanced, and that Alkibiades lost his nerve; for Nikias, it was an obvious chance to divide his opponents. The temporary alignment of Alkibiades with Nikias was a stab in the back for Hyperbolos which could justly be resented, and I imagine that this manœuvre did more than anything else to create the distrust which good democrats felt for Alkibiades, in the long run fatal to his chances of becoming an established leader of the people in Perikles' style. In the short run his betrayal of H. need not have diminished the number of those who wanted to help Argos and were prepared to risk war; the treaty as it emerged in the prytany of Aiantis represents a victory for Alkibiades, and it looks as if he could have afforded the risk of ostracism. Given the obvious importance of this issue and its suitability as background for an ostracism in spring 416, we may feel reasonably sure that the majority tradition in Plutarch is right, that the main contest was between Nikias and Alkibiades; Theophrastos may have had good evidence that Phaiax was involved, but was probably wrong to substitute him for Nikias as a principal.

In Thucydides' narrative all this should come at the end of v. 83; one might indeed speculate that the collapse of the expedition to the north, Nikias' alternative to adventure elsewhere (vi. 10.5), helped to weaken his cause in the Argive issue. Gomme lamented Thucydides' absence from Athens and noted that 'information from the Athenian side came unevenly to him' (v. 74. 1 n., cf. 75. 5 n.; and e.g. viii. 69. 3 n.). But he knew the main lines of development at Athens, and from time to time a surprising amount of detail; and passages in viii show that he did not always wait till his information was complete before beginning to write (see pp. 251–4 above). I thus doubt if ignorance should be invoked to explain his failure to deal with the ostracism of H. in its chronological place. Though he took pains to make the military narrative complete, there is no attempt to present a

continuous political account for Athens or for any other city. It seems rather that he designed to illustrate types of politician and of political situation by concentrating on particular occasions and particular topics for speeches; certainly it was not his method to make his points by accumulation of instances. Kleon is mentioned only on selected occasions and no other Athenian demagogue is given an active part in the story (for the Syracusan Athenagoras cf. *Phoenix* xvi (1962), 77 with n. 31). Thus Androkles is named at 65. 2 above, where the murder of an individual enemy of Alkibiades is relevant, but not at vi. 29. 3, where he can be merged without detriment to the story in the mass of Alkibiades' opponents; and the demagogic past of Peisandros gets no mention, though his activity as ζητητής in 415 (And. i. 27, 36) could have earned him a place e.g. at vi. 53. 2. It is thus in accord with Thucydides' practice that H. should be merely dismissed, but one may nevertheless feel surprise that the renewal of the Argive alliance was passed over without further comment, for it was little less important for the future than the treaty of 420, whose preliminaries are described in some detail at v. 43–6. Perhaps that debate got its place in the story because it illustrated Alkibiades, perhaps Thucydides thought he had sufficiently indicated the fact of the renewed alliance and did not need to describe the process by which it had been accepted at Athens. But if we are to deduce from any of this that book v is incomplete, the argument should be based rather on Thucydides' reticence over the alliance and not on his silence about Hyperbolos' ostracism.

μετὰ Χαρμίνου: 30. 1 with n. 41. 3–42. It is natural that the oligarchs should leave one of their generals at Samos, where Leon and Diomedon were not their partisans (§ 4). What became of Charminos thereafter we are not told.

πίστιν διδόντες αὐτοῖς: Goodhart compares iii. 82. 6; and see vol. iv, p. 286.

4. Λέοντι καὶ Διομέδοντι: 23. 1, 19. 2 nn. διὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου suggests that they had held office under the democracy before their election as generals in 412, but we cannot verify this. Their known loyalty to democracy is further evidenced by their election among the generals who succeeded in 406 after Notion (X. *HG*. i. 5. 16, cf. *JHS* lxxiii [1953], 4).

Θρασυβούλῳ: the first appearance of the son of Lykos, of Steiria, later the leader of resistance to the Thirty. Nothing is known of his family or his previous career, but he was a man of means (Davies 7310), and his other trierarchy in 406 (X. *HG*. i. 6. 35) makes it likely that here he is the trierarch and Thrasyllos the hoplite. For his daughter's marriage to Nikias' grandson see D. M. Lewis, *BSA* 1 (1955), 30; on the basis of this and his appointment as general in 411 (76. 2), Davies puts his birth in the 440s, perhaps too positively, for in this emergency

rules about minimum age for generalship need not have been strictly kept.

Θρασύλωφ: we cannot name his father or deme, let alone elucidate his family connections and previous career. He was probably a more convinced democrat than Thrasyboulos (Beloch, *Att. Politik* 84–5. cf. *JHS* lxxiii [1953], 4). The name should be Θράσυλλος. The Θράσυλλος[*ς Εὐώνυμεύς*] of *IG* ii². 1388. 69–70 was his contemporary; Hansen's reverse index reveals no alternative to the restoration Θράσυλλος in *IG* ii². 928. 87; and there are others in the fourth century, whereas Θράσυλος is much less certainly attested. (B has - λλ - in all passages except this.)

δι' ἣν μόνον: μόνην recc., preferred by Stahl, Steup, and others. vi. 56. 2 ἐν ἣ μόνον ἡμέρᾳ (which Steup contemplated altering too) justifies μόνον here, and cf. Dover on Ar. *Nub.* 1401; the meaning is not in doubt. CG add μέχρι νῦν after μόνον, probably a gloss on ἐς τοῦτο; the latter is preferable, since it is unusual to use νῦν for the point of time in the past of which an author is speaking.

5. τοὺς Παράλους: for the state triremes Paralos and Salaminia, see Busolt–Swoboda 1208; Miltner, *RE* xviii 1209–11 (Paralos 8). Harp. s.v. *Πάραλος* (other lexicographers mostly curtail or muddle) tells us that the name came from a hero Paralos; they were paid 4 ob.; they spent most of their time at home; Hypereides (fr. 51 Kenyon) mentioned other privileges, not here specified. The hero was worshipped in the Paralion by a body named Paraloi (*IG* ii². 1254), a puzzling organisation (D. M. Lewis, *Historia* xii [1963], 34 n. 113). The necessity for speed in the carrying of orders and dispatches (cf. Ar. *Av.* 1204), and for a crew permanently on call, account for their special pay. Plutarch's comment, that they were reserved for special occasions (811 cd), must be true in general, though Th. iii. 77. 3 shows that they might sometimes be involved in an ordinary battle. A special *ταμίας* was elected for them (D. xxi. 171–4; *Aθ. π.* 61. 7: by Aristotle's time Salaminia had been replaced by Ammonias, since the occasion described in X. *HG*. vi. 2. 14, but the name Paralos persisted, perhaps protected by the cult).

For the phrase ἄνδρας Αθηναίους τε καὶ ἐλευθέρους, see vii. 13. 2 n. Classen defended ἐν τῇ νῇ πλέοντας against critics who point out that their presence on the ship is already clear: ΣΓΜνε₂ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νεὼς τῆς Παράλου means to distinguish these Paraloi from others for whom the same name was used (cf. Suda s.v.) and does not imply a text without this phrase. The precise allusion in αἰεὶ . . . ἐπικειμένους is lost to us, but they must have shown their feelings on some earlier occasion which Thucydides found noteworthy; and Aeschylus in Ar. *Ran.* 1071–2, καὶ τοὺς Παράλους ἀνέπεισεν (sc. Euripides) ἀνταγορεύειν τοῖς ἄρχονσιν, κ.τ.λ., must refer to something other than their conduct in this counter-revolution. Otherwise their only appearance in anything

like a political role is in 331, when the whole crew joined Diophantos and Achilles in their embassy to Alexander (Arr. iii. 6. 2; Aeschin. iii. 162).

αὐτοῖς: as the next sentence shows, not the Paraloi but the Samian democrats (Σ^{Mycz}).

δηπότε ποι πλέοιεν: in spite of 63. 2 above, the fleet was in a condition to go out in substantial strength.

6. **ἐπειθέντο:** repeated attacks according to Stahl, which is not what the context suggests; it is not clear why Thucydides used the impf. **οὐ μνησικακοῦντες:** this moderation contrasts strikingly with the ferocity shown in 21, and foreshadows the much-praised moderation of the Athenians in 403. It was only common sense in their precarious situation: possibly it was known that Peisandros and the Athenian oligarchs, who were principally to blame, had corrupted only a few of the Samian *δυνατοί*.

74. 1. **Χαιρέαν . . . τὸν Ἀρχεστράτου:** neither name is uncommon in the period, but it is natural to identify this Chaireas with the man who commanded the land troops at Kyzikos in spring 410 (Diod. xiii. 49. 6). Cf. Wilamowitz, *AuA*. i. 68. n. 40 (but he should not have made Ch. the *ταμίας* of the Paralos: Thucydides here gives his democratic enthusiasm as the reason why he was sent back to Athens with the Paraloi). Davies 9238 sets out the case, which he rightly says is not 'particularly compelling', for identifying Archestratos as the son of Lykomedes, general at Poteidaia (Th. i. 57. 6), and taking the same man to be the author of laws concerning the Areopagus in *Aθ. π.* 35. 2. The point of *ἄνδρα Αθηναῖον* is presumably to show that he was not a Samian, the Samians (below) being parties to his despatch to Athens; again, the implication is that he had no previous connection with the Paralos.

οὐ γὰρ ἔδεσάν πω, κ.τ.λ.: 73. 1.

2. **στρατιώτιν ναῦν:** the ship is on guard duty, not transporting troops, so *στρατιώτις* does not indicate the purpose for which a (normal) ship is currently being used; it therefore refers to a structural modification (vi. 43 n.). For the guard on Euboea see 1. 3, 95. 3, and the fort at 95. 6.

3. **ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον πάντα δεινώσας:** it is interesting that Thucydides should state this as a fact. He clearly had no bias in favour of the Four Hundred, and he gives a severe picture of the terrorism before their installation (esp. 66. 2); but he claims to know that there were few executions after the coup (70. 2), and here that Chaireas was lying (§ 3 end). It is of course possible that he had other grounds for distrusting Ch., and he would certainly have disapproved of his agitation on the present occasion (cf. 86. 4). The style of the allegations is no doubt meant to reinforce this impression: freedom of speech had

been suppressed in fact (66. 2), but *γυναικες* --- *ὑβριζονται* is standard rhetoric about tyrants (cf. Hdt. iii. 80. 5), and for the use of hostages cf. Polykrates (Hdt. iii. 45. 4).

75. 1. *τοὺς --- μάλιστα ποιήσαντας*: only two have been named, of whom Peisandros certainly and Phrynichos probably had left for Athens by now, but others must have remained besides Charminos (73. 3). For the rank and file of the conspiracy cf. 48. 3 *τοῦ ἐταιρικοῦ τῷ πλέοντι*.

ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ μέσου: edd. speak of 'neutrals', comparing iii. 82. 8 *τὰ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν* oppressed by extremists of both sides, and X. HG v. 4. 25 where *τοὺς διὰ μέσου* means those who were not adherents of either Kleombrotos or Agesilaos; the phrase does not recur in Thucydides in precisely this form. One may doubt if many Athenians were genuinely indifferent between democracy and oligarchy, but enough were accessible to the argument used here and at 92. 8, that internal quarrels must be postponed till they had dealt with the external enemy. On Thucydides' own priorities see 97. 2 n. below.

2. *λαμπρῶς ἤδη*: cf. 67. 3 with n.

ὅ τε Θρασύβουλος ὁ τοῦ Λάκου: his namesake Θ.Θράσωνος *Κολλυτεύς* does not appear in our record till after Notion, late 407 or early 406 (Plu. Alc. 36. 1); his career lasted till at least 373/2 (E. Schweigert, *Hesp.* viii [1939], 4–5). He might thus have been prominent enough by the time this was written to make it desirable to distinguish the two men by their patronymics, but Thucydides in any case regularly gives patronymics for important characters; it is hard to see any significance in the fact that it is given here and not at 73. 4 (cf. Aristokrates, 9. 2, 89. 2). One would expect a patronymic for Thrasyllos too; perhaps Thucydides did not at this time know it.

ῳρκωσαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας: on such general oaths see p. 228 above, and Demophantos' decree of summer 410 (And. i. 98).

δημοκρατήσεσθαι: CG, clearly right against ABEFM *δημοκρατηθήσεσθαι*; cf. 48. 5.

πολέμιοί τε ἔσεσθαι: some shadow of justification can be found for the switch to the nom. at 48. 6 (see n. there), but this looks like merely arbitrary variation.

ἐπικηρυκεύσεσθαι: Reiske, for codd. *ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι*. Nothing in the context would justify the differentiation of this as pres. inf. from the four futures which precede it.

3. *τὰ ἀποβησόμενα --- ξυνεκοινώσαντο*: a curious expression for an unusual idea; the reference is presumably to prospective success or failure in facing the dangers indicated in *νομίζοντες* --- *διαφθαρήσεσθαι*. The close collaboration continued till the end of the war, when Samos held out against Lysandros even after Aigospotamoi, according to X. HG ii. 3. 3, 6 longer than Athens itself. See also ML 94.

76. 1. *τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον*: after the futures of 75. 2 and *καθέστασαν* here, there is no difficulty in referring this to the coming months as well as to the present moment (Steup, against Goodhart).

ἀναγκάζοντες: a very attenuated use of the word. Weil's 'voulaient imposer' conveys the sense, but it is to be noted that whereas the fleet could contemplate the use of force (82. 1, 86. 4), the Four Hundred had no weapon but persuasion by an embassy (72, 86).

2. *ἐποίησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησίαν*: *contionem advocaverunt* (Stahl) is too informal. *ἐκκλησίαν ποιεῖν* is a regular phrase for 'call an assembly' (ML 46. 19 etc., cf. Th. iv. 118. 14), and this body proceeded to such acts as the deposition and election of generals (the regular assembly did not depose trierarchs, but the situation is not normal). Especially in § 6, they regard themselves as having taken over the functions of government, a development of a kind not unfamiliar in our own times.

τοὺς μὲν προτέρους στρατηγούς --- ἔπαυσαν: no exception is made for Leon and Diomedon, who disliked the oligarchy (73. 4) but may have been thought to have acquiesced in it too easily. They make no appearance in the following narrative, but nor do any generals except Thrasyboulos and Thrasyllos (100. 1, 4; 104–5), and Alkibiades who after his election (82. 1) overshadows the rest. Others who appear later in the Hellespont may have been elected now: Eumachos (X. HG i. 1. 22), quite probably Chaireas (Diod. xiii. 49. 6, see 74. 1 n. above), possibly Diodoros and Mantitheos (Diod. xiii. 68. 2).

3. *παραινέστεις --- ἐποιοῦντο*: not *λόγος*, but the introduction to this unusually long piece of *oratio obliqua* is like the introduction to a Thucydidean speech, prompting the question whether one was planned for this occasion. There are some characteristic generalisations, e.g. § 6 *οὐπερ ἔνεκα --- κρατεῖ*: more material would perhaps be needed for a full-scale political analysis, but alternatively this could easily have been turned into something like a commander's address to his men. For *παραινεῖν* of a political speech cf. i. 139. 4, and *IG* i². 90. 43, 136. 2, *SEG* x. 64a. 7; the verb used of commanders is normally *παρακελεύομαι*, but the result may be called *παραίνεσις*, e.g. iv. 93. 1, 95. 1, vi. 68. 1.

τοὺς γὰρ ἐλάσσους: in the next sentence they claim to have *τὸ πᾶν ναυτικόν*, which is true enough, for it appears that every ship that could be spared was sent across the Aegean as it became available, and later emergency produced no more than 36 at Athens and Eretria (95. 3). But so far as we know no troops had been sent from the city since the thousand late in 412 (25. 1).

ποριμωτέρων: 'better able to provide', as Ar. *Ran.* 1429 and elsewhere; 'well-provided' (LSJ II. 2) is weaker and less well attested.

4. *ἔχοντων γὰρ σφῶν*: to put this into the gen. abs., though 'they' are

the subject of the sentence, gives the argument added weight (Steup), which the plain nom. would not have. iii. 13. 7 is a close parallel.
 $\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \tau\epsilon\ \ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\varsigma\ p\ddot{o}leiv\varsigma$: $\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ om. B. Athens (Stahl) does not need to be distinguished from the cities it rules, and after 75. 3 it is hardly necessary to except Samos, but either might serve as the correlative to a slightly pleonastic $\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, whereas the interpolation of this word is not at all likely.

$\ddot{\sigma}\tau\epsilon\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\ddot{o}\lambda\epsilon\mu\eta\sigma\epsilon\nu$: i. 115. 2–117, cf. Plu. *Per.* 28. 8. Gomme (ms.) noted that the phrase here used, while not inconsistent with the narrative in book i, was clearly not 'thought' at the same time.

5. $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\rho\o\tau\epsilon\rho\o\ \alpha\dot{u}\tau\o\varsigma\ \kappa\rho\atilde{a}te\in\varsigma$, κ.τ.λ.: $\alpha\dot{u}\tau\o\varsigma$ are the Athenians at home, and down to now the Samos fleet has kept the enemy from blockading the Peiraieus. That is over-dramatic: the real need was to keep the Peloponnesians away from the Hellespont, which the fleet failed to do (99 ff.), but it is true that nothing else besides this fleet stood between Athens and the starvation which ensued after Aigospotamoi.

$\kappa\alpha\iota\ \nu\ddot{u}\nu\ \dot{\epsilon}\varsigma\ \tau\o\iota\o\nt\o\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\o\st\jmath\o\nt\o\varsigma\nt\o\varsigma$, κ.τ.λ.: the text cannot be right. The abrupt change to the indicative, abruptly reversed in the next sentence, is far harsher than the nominatives of 48. 6 and 75. 2, and besides $\dot{\epsilon}\varsigma\ \tau\o\iota\o\nt\o\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\o\st\jmath\o\nt\o\varsigma\nt\o\varsigma$ --- $\ddot{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon\ \delta\mu\eta\atilde{a}\tau\o\tau\epsilon\o\$ is, as Goodhart remarks, 'a very meaningless circumlocution' in a passage otherwise notable for the concentration of its language.

Dobree's *κα\alpha\o\st\jmath\o\nt\o\varsigma\epsilon\o\thai* and Classen's *κα\alpha\o\st\jmath\o\nt\o\varsigma\i\thai*, leaving aside the question how either was corrupted to *κα\alpha\o\st\jmath\o\nt\o\varsigma\nt\o\varsigma*, do not remedy the latter defect; nor does Stahl's suggestion that $\langle\epsilon\tau\i\ \mu\ddot{a}\lambda\lambda\o\, \dot{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\i\rangle$ has fallen out after $\kappa\alpha\i\ \nu\ddot{u}\nu$. But the latter is a move in the right direction, accounting for the fut. indic. and allowing the present possibility for the Samos fleet to grow naturally out of the previous situation. Herwerden inserted $\langle\epsilon\i\rangle$ after $\kappa\alpha\i\ \nu\ddot{u}\nu$ and deleted $\ddot{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$, which breaks up the 'circumlocution' and provides an acceptable sense: 'and now, if they refuse to restore the constitution and it comes to that kind ⟨of struggle⟩, we are better able...' For *το\i\o\nt\o\varsigma* with no following $\ddot{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$ cf. vii. 57. 11.

$\ddot{\eta}\ \ddot{\nu}\pi\ \dot{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\i\o\w\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\y\epsilon\o\thai$: the brachylogy is more forceful than a strictly logical formulation, 'than they are able to deny the sea to us'; vi. 33. 4 is a close enough parallel. In fact the Athenians at Samos needed to keep their whole force together to maintain themselves against the Peloponnesians at Miletos (79. 2, cf. 82. 2, 86. 4), and could not spare ships to interfere with the city's supplies, the threat implied here. (If we are now in June, it is not long before the main seasonal shipment of grain through the Hellespont.)

6. $\o\i\ \gamma\i\, \kappa\cdot\tau\cdot\lambda\cdot$: another notable brachylogy, sc. 'in losing the support of those who...'

$\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\i\ \alpha\dot{u}\tau\o\ \dot{\epsilon}\pi\o\pi\i\z\o\nt\o\varsigma\nt\o\varsigma$: nothing has been said about the financing of

the war from Athens since 15. 1, when the reserve of 1,000^T was set free for use in summer 412. By winter 411/10 commanders in the field were forced to spend time collecting money (X. HG. i. 1. 12), a need familiar from fourth-century history, and this may well have set in at Samos by June 411. For the further development of Athens' financial position, see ML 84 with comment, esp. the ἀνομολογήματα at 84. 17, 20, 34.

οὐπερ ἔνεκα --- κρατεῖ: Grote translated 'which is the great superiority of a city over a camp'. Stahl and others object that this requires ὥπερ, and Goodhart insists that ἔνεκα has always a causal sense in Thucydides (though not in Plato): so, 'which is the purpose of the control exercised by a city over its armies'. This is to tie Thucydides into a quite unnecessary strait-jacket; Grote's translation is greatly preferable.

τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καταλύσαντες: contrast Αθ. π. 29. 3, 31. 1 (pp. 215, 227 above).

τούτους, οἵπερ ἄν, κ.τ.λ.: there is no specific group that *τούτους* can refer to, and it seems simply to anticipate the category described in the following clause.

7. Ἀλκιβιάδην τε --- παρέξειν: if we can trust 63. 4 (see n. there), the scene described at 56 did not destroy the oligarchs' belief in his capacity to bring about an alliance with the Persians, only in his good faith in his dealings with themselves; and these *στρατιῶται* in search of comfort are naturally ready to believe in his ability. We have not been prepared for the possibility that he would join the democrats except to the extent that we have Thucydides' opinion (48. 4) that he was interested only in his recall, not in constitutional forms. Though nothing has been said of his doings since 56, it is implied at 81. 1 that Thrasyboulos at least had been in touch with him since. The king's preference for oligarchy, so important to earlier argument (48. 1, cf. 53. 3 with n.), is now conveniently forgotten.

πολλὰς τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις: from the colonial period and earlier, the Greeks were familiar with the idea of making a collective fresh start somewhere else. Cf. Phokaia (Hdt. i. 163 ff.) or Themistokles' threat before Salamis (Hdt. viii. 62. 2). Closer still is Xenophon's plan that the remnant of the Ten Thousand should found a colony (*An.* v. 6. 15), rejected in the event, as the present plan would no doubt have collapsed.

77. οἱ δὲ --- πεμφθέντες: 72. From 73. 1, 74. 1 it is plain that the counter-revolution at Samos took place after the establishment of the oligarchy at Athens. For the time when the envoys left Athens see 72. 2, 86. 3 nn. From 72. 2 it is clear that they left before the arrival of the Paralos (74. 2), and *ταῦτα* here will mean the counter-revolution in general, not just the specific developments of 75–6. Either they sailed

much more slowly than Chaireas, or they waited at Delos to find out what was happening at Samos.

πρέσβεις is the normal plural of *πρεσβευτής* in the Classical period, and in Thucydides *πρεσβευταί* is otherwise found only at 86. 1, of these same envoys. The phrase is not otherwise suspicious, but [οἱ δέκα πρεσβευταῖ] is not needed, and Herwerden was right to excise in both passages.

78–88. *The Fleets at Samos and Miletos. Recall of Alkibiades*

78. ὅπο δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον: we last heard of the Peloponnesian fleet at 63. 2, and what was there narrated is probably to be dated after the second departure of Peisandros from Samos (63. 3 n.). The *ταραχή* of 79. 1 should be the last event reported from there, the democratic upheaval in the fleet (75. 2, 76. 2), and news of it arrived at or just before the conference held by Astyochos as a result of the agitation described in 78. We here move back in time from 77, but not by much.

ώς --- φθείρεται τὰ πράγματα: cf. 46. 5 ἔφθειρε τὰ πράγματα (sc. Tissaphernes), the clearest of several echoes of language between the two passages.

οὗτε πρότερον ναυμαχεῖν, κ.τ.λ.: at 46. 5 it was Tissaphernes who prevented battle. Here *τοῦ μέν* is Astyochos, contrasted with *τὸν δ' αὐτὸν* T. below, but this makes little difference: the two are jointly responsible, and the disjunction only separates out the spheres in which each had direct control. The complaint thus refers to occasions after the arrival of Astyochos (36. 1), and Steup was wrong to refer it to the period between the Peloponnesian reinforcement at 26. 1 and the Athenian at 30. 1. For the occasions when opportunity for battle was offered see 46. 5 n.; since then none has been mentioned except at 63. 2, when Astyochos did offer battle (for the question whether this is a doublet of 79. 1–5 see 79. 1 n.).

ἔρρωντο may refer to their morale rather than their number (ii. 8. 1; vi. 31. 1, vii. 18. 2 with nn.), expressing the same point as 46. 5, *τὴν ἀκμήν* --- πάνυ ισχυρά: the picture of a Peloponnesian fleet with high morale and eager for action is not quite plausible (see 46. 5 n.), but long inaction and the wait for the Phoenician ships must have been depressing, and it would be easy to imagine that chances had been missed. δλίγον however is inexcusable, for though the Peloponnesians had some numerical superiority in these waters, especially after the arrival of Antisthenes (41. 1), there was never a time when the Athenians were 'few' in comparison. It was suggested at p. 27 above that Thucydides in giving so many precise figures expected his readers to keep rough track of the proportions, and even if he had not

himself done all the sums at every stage, he knew that this was wild exaggeration and must mean his readers to discount it.

The source for the parallel passage at 46. 5 might have been Alkibiades; he was now with Tissaphernes (81. 1) and could have maintained some contact, but 78 reads as if it came rather from a Peloponnesian informant, whether or not this informant shared the view of the sailors.

ὅτε στασιάζειν τε λέγονται: this would be applicable at any time after 48. 2–3. The problem (79. 1 n.) is its relation to the description at 63. 2 of the position at Samos.

οὐδέπω ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἰσίν: οὐδέπω must look forward to the return of Strombichides (79. 5), but the phrase does not quite fit, for he had not been at Samos since late 412 (30. 2) and the 24 ships he took to the Hellespont were from the Chios squadron (62. 2). It seems to be implied here that the Peloponnesians knew that a message had been sent to recall him (79. 3); the Athenians were equally well informed of Peloponnesian plans (79. 3).

ἄλλως ὄνομα: edd. cite parallels (*S. Ph.* 947, *D. xix.* 24) for *ἄλλως* qualifying a noun ('a mere name'). Arnold and Goodhart, observing that Thucydides elsewhere uses *ἄλλως* with a verb ('in vain', e.g. i. 109. 3) but not with a noun, took it with *μένοντες*; but this runs uneasily, and we should not deny to Thucydides a usage familiar to his contemporaries.

By itself the phrase might imply that they thought these ships merely imaginary, but Thucydides believed in their existence (87. 3, and cf. *τὰς τε ναῦς ταύτας* below). It is not the ships that are unreal, but Tissaphernes' intention to bring them into action (cf. vi. 10. 2).

οὐ ξυνεχῶς οὐδ' ἐντελῆ: 45. 2, 46. 5, 87. 3, 99.

οἱ Συρακόσιοι: cf. 29. 2, 45. 3, 84. 2, 4, 85. 2–4.

79. 1 δόξαν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ ξυνόδου: though there was no question of any but a Spartan commander, the views of the allies had to be taken into account and conferences were needed; cf. 8. 2, 32. 1, 3, and v. 60. 1.

ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ταραχή: unlike the mutual suspicions of 63. 2 and the vague *στασιάζειν* of 78, this should be a specific event, and the reader is apparently expected to take the reference without trouble. The *ταραχή* is then the democratic counter-revolution which starts at 73, and the reader should also have in mind the description in 76. 3–7 of the mood of the Athenians at Samos, and the reference to their preparations for action in 77. Their advance to Glauke of Mycale (§ 2) fits well with all this, but not with 63. 2 where the Athenians stay in Samos harbour *διὰ τὸ ἀλλήλους ὑπόπτως ἔχειν*. This is decisive against the proposal of Holzapfel (457–62) to take 63. 2 and 79 as a doublet; 79 fits into a later stage of the developments at Samos (though Steup went too far in claiming that 63. 2 comes 'shortly' after

Strombichides' departure for the Héllespont). There is a further difference in Astyochos' motive, at 63. 1 confidence after the naval success at Chios, at 79. 1 the turmoil in his own fleet; and at §§ 4–5 the Peloponnesians encamp on Mykale with the intention of attacking Samos the next day, but this was then called off, whereas at 63. 2 Astyochos does make an *ἐπίπλους* against Samos.

The main argument in Holzapfel's favour is that Astyochos' *ἐπίπλους* of 63. 2 is disregarded by the agitators of 78. So Steup (appendix): his explanation is weak, that at 63. 2 Astyochos did not yet know of the *stasis* at Samos, so this challenge did not count for the agitators. The latter might indeed not bother too much about the facts in their attack on Astyochos, but our problem is not what they actually said but about Thucydides' presentation. There is some failure of co-ordination, less glaring than the absence of any cross-reference between 29 and 45. 2 (see 45. 2 n.), but still slightly disquieting.

οῦσαις δώδεκα καὶ ἑκατόν: slightly more than was to be expected from earlier figures. See pp. 29–30 above, §§ 12, 16: Astyochos may have received an unrecorded reinforcement, or mobilised ships locally.

πεζῇ · · · ἐπὶ τῆς Μυκάλης: by this time the intervening cities (Myous, Priene, etc.) have evidently been lost to Athens (cf. 19. 1, 28. 5, 45. 5 nn.). The distance from Samos is slight (§ 2) and the Peloponnesians may have contemplated ferrying troops across after a naval victory; or, since the Athenians were able to occupy points on Mykale, they may simply have wished to secure their own base.

2. δυοῖν καὶ δύδοικοντα: also more than expected. See pp. 30–1 above, § 17: it is likely that some Athenian movements have gone unrecorded.

Γλαύκῃ τῆς Μυκάλης: not precisely identified.

τῷ πλήθει · · · ικανοὶ εἶναι: in the previous winter the Athenians held the sea (30. 2) with 74 ships against some 90, and earlier they risked steeper odds; but here their inferiority was such that it was sensible to wait for Strombichides. *περὶ τοῦ παντός*, though there is no verbal echo, is very much in the spirit of Phrynicos' advice at 27.

3. προήσθοντο: each camp is well informed of what goes on in the other (78 n.); indeed, since there had been time to send a message to the Héllespont, in answer to which Strombichides arrived the next day after the Peloponnesian encampment on Mykale (§ 5), the Peloponnesian intention was known well in advance. Cf. 50. 5 n.

ἐπ’ Αβύδου ἀφικομέναις: so CG, and the gen. (*pace* Steup) is normal with verbs of motion; "Αβυδον ABEFM. Steup was troubled by the mention of Abydos where Strombichides failed, rather than Sestos where he probably was (62. 3). Abydos was perhaps regarded as the

main objective of his expedition, and the acc. may be right (cf. 62. 2 ἐπ' Ἀβυδον ἥλθεν).

4. τῶν πλησιοχώρων: the order in § 1 was only to Miletos. These may be troops picked up on the way; Priene as well at Miletos had an ancient grudge against Samos.

6. ὄκτω καὶ ἑκατόν: the 'ships from the Hellespont' (§ 5) numbered 24 (62. 2), which would bring the fleet up to 106, and Stahl wished to emend accordingly; but see p. 31 above, § 18.

βουλόμενοι διαναυμαχῆσαι: now that the Athenians feel strong enough for battle (108 to 112 counts as Athenian superiority), the Peloponnesians refuse, bringing us back to the position which was broken only at Kyzikos in spring 410 (27. 5 n.).

80. 1. οὐκ ἀντανήγοντο: Steup accepted Clasen's ἀντανηγάγοντο, as a reference to a single occasion at 79. 6, the aor. and impf. forms of ἀγω and compounds being easily confused. The impf. may stand, referring to their general disposition (Goodhart) rather than to the one occasion. If they could not risk battle when concentrated, it made sense to use detachments to spread the revolt against Athens.

ὅσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον: 8. 2, 39. 2; and for Klearchos see 8. 2 n.

3. καὶ αἱ μὲν τῶν Πελοποννησίων, κ.τ.λ.: there is no answering δέ, and where we might expect one in § 4, contrasting Samos with the Peloponnesians, we have καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα. That might be excused by the intervening complications, which include the division of the original subject into two (*ai μὲν Δήλου - - - ai δέ*); the trouble is that when we come to a main verb (*ἀφιστᾶσι*) it belongs only to the second half, the squadron with Helixos, and *ai μέν* is left in the air. Krüger deleted the *καὶ* after *χειμασθεῖσαι* (it might be better to transpose the words): this leaves *ai μέν - - - ai δέ* in apposition to *ai - - νῆσες*, which would be normal enough for Thucydides if *ai μέν* had a verb, but it is hard to contemplate a sentence which is only half a *nominativus pendens*, not helped out by any attempt to reclaim the original subject as in 52. Clasen deleted the *καὶ* after *Κλεάρχου* and altered ἐλθοῦσαι to ἥλθον (Krüger, more attractively, thought this might be Thucydides' own slip); others insert various verbs after ἐλθοῦσαι. The sense is not in doubt, and if emendation is needed, as it seems to be, it had best be as unobtrusive as possible.

ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, σπως λάθοιεν: presumably well south of Samos and outside Ikaros, from which it would be no great distance to Delos. Cf. 99.

κατὰ γῆν - - - κομισθείς: there was little hostile territory to cross, if any, and Derkylidias had used this route earlier, cf. 61. 1 with n. Klearchos is not heard of again till Diod. xiii. 40. 6 (see 107. 1 n. below); for X. HG i. 1. 35-6 see 8. 2 n. above.

Ἐλίξου τοῦ Μεγαρέως στρατηγοῦ: he reappears during the Athenian

siege of Byzantium in 408, in command of Megarian troops (X. *HG* i. 3. 15–21). The Megarian origin of Byzantium is relevant.

4. *νεῶν βοήθειαν*: from 100. 5, 102. 1, it appears that there were twenty Athenian ships in the Hellespont when Mindaros arrived there.

ὸκτὼ πρός ὀκτώ: edd. note 107. 1 *τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ὀκτὼ ναῦς*, and speculate that two of Helixos' ships had suffered permanent damage, but the reappearance of this number could be mere coincidence.

81. 1. *οἱ δὲ προεστῶτες --- καὶ μάλιστα Θρασύβουλος*: by an incoherence less unusual than that discussed at 80. 3 above, Thucydides continues with sing. verbs as if Thrasybulos were the sole subject. The only other leader who has been mentioned is Thrasyllos (75. 2). *αἰεί γε --- ἔχόμενος* implies that Thrasybulos met serious opposition. On the subsequent record, for which see *JHS* lxxiii (1953), 4, it would be permissible to identify Thrasyllos as the principal opponent of Alkibiades' recall; but that means that the only other named member of *οἱ προεστῶτες* opposed Thrasybulos, and the structure of the sentence becomes rather more anomalous. We may take it that there were enough others who supported Thrasybulos—in Thucydides' account of the feeling in the fleet at the time of the counter-revolution (76. 7) the possibility of Persian help through Alkibiades' mediation was assumed from the start—but Thucydides' expression does not seem a very efficient way of stating this.

[*καὶ*] *τέλος ἀπ' ἐκκλησίας ἔπεισε*: Dobree's excision of *καὶ* may be justified by supposing that it arose out of the false reading *ἀεὶ τε* above (BG; for the rest see app. crit.; Meineke's *αἰεί γε* is certainly right), but Steup defends it, connecting it with the *καὶ* in the next line. *τέλος* implies considerable debate before the issue was put to the assembly, but there is time for that in the period covered by 77, 79, and we need not keep the envoys of the Four Hundred waiting too long at Delos (77, 86. 1). *ἀπ' ἐκκλησίας* C, *ἐπ'* cett. In 79. 1 *ἀπὸ ξυνόδου*, 97. 2 *ἀφ' ὧν --- ἐψηφίσαντο*, the decision results from the meeting; here, though much of the argument was before the meeting, Thrasybulos' successful persuasion depends on the final vote. *ἐπ'* *ἐκκλησίας* in the sense of 'at an assembly', though not too remote from regular uses of *ἐπί*, is not found before Memnon, *FGrH* 434 39. 2 (59), perhaps a contemporary of Plutarch (Jacoby, introd.). ABEF *ἔπεισαν*, though the recovery of the plural subject would in a way be welcome, cannot stand in face of *πλεύσας --- κατῆγεν* below.

κάθοδον καὶ ἄδειαν: cf. 76. 7. *ἄδεια* was needed to protect him from the effects of his condemnation in 415 (vi. 61. 7), but X. *HG* i. 4. 11–12 shows how precarious his position still remained in 407. From Samos nothing could be done about the curses pronounced on him (Plu. *Alc.* 22. 5, 33. 3, cf. 53. 2 above).

νομίζων μόνην σωτηρίαν, κ.τ.λ.: Alkibiades' gifts of military leadership do not yet come into question; contrast vi. 15. 4 (15. 3 f. n.).

2. ἐπηγιάσατο καὶ ἀνωλοφήρατο: ἐπαιτιᾶσθαι means 'accuse', with the person accused in the acc. and the crime (where expressed) in the gen. or a dependent inf. (five instances in Thucydides); edd. compare Pl. *Eph.* vii. 329 a τὸ μῆκος τῆς πορείας - - - ἐπαιτιώμενος for the impersonal object here. Alkibiades does not blame persons unspecified for his exile, but (a little elliptically) his exile for anti-Athenian acts which he could not deny. Cf. vi. 92, and the arguments of his defenders in 407 (X. *HG*. i. 4. 13-15).

ὑπερβάλλων ἐμεγάλυνε, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 82. 3, 88, 108. 1. It may be taken as certain that these words were written after Alkibiades' imprisonment by Tissaphernes in the following winter (X. *HG*. i. 1. 9), which even Alkibiades would find it hard to explain away; and possible that they were written before the successful campaign of 408. See further 108. 1 n.

περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: as opposed to his *ἰδίᾳ ξυμφορά* above. This and to some extent τῶν μελλόντων below refer to the restoration of democracy, the main subject of the discussion in 76. 5-6 and of the sailors' hopes in 82. 1.

αἱ ξυνωμοσίαι διαλυθεῖν: these can be only the oligarchic clubs encouraged by Peisandros in the winter (54. 4), whose terrorism later (65. 2) paved the way for the Four Hundred. Here they are presumably seen as the basis of the power of the extremist group, now the main obstacle to Alkibiades' return to Athens. It is odd to reflect that their conspicuous crime, the murder of Androkles, was committed mainly because he was Alkibiades' enemy and might hinder his recall by the oligarchs; but Alkibiades had now changed sides, and Androkles was no doubt popular with his present sailor audience.

διαβάλλοιντο: the sense 'set at variance' is well established (cf. LSJ διαβάλλω III), and here clear from 83. 1, 88.

3. τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στρώμνην ἔξαργυρῶσαι: cf. Kyros' offer in X. *HG* i. 5. 3, καὶ τὸν θρόνον κατακόψειν ἐφ' οὐ ἐκάθητο, ὅντα ἀργυροῦν καὶ χρυσοῦν. Either Persian satraps were addicted to expressions of this type, or it had become a standard Greek rendering of oriental phraseology.

ἐν Ασπένδῳ ἥδη οὔσας: the first location we have had for these ships, and so far west that we can be sure the Persians had genuinely intended to use them in the Aegean. Aspendos is on the west bank of the R. Erymmedon, not at the mouth but some seven miles up: see ATL i. 471, Ruge RE ii. 1725.

εἰ σῶς αὐτὸς κάτελθὼν αὐτῷ ἀναδέξαιτο: σῶς *MIT*³¹ (second hand in margin) *ΣΜίγ^c2*; see Kleinlogel 117. σῶς is clearly right against ὡς (ABEF: om. C), and *ΣΜν^c2* εἰ ἀνασωθεὶς Άλκιβιάδης ὄπίσω ἀνάδοχος

γένοιτο gives the sense correctly: if Alkibiades returned safe and vouched to Tissaphernes, sc. for the good behaviour of the Athenians.

82. 1 μετὰ τῶν προτέρων: 76. 2. Steup notes that no one was deposed to make room, but we do not know that they had elected a full ten, and in any case we should not here expect formal correctness.

τὰ πράγματα πάντα ἀνείθεσαν: elsewhere in Thucydides *ἀνείθεναι* has its normal senses, 'dedicate' (e.g. i. 13. 6) or 'attribute to' (e.g. viii. 51. 3); here it is the equivalent of ii. 65. 4 *πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν*, cf. Ar. *Nu.* 1453. *An.* 546. As Gomme noted at ii. 65. 4, there is no need to suppose a formal grant of superior powers; the direction of their affairs was left to him *de facto*.

διὰ τὸ αὐτίκα --- καταφρονεῖν: διὰ BCG, κατὰ cett. As it stands, the structure of the sentence compels us to take διὰ (κατὰ) τὸ αὐτίκα together as a note of time, but Classen objected that there is no good parallel for either phrase and that no note of time is needed after *ἔτοιμοι ἦδη*, and he deleted these words. The alternative is to emend what follows, either changing *τε* to *γε* (Stahl) or deleting *τε* (Goodhart), so that διὰ τό --- καταφρονεῖν can be taken together, 'because, as a result of what had been said, they immediately despised the enemy here present'. *αὐτίκα* is then inoffensive; καὶ *πλεῦν* (B), *πλεῦν τε* (cett.) could be alternative attempts to fit the end of the sentence to a *τε* before *παρόντας*. Against Classen, it is not easy to see why anyone should have interpolated διὰ τὸ αὐτίκα; Goodhart's solution is far more attractive.

2. ὁ δέ --- διεκώλυσε: see 86. 4 n.

3. ἵνα δοκῆ --- κοινοῦσθαι: ἵνα δέ AEFM, and many since Böhme have taken this to be a remnant of *ἵνα δή*. Though *δοκῆ* does not necessarily contrast seeming with reality and *δή* may report a valid motive, some suggestion of irony would be in place here: Thucydides now clearly thought that Alkibiades was misrepresenting his position with Tissaphernes (81. 2 with n.). Nothing has been said about his standing since 56, but at 81. 1 he was still with Tissaphernes. He had failed to bring him over to the Athenian side, but his conduct of the negotiations of 56 had saved the satrap some embarrassment, and Thucydides believed (57. 2, cf. 87. 4) that the latter was still following the advice given in 46. 1-4.

τοὺς Αθηναίους φοβεῖν: 81. 2 makes the distinction that the oligarchs at Athens were to be frightened, the Athenians at Samos to regard him with more respect. Here, *ἐκείνοις* are the Athenians at Samos, and no reader could be expected to think back to 81. 2: the reference is to the previous sentence, and in spite of the unexpectedly strong word *φοβεῖν* no more can be meant than that he used the situation to impress (rather than alarm) one with the other.

83. 2 ξυνηνέχθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.: the main statement (§ 1) creates no difficulty, but this explanatory sentence does. (a) The reference to the Athenian ἐπίπλους and the Peloponnesian refusal to fight (79. 6) is clear enough. As the sentence runs, it seems that Tissaphernes used the refusal of battle as a reason for reducing pay, which does not fit well with previous allegations (46. 5, cf. 78) that he had prevented them from fighting when they had wished to, but he does not have to be perfectly consistent in his excuses. Again, as at 46. 5 (see nn. there), one may wonder how much time is needed for reduction or irregularity to become noticeable; we are given no indication of the lapse of time since 79. 6, but it might be some weeks. (b) The reference in πρότερον ἔτι τούτων should be either to the moment when they learnt of Alkibiades' recall (Steup), or to the last event mentioned, the Athenian ἐπίπλους. In either case, Alkibiades is not recorded as having done anything to their detriment, and edd. refer to matters as far back as 45. 2–46. The sentence then appears to be in the wrong order, γενόμενον referring to a time later than does ἐπιδεδωκέναι, which rightly troubled Goodhart. Neither his remark, that the inf. gives 'the essential fact', nor Steup's treatment of the whole sentence as a parenthesis, disposes of the difficulty.

πολλῷ - - - γενόμενον brings in a new point, in respect of which the situation of 78 had worsened since the events of 79. All would be well if we could take the second part of the sentence in the same way, and suppose some fresh intervention by Alkibiades which had worsened Peloponnesian relations with Tissaphernes. The text we have contains nothing but Alkibiades' intention at 81. 2 to bring this about; Thucydides may have intended to amplify that; if he had, this would be much more attractive than a back-reference to the very distant 45–46, and would give more substance to Hermokrates' incrimination of Alkibiades at 85. 2.

Duker's *κατά* for *καὶ* before *τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Μίλητον* is necessary, unless we remodel the sentence more extensively. The variants in πρότερον ἔτι τούτων (*ἔτι C solus*; *εἰς ἔτι GM*; *εἰ ἔτι cett.*) may suggest that the text is not in order, but do not indicate a remedy.

ἀρρωστότερον: cf. iii. 15. 2, vii. 47. 1.

3. *οἴσπερ καὶ πρότερον*: 78. The degree of repetition, and even verbal echo, between these chapters is disquieting; no doubt the agitators did repeat themselves, but Thucydides would not normally indicate that by repeating his own description.

καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸ στρατιωτικόν: the intervention of the officers is a new fact, as against 78, but hardly worth this degree of emphasis. This sense of *στρατιωτικόν* is unique for Thucydides, but attested for the Hellenistic period; Krüger was right to delete these words as an interpolation.

διαναυμαχήσει: *ἰδίᾳ* (vel. sim.) *ναυμαχήσει* ABEF, which Classen

defended, 'fight on their own' without reference to Tissaphernes. This adds hardly anything, whereas διαναυμαχεῖν, already used at the end of 78, is the stronger word, 'fight through to a decision' (not necessarily to victory, cf. vii. 60. 2; LSJ's 'maintain a sea-fight' is inept). Victory would give them Samos and much else, a richer prize than Iasos (28. 3, 36. 1) and more satisfactory than an alternative Persian source of pay.

ὅθεν τροφὴν ἔξει: Pharnabazos, cf. 80. 2.

ἀπολείψειν --- τὰς ναῦς: cf. Tissaphernes at 57. I, κενωθεισῶν τῶν νεῶν.

ἐπιφέροντα ὄργας: τὸ ἐπιφέρειν ὄργην ἐπὶ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ συγχωρεῖν ἔταττον οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ΣΜνε₂, citing Kratinos (fr. 230) τὴν μουσικὴν ἀκορέστους ἐπιφέρειν ὄργας βροτοῖς σώφροσιν. These seem to be the only occurrences of this phrase; in the Homeric ἐπὶ ἡρα φέρειν (*Il.* i. 572, etc.) ἡρα is not the same as ὄργας here, and the sense of ἐπιφέρειν must be slightly different. (Goodhart, examining more closely the implications of Kratinos' and the scholiast's language, concluded that the literal meaning was 'further Tissaphernes' own inclinations').

84. 2. Συρακοσίων: already the principal agitators at 78.

ἔλευθεροι ἥσαν τὸ πλῆθος: nothing has been said about the composition of the crews in the Peloponnesian fleet. For slave rowers at Chios see 15. 2 with n., and in contrast with Athenian practice a proportion of slaves may be expected elsewhere, but these arguments about pay and the fear of desertion allow the inference that many of the rowers were free, and probably many were not nationals of the states that provided the ships. From this passage it could be deduced that not all the crews of the Syracusan and Thourian ships were free, and that we have to suppose a higher proportion of slaves among the rest.

Δωριεῖ: the commander of the Thourian ships, 35. I.

βακτηρίαν: Plutarch (*Nic.* 19. 4) takes this staff as specifically Spartan, and other Spartan commanders threaten or strike with it (X. *An.* ii. 3. 11, *Plu. Them.* 11. 3). It may be part of the insignia of office in the Spartan armed forces; at Athens we meet it only as a means of support (Ar. *Ach.* 682, Lys. xxiv. 12) till its use as a juryman's symbol (*Ἄθ. π.* 63. 2 ff.).

4. τὸ --- Τισσαφέρνους φρούριον: not previously mentioned. For expulsion of similar garrisons from Antandros and Knidos see 108. 5-109. I.

5. ὁ μέντοι Λίχας, κ.τ.λ.: 39. 2 with n., and for his objections to the first two treaties with Persia, 43. 3-4, 52. These were met in the third treaty by the limitation of the king's authority to his Asiatic territory, and it is clear from the whole narrative since then that this treaty was accepted as a framework for the relations between the Peloponnesian fleet and Tissaphernes, whether or not it had been

formally ratified at Sparta (58. 1 n.). Lichas describes the Milesians and others as being *ἐν τῇ βασιλέως* (the treaty texts show that we should supply *χώρα*, and that this is not simply a geographical expression), which by the formula of 58. 2 would subject them wholly to the king's authority, and at first sight he is here reminding them of this. If so, it is exceedingly surprising that he should at the same time tell them publicly that their obligation will last only till the end of the war, and far from clear how he envisaged their position when the war did end; and still more surprising if Sparta had ratified the treaty, in which case he would almost certainly have been one of those who swore the oath.

But the qualification *δουλεύειν - - - τὰ μέτρα* does not read as if he thought that the Milesians and the rest had been delivered over absolutely to the Persians' mercy (contrast the unqualified *δουλεύειν* of 43. 3: it is to be noted that Thucydides, with one or two exceptions, uses *δουλεύειν* and *δουλεία* only in speeches and reports of speeches); nor is *ἐπιθεραπεύειν* entirely suitable in such a context. It is more likely that Lichas took the agreement between the king and the cities, referred to at 37. 5, to subsist still (see 58. 2 n.); he could then be telling the Milesians that, even if Tissaphernes was in breach of this agreement, they had best put up with that, at least while the war continued. That would also explain how the Milesians thought it worth their while to send an embassy to Sparta (85. 2); the question at issue would be of the present standing of the agreement the Milesians and others had entered into with the king. But Lichas was over-optimistic if he thought that such an agreement was likely to benefit the Milesians when the war was over and the Spartan forces had gone home.

νόσῳ ὅστερον ἀποθανόντα: for his age see v. 50. 4 with n.

οὐ ἔβοιλοντο οἱ παρόντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων: it is no use speculating where this might be. Edd. persistently compare Brasidas' burial *πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὕτης* in Amphipolis (v. 11. 1), in spite of Stahl who firmly pointed out that the cases are not comparable; all we are entitled to deduce is that the Spartans wanted a more prominent site than the Milesians would concede. Goodhart suggested that *οἱ παρόντες* might imply a time when the main fleet had left (99), but 87. 1, 6 rather suggest that Lichas was already ill when Tissaphernes went to Aspendos.

85. 1 Μίνδαρος - - - ἐπήλθε: see v. 36. 1 n. for the time when Spartan *ναύαρχοι* took office, near the autumn equinox*. The impression that Mindaros arrived somewhat early derives from the fact that not very much has happened since the installation of the Four Hundred in June, and there are still many events to be crowded into the remainder of the summer. Irregularity in the Spartan calendar is as

likely a cause as any desire to replace Astyochos before his time (§ 3 n.).

2. **ξυνέπεμψε δέ - - αὐτῷ:** this need not mean more than that Tissaphernes made use of the fact that a ship was going to the Peloponnese; it is not fresh evidence of collusion between him and Astyochos (§ 3 n.).

Κάρα δίγλωσσον: cf. Mardonios' agent Mys of Europos (Hdt. viii. 133-5); and Kyros' interpreter Pigres (X. *An.* i. 2. 17, 8. 12) has a Karian name. (All these must in fact have spoken three languages: *δίγλωσσος* no doubt meant for Thucydides simply Greek and non-Greek. Cf. Lewis 14.)

κατηγορήσοντα - - περὶ τοῦ φρουρίου: Tissaphernes believed that he had a case against the Milesians' denunciation of him, but equally the Milesians seem to claim some rights against him. For one view of the question at issue see 84. 5 n. above; another possibility is that Sparta had not yet ratified the treaty, and the Milesians hoped to obtain some modification of the clause (58. 2) which gave the king entire control over them. In either case the Spartan assembly is here faced, perhaps for the first time, with the full implications of the third treaty, and it is to be wished that we knew more about their reaction. According to X. *HG* i. 1. 31 (see § 3 n. below) the case against Tissaphernes was well received, and the sequel suggests that Mindaros was authorized to transfer his fleet to Pharnabazos if Tissaphernes continued unsatisfactory; which comes near to abrogation of the treaty.

φθείροντα - - ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα: a comparatively moderate statement of the case (cf. 46. 5 n.); and Hermokrates does not implicate Astyochos in the charge (cf. X. *HG* i. 31, cited below).

3. **πρὸς αὐτὸν ἦν αὐτῷ:** the repetition of *αὐτός* at such close distance with a different reference is unusual, but cf. Ar. *Ran.* 1377.

περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ τῆς ἀποδόσεως: 29. 2, 45. 3.

καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα, κ.τ.λ.: Xenophon (*HG* i. 1. 27-31) describes the arrival of the news of Hermokrates' exile, and of these same three successors, while the Syracusans were rebuilding their fleet after Kyzikos, i.e., in summer 410, and most commentators therefore assume Thucydides here looks forward to events the best part of a year ahead. Against this energetic protest was raised by Steup, whose appendix reproduces his arguments in *Rh. Mus.* lvi (1901), 459-60, and Wilamowitz (608-12).

(a) As Wilamowitz stressed, no reader with only this text before him could guess that Thucydides here anticipates a much later event; *τὰ τελευταῖα*, looking back to *αἰεὶ ποτε*, appears to give the last stage of the quarrel before Hermokrates' departure.

(b) Xenophon is not easy to sort out. At i. 1. 26 the Syracusans were at Antandros while their new ships were building. *ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ*

τούτῳ (27) their generals hear that they have been exiled: they hold a meeting, recite their record, deprecate *stasis*, and are persuaded to retain office till the arrival of their successors, who are named at 29 with the patronymics which Thucydides did not give. 30–1 more generally sketch Hermokrates for us, his daily conferences with his junior officers, his weight in council. With that we reach, or go back to, the point at which Thucydides left him: *κατηγορήσας δὲ Τισσαφέρνους ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ Ἐρμοκράτης, μαρτυροῦντος καὶ Αστυόχου, καὶ δόξας τὰ ὄντα λέγειν, ἀφικόμενος παρὰ Φαρνάβαζον, πρὶν αἰτῆσαι χρήματα λαβών, παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν εἰς Συρακούσας κάθοδον ξένους τε καὶ τριήρεις.* ἐν *τούτῳ* δέ (whenever that may be) the successors arrived at Miletos (the change of scene from Antandros is not explained) and took over. 32 *κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον* connects this in time with a transaction (for which see *JHS* lxxiii [1953] 7 n. 21) which resulted in the exile of Pasippidas from Sparta. *HG* i. 3. 17 suggests that this man's activity in the Aegean belongs to 409, or possibly 410, and Beloch (ii². 2. 273) tentatively suggested him as nauarch for 410/09; the incident described in i. 1. 32 is the end of his career and should belong to 409 rather than 410. 33 *περὶ δὲ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους Θρασύλλου ἐν Αθήναις ὄντος* introduces Agis' demonstration against the walls of Athens, which should belong to the second half of summer 410.

(c) The contradiction between i. 1. 29 and 31 has long been a matter for concern (see e. g. Underhill's n.). At 29 Hermokrates and the rest waited, to all appearance at Antandros, until their successors came, and the trierarchs then sent them where they wished to go. At 31 Hermokrates' mission to Sparta is narrated, abruptly and without introduction, and when he returns he is no longer commanding a Syracusan fleet but is an exile operating on his own account. *ἐν τούτῳ* in the last sentence of 31 (see above) should refer to the period of Hermokrates' mission to Sparta and return, a flat contradiction of 29; and the location of the take-over at Miletos is at best a curious incongruity. Further, denunciation of Tissaphernes at Sparta belongs in 411: since the autumn (Th. 99) the scene has shifted to the Hellespont, where Pharnabazos acts as a loyal ally, and there is no reason to revive the quarrels of summer 411 or bring in the witness of Astyochos. The dry and rapid summary reads as if the writer wished to fill in briefly the story of Hermokrates from the point where Thucydides left it, which is exactly where the summary starts: the contrast of *πρὶν αἰτῆσαι χρήματα λαβών* with Tissaphernes' allegation in Thucydides has often been noted, and may be another slight indication that Th. viii. 85 was in Xenophon's mind. The summary contains no military activity by Hermokrates, which is right if he left in 411, and Xenophon has given him no part at Abydos or Kyzikos: i. 1. 27 is his first appearance in *Hellenica*.

There is certainly some confusion here, compounded by the subsequent jumps of the narrative forward into 409 and back into 410. Brückner (*Zeitschr. f. d. Alterthumswiss.* vi [1839], 396) wished to delete all of i. 1. 31, from *κατηγορήσας* (not only to *τριήρεις*, as Marchant reports), positing an improbably learned reader, who remembered his Thucydides and also knew the sequel, and wanted to account for the good relations between Hermokrates and Pharnabazos. It seems more likely that i. 1. 27–9 is the intrusive element. It is hazardous to try to reconstruct how Xenophon's mind worked in composing this contradictory piece, but possibly he was told of something that Hermokrates had done shortly after Kyzikos (he was present in this area as an exile later, cf. *HG* i. 3. 13), and was misled into thinking that his exile came at this juncture; then, after adding to his sketch of Hermokrates' character, he thought he should also rough in what had happened to him since he was last mentioned in Thucydides, but did not trouble to resolve the contradiction he produced in doing so. This would be cavalier indeed, but no imaginable explanation can wholly exonerate Xenophon.

(d) There is little by which we can test the dating of Hermokrates' deposition and exile.

(i) Thucydides does not name him after 85.4, and in the order of battle for Kynossema (104. 3) the Peloponnesian right is held by *Συρακόσιοι*, whereas the left, and both Athenian wings, are commanded by named individuals; but Diodoros (xiii. 39. 4) adds to these Syracusans the note *ὅν Ερμοκράτης ἀφῆγεντο*, though he ascribes to him no positive action during the battle. No commanders are named for Abydos or Kyzikos, though the Syracusans were there (X. *HG* i. 1. 18; Diod. xiii. 45. 7). When he comes to Hermokrates' return to Sicily, Diodoros' introductory statement (xiii. 63. 1–2) refers to the exile without dating it; places the hand-over of the fleet to his successors in the Peloponnese, which cannot be literally true (Hermokrates did not take the fleet to the Peloponnese) and is irreconcilable with *HG* i. 1. 29, but might be a misunderstanding of the position as given in i. 1. 31 and in Thucydides; and explains Pharnabazos' subsidies by the friendship they had contracted *ἐκ τῆς στρατείας*, which favours *HG* i. 1. 29 to the extent that, if the deposition occurred in 411, Hermokrates had shared no campaign with Pharnabazos. One cannot be sure what line was taken by Diodoros' ultimate source.

(ii) There is no other indication that Miletos was ever again a Peloponnesian naval base after 411. Thrasyllos in 409 encountered land troops from Miletos at Pygela (*HG* i. 2. 2–3) but no naval opposition; but at Ephesos he met, again on land, Syracusan crews both from the original squadron and from five ships newly arrived

(i. 2. 8). Clearly the Syracusans might operate south of Antandros, but nothing points to their having been stationed at Miletos after 411.

(iii) Steup laid great stress on a phrase used by the deposed generals at i. 1. 28, ὅσα - - ἀγέττητοι γεγόνατε ἡμῶν ἡγουμένων, whereas after Th. 85. 3 they had shared in the defeats at Kynossema and Kyzikos; but we cannot assume that Xenophon has reported their actual words.

(iv) No clear help can be got from the side of Syracuse. Diodoros (xiii. 34. 6) briefly describes democratic reform under 412/11 as a sequel to the victory over Athens (cf. 33. 2, under 413/12), which would exclude deposition in 410; but in this confused area of Diodoros we cannot trust his attribution to a specific Attic year. Beloch (ii². 2. 246) argued that Hermokrates' fall needs a weighty cause and found this in the disaster of Kyzikos, but this overrates the security of his position in Syracuse. His political success late in 415 (Th. vi. 72–73. 1) is balanced by his deposition after a military defeat next year (vi. 103. 4 with n.: two of his successors on that occasion might be identified with democratic generals of 409, X. HG i. 2. 8). Though he regained influence (vii. 21. 3 with n.) and then commanded the ships sent to the Aegean, absence and the lack of conspicuous success could well have undermined his position again by the middle of summer 411, and echoes of the sailors' complaints about their pay may have contributed.

Given the confusion and contradiction in Xenophon's account and the lack of outside support for dating Hermokrates' deposition to 410, it is certainly better to take Thucydides' *τὰ τελευτᾶ* in the more natural way and date this episode to 411. If this were an anticipatory digression, the point would presumably have been to illustrate further the enmity between Tissaphernes and Hermokrates, but for this purpose it was not necessary to list the latter's successors, whereas this detail fits naturally into an account of a transaction that had already taken place. *φυγάδι* ὄντι *ἥδη* here and § 4 ὁ μὲν οὐν fit this interpretation better.

While Steup was content to satisfy himself that Xenophon was wrong, Wilamowitz wanted also to explain the error. He noted that Xenophon had been at Antandros (*An.* vii. 8. 7.) where the Syracusans received a grant of *εὐεργεσία τε καὶ πολιτεία* (HG i. 1. 26), and that he might have met Syracusan supporters of Hermokrates later living at Ephesos (i. 2. 10); and he suggested that he got the patronymics of the democratic generals from a decree of one of these cities. He further found it 'natural' that Antandros should have given the same honours to the deposed Hermokrates, but this is less plausible, and from Xenophon it looks as if the honours in both cities were given to the Syracusans in general, not to named individuals. Nevertheless, it is likely enough that Xenophon misunderstood some informant's account of something that actually occurred in 410.

His error does not invalidate all his information; we need not, for instance, suppose that the generals' patronymics are spurious. More important, he may be right about the outcome of the proceedings at Sparta, on which see Lewis 110–14. If Hermokrates' case against Tissaphernes was well received at Sparta, Mindaros may have been authorized to change paymasters if Tissaphernes continued unsatisfactory. If Astyochos supported Hermokrates and his witness was accepted, we ought to discount heavily the charges made against him in 78, 83. 3, which Thucydides does not explicitly underwrite. On an earlier occasion (39. 2 with n.) he was evidently acquitted on not dissimilar charges, but Thucydides does not record that acquittal.

In Xenophon (*HG* i. 1. 27–9) Hermokrates has colleagues, but Thucydides mostly writes as if he were in sole command, and B's reading at 45. 3 (see n. there) would exclude colleagues.

4. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης, κ.τ.λ.: no explicit account is given, here or later, of his current relations with Tissaphernes; but he was still received, and the Peloponnesians believed that he exerted influence (87. 1).

86. 1 οὓς τότε ἔπεμψαν: 72, 77. For [*πρεσβευταῖ*] see 77 n.

3. οὐθ' ἴνα τοῖς πολεμίοις, κ.τ.λ.: this needed stress at Samos, where right down to the final departure of Peisandros (63. 4) the accent had been on continuing the war (cf. 70. 2 n.). The peace policy of the Four Hundred could not be entirely concealed at Athens, but at this distance the envoys might get away with denial for the time being. ἐσέβαλον: the reference can only be to Agis' attempt on the city (71. 1–2) which included the summoning of large fresh forces from the Peloponnese. It would be odd to describe this simply as an 'invasion', and Steup and others accept Herwerden's *προσέβαλλον*; but it suits the envoys' argument to describe it so. Agis' preparations for this attack must have taken a little time, and the envoys seem to have left Athens after it was delivered: see 72. 2 n.

τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὃι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν: in the older interpretation *τῶν πεντακισχιλίων* depends on *μεθέξουσιν*, 'all (citizens) in their turn will be members of the Five Thousand'; since Stahl, who objected that *ἔσονται*, not *μεθέξουσιν*, is required for 'will be members of ...', most edd. and historians have understood 'all members of the Five Thousand in their turn will have a share (in the government)', supplying *τῆς πόλεως* or *τῶν πραγμάτων* (cf. 65. 3). The linguistic difficulty of this is very great, as Steup stressed: no instance is known in Classical Greek of a partitive gen. with *πάντες*, and *πάντες* is such a common word that there are very numerous opportunities for this usage, if Greek tolerated it. Nor is this interpretation of *μεθέξουσιν* easy. The obvious way for the Five Thousand to participate *ἐν τῷ μέρει* is the one propounded later at 93. 2, that they should serve in rotation on the Council of the Four Hundred, and the passage was so

taken by Stahl and all who have followed him (cf. Hignett 374); but at 93. 2 this proposal is spelt out clearly and unambiguously (using ἔσεσθαι, not μεθέξειν), just as at 65. 3 the meaning of μεθεκτέον τῶν πραγμάτων is clear, but our passage on this interpretation falls between two stools. Nor does it help much if we suppose that the envoys had in mind offices other than that of Councillor. Stahl's objection to μεθέξουσιν might be reduced, though not quite abolished, if we think of 'Five Thousand' as the name of an institution rather than as a number.

It is in the highest degree improbable in fact that the envoys told the sailors that all citizens, of whatever class, would in turn belong to the governing Five Thousand. The reason is not so much that the message originally entrusted to them at 72. 1 was different (Stahl), for in their difficult situation they might have enlarged or embroidered it; rather, that the movement had throughout been presented as one to restrict the franchise to the *δυνατοί*, and had at the start been so presented to these sailors (48. 1–3). The message given at 72. 1, that the governing body was five thousand and not four hundred, has some merit, in that five thousand is a large number and would ensure that Athens was not being subjected to a tight oligarchy on the usual Greek model. But to restrict the franchise, and then say that everyone in turn should be a member of the restricted body, makes no sense on any system, and invites the retort that, if citizens of all classes are fit to enter the governing body, it would be simplest just to stick to democracy.

It should therefore be considered if the clause is not corrupt. We need here only a very general statement of principle, for the envoys are not likely to sandwich anything of great constitutional subtlety between statements that they are not surrendering to Sparta and are not maltreating the sailors' families. Mention of the Five Thousand and the word μεθέξουσιν suggest a statement about the franchise, on the lines of 65. 3 (but expressed positively, not negatively) and 72. 1. The suspect item is thus ἐν τῷ μέρει, which however we take it brings in complications; but I have no proposal to offer.

ώσπερ Χαιρέας διαβάλλων ἀπήγγειλεν: 74. 3, with n.

4. καὶ δοκεῖ Αλκιβιάδης --- ὥφελῆσαι: there need be no doubt that this is Thucydides' personal judgment; apart from Valla's *videtur*, codd. ἔδόκει would require ὥφελεῖν (Stahl), and Classen's δοκεῖ is certainly right. *πρῶτον* (B: Valla has *primum*, not *primus* ... *tunc* as printed by Stephanus) makes this the first occasion when Alkibiades had done positive service to his city: *πρῶτος* (cett.) has to mean that on this occasion he rendered specially conspicuous service (Steup). The basic argument of the defenders of *πρῶτος* is that Thucydides cannot have rated the earlier actions of Alkibiades so low as *πρῶτον* would imply, and the use of so mild a word as ὥφελῆσαι reinforces

this argument. Steup pointed to the words given to Alkibiades at vi. 16 f. and vi. 89. 3, and to the harm he is alleged to have done to the Spartan interest at viii. 45 f. For the first, see vi. 16. 6 n.; as to vi. 89. 3, there could be no doubt of Alkibiades' intention to harm Sparta between 420 and 415, and he caused them some trouble, but there is no need to rate it higher than that; for the last, Thucydides has just shown marked scepticism about Alkibiades' influence over Tissaphernes (esp. 81. 2). The judgment expressed in *πρῶτον* — *ἀφελῆσαι* is exaggerated in its severity, but it is not out of line with what Thucydides may be supposed at the time of writing to have thought about Alkibiades (cf. vi. 15. 3 f. n.)—and Alkibiades provoked exaggeration.

If the content is not decisive against *πρῶτον*, it must be preferred. *πρῶτος* is used to place a person (or thing) first in a series, usually a temporal sequence; where it expresses weight or importance, we need a category, self-evident or explicitly stated, within which the person is the most important. We cannot here set up a category of persons who rendered service on this occasion, for Thucydides stresses (§ 5) that Alkibiades' performance was unique, and a bare *πρῶτος* is not the way to convey that he achieved what others could not. There is no difficulty, *pace* Steup, in the combination of *πρῶτον τότε* with *οὐδενὸς ἔλασσον*: Thucydides is saying both that this was the first occasion, and that the service rendered was extremely valuable.

There remains the question of the relation between this and the report of a similar movement, also quelled by Alkibiades, at 82. 1–2. Holzapfel (462–4) took this too as a doublet (cf. 79. 1 n.): Thucydides had two reports of the same occurrence and had written both up, but had not yet decided between them. The fact that he made the comment now under discussion on the later and not the earlier occasion (Holzapfel accepted the reading of B) lends some colour to this, but Steup was probably right to reject it. Thucydides might reasonably reserve his comment for the more serious occasion, when the sailors' feelings were more dangerously roused. It remains odd that the second report takes no notice at all of the earlier occasion, but cf. 45. 2, 79. 1 nn.; we need not with Steup assume a lacuna in the text we have.

ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς: the meaning is not in doubt, but the expression is awkward; it might be less so if we deleted *ἐν Σάμῳ*.

5. **ἄλλος μὲν οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς ίκανὸς ἐγένετο:** not, this time, a manœuvre or trick of the clever kind characteristic of Alkibiades, but force of oratory, and indeed of character. For his oratory see vi. 16–18 n. (vol. iv, p. 246). This, with *πρῶτον*, κ.τ.λ., above, is the first symptom of a change of view about his weight and abilities, and it was presumably written after the great victory at Kyzikos, little more than six months after the occasion here described. The change is not a complete

reversal: even after the war, when writing vi. 15. 3–4, Thucydides still had large reservations about Alkibiades.

ἰδίᾳ: according to Steup, personal passion because of the alleged treatment of their families (74. 3, 86. 3). The distinction is rather between the public decision (*τοῦ ἐπίπλου ἔπαυσε*) and threats to the envoys as individuals (§ 2).

6. *αὐτὸς δὲ ἀποκρινάμενος, κ.τ.λ.*: the wording, with its emphasis on *αὐτός*, makes this very much the personal answer of Alkibiades; cf. 89. 1 where it is so taken, 89. 2 where the Samos fleet and Alkibiades are treated almost as separate powers. He could no doubt have carried the meeting with him, and perhaps did: cf. 82. 1.

ῶσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τοὺς πεντακοσίους: if the restriction to five thousand was to continue, a Council of Five Hundred would not occupy quite the same position as its democratic predecessor; but if in the late fifth century thetes were technically ineligible (and poor men are not likely to have been eager for this service), the composition of a Five Hundred drawn from the Five Thousand need not have been very different from that of the old Council. Hignett (279, 378), from the weight given to this message at 89. 1, 4, concluded that the constitution of 97 included a Council of five hundred, which may be right, but it is also possible that an alternative was found acceptable to Alkibiades. See 97. 1 n.

τοὺς στρατευομένους: cf. 65. 3, where pay was to be abolished for *ἄλλους* *ἢ τοὺς στρατευομένους*; to this audience, that will have been stressed.

7. *ἐκέλευεν ἀντέχειν*: this is nicely calculated to divide the oligarchs at Athens, a substantial group of whom disapproved of the peace overtures and wished to carry on the war (63. 4, 70. 2 nn.).

8. *Ἀργείων πρέσβεις*: the 1,500 men who came out late in summer 412 (25. 1) suffered heavy loss outside Miletos (25. 3) and went home in anger (27. 6). Nothing has been heard of Argos since, but the oligarchs and their attempts at peace with Sparta must have alarmed the Argive democracy; Thucydides underlines the point by describing their addressees as 'the Athenian demos in Samos'. The crew of the Paralos (§ 9) could give the Argives news of the counter-revolution at Samos, but they may not have known of the recall of Alkibiades.

ὅταν τις καλῇ: Alkibiades' present military plans are not stated, but it is not likely that at this stage, when the movement of the Phoenician ships was still in doubt, he contemplated action by land in Tissaphernes' territory. After Kyzikos Argive hoplites would have been most useful in the Hellespont (*JHS* lxxiii [1953], 2), but we hear of no attempt to bring them there.

9. *περιπλεῖν Εὔβοιαν*: 74. 2.

[*πεμπτὸν*] *πρέσβεις*: *πεμπτούς* M (the paraphrase of Σ^{Myc_2} does not reveal what stood in the scholiast's text); *πέμπουσι* cett. Steup

defended the unique *πεμπτούς* by the analogy of *μετάπεμπτος* at vi. 29. 3, 74. 1, and explained *πέμποντι* as a corruption of this. But whereas *μετάπεμπτος* has some point (vi. 29. 3 n.), *πεμπτούς* adds nothing here, nor is there any apparent reason why it should have been preferred to *πεμφθέντας*. But it is hard to explain the interpolation, any more than the *ἔπειμπον* which at 89. 2 seems to have been added to another sentence concerning envoys. Perhaps *πεμπτούς* conceals some more meaningful qualification.

Steup rightly argued, against Classen, that this is not the first embassy sent off at 71. 3, since the Paraloi did not reach Athens till 74. 2, and they were then sent to Euboea; there must have been several embassies. To use an inferior ship was economical, and Athens was very short of ships (76. 4 with 76. 3 n.), but it seems quite extraordinarily rash of the Four Hundred to entrust their envoys to these fervent democrats (73. 5).

Λαισποδίαν: the name is rare, so this may well be the general of summer 414 (vi. 105. 2 with n.). Antiphon's speech *κατὰ Λαισποδίου* (fr. 21–4 Th: it concerned activities in the Thraceward area) need not imply the existence of another or an unconnected Laispodias.

Ἀριστοφῶντας: unknown, and there is no positive reason to connect him with the fourth-century politician, born in the 430s (Davies 2108) and active against the Thirty in 404/3.

Μελησίαν: sometimes identified with the son of Thoukydides, son of Melesias (e.g. Davies, pp. 232–3); but the name occurs in other families and demes.

οὐχ ἥκιστα: they are not among the leaders named at 68, and play no part elsewhere in the story. This is a weak use of *οὐχ ἥκιστα*: cf. 97. 2 n. **ἀφικνοῦνται ἡπερ εἶχον τριήρει:** we are not told whether they took the Argives home; the Paraloi make no further appearance.

87. 1 τὰς διαβολάς: 83–5, esp. 83. 1. A little confusingly, Thucydides here singles out one of the three possible motives discussed in § 3, and not the one for which he himself will eventually decide. No doubt Tissaphernes did claim that his journey was proof of his sincere support for Sparta, and *ὡς ἐδόκει δῆ* alerts us to the possibility that this was not his genuine, or at least not his primary, motive.

ἢς Ἀσπενδον: 81. 3, with n.

τὸν Λίχαν · · · ἐκέλευεν: as Steup notes, he had taken Tissaphernes' part at 84. 5, in spite of earlier quarrels; and his seniority made him suitable. But it was Philippus (§ 6) who eventually reported back (99), and perhaps Lichas was too ill (84. 5) to take up the invitation.

Τάμων: 31. 2 n.

2. λέγεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ ταῦτο: it is rare for Thucydides to refer in any detail to the difficulties he had in gathering information (vii. 44. 1 n.); here however the next sentence shows that he was in no doubt about

the facts, only about the interpretation. § 3 gives us a minimum of three informants, not necessarily all direct. None has a specifically Athenian angle (88 makes clear that he had no certain knowledge of what Alkibiades thought), and all three may be views current at the time in the Peloponnesian fleet.

None however gives what is probably the true explanation, for which see D. M. Lewis, *Historia* vii (1958), 392–7. From G. R. Driver, *Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century B.C.* v, vii–viii, with A. E. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C.* 27, 30–1, Lewis makes out a good case for a revolt in Egypt in 411, which would at any rate in part substantiate the statement attributed by Diodoros, xiii. 46. 6, to 'Pharnabazos' (i.e. Tissaphernes), that he had sent back the 'three hundred ships' to Phoenicia πυνθανόμενος τὸν τε τῶν Ἀράβων βασιλέα καὶ τὸν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἐπιβουλεύεν τοῖς περὶ Φοινίκην πράγμασιν. For the detail see Lewis; for Thucydides we should note the following:

(a) As already noted (46. 1, 58. 7 nn.; cf. Lewis 392, 396–7), while the king is not wholly absent from Thucydides' mind (e. g. § 5 here), he treats Persia's relations with Sparta as if the decisions were taken by Tissaphernes, and as if his task were therefore to explore the satrap's intentions. Later events would correct this distortion, and by the time he came to write his brief summary of the last phase of the war at ii. 65. 12 he thought 'Kyros the king's son' an important factor but passed over Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos entirely (cf. *Historia* x [1961], 13–14).

(b) Some facts, however garbled, about the trouble in Egypt were known to the Greeks by the time Ephoros wrote (Diod. xiii. 46. 6, cited above). Ktesias might be the source, but these facts were surely discoverable before his book appeared; indeed, if Diodoros is at all right, Tissaphernes had already in 411 given an explanation of the withdrawal of the Phoenician ships more plausible than what we get here in § 4 and fully as well worth mention. It is peculiarly frustrating that book viii breaks off where it does: at 109. 1 Tissaphernes is on the point of explaining the matter *ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα*, but we do not discover what Thucydides was told about his excuses. If they at all resembled what we have from Diodoros, then Thucydides wrote this elaborate (if loosely constructed) analysis at a very early stage in his collection of the material, when he had nothing better to go on than speculation in the Peloponnesian fleet immediately after the withdrawal of the ships.

3. Ἐπτὰ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν: Plutarch's 150 (*Alc.* 25. 4) is a reasonable approximation, and Diodoros' three hundred (xiii. 36. 5, and throughout) might be the strength of the fleet originally ordered (cf. § 5 below); but it is not easy to see why Isokrates (*xvi.* 18) reduced the number to ninety, in a context where he might rather be expected to exaggerate.

ὅσπερ καὶ διενόηθη: 46. 5, 56. 2, 57. 2. On this explanation Tissaphernes used the opportunity to demoralise the Peloponnesian fleet still further (he was out of reach of direct complaint from the Spartan commander, and if he later changed his mind he could put the blame on Tamos); but this gives no reason for him to have brought the ships as close as Aspendos. He remained there till 108. 3, which is still within the Thucydidean summer, but there is no way to reckon the length of his absence (§ 1 gives no clear idea when it began), though it was long enough for a difference to be noticeable in the provision of *τροφή*.

ἐκχρηματίσαιτο ἀφείς: edd. assume that *ἐκχρηματίζεσθαι*, takes a direct acc., like *πράσσεσθαι*, of the person from whom money is extracted, and that *τοὺς Φοίνικας* depends on *ἐκχρηματίσαιτο* as well as on *προαγαγών* and *ἀφείς*; this makes good sense, but Steup's argument from the list of verbs in Pollux iv. 42–3 is weak, for it contains verbs which do not govern a direct acc. of this kind. Again, no reason is given explicitly for bringing the ships to Aspendos; Arnold suggested that it was easier to blackmail the Phoenicians if they had been brought so close to the scene of their service. The king's interest is here wholly forgotten.

καταβοῆς ἔνεκα --- τοῦ λέγεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.: Classen and Stahl took *ἔνεκα* to state his purpose, that his action should be reported to Sparta, but Goodhart and Steup objected that this is not a possible meaning for *καταβοή*; the reference must be to the denunciation at 85. 2, and *ἔνεκα* therefore states his reason, his purpose being given by *τοῦ λέγεσθαι*. (Poppo's *τοῦ*, for codd. *τῷ* or *τῷ*, is necessary on any interpretation. For *τῷ* with inf. cf. vii. 36. 5 n., where the cases discussed rather favour *τοῦ* here; for *τοῦ* with inf. for positive purpose cf. i. 4, and viii. 39. 4 is not very different.) This may be what Tissaphernes said when he left Miletos (§ 1 n.). If he delayed long or did not in the end bring the ships, he would have destroyed his credit entirely, but this did not matter if his object was to break the Spartan connection (46. 5, 58. 6 nn.).

4. ἐμοὶ μέντοι --- ποιήσῃ: the general line is not in doubt. Thucydides inclined throughout to the view that Tissaphernes' policy was to wear both Greek powers down (46. 5, where the last n. discusses the degree to which Thucydides accepted the view stated, and 57. 2)*, and the explanatory *κομίσας γάρ, κ.τ.λ.*, fits best with this. The difficulties lie in the wording:

(a) Schwartz (363) deleted *σαφέστατον εἶναι* because of the anomalous dependent inf. *ἀγαγεῖν* (we expect *στι* + indic. as in § 3), and Tucker inserted *⟨τόδ⟩* before *εἶναι*, to which the inf. could be in apposition; but the anomaly is not unparalleled (Steup pointed to the inf. dependent on *κατάδηλοι ὄντες* at iv. 47. 2), and *σαφέστατον* makes an important difference, emphasizing Thucydides' confidence in his analysis.

(b) *διατριβῆς* B, *τριβῆς* cett. *τρίβειν* is much the more common verb

in the sense 'wear down', while *διατριβή*, *διατρίβειν*, have usually the special sense 'waste time': contrast vii. 42. 3, 43. I, 47. 3 with 48. 6, 49. 2 (see n. to 48. 6). But *διατριβή* at v. 38. 4 is more general, and Thucydides has just used *διατρίβειν* at viii. 78, 87. 3 for the effect of Tissaphernes' measures on the Peloponnesian fleet; and he does not elsewhere use *τριβή*, a word more common in tragedy in this sense. *διατριβῆς* is probably right, recalling § 3 ἵνα *διατρίβῃ*.

(c) The more serious question is of the relation of *διατριβῆς* --- καὶ ἀνοκωχῆς to *φθορᾶς μέν* and ἀνισώσεως δέ below. Schwartz (*ibid.*) took the former as a unitary expression and complained that the two separate concepts which follow do not fit it; his violent remedy, to delete both *φθορᾶς μέν* and ἀνισώσεως δέ, is unattractive, and he did not explain how he would take ἀνοκωχῆς, which here cannot have its usual special sense 'truce'. This is clear in seven out of eight instances in Thucydides (e.g. iv. 38. 1), and ἀνοκωχῆς *κακῶν* at iv. 117. 1 is not very different; here on any of various interpretations (e.g. Steup's *Hinhalten*, Weil's *immobiliser*) 'truce' is inapplicable and we must look at the derivation from ἀνέχω. The most promising sense is LSJ ἀνέχω A. II 'hold back, check', with a political application at Th. vi. 86. 4; and there is some support from ἀνοκωχεύω ('hold back', etc.), presumably derived from some technical use of ἀνοκωχή. The instance nearest to ἀνίσωσις is vii. 48. 3 ἀνεῖχε, but it is not necessary to bring ἀνοκωχή so close to ἀνίσωσις as *διατριβή* is to *φθορά*. *διατριβῆς* --- καὶ ἀνοκωχῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν refers to both Greek powers, as ἀνισώσεως necessarily does, whereas *φθορᾶς* in the context refers only to the effect on the Peloponnesians. It is not illogical to say that Tissaphernes wished to wear down and check the Greek powers, and to develop this by saying that he meant to damage the Peloponnesians and equalize the two sides.

(d) Stahl and Steup prefer *μηδετέρους* (cett.) to *μηδετέρους* (BM), because the negative should go with *ποιήσῃ*, not *προσθέμενος*; but the sentence runs more easily if the indirect object of *προσθέμενος* is expressed.

ἐπεί --- οὐκ ἐνδοιαστῶς: Reiske's *ἐπιφανεῖς* does away with the duplication between *ἐπιφανές* (CEG) or its variants and οὐκ ἐνδοιαστῶς; with a comma after *ἐθουλήθη* and Dobree's ἂν a clear sentence emerges. Steup and Tucker were troubled by the position of δήπου, but cf. Ar. *Pl.* 497, D. xviii. 117.

ἀντιπάλως μᾶλλον ή ὑποδεεστέρως: Thucydides' formulation, markedly different from that of his Peloponnesian informants at 78, agrees well with the figures last given, at 79.

5. ἦν εἰπε πρόφασιν: Thucydides argues throughout on the basis of what could be achieved if Tissaphernes brought the Phoenician fleet up to join the Peloponnesians; on this basis, 147 ships would be ample for victory, so Tissaphernes' excuse seems clear evidence of his

bad faith. If Tissaphernes' real aim was to get rid of his Greek allies (46. 5, 58. 6, 99 nn.) and defeat Athens on his own with the Phoenician ships, it is intelligible that he wanted more than 147 before he committed himself to operations.

ὅσας βασιλεὺς ἔταξε: no number has been given, but the three hundred of Diodoros (xiii. 36. 5 etc.) might be the strength intended (§ 3 n.).

χάριν ἄν --- ἔσχεν: *χάριν ἔχειν* more often means 'feel' than 'receive' gratitude, and on this ground and because he thought ὁ δέ more suitable if it indicated a change of subject, Goodhart deleted *τῶν βασιλέως* to produce a sentence of which the king could be the subject. But *χάρις* can be either a favour done or one received, and there is no difficulty in understanding ὁ δέ to be Tissaphernes (cf. Kühner-Gerth i. 657 f. and e.g. Hdt. vi. 3).

6. **ώς ἐπὶ τὰς νῦν:** to Thucydides this can be only further evidence of Tissaphernes' deceitfulness. But we do not know at what point he learnt that he was not to have the use of these ships (§ 2 n.), and their arrival at Aspendos, which shows that it was intended to use them in the Aegean, was apparently recent at 81. 3. The invitation to Philippus may be a genuine attempt to keep up the appearance of collaboration.

Φίλιππον ἄνδρα Λακεδαιμόνιον: very probably the same who was put in command at Miletos late in 412 (27. 5). He was presumably a Spartiate; for Thucydides' practice in this matter see 22. 1 n.

88. **ἀσφαλῆ καὶ μεγάλην χάριν:** safe, because Thucydides surmises that he knew already that the Spartans were not to get the ships. But see 87. 2, 6 nn.: Alkibiades may have taken more of a risk than Thucydides in the light of the outcome supposed.

ώς εἰκός: earlier (46–52) Thucydides seemed more certain about the mind and purposes of Alkibiades*. This phrase makes it less likely that he had later discussed this phase of the war with Alkibiades himself: his information may rather have come from someone in Alkibiades' entourage who for some reason was no longer in the same way available.

ἐς τὴν --- φιλίαν: in respect of his (supposed) friendliness with Alkibiades and the Athenians; cf. 82. 3, 83. 1–2, 87. 1.

ὅπως --- ἀναγκάζοιτο προσχωρεῖν: the old plan (47. 2, 52) persists, but perhaps more in Thucydides' mind than in Alkibiades'. However he tried to deceive others, Alkibiades himself must have known since 56 that there was very little chance of his bringing Tissaphernes over to the Athenian side. Equally he must have known of Pharnabazos' offers to the Spartans (80. 2, cf. 99)—he had been in Sparta at the start of the negotiations in winter 413/12 (5. 4–6. 1), and the subject must have been discussed both in the Spartan camp and at Tissaphernes' court—and he must have considered the possibility that by fostering

the quarrel with Tissaphernes he merely encouraged the Spartans to turn, as they did, to Pharnabazos and move to the Hellespont where Athens was much more vulnerable. But his supposed influence with Tissaphernes was Alkibiades' great asset (81, 82. 3) and he had to do all he could to keep up the pretence—and something might always turn up.

εὐθὺς τῆς Φασήλιδος καὶ Καύνου: the places are named, both here and at 108. 1, in what seems to us the reverse order (v. 47. 10 n., vi. 72. 1, and see Steup's n. to ii. 7. 3). The usage is not invariable, e.g. at 22. 1 Klazomenai and Kyme are named in the order we expect, but it is common enough to show that the Greeks did not feel our need to name the nearer place first. In this case neither place is his destination, nor is he likely to have put in at either, for Kaunos had been in enemy hands since late in 412 (39. 4 with n.), and at 99 we find a Spartiate in Phaselis*; his course is perhaps defined in this way to show that he did not need to go outside Rhodes to avoid the enemy. ἀνω is regularly used for a journey away from the coast, up country, and so to distinguish the inland parts of Asia, nearer the centre of Persian power (e.g. Hdt. i. 177); to use it of a voyage from Samos to Aspendos is not quite logical, but intelligible on this analogy.

89–98. *Fall of the Four Hundred. Battle of Eretria. Establishment of the Five Thousand at Athens*

89. 1. *οἱ --- πρέσβεις:* 72, 77, 86.

τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου: 86. 6–7, with some verbal repetition.

τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μετεχόντων: the rank and file as opposed to the leaders (§ 2: cf. 48. 3 *τοῦ ἐπαιρικοῦ τῷ πλέοντι*), certainly including many who had joined because they wanted more effective prosecution of the war and accepted the argument (53. 3, etc.) that an oligarchy was needed to obtain the king's help.

2. **τῶν πάνυ --- δητῶν:** Classen's deletion of *στρατηγῶν* is certainly right. Stahl's argument from the fact that Aristokrates was taxiarχ (92. 4) not general is shaky, since he is still among those *ἐν ἀρχαῖς*; but to describe these men as those 'who belonged fully to the oligarchy and held office' is much more effective than describing them as 'generals and other office-holders'. See further the argument of M. D. Reeve at 1. 1 n. against connecting *πάνυ* there directly with *στρατιωτῶν*, which applies equally against connecting it here directly with *στρατηγῶν*. Reeve at 1. 1 connects *πάνυ* with the participle, and he achieves the same result here by deleting also the *τῶν* after *στρατηγῶν*. These then are men from the inner circle as opposed to the rank and file in § 1.

Θηραμένη τε τὸν "Αγνωνός: 68. 4 with n., and § 3 n. below.

Ἀριστοκράτη τὸν Σκελίον: his earliest certain and dated appearance is in 414 (Ar. *An.* 126), but he is very probably to be identified with the

man who swore both to the peace and to the alliance in 421 (v. 19. 2, 24. 1; see *JHS* lxxvii [1957], 179), and with the general sent to Chios early in 412 (9. 2 above), neither of whom has a patronymic. Plato (*Gorg.* 472a–b) testifies to his high position and his dedication *ἐν Πυθίον*; *IG* i². 772, recently rediscovered (T. L. Shear jr., *Hesp.* xlii [1973], 173–5), turns out to read Ἀριστοκράτης | Σκελίο | ἀνέθηκεν | νικήσα[ς] | Κεκροπ[άδι] | Ἐρεχθ[ηδι], which with two tribes named must be a victory at the Thargelia and the dedication should originally have stood in the Python. The lettering is anomalous, *sigma* with three bars but no other archaic letter-form, and Ionic *eta* with slightly curving uprights; as to the date, since there is now no doubt that this is our Aristokrates (for previous views see D. M. Lewis, *JHS* lxxxiv [1964], 156–7; Davies 1904), the question is where to fit this victory into his career, assuming that he had already an established position in 421 (above). His father's name is mostly Skellias in literary texts: Ar. *Av.* 126 can be emended to accommodate Σκελίον, but not fr. 25 Dem.; Plato's text and D. lviii. 67 show no variant from Σκελλίον; for Thucydides see app. crit.; but the inscription shows that Σκελίο was a possible variant at the time when it was set up.

This passage shows that he had taken a prominent part in setting up the oligarchy (see also next n.); 92.2 confirms his membership of the Four Hundred, 92.4 gives him the office of taxiarch. Here he is clearly opposed to the extremists, and Lysias (xii. 66) makes him the leader in the overthrow of the Four Hundred, Theramenes following him out of jealousy and fear, while *Aθ. π.* 33. 2 names him before Theramenes as the *αἰτιώτατοι* — τῆς καταλύσεως. ML 84. 35 gives us an Aristokrates as one of the generals of the restored democracy in 410/09; Xenophon (*HG* i. 4. 21) names Aristokrates and Adeimantos as *κατὰ γῆν στρατηγοί*, elected as Alkibiades' colleagues in 407; the Aristokrates appointed after Alkibiades' fall (X. *HG* i. 5. 16, *Diod.* xiii. 74. 1) must be the same who fought at Arginousai and was then executed (X. *HG* i. 6. 29, 7. 2; *Diod.* xiii. 101. 5; Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 142), but no source gives him a patronymic. There were at least two other men of this name in public life in the late fifth century (*JHS* lxxvii [1957], 179), so that it is not in principle impossible to take (say) the general of 410/09 and 406 as a democrat distinct from Theramenes' ally and Alkibiades' colleague; but the son of Skellias held at least one generalship (Ar. fr. 25 Dem.), and our first hypothesis should be that all these generals are the same man. If so, he could hold office under all kinds of regime and we could take him as a trusted soldier with no strong political feelings, drawn into the Four Hundred by the hope of Persian help in the war. Wilamowitz (*AuA* i. 100 n. 3) was right to warn against making him an 'aristocrat' in politics (whatever Aristophanes might mean by that) on the strength of *Av.*

126; the speaker of D. Ixiii, being a grandson of Aristokrates' nephew, naturally made him a democratic hero, and credits him (67) with warlike exploits as well as the destruction of Eetioneia.

ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις: Bekker, for B ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, cett. ἐν πρώτοις; as also Reiz at vii. 19. 4 for codd. *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις*. A superlative in the masc. nom. pl. is clearly liable to corruption in this idiom, but here the dat. is not impossible Greek and we have to ask what difference emendation would make.

Two views have been taken of the idiom. (a) Arnold on iii. 17. 1, Herbst in *Philol.* xvi (1860), 345–7, and others, influenced mainly by the *kai ἔπι πλείους* which shortly follows *ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται* at iii. 17. 1, argued that Thucydides uses the simple superlative when he means it absolutely, and that *ἐν τοῖς* qualifies, not strengthens, putting the person or thing referred to in the highest class but not necessarily at the top of it; but if iii. 17 is not by Thucydides, the writer may have misunderstood the idiom (see Gomme's n. on iii. 17. 1). (b) LSJ δ, ὥ, τό A. VIII. 6, Steup on iii. 17. 1 and others take *ἐν τοῖς* as strengthening the superlative; so also Kühner in his second ed., but Gerth (i. 28–9) compromised, not absolutely the first but the first place in the relevant class. There are passages elsewhere for which Arnold's interpretation would be possible (e.g. Th. i. 6. 3), but none where it is necessary. The decisive instance against him is Th. vii. 19. 4, where it makes no sense to say that these men were 'among the first' to set out; they must be the 'first of all', which excludes both codd. *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις* and Arnold's interpretation of *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις*.

Here the issue is complicated by 68. 4 *πρώτος ὥν*, which cannot mean that Theramenes was absolutely 'the first'; this is a weak superlative which rates him high but not pre-eminent. Aristokrates, not mentioned at all in 68, is at a lower level, so if we are to take the two men together a strengthened superlative is inappropriate, and we need a phrase which puts them in a class. Read therefore with B *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις*.

[**ἴεπειπον:**] om. CM, and no satisfactory defence has been produced. Stahl suggested that this was either the remnant of a gloss on *πρεσβευομένους*, to show that it refers to those who sent the embassy and not to those who were sent (cf. vi. 104. 2 n.), or an attempt to provide an indicative verb for *φοβούμενοι δέ*, corresponding to *μετέσχον μέν*. The clause *μή τι --- δράσωσι* (cett.: *δράσειαν* B, equally possible and accepted by Steup) expresses a fear, and without *ἴεπειπον* there is no difficulty in taking *τούς τε --- πρεσβευομένους* as a further object to *φοβούμενοι*.

ώς ἔφασαν: as it turns out in § 3, they had other motives which they did not avow. From the opening of § 3 it is clear that the corrupt remainder of this sentence continues to give what they 'said'.

ἄνευ τῶν πλεόνων: either (a) the main body of the Four Hundred as

opposed to the active minority, *τοὺς πρεσβευομένους*, or (*b*) the main body of the supporters of the revolution as opposed to the Four Hundred. § 1 *τοὺς πολλούς* possibly refers to (*b*), and the plea below for a real Five Thousand shows the Theramenists pressing for a wider spread of responsibility; but nothing so far clearly indicates that we are to go outside the Four Hundred, the body in whom decision is at present vested.

οὐ τὸ ἀπαλλαξείειν . . . ἐλθεῖν: to the app. crit. in OCT add that M has *οἰκεῖν* for *ἐλθεῖν*.

ΣΜνε₂: οὐκ ἀντίκειται τινὶ τὸ ἀλλά, ὡς λέγομεν, οὐ τόδε, ἀλλὰ τόδε. ἔστι δὲ παρακελευστικόν, ὡς καὶ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ (Il. xiii. 292)· ἀλλ' ἄγε, μηκέτι ταῦτα λεγώμεθα. ή δὲ διάνοια· οἱ περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην ἄρχοντες τότε τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μετασχόντες αὐτῆς ἐν πρώτοις, ὁρεγόμενοι δὲ δημοκρατίας, ἔλεγον, οὐχ ὅτι ἀπαλλακτικῶς ἔχουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας (ὅπερ ἦν ἀληθές), ἀλλ' ὅτι φοβοῦνται τοὺς ἐν Σάμῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας εἰς Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις, μή τι οὔτοι κακὸν ἐργάσωνται τὴν πόλιν ὀλιγαρχίας γενομένης. ηδὴ οὖν ἡξίουν τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους καθιστάναι. The scholiast appears to have read *ἐν πρώτοις* (above) but not *ἔπειτα*, and to have misunderstood *πρεσβευομένους*. *ἀπαλλακτικῶς* *ἔχουσι* suggested *ἀπαλλαξείειν* (Abresch, cf. i. 95. 7), which has been generally accepted (but it would be better to print *τὸν τότ*, rather than obelise a conjecture accepted into the text).

Steup argued that the paraphrase is not a safe guide because it brings in matter not found in this sentence (*ὁρεγόμενοι δὲ δημοκρατίας, ὅπερ ἦν ἀληθές*), but these points can be inferred from § 1 *ad fin.*, § 4 *ad fin.*, and legitimately brought in to assist explanation. The trouble is rather that the paraphrase makes sense of the passage only by taking it back to front: 'they said, not that they wished to be rid of the oligarchy ... but that they were afraid' of Alkibiades etc., and that enables the scholiast to append (with *οὖν*, not *ἀλλά*) his version of the concluding phrase, which he may perhaps have noticed to correspond with Alkibiades' demand at 86. 6.

But this will not do with the clauses in Thucydides' order, where after the negative the reader must take *ἀλλά* as adversative, creating a wholly senseless contrast between getting rid of an extreme oligarchy and setting up a more equal constitution. The paraphrase demands a negative where our text has it (and a main verb which our text lacks); but the preceding comment on *ἀλλά*, stating clearly that this is not a case of *οὐ τόδε, ἀλλὰ τόδε*, suggests a text without this negative. That would be acceptable, Dover suggests, if we take the *ἀλλά* to contradict not an explicit negative, but one implicit in *ἀπαλλαξείειν* (= 'no longer wish to have'; cf. LSJ *ἀλλά* I. 4. b): the sense would then be 'to be rid of an extreme oligarchy and instead set up the Five Thousand and a more equal constitution'. This is clearly superior to earlier proposals such as Madvig's *οὕπω ἀπαλλαξείειν*

ἢξίουν or Stahl's οὕτοι - - - ἔλεγον (vel sim.), which retain too much of the meaningless contrast. The negative might have been supplied later by a reader who thought that ἀλλά required a negative somewhere preceding, but this would not account for τό; possibly the main verb, which we still need, was οἱ πέφαντο (cf. Pl. *Tht.* 168b), of which οὐ τό is all that remains.

No convincing parallel has been produced for ἐλθεῖν in the sense required; Arist. *Pol.* 1270 a 183 εἰς δλίγους ἥκεν (Stahl) implies a fresh move towards oligarchy, as the scholiast's δλιγαρχίας γενομένης also appears to do. These men wish to be rid of the oligarchy they already have, and for this M's οἰκεῖν (cf. 67. 1, ii. 37. 1 with n.) is preferable.

Ἐργῷ καὶ μὴ ὄνόματι: by itself this could mean that the Five Thousand had been appointed but had no real power (p. 238 above, and vi. 10. 2 with n.); but 92. 11 shows decisively that it means that they had not been appointed at all, and ὄνόματι is mere pretence that they had.

3. σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου: Goodhart protested with justification against taking σχῆμα πολιτικόν as 'a form of constitution' (Stahl, Steup et al., comparing vi. 89. 6), with τοῦ λόγου carrying the implication that it existed only in words. Stahl apparently wished to avoid treating σχῆμα as equivalent to πρόσχημα, but that is not necessary: σχῆμα can mean 'appearance' as opposed to reality (LSJ σχῆμα 2), and πολιτικόν is the adjective relating to πολιτεία, πολιτεύειν (cf. D. xviii. 13). So, 'the (outward) form of their speech, in respect of the constitution,' i.e. the political smokescreen with which they covered up their real motives. This reminds us of 66. 1, and is rather more surprising (see next n.); but §2 ὡς ἔφασαν has warned us that they might not mean quite what they said.

κατ' ιδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας: cf. ii. 65. 7, 11, 12, and note the further echo from this chapter at the end of §4 below. ii. 65. 11 is directed at the democrats responsible for Alkibiades' exile (see n. there), and much though not all of the rest of that chapter is also aimed at them; here he makes the point that such jealousies can be even more destructive in an oligarchy. The echoes from ii. 65 do not prove that this chapter was written, like that, after the end of the war: Thucydides can have nourished for years, at least since the Sicilian expedition, a settled conviction that the quarrels of Athens' leaders hampered her war effort.

We are bound to ask how far this generalization is to be read as criticism of the two men named in §2, and particularly of Theramenes. This clause inculpates οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν, not (as 66. 1) the whole class, so that we are entitled to except individuals, but Theramenes and Aristokrates cannot be dissociated from §2 ὡς ἔφασαν, so far as that may convict them of insincerity. Hignett (273 with n. 1) took 89.2–4 to imply 'that Theramenes was closely associated with the extreme oligarchs'; it 'gives no support to the modern view that he was the

accredited leader of the moderates before the revolution of 411'. But see also 278–9, for the possibility that Thucydides underrated the patriotism of this group.

Thucydides' assessment of Theramenes' part at this stage is nowhere fully explicit. For 68. 4, where he is credited with qualities which Thucydides prized, see nn. there. We are left in no doubt that he had for some time led the opposition within the Four Hundred (90. 3, 91. 1 ἐκ πλέονος, 92. 6), and Thucydides sustains his view of the purpose of the Eētioneia fort, that it was not διαβολὴ μόνον τοῦ λόγου (91. 3), as the reader might have supposed after 89. 3. After 94. 1 Theramenes is not named again, and neither his name nor any other is connected at 97. 1 with the constitution which Thucydides so much admired.

Today this is often referred to as 'the constitution of Theramenes' (e.g. G. H. Stevenson in *JHS* lvi [1936] 48–57). The only ancient text that positively supports this is Diod. xiii. 38. 2, τούτων δὲ πάντων (including the constitution) ἦν εἰσηγητής Θηραμένης; but the force of this, and of testimony in Theramenes' favour elsewhere in Diodoros, is weakened by the extravagance of xiv. 3–5. The speech given to Theramenes in X. *HG* ii. 3. 45–6 concentrates, so far as the year 411 is concerned, on Eētioneia, and *Aθ. π.* 33. 2 on the dissolution of the oligarchy, while 28. 5 speaks of his promoting (*προάγειν*) constitutions rather than creating them. But whether or not he had himself a hand in framing this constitution it is clear from all sources that he had great political weight at this time, and that this weight was thrown behind the Five Thousand. To that extent it is curious that the slur which appears to be cast here on his motives should remain unresolved.

The problem is of course wider: in the light of 97. 2 we can hardly take it as Thucydides' settled view that the Five Thousand had no sincere supporters, yet here he not merely doubts but explicitly denies the sincerity of most of the group within the Four Hundred which pressed for the appointment of the Five Thousand, a group which includes other leading men of that regime besides Theramenes and Aristokrates. For this a solution has been suggested at p. 253 above, that Thucydides' first report of this phase of the revolution came from one of the extremists who fled from Athens at the fall of the Four Hundred (98. 1), and that he put this report into formal prose only provisionally, without the fixed intention of adopting it as the basis of his own final analysis. Such an informant would inevitably see Theramenes and his followers as traitors to the revolution, and would be only too ready to question their motives. The odd language at the end of §4 supports this hypothesis. There it is said that each member of this group was anxious to get in first as *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*, but before he had finished with this episode

Thucydides knew that these men had not restored democracy and that the description was unreasonable; but it makes sense in the mouth of a man who, like the oligarchs of 92. 11, thought the Five Thousand amounted to ἄντικρυς δῆμον, and I see no great difficulty in supposing that Thucydides retained this phrase when writing up this particular report, but very probably realized even then that he would want to use different language when he came to write his final version.

If that is right, this passage should not be used in estimating Thucydides' opinion about Theramenes. It is likely that he had come to no very firm opinion as yet: down to his death in 404 Theramenes was always capable of unexpected action that might alter the views of his critics, whereas Phrynicos and Antiphon were safely dead and their careers and characters open to judgement: (In 410, Thucydides might have mixed feelings about the accuser of Antiphon, whom he so greatly admired; if he had seen the speech [cf. fr. 1b. 6 ff. Th.] he would have encountered a very hostile view of Theramenes.) In fact nothing in Theramenes' record contradicts the programmatic statement given to him at X. *HG* ii. 3. 48, that he was opposed to the extremes of both democracy and oligarchy, a passage that gains in weight because of Xenophon's evident hostility to him down to the break at ii. 3. 9. The formula of *Aθ. π.* 28. 5, that he encouraged various regimes ἔως μηδὲν παρανομοῖεν but opposed them when they got out of hand, would allow him to be sincere in his promotion of both oligarchies, and in his subsequent opposition. A little more doubtfully, I add what may be a fragment of first-hand evidence from Lysias' account of Theramenes' mission to Sparta in 404: xiii. 9 οὕτοι δέ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων τῇ πόλει εὐρήσεσθαι and xii. 68 φάσκων πρᾶγμα ηύρηκέναι μέγα καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον. From the context it is clear that this is something distinct from the hope for favourable terms of surrender, but it is not explained. Lysias claims to quote things that were said in the debate which preceded the despatch of Theramenes (xii. 69, cf. p. 206 above), and this may be a hint that he actually uttered; and it is hard to see what positive good he could hope from the Spartans but the establishment of the kind of constitution he thought good for Athens, and the sequel shows that by this he did not mean oligarchy in the style of Kritias. The modern opinion rejected by Hignett may yet be correct, that Theramenes from the start and consistently favoured a 'moderate' constitution*. **δηλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη**: Thucydides speaks confidently, as if he knew many examples, but the little we know does not confirm what he here says. Megara (iv. 74. 4) is a counter-instance, the maxim does not seem applicable to Samos (viii. 21 n.): we must not forget our ignorance, but the suspicion arises that Thucydides, having found a psychological explanation which satisfied him for the split

among the Athenian oligarchs, may have generalized it a little recklessly. Cf. 2. 1–2 nn. for doubt about a generalization which we are better able to check.

οὐχ ὅπως τοι: 'not only *not* equal'. A. D. Fitton-Brown in *Hermes* lxxxvi (1958), 382 n.2 remarks on the frequency with which this is translated as if it were *οὐ μόνον* (Jowett, Warner: Weil is an honourable exception) and referred to their equality among themselves, like the democratic leaders at ii. 65. 10: see LSJ *ὅπως* A. II. 2, and Th. i. 35. 4, iii. 42. 5. They are not content with having raised themselves as a group above democratic equality.

ώς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὄμοιών : this appears to mean that rejection by democratic electors whom they regard as their inferiors is less wounding to their pride than would be rejection at the hands of those whom they esteem as equals. This is a surprising generalization: nothing of course would make defeat palatable to a Greek, and one would expect his indignation to be increased by his contempt for those who had inflicted it. Thucydides in the detachment of his exile attributes to his own social class a more philosophic attitude than they (or he) could adopt in the heat of the moment.

There might be more comfort for them in the fact that wealthy and distinguished candidates were normally successful in Athenian elections, but this cannot be read into what Thucydides has actually said here. We should remember that he is dealing here not with an established oligarchy in which the distribution of power was regulated by an accepted tradition, but with one newly created in which individual ambition had freer scope. The feeling behind the previous clause is that the rules had successfully been changed in favour of the revolutionaries in general, and that they might be changed further to the advantage of these ambitious individuals, which comes close to saying that their ambition was for tyranny; and in contrast to that it could more fairly be said that the democratic system did not arouse ambitions of this extent. It is also to be remembered that this is hostile criticism, probably due to an extremist exile (see n. to *κατ' ιδίας δὲ φιλοτυμίας* above) whose analysis of the motives of Theramenes' group is not likely to be just and need not be rational.

The paraphrase of Σ^{Myc}2, *οὐ γὰρ ὄμοιόν ἀνδρὸς νομίζοντιν, ἀλλὰ κρείττονος ἐλαττούσθαι*, looks like mere misunderstanding.

4. προστάτης τοῦ δῆμου : in the event (92. 11, 97. 1–2) this was conspicuously falsified. The phraseology again recalls ii. 65. 10–11; but here we are not dealing with normal *τοῦ δῆμου προστασία*, but with *προστάτης* in the much more positive sense of the champion who achieves the restoration of government by the *δῆμος*.

90. 1 τῷ τοιούτῳ εἴδει : cf. 56. 2.

προεστώτες : sc. of the intransigent group which opposed Theramenes.

They are also *οἱ δυνατώτατοι* (below), the ablest and most influential of the Four Hundred. There is no clear indication here that they were in a majority within the Council of Four Hundred, but the implication of 92. 6 seems to be that Theramenes was in a minority. It might help if we had the full story behind Aristotle's assertion (*Pol.* 1305 b 27, pp. 211–12 above) that Phrynicos' party gained power by 'demagogy' within the Four hundred.

Φρύνιχός τε, ὃς - - διηνέχθη : 48, 50–51. Cf. 68. 3: Thucydides seems eager to keep this quarrel before our minds, perhaps to excuse the treachery of one whose intelligence he has asked us to admire (27. 5). **Ἀρίσταρχος** : the name is common, and his past and connections remain unknown. If his extreme and persistent hostility to democracy were known to the public, he is not likely to have held office often before, but he might be the choregos of 422/1. *IG* ii². 2318. 121–2; Davies 1663). See further 92. 6, 9, 98.

Πείσανδρος : 49 n., 68. 1.

Ἀντιφῶν : 68. 1–2 nn.

καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ δυνατώτατοι : in his speech at X. *HG* ii. 3. 46 Theramenes is made to name Aristoteles, Melanthios, Aristarchos, in that order, as generals in charge of the building of the fort *ἐπὶ τῷ χώματι*. Aristoteles is probably the member of the Thirty known to us from X. *HG* ii. 2. 18, 3. 13, and Pl. *Parm.* 127 d. From his position in the list of the Thirty (*HG* ii. 3. 2) his tribe should be Antiochis, and this suits the Aristoteles who (very probably, cf. D. M. Lewis, *JHS* lxxxi [1961] 120–1) was general in 431/0. Nothing further is known of Melanthios. **ἐπεὶ τάχιστα - - καὶ ἐπειδή, κ.τ.λ.** : two separate occasions, and there may have been other embassies (86. 9 n.).

τὴν ὁμολογίαν : B solus; cett. *ἀλιγαρχίαν* makes no sense. No specific agreement has been described, but 70. 2, 71. 3, have familiarized us with the idea that the Four Hundred sought agreement with Sparta, and this is enough to justify the definite article. We do not know on which occasion the terms described at *Aθ.* π. 32. 3 were discussed; for the views of the Four Hundred see 91. 3.

τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἡετιωνείᾳ καλούμενη τεῖχος : § 4 n.

τούς τε πολλούς : as opposed to *σφῶν*, κ.τ.λ. below this can only be the main body of the Athenians, which might be said to have changed sides to the extent that they had at first acquiesced (69. 1) but no longer seemed likely to do so. (This is the fourth *σφῶν* in six lines, which Classen took as a sign of imperfect revision.)

2. καὶ ἄλλους δέκα : the total of twelve is abnormal. At 54. 2 ten men were appointed to go with Peisandros to negotiate with Tissaphernes, and that might be interpreted in democratic terms (see n. there); here it may simply be that the oligarchs have abandoned the usual democratic convention.

The decree of Andron cited by [Plu.] 833 e–f enables us to name

Onomakles (25. 1 n.) who escaped, and Archeptolemos, son of Hippodamos of Agryle, who with Antiphon was condemned and executed (cf. Lys. xii. 67). In view of the rarity of the name the latter may be identified with the Archeptolemos whose efforts for peace (in 425 presumably, cf. Ar. *Pax* 665 *μετὰ τὰν Πύλων*) were defeated by Kleon (Ar. *Eq.* 794–5). Cf. Gomme on iv. 41. 4 (the retraction, vol. iii p. 732, seems mistaken): the transaction is not entirely clear, or the allusion to the 'son of Hippodamos' at *Eq.* 327. The identification of Hippodamos as the famous Milesian architect is natural (the name is not otherwise found at Athens), and is made explicitly if a little confusedly by Σ *Eq.* 327; there is no other evidence that he was given Athenian citizenship, but it is likely enough. The Doric form of the name (for the Ionic form *Ιππόδημος* at Miletos see *Syll.*³ 368, of 289/8 B.C.) may suggest a family connection with the Peloponnese, which could be useful to Archeptolemos in his negotiations.

3. *καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ* : Thucydides' emphasis is all on entry by sea ($\eta\eta$ *βίᾳ ἐπιπλέωσι*, § 4 *ἄρχειν τοῦ ἔσπλουν*). and Steup thought *πεζῷ* referred to troops carried on board ship. If Thucydides had in mind also the admission of troops by land, from Dekeleia or elsewhere, the text and interpretation of § 4 are very much in question.

4. *χηλὴ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἡ Ἡετιωνεία* : there is no doubt that this is the short narrow promontory which covers the west side of the main harbour. This is a natural feature, not made ground. The definition of *χηλὴ* in $\Sigma^{\text{ABFGM}c_2}$ to i. 63. 1 (cited ad loc.), stones set in the sea to protect a wall from the waves, so called from its likeness to an ox's hoof, is not appropriate there, nor to vii. 53. 1 (for which see vol. iv, p. 484); it is certainly wrong here, and at Plu. *Sol.* 9. 3, Suda s.v. *χηλὴ ὄρους*. As Gomme observed, *χηλὴ* is used not only of a hoof but also of the claw of a crab, and that makes it a natural word for the arms, natural or artificial, which enclose a harbour. Xenophon's description of the fort as *ἐπὶ τῷ χώματι* (*HG* ii. 3. 46) must not mislead. *ἐπὶ* (*τῷ*) *χώμα* in D. I. 6, li. 4, and elsewhere, gives a location where quite large numbers of ships are to moor. The original reference may have been (Wachsmuth, *RE* iii. 2369) to the mole which projected from the tip of Eetioneia to meet the opposite mole from Akte, but the phrase came to designate a larger area of the western part of the harbour (Milchhöfer [see next n.] 53).

Philochoros (*FGrH* 328 F 72) derived the name *ἀπὸ τοῦ κατακτησαμένου τὴν γῆν Ἡετίωνος*; the mythological presuppositions of this remain obscure (cf. Jacoby ad loc.). The *θίασος* [*'E*]τιονιδῶν of *SEG* x. 330, found near the Peiraieus, is most probably evidence of a cult of the eponym in the early fifth century.

ἔτειχίζετο οὖν, κ.τ.λ. : to the description here add 92. 1 *καὶ πυλίδας ἔχον καὶ ἐσόδους καὶ ἐπεσαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων*. Modern development in the Peiraieus has obliterated almost all of the ancient walls in the area,

so that we can only rely on earlier modern descriptions: G. Hirschfeld, *Ber. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. (phil.-hist. Cl.)* xxx (1878) 5–7; G. v. Alten (19 ff.) and A. Milchhöfer (50 ff.) in Curtius and Kaupert, *Karten von Attika, Erläut.* vol. i (1881); Judeich 144–54; R. L. Scranton, *Greek Walls* (1941), 114–20; F. E. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (1971), has no systematic discussion. See plan on p. xv. *

The most substantial known remains are those of the Kononian walls built in 395 and the following years, which are sometimes based on the remains of the Themistoklean circuit, and may elsewhere have obliterated them. At their western end, the Kononian fortifications passed to the north of the *μακρὰ στοά* (§ 5 below), crossed the northern recess of the harbour (possibly the *κωφὸς λιμήν* of X. *HG* ii. 4. 31, but this is by no means certain; probably marshy at this time), and continued west to a large gate before turning nearly south towards the sea and then down the west side of Eētioneia. There is no positive evidence that the earlier circuit, the one familiar to Thucydides, followed any part of this line. Only one wall in this area has any claim to a pre-Kononian date, the polygonal wall across the ridge to the north-west of Eētioneia (Judeich 146, Scranton 114). There are no traces to fix the line it took to the east of the surviving portion: Judeich thought this was the Themistoklean circuit and that it went further north than Konon's to enclose the northern recess of the harbour, v. Alten (21) and others assume that it bent south to join the Kononian line at the gate. At the seaward end of this wall, the return along the shore towards Eētioneia appears from the only description (v. Alten, *ibid.*) to be of a later date than the polygonal section. The wall of the Four Hundred, built in haste and at once demolished, need not have left any traces at all, any more than the walls and counter-walls of the siege of Syracuse.

The clearest and most heavily emphasised feature in Thucydides' description is the tower at the southern tip of Eētioneia, precisely at the entrance of the harbour; the reference in *τὸν ἔτερον* is to the fact that it was one of a pair, with a similar tower on the Akte side of the entrance. We cannot doubt that there was such a tower at just this point: ignorance of the topography may be invoked to account for some of Thucydides' statements, about Pylos and elsewhere, but this was home ground, well known both to him and to his informants. Equally, if Thucydides said that the old landward wall terminated at this tower, we have to accept that the circuit familiar to him followed the Kononian line down the outer (west) side of the promontory. Then, according to the accepted text (B), we learn that the new inner wall *πρὸς θάλασσαν* ended at this same tower. That can only mean that the Four Hundred built their wall along the eastern side of Eētioneia, facing inward towards the harbour. This was accepted by Milchöfer

(52), Goodhart, and most edd., but it runs into formidable difficulties both of language and of sense.

(a) North of Eētioneia the old wall did indeed face the mainland; but Thucydides' point of reference is the tower at the southern tip, and down the actual promontory the wall faced out to sea. The harbour does indeed consist of sea-water, and in contrast to a genuinely landward wall the description *πρὸς θάλασσαν* would be acceptable; in contrast to a wall which through the relevant part of its course faced out towards the open sea, it is absurd.

(b) It appears from § 3 that the purpose of the new wall, as given out by or among the Four Hundred, was to defend the Peiraeus against an attack in force by the fleet from Samos. A wall along the shore of the harbour would contribute nothing to the defence of the actual entrance, and would become relevant only when the fleet had forced its way in. The wall could then be used to deny them a landing on Eētioneia itself, but not anywhere else within the harbour. Theramenes thought that the real purpose was to let the enemy in. Again, the wall would contribute nothing towards the entry of the Peloponnesians; once they were in the harbour the wall, however many ἐπεσαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων it contained (92. 1), would be a hindrance rather than a help to their landing on Eētioneia. According to § 4 the object was that a small number of men might ἀρχειν τοῦ ἔσπλου. Thucydides does not describe in detail how they proposed to do this, any more than he explains the λιμένων κλῆσις instituted in 429 (ii. 94. 4); but cf. the 'dolphins' employed in the harbour of Syracuse (vii. 41. 2 with n.), and the elaborate account in Diod. xiii. 78. 4–79. 7 of Kallikratidas forcing entry into the outer harbour of Mytilene and of Konon's defences, which include large stones comparable to the 'dolphins' above (78. 7, 79. 3) and men stationed on the χηλαὶ of the harbour (78. 6–7). Like so much of the military narrative in this part of Diodoros, this may go back ultimately to *Hell. Oxy.* and give a good idea of contemporary practice and resources. But it is to be noted that Kallikratidas did force the entrance, though Konon deployed more than 'a few men' and thirty ships. It is not clear how a wall of the kind suggested would have helped defence of the Peiraeus harbour entrance.

These difficulties in the accepted text seem to me insuperable. Before we consider what alteration is possible, we must ask what the Four Hundred especially feared, and how a wall anywhere in this area would help them. The end of § 1 answers the first question: they were in a hurry because they were losing control of the city and its inhabitants. If entry to Eētioneia were unrestricted, their internal opponents might interfere with the operations of the 'few men' at the harbour entrance. A simple way to prevent this would be to build a wall from some point on the landward circuit north of Eētioneia

down to the harbour (*πρὸς θάλασσαν*) east of the base of the promontory, which would give a relatively short and easily manned defence for Eētioneia on the landward side. It is intelligible that the Four Hundred should be in a hurry to complete this work, and their opponents to stop it before the way was blocked, whereas it is hard to see the urgency of completing or preventing a wall along the harbour shore.

Returning to the text of Thucydides, if the two walls did not meet at the end of the peninsula, there is no point at which they could both terminate. This means that only the old wall can be the subject of *ἐτελεύτη* and that another verb is needed for the new wall; and we must posit a lacuna. We expect from this *γάρ*-clause an explanation of the way in which this combination of walls will protect the harbour mouth, against Athenian opponents if the preceding argument is correct. The function of the old wall was to repel attack from outside the circuit to the north, and *πρὸς ἡπειρον* is fully appropriate; it does not strictly advance the argument to add that this wall reached all the way down the west side of the peninsula, but it helps to stress the completeness of the protection provided. The text may then be sound as far as *πρὸς ἡπειρον*, after which I propose a lacuna in which the function of the new wall was stated, e.g. <and on the side of the Peiraieus they were defended by> ... We must then delete the *τε* before *παλαιόν*, and the text would run more easily if *τείχος* were added after *ἡπειρον*. At the end, the text of ACEFGM, *τὸ καινὸν τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους τειχίζομενον* (*τοῦ* om. C), would suit my hypothesis better: 'the new (structure) being built inside the (main Peiraieus) wall towards the sea'. After the loss of the words I suppose to have dropped out, the text would easily be 'corrected' as in B and in Valla's original*.

The proposed lacuna might be filled in other ways, but the received text cannot stand.

5. διώκοδόμησαν δὲ καὶ στοάν, κ.τ.λ.: from its size and position this must be the *μακρὰ στοά* of Paus. i. 1. 3, the *ἀλφιτόπωλις* of Σ Ar. Ach. 547, built by Perikles (Milchhöfer [see § 4 n.] 50, Judeich 448). *διοικοδομεῖν* occurs otherwise only at iv. 69. 2, where it refers to the closing of a gap; here it must mean 'wall off' (cf. Pl. *Tim.* 69 e), which would be done, again, by building a wall from the nearest part of the Themistoklean circuit to the harbour. Whether this would bring the *stoa* 'within the circle of the Eētioneia fortification' (Steup and others) is largely a matter of communications: *ἔγγυτα τούτον* (sc. the wall proposed in § 4 n.?) *εὐθὺς ἔχομένη* rather suggests that there was at this time a causeway on the line of the Kononian wall. But the walling off of the *stoa* may be a separate operation, to increase their hold on the city.

ἔξαιρεῖσθαι: Pollux ix. 34 cites Hypereides (fr. 186) for *ἔξαιρεσις*, *ὅπου τὰ φορτία ἔξαιρεῖται*. Strictly the verb covers only *τὸν ἐσπλέοντα*: the

normal function of the *stoa* meant that there would be grain there already (*τὸν ὑπάρχοντα*) which the owners could now take out for sale (*προαιροῦντας*) only by leave. Thucydides refers to Athens' need in general for imported grain at vi. 20. 4; for the effects of the occupation of Dekeleia see vii. 28. 1 with n.

91. 1. ἐκ πλέονος --- διεθρόει: only within the Four Hundred themselves, cf. the first sentence of 92. 2.

οὐδέν --- τοῖς ξύμπασι ξυμβατικόν: nothing that would satisfy everyone, i.e. every member of the Four Hundred (not 'all Athenians', as Goodhart and others), or at any rate nothing publishable; Theramenes' point is of course that the extremists have a treacherous secret agreement with Sparta. Σ^{Myc} ineptly understands *Λακεδαιμονίοις* with *ξύμπασι*. For the basis of the negotiations see further § 3 n.

2. Εύθοέων ἐπικαλουμένων: for their earlier applications to the Spartan authorities see 5. 1, 60. 2.

ἐκ Τάραντος: see the honours given at Eretria to Hegelochos of Taras, ML 82; W. P. Wallace, *The Euboian League and its Coinage*, I n. I.

Λᾶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς: Paus. iii. 24. 6, with Frazer's n.; Leake i. 273 ff.; Bursian ii. 147. The city of Pausanias' day was ten stades from the sea, and he reports ruins of an earlier city on the summit of Mt. Asia. For Las as a naval base cf. Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F 117; Scyl. 46. It is mentioned only here in Thucydides, not in Herodotus or Xenophon; the unnamed *νεώριον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων* at i. 108. 5 is identified by Diod. xi. 84. 6, Paus. i. 27. 5, as Gytheion.

Ἀγησανδρίδας Ἀγησάνδρου: his father may be the member of the final embassy to Athens at the outbreak of war (i. 139. 3), and he may be brother to the Pasitelidas of iv. 132. 3 (whose father appears there as *'Ηγησάνδρου*: cf. C here and at 94. 1, and codd. at v. 52. 1). Nothing else is known of his antecedents; for his later career see 94. 2, 95. 7 nn. **ἄς ἔφη Θηραμένης, κ.τ.λ.:** he need not have known all the details here given, or exactly where the ships were; the ambassadors could have brought back a report that such a fleet was in preparation. But the Athenians are often well-informed of enemy movements: cf. 15. 1 n., and perhaps 39. 3; X. *HG* i. 4. 11.

3. ήν δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον: Thucydides is in no doubt about the treachery, but his vague language shows that he did not simply accept the whole charge as formulated. *οὐ πάντι* is therefore not a total negative, 'not at all' (Steup), but rather 'not simply', *πάντι* emphasizing *μόνον*; there was an element of *διαβολή*, but also some truth.

ἐκεῖνοι γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: if Thucydides' first reports came from extremist leaders who left Athens at the fall of the Four Hundred (p. 253 above, 89. 3, 92. 2 nn.), he could have had full information about the negotiations and opportunity to assess the temper of those who conducted them.

(a) Phrynicos' comments (48. 5–7) on the plan to set up oligarchies in the allied cities show that the conspirators then hoped to retain the empire, expecting that these oligarchies would prove loyal to the Athenian oligarchy. Here it is firmly stated that even the extremist oligarchs wished to keep the empire, and we can fairly infer that no substantial part of the Athenian upper class favoured the allies to the point of actually wishing to give them their independence. The evidence on which the contrary opinion has been founded is illusory*.

(b) If this was written soon after 411, it is interesting to find ships and walls already prominent as counters in the negotiation: cf. at the end of the war X. HG ii. 2. 11, 15, 20; Lys. xiii. 8–9, xii. 68. We need not take this as hindsight, for these points were likely to come up at any time after the Sicilian disaster when the Athenians were negotiating from weakness, and Thucydides could have learnt about these matters from the Spartan side as well as from Athenian exiles.

(c) At 90. 2 the Athenian envoys were instructed to accept any settlement ὅπωσοῦν ἀνεκτός, and 91. 3 shows that that threshold was extremely low, raising the question why the Spartans did not give the Four Hundred more open encouragement. They cannot have hoped for more abject capitulation than is indicated at the end of this sentence, but they may have doubted the capacity of the Four Hundred to deliver the city openly, and publication of severe terms would have inflamed the opposition in Athens. It was thus best to stall the open negotiations and make a secret pact, as Thucydides by now (92. 1) clearly believes they had.

πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων: the subject (*ἐκεῖνοι*) is the extremist faction accused by Theramenes, who would be in the most immediate danger from a counter-revolution, though the Theramenists would also be at risk under full democracy. So not 'before' or 'rather than' the rest (cf. e.g. v. 93, 100), but 'more surely than': the main function of the phrase is to add emphasis.

καὶ ὅπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν: once the Spartans had been admitted there could be no question of restoring democracy, or of any but an oligarchic regime. This phrase therefore refers not to the constitution but to the condition of the city: they did not care how much Athens was weakened and humiliated so long as they saved their skins.

92.1. καὶ πυλίδας ἔχον καὶ ἐσόδους καὶ ἐπεσαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων: this is curiously inflated, for a gate must be an entrance and entrance through a wall must be by some kind of gate; and a 'means of introducing the enemy' (this sense of *ἐπεσαγωγή* occurs only here) must involve entrances. The redundancy is less if we follow C in omitting *καὶ* after *ἐσόδους*, but C also omits the necessary *καὶ* before *ἐσόδους*: the reading of *Π¹* cannot be determined from the length of the gap.

Goodhart claimed that *τεῖχος* means the whole fortification, so that the gates, etc. might be in the old wall to the north-west, but as the sentence runs the reference is clearly to the wall they are now building. In that case (cf. 90. 4 n.) the gates are not to admit the enemy to Eētioneia, but to let them through to the Peiraieus and the Long Walls. But Thucydides may also have in mind the possibility of admitting troops by land through the old wall: cf. 90. 3 *καὶ πεζῷ*.

2. κατ’ ὀλίγους τε καὶ κρύφα: 91. 1 *διεθρόει* shows that Theramenes had spoken often and openly enough, but that must have been within the Four Hundred. We now begin to consider those outside that body (*τῶν ἔξωθεν* below).

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος, κ.τ.λ.: for the murder of Phrynicos see Lys. xiii. 70–2; Lyc. *Leocr.* 112; Plu. *Alc.* 25. 14; ML 85 with comment.

Lysias attributes the plot to Thrasyboulos of Kalydon and Apollodoros of Megara; the actual blow was struck by Thrasyboulos, and in the confusion both escaped. The speech was delivered ‘many years later’ (§ 56) than the alleged crime of Agoratos in 404, but must belong to the early years of the fourth century, when memory of Phrynicos’ murder, and also of the ensuing controversy (below), was reasonably fresh. Many years later still, Lykourgos told a story recklessly different from those of Thucydides and Lysias, but still named Apollodoros and Thrasyboulos (in that order). The dissentient is Plutarch, who in this area of *Alc.* relies heavily on Thucydides, and appends to his account of the transaction of 50–1 above a brief forward reference to the murder, attributing it to Hermon, one of the *περίπολοι*; this must be confusion with the Hermon of § 5 below, who still commanded the *περίπολοι* at Mounychia after the murder and therefore cannot have been implicated.

ML 85 shows that there was prolonged controversy over the rewards to be given to the murderers. It is dated to the spring of 409, some year and a half after the murder, but it refers (17–18) to earlier decrees for Thrasyboulos. The main decree adds to these; a first amendment gives him Athenian citizenship (15–17), and provides honours for several others (as metics), including Agoratos (25–34); a second amendment (38–47) orders an enquiry into bribery in connection with a decree for Apollodoros. The matter did not end there, for Lys. vii. 4 refers to a plot of ground once owned by Peisandros, given to Apollodoros the Megarian as a reward and sold by him shortly before the time of the Thirty; and Lysias xiii and Lykourgos attest his standing later as second murderer. Lysias (72) produces a decree and asks the jurors to note that it does not make Agoratos an Athenian, *ἄσπερ Θρασύβουλον καὶ Απολλόδωρον*; then, slipping into the plural, he says that ‘they’ gave money to the proposer and got themselves inscribed as *εὑεργέται*. ML 85 orders that Agoratos and others be inscribed as *εὑεργέται*, and grants

citizenship to Thrasyboulos. With this combination, the decree produced by Lysias can hardly be totally distinct from ML 85, though this does not grant citizenship to Apollodorus but treats his claim as spurious. Roehl removed the contradiction by deleting *καὶ Απολλόδωρον* (twice): more probably Lysias either combined ML 85 with a later decree which did give Apollodorus citizenship or, knowing that he was later reinstated, simply forgot that ML 85 was not the relevant document. At the end of § 72 he again appeals to a decree, *τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα*, which Auger emended to *τὸ αὐτό*, but Lysias' case in this section would be improved if he could refer to a later decree which positively incriminated Agoratos. This was a murky and prolonged affair, and we cannot be sure that the Athenians came in the end to the right answer; but it is to be noted that Thrasyboulos, certainly a foreigner, received the earliest and the most substantial rewards, and that there is no suggestion that his claims were ever challenged.

Thucydides gives no names, but says the actual murderer was one of the *περίπολοι*. For these see iv. 67. 2.n., and add Ar. *Av.* 1360–71, discussed by H. D. Westlake in *CR N.S.* iv (1954), 90–4. The belief that foreigners were employed in this service at this date rests wholly on the assumption that Thrasyboulos was a *περίπολος* (Busolt–Swoboda 1195 n. 2; Westlake 93 n. 2; Gomme was more cautious); the more natural assumption is that they were citizens, and since Thucydides takes the trouble to say that the accomplice was an Argive, he almost certainly thought that the *περίπολος* was an Athenian. There is no trace elsewhere of the Argive accomplice, who unlike Lysias' Megarian Apollodorus was captured, and what he then said under torture is a substantial element in Thucydides' story; it is not easy simply to discard him, and it may be that he was later killed (or somehow discredited) so that Lysias and the rest disregarded him (Valeton, *Hermes* xlivi [1908], 485).

The main discrepancy can be neatly resolved by the hypothesis that Thucydides' informant left Athens at the fall of the Four Hundred. Down to that time the murderer remained hidden, or escaped abroad; the belief that he was one of the *περίπολοι* could well be a contemporary rumour, encouraged by what the Argive revealed about meetings at the house of the *περιπόλαρχος*. [Plu.] 834 b shows that the posthumous decrees about Phrynicos were passed very early in the rule of the Five Thousand: by that time it was safe and profitable for Thrasyboulos to reveal himself, but by that time Thucydides' informant had left Athens, and at the time he gave the story to Thucydides he had not heard this sequel. When Thucydides returned to Athens, he could sift the whole controversy, and writing then he could hardly have described the episode as he does here; he should indeed have heard further news of the matter long before his

return, and this looks to be a case where he wrote up his report very soon after the event.

Apollodoros remains something of a mystery. Thrasybulos must have known the truth about his claims, and he was surely a credible witness; but doubts about Apollodoros do not affect the issue here discussed.

ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ; **ἀγορὰ πλήθουσα** is used to mark the time of day even when no actual *agora* is in question (e.g. Hdt. iv. 181. 3; X. An. ii. 1. 7), so *πληθούσῃ* need mean no more than that Phrynicos was killed in the forenoon. But Thucydides was surely also attending to the fact that it was crowded when the murder took place, and the murderer nevertheless escaped.

οὐδενὸς δύομα - - - εἶπεν; if Thucydides' informant was one of the oligarchic leaders, near enough to the centre of power to know the facts of an inquiry which can hardly have been held in public, we can trust this report (see above).

ἔς τοῦ περιπολάρχου: the commander of the whole force, whereas Hermon (§ 5) commanded only the contingent at Mounychia.

οὐδενός - - - **νεωτέρου:** no arrest of the *περιπόλαρχος* or others, and no steps against the openly declared opposition of Theramenes, a clear sign that the extremists were losing confidence and control. *αὐτοῦ* is neuter, the affair in general, or the Argive's information.

3. **ἀπὸ τῆς Λᾶς;** 91. 2.

πάλιν **ἐν Ἐπιδαύρῳ ὄρμεῖν:** presumably what they actually did, not what Theramenes thought it would be unreasonable for them to do. In that case the movements of this fleet are incompletely reported, as it next appears (94. 1) from the direction of Megara. It is surprising that the raid on Aigina did not provoke more direct reaction, especially as the initial movement would have looked like a threat to the Peiraieus; one would have expected at least argument about defence measures.

4. **τὴν ἔαυτοῦ φυλήν:** the contingent from his own tribe, whose regiment Aristokrates as taxiarch commanded. These were no doubt troops on whom he could personally rely, though they were not the only hoplites present; but it is not clear that Aristokrates himself took an active part, and in § 10 and throughout 93 *οἱ ὄπλιται* are the subject, not any named individual. Cf. also § 5, **τῶν ὄπλιτῶν τὸ στίφος.** **Ἀλεξικλέα:** known only from this passage and 98. 1, and the doubtful reflection in Lyc. *Leocr.* 115.

ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας: Steup took this temporally, since the establishment of the Four Hundred at 70. 1, when at least some new generals were presumably appointed. There is little point in noting that here: Goodhart compared 75. 2 and saw a reference to his political commitment, for which see the next phrase and 98. 1.

πρὸς τοὺς ἐταίρους τετραμένον: **ἐπέρους CGT¹**; **τεταγμένον BM** (the

word falls in a gap in *Π¹*). For the part played by the *έταιροι* see 54. 4 with n., 65. 2: if this reading is correct, it gives the clearest implication in Thucydides that *έταιρεῖαι* were a distinctively extremist institution. *έτέρους* would have to mean the faction opposed to that of Aristokrates and the hoplites, and though this is not impossible it is less likely. *μάλιστα τετραμμένον* should mean 'most inclined to' the conspirators and their cause: *τεταγμένον* is less easy.

5. "Ερων: probably the ἄρχοντι ἐς Πύλον who was paid 6T in Pryt. III of 410/09 (ML 84. 10). Nothing else is known of him, but as a commander of *περίπολοι* he is of course a likely attendant at the house of the *περιπόλαρχος* (§ 2).

τὸ στῖφος: *πλῆθος* B, which might well have replaced the rarer word, whereas the reverse is improbable. Steup makes them the main body of hoplites as opposed to those engaged on the wall; but Thucydides is clearly talking of what happened on the spot, and his point is that this was a revolt of the rank and file, not only of officers and political leaders.

6. *πλὴν ὅσοις μὴ βουλομένοις ταῦτ' ἦν*: as the text stands *ταῦτα* must refer to what follows, taking arms or threatening Theramenes, i.e. 'they were ready to . . ., except for those who were opposed' (for the political sense of *βούλοσθαι* see vi. 74. 1 n.); and this, though logically feeble, is a possible way of saying 'though there were some who did not agree'. *Σ^{Myc2} πλὴν ὅσοι ἐβούλοντο δλιγαρχεῖσθαι*, unhelpful as it is, seems to paraphrase a text containing *πλὴν*. But the word seems to have been omitted in *Π¹*, and Steup and others had already proposed to excise it. In that case *ταῦτα* refers to what precedes, the line taken by the hoplites, i.e. 'those who were opposed to this were ready to . . .', which is some improvement.

ἐς τὰ ὄπλα λέναι: *τὰ ὄπλα* could be the place where the arms were (cf. 69. 1 with n.); Arnold thought they wanted to arm themselves, Goodhart and Steup that they wished to secure control of these arms. But it is not certain that *ἐς* compels us to think of a place (Krtüger): the phrase may refer to the readiness to fight demonstrated in §§ 7–8. *ἀπολογούμενος*: this indicates that Theramenes was in a minority among the Four Hundred, and could not declare himself openly till he was out among troops who supported his line.

παραλαβών: this can hardly have been simply his own decision, and *παραλαβών* presumably amounts to 'persuaded them to appoint as his colleague'. But it is curious that the majority allowed him to take a sympathetic colleague, with no safeguard but Aristarchos and his cavalrymen, who proved insufficient. With *ξυναφαιρησόμενος* supply *Ἄλεξικλέα*.

7. *δῖ τε γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει, κ.τ.λ.*: edd. have noted the close verbal parallels with ii. 94. 1.

8. *Θουκυδίδου τοῦ Φαρσαλίου*: otherwise mentioned only in the lists

of Thucydides' homonyms, Marcell. 28, *S Ar. Ach.* 703, *Ve.* 947, for which see Jacoby on Androton, *FGrH* 324 F 37, 57, and Philochoros, 328 F 120. Marcellinus cites Polemon ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀκροπόλεως, φάσκων αὐτὸν εἶναι πατρὸς Μένωνος, who could be the Menon of ii. 22. 3, and he in his turn grandson to the Menon of Pharsalos who helped Kimon against Eion (D. xxiii. 199); the Menon of Plato and Xenophon was the son of Alexidemos (*Pl. Men.* 76 e), but Thouskydides could be his uncle. These connections would explain the weight he carries at Athens; and his anxiety to prevent an Athenian collapse may support the suggestion of J. S. Morrison, *CQ* xxxvi (1942), 66, 74, that he had come to Athens to seek support for the anti-Spartan party in Pharsalos, whose position had been weakened by Agis' thrust to the north late in 413 (3. 1).

ἔφεδρεύοντων ἔγγυς τῶν πολεμίων: Stahl and Steup prefer *ἔτι* (ABEF) to *ἔγγυς* (cett.); and it makes little practical difference whether he told them to wait till the enemy were no longer at Epidauros, or till they were not so close. There is no force in Steup's argument that it is the continuance of the threat that needs emphasis here; distance is just as relevant, in that Agesandridas could intervene before they had time to recover and organise defence.

9. **ὅσον καὶ ἀπὸ βοῆς ἔνεκα - - - τῷ ἀληθεῖ:** the first phrase seems to be colloquial, a redundant combination of *ὅσον ἀπὸ βοῆς* and *βοῆς ἔνεκα*, the latter a development along the line of *ἐμοῦ γ' ἔνεκα*, 'as far as I am concerned'. At X. *HG* ii. 4. 31 it is not even attached to a verb of speaking, and the meaning of the idiom is clearly that the action was done only for show. The Greek text would be clearer without the comma after *ἔνεκα*. *ΣΜνε₂* ἀπὸ βοῆς καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῶς, with Valla's *re vera*, support *τῷ ἀληθεῖ* (recc.). Those who retain codd. *τῷ πλήθει* do so mainly on the ground that *ἐναντίοι* needs a complement (as 90. 1 *ἐναντίοις τῷ δήμῳ*, of this same Aristarchos); but in the context there can be no doubt whom the *ἐναντίοι* oppose, and there is not much weight to the further argument that Thucydides elsewhere uses *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* and *τῷ ἀληθέᾳ* but not *τῷ ἀληθεῖ*. *ἔχαλέπαινον* by itself does not enough bring out the opposition to Theramenes' merely pretended anger.

10. **ὅμοσε τε ἔχώρουν - - - τῷ ἔργῳ:** this can hardly mean less than that they showed a disposition to fight. The *ἔργον* is not the task to which they later address themselves, destruction of the wall (as § 11 *ἐπὶ τῷ ἔργον*), but resistance to the attempt to repress them; and this is *ἔργον* even if they next ask a question rather than start fighting.
ἀναβάντες: presumably on to the wall itself, to begin destruction from the top; the word tells us nothing of the location of the wall (90. 4 n.).

11. **ἐπέκρυπτον γὰρ ὅμως, κ.τ.λ.:** the subject is still the corporate and anonymous hoplites of § 10, not leaders like Theramenes and Aristokrates who knew that the Five Thousand did not yet exist. See

§ 4 n. for the question how active a part Aristokrates took; and § 10 for Theramenes' conspicuous deference to the hoplites. The *παράκλησις* above is addressed by these hoplites to the many men from the Peiraieus of § 10. This passage gives no indication whether Thucydides, at the time of writing it, was still as sceptical of the sincerity of most of the Theramenists as when he wrote 89. 3–4. It does however strongly suggest that the hoplites wanted a return to outright democracy, and this is one of the main foundations of the theory of G. E. M. de Ste. Croix (see 97. 1 n.) that the constitution of 97. 1–2 included an assembly in which all citizens could vote. But next day the hoplites were ready for compromise (93. 2–3), and sympathy with the programme of the Five Thousand may have been more widespread among them than this sentence would suggest (cf. 93. 3 n.).

οὗτε εἶναι οὗτε μὴ δύντας δῆλους εἶναι: the most certain indication that in Thucydides' view no Five Thousand had been appointed before the overthrow of the Four Hundred.

93. 1 τὸν τε Ἀλεξικέα - - - ἀφέντες: Thucydides does not explain, but from what follows it is clear that tension was very much reduced since the day before. Then (92. 7) an armed clash was expected: there might have been troops loyal to the Four Hundred (69. 3–4, the cavalry of 92. 6), but the hoplites show by their movements on this day that they now knew they had no need to fear.

τὸ πρὸς τῇ Μουνίχᾳ Διονυσιακὸν θέατρον: Judeich 451; in this period the only theatre in the Peiraieus, hence X. *HG* ii. 4. 32 *τὸ Πειραιῶν θέατρον* without qualification. The assembly met there when the Thirty were in process of establishment, Lys. xiii. 32.

ἐξεκλησίασαν: so recc., and the simplest explanation of codd. *ἐξεκλησίασαν* is that Thucydides wrote *ἐξεκλησίασαν* as if the verb were compounded from *ἐκ* and *κλησίαζω*, and the kappa was then doubled by contamination with *ἐκκλησία* itself. See LSJ *ἐκκλησίαζω* for variants in other texts.

ἐν τῷ Ἀνακείῳ: Judeich 304; Wachsmuth, *RE* i. 2032–3. The temple of the Dioskouroi (Anakes) was on the north slope of the Akropolis, below the temenos of Aglauros (Paus. i. 18. 1–2), evidently on fairly level ground since it was designated in 415 as the assembly-point for the cavalry (And. i. 45). Polyaenus (i. 21. 2) locates here the parade ordered by Peisistratos which *Aθ. π. 15. 4* places at the Theseion (not far off, cf. Paus. i. 17. 2 ff.); evidently a standard location for parades.

2. ἐπιεικῆς: not elsewhere applied by Thucydides to persons. The meaning is clearly 'reasonable', 'responsible' (iii. 9. 2 *πρόφασις ἐπιεικής* is close to this, and see Dover *GPM* 191): cf. X. *HG* i. 1. 30, from which it is no large step to its use in *Aθ. π. 28. 1* as a label for the opponents of radical democracy.

τούς τε πεντακισχιλίους, κ.τ.λ.: cf. 86. 3 with n. The principle of rotation is here clearly stated, though the method is left for future determination, which suggests that no great thought had yet been given to the plan. Alkibiades' message (86. 6) had allowed for the continuance of the Five Thousand, which will have made compromise easier; but the oligarchs do not concede his demand that the Five Hundred be restored.

τέως δὲ τὴν πόλιν . . . ἀνώσαι: cett.; B's *τὴν δὲ πόλιν* is not nonsense, but *τέως* makes the added point that the constitutional details could wait till the enemy threat seemed less immediate (cf. 92. 8).

Thucydides has earlier treated the negotiations with Sparta as the unitary policy of the Four Hundred (70. 2, 71. 3), but in fact it is likely that there was always a middle body which wanted to continue the war while still maintaining the oligarchy (cf. 86. 7, 89. 1 nn.). The envoys of the Four Hundred were no doubt men who could represent themselves as patriots.

This use of *ἀνωθεῖν* was imitated by Dio Cassius (Iii. 17. 2), but has no clear Classical parallel. Goodhart understood it as 'a veiled threat of calling in the Lacedaemonians' if the hoplites would not compromise; but that crisis seems for the moment to be past, and this is more probably a metaphor for the effects of continued dissension which would 'push the city over' into the enemy's hands.

3. ἡπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον: i.e. than on the previous day; cf. § 1 n.
περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ: *τὸ πολιτικόν* does not occur elsewhere in Thucydides; *περὶ τῆς πάσης πολιτείας ΣΜνεζ*, which Steup understood to mean 'the whole community, the whole state'. At Hdt. vii. 103. 1 Stein understood *τὸ πολιτικόν* as 'the constitution' and Powell translates 'the polity'; but there the phrase distinguishes the general mass of the Spartans from Demaratos their king, and this is not far from Xenophon's occasional use of the adjective for the 'citizen army' as opposed to allies (*HG* v. 3. 25, cf. iv. 4. 19). Here it would not be impossible to suppose that the hoplites were afraid for 'the whole citizen body': the danger is a total collapse, in which Athens will cease to be a city and they will no longer be real citizens (cf. 92. 8 *ἀπολέσαι τὴν πατρίδα*). Goodhart argued that neither *πολιτικόν* nor *πολιτεία* was appropriate here and excised the word, comparing 79. 2 (cf. also vi. 40. 1): the vagueness of *τοῦ παντός* might easily provoke explanatory interpolation.

ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ: cett.; **ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου C;** and note the variations in the next sentence. The form *Διονύσιον* is not in itself unacceptable (cf. Ar. fr. 131), and should probably be retained here; see 94. 1 n.

D. xxi. 9 cites a law that the assembly should meet *ἐν Διονύσου* on the day after the Pandia to deal with business arising out of the conduct of the Dionysia, and the third-century inscription published by Meritt in *Hesp.* vii (1938), 100–2 refers to this (18–19) evidently

as a regular annual occasion. We are given no reason for the choice on this occasion: a temple might add solemnity (67. 2 n.), or perhaps with the mass of the hoplites and others it was thought that more room was needed than was available on the Pnyx (Pickard-Cambridge, *Dramatic Festivals*² 263; Kourouniotes and Thompson, *Hesp.* i [1932] 104*; cf. 72. 1 n.).

περὶ δρονοίας: the only basis for negotiation so far given is that of § 2, nomination of the Five Thousand and rotating membership of the Four Hundred, and it is clear that that was not rejected out of hand. The Four Hundred could hardly settle for less if they were to save their lives and citizenship, and if the hoplites were ready to do any kind of deal they must have accepted this much.

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94.1. ἡ [ἐν Διονύσου] ἐκκλησία: Stahl condemned all four words on the ground that the right subject for ἐπῆλθεν is ἡ ἡμέρα, understood from 93. 3, not ἐκκλησία, which GM συνῆλθεν would suit better. i. 126. 5, vi. 57. 1, show this to be an imaginary difficulty: so Steup and others, who nevertheless bracket ἐν Διονύσου as unnecessary repetition. It might also be objected that ἡ ἐν Διονύσου ἐκκλησία appears to be the title of the regular meeting referred to in 93. 3 n. If ἐν τῷ Διονύσῳ is the correct reading at 93. 3, that might help to account for the variant readings here in BFM.

Thucydides does not specify the interval between the move of the hoplites to the Anakeion and the ἡμέρα ῥητῆ of 93. 3, but it can hardly have been long.

ἀπὸ τῶν Μεγάρων - - παραπλεῖν: nothing has been said of a movement from Epidaurus (92. 3) to Megara.

πᾶς τις [τῶν πολλῶν ὄπλιτῶν]: πολλῶν om. C, ὄπλιτῶν om. B. Edd. variously bracket all three words (Stahl, Goodhart) or ὄπλιτῶν only (Arnold, Steup). Thucydides since 92. 4 has concentrated his attention on the hoplites, and the destruction of the *τείχισμα* was their work, but others would be interested. There is no obvious point in distinguishing 'the main body of the hoplites' (if *τῶν πολλῶν ὄπλιτῶν* is acceptable Greek for that) from some special category; there is a little more in recording the view of 'the many' as opposed to the oligarchs (Weil); but *πᾶς τις* by itself would give satisfactory sense.

2. τάχα μὲν τι, κ.τ.λ.: the only place where Thucydides used *τάχα* of past events, with indic. and no *ἄν*. It should not have been in principle harder to learn about this fleet than about the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia, either from Agesandridas who probably survived (X. *HG* i. 3. 17) the disaster of his fleet at Athos (Diod. xiii. 41. 1–3), or from others, but Thucydides has not yet done this. Here as at 64. 5 he reckons up probabilities on the basis of what he has so far gathered.
3. οἱ δ' αὖ Αθηναῖοι: αὖ om. B, and Bekker proposed δ' *οὐν* on the

ground that this is resumption after a parenthesis, not a contrast of statements about the Athenians and about Agesandridas.

ώς τοῦ ἴδιου πόλεμου, κ.τ.λ.: *περιαιρέον τὸν ἡ σύνδεσμον ΣΓΜνεζ*, and there is no way round this, though the sentence is still awkward from the accumulation of genitives and the unusual use of *ἴδιος πόλεμος* to refer to internal *stasis*—‘a war from the enemy, greater than their private (war), was not distant but close upon the harbour’. Attempts to take *ἴδιος πόλεμος* differently, so that *ἡ* might stand (Ullrich, Krüger) produce impossibly artificial results (see Steup): the *ἡ* was presumably interpolated by someone who found the phrase confusing (for the interpolation of *ἡ* cf. vi. 40. 1.n.).

παρούσας: the *ἄλλας* which follow were also ‘present’, so Krüger altered this to *όρμούσας*; but *παρούσας* may be understood as ‘present and ready’.

95.1 Θορικοῦ: Frazer, *Paus.* ii. 407–11, v. 522–6; W. Wrede, *RE* vi. A. 338–40; on the east coast, just north of Laureion, some six miles beyond Sounion. Thorikos with its two harbours was a port of importance in prehistoric times; Demeter landed here from Crete (*h. Hom. Dem.* 126), and Philochoros (*FGrH* 328 F 94 = *Str. ix. 1. 20*, 397) listed it among the twelve cities of Kekrops. It was a coastal deme of Akamantis, not prominent in the historical period but well known (cf. *Hdt. iv. 99. 4*); the Athenians fortified it in 409 (X. *HG i. 2. 1*).

Πρασιῶν: Frazer, *Paus.* ii. 403–5; Ernst Meyer, *RE* xxii. 1695–6; on the southern shore of the bay of Pórtο Ráfti. Prasai was also important in the prehistoric period, and had a special connexion with Delos (*Paus. i. 31. 2*); it was a coastal deme of Pandionis. The most likely harbour between Thorikos and Prasai is that of Dhaskaleió.

Ὦρωπόν: in Boeotian hands since the end of winter (60. 1).

2. ἀξυγκροτήτοις πληρώμασιν: cf. X. *HG vi. 2. 12*, Plb. i. 61. 3–4, Polyae. iii. 11. 7. Athens had a large pool of experienced sailors (cf. e.g. [X.] *Aθ. π. 1. 19–20*, which does not suggest that they received regular training for war); but individual crews had still to learn to work together, as those of Iphikrates on his way to Kerkyra (X. *HG vi. 2. 27–32*). Cf. Th. vii. 14. 1 with n. Here there was no time for that. (*Εὗβου γάρ · · · πάντα ἦν*): see ii. 14. 1, vii. 28. 1 with n.)

Θυμοχάρη στρατηγόν: known only from this occasion and his further defeat shortly after (X. *HG i. 1. 1*), but it is highly probable that he belonged to the prominent family from Sphettos (Davies 13964) whose record of military office begins for us with Phaidros son of Kallias (general in 347/6) and continues through his son Thymochares to his grandson, another Phaidros, who held many offices in the first quarter of the third century.

Unless Thymochares was elected *ad hoc* by the same body which

sent him to Eretria, which is not impossible, *στρατηγόν* means that he was a general of the Four Hundred, surviving in this emergency either because of military talent or as being distinguishable from the extremist oligarchs. The miserable epitome which Diodoros gives (twice over, at xiii. 34. 2–3 and 36. 3–4, cf. pp. 208–9 above) speaks of the oligarchs sending out forty ships to Oropos, where the enemy triremes were, under two unnamed generals who quarrelled and lost a badly prepared battle, in which 22 ships were taken but they got the rest safe back to Eretria. The figure for the losses is that of Thucydides (§ 7), and the final reference to Eretria might be a mistaken echo of the fort *ἐν τῇ Ἐρετρίᾳ* of § 6; but the *stasis* between the two generals, prominent in both Diodoran versions, is a fresh item not from Thucydides, and the forty ships might be not a rounding-up of Thucydides' eventual total of 36 at Eretria (§ 3) but a real discrepancy. Divergences from Thucydides in this area of Diodoros need serious attention because of the possibility that *Hell. Oxy.* started well back in this summer, going back over ground that Thucydides had covered (64. 4, 99 nn.). However, even if we accept the quarrel as fact, Thucydides may still be right about the despatch of Thymochares: Diodoros is always least reliable where he most heavily condenses, and his source may have spoken of a quarrel of Thymochares from Athens with the commander already at Eretria. Without the text of *Hell. Oxy.* we can only guess, but we should not simply disregard Diodoros.

3. *ταῖς πρότερον ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ οὖσαις*: cf. the guard duty of the Paraloi (74. 2), and Polystratos sailed out to Eretria (Lys. xx. 14), probably to something that could be described as an *ἀρχή* (*ibid.* 6, see p. 202 above); but the details were evidently unknown to Thucydides, who gives only the total of ships that actually fought. *ἐς Εὐβοιαν* (ABEFM) might be defended as *difficilior lectio*, comparing the unemended text of Hdt. i. 21. 1 (and cf. Th. vii. 57. 1 n.), but it is unsuitable here, where ships already present are contrasted with new arrivals.

ἔξηκοντα σταδίους: so also Strabo (ix. 2. 6, 403). The distance (10·5 km) implies a stade of 175 m (see vol. iv, pp. 467–8); but accurate measurement over water would be hard, and this is declared to be an approximation (*μάλιστα*).

4. *ἐπλήρουν*: in view of what actually happened this is an exceptionally 'conative' use of the verb, and amounts to 'gave orders to man'.

τοὺς στρατιώτας: often demonstrably land soldiers, but the term fits any member of a *στρατός* (cf. vi. 24. 3 n.). 84. 3, with *οἰα δὴ ναῦται* applied to *τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν*, shows that the latter means ships' crews; LSJ's 'soldiers serving on ship-board' is wrong for ii. 88–89. 1.

(*οὐδὲν γάρ . . . τῶν Ἐρετριῶν*): no time need be wasted on Steup's idea

that οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπωλεῖτο should be excised, as contradicted by the men's purchases at the end of the town; this refers to the regular *agora*. But the sentence does not run easily. The words cited have to be treated as a parenthesis, since ἀλλ' ἐκ . . . οἰκιῶν depends on ἐπιστιζόμενοι; but ὅπως . . . ἀνάγεσθαι expounds the Eretrians' plan, and it is awkward to have their *πρόνοια* taken out of the main flow of the sentence. A more coherent structure would result if (as Dover suggests) we read ἀλλ' ⟨ἢ⟩ ἐκ, punctuating with a comma after *eīvai*, a colon after ἐπιστιζόμενοι, no brackets, and no comma after 'Ερετριῶν: 'for by the Eretrians' contrivance nothing was sold except from the houses at the end of the town, in order that . . .', with the result that the *ὅπως*-clause is easily connected with the *πρόνοια*.

At 5. 1, 91. 2, undifferentiated Euboeans negotiate with the Spartan authorities, but at 60. 1 it is Eretrians who help the Boeotians at Oropos, ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἀπόστασιν τῆς Εὐβοίας, and at 60. 2 the envoys to Rhodes are again Eretrians. Here they take an active part in organizing the Athenian defeat, whereas Chalkis even after the battle still for the moment hangs back (§ 6). This strongly confirms the belief (W. P. Wallace, *The Euboian League and its Coinage* 4) that Eretria was the moving spirit behind the Euboean League founded at this juncture. It is known to us only from its coins, which begin with two separate issues of didrachms whose Aiginetan standard, unique for Euboea, testifies to Peloponnesian influence. Wallace (5-7) connects the first series with fighting round Eretria in 411 and perhaps in 410/09 (ML 84. 16-18), and with the construction in autumn 411 of a causeway across the Euripos (Diod. xiii. 47. 3, ascribed to 'Chalkis and almost all the other inhabitants of Euboea'); the second with a League squadron sent to assist Lysandros in 405/4 (ML 95g; Paus. x. 9. 10).

σχολὴ πληρουμένων: sc. τῶν νεῶν, a bold ellipse.

σημείον δέ -- ἥρθη: by the Eretrians. Cf. Lysandros' stratagem at Aigosopotamoi as Xenophon tells it (*HG* ii. 1. 27: little of the alternative version shows through in Diod. xiii. 106. 1-2, but enough to show that it was substantially different).

5. διὰ τοιαύτης δὴ παρασκευῆς: the Eretrian stratagem has been fully expounded, and a reference back to it (διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ παρασκευήν ACEF) would not be inappropriate; but that calls for a verb reflecting the Athenians' disorder, not the neutral ἀναγαγόμενοι. Better then the gen., referring to the Athenians' (inadequate) state of preparation (cf. Diod. xiii. 36. 4 ἀπαράσκενοι): edd. compare iv. 8. 8 δὶς ὀλίγης παρασκευῆς.
6. τὸ τείχισμα τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἐρετρίᾳ: τείχισμα B, ἐπιτείχισμα cett., but the latter should be a fort built for offence in or near enemy territory, whereas the primary purpose of this must have been defensive. Classen took it to be within the city: the alternative, 'in the territory of Eretria', is certainly possible (16. 3 n.), and meets the argument of

Steup that the fort should lie in a direction different from *πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἐρετριῶν* (cf. also *ATL* iii. 295 n. 100). Wallace (§ 4 n.) 5 n. 13 argues for 'in the city', but he himself observes that in Eretrian inscriptions η̄ 'Ἐρετρία' regularly means the whole territory, and he seems not to have considered Steup's argument. His note was mainly concerned with ML 84. 16–18, the payment on Pryt. VI. 11 of 410/09 (i.e. at the beginning of 409) of 3740 dr. 1½ ob. *στρατεγῷ έχς Ἐρετρίας*: *Εὐκλειδεῖ ἀνομολόγημα*. For *ἀνομολόγημα* see *ATL* iii. 365–6, ML p. 259: it appears to mean money collected and spent in the field, but reported to Athens and included in the account as if it had been a loan from Athena. έχς 'Ἐρετρίας' suggests that Eukleides was stationed at Eretria or in its territory, rather than that he commanded a fresh expedition to Eretria, for which this would be a surprisingly small sum; more probably the Athenians maintained their hold on the fort here mentioned, and this money, wherever it was collected, is for its maintenance.

ὅσαι ές Χαλκίδα ἀφίκνονται τῶν νεῶν: these appear to be the only ships to survive, so fourteen in all, the 36 of § 3 minus the 22 of § 7. Chalkis evidently did not immediately join the revolt, but did so soon after (§ 7). The ships, cut off from direct return home, might retreat to Oreos and make their way from there.

7. *Εὗβοιάν [τε] ἄπασαν, κ.τ.λ.:* τε *Εὔβοιαν* M, producing a still less manageable sentence. A lacuna after *ἀποστήσαντες* (Classen, Stahl) containing another indic. verb (e.g. ξέχον), or alteration of *ἀποστήσαντες* to *ἀπέστησαν* (Widmann), leaves an awkward balance between the elements joined by τε --- καὶ, and most edd. prefer to excise τε, leaving the clear sense that besides causing the revolt they took necessary measures for defence etc.; we may note that Agesandridas' fleet was still in Euboea in 107. 2. (For the question whether καὶ --- τε can mean 'and also' in Thucydides, see Denniston 535–6, 588.)

Wallace (§ 4 n.) 5–7 argues that Karystos, though liberated, did not at this stage join the Euboean League, mainly on grounds of its position and policy. But his argument from the monument for Aigospotamoi at Delphi, that 'there is no Chalcidian... among these generals', though true for the text of Paus. x. 9. 10, is now involved in an epigraphic puzzle. ML 95j [*Xa*]λκιδεύ[*s*] was inscribed as a guide on the top of the block, not to be seen by spectators; but Pausanias would have seen the inscription on the side, of which we have the last line *Kορίνθιος*, but the loss of the previous lines prevents us from knowing which of Pausanias' two Corinthians this is, if either.

πλὴν Ὄρεοῦ: Thucydides presumes that his readers know that this represents Hestiaia (Theopompos *FGrH* 115 F 387 = Str. x. 1. 3, 445), though the Athenian cleruchs settled there after the Euboean Revolt of 446 (i. 114.3, with n.) have been called '*Ἐστιαιῆς*' as recently as vii. 57. 2 and the name Oreos has not been mentioned at all.

96.1. ἥλθε τὰ - - - γεγενημένα: ἥλθε in 'the sense 'news arrived of' is unusual; Steup compared D. iii. 5 ἥλθε γὰρ ἀμφότερα.

2. ἄλλων τε νεῶν: the twenty ships of 97. 1 are disregarded, and they could not take on the victorious Peloponnesian fleet of 42 in the open. Εξ ἡς - - - ὠφελοῦντο: cf. 95. 2.

3. μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς - - - ἐθορύβει, εἰ - - -: cf. vii. 28. 3. μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐπίεζεν ὅτι - - -.

δι' ἔγγυτάτου: topographically the nearest, so the most immediate threat; a move to the Hellespont (107. 2) to help cut off Athens' supplies would in the longer run be as formidable, but would allow time for reconciliation with the Samos fleet, or other counter-measures.

εὐθὺν σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ: εὐθύς codd., the -s erased in B. Stahl objected to Lobeck's εὐθύ that it is used with places (e.g. 88 *ad fin.*) but not with persons, but cf. Ar. *Pax* 68, 77 (Goodhart). Steup stood out for εὐθύς, on the ground that immediacy in time was the essence of the threat; σφῶν has then to be taken closely with τὸν Πειραιᾶ, for which Arnold compared i. 114. 2 τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσίνα. But σφῶν (*pace* Arnold) is not equivalent to τῆς Ἀττικῆς, and the emphasis given to it is excessive (Goodhart). 'Sail straight for them, against the Peiraieus which was empty of ships' is not in Thucydides' sparest style, especially since he has made the point about the ships already, but it will pass.

ἐνόμιζον: the subject is changed without notice from the Peloponnesians (*τολμήσουσι*) to the Athenians, and back (§ 4 ἦσαν), but Thucydides' changes of subject can cause more confusion than this (cf. v. 59. 2).

4. καὶ ἡ διέστησαν ἄν, κ.τ.λ.: καὶ διέστησαν ἄν - - -, εἰ ἐποιόρκουν C; καὶ ἡ διέστησαν ἄν - - - ἐφορμοῦντες, ἡ (ἢ εἰ Bekker) ἐποιόρκουν cett. C's text is simple and translatable, but it is not clear why ἡ - - - ἡ or ἐφορμοῦντες should have been intruded. That of cett., without Bekker's εἰ, sets up a weak and unattractive antithesis. Steup objected to Bekker's text that there is still no reason to contrast the διέστησαν and ἡνάγκασαν clauses, so he inserted ⟨γ⟩ after διέστησαν and excised ἐποιόρκουν μένοντες as a gloss, remarking that there is no substantial difference between ἐφορμεῖν and πολιορκεῖν. This was superficial. Their mere appearance off the Peiraieus (*ἐφορμοῦντες*) might have the effect of intensifying division in Athens to the point where they could occupy the city (cf. 94. 2) and end the war directly; but it might cause the Athenians to drop their internal quarrels (cf. 92. 8, 93, 94. 3) and unite in resistance, in which case there would be nothing for it but a siege (*ἐποιόρκουν μένοντες*), which would take longer but would soon draw the fleet away from Ionia and deliver the empire into the hands of the Peloponnesians. Bekker's εἰ gives the sentence more point and sets out the alternatives clearly.

τὰ μέχρι Εύβοίας: *Bouartias* B, with *Eύβοίας* as a marginal alternative. Arnold accounted for *Bouartias* as a reminiscence of 43. 3 **τὰ μέχρι Bouartῶν**, which is far too remote; Stahl supposed it came from a text in which *Eύβοίας* had lost its first syllable; no one but Bekker has accepted it, and however we reckon it would be an odd limit to put on the Athenian empire. Euboea is not much more attractive. As many have noted, *καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν - - - πᾶσα* suggests that the preceding enumeration is not complete; but if *μέχρι* means 'up to and including' that covers everything up to the east coast of Attica itself and already adequately defines the Athenian empire, whereas if it means 'up to but short of' it is odd to exclude Euboea which the Peloponnesians have just acquired. The enumeration is fully sufficient without adding this limit, and many edd. have excised the phrase, but the trouble then is to explain how it came into the text: Steup's suggestion (e.g.) is not very convincing, that someone wished to define in the margin how far the empire did extend.

5. καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς: cf. Thucydides' explicit judgement at ii. 94. 1 on the attempt on the Peiraieus late in 429; the conduct of Alkidas at iii. 29–33 and 79. 3 is implicitly condemned (but see Gomme's n. to 79. 3), and there are other less clear instances.

οἱ μὲν ὀξεῖς, - - - οἱ δὲ ἄτολμοι: the theme more extensively developed by the Corinthians at i. 70. The subject of *ἀφέλουν* must be the Spartans: these pairs then stand outside the formal construction, as parentheses to illustrate *διάφοροι* (Goodhart compared *οὐδὲ έκείνοι ἐπ' ἔκείνους* at 43. 1).

μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι, κ.τ.λ.: vii. 55. 2, which also uses the word *ὁμοιότροποι*, has a different point, that against a democracy Athens could not use the weapon of promising political change (see n. there); a limited point, anticipated briefly by Nikias at vi. 20. 2, valid enough but Thucydides does not make much of it. *ἄριστα καὶ προσεπολέμησαν* is much more dubious. The Syracusans were not indeed deficient in *τόλμα*, as Thucydides stresses at vi. 69. 1, but down to the end of vi they were consistently unsuccessful in the field, and at vi. 103. 3–4 they were by Thucydides' account near to negotiating surrender. The tide turned with the arrival of Gylippos from Sparta, conspicuously not *ὁμοιότροπος* with Athens, and then the Syracusans showed qualities of zest and resilience like those attributed to Athens: cf. the analysis of their feelings at vii. 56, and Thucydides may also have in mind the spirit they show in viii (not only Hermokrates, cf. 84. 2). It would be an over-simplification to confine the comparison to their political constitutions, even at vii. 55. 2 where this is the main point: Thucydides did not think that the democratic system had been an unmixed advantage to Athens in her attempt on Sicily (cf. ii. 65. 11, and the comment of W. E. Thompson in *Hist. xx* [1971], 141–51), nor can one suppose that he regarded the demagogue Athenagoras as an

asset to Syracuse. The comparison must take in other *τρόποι* to make this passage at all digestible, and it might have been easier if Thucydides had not been quite so concise.

97. 1. ναῦς τε εἴκοσιν: possibly including the fourteen survivors from the battle off Eretria (cf. 95. 6 n.); not enough to engage a fresh battle, but they might help to block Peloponnesian entry into the harbour. **εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον:** the combination *τότε πρῶτον* rather awkwardly suggests that this was the first time they had ever met on the Pnyx; but Thucydides knew so well what he tells us in the next clause, that this was the normal place of meeting, that it probably did not occur to him that it could be read in this way. The point is probably that this was the first time an assembly of any kind had met since the oligarchs' seizure of power.

Ἐς τὴν Πύκνα - - -, οὐπερ - - εἰώθεσαν: not Kolonus (67. 2) nor the Dionysion (93. 3), but the familiar Pnyx, which might suggest that this was to be an assembly of the pre-revolutionary demos. See further next n.; for the Pnyx down to 404, Kourouniotes and Thompson, *Hesp. i.* (1932), 96–113. ξυνέλεγον and **ἐς τὴν Πύκνα** favour Herwerden's *οἶπερ*, which would be easily corrupted to *οὐπερ*.

τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδούναι: this has usually been understood to mean that the franchise was to be restricted to this body (whatever its actual number), but G. E. M. de Ste. Croix in an ingenious and forcefully argued article (*Hist.* v. [1956], 1–23) maintains that there was no such limitation as regards assembly or lawcourts, but that the Council was limited to the upper classes, possibly with some added powers. This seems on its way to becoming an established view (but see P. J. Rhodes, *JHS* xcii [1972], 115–27), and I must set out my reasons for not accepting it.

I. μετρία ξύγκρασις. Considerable stress is laid (6–8) on this phrase from § 2, which Ste. C. takes to represent the constitution of the Five Thousand 'as a reasonable mixture, a fair blend, of the interests of the Few and the Many' (this is clearly the right interpretation of § 2 *ἐς*: cf. ii. 37. 1); this language 'implies that the Many, like the Few, got some degree of power', and it is absurd to imagine Thucydides 'applauding as a fair "mixture" a regime which in fact gave no rights at all to the Many (or to the bulk of the Many)'. Hence Ste. C.'s solution (13, see above), in which the Many as members of the assembly can outvote the Few at any time.

The basic trouble with this is that the Many cannot be given anything less, in the way of 'power', than the vote which Ste. C. assigns to them, but to give that is to concede at once the whole theory of democracy; his constitution is not any kind of oligarchy. For their share of the 'mixture' the Few are left with a monopoly of office and the possibility of extra powers which they would not have

had under democracy, but with the prospect of losing even these privileges whenever it suited the Many to cancel them. The restriction on office does not amount to much when the line between the Few and the Many is drawn so low, in effect excluding only the *thetes*; *Aθ. π. 7. 4* shows that under the democracy *thetes* were never formally admitted to such office (cf. Rhodes 126–7, incorporating Ste. C.'s reply on this point). If there is to be any substance in the concession to the Few it must lie in their added powers, which might consist in confining to the Council decisions which under democracy would have been taken by the full assembly, and the matters thus transferred would have had to be substantial. The 'mixture' is still imperfect. It is the essence of oligarchy, not just an optional extra, that there should be a restriction on the franchise, and to deny this to the Few is just as 'unfair' to them as it would be unfair to the Many to impose a restriction.

The difficulty of finding a solution in terms of the franchise is illustrated by a passage in Aristotle's discussion of mixed constitutions. *Pol. 1294a 35* gives us three modes, *εἰοὶ δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως*, and the second is so relevant as to deserve quotation: 1294 b 2 *ἔτερος δὲ τὸ <τὸ> μέσον λαμβάνει ὃν ἐκάτεροι τάπτουσιν, οἷον ἐκκλησιάζειν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τιμήματος οὐθενὸς ἢ μικροῦ πάμπαν, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ μακροῦ τιμήματος, κοινὸν δέ γε οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέσον ἐκατέρου τίμημα τούτων*. Ste. C. notes (8 n. 33) that this use of *μίξις* is unique in Aristotle, and claims that 'he is in effect cheating'. Even if he is, the passage shows that the cheat is linguistically possible, and one might take Thucydides' *ξύγκρασις* in the same way, and suppose that he would have been prepared to use the word to describe a franchise which was too narrow for democrats but too wide for real oligarchs.

If we are here concerned at all with the franchise, this is more tractable on the oligarchic side. The demands of democracy are absolute, the full franchise or nothing: oligarchy admits of gradation. The extremists, for whom Five Thousand amounted to outright democracy (92. 11), were no longer in control and some had fled (98. 1), though others took their chance and remained, even Antiphon. Others of the Four Hundred, who survived as Antiphon did not, might have preferred a more restricted franchise. To include in the 'few' *ὅποσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται* does not indeed make the Five Thousand a democracy, even a modified one, but it does remove their regime very far from what a Greek of that time would ordinarily understand by oligarchy, and here we clearly stand on the middle ground of compromise.

Rhodes (122–3) suggests that the democratic element in the mixture lay in the machinery of decision, a large role being given to the full assembly of the Five Thousand; and this again would

differentiate this regime from full oligarchy. There is no place at all for an assembly in the Boeotian constitution (v. 38. 2; *Hell. Oxy.* 16 [11]): Arist. *Pol.* 1294 b 3–4 (quoted above) contemplates an assembly, but with a high income qualification. To involve so large a body as the ὅπλα παρεχόμενοι in state decisions was a large concession from the side of the Few. It is not ‘absurd’ to imagine Thucydides approving such a compromise; and in any case there seems to be a jump in Ste. C.’s argument, in that the blending of the *interests* of the two groups need not carry a constitutional implication that they ‘got some degree of power’.

The position of the Many was greatly improved in that they were no longer in the hands of a gang such as the Four Hundred had shown themselves to be, and there is no reason to expect that Thucydides would think they deserved more than they here got. He was not much interested in constitutions as such (§ 2 n.), and his strictures on the successors of Perikles (ii. 65. 8, 10) and his treatment of Kleon and Hyperbolos (viii. 73. 3 n.) suggest that he would favour a system which did not give too much latitude to Kleophon; when there was no longer a Perikles to control the people (ii. 65. 8), a more mechanical form of restraint might appeal to him. But the end of § 2 suggests that his mind was mainly on the practical achievements of this brief regime; the *ξύγκρασις* may not be a matter of the constitution at all.

2. *τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι*. ‘All such phrases signify essentially control of affairs’, as Ste. C. puts it (3), and the only qualification needed is that the strength of the phrase varies a little according to the verb employed. Certainly such phrases may tell us nothing at all about the formal franchise (*ibid.*): so iii. 72. 2, and neither ii. 65. 4 ἐπέτρεψαν nor viii. 82. 1 ἀνετίθεσαν implies a formal grant of special powers. ii. 65. 10, ἐτράποντο καθ’ ἥδονὰς τῷ δῆμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι, shows a weak form of the phrase: there is no question of giving the people a right of decision, which they possessed already, rather of failing to give that positive lead that a true statesman should. *παραδιδόναι* is stronger, and means the effective hand-over to another of something which one owns or controls, often a military surrender or the cession of territory, but cf. iv. 28. 3 (Nikias’ surrender of the generalship to Kleon), viii. 29. 2, 38. 1 (Therimenes’ hand-over of the fleet to Astyochos). But in Ste. C.’s view the people here surrender hardly anything, and ‘control of affairs’ is inappropriate to the situation of a Five Thousand whose rights, such as they are, may be voted away at any time by the assembly. *τὰ πράγματα παραδιδόναι* cannot mean so little as this.

Ste. C. describes this phrase as ‘quite vague’ (3) and suggests that the vote ‘may very well have been deliberately couched in the imprecise form of words used by Thucydides’; and that the decree

passed at Kolonos may again have been vaguely worded (5). This seems hardly possible. For Kolonos, Lys. xx. 13 (cf. 16) uses the formula ὑμῶν ψηφισαμένων πεντακοσιλίοις παραδόνται τὰ πράγματα, and on that occasion the oligarchs surely did not propose to leave the demos in any doubt about its new status: Ste. C. (4) points out that Lysias says nothing of the occasion of 97. 1, but this is still evidence for the way the phrase should be understood there. Again, the frequent assemblies of 97. 1 cannot have failed to define what they were introducing.

97. 1 may be description rather than quotation of a decree, if *τὰ πράγματα* is alien to the language of decrees. It does not occur in this sense in any extant decree; and a possible alternative, the *πολίτευμα* of Tod 192, 3–4, does not appear in this sense before Aeschin. ii. 172, or in the fifth century at all. For our period the expected word is *πολιτεία*, which appears in Aristotle's version of the Kolonos decree, *Αθ. π.* 29. 5, and in his description of the regime of the Five Thousand, 33. 1. It makes no great difference whether we translate it 'franchise' or 'control' (Ste. C. 4), for control would be only precarious if the franchise were not limited. Franchise is certainly meant by *πολιτεία* at Lys xxxiv. 3: cf. the hypothesis (= Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 32, p. 49R), which might possibly reproduce the wording of the decree proposed by Phormisios.

3. Supporting evidence.

(a) If the *παράκλησις* of 92. 11 was made by the hoplites to the crowd, it follows that there was no enthusiasm for the Five Thousand among these hoplites, who only refrained from calling for outright democracy because they were afraid that the Five Thousand already existed. If that was their feeling it is surprising that they should have decided against full democracy in the following days. R. Sealey, *Essays in Greek Politics* 124, treats 92. 11 as decisive for Ste. C.'s view, but see n. there: we must allow also for the fact that the hoplites were less fierce the next day, and ready to meet *περὶ ὁμονοίας* with the Four Hundred themselves (93. 3, with n.). If individual members of the Four Hundred were to have any future in Athens, the hoplites must have been ready to accept a compromise in place of full democracy.

Ste. C. (9), following Wilcken, takes it that the assembly of 97. 1 was open to all, and this must be formally right since no list of the Five Thousand had yet been produced and there was no restriction to enforce; but G. Vlastos (*AJP* lxxiii [1952], 196 n. 20) rightly stressed that the hoplites were in the lead at this stage, and suggested that not many *thetes* would have turned up at this meeting (cf. C. Mossé, *Rev. hist.* ccxxxii [1964], 9, and Vlastos's more general critique of Ste. C. in Mau and Schmidt, *Isonomia* 20 n. 6).

(b) The trial of Polycrates (Lys. xx: see pp. 202–3 above) provides no fresh clue. The second trial was certainly held in a

democratic court (xx. 17 points to a time very soon after the restoration: Ste. C. 13), and the first under the Five Thousand. But it will be time enough to complain with Ste. C. (11–12) of 'the failure of the speaker to cast discredit on that court as not being a fully democratic popular dicastery' when we are sure that such tactics would have helped the defendant. The one clue that we have is the attempt in the first trial to associate the defendant with Phrynicos (11): that is, he was ranged with the extremists whom the Five Thousand had condemned to death. The accusers at the second trial could argue that, if even the Five Thousand had found Polystratos too much of an oligarch, honest democrats must all the more condemn him. The speaker does his best (17) by claiming that the accusers at the first trial were men hostile to the people, but he was probably better advised at 18 to concentrate on the poor quality of the evidence produced at that time. The fragments of Antiphon's defence might offer more comfort to Ste. C.'s thesis, addressing the jury under the Five Thousand as *ὑμεῖς* as if it were continuous with the old democratic juries with which he might hypothetically have been in trouble: for that see p. 200 above, where it is argued that this is not significant.

(c) Ste. C. further argues (10–12) that the literary sources slur over the transition back to democracy in a way that would be impossible if it 'involved such a vitally important step as the restitution of the franchise to the Thetes'; that the transition seems in fact to have been peaceful, even gradual; and that Thucydides himself (98. 4) signals the end of the Four Hundred with the words *καὶ η̄ ἐν ταῖς Αθήναις δολιγαρχίᾳ καὶ στάσις ἐπαύσατο*. To take this seriatim, (i) the fault lies mainly with Xenophon, as Arnold complained in his n. to 97. 2. Since Diodoros also passes over the transition in silence, an omission which shocks us less, we are thrown back on *Aθ. π. 34. 1* as the only narrative source. (Ste. C. [10 n. 45] notes the suggestion of v. Fritz and Kapp that 34. 1 *τούτους* refers to the Four Hundred not the Five Thousand, but he candidly ends [23] with the 'strong presumption' that it refers 'to the people last mentioned in the preceding chapter, i.e. the 5,000', and leaves the matter open.) Accordingly, commentators before 1890 (Arnold, Stahl, *et al.*) were naturally puzzled to know when the regime of the Five Thousand did end. The gap in the narrative sources is not filled by allusions in the orators or elsewhere, but that is not surprising. The Four Hundred remained very much alive in the Athenian memory, with constant reference in the courts to those who might have been implicated in their crimes; the main contrast between them and the democracy has dominated the picture to such an extent that the intervening stage of the Five Thousand is hardly noted at all, and has to be sought doubtfully in such allusions as Lys. xx. 21. (ii) For the transition of 410, gradual in some ways but

in others felt to be more abrupt, see pp. 195–6 above. It is to be wished that we had an exact date for the debate on the Spartan peace offer after Kyzikos (Diod. xiii. 52. 2–53; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F 139), in which Kleophon ἐμετεώρισε τὸν δῆμον and got the offer rejected. This has been taken to show that democracy had already been restored, but unless there was a long interval between the battle and the embassy the debate should have taken place under the Five Thousand; and perhaps it did, for Kleophon as the son of a general presumably counted among the ὅπλα παρεχόμενοι and could address the Five Thousand. As to the people, it would not have been easy to keep them out of the meeting (cf. 67. 2 n.) and some may have raised their hands to vote, but even without the casting of unqualified votes their presence and attitude could intimidate. This would not be the only time a regime has crumbled gradually rather than collapsed suddenly: we could imagine infiltration of meetings and increasing influence exercised by Kleophon, helped out by the absence on service of Theramenes certainly, probably of other leaders of the Five Thousand, and above all by the fact that the great victory at Kyzikos relieved Athens of the feeling of desperate emergency. (iii) Thucydides regarded the regime of the Five Thousand as a μετρία ξύγκρασις, and it is not too surprising that he should speak of the Four Hundred as ‘the’ oligarchy of 411: this is, again, a symptom of the difference between the Five Thousand and normal oligarchy. The *stasis* is, quite naturally, the threat of actual civil war that dominates 92–6. For 89. 4 προστάτης τοῦ δήμου, see n. there: nothing can safely be deduced from δημοκρατία and δῆμος at 68. 2, certainly not that Thucydides himself regarded the regime of the Five Thousand as democratic.

The evidence thus does not support participation of the *thetes* in the regime of the Five Thousand. Even if we take a stand on Thucydides’ statement about the feeling of the hoplites at 92. 11 and neglect their change of heart in 93, the wording of 92. 11 still shows that for Thucydides there was a substantial distance between the Five Thousand and democracy; and the case for reading a restriction of the franchise out of 97. 1 is solid. The scanty evidence gives no further positive information about the mechanics of this regime: cf. Ste. C. 21–2. The arguments which he (14–20) and Hignett (376–8) deploy are decisive against Ferguson’s view that *Aθ. π.* 30 was now enacted as the constitution. For the one decree we have, see pp. 197–8 above: it reveals one divergence from normal democratic procedure, but nothing else significant. The decree of Demophontos (And. i. 96–8) allows no inference about the numbers or mode of election of the Council set up by the Five Thousand (Ste. C. 22); and there is nothing else.

(εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται): five thousand was a

maximum in the programme of 65. 3; in Aristotle's version of the Kolonus decree it is a minimum (*Aθ. π.* 29. 5), but with no indication how far anyone thought the minimum might be exceeded. The wording here shows that the stated number was not any longer a guide to the numbers actually given the vote, but again makes no definite estimate; for doubts about the reliability of the figure 9,000 in Lys. xx. 13, see pp. 205–6 above. It is not easy to guess the number who ὅπλα παρέχονται in autumn 411.

ii. 13. 6 gave 13,000 first-line hoplites in 431, to whom we must for this purpose add a thousand cavalry (ii. 13. 8 with n.) and those too old for normal service: Gomme, *Population of Athens* 5, reckoned some 25,000 in all. The plague cost 4,400 hoplites ἐκ τῶν τάξεων and three hundred cavalry (iii. 87. 3), and not all this will have been made up. Apart from normal wastage, recent losses in Sicily included the 1,500 ἐκ καταλόγου of vi. 43 and the 1,200 of vii. 20. 2; the thousand hoplites sent to Samos in summer 412 might be reckoned, less casualties, as potential citizens. The next figure available is 6,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry outside Corinth in 394 (X. *HG* iv. 2. 17), but we do not know what proportion of Athens' total force this represents. Later, for the time of the Lamian War, Gomme (8) calculates some 14–15,000 men of the required census between the ages of eighteen and sixty. Ferguson (*CAH* v. 338) thought we should count only those over thirty: this is tied to his unacceptable view that the constitution of *Aθ. π.* 30 was now in force, but it might still be right and would appreciably reduce the number.

As always with Greek population figures, we are reduced to guessing. It looks as if Five Thousand would produce a franchise much more restricted than the hoplite class, which is probable enough: we do not know how the authors of the programme of 65. 3 reckoned those who were 'most able' *τοῖς τε χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν*, and they may well have thought the whole body of hoplites too numerous. For the present regime, even with Ferguson's age-limit, we can hardly do much less than double the number, and suppose that the name Five Thousand was retained, however inappropriate, because it had been so much talked about as the political goal of the 'moderates'. This has a large bearing on our understanding of Thucydides' *μετρία ξύγκρασις*: ten thousand is a very long way from ὀλίγοι.

μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν μηδεμιὰ ἀρχῆ: so also *Aθ. π.* 33. 1. At Kolonus *Aθ. π.* 29. 5, less drastic than Th. 67. 3, allowed pay to archons and *prytaneis*. The original plan (65. 3) abolished all pay but military, and serving troops must have been paid (cf. Alkibiades at 86. 6).

εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπάρατον ἐποίησαντο: for the negative, after a negative main clause, edd. compare i. 28. 3. *εἰ δὲ μή* is shorthand for some formula such as that of ML 49. 20–22, *ἐ]ὰν δέ τις ἐπιφεύγει παρὰ τέ[ν στέλεν ἔ*

ρρέ]τορ ἀγορεύει ἐ προσκαλέσθα[ι ἐγχερέι ἀφαι]ρέσθαι ἐ λύεν τι τὸν
hefsephi[σμένον]. From the run of the sentence it is clear that the curse applies specifically to the pay, not to the constitution as a whole: an oath to the constitution is likely enough (cf. the oaths in the last clause of Demophantos' decree, And. i. 98, and Th. 75. 2), but a curse is another matter. The sanctions in ML 49 are the standard secular ones, *atimia* and confiscation (23–5): but some states were ready to add quite minor items to their official curses, e.g. *DGE* 688 C. 5–9 from Chios, dated by Jeffery (338, no. 48) to the second quarter of the fifth century, and it would have been possible to add to the ἀραι pronounced at Athens before meetings of the assembly (p. 190 above). But for so particular an enactment we should think rather of a separate pronouncement contained in the relevant decree, as *Syll*³. 167. 12–14 ἐπαρὰς ἐποιήσαντο περὶ τούτων μήτε προτιθέναι ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα μηδένα μήτε ἐπιψηφίζεσθαι (Mylasa, 367/6). The solemn sanction shows the importance attached to financial economy, and betrays a suspicion that an attempt to restore pay might before long prove hard to resist.

2. ὅλαις ὕστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι: Herwerden and Wecklein altered *πυκναὶ* to ἐν *Πυκνῷ*, which has been accepted by many edd. but is not necessary. Stahl's argument that § 1 ἐσ τὴν *Πύκνα* must look forward to other meetings on the Pnyx is empty (cf. Goodhart), and his belief that frequent meetings would not be needed seems merely arbitrary. νομοθέτας: the title is unexpected, since the office is not otherwise found at Athens before 403 (And. i. 83–4: for ML 69. 16 see the comment at their p. 192). We cannot quite rule out the possibility that officers so named had been appointed on earlier occasions without our hearing of them, but the name seems more appropriate to this time when a wholly new constitution was being introduced. They have usually been taken as a constitutional commission like that of 67. 1, but there is no indication here of an interval during which the voters waited for them to introduce proposals; the impression is rather that this series of meetings completed the business, quickly if we retain *πυκναὶ* (above). We might suppose (a) that a meeting early in the series set up a body of *nomothetai* to judge the proposals brought before subsequent meetings, like the *nomothetai* of Teisamenos' decree of 403 (And. i. 83–4; cf. MacDowell ad loc.), and this is perhaps the least improbable; (b) that officers with this title were to play a permanent part under this constitution, but it is not quite easy to imagine the role for which this would be the appropriate title; (c) that the Five Thousand thought of their present arrangements as provisional and envisaged a more leisurely reform which these *nomothetai* were eventually to propose, but the wording and the co-ordination with τἀλλα suggest rather that they were relevant to the constitution actually being set up now.

καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δῆ --- εὖ πολιτεύσαντες; this controversial sentence is analysed in detail by G. Donini, *La posizione di Tucidide verso il governo dei Cinquemila* (1969). Argument is needed to elucidate every phrase but *Ἀθηναῖοι φάίνονται*.

(i) **εὖ πολιτεύσαντες.** Interpretation of the other phrases and of the sentence as a whole depends so much on the way we take these words that they must be discussed first. The basic question is whether they refer to the form of the constitution, or to the manner in which political activities were conducted (Donini 8–12). The neutral sense of the verb, 'be a citizen' or 'live as a citizen', is clear for active and middle in Thucydides (iii. 34. 2, vi. 92. 4) and elsewhere. Reference to specific acts or policies is clear at ii. 65. 7 *κακῶς --- ἐπολιτευσαν*, leading on to such usages as D. i. 28 *τῶν πεπολιτευμένων αὐτοῖς* ('their political record'). The reference to constitutional form at i. 19 and iii. 62. 3 resides rather in the qualification *κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν κ.τ.λ.*, than in the verb; at iii. 66. 1 where the Plataians are urged to *πολιτεύειν* according to the general tradition of the Boeotians, that certainly includes joining the Boeotian League, and so according to *Hell. Oxy.* 16 (11). 2 adopting a specific constitution for the city, but it would still not be right to translate the verb 'have a certain form of government' (LSJ *πολιτεύω* 2). At viii. 53. 3, *εἰ μὴ πολιτεύσομέν τε σωφρονέστερον καὶ ἐσ ὀλίγους μᾶλλον τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσομεν*, the second clause unambiguously refers to the form of the constitution, but that need not carry the first half with it: *σωφρων* is normally used of conduct. It would be unreasonable to deny that *πολιτεύω* can refer to the constitution, but this is usually helped out by some qualifying phrase: when it occurs unqualified, or with *εὖ*, *κακῶς*, or another adverb of manner, the presumption is that it refers to the manner in which political affairs are conducted. In the immediate context here, the previous sentence ends with *πολιτείαν*, here meaning constitution, and the explanatory clause which follows (*μετρίᾳ γάρ, κ.τ.λ.*) might describe the constitution; but this is not decisive, for it is clearly possible to remark on political behaviour in a context concerned with political forms, and it is by no means certain that *μετρίᾳ -- ἔγένετο* does refer to the form of the constitution. I would conclude that the reference is almost certainly to the political conduct of the Athenians during the period referred to.

(ii) **οὐχ ἥκιστα.** Steup claims that in Thucydides' normal usage this is equivalent to *ἄριστα δῆ πολιτεύσαντες*, which is undeniable. The examples he gives of exceptions (i. 3. 1, ii. 61. 3) seem to me indecisive, but viii. 86. 9 certainly does not mean that Laispodias and his colleagues were more responsible for setting up the Four Hundred than the persons named in 68. Similarly at vi. 15. 3, the striking statement that Alkibiades' expensive tastes *οὐχ ἥκιστα* caused the ruin of Athens cannot seriously be taken to elevate his horse-racing

above the causes alleged at ii. 65. 12 (cf. J. H. Finley, *Three Essays* 136 n. 28). i. 67. 2 (Donini 96) might just be taken to mean that the Aiginetans, though in secret, were still the most vehement instigators of war, and at ii. 27. 1 the view that they were more than anyone else the cause of the war might be an opinion held by the Athenians when their attention was particularly directed towards Aigina, but this does not fit well with what Thucydides says elsewhere of their views, and the phrase would more comfortably be taken in the sense that Aigina was one of the prime causes of war. The majority of instances conforms to Steup's view, but the usage is not invariable, and we are not compelled to take this as a positive superlative if the context suggests otherwise (cf. Kirkwood, *AJP* xciii [1972], 92–103). That is, we need not understand that the political conduct of the Athenians was absolutely the best it had ever been at the period to which this sentence refers; it may be only that this was one of the best periods.

(iii) *tὸν πρώτον χρόνον* and *ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ*. Two interpretations are propounded for *tὸν πρώτον χρόνον*, either 'in the first phase' sc. of this regime or of the time after the fall of the Four Hundred, or 'for the first time', in which case *ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ* qualifies this phrase directly, 'at least in my lifetime' (Donini 4–7). For 'in the first phase' edd. have compared vii. 87. 1 *τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους*, but the plural there gives the required sense unambiguously, as the singular here does not. The order of the phrases seems to encourage us to connect *ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ* closely with *τὸν πρώτον χρόνον*; on the other hand, if *πρώτον* is this kind of superlative it combines uncomfortably with *ἡκιστα* (Donini 5–6). Thucydides is capable of using double superlatives in a way which English would not tolerate (iv. 74. 4, v. 74. 1 with n.): but 'for the first time in my life they conducted their affairs best' does not run easily or allow paraphrase of the kind attempted in my n. to v. 74. 1, and still less could one contemplate 'for the first time in my life this was one of the periods when they conducted their affairs best'. It would run no better if the reference were to the form of the constitution.

Steup argued that there is no parallel for *tὸν πρώτον χρόνον* in the sense 'for the first time', and declared it impossible unless some note of time is added; Herwerden proposed to insert *〈τότε〉* after *δὴ*. Goodhart noted that 'at first' is usually *τὸ πρώτον*, whereas to mean 'for the first time' *πρώτον* is used without the article; Gomme (ms.) apparently agreed. This is a crucial point. If this combination of phrases could mean, or could without great difficulty be taken to mean, 'for the first time, at any rate during my life', then Thucydides could hardly have written these words expecting them to be understood in a different sense: if he could rely on his readers to take *τὸν πρώτον χρόνον* as 'during the first phase', then he could expect

them to take ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ as qualifying the whole clause, not specifically τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον.

The numerous instances confirm Goodhart's view, with the qualification that *πρῶτον* can take the sense he assigns to τὸ *πρῶτον* (there is no difference perceptible between τὸ μὲν *πρῶτον* - - - ἐπειτα and *πρῶτον* μέν - - - ἐπειτα), whereas τὸ *πρῶτον* is not used to mean 'for the first time'. With the adjective, ὁ *πρῶτος* has always some trace of a numerical sense, looking forward to an actual or potential second, third, etc.; *πρῶτος* can have a similar sense, but if the writer's mind is on the fact that this is an innovation or a fresh start, then some phrase without the article is used, often a predicative adj. or the neuter as adv. Cf. i. 96. 2: in 'Ελληνοταμίᾳ τότε πρῶτον Αθηναῖοι κατέστη ἀρχή Thucydides' mind is on the new institution, not on this particular board or any contrast their successors might present; in ἦν δ' ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἔξήκοντα he gives the amount of this particular assessment, and the reader is warned that in later assessments the figure might be different. If that is right, the reader here is invited to contemplate a ὕστερος χρόνος when things might be different. Steup's absolute negative is not easy to prove, but it is the case that there is no parallel for the meaning 'for the first time', whereas vii. 87. 1 is a parallel of a kind for 'in the first phase'. The point sometimes raised, that *πρῶτον* is used immediately below in the sense 'for the first time', is of no effect, since there it has no article; and so common a word could be used in two distinct senses in close proximity. (The issue is clouded in English by the fact that we use one word, 'time', where e.g. French has two, *fois* and *temps*, so that 'for the first time in my life' comes more easily to us: *χρόνος* does not mean *fois*, but since a period of some duration is involved this makes no substantial difference.)

There is also a historical issue, that the Five Thousand survived for at most nine months, and it seems incongruous to divide up, for praise or blame, so very short a period. The difficulty is less if we may think of Thucydides writing soon after each event, using the reports which reached him successively from Athens, hopeful at first that the Five Thousand had eliminated the *stasis* which in his view was Athens' greatest danger, disappointed later by the revival of the demagogues. In these terms he might well distinguish between an initial period of success down to Kyzikos, and the period when Kleophon was able to procure the rejection of the Spartan offer of peace. But we have still to ask how the Athenians of this short period earned their high praise. Their generals won the victory at Kynossema which first revived the city's morale, then the greater victory at Kyzikos which appeared to put Athens on the road to full recovery. It is less clear what the citizens at home had done: Thucydides was hardly thinking of the financial reform mentioned at 'Αθ. π. 30. 2 (see

pp. 220–1 above). He must in fact have had the military recovery in mind, and the contribution of the citizens at home was to have appointed the right men and allowed them to conduct their operations without interference. The main contrast would be with the less tolerant regimes before and after, the Four Hundred and the restored democracy (cf. *Hist.* x [1961] 12 n. 30).

But if Steup and Goodhart are right, that *τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον* must refer to the first phase of the regime of the Five Thousand, it then becomes a considerable problem what *ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ* is doing in this position, or in the sentence at all. Steup and earlier edd., assuming that the issue was about the formal constitution, guessed that Thucydides here allowed that the constitution of Solon was superior; but the author of i. 1–21 was no *laudator temporis acti*, and to the extent that he thought about such matters at all he would more probably have supposed that the Solonian constitution was still in operation in his own day (cf. Teisamenos' decree of 403, And. i. 83). But if the issue is about the Athenians' conduct of their affairs, the qualification *ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ* raises at once the question whether Thucydides rated their performance in the years of Perikles' ascendancy lower than what they did in the few months of the regime of the Five Thousand.

Donini (99 f.) develops a suggestion of J. H. Finley's, that *ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ* might refer to Thucydides' adult and working life (cf. v. 26. 5), and so exclude the period before 431 and avoid direct comparison between the Five Thousand and the Periklean period; but even if Thucydides was born as late as 455 (v. 26. 5 n.) it would be more natural for him to include at least the period after 440 as belonging to his own lifetime. A more hopeful line might be that, in reference to the time of his own youth, Thucydides' admiration went all to Perikles' gifts as leader, not to the response of the citizens to his leadership; some of his language, especially in ii. 65, would support this, and allow him to rate the leaders lower and the citizens higher in 411. But the attraction of this diminishes when we consider exactly what is being compared. Thucydides records two crises in Perikles' time, one in 431 which he was able to suppress (ii. 21–22), the other in 430 from which he quickly recovered (ii. 65. 1–4), but otherwise the citizens of the period from 440 to 429 accepted his lead, as the well-known sentence at ii. 65. 9 indicates, and regularly re-elected him to office; and for that they may claim as much credit as can be given to the citizens of 411 who, as was argued above, elected and supported the right kind of leaders. It may then be necessary to fall back on the more pedestrian solution, that *οὐχ ἥκιστα* is a weak superlative, and that virtue is allowed to the citizens of both periods, though Thucydides' main attention may be, as suggested above, directed to comparison of this regime with those that followed and

preceded it. The trouble with that is that it leaves *ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ*, which from its position looks like an integral element in the judgement, as a qualification of no great moment, excluding from his present horizon the possibility that other and earlier periods might have shown the Athenians displaying similar virtue.

There are thus in this sentence elements which strongly suggest that we should take it as a judgement on the way the Athenians conducted their political affairs in the first phase of the regime of the Five Thousand, but also some objections. We have further to examine what indications can be found elsewhere in Thucydides of the line he might be expected to take about the Five Thousand, and about comparison of their regime with the great days of Periklean democracy: the question of his own political opinions ought to be examined in this *Commentary*, and this is the appropriate point.

(a) For comparison with the days of Perikles, the Funeral Speech is a natural point of departure. It is praise indeed, but of a way of life, not of a constitution. Thucydides does not make Perikles say that Athens is a good place because her political decisions are taken by majority vote of the free adult male population: he says that a man can have a better life there than elsewhere (ii. 41. 1). There is explicit reference to the constitution at ii. 37. 1, *καὶ ὅνομα μὲν δὰ τὸ μῆν ἐσ δλίγους ἀλλ' ἐσ πλεόνας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται*: it would be rash to infer that Thucydides thought the reality greatly different from the name, but the phrase is lukewarm, and that is itself significant. The *μέν*-clause is, as often, concessive: the complicated *δέ*-clause to which it looks forward, whatever else it may assert, defends the system against a standard charge, that under such a regime men of talent do not get enough weight and opportunity. Democracy seems to need defence rather than praise; there is hardly anything in the speech that could be called anti-democratic, but Thucydides does not make Perikles speak like an enthusiast for democratic doctrine.

(b) The epilogue on Perikles (ii. 65) is even less concerned with the form of the constitution, but deeply engaged with the question of effective leadership. The emphasis on Perikles' foresight and his capacity to control the demos, coupled with the analysis of his successors' faults, leaves no doubt that Thucydides rated very high indeed the style in which Athens' affairs were conducted in the time of Perikles' ascendancy, and renders it unlikely that he preferred the actual performance of any later regime above this. The trouble after Perikles' death was due, he says (ii. 65. 10), to the fact that the successors were more on a level with one another, and so turned to vote-catching for the sake of their individual advancement. That could be taken as criticism of the system under which this sort of competition was possible, and it might be held to be implied that Thucydides would favour a system which, by eliminating the *thetes*

as voters, eliminated the worst features of the demagogues' procedures. But this is not explicitly said, in ii. 65 or elsewhere; instead he concentrates on the performance of the leaders, as in ii. 65. 7 on their individual ambition and greed. It would be wrong to extract any constitutional prescription from this chapter.

(c) The analysis of *stasis* in iii. 82–3 is also concerned with individuals, this time with their use of guile and force in pursuit of party ends. Through most of this passage one can make no distinction of party, unless the references to *έταρισται* in 82. 4–6 are taken to point towards the oligarchs. Where he does distinguish ideologies by their slogans (82. 8), the slogans are equally spurious, *πλήθος ισονομία πολιτική* no better and no worse than *άριστοκρατία σώφρων*; these chapters are, as Gomme stressed, about the disastrous effect of war on politics and political morality, not about the faults of one side rather than another.

(d) The most solid assertion of the virtues of democracy is at vi. 39. 1, and the defects of oligarchy are as firmly set out at 39. 2. But here the speaker is the Syracusan demagogue Athenagoras, who is utterly wrong about the situation of his city and whom Thucydides certainly does not wish to commend (vol. iv, p. 301; *Phoenix* xvi [1962] 77 n. 31), and the fact that these apparently reputable sentiments are put into his mouth should make us suspect that there is something wrong or inadequate about them: not that what is said is actually false, but Thucydides may well mean to imply that such conventional assertions, coupled with denunciation of his opponents as oligarchic conspirators, are not enough, that for effective action a city needs more than ideological purity. Athenagoras' *δῆμον ξύμπαν ὀνομάσθαι* is well enough (see the parallels assembled by Donini 86–7), but it does not make him into a good adviser, still less into Thucydides' mouthpiece. Gomme (ms.), commenting on J. H. Oliver, *Rh. Mus.* xcix (1955), 40, wrote: 'As usual the modern is too naive. Thucydides did not believe, nor did Pericles, that a good form of constitution would always show good results. He knew that fools could win, and that wise men sometimes act foolishly.'

Some other explicit references to democracy are more transparent. There is irony or malice at iii. 37. 1 where Kleon denounces the Athenian assembly and its intellectual licence, but the malice is directed at Kleon, not at the system. Again, Alkibiades' *όμολογον μένη ἄνοια* at vi. 89. 6 serves to display him suiting his sentiments to his Spartan audience and tells us nothing about Thucydides' views, even by implication.

(e) Thucydides' treatment at viii. 1 of the installation of the *probouloi* in autumn 413 might be held to imply approval of a movement away from democracy, and there is some criticism in 1. 4 *ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν*: for oligarchic overtones in some of the

language see nn. there, where it is suggested that these may simply be due to the nature of the measures the assembly was taking. It is true that Thucydides thought that the decision to sail to Sicily was a grave error of judgment, but it does not follow that he would approve of any and every mechanism designed to safeguard the city against rash decisions: he would judge by results.

(f) For an explicit comment on oligarchs, set out as the author's own opinion, we have the very damaging remarks at viii. 89. 3-4 on the unbridled ambition of individual members of the Four Hundred. The comment is not quite general, in that it refers not to established and stable oligarchies, but to one newly set up by revolution; and there may be some distortion due to the source (see 89. 3 n.). The passage does show that he was as ready to pick out the characteristic faults of the oligarchs as to comment on the faults of the mass of the people.

(g) Much more damaging is Phrynicos' comment on the *καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ* at viii. 48. 6, for which see nn. there and de Ste. Croix 37-8. This does not deal directly with the constitution, but it comes in a context concerned with the installation of oligarchies, and the point is that it is men of this kind who will be in charge of the Athenian oligarchy. Presenting the upper classes of Athens as the oppressors of the allies and the Athenian demos as their refuge, the passage is unique as a comment on Athens' relations with her empire; defence (e.g. Isoc. iv. 104-6) or attack (e.g. [X.] *Aθ. π. I.* 14-15) normally took shallower forms, and even in Thucydides we are more accustomed to hear of the greed of the people or their leaders (e.g. iv. 21. 2, vi. 24. 3). It may well be that Thucydides himself would endorse what Phrynicos here asserts (48. 4 n.); even if he was reporting a view which he did not altogether share, the mere fact that he reports it shows that he was thinking in terms far removed from those of the conventional opposition between the two ideologies. We might remember also Athenagoras on the selfishness of oligarchs (vi. 39. 1-2): while Thucydides could not approve the use he made of the people's hostility to oligarchy, the statement itself need not be condemned any more than his statement of the democratic ideal.

(h) Further examination of individual passages, or of the implications of longer stretches of narrative or comment, would not greatly alter the conclusions that emerge from this review; but for completeness' sake we should also look at his opinions on some of the individuals concerned, and the influence that might have on his judgement. Very few of those who appear in the *History* are accorded so many lines of high praise as are given to Antiphon at 68. 1-2, and next to him among the persons of this drama is Phrynicos, who displayed understanding not only at Miletos in summer 412 but also later (27. 5). Yet Thucydides did not follow their line, but speaks his

approval of the Five Thousand, who executed Antiphon and condemned Phrynicos posthumously: the independence of his judgement is nowhere more clearly attested. What he thought of Theramenes and his group is more of a problem (89. 3 n.); he cannot have thought ill of the man whom he described at 68. 4 as *οὐτε εἰπεῖν οὐτε γνῶναι ἀδύνατος* (no other passage characterizes Aristokrates), but silence here may mean that he had reservations about Theramenes at the time when he wrote this. As to the democratic leaders after Perikles, Thucydides' opinion is not in doubt, and the analysis of Gomme (esp. *More Essays* 112–21) and others has shown that his opinion did somewhat distort his presentation of events in which Kleon was involved. Hyperbolos (73. 3) and Androkles (65. 2) fare better only to the extent that they get less attention; more would have had to be given to Kleophon if the *History* had been completed, for his rejection of the peace overtures after Kyzikos and his role during the siege of 405/4, filling out his share of responsibility for the *stasis* inside Athens which in Thucydides' view caused her fall (ii. 65. 12). There is that much justification for expecting some bias towards a constitution which deprived Kleophon of the votes of his natural supporters.

In all his work nothing so clearly reveals Thucydides' own preference as his commendation here of the Five Thousand. Since their constitution must formally be classified as an oligarchy, though of an unusual kind (§1 n.), he himself must be counted as that much of an oligarch, but that tells us hardly anything of importance about him. The evidence reviewed shows that his interest was in the quality of the leaders, their capacity for foresight and rational decision, and to a much less extent in the political habits of the peoples they led. He can put into the mouth of an incapable leader what appears to be an irreproachable statement of the theoretical virtue of democracy (vi. 39. 1), treating that apparently as a secondary matter; to Perikles he gives no statement of that kind. For the most part he describes: the occasional passage of explicit analysis, as ii. 65, or the implicit message of his descriptions and speeches, are not in commendation or disapproval of constitutional theory, but are concerned with the quality of political decisions, whether they take proper account of the realities of a situation, whether they exhibit the intellectual insight which he most warmly admired. Only in this passage can he be thought to commend a system as such, and here only if the passage is in fact a comment on the form of the constitution.

If that is in general right, it greatly strengthens the presumption that *εὖ πολιτεύοντες* here refers to the management of affairs. Since Thucydides did not think that affairs were managed worse in Perikles' later years than under the Five Thousand, we must take *οὐχ*

ἥκιστα in its weaker sense, 'this was a period when Athenian affairs were exceptionally well conducted'. *τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον* must be taken, as the analysis above suggested, to mean 'in the first phase': if Thucydides' concern is not with the form of the constitution, there is nothing stated or implied in this sentence that could reasonably be thought to hold in autumn 411 for the first time in his life. That leaves ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ out on a branch, not adding anything substantial to the judgement, and that is disquieting; nevertheless, I would take the sentence to mean that 'the initial period (of this regime) was one of the periods when the affairs of Athens were conducted best, at least in my time'.

μετρία γάρ --- ἐγένετο: in the course of the preceding nn. it was sometimes necessary for purposes of the argument to assume that this refers to the form of the constitution. That is clearly possible, but not necessary: this clause assures us that the interests of the people were given proper consideration, but that need not be a matter of their precise niche within the constitutional arrangements of the regime. It is not easy to make out from other parts of the *History* what Thucydides thought should be done in their interest, if indeed he had any very determinate view about that. One might expect that freedom from oppression and arbitrary government would be a large part of it, and the constitution is relevant to that, in that the base of the government was now broad enough to secure them against the worst. Given Thucydides' preoccupation with leaders rather than the people they led (see previous n.), he might mean that leading democrats were given a part to play: Thrasyllos, whom the Four Hundred could not have employed, was at least tolerated as a general at Samos and in the Hellespont. On the other side Theramenes, who did not have the confidence of the restored democracy (Lys. xiii. 10), was a prominent general under this regime, another element in the ξύγκρασις. It would not be surprising if Thucydides' main interest was in the practical effects of the compromise for the conduct of the war, as in the next clause, but a reference to the constitution as such cannot be ruled out as irrelevant.

τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν: the reference of *τοῦτο* is probably to εὖ πολιτεύσαντες, the intervening clause *μετρία γάρ ... ἐγένετο* being explanatory of that. *πρῶτον* suggests that further stages of recovery were already known to Thucydides when he wrote this, and *τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον*, as interpreted above, implies that this sentence was written after Kyzikos and the rejection of Sparta's peace offer. The immediate point is the revival of Athens' will to fight, after the negotiations of the Four Hundred, the defeat at Eretria, and the loss of Euboea (cf. 96). Kynossema (for its effect on the city's morale see 106. 5) was an effect of the counter-revolution to the extent that the fleet was no longer pre-occupied with a possible need to intervene at

Athens; at Kyzikos the presence of Theramenes and the absence of Thrasyllos alters the colour.

3. **Ἀλκιβιάδην --- κατέναντι**: he did not in fact return to Athens till summer 407, and then very hesitantly (X. *HG* i. 4. 11); and Xenophon, speaking of his election to the generalship then, describes him as an exile. It may well be that the democracy, restored in summer 410, did not recognize the recall as valid: see *JHS* lxxiii (1953), 3 with n. 7.

καὶ ἄλλους: for men known to have fled in 415 see the list in vol. iv. 277–82. The only returned exile we can name is Alkibiades' uncle Axiochos, who was home by 407 (ML 89. 48) but need not have reached the city before his nephew.

παρά τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρὰ τό --- στρατόπεδον: Thucydides need not mean two separate messages, but the language comes near to treating Alkibiades as a power distinct from the fleet.

98. 1. **εὐθύνεις**: the point of reference is presumably the first meeting of 97. 1, which deposed them.

Πείσανδρον: what happened to him after this is not known, except that Lys. vii. 4 reports the people's gift of his confiscated farm to Apollodoros of Megara, one of the murderers of Phrynicos (92. 2 n.). **Ἀλεξικλέα**: 92. 4. Lykourgos' report (*Leocr.* 115) of his execution is not in detail credible, but he is there joined with Aristarchos whom we know to have been captured and killed (below), and the same may be true of Alexikles.

καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῆς διλιγαρχίας μάλιστα: the startling omission of Antiphon was noted by Stahl, but oddly not by Steup in his argument for emending this passage. The trial of Antiphon and the surprising fact that he stayed in Athens after the establishment of the Five Thousand are discussed at pp. 198–200 above. Thucydides knew that he did not flee (68. 2), yet this sentence, especially by adding in the separate case of Aristarchos, gives a firm impression that all the main oligarchic leaders are being accounted for; and this is all the odder, since Antiphon was mentioned as recently as 90. 1–2, along with Peisandros and Aristarchos, among the leaders of the extremist group. Steup's proposal to insert *ὡς εἰπεῖν* only papers over the crack; this appears to be a case where Thucydides has not yet properly organized the information that came to him.

Ἀρίσταρχος: 90. 1 with n. This incident is referred to by Xenophon (*HG* i. 7. 28), when Euryptolemos says he was allowed a day to defend himself; he must then have been captured and tried at some time before Arginousai, in the late summer of 406, but we know no details. For Lyc. *Leocr.* 115 see n. on **Ἀλεξικλέα** above.

Οἰνόην: ii. 18. 1 n.; vol. iii, pp. 724–5; N. G. L. Hammond, *BSA* xlix (1954) 121–2.

2. **ἥν δέ --- τεῦχος**: in much the same words as ii. 18. 2, but condensed.

Gomme (ms.) noted 'not written with ii. 18. 1 in mind—not very surprising, except for the fact of Oinoe having been the place where the Peloponnesians first invaded Attica'.

διὰ ξυμφοράν --- **διαφθορᾶς**: this incident, not otherwise recorded, may have happened at any time (cf. vii. 27. 3 *κατὰ διαδοχῆν*), and there is nothing to be said for connecting it (Classen, Goodhart) with the withdrawal of the large extra force at 71. 3, an operation of a different kind and scale. The obscurity of the reference of *σφίσω*, not cleared up till the end of the sentence, is surprising; but the reader can tell from *ἐποιιόρκουν* that a Peloponnesian subject is coming.

ἔθελοντηδόν: i.e. not a League operation (*ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ΣΜ^{νc₂}*). The special interest of the Boeotians, obvious as it is, was not mentioned at ii. 18.

4. **καὶ ἡ ἐν ταῖς Αθήναις διλιγαρχία καὶ στάσις ἐπάνσατο**: see 97. 1 n. It is natural that Thucydides should treat the Four Hundred as 'the' oligarchy, passing over the compromise regime of the Five Thousand; and as to *stasis*, there was no longer an immediate danger that fighting would break out within the city.

99–109. *The Peloponnesians move to the Hellespont. Battle of Kynossema.*

99. **ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους**: the only clear indication is the statement that Mnasilochos, the archon of the Four Hundred, ruled for two months of the year 411/10 (*Ath. π.* 33. 1: see p. 239 above for the possibility that we should allow a little more than the exact two months); on Meritt's most recent reckoning (*Ath. Year* 218, unchanged in *Proc. Am. Ph. Soc.* cxv [1971], 114) that should take us to the last week of September, or even into October (the same result is obtained from combining the data given on pp. 267 and 269 of vol. iv.).

καὶ οἱ --- **Πελοποννήσιοι**: these words are necessary to change the scene for us, but they have no verb to govern; when Thucydides returns to the main sentence the subject is narrowed to Mindaros. The structure is similar to that of iv. 73. 4, for which see Gomme's n., and less confusing than the shifts of subject at viii. 48. 1–2 (see n. there). It is by no means certain that we should impute this to want of revision (Steup).

τῶν --- **προσταχθέντων**: at 87. 1 the responsibility was laid on Tamos, but we need not suppose that he worked entirely alone. From 87. 3, where the provision was 'no better, but even worse', we have declined to no provision at all.

[**ὅτε ἐπὶ τὴν "Ασπενδον παρῆι**]: the comment of *ΣΜ^{νc₂}*, *τῶν κελευσθέντων ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους, ὅτε αὐτὸς ἐσ "Ασπενδον ἀπῆι*, persuaded Hude that these words did not stand in the scholiast's text and should be excised. But there is nothing intrinsically suspicious about the back-reference,

though an alert reader might remember without it, and similar paraphrases in these scholia (98. 2, and the other n. on 99) make some use of Thucydides' actual wording. The clause should be retained (Steup).

καὶ αἱ Φοίνισσαι νῆσοι οὐδὲ δὲ Τισσαφέρνης: it is easier to understand a negative with the first item when there is a following negative, as *οὐδεῖς* at vi. 55. 1, but it is possible without one in prose as well as in poetry; see Denniston 194.

ὅ τε Φίλιππος ὁ ἔμπεμφθεὶς αὐτῷ: 87. 6, where he is sent at Tissaphernes' suggestion. The construction here is more surprising, in that one might expect the phrase to refer to two persons sent off by the same authority, whereas Philippos is 'sent along with' Tissaphernes who is not under Peloponnesian control.

ἄλλος Ἰπποκράτης, ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης: see 35. 1 n., and for *Σπαρτιάτης* 22. 1 n. *καὶ ὁν* seems an odd expression to join such disparate items, but Krüger's *κατοικῶν* is most unlikely for a Spartiate. This phase of the war must have entailed the detachment of a number of officers on various missions, and it is no surprise that Thucydides does not tell us what this one was about.

Φαρνάβαζός τε ἐπεκαλεῖτο αὐτούς: cf. 80. 2, where it is added that he was ready to give *τροφή*.

κομίσας τὰς ναῦς: E. Delebecque, *Ann. de la Fac. des Lettres d'Aix* xlivi (1967) 33 with n. 33, claims that in view of the context these can only be the Phoenician ships (the last ships mentioned, only two lines higher). 'Il faut croire que les deux satrapes d'occident avaient un égal droit de regard sur la flotte royale': but rights over the royal fleet could only be granted by the king, and there is no indication, or probability, that his dispositions as set out at 58 have been altered. As to context, the main body of the chapter is about Mindaros' voyage north; and cf. 80. 2. (It should perhaps be added that the main point of Delebecque's article is entirely reputable; that—against the view of some standard histories—Alkibiades' boast at 108. 1 is spurious.)

τὰς λοιπὰς ἔτι πόλεις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς: Abydos is the only city so far actually recorded as lost to Athens (62. 1): Lampsakos was retaken at once (62. 2), and Kyzikos, a more important prize, was twice lost and recovered (107. 1 with n.; X. *HG* i. 1. 14, 19, Diod. xiii. 49. 4). But 101. 3 implies that Rhoiteion and Sigeion were in Peloponnesian hands, and the many fires *ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ* of 102. 1 suggest that most of the coast between Sigeion and Abydos was lost. Probably Derkylidias brought these places over on his march north (61. 1). Tissaphernes' coastal zone must by now be almost entirely in his or Peloponnesian hands, but the mainland territory of Klazomenai remained with Athens (31. 2 n.) and Halikarnassos (108. 2 with n.).

ἔλπίζων · · · ἀπ' αὐτοῦ: edd. refer back to 6. 1, and Tissaphernes'

reaction at 109. 1 shows that the issue is the competition between the two satraps. Of the two objectives set out at 6. 1, Tissaphernes had almost achieved the recovery of his Greek cities, and had made his treaty with Sparta; and in this treaty he appears as the king's principal agent (58. 1 n.), with command over a substantial Phoenician fleet. As noted at 58. 6, it appears to have been thought that he could dispense with the Peloponnesian fleet once the king's ships arrived, and his behaviour over their *τροφή* may have been intended to edge them out. But this strong position collapsed with the withdrawal of the Phoenician ships and Mindaros' move to the Hellespont. Tissaphernes now had no ships of his own and had quarrelled with the only other fleet available to him; and those provisions of the treaty (58. 5-7) which gave him a special position when the king's ships arrived would now not take effect. Pharnabazos on the other hand might hope, with the Peloponnesian ships alone, to close the Hellespont and bring the war to a quick end (cf. 109. 1 *κατορθώσει*). He was thus very much back in the competition which he seemed to have lost, till the brilliant Athenian victory at Kyzikos once more changed the situation. There is no clear indication what the king thought of Pharnabazos' initiative, but shortly afterwards (X. *HG* i. 1. 9) Tissaphernes says he himself has been ordered to continue the war against Athens. The fact that the ships were withdrawn at all shows that the king rated other matters higher than the Aegean war.

πολλῷ κόσμῳ: not the looks of the fleet, presumably, but its discipline in contrast to the disorders of 83-4. Goodhart took this to mean they were ready to fight if necessary, which perhaps over-translates.

τρισὶ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα: at the last count (79. 1) the Peloponnesians had 112 ships. Forty then left for the Hellespont (80. 1), but we may presume that thirty returned (80. 3, see p. 31 above, § 19); and we hear below of another sixteen sent to the Hellespont, which should leave 86 in the south. The discrepancy is exactly filled if we bring in Diodoros' report (xiii. 38. 5) that at this point Mindaros sent Dorieus with thirteen ships to deal with a threatened conspiracy in Rhodes; the fact, omitted by Thucydides but perhaps transmitted through Ephorus from *Hell. Oxy.*, is confirmed by Xenophon (*HG* i. 1. 2), who says that Dorieus arrived at the Hellespont from Rhodes with fourteen ships at the beginning of winter (i.e. 411/10) but does not say what he had been doing there. It is of no great moment that Diodoros (38. 6) gives Mindaros' total as 83, not 73, which in the light of 39. 3 should be corrected in some way (see 103. 1 n. below). But Arnold rightly wondered about the two ships that went to Aspendos with Philippus (87. 6): one or both may have come back, or Mindaros may have acquired another ship or two elsewhere. One must not expect the figures to work out with perfect exactitude.

Stahl and others took Thucydides' figure as his own calculation, and were puzzled that he should take into account these thirteen ships whose dispatch elsewhere he has not mentioned: the favourite remedy was a lacuna. More probably the figure is taken from the report he received of Mindaros' movement; and we see from the next clause how patchy Thucydides' information was.

πρότερον δέ, κ.τ.λ.: Thucydides' normal practice would have been to record this in its chronological place, at the cost of interrupting another narrative. This too (see above) was probably part of the report he had of Mindaros' operation, and he did not yet know exactly where it fitted in. The ships must have been sent after Strombichides' return from the Hellespont (79. 5): 80. 1 shows that the Peloponnesians intended already at that stage to send larger forces to the north.

ἐς τὴν Ἰκαρὸν: Mindaros relied on speed (above) and not on a circuitous route to get him past the Athenians at Samos, but he would naturally go outside Samos and up past Ikaros, so the storm did not take him far off his route.

100. 1. ὁ δὲ Θράσυλος: last heard of when elected general at 76. 2; like the rest he was then overshadowed by Alkibiades. With the latter (88) and Thrasyboulos (§ 4) absent, only Thrasyllos remained at Samos of the generals Thucydides has named.

πέντε καὶ πεντήκοντα: the last total given (79. 6) was 108, since when twenty (combining § 5 with 102. 1, see p. 31 above, § 19) had gone to the Hellespont, thirteen with Alkibiades to Aspendos (88), five with Thrasyboulos to Eresos (§ 4), which should leave seventy. Thrasyllos did not wholly denude Samos, for there were nine ships available there to Alkibiades when he returned (108. 2); Thrasyllos perhaps reckoned that sixty Athenian ships could cope with 73 Peloponnesian. Goodhart thought the placing of *εὐθύς* might imply that more ships were to follow later (cf. i. 26. 3), but the inference is insecure, and no further ships are known to have left for the north till the eighteen which appeared with Alkibiades in the winter (X. HG i. 1. 5). Other small squadrons may also have been detached, like that of Thrasyboulos.

2. καθέξειν: intrans. (*ἐνδιατρίψειν ΣΜν*), as 28. 2; the trans. sense, with Thrasyllos as subj. and Mindaros as obj., suits less well with Thrasyboulos' next actions.

σκοπούς --- ἡπείρῳ: on the mainland opposite Lesbos, according to Goodhart, as if Thrasyllos anticipated the route Mindaros in fact took (101). But these scouts* were to detect movement in any direction (*ποι*), therefore on the Erythrai peninsula opposite Chios, and on the south coast of Lesbos. It is not explained how Mindaros got away

undetected, but the scouts are stated to have failed (103. 2): in each case they were watching from a considerable distance.

Μήθυμναν: 22. 2 n. This is the part of Lesbos furthest removed from Chios, so the point where Thrasyllos took on provisions, not his base for action.

3. **Ἐρεσος** --- ἀφειστήκει: it had already revolted in 412 on the first arrival of Astyochos (23. 2-4), but it was presumably included in the Athenian recovery of Lesbos at 23. 6.

Μηθυμναίων . . . φυγάδες: in spite of the city's general loyalty there will always have been exiles; cf. the plot to betray Methymna in 428 (iii. 18. 1). The brief revolt of 412 and its suppression (viii. 22. 2-23. 6) will have increased the number.

προσεταιριστούς: otherwise only Dio Cassius (xlvi. 51. 3, xlvi. 10. 3), where it is a noun meaning 'followers'; but the verb occurs in Classical prose, e.g. Hdt. iii. 70. 2, 3 of Persian nobles brought into the conspiracy against the pseudo-Smerdis, v. 66. 2 where Kleisthenes τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται. These instances do not encourage speculation about Kymaian ἔταιρίαι (Goodhart, cf. LSJ): the unusual word probably distinguishes these men as volunteers 'brought in as companions in the enterprise' from the hired men next mentioned. If so, *τε* (om. ACEF) should perhaps be deleted.

Αναξάνδρου --- ήγουμένου: *Αναξάρχου* CG. IG vii produces one Anaxarchos from Akraiphia, one Anaxandridas probably from Thebes, and a family at Hyettos with more than one Anaxandros; this is not enough to establish the relative frequency of the two names in Boeotia. For the kinship cf. iii. 2. 3 with n., vii. 57. 5, viii. 5.

2.

Ἀθηναίων φρουρούς: the Athenians cannot have spared large numbers for this duty, and we may legitimately infer that the three hundred got little support within Methymna.

4. **προαφιγμένος** δέ, κ.τ.λ.: again (cf. 99 n.) Thucydides' normal practice would have been to give this in its chronological place. Diodoros is too heavily condensed to give help here: the sixty ships with which the Athenians set out after Mindaros (xiii. 38. 7) must be the 55 of Thrasyllos and these five. Like Thrasyllos (§ 1 n.), Thrasyboulos has not been mentioned since Alkibiades took over at Samos (81. 1).

5. **ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου** --- ἀνακομιζόμεναι: Classen was troubled by the use of *τινές* with so small a number, and wanted a clearer indication that these ships were Athenian. But cf. 74. 2: *τινές* may seem redundant here (as there), but hardly ambiguous. We should expect constant minor traffic of this kind between fleet and city.

καὶ Μηθυμναῖαι *<πέντε>*: *καὶ αἱ Μηθυμναῖαι* B, which Steup accepted as meaning the whole naval force of Methymna, but this is difficult in the absence of any previous hint that Methymnaian ships were taking

part. *καὶ Μηθυμναῖαι* (cett.) cannot stand alone, but it is an easy explanation that a numeral has fallen out, and Dobree's *〈πέντε〉* makes up the total to the 67 of the next sentence; or possibly *τινὲς* (above) originally followed *Μηθυμναῖαι* and had been displaced (the actual number might still be five, cf. 104. 2 n.).

ἀφ' ὧν τῷ στρατεύματι: ἀφ' ὧν νεῶν τοὺς στρατιώτας παραλαβόντες παρεσκευάζοντο Σ^{Myc2} , with the same degree of cumbrousness as English 'with the men from which ...'. It is left to our imagination to guess what *μηχανάι* they had with them or could improvise; vii. 43. 1 is equally unspecific. Thucydides caters for readers who would know what to expect.

101. 1 δυοῖν ἡμέραιν: Lobeck and Herwerden, for codd. *δυσὶν ἡμέραις*, presumably due to a copyist's conversion of the Attic into more familiar forms. The gen. is more appropriate than the dat. for the time within which the provisioning was accomplished.

τρεῖς τεσσαρακοστὰς ἔκαστος Χίας: ἀρχαῖα νομίσματα ἐπιχώρια Σ^{Myc2} ; the scholiast is not likely to have known much about earlier Chian systems of coinage, but this at least shows that the word was thought by a Greek reader to refer to coins. A fortieth is a rare fraction, arising naturally enough in a proposal for taxation (Ar. *Eccl.* 825), but not known as an element in any system of coinage, Chian or otherwise. There is thus some temptation to take this as a measure (not that a fortieth is any more familiar in that field): but provisioning should be covered by *ἐπιστισάμενοι*, and if the sailors took three Chian fortieths of something in addition, we might expect Thucydides to tell us what this something was. These are then probably coins: even when they carry their provisions with them, Greek expeditions expect the men to buy this food with money (W. K. Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practices = The Greek State at War* i, ch. ii), and these men had latterly had no Persian money at all (99 ad init.).

Head (*HN²* 600) suggested that the fortieths were tetradrachms of the individual Chian standard, forty of which might be reckoned equivalent to a mina of one hundred Aiginetan drachmai. X. *HG* i. 6. 12 *καὶ ἐκ Χίου πεντεδραχμίαν ἔκαστω τῶν ναυτῶν ἐφοδιασάμενος* can be accommodated to this (P. Gardner, *History of Ancient Coinage* 251–2) if we suppose that the sailors received two Chian tetradrachms, treated as equivalent to five Aiginetan drachmai; Gardner noted that Xenophon's *πεντεδραχμία* need not mean a single coin of that value (we might add the *πεντάθολον* of Ar. *Eg.* 798, which surely does not imply a single coin). This interpretation of Xenophon remains possible, on the assumption that for the sailor's benefit these unfamiliar coins were given a value in terms of the system they knew; but in ML 67. 9–10 the Chian friends of Sparta make their contribution in Aiginetan staters, and Xenophon's sailors might have

received actual Aiginetan drachmai. It seems much less probable that commanders or men would use unfamiliar fractions of a mina for such an equation, and in any case, if the Aiginetan mina contained not a hundred but seventy drachmai (M. J. Crawford, *Eirene* x [1972] 7 n. 7), this neat and ingenious interpretation collapses altogether. No alternative has been proposed (Crawford's *obiter* suggestion that the mina was divided into forty staters on Chios does not help: if Thucydides wrote in terms of such a Chian system, he would simply say 'three Chian staters'), and the fortieths must remain for the time being a mystery. We have thus no materials for guessing how many days' pay this represents, or estimating the total taken from the Chians; Mindaros needed only to tide over till he could receive his subsidies from Pharnabazos.

〈οὐ〉 πελάγια: Haacke's 〈οὐ〉 is necessary both for the sense (by keeping out to sea they would be more, not less, likely to encounter the Athenians at Eresos) and to account for ἀλλά; it would easily drop out after Χίου.

2. τῆς Φωκαΐδος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίοις λιμένα: otherwise only in a list of islands which Plin. *NH*. v. 138 attaches to Smyrna (*iuxta Smyrnam sunt Peristerides, Carteria, Alopece, Elaeusa, Bacchina, Pystira, Crommyonesos, Megale*) before going on to the group *ante Troadu*. See Wade-Gery, *AJP* lix (1938) 470–5; J. M. Cook, *CQ N.S.* ix (1959), 124. Most are unidentifiable, but Bacchina has been taken to be Livy's Bacchium (xxxvii. 21. 7 *imminet urbi Phocaensium*), and Cook argues that the text of Pliny had originally *bacchiū*. Since Karteria is also *τῆς Φωκαΐδος*, this has suggested identification of the group Carteria–Bacchium with four islands off the coast of Phokaia, taken from north to south (in which case Elaeusa must be distinct from the Elaioussa of Str. xiii. 1. 67, 614), but Cook wished to find in the letters after *bacchiū* a reference to Aspis between Teos and Lebedos (Str. xiv. 1. 29, 643), some distance to the south, and thereafter, much more tentatively, to Psyra off the north-west corner of Chios. It is clear that the text of *NH* v. 137–8 needs thorough examination as a whole, to see how Pliny's strings of islands can be worked out. Meanwhile the only new information we acquire is that Karteria was an island.

ἐν Ἀργινόσαις τῆς ἡπείρου: Stephanus s.v. *Ἀργέννουρα* notes that Androtion (*FGH* 324 F 17) wrote the name with an *iota*, which if pressed would imply that he found *epsilon* in his text of other writers. Here we have -γιν- CG, -γεν(ν)- ABΕF, the whole passage omitted in M, *Arginussis* Valla. The texts of Xenophon (*HG* i. 6. 27 etc.) and Diodoros (xiii. 97. 2, etc.) show no variant from -γιν-, but Stephanus is evidence that -γενν- survived, and J. M. Cook (*CQ N.S.* ix [1959], 123) argues for the retention of *argennusae* in Pliny. Stephanus derives the name *παρὰ τὸ Ἀργεννὸν ἀκρωτήριον, ἀφ' οὐδὲν ἀργεννόεις*: no such headland is known otherwise in this area, but Strabo gives this

name for the cape further south which Thucydides calls *Ἄργινον* (34. 1 with n.). This appears to be a matter of dialect variation in a word for 'white', common enough in names for capes and islands.

No other source knows of a mainland Arginousai, unless *Σ Ar. Ran.* 33 *πόλις* (*Σ* 698 *κώμη*) *τῆς Αἰολίδος* is held to imply one; Pliny's *Arginusa cum oppido* (*NH* v. 137) is certainly an island. Krüger, who noted the parallel of Sybota, islands at i. 47. 1 and a mainland harbour at i. 50. 3, is followed by most edd. in nevertheless excising *τῆς ἡπείρου* as an intrusion from the next sentence; Hude, following Gertz, inserted *(καὶ)* after *Ἄργινούσαις* (with no comma after *ἡπείρου*), which is possible but more awkward.

3. παραπλεύσαντες: ABEFG add *τὴν Κυμαίαν*, which cannot be right, and at Arginousai they were mostly past Poppo's *τὴν Καβαίαν* (for which see e.g. Str. xiii. 1. 68, 615); this is accidental repetition from § 2. The object we expect is Mytilene, to be understood from the end of the last sentence. They could not help passing fairly close, and though they need not expect a substantial Athenian force there, it might be worth while to avoid immediate observation by passing at night (for the Athenian *σκοποί* see 100. 2 n.).

Ἀρματοῦντα: not known from any other source; Artemidoros (Str. xiii. 3. 5, 622) gives this name to the promontory which encloses the Elaitic Gulf on the north, but that is well behind them. After passing between Lesbos and the Hekatonnesia they would cut across the mouth of the Gulf of Atramyttion, and they picked up the mainland opposite Methymna. J. M. Cook (*The Troad* 240, cf. the map on p. 190) regards Sivrice Bay as the only possible location.

Λεκτόν: the south-west promontory of the Troad, a western prolongation of Mt. Ida, after which the coast turns north; cf. Str. xiii. 1. 2, 581, 6, 584, etc. and Cook 226–8, 237–8.

Λάρισαν καὶ Ἀμαξιτόν: ATL i. 505–6 (s.v. *Κολώνη*) needs some correction in detail; see Cook 219–21 (Larisa), 231–4 (Hamaxitos), with the map on p. 190. Larisa is north of Hamaxitos: for the tendency to take geographical names in what seems to us the reverse order see 88 n., but the inconsistent order Lekton–Larisa–Hamaxitos looks like a mistake. These were two of the Aktaian cities taken from Mytilene in 427 (iii. 50. 3, cf. ATL ii. D22, 14–15; A9 iii. 129–30, A10 iv. 18–19; full list of the cities ATL i. 459): Cook (197–8) argues against the view that Larisa was ever part of the *peraia* of Tenedos.

'Ποίτειον: ATL i. 530 (s.v. *Οφρύνειον*), Cook 79–81 with map on p. 62; east of the Scamander mouth and well inside the Hellespont. This was also one of the Aktaian cities taken from Mytilene (see last n.: A9 iii. 126, A10 iv. 16); for the raid of Mytilenean exiles in spring 424 see iv. 52. 2 with n.

Σίγειον: ATL i. 547–8; full discussion of the sites of Sigeion and Achilleion in Cook 178–88, map on p. 104; outside the Hellespont on

the west coast of the Troad. Taken from Mytilene by Athens in the sixth century (Hdt. v. 94–5; Th. vi. 59. 4 with n.), it was praised for continuing loyalty to Athens in the middle of the fifth century (*SEG* x. 13, cf. Meiggs 117), but seems to have revolted by now (99 n.).

102. 1. δυοῖν δεούσαις εἴκοσι: no number was given for the νεῶν βοήθειαν at 80. 4, and nothing has been said since of the Hellespont. With the two ships of 100. 5 we have twenty in all, but there may have been other small movements unrecorded. For Sestos as the Athenian base, and the failure to retake Abydos from the Peloponnesians, see 62. 3.

οἵ τε φρυκτώροι, κ.τ.λ.: the beacons are long-distance signals, but there is no indication where they were lit. Neither they nor the fires could be seen from Sestos itself, so watch was kept higher up, e.g. on Kynossema.

τῇ Χερσονήσῳ: Steup excised these words, on the ground that at Sestos they were already on the Chersonese coast, but that leaves ὑπομεῖξαντες (έγγισαντες Σ^{vc_2}) in the air. The expression is not quite logical, but edd. are surely right to understand that they stuck close to the European shore past Madytos, as stealthily (ὑπό-) as possible.

Ἐλαιοῦντος: *ATL* i. 484; inside the tip of the Chersonese (Mazousia, C. Helles), with a large harbour.

ἐκπλεῦσαι --- τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκπλεύσαντες διαφυγεῖν Σ^{Mvce_2} . Classen's parallels (ii. 88. 2, 91. 1, iii. 34. 2; one might add the use of the acc. with ἔξιστασθαι), found inadequate by Steup, are enough to sustain the scholiast, whose sense is superior to that produced by taking τὰς . . . ναῦς with παρέπλεον, with a comma after εὐρυχωρίαν (Steup, following Widmann), a singularly awkward word order.

2. ἐκκαίδεκα: 99. For Abydos see 61. 1 n., 62.

προειρημένης φυλακῆς --- ἣν ἐκπλέωσιν: ἐπίπλω is clearly concrete (Σ^{GMvce_2} below), for which ii. 90. 2 is not a perfect parallel but the usage is not surprising; for ἀνακῶς (ἀντὶ τοῦ προνοητικῶς καὶ φυλακτικῶς Σ^{GMvce_2}) cf. Hdt. i. 24. 7. Σ^{GMvce_2} καίτοι προειρημένου τοῖς ἐν τῇ Αβύδῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ φιλίου ἐπίπλου (τούτεστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ στόλου τοῦ μετὰ Μινδάρου), ὅπως παραφυλάττωσι τοὺς Αθηναίους ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ λαθεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκπλεύσαντας makes this an order given beforehand by Mindaros to the Abydos squadron to take care that the Athenians did not sail out unobserved; and it is not easy to believe any of the alternatives that have been proposed. Classen objected that a dat. with προειρῆσθαι must be taken as the recipient of the order, and took ἐπίπλους to be the fleet of Thrasyllos and the message to be sent from Sestos; but the connection with what precedes is very weak, and φυλακῆς and ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν do not suit this interpretation. Stahl made it a message from the Abydos squadron to Mindaros, and wished to insert e.g. ἀμελέστερον

ἐπιτηρούσας before *προειρημένης*, the watch being less careful because they had handed over the responsibility to Mindaros, and Goodhart thought this sense could be obtained without a lacuna; but the connection is very obscure, and even Stahl's text is not a natural way to express what he requires. Steup defended the scholiast, observing that concessive participles are common in Thucydides, and datives of the agent with passive verbs. Alternatively we might take *φυλακή* to mean 'guard' rather than 'watch', i.e. they had been ordered to protect the incoming fleet by keeping a close watch on the Athenians, and perhaps try to stop them if they did come out. (The presence of *αὐτῶν* makes the change of subject between *ἔξουσιν* and *ἐκπλέωσιν* easier than the similar change at vii. 4. 4: see n. there.) The dative in either case remains ambiguous (Classen, above), but it is not easy to imagine anything that Thucydides could have wanted to say here other than a watch on Sestos by the Abydos squadron.

κατιδόντες - - - *ποιουμένων*: *ποιούμενοι* codd., which can only be kept by taking *δίωξιν* in the sense of *φυγήν* (as Σ^{rec}), but this is contrary to Thucydides' usage and 103. 3 διώξει renders it impossible. Weil accepts Classen's *ποιουμένας*, but this does not run easily, and there is something to be said for Steup's argument that we need to hear of Mindaros sighting the Athenians, not vice versa. Steup followed Gertz and Hude in reading *κατιδόντος*, with Krüger's *ποιουμένου* and commas after *Μινδάρου* and *ποιουμένου*, and this is not unattractive. *πάσαις*: Reiske; *πάσας* B is impossible, but cett. *πᾶσαι* might stand, whatever we read earlier in the sentence.

**Ιμβρον*: B; cett. *ἡπέριον* makes no sense in the context.

3. *τὸ ιερὸν τοῦ Πρωτεσιλάου*: Hdt. ix. 116. 2; not precisely located, but Str. vii. fr. 52 καὶ σχεδὸν τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ νοτιώτατον ἄκρον τῆς Χερσονήσου refers to the shrine not to the city of Elaious, and places the former near the tip of C. Helles.

κενήν: presumably near enough for the men to escape by swimming ashore, but there were not enough Athenian ships present to dispute the capture.

103. 1 *Ἐξ καὶ δύδοικοντα*: the 73 that came with Mindaros and the sixteen from Abydos, less the two lost at § 3 below, should give us 87. Diodoros (xiii. 39. 2) has the Athenians capture three ships (but left behind at Sigeion, not *πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος* as in § 3 below), and his figure would put the count straight; but his total for the fleet is 88 (39. 3) not 86, and we cannot assume that his source had precisely the same set of figures as Thucydides. For the latter, the figure for the battle at 104. 2 is most probably a corruption of 86: Diodoros complicates the issue by not mentioning the Abydos squadron at all, but his original figure of 83 for Mindaros (38. 6) less the three casualties could not produce 88, and we should probably suppose that the figure at 38. 6

is corrupt and that his source did add the Abydos squadron, though the details are irrecoverable.

2. *τῶν σκοπῶν*: see 100. 2 with n.; they should have seen at least Mindaros' departure from Chios, and the failure is not explained.

τὸν παράπλουν: it looks as if they were expecting Mindaros to go outside Lesbos, and be seen passing them at Eresos, and Thucydides' wording at 101. 1 (*⟨οὐ⟩ πελάγιαι - - - ἀλλά*) suggests the same.

3. *πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος*: for the contrast with Diod. xiii. 39. 2 see § 1 n.
ἐκ τῆς Ἰμβρου: some had fled towards Lemnos also (102. 2), but the ships had then no doubt concentrated at Imbros, nearer the scene of action. The figure at 104. 2 shows that all available ships were collected for the battle.

104. 2. *ἀπὸ Ιδάκου μέχρι Αρριανῶν*: otherwise unknown, but roughly located by the fact that part of the Athenian fleet had rounded Kynossema (§ 4), and by the position of the Peloponnesians opposite them.

Ἐξ καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα: ὄγδοήκοντα CG, but § 5 and 105. 2 show that the Peloponnesians had superior numbers on both sides of Kynossema; the figure has slipped in here from the next line. 67 at Eresos, including five from Methymna (100. 5) with fourteen survivors from the Sestos squadron (102. 1, 3) might make 81, but it is not said at 103. 2 that all 67 came from Eresos, and the simplest solution (Arnold) is that the five Methymnaians remained behind; alternatively (Stahl, Steup) five had got left behind at Imbros (103. 3 n.).

ἀπὸ Αἰγάλεω μέχρι Δαρδάνου: for the location of Abydos see 61. 1 n. For Dardanos see ATL i. 479, Cook 57–60: Hdt. vii. 43. 2 makes it *ὅμοιος* with Abydos, and Str. xiii. 1. 28, 595, notes that at some periods it was amalgamated with Abydos. The Peloponnesian left wing, and therefore the Athenian right, was some way downstream from Kynossema.

Ἐξ καὶ ὄγδοήκοντα: Arnold, for codd. *όκτὼ καὶ ἔξήκοντα*, an unusual but intelligible form of corruption. Cf. perhaps Tod. 191. 10–11 *τρισχιλίοις καὶ διακοσίο[ις] στάτηρας*, 49–50 *δισχιλίοις καὶ τρι[α]κοσίοις στάτηρας*, where one might have expected the sums to be the same (Tod p. 261; P. J. Rhodes, LACTOR 9, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* 359–323 B.C., 33.). The alternative is Diodoros' 88 (xiii. 39. 3, see 103. 1 n.), but in Thucydides' narrative Mindaros has no obvious opportunity for reinforcement (the squadron at Byzantium was still east of the straits, 107. 1): we should stick to the figure given at 103. 1.

3. *Συρακόσιοι*: under Hermokrates according to Diod. xiii. 39. 4, but see 85. 3 n. above.

τὸ μὲν ἀριστερὸν Θράσυλος, ὁ δὲ Θρασύβουλος τὸ δεξιόν: Diodoros reverses their positions (xiii. 39. 4), but this may be discounted since

he found these two hard to distinguish, indeed from xiii. 64. 1 to 97. 6 they are combined into a single figure labelled Thrasyboulos, though thereafter they are distinguished again.

οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι στρατηγοί: none has been named, though the phrase suggests that Thucydides could have done so; he could not know how much we should have welcomed even a few more names.

4. **ὑπερσχόντες αὐτοί:** the nominatives break the construction but clear the sense; edd. compare v. 41. 2 *έτοιμοι εἶναι*. But this sentence is peculiar in that the initial gen. abs. looks forward to a main clause in which the Athenians will be the subject (*οἱ Αθηναῖοι γνόντες, κ.τ.λ.*), so that *καὶ καὶ μέν* — — — *οὖσαν* does not give a new direction to the sentence but interrupts its original plan.

5. **Κυνὸς σῆμα:** or the tomb of Hecuba (Diod. xiii. 40. 6, Str. vii. fr. 56). See Eur. *Hec.* 1265–73.

ἀσθενέστ — ταῦς ναυσί: Goodhart, finding this illogical, wished to read *ἀσθενεῖς* and delete *καὶ*: but it is not out of the style for Thucydides to transfer 'weak' from the Athenians to their ships.

μὴ κάτοπτα: this is true close to the European shore, but progressively less so as the battle shifts across to the Asiatic side; cf. 105. 3.

105. 3 **ἐπεχούσας:** *τὰς ἐπικειμένας ναῦς Σ^{MV}*, cf. § 2 above. With the common meaning 'halt, stop' we should naturally take this after *γνόντες* and understand 'when they saw the ships that were against them halt'; but as Arnold noted, no reason is given why these ships should thus halt, and Thucydides uses only the aor. in this sense, where it is almost invariable. The scholiast's sense is adequately attested (LSJ *ἐπέχω* III. 1. b), but also the sense 'cover', of the ground over which something extends, including a line of battle as at iii. 107. 4. The meaning could thus be no more than 'the ships placed opposite them', these being the object of *ἡμύναντο*, while the object of *γνόντες* is the situation as described at the end of § 2; but the run of the sentence is perhaps easier if *γνόντες* looks forward, not back.

ὑπολαβόντες: *Σ^{rec}δεξάμενοι* would make sense if these ships were attacking Thrasyboulos, but at this point he is the attacker. We need a sense for which *πεπλανημένας* can be predicative, and there is no exact parallel in Thucydides. Probably 'they took these ships next, scattered as they were': the Platonic usage in which one speaker takes over from another (e.g. *Rep.* 331 d) is not very different, or the sense in which one event succeeds another, e.g. *Hdt.* vi. 27. 3.

οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι, κ.τ.λ.: some account has been given of the reversal in the centre, but of Thrasyllos' half of the battle we have heard only that he was prevented by the Syracusans and others from coming to the help of Thrasyboulos (§ 2). We are not told why these began to retreat; *ἐπειδή* — — — *έώρων* will be true only when they were far

enough out from the European shore to see round Kynossema (104. 5 n.).

106. 1 Μείδιον: *Πύδιον* CGM, for which Hesych. *Πύθιον· τὸ ὕδωρ*. *Θουκυδίδης* has been held to give some support; but the obscurity of τὸ ὕδωρ is against this (Schmidt bracketed these words in the belief that the reference is to vi. 54. 6–7). Since Thrasybulos was attacking upstream and the eventual refuge of the Peloponnesians is Abydos, the odds are in favour of the Koca Çay directly east of the tip of Kynossema (Cook 55). Str. xiii. 1. 28, 595, names this Rhodios, but this is part of the controversy over the identification of the rivers flowing out of Ida (*Il.* xii. 20–22), and Strabo knew of another view which made Rhodios a tributary of the Aisepos. It would be no surprise if the river had a name different from Rhodios in Thucydides' day, but there is no evidence to help us choose between the two we are given.

2. τὰ κατὰ βραχὺ σφάλματα: edd. refer this to the battle off Eretria (95), but that with the loss of Euboea was a disaster large enough to merit separate mention (§ 5), and not a failure by this fleet. We should think rather of smaller incidents since Miletos: Charminos' defeat (42), a Chian success (61. 3), the loss of Abydos (62. 3), Thasos (64. 4), Eresos (100. 3), and the last incident off Elaious (102. 2–3). Though there were small successes too, this was a discouraging record for a fleet accustomed to victory; the worst, though this is not to be got out of Thucydides' words, was the loss of the initiative and Athens' inability to check the loss of territory. The vigorous language used here (§§ 1, 5) testifies to the depressing effect of the warfare of the last twelve months and the sudden rebirth of hope produced by the news of Kynossema. If this was written soon after the event, when Thucydides was living in exile and probably among those who sympathized with the Peloponnesians (v. 26. 5), the effect will have been all the greater for him.

3. Χίας μὲν ὁκτώ, κ.τ.λ.: this catalogue and the topographical detail show that Thucydides received detailed reports of this action. Diodoros' list (xiii. 40. 5) corresponds almost exactly: though he misses out the two Boeotian ships and the one Spartan (for Thucydides, B omits the Boeotians), his source evidently reproduced Thucydides here, and when Diodoros gives the Athenian losses as five not fifteen that might be his or his copyist's error rather than a divergent account. Some other small details agree, e.g. the five days' wait at Th. 103. 3, Diod. 39. 3. But Diodoros' source may have had slightly different figures for the Peloponnesian fleet (103. 1 n.), and hazy as the battle itself is in Diodoros there are certainly large discrepancies. The hypothesis that the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* corrected and supplemented Thucydides (64. 4, 95. 2, 99 nn.) cannot be

excluded, or that that account came down through Ephoros to Diodorus. Two main questions arise.

(a) In Diodorus, from 39. 4 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον to 40. 3, a disquisition on the technical skill of the Athenian steersmen replaces any account of the tactics of the battle. The only concrete item is the importance given to the Hellespontine current: there is no detail here either, but the strong current is a fact, almost certain to play a part in any battle in these waters, but it plays none in the relatively detailed description of Thucydides. The Oxyrhynchus historian may have found something to add here, but Diodorus has prevented us from seeing what it was.

(b) Diodorus' ending (40. 4 ἵσορρόπου δὲ τῆς μάχης οὖσης, ἐπεφάνησαν ὅπέρ τινος ἄκρας ναῦς εἴκοσι πέντε παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων ἀπεσταλμέναι τοῖς Αθηναῖσι, cf. 39. 1) does descend to detail and is irreconcilable with Thucydides. The passage has been explained as a doublet of Alkibiades' appearance during the next Hellespontine action (xiii. 46. 2; X. HG i. 1. 5), but the explanation limps; the despatch of these ships by the allies is a distinctive feature, tied in with the previous narrative (39. 1), though we may well wonder what allies besides Methymna could contribute ships in this crisis. Diodorus may have misunderstood (his account of Notion at xiii. 71. 2 shows how far he could go in this direction), and his source did follow Thucydides much of the way, notably in the list of Peloponnesian casualties; but this looks more like a significant piece preserved from a radically different version, in which the fortunes of the battle were changed not so much by Thrasybulous' action as by the appearance of fresh ships.

Though Thucydides' account is full, it has gaps: it is not fully clear how Thrasybulous at 105. 3 was able to put to flight the ships that pressed so hard on him at 105. 2 (it was the Peloponnesian centre that fell into disorder, not the left wing), and we could be told more about the Syracusans (105. 3 n.). But Diodorus' version cannot simply be substituted: to resolve this we need the text of *Hell. Oxy.*, or at least of Ephoros.

5. ἐπερρώσθησαν, κ.τ.λ.: the next step in the recovery whose first stage is noted at 97. 2.

107. 1 οἱ ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ Αθηναῖοι: though this was their original destination (104. 1), it was not said that they went there after the battle, and from § 2 it appears that some of them went back to Elaious with the captured ships. Three days is long enough for this (ἡμέρᾳ τετάρτῃ), but we need not imagine a lacuna at the end of 106. 4 (Steup).

Κύζικον: on the south shore of the Propontis, at the southern tip of Arktonnesos. See F. W. Hasluck, *Cyzicus* (1910): and on the question

whether Arktonnesos was then joined with the mainland, *ATL* i. 507 with n. 1. Thucydides has said nothing about its revolt, but Diod. xiii. 40. 6 tells us that it went over before the battle to Pharnabazos and Klearchos, the latter of whom has not been mentioned by Thucydides since he reached the Hellespont by land at 80. 3.

Ἀρπάγιον καὶ Πρίαπον: Priapos is located west of the mouth of the Granikos by the sequence in Str. xiii. 1. 11–13, 587–8: see *ATL* i. 542. Harpagion was either at the mouth or just east of it (Str. xiii. 1. 11, on the border between Priapos and Kyzikos; Suda s.v. *Mīwās*: etc.): see *ATL* i. 470. Thucydides has thus again named the places in the reverse of the order we expect (88 n.).

τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ὁκτώ ναῦς: 80. 3–4 with nn. Thucydides has not mentioned them since, but the presence of Klearchos in Diod. xiii. 40. 6 (above) suggests that they took part in procuring the revolt of Kyzikos before advancing to Priapos.

ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν: 14. 3 n.

χρήματα ἀνέπραξαν: it has been suggested that the compound implies the exaction of something already due (ii. 95. 1, cf. X. *An.* vii. 6. 40, Ar. *An.* 1621). Diod. xiii. 40. 6 adds that after this they returned to Sestos; at X. *HG* i. 1. 3 they appear at Madytos a little further downstream.

2. Ἰπποκράτη καὶ Ἐπικλέα: for Hippokrates see 35. 1 n.; Diod. xiii. 41. 1 names only Epikles, about whom nothing else is known.

τὰς ἐκεῖθεν ναῦς: the 42 ships under Agesandridas have not been mentioned since 95. 7. According to Ephoros (*FGrH* 70 F 199 = Diod. xiii. 41. 2–3) Epikles collected fifty ships from Euboea, all of which were lost in a storm off Athos.

108. 1 ταῦς τρισὶ καὶ δέκα ναυσίν: 88.

ἀγγέλλων ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.: 87–8 show what this was worth; at least from 81. 2 ὑπερβάλλων ἐμεγάλυνε, Thucydides makes clear his belief that Alkibiades grossly exaggerated his influence with Tissaphernes. This capacity to extract maximum advantage from the situation in which he found himself dominates Thucydides' judgement of Alkibiades in this book (cf. e.g. 45–8), and there is no reason to suppose that it would be forgotten thereafter: Alkibiades' performance in Athens in 407 (X. *HG* i. 4. 8–23; Plu. *Alc.* 32–5; Diod. xiii. 68–9) could be seen in the same light. This need not have much bearing on the more positive appreciation of Alkibiades' qualities that we find in vi. 15. 4, written after the war (vi. 15. 3f. n), which depended on practical achievements in the Hellespont in the years 410–408, beginning with the battle of Kyzikos. That sequence had presumably begun before Thucydides stopped work on book viii, but it had not developed far enough to alter his estimate of Alkibiades (cf. 47. 1 n.), which to that extent can be used as an element in dating the composition of the book.

2. ἐννέα πρὸς αἵς εἶχεν: that could still leave a small number of ships at Samos: cf. 100. 1 n.

Ἀλικαρνασσέας: a safe refuge for Charminos in the previous winter (42. 4). The decree for Halikarnassos of Pryt. IX of 410/09 (*IG* i². 110a; cf. *JHS* Ixxiii [1953], 6) shows that its loyalty survived Alkibiades' exactions.

Κῶν ἐτείχισεν: absence of walls is noted at 41. 2, as well as earthquake damage. Diod. xiii. 42. 3 has him take much booty from Kos, which he shared with the troops at Samos: the simplest explanation would be that Alkibiades did collect such booty from another place and that Diodorus has telescoped this with his action at Kos (a similar explanation is needed at xiv. 38. 5, cf. *Phoenix* xxv [1971], 222–3). Early in 407 Kos seems to be in Spartan hands (X. *HG* i. 5. 1).

ἄρχοντα: B, ἄρχοντας cett. B^{yp}, the latter usually disregarded; *magistratibus* Valla. Steup thought Kos too small for a plurality of archons, which seems arbitrary; there is no obvious way to decide the question.

τὸ μετόπωρον ἥδη: noted at vii. 79. 3, 87. 1, for the weather; φθινόπωρον is mentioned at ii. 31. 1, iii. 18. 3, 100. 2, apparently to bring out the lateness of the season when an operation was started. Only in this passage can the time be determined at all precisely, since the timetable of events at Athens suggests that we have now reached October (99 n.).

3. ἀπὸ τῆς Ασπένδου: 87. On the reasons for Tissaphernes' alarm see 99 n.

4. Αντάνδριοι: iv. 52. 3, 75. 1. with nn.; *ATL* i. 469; Cook 267–71; Str. xiii. 1. 51, 606. It lies on the south shore of the Troad, south of the crest of Mt. Ida whose timber was one of its main assets (iv. 52. 3; X. *HG* i. 25). Seized by Mytilenean exiles early in 424, it was recovered in the same summer by Demodokos and Aristides. We have not been told of a recent revolt, but Derkylidas' march north (61. 1) is a likely occasion; along this narrow coast a hostile Antandros could have held up his movement. Here only characterized as Aiolic; at iv. 52. 3 Thucydides put it among the Aktaian cities taken from Mytilene (cf. *ATL* ii. A10. iv. 15).

διὰ τῆς "Ιδης: we have no idea what was going on in the interior, but evidently this passage was open to Athens' enemies. For the coast see 99 n.

όπλιτας: Diod. xiii. 42. 4 adds παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων, and explains that the Spartans were angry with the satrap (here, as throughout xiii, named Pharnabazos) because of the non-arrival of the Phoenician ships. No doubt Spartan permission was needed, but there can hardly have been enough Peloponnesians to spare and the hoplites were probably Abydene (cf. Anaxibios' force at X. *HG* iv. 8. 35).

Ἀρσάκου - - - Τισσαφέρνους ὑπάρχου: at Atramyttion some ten years

earlier (below), which might suggest that he was in charge of this area, as Tamos (31. 2) of Ionia; but *ὕπαρχος* is a general word (used by Hdt. for 'satrap', see 5. 4 n.) and need not be tied to an area. The problem is that both places should belong to Pharnabazos' satrapy: he held Antandros in spring 410 (X. *HG* i. 1. 25), and his father Pharnakes Atramyttion in 422 (v. 1). (a) In summer 412 (or a little later) Tissaphernes held a superior command (5. 4 *στρατηγὸς τῶν κάτω*, see n. there) which could have enabled him to intervene in Pharnabazos' satrapy; and at the time of Derkylidas' march north it may have been easier to send in troops from the south. (b) In 422/1 Arsakes might have been in the service of Pharnakes, not of Tissaphernes. Alternatively we might suppose that the revolt of Pissouthnes supervened in this year, while the Delians were at Atramyttion, and that Tissaphernes, sent down as the king's general to deal with the revolt, had then authority extending outside Pissouthnes' own satrapy; and that, if the speculation could be confirmed, would give us the date for the revolt which at present we lack. The service for which the Delians were to be conscripted might indeed be service against Pissouthnes. The background of this allusively treated episode would be clearer if Thucydides had in general filled in the Persian background to this phase of the war (cf. 5. 5 n., and Lewis 80–1 with n. 198).

Δηλίους - - - ὅτε - - - ἀνέστησαν: from spring 422 (v. 1) till they were brought back to Delos in summer 421 (v. 32. 1).

Ἄτραμύττιον: near the head of the gulf of that name, on its southern shore. Hdt. vii. 42. 1, Str. xiii. 1. 51, 606, give the rough location: see Hirschfeld, *RE* i (1893), 404. This counts as Mysia, but the strongest tradition makes Atramyttion a Lydian colony: Str. xiii. 1. 65, 613, Stephanus s.v. *Ἄδραμύττειον* (Arist. fr. 484), cf. Nic. Dam., *FGrH* 90 F 65. For Skylax (98: c. 360 B.C.) it was a Greek city in the Lesbian *perαια*; Str. xiii. 1. 51, 606, calls it *Ἀθηναῖων ἄποικος πόλις*, but though on the coast and not far from the tribute-paying *Αστυρηνοὶ Μυσοί* (*ATL* i. 473) it was never part of the empire and at Th. v. 1 Pharnakes treats it as his own.

στρατιάν: most edd. follow Aem. Portus in reading *στρατείαν*, on the ground that a *στρατιά* is imposed on communities, not individuals; but the summons presumably went to an organised community of Delians at Atramyttion.

5. **ἄλλα:** the vagueness of this has led to emendation (*ἄττα* Krüger, *ἄμα* Herwerden, Stahl), but Steup rightly left it unaltered.

109. 1. Μιλήτῳ: 84. 4.

Κνίδῳ: it went over to Tissaphernes at latest in winter 412/11 (35. 1), but there is no sign of a garrison at the time of the Athenian attack at 35. 3–4.

δείσας μή --- βλάπτωσι: cf. 57. I.

ἀχθόμενος εἰ Φαρνάβαζος, κ.τ.λ.: see 99 n.

ώς εὐπρεπέστατα: see 87. 2 n. Thucydides gives no hint of the content of his defence: he might have supposed that Tissaphernes went on merely prevaricating, or he may at this point have heard that the ships had been withdrawn to meet a threat in Egypt (Diod. xiii. 46. 6). If the latter, he had much rewriting to do.

Θυσίαν --- τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι: Thucydides does not elsewhere record the sacrifices of individuals in the manner of Xenophon (e.g. *HG* i. 1. 4, immediately after this). In 409, when Thrasyllos threatened Ephesos, Tissaphernes collected an army and sent round horsemen παραγγέλλων πᾶσιν εἰς Ἔφεσον βοηθεῖν τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι (*HG* i. 2. 6), and the form of this proclamation may suggest that the satrap of Sardis claimed some special relationship, inherited from Kroisos. Ephesos appears to have gone over to the Persians early (19. 3, with n.); Plutarch's remarks about its condition before the arrival of Lysandros (*Lys.* 3. 3) are less easy to fit into the known history of the period. It may be that Tissaphernes planned to make some important pronouncement on this occasion, and that this gave rise to Thucydides' mention of his sacrifice, but if so we have no idea what he contemplated.

It should be noted that our text of Thucydides stops not only in mid-narrative, but in mid-sentence. Phrases of this form, for which cf. i. 61. 2, iv. 77. 2, cry out for completion. See Appendix 2, p. 387.

2. [ὅταν --- πληροῦται]: C omits the quasi-editorial addition.

* * *

Tissaphernes arrived at the Hellespont at X. *HG* i. 1. 9, but Xenophon was interested only in his dealings with Alkibiades and says nothing of any meeting with the Peloponnesians or Pharnabazos. Thereafter Pharnabazos holds the centre of the stage for a few years, but that is mainly because the events of 410–408 took place in his area; Tissaphernes is prominent enough when the war briefly enters his satrapy (X. *HG* i. 2. 6, see above). The arrival of Kyros in spring 407 put an end for the time to their rivalry, and indeed frustrated the policies of both.

THE two appendices which follow are both concerned with the problem of the composition of Thucydides' *History* and are closely interconnected, though they approach the problem from different directions. App. 1, by Andrewes, surveys those passages which, because of incoherence or omission, suggest that Thucydides would have revised them if he had lived to finish his work; it is specially concerned with the light that unrevised portions of the *History* may throw on the author's methods of work. App. 2, by Dover, surveys the validity of arguments by which one may distinguish earlier and later strata in the *History* as we have it.

APPENDIX 1

INDICATIONS OF INCOMPLETENESS

1. *Introduction*

SINCE the *History* is unfinished in the crude sense that it breaks off abruptly six years before the end-point which Thucydides had set himself (v. 26. 1), it is reasonable to expect that it will also prove to be unfinished in the sense that not all of it has been revised up to the standard that the author aimed at; and it is legitimate to consider lack of revision as a possible solution for some of the problems that the work presents. Historiographically, this will be a matter of detecting incoherence or omission, especially failure to provide explanation of items which evidently need it. We must not demand too much. It is unlikely that any writer, more particularly any historian, has ever brought his work to such a pitch of completeness that there was nothing he could wish to add or alter, and our justified admiration for Thucydides must not tempt us to set a superhuman standard for him. But we are entitled to examine his narrative procedure and compare one part of the *History* with another, and if we can isolate parts which are relatively unrevised that may yield important conclusions. In the more obviously polished parts of the work Thucydides gives us hardly any clue to the way he reached the decisions a historian has to take in constructing his narrative; the less well revised parts may, and I think book viii certainly does, give us useful insights into his methods of work.

Questions of language are more slippery. Thucydides was a bold writer, much addicted to variation, concerned to pack the maximum of meaning into the shortest possible space; and a phrase which we find rough or abrupt may be precisely what he judged suitable to create a particular effect or to avoid the kind of monotony he disliked. Further, our texts have suffered much corruption in the course of copying by hand over many centuries, and where we detect a linguistic anomaly it will often be right to search for a plausible emendation rather than to complain of imperfect revision. On the difficulty of making firm deductions from the distribution of linguistic phenomena through the various parts of the *History*, see App. 2, pp. 393, 434f.

The most visible differences in Thucydides' practice are the absence of speeches from v. 10–83 and from the whole of viii, and the presence of verbatim transcripts of treaties, not found elsewhere, in iv. 118–v. 79 and in viii. Most readers of Thucydides have in addition

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a strong subjective impression that much of v and the whole of viii are somehow rougher and less tidy than the narrative of the Archidamian War or the Sicilian expedition. Discussion has naturally centred in the main on the speeches and documents, a matter of fact and not opinion. Very varied views have been expressed, in antiquity and in modern times, on the question whether the absence of speeches was Thucydides' deliberate intention or a sign of incompleteness (see viii. 48. 7 n.); and modern critics have both denounced the documents as alien to the historian's style and seen them as a sign of change in Thucydides' method (Schwartz 27–31; Wade-Gery, *OCD* s. v. Thucydides § 4). The controversy has been conducted at an uncomfortably high theoretical level, and often on the basis of unjustified assumptions about the rules of fifth-century historiography (below, pp. 374 f., 403). A safer basis may be found in the examination of Thucydides' narrative practice, beginning with those parts of the work which at first sight look to be the most finished.

2. *The Archidamian War*

This is *prima facie* highly finished work, which displays more fully than any other section of the *History* Thucydides' capacity to interweave the various threads of his narrative without loss of overall clarity. Without at present attempting to define the point at which this fully finished narrative ends, we may note the following:

(a) Except that some routine operations are not described unless they led to a significant result (cf. ii. 31. 3; and one may suspect that ἀργυρολόγοι νῆες were sent out on other occasions than the two that are mentioned, iii. 19, iv. 50. 1, 75), the military narrative appears to aim at completeness: this is evidenced both by the abundance of relatively insignificant detail, and perhaps also by the tone of iii. 90. 1, which does not exactly apologize for confining his account of the first Athenian expedition to Sicily to the most important items, but may indicate that he thought his readers would expect the full story (see also Dover, *Maia* vi [1953], 8). We have no way of telling how selectively Thucydides treated other theatres of the war, but we are not troubled here, as at viii. 21, 92. 2, by apparent ignorance of items known to us and clearly relevant; and it is rare for him to introduce matter which calls for explanation but does not receive it. No attempt is made to provide a continuous political narrative for Athens or any other state, which is surprising in view of Thucydides' interest in political behaviour, but the fact is indisputable (see viii. 73. 3 n. ad fin.).

Lapses from the prevailing standard are neither numerous nor important:

(i) Plain error is not a certain sign of lack of revision. Conversation

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with a participant might have revealed to Thucydides that he had made serious mistakes about the topography of Pylos and Sphakteria (vol. iii, pp. 482–6)*, but without some such accidental stimulus he would have had no reason to suspect that the matter needed revision. The same applies to some other topographical doubts: at iii. 4. 5 he appears to have misplaced Malea in Lesbos (see iii. 6. 2 n.), and Gomme was probably right to suggest that he 'had no clear picture of Minoa in his mind' (vol. ii, p. 336: A. J. Beattie, *Rh. Mus.* ciii [1960], 21–43 gives a different and more plausible account of the topography, but leaves Thucydides still guilty of some lack of clarity).

(ii) Some omissions which strike us forcibly will not have seemed so important to Thucydides. Thus our estimate of Perikles' strategy would be much clarified if we knew what the expedition of ii. 56 was intended to achieve, in particular what the Athenians would have done with Epidauros if they had taken it (56. 4); and we should be grateful for a clearer exposition of the purposes of the Solygeia campaign (iv. 42–5). But Thucydides is capricious in his attention to the plans of military commanders, and he may, at some if not all periods of his writing, have thought that his business was to describe what happened rather than what was intended. The most spectacular omission of all, his silence about the raising of the tribute in 425 (see vol. iii, pp. 500–1), puzzles us more, because of his interest in the tribute at e.g. ii. 13 and his mention of the *eisphora* at iii. 19. 1 (cf. also the detail about Syracusan finances at vii. 48. 5), and Gomme felt sure that he would have remedied it; but we do not know how it came to be left out in the first instance, and that makes it harder to feel confident that he would have seen the necessity of revision here.

(iii) There are however some passages which indicate confusion or draw attention to an omission.

ii. 31. 2: the number (3,000) of the troops at Poteidaia is puzzling in the light of i. 61. 4, 64. 2, especially as we are not told till ii. 58. 2 that Phormion's 1,600 had been withdrawn. See ad loc., and iii. 17. 4 n.

ii. 72. 1 refers to an earlier (*πρότερον ἥδη*) appeal of the Spartans to the Plataians, which Thucydides has not mentioned. See also iii. 68. 1 n.

ii. 95. 3 prompts the question what had happened to Philip, mentioned only a few lines above.

iii. 7. 1 raises a similar question about Phormion, who had returned to Athens with his ships as recently as this spring (ii. 103. 1); and it raises it the more insistently since we have information about him from other sources which might be relevant. See vol. ii, pp. 234–7.

iii. 16. 1–2 leave us in some doubt about the number of ships operating round the Peloponnese in spring 428; but the solution may be, as Gomme suggested, a lacuna in 16. 1.

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iii. 56. 2, 65. 1: the Plataians assert, and the Thebans repeat, that the attack on Plataia in 431 took place *ιερομηνίᾳ*. There is no hint of this in the original account (ii. 2–6) or elsewhere: e.g. vii. 18. 2 has only *ἐν σπονδαῖς*.

iv. 14. 5: in the light of iv. 8. 7–8, it is odd that Thucydides never indicates what sort of base the Athenians now had, or where.

iv. 21. 3: for the repetition from iii. 36. 6, see vi. 72. 2 n.

iv. 41. 2: the repetition from iv. 3. 3 would presumably have been eliminated. So also perhaps that in iv. 56. 2 from ii. 27. 2.

iv. 65. 1: the special arrangement made for Morgantina presumably owes its place to the fact that it was the only, or the only substantial, exception to the rule that each side was to keep what it had; but Morgantina has not been mentioned earlier (and is not later), nor do the references to Kamarina show any reason why this exception should have been made in her favour.

iv. 66. 1: we might have expected a fuller exposition of the situation at Megara, especially of the exiles at Pagai; the brief reference to *stasis* and exiles at iii. 68. 3 does not help.

iv. 108. 2–6: not fully co-ordinated with iv. 81. 2–3; see Gomme's n.

iv. 118: the text of the truce refers to much detail that has not been explained, notably the trouble about funds at Delphi (§ 3) and the agreement Athens had made with Troizen (§ 4). § 2 τοῖς παροῦσιν also raises questions to which Thucydides has given no answer.

iv. 132. 3: the obscurity of this sentence must in large part be due to Thucydides' excessive brevity; see Gomme's n.

v. 6. 1 repeats information already given at iv. 88. 2 (Stagiros), 107. 3 (Galepsos).

v. 10. 6: the *σταύρωμα* has not been explained, and this leaves us (but presumably not Thucydides) in some doubt about the gates of Amphipolis.

v. 16 ff. raise other problems, to be discussed below.

Some minor puzzles could be added to this list, but not (I think) any of greater importance. The standard of coherence and intelligibility is high, and there is no drop in the quality of the narrative we are given till we reach the confused area round the Peace of Nikias and the Spartan–Athenian alliance. But the record is markedly selective after Delion, and it is only the northern narrative of iv. 102–v. 13 that exhibits the real finish. References to events elsewhere are sporadic and mostly scrappy: iv. 109. 1, half a sentence to the Long Walls of Megara; 117 leading up to the truce of 423; 133.1 Thespiae; 133. 2–3 the temple of Hera at Argos and Chryse the priestess; 134 Tegea and Mantinea; v. 1 the Delians; 3. 5 the loss of Panakton; only 4–5, the mission of Phaiax to the west receives extended treatment. This imbalance, never corrected, must be connected with Thucydides'

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exile; and it is significant that, at the time of writing this last part of the Archidamian War, he had not used the Peloponnesian sources now available to him (v. 26. 5) to fill the gaps in iv. 102–v. 13, or to supply the detail we miss at iv. 66. 1.

On the other hand, iv. 118–19, the full text of the truce of 423 with the decree of the Athenian assembly and the full list of oath-takers, marks a new departure. iv. 16, the Pylos truce of 425, might be thought to foreshadow this development, with its free use of documentary language and the full detail about the rations allowed to the Spartans on Sphakteria. But this last is explicable in the light of Thucydides' interest later in the provisioning of these Spartans, at iv. 26. 4–27. 1, 39. 2; and documentary language, though not to the same extent, shows through in the treaty between the Akarnanians and Amprakia in iii. 114. 3. Above all, there is in iv. 16 no detail that calls for explanation that has not been given in the narrative, and it is this, with the full verbatim transcription, that constitutes the real innovation at iv. 118–9. Brasidas has still two speeches of normal type to deliver thereafter, iv. 126 and v. 9; in this respect the only innovation is the argument between the Boeotians and Athenians at iv. 97. 2–99, a far longer piece of *oratio obliqua* than is to be found elsewhere, even in viii.

(b) The narrative is ordered in a firm chronological framework of numbered years, each divided into summer and winter. Most events fall easily and naturally into one of these divisions. When the operations of a single force cross a seasonal boundary, this is noted: so ii. 92. 7/93. 1, iii. 102. 7/105. 1, v. 12. 2/13. 1. Thucydides rarely indicates time within his summer or winter, mostly to note that an event came at the beginning or end of winter, at the beginning of spring or in the last part of summer (*τελευτῶντος*, cf. viii. 25. 1 n.); the two instances of *θέρους μεσοῦντος* fall outside this section (v. 57. 1, vi. 30. 1), but we have three mentions of autumn (cf. viii. 108. 2 n.); there are a few references to the degree of ripeness of the crops, but these are almost part of the story, as iii. 15. 2, iv. 84. 1, certainly are; the precision of ii. 78. 2, the autumn rising of Arcturus, is unusual, but that was a familiar landmark in the agricultural calendar (vol. iii, pp. 706–10, vol. iv, p. 20). Balancing this general vagueness we have a clear and determined effort to keep events in their strict chronological order, at the cost of frequently breaking off one narrative in order to keep us abreast of what was happening elsewhere at about the same time. Gomme (vol. ii, p. 413) noted the fragmentation of the Sicilian campaign at iii. 86, 90, 99, 103, iv. 1, as an extreme instance of Thucydides' adherence to this principle, which he nowhere states or argues though it is clear beyond question in his practice.

Breaches of the principle are infrequent, and almost all quite explicit. When they are put together, it is apparent that they derive

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mostly from Thucydides' habit, observable in his practice elsewhere, of mentioning an item only at the point when it becomes fully relevant: thus the detail of the Peloponnesian walls round Plataia is given at iii. 21 when it is relevant for the Plataian escape, not at ii. 78. 1 when they were being built. This cannot be called a breach of the chronological order, as the following can.

ii. 65. 6: Perikles' death is recorded over a year before its time, presumably because Thucydides thought this last crisis of his career was the more appropriate place to sum up his character and achievement. The actual date is clearly indicated.

iii. 34. 1: Paches' action at Notion brings in mention of the Persian capture of Kolophon, which had not been noted when it occurred but is here stated to have taken place at the time of the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, i.e. over three years earlier. This, the most striking displacement in this part of the work, may be related to Thucydides' apparently late realization of the important part Persia was due to play in the war (below).

iii. 68. 3: the anticipatory notice of the uses to which the land of Plataia was put involves some confusion, for which see Gomme's n.

iv. 50. 3: for the possibility that the Athenian embassy to Persia is here somewhat anticipated, see Lewis, 71 n. 140.

iv. 70 ff.: at the point when Brasidas' presence in the neighbourhood of Sikyon and Corinth becomes relevant to the Athenian operation against Megara (70. 1), he is introduced and we are told very briefly why he was there; but we have to wait till after the conclusion of the narrative about Megara (74. 4), the recital of quite other matters (75–7), Brasidas' own journey north up to the Macedonian border (78–79. 1), before we are given adequate explanation why he had set off in the first place (79. 2–81. 1). Criticism of Thucydides' procedure here has centred on the interruption of his account of Brasidas' movements between 74. 1 and 78, not a breach but an example of his regular method (see Gomme's n. to 78. 1, and *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History* 134–7; but the fact that the items come in order of the impact they made at Athens is surely a product of Thucydides' method, not his reason for adopting it). The delay in the explanation of 70. 1 is more disquieting; if the plot against Boeotia could be explained (76) at length as an introduction to the first stage of its implementation (77. 1), 70 could have been interrupted to accommodate what we find later in 79–80. The elaborate arrangement of the material must be deliberate, but this feature of it remains obscure.

iv. 80. 3–4: no indication is given of the date of this earlier murder of helots (contrast iii. 34. 1).

v. 4–5: it is hardly abnormal that Thucydides should only now (5. 3) tell us that Lokroi had not made peace with Athens in 424, but their agreement with Phaiakai (5. 2) must precede his negotiations in

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Sicily (4. 6). and it might have been expected that Thucydides would have put this in its chronological place. More generally, the voyage of Phaiax must have taken an appreciable time, and in Thucydides' normal practice it could have been split into two or more parts, each in its chronological place. See Gomme's n. to 5. 1: his explanation, that this 'reflects the manner in which Thucydides himself was informed', assimilates this to phenomena found in viii (below, pp. 373-4) but rare elsewhere.

Apart from this last instance, the exceptions to Thucydides' rule are minimal, in contrast to the regular exemplification of it. His not infrequent forward references, to a change in circumstances since the time of the event he is relating, are in a different category. The date of the change may be unknown to us, but for a contemporary reader it was a help, not a hindrance, to be told that the walls of Amphipolis in 424 were not the walls he would see now (iv. 103. 5). The questions raised here are about the date of composition, whether of the original version or of a later addition, and will be treated in App. 2, pp. 405-14.

(c) The story is told from a single consistent viewpoint. Changes of mind or of emphasis, such as that between vi. 1. 1 and ii. 65. 11 (see App. 2, p. 427), hardly arise for the Archidamian War, and there is no such fluctuation in his estimate of the principal actors as we see in his account of the Athenian oligarchs in viii (below). Yet his many informants will have seen what they reported to him from very various points of view, and the uniformity in what we read has been imposed by the author. (It is a related phenomenon, that Thucydides hardly ever records factual variants, as Herodotus does; passages such as ii. 5. 6 are very exceptional, and his normal practice, once he has made up his own mind, is to present the result to the reader without allowing him the option to choose between conflicting versions.)

The language used at the beginning of ii perhaps betrays some uncertainty in Thucydides' mind, whether the attack on Plataia or the invasion of Attica should be reckoned as the actual beginning of the war (see Gomme's n. to ii. 19. 1). Gomme also thought that he detected signs of an incomplete remodelling of the opening chapters of this book (22. 1 n.), but see J. de Romilly, *REAlxiv* (1962), 287-99.

3. *The Sicilian Books*

No reader of Thucydides is likely to feel that the narrative of the Athenian expedition to Sicily is an unelaborated first draft. It is indeed the complexity of the writing that creates difficulties here, mostly to be solved by reinterpretation or emendation, though in many cases some awkwardness remains: thus the sequence *τοσοῦτον* - - - *ὅσον* - - - *ώστε* at vii. 28. 3 is an obstacle at first reading of this

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involved sentence, and something seems to have slipped in another complicated sentence at vii. 57. 4 (see ad locc.). Historiographical incoherences, which I list under the same headings as in the previous section, are trivial enough.

(a) vi. 4. 1 προδόντος τὴν χώραν, if the text is correct, appears to have been too much condensed.

vi. 16. 3 presupposes that Nikias had charged Alkibiades with ἄνοια, which he has not.

vi. 32. 3-41: it is odd that the earlier Athenian intervention in Sicily is nowhere mentioned in the debate at Syracuse.

vi. 44. 3, 46. 2: similarly, the earlier alliance with Rhegion, and the part played by Rhegion at the time of the earlier expedition, appear very relevant for the negotiations with this city now, but there is no hint of Rhegion's past record.

vi. 46. 3: the reference to Greek cities in the neighbourhood of Segesta can hardly be anything but inadvertence.

vi. 53. 3-54. 1: for the misleading expression of Thucydides' reason for introducing the Peisistratid excursus, and for the likely explanation, see vol. iv. p. 328.

vi. 72. 2: on the second 'introduction' of Hermokrates, see ad loc.

vi. 103. 4: the generals now deposed included a Herakleides son of Lysimachos (73. 1), and it is surprising that Thucydides does not in some way distinguish the Herakleides now appointed from his predecessor.

(vi. 104. 2 *Τεριναῖον κόλπον* appears to be a mistake, but Thucydides may never have realized this; cf. p. 363 above, on Pylos.)

vii. 9: no account has been given of Perdikkas' change of sides.

vii. 31. 4: we are not told why the Naupaktos squadron now has 18 ships in place of the twenty at 19. 5, but in view of Thucydides' practice in viii this is probably not significant.

vii. 44. 2: for the difficulty of making ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ fully intelligible, see vol. iv. p. 478.

vii. 48. 9: the amount of repetition within 48 and between 48 and 49 is such as to suggest a need for revision.

(b) vi. 73. 5: for the possibility that there is some chronological displacement here, see vi. 93. 4 n.

vii. 27-8: Thucydides has not made clear the extent to which various sections of this excursus look forward beyond the summer of 413. For the suggestion that parts of it, but not the whole, might eventually have been placed somewhere in viii, see vol. iv. 404.

(c) There is no large shift in Thucydides' viewpoint visible within vi-vii, but ii. 65. 11, written after the war, shows that some shift took place after the composition of the Sicilian books.

But this is a single-line story, even more than iv. 102-v. 13. At vi. 7 we are given an episode of the conflict between Sparta and Argos,

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and an item of northern history: thereafter there is nothing till we come to the involvement of Sparta in the Sicilian affair at 88. 7, and after that only vi. 95, 105, vii. 9 could be said to have no direct connection with the Sicilian expedition. From vii. 34 onwards the historian never even glances away from Syracuse.

That might be due to the combatants' concentrating their energies on the expedition and connected events, and nothing in vi-vii indicates any kind of gap. Some passages early in viii do however show clearly that important matters have been passed over.

viii. 3. 1: Agis' expedition to the Malian Gulf cannot be unconnected with the security of Herakleia Trachinia, though the name of Herakleia is, curiously, not mentioned in the passage. This area was last mentioned at v. 52. 1, when the Boeotians took Herakleia over and the Spartans were angry at this. Something is missing from this story, though the gap may be in v rather than in vi-vii.

viii. 5. 4-5: the death of Artaxerxes was reported at iv. 50. 3, where nothing was said about the succession; and nothing has been said of Pissouthnes, the then satrap of Sardis, since iii. 34. 2. Here at 5. 4 we encounter, not very fully introduced, Dareios and Tissaphernes who are to play a large part in what follows. At 5. 5 we are told that Amorges son of Pissouthnes was in revolt in Karia, but it is not made clear till 54. 3 that Athens was committed to the support of Amorges. For a possible indication of the date of the revolt and death of Pissouthnes, see viii. 108. 4 n. and Lewis 80-1; Athenian support of Amorges had probably begun by 414 (see 5. 5 n.). This is an item of such importance for the events narrated in viii, and for the fortunes of Athens in general, that we cannot suppose that Thucydides meant to leave us in the dark about it.

viii. 16. 3: we need some explanation of the wall the Athenians had built at Teos.

viii. 19. 3: equally, we need to be told the circumstances in which Ephesos had been lost to Athens.

All but the first of these are aspects of Thucydides' failure to keep us informed about Athens' relations with Persia in the period immediately before the opening of book viii. The remedy should have been revision of vi-vii with the addition of this information

4. *Book viii*

This last unfinished book presents a radically different picture. Since the problems have all been discussed in this volume, I list them as briefly as possible, and I omit some borderline cases: thus 1. 3 where Thucydides gives only the vaguest indication of the duties of the *probouloi* and none of their number, or the misleading indication at 2. 1 that numerous neutrals now joined the Spartans. I have however

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included some items of very little importance, for their value as indications.

(a) 5. 2: it is rare for Thucydides to use technical terms such as ἀρμοστής, and the common Greek equivalent ἄρχων has been used just above.

11. 3: wholly unclear what ships can have been recalled.

21: Thucydides knows of an Athenian decree in favour of Samos, but apparently not the content of the decree of which we have fragments.

23. 5: the account of Astyochos' operations in Lesbos breaks off in the middle, and nothing is said of what the land force (22. 1) did.

24. 2: the Athenian forts in the territory of Erythrai were presumably of recent construction, but we have not been told so.

29. 2: whatever text and interpretation is adopted, this agreement could have been expressed more clearly.

30. 2: two groups of a thousand hoplites were mentioned at 25. 1, but one of them has vanished without trace.

ibid.: the numbers here given for Athenian ships show that Thucydides has missed out a substantial movement in the preceding chapters (see pp. 28–9 above, § 8).

31. 3–4: Phokaia and Kyme here appear to have joined the Spartan side, but we have not been told of this (cf. 22. 1 n.).

32. 2: the number of hoplites suggests an error either here or at 17. 1; cf. 25. 2 with n.

32. 3: emendation removes some of the difficulties of this section, but η τοὺς Αθηναίους – – – κακώσειν remains very obscure.

33. 1: the breakdown of Astyochos' squadron into nationalities should come earlier, especially as the Corinthians have been mentioned at 32. 1.

35. 3: in this book Thucydides normally gives the number of ships in any squadron he mentions, but not here, or at 41. 1, 80. 4. In the last case we can guess the figure from 100. 5, 102. 1; the lack of a figure at 41. 1 makes it hard to calculate the number of ships Astyochos left at Miletos (pp. 29–30, § 12).

38. 3: Dobree's δλίγοντ seems a necessary emendation, but the text still fails to make it clear what Pedaritos had been doing.

48. 5: ὑπεσχῆσθαι requires previous explanation.

52: however we interpret this difficult passage, it is hard to acquit Thucydides of some obscurity of expression.

56: Thucydides' language is equivocal here, on the question whether Tissaphernes or Alkibiades was responsible for raising Persian demands.

58. 1: the treaty is said to have been made in the Maiandros plain, whereas Tissaphernes had gone to Kaunos to negotiate it, and 57. 2 implies that it was completed there. It is also relevant (see below) that

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58. 5-7 refer to 'the king's ships', whereas in 59 and elsewhere they are 'the Phoenician ships', and Thucydides often writes as if Tissaphernes had full control of them.

64. 5: Thucydides speculates, with the implication that he does not know, about the effect of establishing oligarchy in states other than Thasos.

67. 1: there are very strong reasons for thinking that Thucydides was wrong about the numbers of the constitutional commission.

67. 3: Thucydides' telescoping of the actual enactment has left us no reference for 'the Five Thousand' except 65. 3, and we are not told that the programme there outlined had now been carried.

71. 1: emendation will not fully reduce this sentence to order, and it may be the conflation of two versions.

83. 2 would be more intelligible if it related to some recent action by Alkibiades which Thucydides has failed to record.

86. 4: no notice is taken of 82. 1-2.

87: fuller information would almost certainly have necessitated drastic modification of these speculations, which seem to be based on views current at the time in the Peloponnesian fleet.

92. 2: Thucydides appears not to know of subsequent decrees, passed earlier than spring 409, for the murderers of Phrynicos.

94. 2: the uncertainty about Agesandridas' intentions is uncharacteristic.

95: in view of Diod. xiii. 34. 2-3, 36. 3-4, Thucydides' account of the battle of Eretria may be incomplete. It is also unusual that he does not give the number of ships that sailed with Thymochares or the number already at Eretria, but only the eventual total.

95. 7: it is not explained that Oreos, not mentioned elsewhere, is identical with the Hestiaia of i. 114. 3, vii. 57. 2.

98. 1: the sentence gives the impression that Thucydides intended to account for all the main leaders, but he omits Antiphon, mentioned no further back than 90. 2.

101. 3: the order of the names Lekton-Larisa-Hamaxitos is inconsistent.

105. 3: the later phases of the battle, especially the retreat of the Syracusans, are not clearly explained. (Diod. xiii. 40. 4 shows that a radically different version was current in antiquity.)

The most captious criticism could not produce a comparable list from any other book of Thucydides.

(b) 45. 1: the backward leap in time is unexampled in Thucydides, and the formula with which it is introduced is not found in earlier books. We can roughly calculate (44. 4 n.) that the Peloponnesian fleet was not established at Rhodes before 15 January 411. The date of Alkibiades' secession to the court of Tissaphernes is more problematic, but it must go back at least to some time in November

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412 (p. 186 above). The material dealt with in 45 ff. is different in kind from that of the preceding narrative, but that would not normally have stopped Thucydides from putting each item in its chronological place, and his failure to do so here has left us with problems of a kind which he does not usually create for us. The most controversial is the question whether 29 and 45.2 describe the same transaction or two separate occasions; and we should understand Tissaphernes' purposes better if we knew at what point in the earlier narrative he had introduced the plan of bringing up a Phoenician fleet, so offhandedly mentioned for the first time at 46. 1 as already in preparation (*ἄσπερ παρεσκευάζετο*: contrast ii. 23. 2 *ἄσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο*, for which the reader is adequately prepared by ii. 17. 4). Even if Thucydides intended to maintain the overlap between these two sections, the correlation between them urgently called for improvement. As it is, we have only 50. 2, which tells us that the events covered in 45–51 did not end later than the last days of December, and 52, which is too obscure to give us much help.

53. 4: Thucydides writes as if Peisandros addressed the assembly as soon as he arrived in Athens, and left almost immediately afterwards. This cannot be right (see 54. 4 n. and pp. 186–7); and in spite of 54. 4 *ώστε μηκέτι διαιμέλλεσθαι*, Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousai* strongly suggests that the oligarchs' terror campaign did not begin till well after Peisandros' departure (pp. 190–3 above). If Thucydides had been able to check the chronology, his normal practice would have led him to split this episode into at least two separate parts.

61. 2: if this occurred while Astyochos was still in Rhodes, it should have been recorded before the end of winter (60. 3).

63. 3: again, and with much the same introductory formula as at 45. 1, there is a backward leap of uncertain extent. This is again uncharacteristic, but it raises no problems comparable to those raised by the leap at 45. 1, though it encouraged Holzapfel to treat 63. 2 and 79 as a doublet, wrongly.

98. 2: judging by the standard of ii–iv, we might have expected Thucydides to tell us about this incident in its chronological place.

99: the earlier despatch of sixteen ships to the Hellespont would normally have been recorded when it occurred.

100. 4: similarly Thrasybulos' movement to Eresos (*προαφίγμένος* – – – *ἡν*: contrast iv. 2. 2 *προαφίκτο*, a simple reference back to iii. 115. 2).

(c) The shifts in Thucydides' view of the Athenian oligarchs have been fully discussed at pp. 252–3 above and under the relevant passages: the most striking is the contrast between 89. 3–4, where the group headed by Theramenes is merely insincere and ambitious, and 97. 2 where the regime they set up is given the highest praise. This is

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the most significant indication we have for the early stages of Thucydides' composition. The inconsistency between 89 and 97, and the others discussed at pp. 252–3, do not at all resemble the shift of view between vi. 1. 1 and ii. 65. 11, and cannot be accounted for by supposing long intervals between the writing of the passages concerned, in which Thucydides came to see the persons and their actions in a different light. It is far more plausible to suppose that he wrote out, often in a characteristically complex style, reports that he had received from informants of differing political views, leaving it to a later stage to integrate these into a unified account written from his own point of view. About some questions, such as the character of Theramenes, he may well not have made his own mind up at the time when he wrote this first draft.

The same hypothesis will account for some of the inequalities in the narrative. We may see the narrative of 39–44 as a single block, derived mainly from Peloponnesian sources, and 45 ff. as another block, derived from an informant in close touch with Alkibiades and from informants in the fleet at Samos, and suppose again that it was left to a later stage to co-ordinate these two blocks. On a smaller scale, we may imagine that the fact that some ships had been sent to the Hellespont earlier reached him first as part of the main report about Mindaros' move to the north (99), and he perhaps did not at this stage know exactly where the earlier mission should be fitted in; and similarly for other details that seem out of place. 92.2 seems a particularly clear case, that he wrote out what he heard of the murder of Phrynicos from an informant who had had to leave Athens shortly afterwards, and did not wait for the further information which he could be sure of getting later. Note that this is the opposite of the procedure attributed to Thucydides by Rehm at vii. 4. 1, 7. 1, and by Wilamowitz at v. 76. 3, of leaving a blank in his manuscript to be filled in later with the relevant matter. For the first two cases see vol. iv, pp. 476–7. The third case is slightly more plausible: but the text is readily understood, and given Thucydides' taste for bold linguistic experiments, apparent in vi. 76. 4 (cf. Dover 10 f.), the bizarre expressions may stand. The evidence of book viii suggests that he drafted continuous prose even where he knew that he would later have to add or alter.

If it was Thucydides' normal habit to write up in fully literary form his informants' reports as he received them, that settles some of the questions raised by Gomme about Thucydides' 'notes'. Thus at vol. ii, p. 287, he remarks that Thucydides must at once have received full detail about the Plataians' escape in winter 428/7, and in effect rejects the possibility that all this was left 'in the form of disconnected jottings' till after the war; the evidence of book viii confirms his conclusion that 'notes', here and elsewhere, 'might be virtually

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equivalent to the final narrative'. The process of unifying such 'notes' into a consistent narrative might leave many of them untouched since their first composition. But we are left with no clue at all to the question why he so abruptly gave up composing this first draft, and in what form he kept whatever materials he collected for the history of the years 410–404. It is clear from v. 26. 1 that he believed he was in a position to complete his task, but after viii. 109 there was nothing that his literary executors thought coherent enough to give out for copying; and that implies more than a temporary interruption, of a kind that can easily be imagined, but instead a change of practice which is harder to account for.

If book viii represents so early a stage in Thucydides' composition, and still more if he himself had not yet fully made up his mind how to treat some parts of the Athenian revolution, it is fully intelligible that there are no speeches in the book, and credible that some passages of indirect speech were meant as foundation for speeches to be elaborated later in *oratio recta*. In the matter of the treaties viii. 57–9 offer what may be a helpful clue. It is hardly possible that Thucydides wrote these three chapters as they now stand at the same time, and it is the treaty text in 58, with its reference to 'the king's ships' (above) that is the misfit, inserted (see 58. 1 n. and 58. 7 n § 2) to replace a presumably briefer summary in Thucydides' own words. That leaves us with two possibilities. (a) Thucydides himself cancelled the original version of 58 because it was in some way unsatisfactory, and substituted the text of the treaty, conscious that this left him with some rewriting to do to co-ordinate 57 with the new 58; and this has an analogy in the makeshift introduction to the Persian factor at 5. 4–5, which presupposes some rewriting which Thucydides never completed. (b) The substitution may be the work of the editor, who in spite of Schwartz's extravagances must of course have existed. We need not attribute to him any ambition to amplify or remodel Thucydides' work; faced with two alternative versions, he would simply have chosen the fuller of the two.

The second explanation has the advantage that it can be extended to deal with anomalies elsewhere. Gomme (vol. iii, p. 681) had already speculated that the verbatim text of the Peace of Nikias had replaced an earlier outline in narrative form; when the commentary doubts (vol. iv, pp. 62–3, 131–2) if Thucydides would have kept the full texts of v. 47, 77, 79 in his final version, it might with equal reason have doubted if he inserted them in the first place; the unexplained detail and the documentary completeness of iv. 118–19 are disquieting (Gomme, vol. iii, pp. 606–7, reserved judgement on this); and for myself I find it hard to believe (*pace* Steup and Gomme on v. 24. 1) that Thucydides would for any consideration have repeated an entire list of 17 names so close together as v. 19. 2, 24. 1. That is not to assert

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a 'law of style' which would universally have excluded alien matter such as these texts from a true history (Schwartz 28–30; Tod and Bury as cited and rebuked by Gomme, vol. iv, p. 62); the offence is against the economy of Thucydides' own historiographical method, as displayed in his account of the Archidamian War.

The hypothesis that in all these cases the editor substituted the full verbatim text for an original Thucydidean summary may seem too sweeping a solution for difficulties that can, up to a point, be met and have been met in other ways; but it implies no more than that the editor, when faced with a choice between a fuller and a briefer version consistently preferred the former. That we do not find such texts in other parts of the *History* will mean that the editor was not there faced with such a choice: that is, where Thucydides was satisfied with his own rendering of a treaty, he had not kept a copy of the full text. It would not be surprising if he had kept the text of the truce of 423, for in this part of the work (iv. 102–v. 13, see p. 364 above) there was almost certainly further work to be done for areas other than the Thraceward. On this view it is not the full transcription of the truce that marks this section of the Archidamian War as unfinished, but the cessation of detailed reports about southern Greece after the Delion campaign.

5. v. 14–116

No simple solution has yet been found for the difficulties in Thucydides' account of the Peace of Nikias and the Spartan–Athenian alliance. Perhaps the oddest of these is the confusion over the various occasions when the allies of Sparta assembled there and departed. The embassies which left Sparta at 27. 1 after the conclusion of the peace and the alliance are described as *αἴπερ παρεκλήθησαν ἐς αὐτά*, and (disregarding for the moment the complication introduced by mention of the alliance) the reader inevitably connects this with the summons of the allies to vote on the peace at 17. 2; or rather, he would do so but for the conflicting report at 22. 1. Here the allies are at Sparta, and the recalcitrants are urged to accept the Peace, but they refuse on the same grounds as before (*ἡπερ καὶ τὸ πρώτον*); the wording suggests that this is not the same meeting that originally discussed the peace, and that is eminently reasonable if this meeting follows the journeys described in 21 which must take some time. (If Lloyd-Jones's *αὐθίς* for the *αὐτόν* of the first clause is accepted, the point is fully explicit: see vol. iv, p. 22.) At 22. 2 the embassies are dismissed, so that 27. 1 makes less sense than ever.

Further, the wording of 22. 1 strongly suggests that the objections of the states that refused the Peace had been stated previously; and this might have been true at some stage in the development of the

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work, for instance in the narrative version which Gomme thought might have been replaced by the present 18. As the text stands, we have only the statement at 17. 2 that Boeotia, Corinth, Elis, and Megara voted against the Peace, with no explanation but the bare fact that they were not satisfied. The Megarian objection is so obvious that it might have been left unstated. For Boeotia we have the reference to the surrender of Panakton in the treaty text (18. 7), and an impression that they were not very deeply concerned and were waiting on events (31. 6, 32. 7). The objections of Corinth are however expounded fully enough at 30. 2-3; but the Elean grievance against Sparta is explained in 31. 2-5 not as the reason why they rejected the Peace but as their ground for joining the Argive alliance, though it looks very much as if the quarrel over Lepreon had begun before the negotiation of the Peace.

This makes it very hard to imagine the form and content of an earlier narrative version of 18, except on the supposition that it was written at a different time and on a different plan from those of the narrative surrounding 30-1. The problem is thus one of the order of composition of the *History*, to my mind one of the least tractable of such problems, and it will be discussed in App. 2, pp. 429 f. The problems connected with the Spartan-Athenian alliance also belong there: see vol. iv, p. 21, where I missed the appropriateness of a reference to the alliance for the phrase *τοὺς πρὶν ἐχθίστους*. The problem of the six years and ten months at 25. 3 is perhaps to be solved by emendation (see ad loc.), but the clash between this section and 35. 2 remains.

Once past 27. 1 we enter on a stretch of continuous, if rather disjointed, narrative, 27. 2-84, 114-16. I list the troublesome passages under the same headings.

(a) 32. 1 appears to neglect iv. 123. 4.

34. 1: the *neodamodeis* are not explained. Thucydides does not normally introduce such terms at all: cf. pp. 11-12 above on viii. 5. 2, but there a reader unfamiliar with *ἀρμοστής* could much more easily gather its meaning from the context.

36. 1: the considerable difficulties of this passage are of a kind to suggest that it is a first draft which would have been revised.

39. 2-3: the threefold mention of the Spartan hope to recover Pylos in exchange for Panakton could hardly have survived revision.

39. 3: the statement that Panakton was dismantled is very abrupt, and is not clarified till 42.

40: it is not certain that Thucydides has confused the chronology in 40. 1, or compressed the opening of 40. 2 too far, but some clarification would be desirable.

49. 4 is another somewhat opaque sentence.

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52. 2 tells us surprisingly little about Alkibiades' Peloponnesian expedition, but perhaps this is what Thucydides intended.

55. 1: *ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων* is unexplained; but Thucydides' general vagueness about this conference may reflect his view of its importance.

59. 4: Thucydides' view of the situation of the Argive army is clear enough, but his grounds would be clearer if he had told us at what stage the Boeotians came on the scene.

61. 4: the hostages at Orchomenos are not explained.

66. 1: the element of surprise (*όρωσι δὶ δλίγουν*) has not been made intelligible.

83. 4: both the blockade (if that is what it is) of Macedon, and the frustration of Nikias' expedition to the north, call for more explanation than they receive.

115. 3: the Corinthian action and its reasons call out for explanation.

(b) 48. 2: the prior alliance of Elis, Argos, and Mantinea has not been mentioned in its chronological place.

82. 5: if Thucydides knew that the formal renewal of the alliance of Argos and Athens did not take place till the spring of 416, it is a little misleading to mention it here and not when it was completed.

There are no major dislocations here comparable to those we find in viii, but an unusually high incidence of obscure and not wholly intelligible sentences for which emendation is not, so far as we can see, a remedy. The campaigns of summer 418 and some other lesser matters are narrated fairly fully, and the main difficulty with the battle of Mantinea may be one which Thucydides had not appreciated; in these cases we may suppose that his information reached him soon after the event, that he wrote a full account at once on the basis of this information, and that he might never have felt a need to amplify or amend (cf. pp. 373-4 above).

The impression that the central part of book v is unfinished work rests partly on the obscurities of formulation noted above, partly on the scrappy and disjointed character of the narrative apart from the campaigns of 418. That might be due to the character of the events to be narrated (see Gomme, vol. iv, p. 63), but Thucydides' performance elsewhere shows that he was capable of imposing better order on the material, and the obscurities of expression suggest that he had not yet finished working on this section. (A similar explanation has sometimes been offered for the scrappy character of viii, e.g. Weil [introd. pp. xxvii-xxviii], but this falls far short of accounting for the anomalies listed above.) A firm indication is given by the fact that the narrative is almost entirely confined to the Peloponnese and Melos, with some

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necessary but seldom very full reference to Athens; references to events in the north and elsewhere are brief in the extreme, and there is at least one omission known to us.

32. 1: surrender of Skione.

ibid.: restoration of the Delians.

32. 2: six words on the beginning of a war between Phokis and Lokris.

35. 1: Dion and Thyssos.

39. 1: loss of Mekyberna.

51–52. 1 deals a little more fully with trouble at Herakleia Trachinia, but Diod. xii. 77. 4 shows that there was more to say.

82. 1: revolt of Dion, not co-ordinated with 35. 1.

ibid.: Spartan action in Achaia.

ML 77. 2–10 refers to operations in Thrace, the result of a change of plan which transferred to Euthydemos a payment originally intended for Demosthenes, whose destination at that stage is lost in a lacuna.

ibid. 16–17, a payment to another general and to Autokles for a purpose unknown, which might or might not have been something that we should have expected Thucydides to record.

83. 4: see above, and cf. ML 77. 18–21.

Data about the revolt of Pissouthnes, relevant for viii., may be missing from here, but the uncertain chronology leaves it uncertain where these should have been inserted.

The impression that this stretch of v is incomplete is justified, and we may reasonably suppose that a revised version would have drawn some threads tighter; the uncertainty and divided aims of the Greek states in the period before Mantinea could have been conveyed by other means than a disjointed narrative. The narrative as we have it makes no obvious call for speeches, as many readers feel that viii. does, nor are there here comparable pieces of indirect speech that might have been converted into *oratio recta*; v. 69 would not be improved by conversion into a series of commanders' speeches such as we find for some battles elsewhere. This stretch might have been left without speeches, like vii. 16–60, or Thucydides might have felt, on returning to book v., that the situation could be clarified by reporting more fully what had been said at one of the many meetings that he mentions. Of the three documents incorporated, 47 hardly merits full citation, for the reasons set out in v. 47. 12 n.; and from what we have of it (see viii. 73. 3 n.) it looks as if the Athenian–Argive treaty of spring 416 contained matter of much greater significance, especially for the development of Athenian policy; but the wording of viii. 73. 3 does not suggest that Thucydides, when he wrote this passage, had any intention of going more deeply into these matters. The Argive–Spartan documents of 77 and 79 are more

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deeply suspect because of their extreme obscurity and their very brief effect (see v. 76. 3 n.).

6. *Book i*

The main problems of the first book are compositional and fall to be treated in App. 2 (pp. 415–23): if Thucydides' view of the causes of the war shifted, that would be relevant here only if it produced more blatant contradiction than we actually find. Incongruences of the kind examined in this appendix are comparatively rare. Since their incidence might be relevant to the compositional problem, it will be best to take this book section by section.

(i) *Introduction*

Many commentators have found the argument as a whole difficult to follow, though not impossible, and have speculated that Thucydides would have clarified or even expanded it in revision: cf. vol. i, p. 136 with n. 1.

(ii) *Kerkyra*

27. 2: it is not clear whether the discrepancy between the 3,000 hoplites here and the 2,000 of 29. 1 calls for explanation or emendation.

42. 2 ὑπαρχούσης πρότερον is a very odd expression on any interpretation, but without knowing why Thucydides adopted it in the first place we cannot feel sure that he would have changed it.

46. 4: the topographical problem that troubled Gomme may be unreal: see N. G. L. Hammond, *Studies in Greek History* 447–70 (=JHS lxv [1945], 26–37), esp. 469 n. 1.

51. 4 probably calls for emendation.

(iii) *Poteidaia*

56. 1, 57. 1 εὐθύς proved for Schwartz (92–101) that the join between Kerkyraika and Poteidiatiaka had been clumsily made by an editor who had not understood the length of the gap between Sybota and the first Athenian action against Poteidaia. 57. 1 can cause no real offence, for the Athenians no doubt did begin their preparations soon after Sybota, in the winter; the trouble at 56. 1 arises from Thucydides' linkage of these two sets of events as successive quarrels between Corinth and Athens, which is legitimate enough in itself but has involved him in jumping, with this εὐθύς, over the earlier stages of the northern business in which Perdikkas was more prominent. Schwartz indeed complained also of the way in which the text shifts from Corinth to Perdikkas, and derided Steup (96 n. 2) for saying no more than that Thucydides had managed the transition badly; but

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that is surely what happened, and one cannot feel certain that the awkwardness would have been seen by him as calling for revision.

59. 2: in a full narrative, we might expect to have been told what had become of Derdas himself.

61. 4 Pausanias, and 62. 2 Iolaos, are not explained.

62-3: if $\mu\eta\nu\iota\epsilon\kappa\tau\omega$ at ii. 2. 1 is retained, the difficulty which Gomme (vol. i, pp. 421-5) found over the date of the battle at Poteidaia is not unreal, but the probable explanation, as with the preceding points, is that Thucydides did not set out to describe these campaigns so fully as those of ii-iv.

(iv) *Pentekontaetia*

(a) The problems here are not about individual passages, but about Thucydides' intentions and the odd proportions of the excursus.

97. 1 *διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων* and 97. 2 *ἐν οἷς τρόπῳ κατέστη* arouse expectation that the excursus will deal with the development of the original League into an empire, but only 99 in any way fulfils this. If it was worth telling us at the start that policy was deliberated in *κοιναὶ ξύνοδοι*, we should surely also be told when and in what circumstances these *ξύνοδοι* lapsed.

It is natural enough that the stark brevity of 98 and 100. 1 should give way to fuller detail in the later stages, as 115. 2-117, but an author of Thucydides' calibre might have resisted this tendency. To have dismissed the battle of the Eurymedon in five bleak lines at 100. 1, and to have devoted seven lines to the fate of a Corinthian detachment at 106, falsifies the declared purpose of the excursus.

Of the omissions listed by Gomme in vol. i, pp. 365-70, some are no doubt due to the scale of the excursus (e.g. the alliance with Segesta, and that with Phokis), others to Thucydides' concentration on Athens (so, in spite of Philochoros *FGrH* 328 F 117, the Arcadian War, which in any case comes early in the period when Thucydides' summary is at its briefest); and one, the Congress proposed by Perikles, may not be a real event (R. Seager, *Historia* xviii [1969], 129-41; A. B. Bosworth, *ibid.* xx [1971], 600-16). The abandonment of the war against Persia, whether or not the formal Peace of Kallias existed, remains a most extraordinary gap; if Drabeskos was worth a double mention (iv. 102. 2, i. 100. 3), the foundation of Amphipolis rated more than one (iv. 102. 3); later developments in Akarnania call for a firmer dating of the first Athenian involvement (ii. 68. 7-8); and ML 56. 7 raises curiosity about the degree of Peloponnesian implication in the revolt of Samos, which is far from satisfied by i. 40. 5, 41. 2).

The need for brevity hardly excuses silence about the antecedents of the operation at Halieis, 105. 1.

(b) The difficulty of establishing the chronology of the Pentekon-

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taetia is notorious, and it raises a question about the method here adopted by Thucydides, not dissimilar from the question raised by vi. 2–5. His criticism of Hellanikos (i. 97. 2) leads us to expect chronological precision. Instead we find a series of statements of interval so incomplete that many of the events, especially in the earlier part of the excursus, float completely free; for the central part of the period we can convert relative into absolute dates only because the Thirty Years' Peace is tied to Thucydides' chronology of the war by i. 87. 6, ii. 2. 1; but the astonishing vagueness of 118. 1 οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὑστερον shows how little Thucydides was concerned to provide a clear link between the last event of his Pentekontaetia, the revolt of Samos, and the beginning of the Kerkyraika. Absolute chronology is not here a consideration, and one can only suppose that the criticism of Hellanikos relates to some specific chronological errors in his work (Steup on i. 97. 2, Anhang; but see Jacoby, Introd. to Hellanikos *FGrH* 323a, p. 17).

It has however been held, most energetically in *ATL* iii. 162 ff., that the criticism implies a promise that Thucydides will at least put events in their exact chronological order; and though the promise is not in this form to be read out of the words used, it gains some colour from the frequent use of *πρῶτον*, *ἔπειτα*, *μετὰ ταῦτα*, etc., especially in the earlier parts of the excursus, while the division of the siege of Aigina between 105. 2 and 108. 4, and of the building of the Long Walls between 107. 1 and 108. 3, reminds us of his concern to preserve chronological order in the war books. But the imperfects of 109. 1–2 (contrast *ἐτελεύτησεν* at the end of 110. 4) suggest a substantial overlap between 108 and 109, and a similar overlap between 104 and 105 is likely enough; the principle of exact order is not firmly enough established to compel emendation of 103. 1 δεκάτῳ ἔτει. If Thucydides had wished to enable his readers to date events within the fifty years, he could have done so with little extra trouble, but he did not do this and it is far from clear that he wished to.

(v) 118–146

There is hardly anything to note from the end of the book. The excursus on Pausanias has been heavily criticized (see Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* 465–6), the most damaging point being that there is not enough time before Pausanias' recall from Byzantium for the correspondence and negotiation Thucydides has crammed in here; if this excursus was based on a written source (H. D. Westlake, *CQ* n.s. xxvii [1977], 95–110), Thucydides was not sufficiently critical of its statements, but there is no certainty that he would have seen a need to revise it.

The unsurprising result of this review is to find the transition to the Poteidiatika at 56–7 awkward, and the Pentekontaetia excursus

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an imperfectly co-ordinated and probably hasty piece of work. Otherwise the first book, at this level, shows rather fewer signs of incompleteness than the main narrative of the Archidamian War.

7. *Conclusions*

(a) Book viii as a whole represents an earlier stage in Thucydides' process of composition than any other part of the *History*. Down to the time of writing viii. 109, it appears that his method was to write out in full literary form the reports he received, soon after receipt of them and without waiting for the fuller information he could be sure of getting later; for several passages this is nearly demonstrable, and it is likely to be true for the whole book. There seems to be no clue to the question why these drafts stop where they do, or in what form Thucydides kept such information as he had collected for the last years of the war.

(b) The next stage would be to sort these materials out. In many cases, perhaps in most, it would not be necessary to alter his first draft, though from time to time we see from the reflection of later events that he must have done so; but there would be work to be done in assigning each item to its appropriate place, removing inconsistencies, and imposing a unitary point of view. This process is nearly complete for ii-iv. 101, perhaps as complete as it would ever have been.

(c) iv. 102-v. 13 is equally finished work as regards the Thraceward area, but needed to be completed with fuller information about events elsewhere. Similarly in vi-vii the Athenian expedition to Sicily and matters directly related to that have been fully worked out, but there are gaps elsewhere, some of them important. v. 27-84 is perhaps at an intermediate stage. Though there are few factual incoherences, the account of events in the Peloponnese and in related areas is less well ordered than we are entitled to expect from Thucydides, and awkward or imperfectly intelligible formulations are frequent enough to suggest that he had not finished working on this period; while for the north and for other areas we have only scrappy notes so brief as to suggest that they are no more than memoranda about matters that he proposed to investigate more fully when he was able to do so.

(d) The absence of speeches from viii, in spite of obvious opportunities, is adequately accounted for by the fact that this is a very early stage of the process of composition. The position is not clear for the other long stretch without speeches, v. 10-84: it is conceivable that Thucydides intended none here, or that on revision he would have decided that one or more would be helpful to understanding the period. See App. 2, p. 412, for argument in favour

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of regarding Hermokrates' speech at iv. 59–64 as a later addition to a completed narrative.

(e) Though other views can be and have been taken, the documents in iv–v and viii seem to me to be out of scale in relation to Thucydides' regular narrative method, and to introduce unexplained detail in an uncharacteristic way. This might represent the deliberate adoption of a new method, or the full verbatim documents might in the final version have been replaced by shorter summaries: the latter appears to me very much the more likely. The documents may have been placed where they stand by Thucydides as a provisional measure; or possibly the editor, finding at these points two versions, the full text and a briefer summary, thought it right to cancel the shorter version and have the fuller one copied.

APPENDIX 2

STRATA OF COMPOSITION

1. *Constitution of the Problem*

THERE are three ways of writing the history of a war which is fought during one's own lifetime. One way is to wait until it is over; the task then differs, in the nature of the evidence available, from that of writing the history of a war remote in time, but the principle is the same. The second way is to keep a kind of diary and eventually put the entries together in the right order but without revision. The third way also involves the keeping of a diary, but the recorded material is revised later and subordinated to a considered design for the work as a whole. Plain references in Thucydides to the defeat of Athens in 405/4 (ii. 65. 12, v. 26. 1 [cf. 26. 5], vi. 15. 3 f. [cf. vol. iv, pp. 242-5]) and to the total duration of the war (v. 26. 4), reinforced by other passages of books i-iv in which reference is made to events later than the Peace of Nikias (cf. pp. 407-12) suffice to prove that he did not follow the second of these three methods. His own statement (i. 1. 1) that he began to write a history of the war at the time of its outbreak tells us that he did not follow the first method either; we are not altogether free to disbelieve his statement, given the existence of 'early passages' (cf. pp. 405 f.), though we are free to believe, if the evidence is compatible with our belief, that most of his research and reflection on the events of a given year was much later in date than what he recorded during that year itself. That procedure is one form of the third of the three possible methods of writing the history of a war, and the attempt to decide which form of that method Thucydides followed is the essence of the 'composition problem'.

By the time that a war has lasted twenty years, with no end in sight, a man who intended from the start to write its history begins to wonder whether he will live long enough to see the job through; in those circumstances he is likely to begin to put his provisional narrative of its earlier years into definitive form. The Peloponnesian War lasted more than twenty years, but it had one peculiar feature which is the second ingredient of the composition problem and would in itself suffice to create such a problem. The war of which Thucydides began to write the history in 431 ended in 421 with the Peace of Nikias; he decided (v. 25 f.) to treat what followed, from 421 to 404, as constituting, with the Archidamian War, one great war. But when did he take that decision?

In v. 26. 2 he argues for the illusory nature of the peace and for the

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unity of the Peloponnesian War as if he were propounding a view not generally held, and it is true that fourth-century writers speak as if the tradition which they inherited treated 431–421 and 415–404 as two periods of war separated by a period of peace (Pl. *Mnx.* 242 E, ‘a third war’ from 415, 431–421 being the ‘second’, sc. against fellow Greeks; And. iii. 8 f.). Was Thucydides really so prescient in 421 that he went on taking notes with the intention of postponing their transformation into a continuous narrative until he should be satisfied that a lasting peace had begun? Ullrich (69) posed the question: ‘Was konnte ihn abhalten, sogleich nach dem Frieden des Nikias an die Darstellung selbst zu gehen?’

Ullrich meant this question to be rhetorical; but it actually admits of more than one answer. First, it is by no means impossible that Thucydides should have realized by 420 that no true period of peace had been inaugurated. The words he puts into the mouth of Nikias in 415 (vi. 10. 2 ὅνόματι σπονδαί) and of Alkibiades in the same debate (vi. 17. 5, ‘the Greek world had difficulty in raising enough hoplites ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ’) might reflect a thoughtless transference of the author’s view to personages of his narrative; but they might not. Since he recalls (v. 26. 4) that even at the beginning of the war an oracle ‘cited by many’ declared that it was destined to last twenty-seven years (cf. Patzer 15) it seems that others besides a sophisticated historian had motives for thinking that the Peace of Nikias would not endure. Indeed, more people may have believed in the unity of the war at the time than a generation later, and Thucydides’ arguments in v. 26. 2 may be directed against the later belief rather than against his own contemporaries. Admittedly the separation of 415–404 from 431–421 in And. iii. 8 f. is poor evidence for Athenian public opinion at any date, since it was necessary for Andokides’ argument, at a critical moment in his political career, to exaggerate the peacefulness of 421–415 and what he regards as the regular alternation of wars and peace-treaties which characterized Athenian history in the fifth century. In Pl. *Mnx.* 242 A–E, where the distortion of that history in the interests of patriotic complacency is extreme,¹ the distinction between the Archidamian War and the war of 415–404 makes it possible to say that of the three wars which Athens fought against a combination of Greek enemies in the fifth century she won the first two—a victory on points, as it were, over the century as a whole; treatment of the twenty-seven-year war as one war, lost by Athens, would have been much more injurious to Athenian self-esteem, and this may well be a reason why the ‘one war’ theory declined in the early fourth century. The use of such expressions as Δεκελεῖκὸς πόλεμος in Isoc. viii. 37 and xiv. 31 is of

¹ Cf. N. Scholl, *Der platonische Menexenos* (Rome 1959), 48–59, Ilse von Löwenclau, *Der platonische Menexenos* (Stuttgart 1961) 88–96.

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little importance either way, since Thucydides himself uses *πόλεμος* when speaking of a portion of the war, e.g. 'the first war' (v. 24. 2), 'the previous war' (vii. 18. 2), 'the subsequent war' (iv. 81. 2), in all of which 'fighting' or 'operations' is perhaps a better translation than 'war'. Many years were to pass before designation of 431–404 as 'the Peloponnesian War' became normal usage,¹ with increased awareness of the decisive bearing of that war on the history of Athens and increased recognition of the stature of Thucydides' history of it. Its potentially decisive character and the magnitude of the issues left unresolved by the Peace of Nikias may well have been better understood by politicians, generals and historians who lived through the events of 431 and 421–415 than by Athenians generally in the first half of the fourth century.

Secondly, Thucydides went into exile in 424/3 and did not return to Athens until 404 (v. 26. 5). He seems to treat this misfortune as advantageous to his work as a historian, and so it was, in one important respect: it gave him the opportunity to supplement from Peloponnesian sources the evidence already furnished by his own observation and by Athenian sources for the period 431–424. Yet at the same time it cut him off from Athenian sources for events after 424; this deficiency will have been remedied in part by encounters with Athenians abroad during the years of formal peace, and with Athenian exiles after the upheavals of 415 and 411, but 421/0, the time at which it has been supposed (on Ullrich's reconstruction of the situation) that he immediately revised for publication his material on the Archidamian War, was precisely the time at which—having tempered the sorrow of exile with the joy which a historian must feel when he sees 'the other side of the hill'—he would be most acutely aware of his lack of information from Athenians on the last three years of that war. That would have been a strong motive for delay (and cf. pp. 364 f., 391 f.).

Such expectations as may be founded on these considerations enable us to say not that Thucydides must have designed a narrative of the Archidamian War for circulation during the period 421–415 but only that he may possibly have done so. To decide (if we can) whether he did, we must go beyond general considerations and ask: what is the relation between demonstrably 'late' passages and their contexts? Do they sound like afterthoughts? Do there exist

¹ Arist. *'Αθ. π.* 27. 2, 'in the archonship of Pythodoros ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους ἐνέστη πόλεμος', taken in conjunction with 29. 1 *κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον* (sc. down to 413), may imply recognition of the unity of the war, but cf. vi. 72. 2 n. on the expression *κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον*. Diod. xii. 38. 1 and Strabo xiii. 600 treat the term 'the Peloponnesian War' as established usage. Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. 275, thinks that c. 400 the term 'the war against the Peloponnesians' would have been unambiguous at Athens, but might it not have been taken to mean the period 413–404, excluding 431–421 unless the context made the reference to that earlier war plain?

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demonstrably 'early' passages, which could not have been written after such-and-such a date? What plausible theory of Thucydides' methods of work will explain how they escaped correction or deletion? Are any sections of the work differentiated in language or in historiographical technique from the rest? Are there discrepant statements which cannot have been believed, and is there evidence of discrepant views which cannot have been held, by the same man at the same time?

Not only did the war itself possess the peculiar feature of a peace-treaty at half-time, but Thucydides' story of it also has a peculiar feature which is the third ingredient of the composition problem. Although he himself leads us to believe (notably in v. 26. 1) that he completed his task, he did not in fact complete it, for it breaks off abruptly in viii. 109 while describing the movements of Tissaphernes in the autumn of 411. It is hard to imagine circumstances in which Thucydides himself would have put into circulation any portion or instalment of his work which ended not at the end of a year, nor even at the end of a campaigning season, but halfway through a description of a journey (note *καὶ ἀφικόμενος πρῶτον --- τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι*; imagine the effect of a similar cut-off at the end of i. 61. 2 *ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον καταλαμβάνουσι τοὺς προτέρους χλίους, κ.τ.λ.*, and observe how in iv. 77. 2 *τὰλλα ἤτοι μᾶλλον ὡς --- ἀπαντησόμενος* resolves the suspense created by the preceding *ἀφικόμενος --- ἐς Σαλύνθιον --- στρατεύσας πρῶτον, κ.τ.λ.*).¹ It follows that circumstances not of his choosing (cf. p. 374) prevented Thucydides from completing his work; and from that in turn it follows that the act of publication, the physical moving of the manuscript into a situation in which it could be copied for circulation, was performed by someone other than Thucydides. We are bound to ask: did that person leave the work exactly as it was, or did he take on any kind of rewriting, rearrangement, insertion, or deletion? At least it seems that he did

¹ The abruptness of the ending makes it most unlikely that Thucydides himself deliberately divided his work at this point for any purpose, and militates against the suggestion of Adcock 103ff. that i. 1–viii. 109 had been entrusted to a friend before the continuation perished with its author in a shipwreck. The additional sentence, 'When the winter following this summer is over, the twenty-first year is completed', is present in only one (the β family) of the two families of extant Thucydidean manuscripts. Adcock 96, 'A sentence is added in our manuscripts...', 136 ff., 'These words... appear in all the manuscripts except in the Laurentianus (C) and there they are added by a "Corrector" in antiquity', and Canfora 75 ff., 'Nei manoscritti tucididei—tranne che nel Laurenziano plut. 69. 2 (del X secolo) e nei suoi discendenti ... L'espunzione è approvata da quasi tutti gli editori, in omaggio al manoscritto Laurenziano', do not convey a correct impression of the facts; in particular, it does not make sense to speak of corrections in a medieval manuscript as being made 'in antiquity', and although it is quite true that at one time an irrational degree of 'homage' was paid to C, there is nothing irrational in treating as a very late or even Byzantine interpolation an explanatory sentence present in the β manuscripts but absent from C.

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not possess material which enabled him, and perhaps not even such as might have tempted him (see, however, p. 437), to complete the narrative of 411/10 beyond viii. 109 and pass it off as Thucydides'. To discover whether he made any positive intervention in the work which we now possess we need to answer questions similar in character to that formulated above but somewhat more rigorous and restricted. Are there passages so related to their contexts that they must have been not merely inserted later (for that in itself throws no light on the question of posthumous edition) but inserted by someone who did not fully understand the context, or did not perceive that context and insertion contradicted each other, or chose a speciously appropriate point for the insertion when a genuinely appropriate point was available? Are there statements which are not only untrue but such that Thucydides cannot have believed them true and cannot have wished his readers to believe them? The questions have been framed in this way because the best-known treatment of them (by Schwartz) has offered bold affirmative answers. The answers which will be given below are negative, but should not be taken to imply that there cannot have been anything for an 'editor' or 'literary executor' to do. Unless the work which Thucydides left at his death contained all and only the sentences which the work known to us contains, in precisely the order in which they now stand, without any indication anywhere of alternative formulations and possible omissions, someone had to take decisions from time to time about the order in which items should be put, and someone had to choose between (say) a longer and a shorter formulation. There are occasions (cf. pp. 374 f.) on which the hypothesis that such a decision or choice was made provides the easiest solution of a problem; and the problem exists in the first place not because a posthumous editor was unintelligent or irresponsible, but because he was conscientious and self-effacing in doing a job which Thucydides himself, had he lived, would naturally have done better. Some recent work requires us to ask a further question, namely: are any sections of his work differentiated in language or technique in such a way that they cannot easily be attributed to the employment of different 'registers' by Thucydides or to chronological changes in his development as writer and historian? And if there are such sections, can any of them be positively associated with the language and technique of another identifiable author (which, for practical purposes, means Xenophon)?

The purpose of this appendix is not to discuss and assess systematically everything which anyone has ever said about the composition problem, but rather to define the boundaries within which discussion of the problem must operate and to distinguish between what can be demonstrated with reasonable expectation of securing general agreement and what is accepted or rejected only by

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reference to essentially arbitrary concepts of Thucydides' purpose.¹ How little can be demonstrated, will become obvious.

2. *Formal Variation*

Although the eight books into which Thucydides' work has been divided since the Hellenistic era² do not differ inordinately in size (book i, the longest, is 1·36 times the size of book v, the shortest), the space allocated to the events of a single year ranges from 1½ pages of a modern text (year 15) to 56 pages (year 17) in the same modern edition, and even within the narrative of the Archidamian War year 5 takes up nearly three times as much space as year 4. If the first nine years of the war are grouped in threes, as in the eight-book division, the ratio of years 1-3:4-6:7-9 is 1·03:1:1·22. Whether this ratio is the product of chance or of design on the author's part is not known.

On certain formal criteria the work can be divided into six sections of extremely unequal size; each comprises events of more than one year, only one of the five section-boundaries corresponds to a division between 'books', and two of the five do not correspond to any clear stages in the progress of the war. One section (B) may be subdivided with reference to certain phenomena in its last part which have formal affinities with phenomena on other sections; cf. pp. 390, 391.

A	i	Antecedents of the war
B	Br ii-iii	Years 1-6
	B2 iv. 1-51	Year 7
	B3 iv. 52-116	Year 8
C	iv. 117-v. 24	Years 9-10
D	v. 25-83 ³	Years 11-15
E	v. 84-viii. 6	Years 16-19 ⁴
F	viii. 7-109	Year 20 and the first part of year 21.

¹ 'Arbitrary' is not intended here as a derogatory term, for *arbitrium* must be exercised when more than one answer is compatible with the evidence, and it is right (cf. von Fritz 574, on Schwartz) to raise big and difficult problems in addition to the narrowly definable problems raised by individual passages. It is however noteworthy that hardly anybody now accepts Schwartz's own solutions, in which he had the utmost confidence, to the important and far-reaching problems which he rightly raised, whereas there is greater agreement about the implications—pointed out in some cases by Ullrich—of individual words and phrases occurring in certain passages.

² Marcellinus *Vita* 58 mentions that some divided Thucydides' work into thirteen books, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλως. The scholia on ii. 78. 4, iii. 116. 3, iv. 78. 1, 135. 2 specify certain book-boundaries in the thirteen-book edition, and cf. [Plu.] *Mor.* 207 F on the exploits of Brasidas in 'book vii' (i.e. iv. 78-135). On a possible nine-book division, cf. p. 438 n. 1.

³ v. 25 f. form both a postscript to section C and an introduction (the 'second preface') to D, of which the narrative proper begins in v. 27. Cf. pp. 432 f.

⁴ viii. 1 concludes the story of the Sicilian Expedition, but year 19 is concluded in viii. 6, and there are no *formal* criteria which justify allocating viii. 2-6 to section F.

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The relevant formal criteria are: the form of the sentence in which the end of a war-year is marked; the presence or absence of documents quoted verbatim; and the presence or absence of speeches.

The end of a war-year is indicated consistently in sections E and F and predominantly in B and C by the words 'That was the end of the ... year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history', which we may call the 'long formula'. The exceptions within B are ii. 47. 1, 'The first year of the war ended' and iv. 116. 3, 'The eighth year of the war ended', and in C v. 24. 2 '... and the summer of the eleventh year began. An account of the first war, which was continuous for those ten years, has (sc. now) been given'. Throughout section D the short formula 'and the ... year of the war ended' is used. The long formula is commonly called a 'signature' (notably by Hemmerdinger 106 ff. and Canfora 18, 28; cf. de Romilly 47). This is an entirely inappropriate term, for the point of a signature is that the technical difficulty of imitating it guarantees the authenticity of the document to which it is affixed. The addition of the words 'of which So-and-so wrote the history' in a copied text presents a falsifier with no problem at all; nor does its deletion by a falsifier with a different object. In the Hellenistic period it was usual to put the title of a work at the end of a roll, but even if the same practice was followed in the fifth century B.C.,¹ and even if Thucydides used a fresh roll for each year of the war, the absence of his name from ii. 47. 1, iv. 116. 3, and v. 24. 2 shows that the long formula cannot have been meant to stand in lieu of a title.² iv. 116. 3 is explained by the fact that he has referred to himself, as general and as historian, in the course of his narrative of 424/3 (iv. 104. 4; cf. Canfora 23), but at the same time the distance between the two passages (some 200 lines in a modern edition) precludes the notion that 104.4 could serve as a 'title' instead of 116. 3.³ v. 24. 2 is explained by the nearness of 26. 1 in prospect (cf. p. 432); there is no obvious explanation, save caprice, of ii. 47. 1. Consideration should

¹ It probably was (cf. E. G. Turner, *Greek Manuscripts of the Ancient World* [Oxford 1971], 16), because few people can have been so considerate as to roll a papyrus book back to the beginning after reading it and before putting it back in its box. In searching for a book one would naturally assume that someone else had read it and had failed to roll it back to the beginning; hence a title at the end was more useful than at the beginning.

² The assumption that the long formula was originally designed for the end of a roll led Hemmerdinger 107 to describe γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Αθηναῖος in v. 26. 1 as 'absolument contraire à la conception de Thucydide', a conclusion which has had far-reaching consequences; but it is a *petilio principii*, for there are no possible grounds for asserting that it was *not* consistent with Thucydides' 'conception' to say 'Thucydides has written this too' if that is what he wished to say.

³ Indeed, nothing can serve as a title if it is more than a line or two from the end, for if the reader wants to discover the identity of the roll he has taken up and does not discover that from a title in the expected place, he cannot know where, or even whether, the information he needs is given, and consequently he will not look for it.

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be given to the possibility that in sections B, C, E, and F Thucydides could think of no better way of designating that particular war between Athens and the Peloponnesians which began in 431 than by calling it the war whose history was written by Thucydides. If we put ourselves in his place and time we may not find it easy to think of a clearer designation, and if we take account of his personality perhaps we shall not even try to think of one. The magisterial tone of i. 23. 5 (cf. p. 417) helps us to assess the magnitude of the self-confidence which underlies the carefully chosen words of i. 22. 4, and the two passages together suggest that Thucydides did not expect future writers to address themselves afresh to the historical questions raised by *his* war. As for the short formula of section D, it may well be that having written an introduction—the ancestor of what is now v. 26—to justify including the history of the years after 421 in what i. 1. 1 calls 'the war of the Peloponnesians and Athenians', and having named himself in that introduction, he thought it unnecessary to specify 'the war' more precisely in the rest of the section, in which we pass so quickly from one year's end to the next. There is moreover an adequate aesthetic explanation of the short formula: saying 'of which Thucydides wrote the history' five times in a space significantly smaller than that which had been devoted to the fifth year of the war alone would have made him feel rather silly.¹

Documents are quoted verbatim in sections C (iv. 118–119. 2, v. 18 f., 23–24. 1), D (v. 47, 77, 79), and F (viii. 18, 37, 58). iv. 118 includes the full text of the decree (§§ 11–14) confirming Athenian acceptance of the terms proposed (§§ 1–10) in first and second persons plural; iv. 119. 1 f., v. 19, and v. 24. 1 give the full list of those who took the oath on both sides. Comparison with *IG* ii². 86 (Tod, *GHI* 72) shows that the citation of v. 47 is complete at least down to § 7*, and since the inscription survives by chance it may serve as a random check on the completeness of Thucydides' documents as a whole. To those mentioned it is arguable that we should add iv. 16, which is the reason for the demarcation between B₁ and B₂ in the table above. This is the truce over Sphakteria (iv. 16. 1–2), introduced by the words ἐγένοντο σπουδαῖ τοιαῦτε. Although it has in part, especially in its opening clause (and note τοιαῦτε, not αὐτε), the flavour of a précis,

¹ Similarly, if one has occasion to refer in footnotes to a book with a long title, one does not mind giving the title in full once every hundred pages or so; if reference is more frequent, one becomes restive and has recourse to an abbreviation or to 'op. cit'. Again, one may quite like heading each chapter of a work in words, 'Chapter One', etc. (rather than '1', etc.), so long as the chapters are long, and yet feel a strong dislike for 'Chapter Twenty-Two', 'Chapter Twenty-Three', etc., when they are short. Introspection suggests to me that the reason for this is not economic, but is closely related to distaste, felt almost as much by the heirs of Greek culture as by the Greeks themselves, for repetition of the same words, phrases, or structural patterns within a narrow compass.

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it contains some details (the rations which the Spartans are permitted to convey to their men on Sphakteria) more characteristic of a document (cf. iv. 118. 5 and the latter part of 118. 4) than of Thucydidean narrative, and for this reason it might be regarded as generically akin to iv. 118. However, all its detailed provisions play a significant part in the narrative which follows (26. 4-27. 1, 39. 2), and this distinguishes iv. 16 historiographically from iv. 118 and v. 18. Plainly sections C, D, and F separate themselves from A, B, and E in one important area of historiographical method, since it is Thucydides' normal practice in A, B, and E to summarize interstate agreements very briefly, e.g. i. 44. 1 (the *ἐπιμάχια* between Athens and Kerkyra), ii. 29. 5 (Athens' alliance with Sitalkes), 68. 8 (the alliance with Amprakia), iv. 65. 1 f. (the agreement of the Siceliote cities at Gela, about which any reader of book vi longs for more information) and vi. 51. 2 (the alliance of Katane with Athens); iii. 114. 3 (the Akarnanians and Amprakia) is fuller. iv. 16 is—formally, and without regard for reasons—a hint of the technique adopted in section C, but to say that it 'foreshadows' section C would be to beg a very large question, and as a support for any hypothesis about strata of composition it could take no weight.

Speeches are given in sections A, B, C, and E; not, however, in D and F, despite the occurrence of events, particularly in years 19 and 20, to which speeches would have been appropriate, such as the debate at Athens on the need to suspend the democratic constitution (viii. 53) and Alkibiades' dealings with the fleet at Samos (viii. 81. 2, 86. 4; cf. Cwikliński 52 n. 5). The occasions on which Thucydides does give speeches vary so much in their nature and in their significance (military, diplomatic, or political) as to rule out the argument that they all share positive characteristics which are absent from the putative occasions for speeches in sections D and F. Subsection B₃ contains a unique trio of speeches summarized in indirect speech, iv. 97. 2-99, where the Athenians and the Boeotians argue through heralds over the fortification of Delion and the return of the Athenian dead. The issue is similar to that presented by the Peloponnesian attack on Plataia, where the relevant arguments are given in direct speech (ii. 71-4, iii. 53-67); it differs from the two other famous summaries, ii. 13 and viii. 27. 1-4, in that the former is a presentation of quantified data, on which Thucydides has his own comments to make, item by item, and the latter (Phrynicos' advice to his fellow generals) is generically similar to the military debates presented in vi. 47-9, vii. 42. 3-5, 47-9, but distinguished by the vivid impression conveyed by the emphatic repetition of emotive words. The peculiar character of iv. 97. 2-99 is the sole reason for distinguishing a third subsection within section B, and (like iv. 16, treated as justifying the

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demarcation of subsection B₂) it must not be pressed as evidence for a particular stage in the growth of Thucydides' method.

In so far as sections D and F both quote documents verbatim and lack speeches, and D in addition has the short year-formula (a fact which, as we have seen, may be of no significance whatever), there is a certain degree of correlation, even a hint of interdependence, between the three formal criteria so far considered. The correlation, however, is inexact, as is clear from the coexistence of documents and speeches in section C, where we have the sequence: document (iv. 118), speech (iv. 126), speech (v. 9), document (v. 18). Formal considerations taken by themselves cannot tell us whether Thucydides in the course of time eliminated documents and introduced speeches or introduced documents and eliminated speeches, but since there are independent reasons for believing that sections D and F are less fully revised than the rest (pp. 373-8) the former alternative is indicated as the truth. This in turn might suggest that section C represents an intermediate stage of revision; there are however reasons (cf. pp. 375 f.) for thinking that part of section C may in fact represent a stage which could hardly be described as 'revised' at all. As for linguistic features, it is observable that subsections B₂ and B₃ possess one singularity, a much higher concentration of genitive absolutes with the subject understood (cf. Classen-Steup on iv. 3. 1 and 8. 8, and add 31. 1 v. l. to the examples cited) than in any other section. The interpretation of uneven distributions of linguistic phenomena in Thucydides cannot, however, be straightforward. Many linguistic items are concentrated in one portion or another of the work, whether we consider 'portions' in terms of 'sections' or of 'books'; for example, ἄμιλλα (3 occurrences) and εὐχή (3) are confined to books vi-viii, ἀναβάλλειν (5) to iv-v (once in a speech), ἀναγκαστός (3) to vii-viii (once in a 'speech', viz. Nikias' letter), ἀναθαρσεῖν (6) to v-vii, εὐβουλία (4) to i-iii (three times in speeches), εὐδαιμονία (3) to ii-iii (twice in speeches), εὐδαιμων (3) to i-ii (once in a speech), εὐπορία (3; once in a speech) and ἔφορμος (3) to iii-iv. Such a list can be very greatly extended, and it cannot be matched by a list which would link discontinuous portions together, e.g. v with viii or iii with vi. The relevance of these data to the composition problem is doubtful, for the occurrences of a word which is confined to a particular portion of the work may belong all to an early stratum within that portion, or all to later insertions and revisions, or (in any proportions) to both, since in revising a text it is normal to reread it, and linguistic phenomena which occur in it are likely to influence the language used in revision.

3. *Speeches*

The meaning of i. 22. 1, where Thucydides explains the principle

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he has followed in the composition of speeches, has been extensively discussed in modern times. If Thucydides' work had survived only in fragments or excerpts, in such a way that we possessed i. 22. 1 but no speeches from the rest of the work, scope for controversy over the translation and interpretation of i. 22. 1 would have been very greatly restricted. The significant problems are created not by anything within the statement of principle itself, but by the relation between what Thucydides has actually done and what he says he has done (cf. Andrewes, *Myt.* 64–7), for it would have been regarded as obvious from the statement that he proposed to give as accurate an account as he could of what was said by the participants in debates.

With reference to occasions on which he himself was in the audience he says that it was hard for him to recall *τὴν ἀκριβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων*, and that his informants found such feats of memory no easier; this we can well believe, although we must bear in mind that ancient Greeks, attaching great importance to oratory as an art-form, acquainted with its power to generate political decisions of the greatest moment, and accustomed to transact much business without recourse to writing, are likely to have remembered speeches much better than most of us can. Recall being defective, says Thucydides, he has used his own judgment and made any given speaker *τὰ δέοντα εἰπεῖν*, but in so doing he has 'kept as close as possible to the *ξύμπασα γνώμη* of what was actually (*ἀληθῶς*) said'. The *γνώμη* of a speaker is his proposal, his statement of the action which he thinks should be taken; cf. the technical expression *γνώμας προτίθει* in vi. 14 ('invite those present to speak to the motion'), and the *γνώμαι* of the Athenian generals (vi. 47, 50. 1) in their discussion at Rhegion. The analogy of *ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδός* in vii. 80. 2, used with reference to the destination of a journey in which not all the stages head towards that destination, suggests that *ἡ ξύμπασα γνώμη* is what a speech 'adds up to', rather as *τὸ ξύμπαν* is used of an arithmetical total to which the separate items of an account add up. A Thucydidean speaker sometimes uses expressions such as *τὸ ξύμπαν γνώμεν* (e.g. iv. 63. 2, cf. vii. 77. 7) to state the essential point of his speech in a few lines, and the historian also uses *τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν* in summarizing a point of his own (e.g. i. 138. 3);¹ in i. 145, where the Athenians reply to the Spartan demands in accordance with the *γνώμη* of Perikles, a distinction is drawn between *τὸ ξύμπαν* that 'they would not do anything at Sparta's bidding, but they were ready to settle their differences by arbitration' and the details of their reply *καθ' ἔκαστα*. However, the words 'keeping as close as possible . . .' in i. 22. 1 imply that (e.g.) the *ξύμπασα γνώμη* of i. 140–4 is rather more than *μὴ εἴκειν Πελοπον νη-*

¹ Cf. de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 8–10, where various English and German translations of *ἡ ξύμπασα γνώμη* are also discussed.

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σίοις, for a historian could get that right; or he could get it disastrously wrong, but there is little room for variation in the degrees of fidelity with which such a *γνώμη* is presented. That the *ξύμπασα γνώμη* of Perikles' speech is not just 'Do not yield to the Peloponnesians' but 'Do not yield to the Peloponnesians, but (i) . . . , (ii) . . . , because (a) . . . , (b) . . . ', is strongly indicated by the very clear implication of the first half of i. 22. 1 that accurate recollection is always desirable and invention, however sensitively and conscientiously harmonized with the available evidence, always a *pis aller*. No justification could be found in i. 22. 1 for the allegation that Thucydides ever preferred invention to evidence, and any doubts about the value which he attached to *τὴν ἀκριβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων* would be allayed by observation of the parallelism between 22. 1, on speech, and 22. 2, on action, where *οἱς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων εχοί τε ὡν αὐτὸς ἥκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις . . . ἀπαγγέλ - λουσιν* and *ἀκριβειά περὶ ἔκαστου* (reinforced by *ὅσον δυνατόν*: cf. *ἔχο-μένω ὅτι ἐγγύτατα* in 22. 1) echoes *ὅσα μὲν λόγω εἰπον ἔκαστοι . . . τὴν ἀκριβειαν αὐτήν*, κ.τ.λ. (cf. Grosskinsky 27, 55).¹ These considerations would also remove any doubts which might have been felt about the meaning of *τὰ δέοντα εἰπεῖν*, which would plainly be not what the historian thought should have been said as means to an end of which he approved, but what the speaker needed to say (and therefore, in default of evidence to the contrary, may be presumed to have said) in order to get his way a particular audience in particular circumstances.²

This last conclusion, at least, is justified when we turn to the speeches themselves, since many of them are grouped in opposing pairs, so that it follows necessarily that at least one member of each pair must propose action which Thucydides himself thought the wrong response to the situation. No other expectation engendered by reading i. 22. 1 survives unshaken once our reading of the work has progressed beyond i. 31. Thucydides never tells us when his evidence for 'what was actually said' was good and when it was bad;³ we presume that the speeches which he himself heard included some delivered in Athens before the autumn of 424 and we know that he could not have heard any delivered in Athens thereafter, but this does not help us in determining where invention has supplemented recall and report. All his speakers talk the same language, irrespective of nationality and cultural milieu, and it is *his* language, idiosyncratic, sophisticated, exhibiting a variety of linguistic abnormalities for

¹ It should be noted that Pohlenz withdrew (300 n. 2) his earlier interpretation (232) of *ὡς δ' ἄν ἐδόκουν ἔμοις* as antithetical to *ὅσα μὲν λόγω εἰπον, κ.τ.λ.*

² Cf. R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *BICS* xii (1965), 70–82 on the Mytilene debate.

³ The same is true of his narrative; the apologetic comment in vii. 44. 1 is exceptional.

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which the closest parallels are almost always to be found in his own narrative style. Most of his speakers make extensive use of generalizations about the behaviour of states or of mankind in order to explain or predict particular actions or to justify particular recommendations. Some of them talk more like participants in a political philosophy seminar than men seeking to inspire, conciliate, or intimidate the soldiers and farmers who constitute their audience. Perikles answers point by point (cf. p. 418) a Corinthian speaker whom neither he nor any other Athenian had heard; Hermokrates at Gela in 424 (cf. p. 412) talks as if he had read Thucydides' account of events which took place nine years later. It has been doubted whether Athenian envoys (unnamed, i. 72. 1) 'happened to be present at Sparta on other business' (unspecified, cf. 73. 1) on the occasion of the first Corinthian plea, and whether Thucydides could have known what the Athenian envoys at Melos said to its ruling oligarchy (v. 84. 3).¹

There are three possible approaches to resolution of the dilemma created by the difference between what i. 22. 1 says and what we find in the speeches. One attacks the apparently fictitious elements in the speeches, attempting to show that the speaker in question could have said what Thucydides makes him say on that occasion, and a second turns back to the wording of i. 22. 1 itself in order to see how far its translation, interpretation, and apparent implications can be revised without postulating any improbabilities greater than those inherent in the problem we are trying to solve and without overriding the evidence of Thucydidean usage. Both these approaches score quick and easy successes over those who have made extravagant use of 'must certainly have...' and 'cannot possibly have...' in furtherance of the hypothesis that Thucydidean speeches are simply fiction and i. 22. 1 a resounding falsehood, an expression of perverse self-deception, or an enigma effortlessly solved by any ancient Greek accustomed to the conventions of historiography c. 400 B.C.² Successes, however, come harder and slower as the attack is pressed, and a third approach, of the greatest importance to the composition problem, must be employed in considering the intractable residue: the hypothesis that Thucydides had every intention of putting the principle of i. 22. 1 into practice and indeed composed many of the speeches in conformity with that principle, but at a late stage of

¹ Misgivings about the Athenian envoys at Sparta fall far short of a convincing case for the hypothesis that they were not there and did not speak. Pohlens's scepticism about them (234) extends also to the convening of the assembly at which Perikles (ii. 60–64) defended his policy. In both cases to doubt the authenticity of the speech is necessarily also to reject as fiction the narrative statements which immediately precede the speech. On Thucydides' evidence for the negotiations at Melos cf. Dover 23.

² The Greeks in general had more sense than to call a pretentious kind of falsehood 'ideal truth', 'true historical objectivity', etc.

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composition departed from it and did not succeed before his death in arriving at a satisfactory reformulation of i. 22. 1 which would take adequate account of his change of method.

There is no good reason to suppose that a Greek, accustomed to the virtual absence of individualization in the language of characters in epic, tragedy, comedy, and historiography of Herodotean type, should be disconcerted by the linguistic uniformity of the Thucydidean speeches, particularly as Thucydides uses the demonstrative *τοιόσδε* in introducing them, by contrast with the *ὅδε* used for the verbatim citation of documents and poems. Equally, no one would have been disconcerted by the omission or drastic curtailment of conventional ingredients—warnings against impiety, praise of earlier generations, exhortations to heed the verdict of posterity, and the like—which may have been as common in fifth-century oratory (cf. vii. 69. 2) as they certainly were in the fourth century. Anecdotes and historical *exempla*, although certainly it cannot be said that the reader would not expect to find them in a historical work (Hdt. v. 92 and vi. 86 are the most striking instances of their use), are obvious casualties in any process of condensation, and no one would be likely to hold their omission a significant failure to ‘keep as close as possible . . . (etc.)’. At the same time there is some positive reason to believe that a greater degree of argument from high-level generalization was acceptable to a mass audience in the late fifth century than in the fourth; this hypothesis is founded on the amount of generalization in Antiphon v and vi (both homicide cases), to which one might add, from the very beginning of the fourth century, Isoc. xviii. 27 f., xx. 9 f., 15–18. Spartan and Thieban tastes in oratory are not likely to have been the same as Athenian taste, but Spartans, Thebans, and all other Greeks were familiar with the didactic posture and gnomic utterance of the poets whose works they sang at festivals; allowance must be made for the possibility that the Greek public speaker in the fifth century was expected to cast part of his argument into generalized terms and to express himself in language strikingly differentiated from ordinary speech.

If we give some weight to all the considerations listed in the last paragraph, and if we also postulate that it was always the theoretical element in a speech which seemed to Thucydides to be the important and distinctive part of the speaker’s *γνώμη* (so that a historian of his type, given the task of reproducing Demosthenes’ speech on Rhodes [xv], would have done full justice to the argument of §§ 17 f., 21 and 25–9, while paring away most of the rest of the speech),¹ we go some way towards closing the gap between i. 22. 1 and Thucydides’ actual

¹ To condense a fourth-century symouleutic speech into Thucydidean form is a worthwhile experiment for all those who are interested in the problem of *ἡ ξύμπασα γνώμη*.

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practice. The greatest difficulty in reaching agreement on the extent to which any given Thucydidean speech departs from the principles of i. 22. 1, after the paucity of independent evidence relevant to the occasion in question and of analogous fifth-century speeches, lies in the fact that assessment of artificiality, inappropriateness to the occasion and theoretical remoteness is inevitably subjective, and no one assessor can confidently draw a sharp line of demarcation between 'real' and 'unreal' speeches. Pohlenz, who first put forward the hypothesis that Thucydides at some point in time abandoned the principle enunciated in i. 22. 1 (234–53, 295–9, 302 f.; cf. Schadewaldt 26–9), showed himself well aware of the difficulty of demonstrating the allocation of a given speech to the early stratum or to the late (240; cf. Grosskinsky 92–101); he acknowledged that within the same speech one ingredient may be early and another late (228 [cf. Schwartz 110], 298 f.), and it is noticeable that in classifying speeches as late he did not confine himself to judging that their sentiments or types of argument alone made it impossible to reconcile them with i. 22. 1, but invoked also the relation between a speech and the preceding course of the debate (e.g. 238 f., on vi. 9–23) and signs of implausible prescience on the part of the speaker (221–5). Some of his allocations have not commanded general assent even in principle, but if there is a stratum of speeches in which Thucydides was concerned more to impress on his readers some aspects of national policies and international relations which seemed to him important than to report a speaker with even approximate correctness, the hard core of this stratum is the Funeral Speech, the Melian Dialogue (Andrewes, *PCPS* clxxxvi [1960], 3–5, 9 f., *Myt.* 66, 70) and Perikles' last speech (*id.* *PCPS* [1960], 6–9, *Myt.* 70). There is, however, a considerable difference between a division into two strata, carrying the implication that at a certain stage Thucydides decided to make a break with a methodological principle which had hitherto been of some importance to him, and a scale of degrees, which more plausibly implies that having begun with a predilection in favour of the theoretical element in speeches Thucydides 'slid' from reportage to invention more easily on some occasions than on others and more easily later in his life than earlier. The available evidence does not compel us to say that there is any argument or sentiment in any Thucydidean speech which cannot have been voiced in some form or other by the original speaker on the original occasion; the question is, in what form, how explicitly,¹ and how prominently. If the answer

¹ Although it seems virtually certain that Thucydides was willing to present as a single speech a number of speeches made by several people on the same occasion for the same purpose (e.g. vii. 65. 3, where 'the generals and Gylippos spoke as follows' obviously does not mean a chant in chorus), it is not at all necessary to believe (with Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. 385) that he ever presented as one a series of speeches given on different occasions by the same person (Meyer was speaking of i. 140–4), and we must

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to the question is to be translated into terms of early and late date, it is desirable that it should be sustained by evidence of other types.

4. *Variations in Narrative Technique*

Readers of book viii (i.e. of 'section F', as near as makes no matter), turning to it fresh from iii or iv, may be struck by the frequency (cf. Momigliano, *Mem. Accad. Torino* lxvii [1930], 19) with which they encounter speculation and personal opinion. This is in part concerned with the motives and intentions of individual commanders, notably Tissaphernes: 46. 5 διενοέτο τὸ πλέον οὕτως ὁ Τισσαφέρνης, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ τῶν ποιουμένων ἦν εἰκάσαι; 56. 3 δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τὸ αὐτὸ βουληθῆναι; 87. 1 βουλόμενος, ὡς ἐδόκει δῆ - - 87. 2 λέγεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ ταύτο, 87. 3 f. διότι δὲ οὐκ ἥλθον (sc. the Phoenician ships promised by Tissaphernes) πολλαχῆ εἰκάζεται - - - ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ, κ.τ.λ.; cf. 50. 3 ὡς ἐλέγετο. In 94. 2 Agesandridas' movement past Salamis was 'perhaps' (*tάχα*) unconnected with the internal disturbances at Athens, 'but it is probable' (*εἰκὼς δέ*) that there was a connection; in 64. 5 Thucydides generalizes from the political character of the secession of Thasos to the situation in other cities, but qualifies his generalization by *δοκεῖν δέ μοι*. His expression of opinion extends also to an unrealized past, 96. 4 . . . which they could easily have done, if they had been more venturesome', and to a series of judgments on the qualities and capabilities of individuals and communities: 24. 4 f., Chios; 27. 5, Phrynicos; 68. 1, Antiphon; 68. 4, Theramenes; 86. 4, Alkibiades (adding 'and on that occasion no other man would have been capable . . .'); 96. 5, Sparta (following on from 'which they could easily have done . . .' in 96. 4); 97. 2, the constitution which succeeded the Four Hundred. This greater intrusion of the author into the presentation of his material is also apparent in the lively *πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως ἡθύμουν*; of 96. 2.

It should be emphasized that not one of these 'subjective' elements is peculiar to book viii. Apart from ii. 65 (the most extensive and the most famous of Thucydides' judgments on people), iv. 81. 2 (Brasidas) and vii. 86. 5 (Nikias) come to mind. 'It is said' and 'it was said' are used elsewhere (cf. Dover 30 f., and viii. 50 n.) when Thucydides has occasion to speak of the remote past or remote places (e.g. i. 132. 5, the betrayal of Pausanias; ii. 48. 1, the origin of the plague in Ethiopia), of events in which the weather was decisive and he is perhaps unwilling to lend support to those who saw this as divine intervention (ii. 77. 5, 93. 4), of the motives of people who died before he could meet them (ii. 18. 5, 20. 1, Archidamos; iii. 79. 3, Brasidas and

certainly beware of saying or believing that if a writer makes explicit what seems to him implicit in someone else's speech he is 'keeping as close as possible' to that person's *γνώμη*.

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Alkidas), and of anything which the people concerned were for any reason unlikely to admit openly, then or later (i. 118. 3, the oracle given to Sparta by Delphi;¹ vii. 86. 4, treachery in Syracuse; cf. v. 68. 2, 74. 3, where he remarks on Spartan secretiveness, and vi. 60. 2 *επ'* ἀμφότερα εἰκάζεται, on Andokides' involvement in the mutilation of the herms). On this basis, it is only natural that in discussing Tissaphernes' motives he should make it clear that he is reporting data which he has had little opportunity to control, though on another occasion (v. 65. 3) he leaves Agis' reason for a military movement as an open pair of alternatives, whereas in neighbouring contexts (65. 4, 71. 1, 71. 3 *ter*) he speaks with assurance of Agis' wishes, fears, and thoughts. The historian's opinion on what might have happened had circumstances been different is expressed in ii. 94. 1 (very similar in tone and substance to viii. 96. 4) and iii. 113: 6, 'I know (*οἶδα*) that they could have captured Amprakia at a stroke', an opinion offered in vindication of Demosthenes' military insight; iii. 74. 2 and v. 73. 1 are trivial examples. There is one passage other than viii. 96. 3 in which Thucydides poses a rhetorical question: vii. 44. 1, 'but in a night battle... πῶς ἀν τις σαφῶς τι γῆδει;,' apologizing for the difficulty of presenting a coherent picture of the battle on Epipolai.

A concentration of technical peculiarities in one portion of a work is only to be expected, for the same reason as a concentration of linguistic peculiarities, and to justify a sharp separation of book viii from the rest on technical grounds the concentration would have to be greater than it is and the analogous passages from other books fewer. But the concentration of instances of 'it is conjectured', 'as was said', 'in my opinion', and the like in book viii has an obvious link with the comparative frequency with which narrative items in that book appear to be chronologically vague, dislocated, badly coordinated with other relevant items or hard to interpret because we are not given quite enough information. On these items, cf. pp. 369–75.

5. General Principles of Revision

Irrespective of our belief or disbelief in an 'interim' publication of the story of the Archidamian War, we cannot safely generalize about the number of stages which a given passage is likely to have gone through between the original notes on which it was based and the form in which we now read it. The physical format of Thucydides' notes presents no problem; if by chance he could get only papyrus rolls when he wanted separate sheets, he could, after all, cut up the rolls, stick sheets together to form a new roll whenever he wished, and separate them again by further cutting whenever he wanted to

¹ Uncertainty about the content of an important oracular response is surprising, but Hdt. vi. 57. 2–4 suggests that precise knowledge of oracles given to Sparta was confined to the kings and the *Πύθιοι*.

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make insertions.¹ As for the scale and complexity of what he normally carried in his head, or the length of time for which he carried it before he wrote it down, we can hardly speak with assurance. Plato, in contexts where conscientious realism seems to have been among his immediate aims, represents extensive material as transmitted orally, by frequent hearing and careful rehearsal (*Prm.* 126 C; cf. *Phd.* 58 C D, *Smp.* 173 A-C), or by the writing of *ὑπομνήματα* immediately after the event and their supplementation by more leisurely recollection and frequent checking with the original informant (*Tht.* 142 D-143 A).² We do not have to suppose that any reader of Plato found it true to life that Adeimantos' hirsy half-brother should accurately recall the arguments presented in *Parmenides*; we should, however, entertain the possibility (cf. p. 394) that the material conditions and social conventions of Greek culture accustomed people to remembering quite long and detailed narratives.

Anyone who has taken many years to write a book knows from his own experience that he revises some parts of it thoroughly and often and other parts very little, with the result that eventually one paragraph which has been recast a dozen times may stand, in the form which it assumed in year *n*, between two others which have barely been touched since they were first drafted in year *n-10*. Again, an author does not necessarily, or even commonly, revise his material in the order in which the first version was written.³ He is more likely to revise at any given time what engages his interest and enthusiasm at that time; there is no reason why new evidence should become available, or good ideas occur to him, or dissatisfaction with the state of a given passage impinge on him, in the same order as the events which his draft has narrated.⁴ It is possible to imagine an

¹ Cf. W. K. Prentice, *CPh* xxv (1930), 125.

² It is interesting to speculate on the physical details of the process envisaged by Plato: Eukleides composes notes on the conversation between Socrates and Theaitetos 'immediately on reaching home', afterwards elaborates them at leisure, exercising his memory, and corrects what he has written in the light of questions he has put to Socrates 'whenever', he says, 'I came to Athens.'

³ It is worth remarking in this connection that Gomme left a type-written commentary on most of vi. 6-14 but only manuscript notes on vi. 1-5.

⁴ The anonymous author of a nineteenth-century sexual autobiography, *My Secret Life*, sometimes gives his readers explicit information about the relation between his original jottings, his subsequent conversion of these jottings into a continuous narrative, his final revision of this narrative for the printer (more than forty years after his first exploits), and (on occasion) one or more intermediate stages of revision. What he tells us about this process—just what Thucydides does not tell us—provides a solid foundation for the differentiation between strata of revision on internal evidence alone in some passages. According to Steven Marcus, *The Other Victorians* (London 1966), 87, 'the author in no way followed this procedure with any kind of regularity, tenacity of purpose, or organizing conception', but it would have been fairer to say that we do not know what principle the author followed in deciding to tell us that a passage has been revised.

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author in whose work constant and detailed reference back could indicate an order of revision, but explicit references back in Thucydides are few (v. 1~iii. 104, vi. 94. 1~vi. 4. 2)¹ and uninformative, since we cannot know whether (e.g.) iii. 104 existed in its present form when v. 1 was written.

To insist on adding 'in its present form' is not pedantry, but a reservation dictated by differences between ancient and modern publication. When a modern author sends off a work to his publisher, he may well feel that he has said all that he can say on that subject and that it is time for him to turn his attention to something else; indeed, it is well for him if he does feel that, because he will have no opportunity to tinker with what he has written unless his publisher judges a second edition profitable. An ancient author sometimes, no doubt, felt the same when he first let a work of his go into circulation, but in a society where the multiplication of copies is manual an author has the opportunity, so long as there is any demand for his book, to put an indefinite number of revised versions into circulation.² In any case, a demonstrably unfinished work is in a special category. We possess Thucydides' 'final' version in the trivial sense that he did not live to revise any more, but it would be imprudent to suppose that there is a single passage in the whole work of which he felt he could say with complete assurance, 'Now it can go'. In particular, it may be that a change of view which led him to rewrite passage *a* would have led him to rewrite passage *b* as well if he had had time.

A discussion of the composition problem seldom goes on for very long without using the expressions 'could/would (not) have ...', 'must have...', 'cannot have...', and the like.³ Those who use such an expression do not always agree on the criteria of probability which make it meaningful; and the measure of disagreement is often concealed by the lack of explicit declaration and discussion. Sometimes 'Thucydides would not have omitted to mention ...' is an inference from 'if I had been an Athenian at the end of the fifth century writing a history of the Peloponnesian War, I would not have omitted to mention ...'. The basis of the inference should be acknowledged without shame or hesitation, for no historical reasoning whatever is possible without postulating human action and intention in accordance with the criterion of probability, and if I am not to

¹ On *ἐπὶ πλέον* in vi. 54. 1 and its relation to i. 20. 2 see n. ad loc.

² Cf. Dover, *Illinois Studies in Classical Philology* ii (1976), 152–6.

³ Cf. p. 386 above. Ullrich set the fashion (88ff.), saying that if Thucydides had written iii. 86. 2 later than the Sicilian Expedition he would have been bound to qualify by a forward reference his generalization that the Dorian cities of Sicily did not take part in the war on the Peloponnesian side. In this particular case further dispute about what Thucydides would or would not have done is set aside by Classen's observation (ed. 2, xli) that *οὐ ξυνεπολέμησαν* can perfectly well mean 'had not (sc. by 427/6) taken part in the war', but grammar does not always come to the rescue.

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start from myself, whence am I to start? The important thing is not to mistake the start for the finish; in putting myself into the place of an ancient author, I must try to eliminate all anachronism (cf. von Fritz 573) and to avoid imputing to him the physical and temperamental defects of which I am aware in myself. In the case of Thucydides, however, it is arguable that research has been damaged less by anachronism than by fear of anachronism, and much less by realistic criticism of his limitations than by uncritical idealization. Thucydides was born into a society with interests and attitudes different from ours, and plainly the question of what such a man in that society at that time would have done is the next stage of enquiry after some kind of answer has been given to the question, 'What would I have done?' (cf. Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. 285, Luschnat 1194); unlike us, he could not draw on a variety of long-standing and highly developed historiographical techniques. To argue from this that he felt himself bound to operate within certain 'rules' of narrative prose, or of exposition in general, is illegitimate. He is one of the only three classical Greek historians whose work we possess in full; each of the three is quite strongly differentiated from the other two in his approach to historiography, and each of the three was, in his own way, an experimenter and explorer in a genre peculiarly rich in alternative possibilities (cf. Andrewes, *Myt.* 65). To speak of common and widespread formal phenomena in early Greek historiography is helpful, for all such phenomena have suggestive value in the consideration of particular problems, but to speak of rules, with reference to an era in which handbooks and rhetoricians' schools were exceptional, is absolutely unjustified. It is more profitable to examine the practices and techniques which predominate in Thucydides as an individual writer, and thus Θουκυδίδην ἐκ Θουκυδίδου σαφῆνιζεν.¹

It sometimes happens that we commit ourselves to a statement about what Thucydides 'could/would (not) have ...' because we have constructed an ideal historian in our imagination and have assumed that Thucydides always measures up to that ideal—a procedure made especially perilous by the part which love of Thucydides is very likely to have played in the construction of the ideal. He is undeniably a magisterial writer; whether he is also a masterly historian depends on how often he gets things right. If we break down his narrative into minimal ingredients (to the number of many thousands) and pose the question, 'True or false?' in respect of

¹ This too has its dangers, e.g. Pohlenz 239 (with i. 72. 1 in mind) on v. 76. 3 γενομένης πολλῆς ἀντιλογίας (ἔτυχε γὰρ καὶ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης παρών), κ.τ.λ.: 'so ist diese blosse Nennung des Alkibiades *völlig unverständlich*' (my italics) 'wenn Thukydides nicht die Absicht hatte ihn in einem Redekampfe mit dem spartanischen Gesandten Lichas auftreten zu lassen'.

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each one, we quickly realize how very seldom we possess any independent evidence which offers us any help at all in answering the question; and when such evidence is available, although it sometimes confirms what he says (e.g. vi. 94. 4, in respect of one of the six minimal ingredients contained in that section) it often conflicts with him or contributes a significant datum about which he says nothing (cf. Dover 4 f., and viii. 92. 2 n.).¹ His generalizations, whether he is summarizing the essential features of a complex series of events or drawing our attention to characteristic features of Greek political behaviour, are impressively and memorably worded and succeed in stimulating reflection and enquiry; they would deserve also to be called penetrating and illuminating if we knew them to be true, but we are not often in a position to assert their truth, and on occasion we have some reason to deny it (see viii. 2. 1 f., 89: 3 nn.). He professes a concern for accuracy, and his narrative nearly always conveys to us an impression of objectivity (at rare moments a flame of anger or pity breaks through for an instant and assures us of his humanity). Unfortunately, everyday experience warns us that in respect of accuracy, objectivity, and fairness there are often great differences between what a man actually does, what he honestly believes himself to be doing, and what he proclaims to be the standards which he sets himself.²

Since immeasurably more can be discovered about (say) Tolstoy than about Thucydides, we have no difficulty in accepting Tolstoy (indeed, the evidence leaves us no choice but to accept him) as a combination of perceptive imagination which commands our respect and obtuse folly which does not; that is to say, as a real person. When, as in the case of Thucydides, we know virtually nothing about an author, we naturally adopt the working hypothesis that he was rational in the pursuit of his objectives and maintained a consistent intellectual level, but such a hypothesis must not be mistaken for an empirical discovery. It is not the case that all historians are invariably methodical and consistent; they tend to be so some of the time and in some respects, but they are capable of being both capricious and inconsistent, making different choices at different times in matters where absolutely compelling reasons for making one choice rather than another are lacking.

These doubts and reservations are not intended to lead to the conclusion that it is a waste of time to consider the composition

¹ The answer to Patzer's question (66) 'Aber dürfen wir historischer sein als der Historiker?' is 'If not, we are wasting our time in studying any ancient historian.'

² It may well be that what Thucydides says in i. 22 about his aims and methods creates in his readers the unconscious expectation that he will always live up to the standards which they would have in mind if they formulated those standards in his words.

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problem at all.¹ It is facts which create the problem: the length of the war, the uneasy intermission, the incompleteness of the narrative, the relation between i. 1, ii. 65, 12, and v. 26, together with a substantial number of discrepancies in method and judgement² which nag at all but the most insensitive readers. That Thucydides was a real person and that caprice, inconsistency, inattention, and blind spots are normal ingredients of human personality are also facts; and if we recognize them, we are likely to prefer the diffident '... would perhaps not have ...' to the dogmatic³ '... cannot have ...'. Suspension of judgement on so many of the particular issues which are relevant to the composition problem is open to criticism as an 'easy way out'. It is easy in the sense that to sustain a positive thesis against all criticism is harder; but there is no correlation, positive or negative, between ease and truth, and the virtue of a thesis is to be sought in its probability in the light of all relevant considerations, not in the ingenuity with which it explains a selection of those considerations. It would, incidentally, be fallacious to suppose that suspension of judgement on particular issues necessarily favours 'unitarians' against 'analysts', as if the entire burden of proof rested upon those who do not believe that Thucydides' work as we have it was composed as a continuous whole after 404. The facts described above as creating the composition problem may fairly be regarded as laying the burden of proof on the unitarians.

6. Early and Late Passages

Describing the withdrawal of the first Peloponnesian incursion into Attica Thucydides says (ii. 23. 3): 'Passing by Oropos, they ravaged the territory called Graike, ἦν νέμονται Ωρώποις Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι.' Oropos was captured by the Boeotians in the winter of 412/11 (viii. 60. 1) and the Oropians were not thereafter 'subjects of Athens'. *véμονται*, which is neither 'dramatic' nor 'inceptive', cannot be explained as a historic present, unless we are to assign it, as sole instance, to a new category of historic presents in Greek narrative

¹ After more than a century of scholarly work, much of it exhibiting great sensitivity and subtlety, a note of disillusionment is to be detected: cf. de Romilly 3 fl., von Fritz 573 ff., Luschnat 1219.

² These discrepancies are not necessarily to be explained by positing a succession of changes in the development of Thucydides' thought, but the absence of an agreed explanation never justifies dismissing them as illusory.

³ The Funeral Speech is especially provocative of dogma: 'inconceivable before the downfall of Athens' (Jacoby, *JHS* lxiv [1944], 56, echoing Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. 282); 'daß die jetzige Schilderung des zweiten Buches, insbesondere Epitaphios ..., in einem Zuge nach 404 geschrieben sind, bezweifelt heute niemand' (Pohlenz 240); '... gehört zu den sichersten Ergebnissen der neueren Thukydidesanalyse' (J. Th. Kakridis, *Der thukydideische Epitaphios* [Munich, 1961], 5 f.).

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writing;¹ and as a phrase within the relative clause, 'subjects of Athens' describes the status of the Oropians at the time designated by *νέμονται*, namely the time at which the sentence was written. The meaning 'which is cultivated by the Oropians, <who were at that time> subjects of Athens' cannot be extracted from the Greek. Contrast with i. 56. 2 is instructive: *Ποτειδέατας, οἱ οἰκοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ισθμῷ τῆς Παλλήνης, Κορυθίων ἀποίκους, ἔαυτῶν δὲ ξυμάχους φόρου ὑποτελεῖς, ἐκέλευον, κ.τ.λ.* Here the accusatives *ἀποίκους* and *ξυμάχους* inform us of the status of the Poteidaians at the time when the Athenians told them to dismantle their walls (not, therefore, *οἰκοῦσιν* - - - *ἀποίκοι* - - - *ξύμαχοι*), and the parenthesis *οἱ* - - - *Παλλήνης* describes the location of Poteidaia. The location was unaltered by the change of population which took place in 429 (ii. 70. 4); the Athenian colonists introduced at that time retained the name of the city (cf. iv. 135. 1) and were presumably called *Ποτειδέαται*, just as the colonists who replaced the Dorians of Aigina were called *Αἴγινῆται* (e.g. v. 74. 3). 'Proof' is a word not to be used lightly in discussion of problems such as the composition of Thucydides' history, but ii. 23. 3 amounts to proof that some part of the narrative of section B (cf. p. 389) existed in its present form before 412.

There is no other passage in subsection B1 of which we can say for sure that it must have been written before the end of the war and escaped revision when ii. 65 was incorporated (on iii. 86. 2 cf. p. 402 n. 3). ii. 54. 3, in which Thucydides discusses the oracle 'a Dorian war shall come, and with it a plague', has been treated as an early passage, since (it is argued) he would not have said 'if there is ever another Dorian war and a famine (*λιμός*) coincides with it ...' after the reduction of Athens by blockade and starvation in 404; but this neglects the difference between a famine (caused by drought, blight, or some other natural phenomenon) coinciding with a war and hunger caused by a siege which is itself an operation of war (cf. Classen ad loc.). Other allegedly early passages in subsection B1 are among the many in which Thucydides characterizes an event by a superlative: ii. 57. 2, the Peloponnesian force ravaging Attica in 430 remained there *πλείστον χρόνον*; ii. 94. 1, the threat to Salamis in 429 caused in Athens *ἔκπληξις* - - - *οὐδεμιᾶς κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐλάσσων*; iii. 26. 3, the incursion of 427 was *χαλεπωτάτη* - - - *μετὰ τὴν δευτέραν*; iii. 87. 2, there was nothing which damaged Athens more than the plague. Such passages provoke the questions: Why no mention of Dekeleia? What of the Sicilian disaster, and the incredulity with which the news of it was received (viii. 1. 1), and the consternation (*ἔκπληξις μεγίστη, κ.τ.λ.*, viii. 96. 1) caused by the loss of Euboea? The

¹ It would have to imply 'cultivated then, as subjects of Athens, and cultivate still, but not as subjects of Athens'. On the historic present cf. Schwyzer ii. 271-3 and dissertations cited there on the phenomenon in historians.

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fortification of Dekeleia as a permanent enemy base is probably irrelevant to ἐσθολαί (cf. Ullrich 80–3), and it may be true, however surprising, that the ἔκπληξis of the Athenians over the attack on Salamis was exceptional; iii. 87. 2 may also be true of the war as a whole, in so far as men are not replaced as easily as ships. The use of superlatives, however, is in itself interesting,¹ for although we readily understand 'so far' when a journalist during a war writes (e.g.) 'the heaviest bombardment of the war', we do not expect a historian who uses such words, as Thucydides does in iii. 98. 4 βέλτιστοι δή --- ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε, vii. 44. Ι μόνη --- ἐν γε τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ, and vii. 85. 4 πλείστος --- τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τούτῳ (cf. τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον in ii. 94. 1), to mean only '... up to that point'. Since Thucydides sometimes adds 'up to now', 'up to that time', 'for a long time past', 'in my time, at least', etc. (i. 50. 2 μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, ii. 64. 3 μεγίστην δὴ μέχρι τοῦδε, ii. 77. 4 φλὸξ τοσαύτη ὥσην οὐδείς πω ἐστί γε ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον --- εἶδεν, v. 60. 3 κάλλιστον --- τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε, v. 74. 1 πλείστου δὴ χρόνου μεγίστη δὴ, vi. 31. 1 πολυτελεστάτη δὴ --- τῶν ἐστί ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον, vii. 86. 5 ἡκιστα δὴ ἄξιος --- τῶν γ' ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἐλλήνων, viii. 96. 1 μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρίν, viii. 97. 2 οὐχ ἡκιστα δὴ --- ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ), he evidently considers that when he adds no such qualification the frame of reference is sufficiently clear from the context. Unfortunately, the frame is not always clear to us (e.g. iii. 87. 2), whether he actually uses the words 'in this war' or requires us to understand them, and we have to decide on the extent of 'this war'. The only thing of which we can be sure is that so long as he believed that the war of which he was writing the history ended in 421 he meant by 'this war' the Archidamian War, and once he had decided that the period after 421 was a continuation of the same war—and that he would go on writing its history—he could never again refer to anything except the whole 27-year war as 'this war' without being aware (especially if he had also decided by then to use the long formula at the close of each war-year) that he was misleading his readers. Since it is fair to assume that he did not wish to mislead, we must interpret 'this war' in sections D, E, and F as referring to the whole war, but when it occurs in sections A, B, and C we have to consider each occurrence on its merits. It is noteworthy that at the end of section C we find τῷ πρώτῳ πολέμῳ τῷδε in v. 20. 3 and ὁ πρώτος πόλεμος in 24. 2; and in vii. 56. 4, where 'this war' is distinguished from the fighting at Syracuse, its reference to the entire period is unambiguous.

Allusions in section B to later events, and passages in which an awareness of later events seems to be implied, may be ranged on a scale of differences in time between the event and the context of the allusion and also on a scale of degrees of precision with which the

¹ Cf. Finley, *Essays* 126–34.

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allusion can be interpreted. Some fall in any case within the Archidamian War itself: ii. 13. 7, 'whenever the enemy invaded'; ii. 20. 1, 'that invasion', sc. by contrast with others; ii. 31. 3, a reference to the capture of Nisaia in 424 (iv. 69. 4); ii. 97. 3, a reference to Seuthes, who succeeded Sitalkes in 424 (iv. 101. 5). Others look further ahead: ii. 65, on the end of the war; ii. 100. 2, praise of Archelaos of Macedon, quite possibly written after his death (cf. Ullrich 147, Cwikliński 2 n. 3; Archelaos' achievements are all described in the aorist tense) but in any case postdating his accession in 413 by some years. ii. 9. 2, 'Pellene was the only one of the Achaian states which took part in the war at first; later (*ἔπειτα*) they all did', may look forward to 417, when the Spartans *τὰ ἐν Ἀχαιᾳ οὐκ ἐπιτηδεῖς πρότερον ἔχοντα καθίσταντο* (v. 82. 1), though the involvement of Achaian states in 429 is implied by ii. 83. 3, 84. 3; iii. 93. 1 f., the statement that Herakleia Trachinia did not become a serious threat to the Athenians, since the Thessalians made war on it continuously (*διὰ παντός*), until they 'wore out' (*ἐξερύχωσαν*) the defenders, who were also ill served by successive Spartan commanders, seems to look forward to 419, when the Boeotians took over Herakleia and expelled Agesippidas (v. 51–52. 1).¹ Interpretation of ii. 48. 2, 'there were not yet *κρήναι* there' (sc. in Peiraieus in 430) is uncertain; Phrynicos fr. 21 (*Monotropos*) refers to Meton as *ὁ τὰς κρήνας ἄγων*, and the play was produced in 415/14 (Hypothesis to Ar. *Av.* and *Σ Av.* 997), but the passage does not necessarily refer to Peiraieus (*Σ* suggests Kolonus). iii. 82. 1, 'afterwards virtually the whole Greek world was disturbed (sc. by stasis)' is of indeterminate reference (though presumably quite late). The description of the Athenians' despatch of ships to Sicily in 427 as a '*πρόπεμψα* to see if it were possible for them to obtain control of Sicily' (iii. 86. 4) may have been influenced by knowledge of 415. The references to the war as *ἄρτι καθισταμένου καὶ ἀκμάζοντος* in 428 (iii. 3. 1) and as *ἄρτι τότε καθιστάμενον* in 427 (iii. 68. 4) are a little surprising if a ten-year war is in question, less so if the point of reference is the full twenty-seven-year period. ii. 34. 7 'throughout the war' is totally ambivalent.

Section A could very well have been composed in substantially its present form as a prooemium to the story of the Archidamian War alone,² which was, after all, remarkable for the duration of sustained

¹ From Thucydides' silence in viii. 3. 1, where Agis' activity in that region is described in some detail, it is a fair inference that Spartan control of Herakleia had been reestablished by 413/12. iii. 93. 1 f. should thus be classified among the passages (cf. below on i. 10. 2 and iv. 48. 5) which seem to have both an upper and a lower terminus.

² This is denied by Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. 276, on the ground that it is altogether too massive a prooemium to a work only three times its length. One element in it is hard to explain whether it was written with the whole war in mind or only the Archidamian War: i. 23. 2, on the great number of cities depopulated 'some by barbarians and others

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military effort by a large part of the Greek world and thus κύνησις --- μεγίστη δή (i. 1. 2; cf. Ullrich 102–30, Cwikliński 7 f., Luschnat 1202). References in section A to 'this war' (e.g. i. 18. 3, 23. 3, 118. 1 f.) are no help at all, since the beginning of the ten-year war was also the beginning of the twenty-seven-year war, and calculations of intervals of time from 'the end of this war' (i. 13. 3, 18. 1) will only become useful to us if we discover grounds for estimating how Thucydides dated the early events mentioned in those passages. The one passage of section A which looks at first sight as if it might have a probative value comparable with that of ii. 23. 3 is i. 10. 2, where Thucydides imagines the conclusions which might be drawn by future historians from the sites of Sparta and Athens if these were deserted. The power of Sparta, he says, would be underestimated; 'and yet they cultivate two-fifths of the Peloponnesian land (*ἡγοῦνται*) the whole of it and many allies outside it'. If *ἡγοῦνται* is taken to mean not 'they are the dominant military power in ...' but that the whole Peloponnesian is bound by alliance to follow where Sparta leads (cf. i. 19 οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμάχους *ἡγοῦντο*), there was no point in time at which the statement was true, but the period between the autumn of 418 and the summer of 417 and the period after the end of the whole war were both periods in which it might be said that Sparta had effective military leadership of the Peloponnesian.¹ The second half of the sentence, concerning the conclusion which would be drawn from the site of Athens, is expressed in different terms: 'it would be conjectured that the power (*δύναμις*) of the city was double what it is'. If the *δύναμις* of a city is measured by the extent of its territory, its own resources of man-power and the speed and firmness by which it can exercise political control over its allies, not by the monetary tribute which it exacts, it is understandable that Thucydides should say what he says of Athens in i. 10. 2 at the height of its power. After 404, when Athens had neither allies nor money, 'double what it is'

by Greeks'. Unless Thucydides refers to the Carthaginian campaign in Sicily, which coincided with the last years of the Peloponnesian War (and Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* 280 n. 1, suggests that it is to this that he refers), 'some by barbarians' is a gross exaggeration (cf. vi. 46. 3 n.). i. 23. 3, maintaining and even heightening the rhetoric of 23. 2, speaks of earthquakes, solar eclipses, famines, and droughts accompanying the war, and the absence of the lunar eclipse of August 413 from the list has been held to show that the chapter must have been composed before 413. The inference is questionable, for the inclusion of a comparatively unspectacular event simply because it happened to have far-reaching military consequences would have been out of tune with the passage as a whole. The plague is the climax of the list, and the plague certainly had far-reaching effects on the power of Athens; but it was intrinsically spectacular and horrifying, and would have been so in any political or military situation.

¹ The situation of Argos at the end of the century is uncertain. In X. *HG* ii. 2. 7 'all the Peloponnesians except the Argives' take part in the Spartan march on Attica in 405.

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seems a curiously inadequate statement; 'many allies outside [the Peloponnese]' also seems inadequate for that time as a description of Sparta's position in the Aegean. It is therefore probable that i. 10. 2 was written soon after the battle of Mantinea, and the rest of i. 1–22 with it (cf. p. 396 on a difference between intention and realization in the composition of the speeches). The only passage in section A to which a later date can be assigned¹ is i. 97. 2, an explicit reference to the *'Αττικὴ ξυγγραφή* of Hellanikos.² That work included (*FGrH* 323a F 25, F 26) information on events of 407/6; Thucydides' reference to it, following on '*all* writers before me left out the Pentekontaetia and narrated either Greek history before the Persian War or the Persian War itself', is a self-contained sentence, 'and the one who dealt with (*ἥψατο*) the Pentekontaetia . . .', which he could have inserted³ without feeling obliged to modify '*all* writers before me . . .', since the Pentekontaetia formed only a portion of Hellanikos' work and, in Thucydides' view, was treated cursorily and inaccurately. There is little or nothing to be said for the hypothesis that i. 44. 3, 'and they also thought that the island (sc. Kerkyra) was conveniently situated on the route to Italy and Sicily' is a glance at the Sicilian Expedition, that the Athenians' prediction of the resentments which a victorious Sparta would provoke (i. 77. 6) must have been prompted by the experience of the years after 404 (cf. Ullrich 142 f.), or that the Corinthian mention of *ἐπιτειχισμός* (i. 122. 1) cannot antedate the fortification of Dekeleia. Sparta thought of *ἐπιτειχισμός* in the winter of 422/1 (v. 17. 2), and in vi. 91. 6 Alkibiades is portrayed as telling the Spartans that the fortification of Dekeleia is something 'of which the Athenians have always been particularly afraid'. If Thucydides, having attributed to his Corinthian speaker in i. 120–4 facile arguments about the use of money from Delphi and Olympia to attract sailors away from the Athenian fleet and a strikingly complacent view of the ease with which Peloponnesian sailors could acquire adequate training and Athens' maritime allies be detached from their allegiance, inserted a forecast of *ἐπιτειχισμός* in the knowledge that no such thing was contemplated in 431 and then continued 'and such other measures as *cannot now be foreseen*', he came very near to a joke at our expense.

¹ i. 115. 4 refers to Pissouthnes as satrap at Sardis *τότε* (sc. in 440), and he was still satrap in 427 (iii. 34. 2), but we do not know when he revolted; 423–421 is the likely period (cf. viii. 5. 4 n., and Lewis 80–1).

² Gomme (vol. i, pp. 6 f.) by implication overstates the case for dating the death of Hellanikos to 412, since the allegation that Hellanikos lived 85 years is to be found not (as a reader of Gomme might infer) in Gell. *Noct. Att.* xv. 23, where his age in 432/1 is given as 65, but only in Luc. *Macrob.* 22, and may have originated with someone who believed (with the source of *Vita Eur.* p. 2. 5 and the Suda entry) that Hellanikos was born in 480.

³ Cf. K. Ziegler, *RhM* lxxviii (1929), 66 f.

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In subsection B2 there is a crucial passage, iv. 48. 5 'so ended the stasis (sc. at Kerkyra), ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε, for nothing worth mentioning was left of one of the two factions'. Diod. xiii. 48 speaks of 'great stasis and slaughter' at Kerkyra in 410/09 (for discussion of the actual date see viii. 13 n.), a passage which owes a little, though not everything, to Thucydides' description of the stasis in 425 and his reflections thereon. If Diodoros is right, then either (a) Thucydides, writing after 404, knew nothing of the events of c. 410 and meant by 'this war' the whole war, or (b) Thucydides wrote the sentence before 410 and meant by 'this war' the Archidamian War; in both cases his limiting clause expresses doubt whether one can ever say that stasis has 'ended' for long. These alternatives are greatly to be preferred to the possibilities that (c) he wrote after 410 and used the expression 'this war' for the Archidamian War because he had not yet decided to treat the period from 421 onwards as part of one great war, or (d) that he had so decided, but nevertheless meant the Archidamian War. The development of the war by 410 makes (c) very hard to believe, and once he had formed the concept of a continuing war he could no longer refer to the Archidamian War as 'this war' without being aware, if (d) is the truth, that he was totally misleading his readers (cf. p. 407). A further objection to both (c) and (d) is that a statement that the stasis ended at any rate so far as the next three years (425/4-422/1) were concerned is a very odd expression of a positive awareness that it recurred after fifteen years.¹ As between (a) and (b), it is plain from iv. 74. 4 (on the duration of the oligarchic victory at Megara), not to mention iii. 82 f. and viii. 89. 3 f., that Thucydides was interested in the stability of revolutions and counter-revolutions, and it is highly unlikely that he would have committed himself to a qualification of 'ended' without being assured that what he was writing was true. This leaves (b) as the only explanation of iv. 48. 5, and given the considerations which led to the rejection of (c), we must suppose that the passage was written not simply before 410, but well before. If, however, the information given by Diod. xiii. 48 is false, the whole of this argument is rendered pointless and iv. 48. 5 loses its significance for the composition problem; but the detail in Diodoros' chapter (5 f., Konon despatched to Kerkyra) renders it at least circumstantial.

iv. 74. 4, καὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χρόνον αὕτη ὑπ' ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στάσεως μετάστασις ξυνέμεινεν, 'never did a counter-revolution carried out by so few last so long' imposes itself as a late passage. So does iv. 81. 2, with its explicit reference to relations between Sparta and the

¹ Ullrich 95-102, 135, nevertheless found it acceptable. All objections to (c) and (d) are, of course, equally valid whether ὅσα γε, κ.τ.λ. is a later insertion in the sentence or an original part of it.

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and the allies of Athens in 'the war after the Sicilian campaign'; and iv. 108. 4, on the extent to which the allies underrated the power of Athens ὅση ὕστερον διεφάνη probably looks equally far forward; cf. the implication of iv. 12. 3, on the reputation of the Spartans *ἐν τῷ τότε* for supremacy on land and of the Athenians for supremacy at sea. A single word betrays Hermokrates' speech at the conference of Gela as late: in iv. 60. 1 he describes the Athenians as *ὸλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες*, but there was at the time a fleet of no less than 60 Athenian ships in Sicily (iii. 86. 1, 115. 4), and these could be described as 'few' only by contrast with a much larger fleet, such as the 136 (two of them pentekonters, and 40 of them troop-transports) despatched by Athens in 415 (vi. 43). The expression *ὸλίγαις νῆσις* is applied in iii. 115. 3 to a number which cannot exceed 20 (cf. iii. 86. 1), and in iii. 115. 5 to a number which must be very small indeed, according to calculation from iv. 2. 2, 8. 3, 13. 2. That Hermokrates in 424 showed sagacity in warning the Siceliote cities of Athenian ambitions there is no need to doubt. That Thucydides composed Hermokrates' speech before 415 and later revised 60. 1 so as to introduce (in cold blood, as it were) *ὸλίγαις ναυσὶ* is harder to believe; it is more probable that he composed the speech for the first time after 415 and did not succeed in shutting the Sicilian Expedition out of his consciousness so as to adopt a standpoint appropriate to the circumstances of 424. It is pertinent that both the narrative of section E and all the major speeches therein (including Hermokrates and Athenagoras at Syracuse [vi. 33–41] and Hermokrates and Euphemos at Kamarina [vi. 76–87]) entirely ignore the conference of 424 and the agreement which resulted (cf. vi. 52. 1 n.); it seems that it was only after he had elaborated section E that Thucydides reconsidered the significance of Hermokrates' warning to the conference and accordingly enlarged its importance in subsection B3 by the insertion of a substantial speech (cf. Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. 282).¹

In section D the only demonstrably late passage is v. 25 f. It will be argued below (p. 432) that the opening words of 26. 1, *γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δαύτρὸς Θουκυδίδης*, are an integral part of a continuous sequence of thought in 24. 2–27 ff. and do not imply that Thucydides had previously put a history of the Archidamian War into circulation (as suggested by Hammond, *CQ* xxxiv [1940], 146). They are nevertheless compatible with the hypothesis that he had done so but eventually wrote 24. 2–26 in their present form as a bridge-passage when his history of the Archidamian War was united with his history of the years which followed.

The one demonstrably post-war passage in section E is vi. 15. 3 f.

¹ The relation between iv. 61. 5 f. and vi. 18. 2 f. is of considerable interest in the light of p. 396 above.

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(cf. pp. 425 f.); there are in addition many superlatives,¹ vii. 44. 1 'and this was the only night encounter of large forces, at any rate in this war', vii. 85. 4, 'a greater slaughter than any in this war'² and vii. 87. 5, 'the greatest of all the achievements in this war, and to my mind the greatest Greek achievement in history (*ὅν ἀκοῇ -- -- ἴσμεν*'); cf. vii. 29. 5, 56. 4, 70. 4, 75. 7. In the first three cases the addition of the words 'in this war' implies a post-war perspective; without the addition, it might have been possible to interpret vii. 44. 1 as 'the only night encounter of large forces (sc. which I have so far had to describe)', given that the point at issue is the difficulty of accurate description. If the argument (pp. 424–7) for the composition of section E before the end of the war (and perhaps well before the end) is valid, it follows necessarily that in the process of revision (and by implication in other sections as well as E) Thucydides inserted assessments of various events as 'the most ...', 'the only ...', 'as ... as any', and the like. At first sight an implausible picture, Thucydides as a collector of 'records'; but there are considerations which make it much more plausible. A modern historian revising his narrative of a very long war through which he has lived interests himself in the 'turning points', the critical moments significant for their effects to a degree which could not be fully appreciated at the time, and he rewrites and amplifies his comments on those events. It may be that Thucydides' superlatives represent an ancient equivalent of this process; under the influence of a traditional attitude exemplified also in Herodotus' desire (Hdt. i. 1) to ensure that *ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά* are not forgotten, he was preoccupied by the *scale* of his subject, as is abundantly clear from i. 1. 1 *μέγαν τε -- -- καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων*, I. 2 *κίνησις -- -- μεγίστη δή*, I. 3 *τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν -- -- οὐ μεγάλα νομίζω*, 23. 1 *παθήματα -- -- οἷα οὐχ ἔτερα ἐν τοῖς χρόνων* (rhetorically expanded in 23. 2 f.), and the tone in which (9 f., especially 10. 3 and 10. 5) he cuts the Trojan War down to size.

The catalogue of nationalities represented in the fighting at Syracuse (vii. 57 f.) contains two passages of disputed significance for the composition problem: 57. 2 *Αἰγινῆται, οἱ τότε Αἴγιναν εἶχον* and 57. 8 *οἱ Μεσσήνιοι νῦν καλούμενοι ἐκ Ναυπάκτου καὶ ἐκ Πύλου τότε ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἔχομένης*. The Athenians who were settled on Aigina in 431 (ii. 27. 1) were expelled in 405 (X. HG ii. 2. 9). It is natural that Thucydides should wish to remind his readers that by *Αἰγινῆται* he means the Athenian colonists, but if he wrote this sentence before 405 *νῦν -- -- ἔχουσιν* would seem to be a more appropriate expression

¹ I exclude vii. 30. 3, on the lamentable fate of Mykalessos, as a sentiment which—concerning an event of an extraordinary kind—had no need to wait for expression until the end of the war. In vi. 31. 1, 31. 6, 'up to that time' is added; cf. p. 407.

² The transmitted text, *ἐν τῷ Σικελικῷ πολέμῳ τούτῳ*, is unsatisfactory (*Σικελικῷ* del. Dobree), since the frame of reference would be too narrow.

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of the reminder—unless he left open the possibility that under the terms of a compromise peace (and *a fortiori* under terms imposed by a victorious Sparta) Aigina would one day be restored to its original inhabitants. If the grievance of those inhabitants was a much more lively and enduring issue in the Peloponnese than Thucydides' narrative in itself would have led us to suppose, it is understandable that he should have left the possibility of their restoration open. This consideration applies with even greater force to *Πύλου τότε --- ἔχομένης* in 57. 8; Pylos was lost by the Athenians in 409 (X. HG i. 2. 18, Diod. xiii. 64. 5–7), but since its return to Sparta had been prescribed in the Peace of Nikias it could be predicted that even a peace treaty in general disadvantageous to Sparta might well provide afresh for its return. As for 'those who are now called Messenians', in the light of i. 101. 2 (on the predominantly Messenian origin of the Helots), i. 103. 3 and iv. 41. 2 (Messenians from Naupaktos put as a garrison into Pylos *ὡς ἐσ παριδά*), there is little doubt that wherever in the world the Messenians of Naupaktos might be (and they were expelled from Naupaktos three or four years after the fall of Athens [Diod. xiv. 34. 2]) they would call themselves, with the tenacity of exiles, 'Messenians'; *οι --- νῦν καλούμενοι* therefore implies a contrast not with the early fourth century but with the long period during which there was no independent political community called 'the Messenians'.

Similarly, it appears from Diod. xiii. 114. 1 and xiv. 47. 6 that a community calling itself *'Ιμεράῖοι* continued to exist after the destruction of Himera by the Carthaginians in 409, and no conclusions can be drawn from Thucydides vi. 62. 2 'Himera, which is (*ἐστι*) the only Greek city in that part of Sicily' and vii. 58. 2, 'The Himeraians from the Tyrrhenian coast, of which they are the only Greek inhabitants (*μόνοι --- οἰκοῦσιν*)'.

No firm conclusion (see n. ad loc.) can be drawn from v. 91. 1, where the Athenians rebut the Melian warning of 'exemplary punishment' should their empire fall by saying that they are not at all worried by such treatment at the hands of Sparta. An Athenian could well have said that in 416, going by the experience of the previous five years; and if the Melian Dialogue is fiction, Thucydides was capable, whenever he wrote it, of perceiving how an Athenian in 416 would have reacted to the Melian warning.

vii. 27 f., on the effects of the fortification of Dekeleia, look further ahead than the context in which they are placed, the early summer of 413, as is clear from 27. 3 'originally fortified by the whole army during this summer, and afterwards occupied by a succession of garrisons', 27. 5 'more than 20,000 slaves had deserted ... and all their sheep and cattle had been lost' (sc. by the time that Dekeleia had achieved its full effect?), and 28. 2 'they suffered in summer and

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winter alike'. We might have expected to find this passage at the beginning of section F, but Thucydides evidently wished to make the point (28. 3) that Dekelia did not have the effect of making the Athenians withdraw from Sicily, and the impoverishment which made them decide that they could not afford Thracian mercenaries seemed to him the appropriate context. The passage could have been written at any time from 412 onwards.

In section F there is no passage which we have any reason to treat as written at a distance of years from any other passage in the section.

7. *Causes of the War*

In i. 23. 5 Thucydides tells us that as an introduction to the story of the war he has composed an explanation of the breakdown of the Thirty Years' Peace: διότι δ' ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρώτου καὶ τὰς διαφοράς. He then (23. 6) draws a distinction between (a) τὴν ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγω, of which he says, lit., 'I think (*ἡγοῦμαι*) that the Athenians becoming great and making the Spartans afraid forced (*ἀναγκάσαι*) them into making war', and (b) *ai* ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτία, which are to be narrated (*αἱδ' ήσσαν*) in the chapters which follow. The antithesis between ἀφανεστάτην λόγω and ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι is strong and clear. That he did not mean his readers to draw any significant distinction between *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις* (a topic on which much has been written in our time) is obvious from i. 118. 1, where 'the events involving Kerkyra and Poteidaia and everything which was a *πρόφασις* of this war' refers to what he calls the *αἰτίαι* in 23. 5 (cf. 55. 2 *αἰτία* δὲ αὕτη πρώτη ἐγένετο and 66. 1 *αἰτίαι* μὲν αὐταὶ *προνυγεγένητο*). It is noteworthy (cf. de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 54 f.) that Dionysios of Halikarnassos in discussing i. 23 treats *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις* as synonyms, to such an extent that he misquotes: τὴν ἀληθεστάτην *αἰτίαν* (v. [U.-R.] p. 427. 10); cf. v. p. 338, 12 ff. (two *αἰτίαι*, one true and one untrue) and vi. 235. 3 ff. ('different *προφάσεις*' put forward by Sparta). The most one can say in justification of what is essentially stylistic variation in i. 23. 6 is that although both *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις* were used in Thucydides' time to mean either the reason actually given by an agent in explaining his action or the cause which could be stated by an observer in explanation of a situation, condition, or event (e.g. ii. 48. 3, *αἰτίαι* of the plague; vi. 105. 2, *εὐπροφάσιοτος αἰτία*; i. 126. 1, Hdt. ii. 161. 3 *πρόφασις*), the common legal or social use of *αἰτία* as 'charge', 'accusation' or 'complaint' (e.g. i. 69. 6) and the medical use of *πρόφασις* to mean a discernible cause of disease or death (e.g. ii. 49. 2) make it appropriate that what was said openly should be treated as *αἰτίαι* when placed in antithesis to what was not brought into the open but

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has been detected by the historian. 'Truest cause' is not a normal English expression, but we are familiar enough with a contrast between 'the reason given' and 'the real reason'. When we make this contrast, we do not imply that the reason given could never have been an adequate reason for action on the part of anyone in the situation of the agent; we express a doubt whether the reason given would have been sufficient to move that agent to action in those circumstances if the real reason had not also existed as a motive force, and at the same time we express a suspicion that even if the circumstances had been such that there was no reason which could plausibly be given the real reason would have impelled the agent to continue to seek plausible reasons for action. Thucydides in i. 23. 6 is implying a doubt whether the complaints of Corinth, Aigina, and Megara would have been sufficient to move Sparta to a declaration of war unless Sparta had been afraid of the growth of Athenian power, and at the same time a suspicion that even if those complaints had not been made Sparta's fear of the growth of Athenian power would have impelled her to seek an occasion for declaring war.

Schwartz, impressed by the difference between the vehemence of the Corinthians in the first meeting at Sparta and their complacency in the second (113 f.), by Archidamos' apparent disregard of the Athenian speech at the first meeting (105-8), and by the unique character of the four-speech debate in i. 66-88 (102), argued that in his original treatment of the outbreak of war Thucydides regarded Corinth as the instigator of Spartan action and Sparta as complying with reluctance lest she lose 'prestige' as the leader of an alliance (118) but after 404 'relocated the will to war' in Sparta (124) and accordingly undertook a substantial revision of book i. On this theory i. 85. 3 onwards belong to the revised version (113, 122), and so does the Athenian speech, i. 72-8; the Corinthian speech, i. 68-71, and Archidamos' speech, i. 80-85. 2, appropriate only to the original version, were destined to be discarded, but were retained (even, perhaps, reinserted) by the posthumous editor. Underlying this treatment of the problems presented by the four-speech debate and Thucydides' distinction between reasons given and the real reason is Schwartz's assumption (cf. especially 25, 105, 108, 114, 118, 131 n. 1) that Thucydidean speeches are designed to impress upon us the historian's understanding of the ingredients of certain situations, not to inform us of the arguments actually deployed by participants in those situations. In the absence of satisfactory grounds for sharing this assumption (cf. pp. 394-8) there is no obstacle to believing that the Corinthians were vehement at the first meeting and complacent at the second, that an Athenian intervened on that occasion with a line of argument which he thought appropriate, that Archidamos urged caution and propriety, and that Sthenelaïdas urged the

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opposite; the need to consider the hypothesis of editorial intervention in i. 68–88 then vanishes (cf. also Pohlenz 212–225).

But the problem which Schwartz tried to solve does not vanish; it resides in the formal expression of i. 23. 5 f. and in the statement that the real reason, Sparta's being 'forced' into war by the growth of Athenian power, was ἀφανεστάτη λόγῳ.

The second half of i. 23. 5, 'in order that no one in the future should seek the origin of so great a war in the Greek world', has a remarkable finality (cf. Andrewes, *Causes* 225)—one might say also, an arrogant finality—and 23. 6 therefore comes as a surprise: 'for although' (or 'whereas', 'while'; $\tau\hat{\eta}\nu\ \mu\ \dot{\epsilon}\nu\ \gamma\acute{a}\rho$, κ.τ.λ.) 'I think the real reason . . . the reasons given openly . . . were as I shall now describe'. In other words, Thucydides realises and acknowledges that the purpose for which he has decided to describe the *airíai* will *not* be fulfilled by that description; a hypothetical future enquirer must accept Thucydides' opinion on the real reason if he is to be saved the trouble of further enquiry. It will not do to say that Thucydides never intended 23. 5 to be followed immediately by 23. 6, for at the time he wrote the word *γάρ* he plainly did; there was therefore a stage at which 23. 5 f. seemed to its author at any rate clear enough, and we cannot assert with confidence that on reconsideration (cf. Schwartz 250) he would have clarified it further. We must therefore explore the possibility that he considered that future enquirers into the origins of the war would have a complete and final answer if they combined the detailed information offered on the reasons given with the implications of 23. 6 that (a) the reasons given would probably not have been sufficient if the growth of Athenian power had not inspired fear in Sparta¹ and (b) this fear would probably have been sufficient to cause hostilities before long even if Sparta's allies had not made the complaints which they actually made in 432.

This possibility appears plausible in the light both of certain other analytical comments and of certain passages in speeches. These are:

i. 33. 3 (the Kerkyrean speaker at Athens): 'If anyone among you thinks that the war . . . will not happen (*έσεσθαι*), he is mistaken, failing to realise that the Spartans desire war through fear of you.'

i. 44. 2 (Athenian reactions to the Kerkyrean and Corinthian speakers): 'They thought that the war against the Peloponnesians was going to happen (*έσεσθαι αὐτοῖς*) in any case' (καὶ ὡς, sc. even though they confined themselves to a defensive *ἐπιμαχίᾳ* with Kerkyra).

i. 68–71: the Corinthian speaker at the first meeting at Sparta argues that the Athenians' dealings with Kerkyra and Poteidaia are part of a plan for further aggression (68. 3 f.), that Athens' aggressive

¹ 'Sparta', here and below, means those at Sparta whose preference for war and rejection of arbitration prevailed.

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policy towards 'her neighbours' is continuous and consistent (69. 3), and this restless aggression, resilient in the face of setbacks, is in the very nature of Athens (70, cf. 71. 3).

i. 86. 5 (Sthenelaïdas' appeal to the Spartans): 'Vote for war, as is worthy of Sparta; do not allow Athens to become greater, and let us not betray our allies.'

i. 88: 'And the Spartans voted ... for war not so much persuaded by the λόγοι of their allies as fearing that the power of Athens would grow greater, for they saw that the greater part of the Greek world was by now subject (*ὑποχείρια*) to Athens.'

i. 118. 2: 'The Athenians... achieved a very powerful position; the Spartans, though they perceived it, ... remained inactive for the greater part of the period (sc. the Pentekontaetia) ... until the power of Athens was plainly reaching a very high level¹ and the Athenians were laying hands (*ὕπτοντο*) on the Spartan alliance.'

An allegation in Pericles' speech (i. 140. 2), 'It was obvious before that the Spartans had designs on us, and that they now have is as obvious as ever', might claim inclusion in the list in so far as it locates the 'will to war' in Sparta, but it says nothing about fear and may fairly be taken as an expression of the view that Sparta is actuated by greed for power and unwillingness to tolerate the continued independence of a major democratic state (cf. Nikias' warning in vi. 11. 7), however scrupulous in the observance of international law that state may be. i. 44. 2 admits of interpretation in the same sense (cf. Andrewes, *Causes* 233–5) even though it is part of Thucydides' exposition of Athenian reaction to the speeches of the Kerkyreans and Corinthians at Athens in 433, in the course of which Spartan desire for war 'through fear of you' is alleged by the Kerkyreans. This allegation is made before the Corinthians are in a position to complain to Sparta about Athenian actions at Kerkyra and Poteidaia; the simplest explanation (equally valid whether i. 33. 3 is *reportage* or fiction) is that the Kerkyreans are aware of the existence at Athens of the view described in i. 44. 2 and decide on balance that they pay Athens the greater compliment, and serve their own ends better, by ascribing Spartan hostility to fear rather than to malice. Of the remaining passages on the list, i. 68–71, 86. 5 and 118. 2 illustrate the difficulty (cf. Andrewes, *Causes* 226) of sharply separating reasons given from real reasons. Irrespective of any question of right and wrong, the complaints of Sparta's allies exemplified the extension of Athenian power and could have sufficed

¹ 'Was plainly rising' is inadequate as a translation of σαφῶς ὕπερο, for such an expression can be used in English of anything which moves from rock-bottom to a position discernibly above rock-bottom. Comparison of αἴρεσθαι elsewhere in Thucydides suggests (e.g. ii. 75. 6, vi. 18. 6, 59. 3) that it connotes rising conspicuously and remarkably above physical or political surroundings.

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in themselves to create fear in Sparta; for it was obvious that failure on her part to accede to the allies' demand for war would diminish not simply her 'prestige' but the effectiveness of her control over her allies and therefore her own power. The Corinthians, after all, threaten to 'turn to another alliance' (i. 71. 4–6; cf. de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 59 f.). Athenian action at Kerkyra and Poteidaia did indeed (rightly or wrongly) *ἀπτεσθαι* (i. 118. 2) the Spartan alliance. Sthenelaidas in i. 86. 5 is thus not appealing for a declaration of war on two separate grounds, but on one ground which has two aspects: the Athenian actions are *both* a breach of the peace which calls for war *and* an illustration of 'the Athenians becoming greater', a process, forcefully described by the Corinthians at the first meeting, which will continue if not halted.

i. 86. 5 and 118. 2 are therefore consistent with each other and with the Corinthian speech; it is not quite so easy to bring i. 88 into line, for if Spartan fear of Athens was created by the allies' charges it seems to make little sense to say 'not so much persuaded by what their allies said (*τῶν ξυμάχων τοῖς λόγοις*) as fearing . . .' (cf. de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 59), particularly when the only allied *λόγος* at the meeting which Thucydides gives us in detail, the Corinthian speech, uses the principal charges throughout as a means of implanting fear in Sparta (cf. Andrewes, *Causes* 226, 237). If, however, Thucydides had already composed i. 23. 6 and had it in mind when he composed 88, and if his concern in 23. 6 was (as suggested above) with sufficiency of cause, it becomes easier, and is not insuperably difficult even if those two conditions are not satisfied, to understand 'not so much persuaded by what their allies said' as meaning that Sparta did not simply act like a judge deciding a case after hearing opposing pleas and would not have been moved, any more than on other occasions, by the sufferings and indignation of her allies, had she not independently come to the conclusion that the situation contained a threat to her own security. The alternative was, after all, reference to arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of the Thirty Years' Peace (i. 78. 4, 85. 2), and that would have been an appropriate response to a situation in which she did not feel threatened.

Yet i. 23. 6 does not simply say that Sparta feared Athens; it introduces, in *ἀναγκάσαι*, the notion (contrast i. 140. 2) that Sparta had no option but to fight. Strictly speaking, no one is 'forced' to declare war, but such words as *ἀνάγκη* and *ἀναγκάζειν* were used, like 'have to . . .' in English, with reference to situations in which a refusal to fight appears likely to result in a loss of wealth, power, or security which, given the values and assumptions of the period and culture in question, is unacceptable—a situation, that is to say, in which the absolute certainty of temporary suffering and the remote possibility of total destruction are preferred to the high probability of lasting

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and substantial loss.¹ It must be remembered that in v. 25. 3, speaking of the resumption of hostilities in 414/13, Thucydides describes both sides without distinction as ἀναγκασθέντες λύσαι τὰς - - - σπονδάς. That the growth of Athenian power put Sparta into a predicament from which victory in war offered the only escape is not a view entertained in Perikles' speech, and it would be surprising if it were; it is however an implication discernible in certain passages of the Funeral Speech (e.g. ii. 36. 2 f., 40. 3 f., 41. 3-5, 45. 1, glorification of adventurousness and courage, without a word about the justice or injustice of the causes in which they are manifested) and in Perikles' last speech (e.g. ii. 63, 64. 3-5, exultation in imperial power and contempt for those who, born into the Athenian community, shrink from the exercise of power; cf. Andrewes, *PCPS* clxxxvi [1960], 6-8). In the Melian Dialogue (notably v. 89, 105. 2), and in Alkibiades' speech in the debate on the Sicilian Expedition (vi. 18. 2, 6 f., on the impossibility of ἀπραγμοσύνη, and especially 18. 3 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς δόσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ.) Athenian commitment to unlimited expansion is made explicit. Since those passages were necessarily written more than fifteen years after the outbreak of the war, their relevance to Thucydides' view of the situation in 432 cannot be assumed without more ado.

If ἀφανεστάτη λόγῳ meant 'never put into words', it would be contradicted by the Corinthian speech at the first meeting at Sparta, designed to instil fear and to present from a hostile standpoint the view of Athenian policy and power which we see presented from an Athenian standpoint in the speeches mentioned above. But given the common Greek idiom in which (e.g.) 'uglier than ...' means 'not as beautiful as ...' (cf. iii. 37. 4, lit., 'stupider than the laws'), ἀφανεστάτη means 'less φανερά than any other', and the apparent contradiction is removed. The formal Spartan demands on Athens, into which expression of jealousy or fear naturally could not enter, spoke of the complaints voiced by Corinth, Aigina, and Megara (i. 139. 1-3~67. 1-4). That section of Athenian society which favoured a soft answer said that 'the (sc. Megarian) decree should not stand in the way of peace' (i. 139. 4). Perikles' reply is directed to rebutting the Spartan demands actually made (i. 140. 3, 144. 2) and expounding the far-reaching consequences of backing down in such a situation. General opinion at Athens in the summer of 431 blamed Aigina as being 'as much responsible for the war as anyone' (ii. 27. 1) and led to the decision to expel the Aiginetans from their island. The comic version of the war's origins propounded in Ar. *Ach.* 513-56 is constructed on the basis of Athens' relations with Megara, and the kernel of it

¹ Cf. the examples cited by de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 61 n. 26. It should be added that the subject of the expression φόβον παρέχειν may be a fact or a situation (e.g. iii. 11. 6), not a person with a conscious intention to frighten.

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(535–9) is the refusal of Athens to repeal the Megarian Decree when Sparta took up the Megarians' entreaty. More significant, perhaps, is a brief passage in *Peace*: the Greeks have come together to pull Peace out of her pit, and the Megarians, whose weakness from starvation makes their efforts ineffective (481–3), are driven away by Hermes (500–2) on the grounds that 'the goddess (sc. Peace) remembers, and abhors you, for you were the first to smear her with your garlic'.¹ Andokides in the early fourth century says (iii. 8) 'we went to war again because of the Megarians', and Aischines ii. 175 echoes him in 343 (cf. de Romilly 17). Since Thucydides in i. 23. 5 f. is concerned with any and all of those who had discussed, were discussing and might in the future discuss the question 'What caused the war?', and not simply with what was or was not said by representatives of the belligerent states when it began, I take λόγω to include such discussion as he had heard down to the time of writing, among ordinary people as well as historians and politicians.

The tendency of the argument throughout this section has been 'unitarian' in the sense that arguments in favour of a clear distinction between a first version and a revised version—the one accepting the Corinthian and allied initiative as decisive, the other seeing the decisive moment in the Spartans' reaction to the growth of Athenian power—have been found wanting; it is not even demonstrable, from comparing and contrasting various passages in book i, that the 'real reason' was not present to Thucydides' mind from the very first (cf. de Romilly 19–24). That is not to say that we should dismiss as the product of our own inadequate understanding such disquiet as we may feel about the argument of book i; feelings are facts, and deserve scrutiny not in order to prove them irrational but to discover whether or not they are generated by a rationality as yet barely articulated. We have become so accustomed to the notion of a contradiction between the first half of i. 23. 6 and the greater part of book i that it is almost impossible to look at the book again with wholly innocent eyes, but if we make the effort we may be struck by a certain lack of balance (the term is preferable in this context to 'contradiction') between i. 24–138 (throughout which Corinth is the trigger but Sparta's attitude to the Athenian empire is the propellant) and 139. The concrete Spartan demands on Athens, as described in 139. 1, were that the Athenians should withdraw their troops from Poteidaia, that they should allow Aigina autonomy, and that they should repeal the Megarian Decree, but they so elevated the third demand above the other two as to say that if it were conceded they would not fight; Poteidaia and Aigina were thus

¹ Popular views of the causes of a war are seldom sophisticated; I heard a British officer say to a Pole in 1944, 'Well, you *started* the bloody war, didn't you?'—which is about as close as one can get to *Peace* 500–2.

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relegated to subjects of a *démarche*, not of an ultimatum. (The utterance of the next and last Spartan embassy, 'Sparta wants peace, and there would be peace if you allowed the Greek world autonomy' [139. 3], despite the immensity of the threat which lurked in it, was not regarded by the Athenians as a concrete ultimatum, unless 139. 4 and 140. 4 radically misrepresent their reaction.)

If Thucydides actually believed at one time that Corinth was primarily responsible for the Peloponnesian decision to fight and subsequently believed that Spartan fears were primarily responsible, the most probable cause of his change of mind is the contempt with which Sparta treated Corinth in 421, and this change of mind will have been closely related to his decision to regard the events of 421 onwards as a continuation of a single great war (Andrewes, *Causes* 229 f.). There is, however, a case to be made for a different change of mind, enlarging, not diminishing, the role of Corinth. A version of book i which had far more to say about the Megarian Decree (perhaps also the autonomy of Aigina) and far less about the Corinthians would have done justice, as the book which we read does not, to *αἱ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι—λεγόμεναι* in the Spartan ultimatum, in the critical debate at Athens, and in Athenian tradition thereafter. If Thucydides never composed such a version in continuously readable form (and I am not suggesting that he did) it will have been because he realized at an early stage that although the Spartans chose to make the Megarian Decree the crucial issue, as the best means of forcing Athens into war, the decree in itself would not have provided the aggressive faction with secure command of a majority in the Spartan assembly, whereas the pressures which pushed Corinth into indignation against Sparta and a threat of secession did provide it. On this hypothesis the prominence of Corinth in book i is the result of Thucydides' digging below the surface of events; i. 67. 4, in which the Megarian Decree is partially explained, and 139. 1 f., in which we are told rather more, are an unsatisfactory attempt to put the most prominent original *aitía* back into a story from which it had been temporarily excluded (did Thucydides forget, in writing one of those two passages, that he had written the other, or was he undecided on which of the two locations was preferable, or did he wish to remind us in 139. 1 of something which he thought we might have forgotten?). In devoting so much space to Poteidaia and including (on an even larger scale, with a full-dress debate) the Athenian intervention against Corinth on the side of Kerkyra, Thucydides exploited the ambiguities of the word *aitía*, shifting from 'accusation' to 'cause', and incidentally extending the boundaries of *τὸ φανερὸν* considerably. The importance of the Kerkyra episode for him was that despite Athenian circumspection and restraint (44. 1, 45. 3, 49. 4, 49. 7, 53. 4) it led inexorably to the first direct encounter between Athenian and

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Peloponnesian naval forces (55. 2) since the making of the Thirty Years Peace. The fact that Kerkyra approached Athens in the hope of an alliance also showed how an imperial power is exposed to the risk of being drawn into other people's quarrels, a risk positively welcomed by the Thucydidean Perikles and Alkibiades (cf. ii. 40. 4 and p. 420). It could fairly be said that the 'real reason' for the war, that Sparta 'had to' fight against Athenian power, was illustrated by Kerkyra's embassy to Athens.

The hypothesis that there was a time (however brief) at which Thucydides gave the Megarian Decree first place among *aīs τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι* is wholly speculative, and there is no sentence in book i which can plausibly be treated as surviving from a version written on that basis. The construction of the hypothesis, however, is a way of reminding ourselves that 'the *αἰτίαι* spoken openly' and 'the truest *πρόφασις*' are in fact more intimately and more harmoniously interconnected throughout book i than Thucydides' own account of the *αἰτίαι* is connected with the *αἰτίαι* which were 'spoken openly' at Athens and Sparta.

8. *Alkibiades and Sicily*

Some aspects of Thucydides' relationship with Alkibiades, and in particular the hypothesis that Alkibiades was one of his most important informants, have been discussed in the course of the commentary (viii. Introd. p. 3, and 45. 1, 46. 5, 51. 3, 88 nn.). Of greater importance for the composition problem is Thucydides' judgement, oblique and veiled but in substance unmistakable, that the Athenians' rejection of Alkibiades was the critical moment in their downfall.

In ii. 65. 11 the view is expressed that the error of the Sicilian Expedition was not so much a misjudgement of the strength of Syracuse and her allies as political discord at home, which led to decisions disadvantageous to the expedition (*οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγυγνώσκοντες*) and 'blunted it' (*τὰ ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν*). The military narrative of section E affords no sign that political dissension, whether because it led to the recall of Alkibiades (vi. 61. 4–6) or for any other reason, had an adverse effect on the spirit and zeal of the expedition (for *ἀμβλύς* and *ἀμβλύνειν* cf. ii. 40. 4, 65. 4, 87. 3, iii. 38. 1).¹ It did, however, deprive Nikias and Lamachos of a colleague whose strategical and tactical view would on occasion have differed from theirs and might, when it did, have

¹ W. E. Thompson, *Historia* xx (1971), 141–51, denies this, but he treats 'the demagogues at home' as a more coherent political group, and more sharply distinguished from the expeditionary force, than was actually the case; and in trying to reconcile ii. 65. 11 with the narrative of section E he does not attach sufficient importance to the tone of vi. 1. 1 (see below).

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prevailed (as at Rhegion, vi. 50. 1). It appears therefore that Thucydides is saying in ii. 65. 11, 'What went wrong with the Sicilian Expedition was the decision, taken after its departure, to recall Alkibiades', and that he implies, 'If Alkibiades had remained in Sicily, the expedition might not have come to grief.' This accords with vi. 15. 3 f., where it is stated that Alkibiades' ambition and extravagance 'later, as much as anything, brought about the fall of Athens' since it generated fear of him as a potential tyrant; that led to the rejection of his leadership, *κράτιστα διαβέντος τὰ τοῦ πολέμου*, and that in turn to final defeat. It accords also with ii. 65. 12, which would mislead us totally on how the Peloponnesian War ended if we were deprived of sources other than Thucydides: 'They did not give in until, having become involved in political feuds (*αὐτοὶ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἤδιας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες*), they met with mishap (*ἐσφάλησαν*).'¹ Thucydides may have in mind the story told by X. HG ii. 1. 25 f., to the effect that the Athenian generals at Aigospotamoi rejected the good tactical advice which Alkibiades, as a private individual, offered them; he may conceivably have believed in the treachery of Adeimantos (cf. X. HG ii. 1. 32, Lys. xiv. 38); or he may simply be making the same point as in vi. 15. 3 f., treating the period between the second exile of Alkibiades and the battle of Aigospotamoi as a quick slide—despite Arginousai—to inescapable defeat. In any case, he has chosen to give the theme of political disunity, first developed in ii. 65. 7, such prominence that the destruction of the Athenian fleet and the subsequent reduction of Athens by starvation are entirely suppressed. Despite his ostensible direction of his work to a panhellenic audience (hence the occasional explanation of institutions familiar enough to Athenian readers, e.g. i. 126. 6, ii. 19. 2), it is possible that Thucydides wanted the critical approval of his countrymen more than other people's; hesitating to say outright (given the climate of opinion at Athens at the turn of the century) that Alkibiades would have saved Athens if allowed to do so, he preferred in ii. 65 to exploit a prevailing idealization of *δρόνοια* and guilt over failure to achieve it, and in vi. 15. 3 f. tactfully made Alkibiades' own behaviour, rather than Athenian reactions to it, the ultimate cause of disaster.

Thucydides' own narrative of Alkibiades' career is not reconcilable at first sight with his assessment of the man's stature. Alkibiades is introduced to us in v. 43. 2 as a young man who owed high political standing to his ancestry, his foreign policy being determined at least as much by a vindictive antagonism towards Nikias as by less selfish considerations (v. 43 in fact exemplifies the generalization of ii. 65. 7). His reintroduction in vi. 15. 2 is even less friendly, leaving no room for the possibility that he was actuated by the patriotic motives to which Nikias (whether justly or not) lays claim in vi. 9. 2. His presentation (vi. 16. 6) of the outcome of his Peloponnesian policy is

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contradicted by Thucydides' own assessment of it in v. 75. 3 (cf. 76. 2). Having persuaded his colleagues on the Sicilian Expedition to delay any action directly against Syracuse and Selinus until they had enlisted by diplomacy as much support as possible (vi. 48), he failed to enlist any at Messene (to which he attached the highest importance) and Kamarina and was rescued from a possible rebuff at Katane by a stroke of unforeseen luck (vi. 50-2). Thucydides in vii. 42. 3 expresses the opinion¹ that if the Athenians had attacked Syracuse without delay they would have achieved their object; in saying this, he comes close to endorsing the plan originally proposed by Lamachos (vi. 49) and therefore implicitly rejects Alkibiades' strategy as mistaken. The terms in which Alkibiades' address to the fleet at Samos is described (viii. 81. 2 f.) are hardly sympathetic; he 'laments' (*ἀνωλοφύρατο*) his personal misfortune, 'exaggerates' (*ὑπερβάλλων ἐμεγάλυνε*) his own influence with Tissaphernes, and 'boasts' (*ἐπικομπῶν*) about the latter's alleged promises. When, soon after, he succeeds in restraining the fleet's angry reaction to Chaireas' news, Thucydides comments that this seems to be the first occasion on which Alkibiades served Athens well (*δοκεῖ - - πρῶτον - - ὠφελῆσαι*, viii. 86. 4 [see n.]).

That is an understandable verdict on the narrative from v. 43 to viii. 86. Clearly ii. 65. 11 f. and vi. 15. 3 f. were 'thought at a different time' from the narrative of books v-viii (Gomme, *More Essays* 100 = *JHS* lxxi [1951], 74), but if we speak of Thucydides as 'changing his mind' about Alkibiades we must draw a careful distinction between a change in the interpretation of a single set of data and a view formed on a second set in opposition to the view formed on an earlier set.

The words *κράτιστα διαθέντος τὰ τοῦ πολέμου* in vi. 15. 4 are fully concordant with the narrative of the years from 411 onwards in X. *HG* i-ii, and if that narrative does not justify Thucydides' judgement

¹ See n. ad loc. and vol. iv, p. 488. E. Christian Kopff, *GRBS* xvii (1976), 23-30, puts forward the hypothesis that vii. 42. 3 is interpolated from Philistos; his reason for rejecting its Thucydidean authorship is that its contradiction of the narrative of book vii is too gross to be acceptable, and his reason for suggesting Philistos as the author is Philistos' 'detestation' of Nikias, manifest (e.g.) in Plutarch's *Nicias*. As regards the former reason, the fact that an assessment is unfair, intemperate, and misleading does not provide good grounds for suspecting that it is interpolated in Thucydides (the opportunity to contrast Demosthenes with Nikias might well bring out the worst in him [cf. vii. 50. 4 n.]); nor does inconsistency, given the circumstances of composition. As regards the positive attribution to Philistos, Paus. i. 29. 12 (= Philistos *FGrH* 556 F 53) is not evidence for his animus against Nikias unless the statement that the Athenians left Nikias' name off the war memorial is false and was propagated maliciously by Philistos. (On Philistos as a source of Plutarch cf. Jacoby *FGrH* IIIb, pp. 512 f.) In any case (M. W. Dickie, *GRBS* ibid. 217-19), even if the entire parenthesis *ἀφικόμενος - - - ὠφελεῖν* were absent from our text, the words *παθεῖν ὅπερ ὁ Νικίας ἔπαθεν* and *ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς - - - τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ - - - δεινότατός ἐστι* would go some way towards showing wherein Thucydides thought Nikias' failure lay.

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in ii. 65. 11 f. in detail it at least enables us to see how Thucydides arrived at such a judgement. In their immediate context (introduced by ὅπερ καθεῖλεν ὕστερον, κ.τ.λ. in 15. 3) the words *κράτιστα, κ.τ.λ.* refer to the time of Alkibiades' second exile, and if Thucydides wrote books vi and vii, including the whole of vi. 15 in its present form, after 404 there is no compelling reason why he should have feared that his readers would take him to be passing a favourable verdict on the military qualities displayed by Alkibiades before 411. He is, after all, capable of combining statement and judgement of different tendency, as viii. 86. 5 itself shows. *καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε --- ἀπέτρεπεν* there cannot be a simple, hasty insertion between § 4 and § 6, for the opening of the next sentence, *αὐτὸς δὲ ἀποκρινάμενος, κ.τ.λ.*, presupposes the mention of someone other than Alkibiades himself in the previous sentence (cf. viii. 100. 2 *σκοποὺς μὲν κατεστήσατο --- αὐτὸς δέ --- παραπλεύσας, κ.τ.λ.*, 6. 1 ὅπως ναῦς κομίσειαν --- καὶ αὐτὸς --- *ἀποστήσειε*), and that is provided by *τούς --- ὄργιζομένους --- ἀπέτρεπεν*, not by the last words of § 4, *κωλυτῆς γενέσθαι*:¹ and in § 7 *καὶ τάλλα ἐκέλευεν, κ.τ.λ.* in turn presupposes something, giving the main content of Alkibiades' answer, later than § 5. It therefore appears that when he wrote viii. 86 Thucydides was able simultaneously to judge that nothing Alkibiades had done down to 411 was advantageous to Athens and to recognize (and declare ungrudgingly) that in restraining the fleet he did Athens an invaluable service which no other man could have done (cf. viii. 48. 4, 108. 1 nn.). In vi. 15. 3f. the words from ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν to ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν could have been inserted, or substituted for something else, without any change in the preceding and following sentences except perhaps the replacement of *τότε δέ by τότε δ' οὖν in § 5. But Thucydides cannot have chosen §§ 2 f. ἐνήγε δέ --- καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας as the right place for an insertion on the later importance of Alkibiades without seeing what § 2 said (for what, otherwise, do we mean by choosing a place? [cf. viii. 52 n.]), and ὅπερ at least guarantees that he intended *ἄν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι --- δαπάνας* to stand. This indicates that he did not regard his factual statement about Alkibiades' motives in 415 as invalidated by the independent facts of Alkibiades' military career from 411. It is not necessary, or even appropriate, to suppose that in ii. 65. 11 Thucydides is reinterpreting Alkibiades' Sicilian strategy, for he can reasonably have formed the opinion (which many of us would have no difficulty in sharing) that if Alkibiades had remained in Sicily he would have learned from events and at more than one stage would have persuaded his colleagues to action which would have averted disaster.

¹ If § 6 had followed immediately on § 4, *ἀποκρινάμενος δέ* would have been expected; cf. viii. 10. 4 καὶ --- οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι --- Ἀλκαμένη ἀποκτείνουσιν καὶ αὐτῶν τίνες ἀπέθανον. *διακριθέντες δέ, κ.τ.λ.*

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But on the original decision to send an expedition to Sicily, and therefore on the parts played for good or ill by Nikias and Alkibiades in the critical debate, there is good evidence for a genuine change of mind on Thucydides' part. The very first sentence of book vi strikes a pessimistic note, remarking on the Athenians' ignorance of the size of Sicily, the number of different nations which lived there, and the scale of the operations which would be required. Thucydides uses this as a peg on which to hang a historical digression on the colonization and early history of Sicily, but although this digression is of very limited relevance to the events of 415, the implication of the opening sentence, that the expedition was too ambitious a venture, is firmly implanted in our minds from the beginning, and it remains present to our minds when we read the debate at Athens and the remaining narrative. In vi. 94. 1 ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον μοι εἴρηται, one of Thucydides' rare references back (in this case, to 4. 2), indicates that the historical digression had already been composed when Thucydides put the narrative of 414 into its present form, and this tells us with virtual certainty what note he struck in his initial statement of the Athenians' intention to subdue Sicily. The tone of ii. 65. 11 is very different: there, the expedition is 'not so much a failure to assess their adversaries, as ...', words which imply that the expedition could have succeeded if Alkibiades had not been recalled. This judgement supersedes—that is to say, it pushes into the background—whatever opinion Thucydides may have formed earlier on the strategy advocated by Alkibiades in Sicily, and it also supersedes (though it does not necessarily invalidate) the judgement expressed in vii. 42. 3. The conclusion follows that vi. 15. 3f. ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν --- ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν are a fundamentally revised version of what (if anything) had come between *καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας* and *τότε δ' οὖν παρελθών*. This revised version cannot have been composed before Thucydides had formed the opinions expressed in ii. 65. 11f.; viii. 86. 4f. are good evidence that those opinions could not have begun to take shape before the autumn of 411, but in the light of Xenophon's narrative it would be surprising if they were not fully formed before the end of the war. At how early a date Thucydides brought the narrative and speeches of section E up to the same standard of elaboration as section B is not so easily deduced, for it depends on a question which is fully deserving of consideration but unlikely to receive an agreed answer: if Alkibiades' conduct from 411 onwards had already made a favourable impression on Thucydides, would not some reflex of this impression be discernible in vi. 1. 1 and vii. 42. 3?¹

¹ To ask whether a favourable view of Alkibiades would not also have been reflected, at least through nuances, in vi. 17 f., 48, and 89–92 would be to beg the main question about the relation of the speeches to historical fact.

9. *The Spartan–Athenian Alliance*

Reference has been made in another connection (p. 388) to Schwartz's hypothesis that certain ingredients in Thucydides' work as we now have it were not intended by the author for inclusion but were inserted after his death by an editor who also made certain adjustments to the text in the neighbourhood of the insertions. The hypothesis is vulnerable to a twofold objection: that the difficulties which it is designed to solve admit of simpler solution (cf. p. 430), and that the alleged editor's oscillation between sensitivity and obtuseness in the understanding of contexts is fundamentally implausible (cf. vol. iv, pp. 327, 404). If, however, we can find in Thucydides a substantial statement which the historian can never have believed to be true, and with it a sequence of interpolations designed to reconcile it with the rest of his narrative, there is a case after all for editorial intervention. Schwartz regarded the text of the treaty of alliance between Athens and Sparta (v. 23 f.), together with the introductory statement (v. 22) of the circumstances in which it was made, as constituting a passage of this kind; it is in fact the crucial issue in the consideration of Schwartz's theory, although Schwartz himself did not treat it as such. He believed (48–56) that Sparta and Athens cannot have concluded an alliance in 421; from which it would follow that they did not, and the assumption is made that in that case Thucydides cannot have believed that they did. Some cursory allusions to the alliance occur in the subsequent narrative (25. 1 καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, 27. 1 καὶ ὑστερὸν ἡ ξυμμαχία, 27. 2 καὶ ξυμμαχίαν, 39. 3 ξυμμαχίαν ἴδιαν — ὥσπερ Αθηναῖοι), and yet there is no allusion to it at the points where, at first sight, we would most expect to find one (29. 2 f., on the indignation of the Peloponnesians at the last clause [18. 11] of the peace-treaty; 30. 2, Corinthian indignation at the peace-treaty; 35. 2–7, the growth of mutual mistrust between Athens and Sparta over non-fulfilment of the peace-treaty; 36. 1, the desire of the incoming ephors of 421/0 to revoke the peace-treaty; perhaps also 44. 3, 46. 1 and 46. 4, on Spartan–Athenian relations at the time when the Argive–Athenian alliance was taking shape); it can even be argued that some of those passages presuppose the non-existence of a Spartan–Athenian alliance. Schwartz concluded (57 f.) that v. 23 was a proposal drafted by the Spartans but never put into effect; that Thucydides' editor, finding the draft among Thucydides' papers and being unaware of its true nature, inserted it into this text; and that this same editor not only interpolated references to the alliance in 25. 1, 27. 1, and 27. 2 and the words ὥσπερ Αθηναῖοι in 39. 3, but also concocted 22 on the basis of 14. 4 and 27. 1. Pohlenz 264 drew attention to the fact that on this theory the editor also interpolated the word καὶ in 42. 2 πυνθάνονται ὅτι καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἴδιᾳ ξυμμαχίᾳν

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πεποίηνται. Now this editor must have been something more than an editor, for to introduce a mission of Ampelidas and Lichas into 22. 2 when no one is named in connection with Spartan–Argive negotiations in 14. 4 argues some historiographical ambition, whether Ampelidas' name (nowhere else mentioned in Thucydides) is derived from research or simply invented. Yet he was not enough of a historian to know that Sparta and Athens concluded no alliance in 421 or (as an early fourth-century historian should have done, on Schwartz's hypothesis) to find such an alliance implausible (Schwartz 58 f. does not take this point into consideration at all). He was subtle and meticulous enough to spot places at which explicit or implicit references to the alliance should be interpolated, yet not skilful enough to smooth over the cracks by simple rewording, and capable of creating a blatant contradiction where none existed before, making the Spartans in 22. 2 send away (*ἀπέπεμψαν*) before the making of the alliance those Peloponnesian representatives who objected to the peace-treaty and then putting into 27. 1 words which keep those representatives at Sparta until *after* the alliance,¹ and saying in 27. 1 that the representatives had been summoned for discussion of both treaty and alliance although in 22. 1 he had chosen words (*αὐτοὶ ἔτυχον ὄντες*: cf. p. 375) which clearly imply that their presence at Sparta between the journey of Klearidas and the negotiation of the alliance was not demanded by the Spartans in connection with that impending negotiation. Moreover, in 48. 1 *αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία οὕτως ἐγένοντο* (sc. between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea), *καὶ αἱ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Αθηναίων οὐκ ἀπειρήνητο* we naturally understand *σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία* after *Αθηναίων*; if we are to be prevented from doing so, it is necessary to postulate that Thucydides actually wrote *Αθηναίων* *(σπονδαῖ)* and that *σπονδαῖ* was removed by the editor or omitted by chance (Schwartz 55; cf. C. Meyer 50 n. 1).

Just as a presupposition about the nature of Thucydidean speeches played an important part in forming Schwartz's view of the debates at Sparta in book i (cf. p. 416), so a presupposition that a historian of Thucydides' stature cannot have composed even a tentative and provisional narrative as ill co-ordinated as certain portions of book v (Schwartz 56) underlies the theory that v. 22 f. and a miscellany of other passages are interpolated. The judgement that a Spartan–Athenian alliance in 421 is an impossibility is invalidated by the words of the Spartan envoy at Athens in 425 (iv. 19. 1), 'The Spartans invite you to make peace and put an end to the war, *διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἄλλήλους*

¹ That is the implication of *ἐς αὐτά*, which any reader (as Thucydides would have realized) would understand, unless he had 22. 1 f. in mind, as referring to the complex of events issuing in the treaty and the alliance.

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ὑπάρχειν' (cf. 20. 3 *Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν φίλους γενέσθαι βεβαίως*). This is, after all, a very public utterance, and even if we choose to believe that no Spartan envoy said any such thing, it remains an element in Thucydides' own picture of Spartan–Athenian relations.

But acceptance of the alliance as fact does not at all explain the contradiction between 22. 1 and 27. 1 concerning the time of departure of the allied representatives from Sparta.¹ This was one of Kirchhoff's reasons (156) for his suggestion (178) that the reference to the alliance in 25. 1, 27. 1, and 27. 2 originated in laconic marginal notes by Thucydides himself, who, Kirchhoff believed (177), had no accurate information on the content of the alliance when he first put book v into the form of a continuous narrative. Kirchhoff's principal reason was his belief (162 f.) that 39. 3 and 46. 2 show Thucydides to have entertained, at the time he wrote those passages, a mistaken conception of what the alliance said. That belief is not required by the evidence (v. nn. ad locc.); also, it is unrealistic to imagine that at a time when Thucydides had some notion of the alliance he should have made no allusion to it before 39. 3 and then, when he was fully informed, added marginal notes at points to which—given an absence of allusion before 39. 3—they were not specially appropriate and were in one case (27. 1) positively inappropriate. There is a further obstacle to the theory of marginal additions (and to the theory of editorial interpolation): in 27. 2, the Corinthian complaint that the Spartans 'have made a peace-treaty and alliance with the Athenians, τοὺς πρὶν ἐχθίστους', it is plainly *ξυμμαχίαν*, not *σπονδάς*, which gives point to the words *τοὺς πρὶν ἐχθίστους* (cf. Steup ad loc., Ed. Meyer *Forsch.* ii. 290 and C. Meyer 43 f.).

Another explanation may be preferred: that when Thucydides wrote v. 27 ff. he regarded the alliance as tied very closely to the peace-treaty, in effect as following from it, and believed (mistakenly) that it was negotiated and made public while Peloponnesian representatives were still at Sparta; that he composed (or revised) v. 1–24 some years later (after the formation of the 'one war' view, cf. 20. 3), and in 22 gave a more accurate version of the sequence of events; and that later still (after 404, necessarily) he rewrote 24. 2 and 25 f. as a bridge-passage (cf. pp. 432 f.) without rereading more than the first few words of 27 and therefore without perceiving the contradiction between 22. 1 and 27. 1 (it may be taken for granted that this contradiction would have been removed by subsequent revision). His earlier view may well have been influenced by the

¹ There is at least one corruption in 27. 1 (*ai ξυμμαχίαι* for *ἡ ξυμμαχία*) and probably a second, for the structure *ἐπεδόη* (etc.) subject₁ verb₁ // *καὶ* subject₂ verb₂ (*καὶ* = 'also') is abnormal and 'also' pointless; either the *καὶ* before *ai ἀπό*, κ.τ.λ. or the *καὶ* before *oi μὲν ἄλλοι* must be deleted. These questions in no way affect arguments for or against substantive interpolations in 27. 1.

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Spartan line of thinking exemplified in iv. 19, but the most important influence will have been the prevalent attitude reflected precisely by the paucity of references to the alliance in the narrative of v. 27 ff. If the peace-treaty could be broken or revoked, the alliance *a fortiori* fell with it, so that opponents of Spartan–Athenian *rapprochement* naturally concentrated their attack on the peace-treaty (cf. C. Meyer 36, 43 f., 47 f.); unlike the alliance, it explicitly committed Sparta's allies to a peace which some of them were not willing to make or keep, and for them the Athenian alliance was an insult added to the injury which mattered.

10. *The Second Preface and v. 25–83*

Schwartz's approach to Thucydidean problems has generated a new hypothesis—adumbrated in one particular by Hemmerdinger 106, explored in another by Delebecque, *Essai* 43 f. (cf. Adcock 105 f., 137 f.) and presented systematically by Canfora (1970, 1977)¹—to the effect that Xenophon put together section D from Thucydidean notes and drafts and used further material of this kind in writing *HG* i–ii. 3. 10.

Two propositions are crucial to this hypothesis in Canfora's presentation: first, that the 'second preface' (v. 26) draws a distinction between Thucydides (26. 1 γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Αθηναῖος) and someone else who speaks in the first person (26. 4 αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε μέμνημαι); secondly, that what the writer says of himself in 26. 5 is, save at one point (τὴν ἐσ Αμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν), so much more applicable to Xenophon than to Thucydides as to demand deletion or emendation of the words ἐσ Αμφίπολιν. If these two propositions were true, we should expect to find that section D differs from the rest of Thucydides in exhibiting distinctive features of Xenophon's language and historiographical technique, and should not be surprised if *HG* i–ii. 3. 10 differ from the rest of Xenophon's historical works in exhibiting some distinctively Thucydidean features. The two propositions themselves are hard to sustain. So far as concerns the first, αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε μέμνημαι arises directly, and solely, out of the comment on oracles in the preceding clause; cf. ii. 48. 3 λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἔκαστος γιγνώσκει — — — ἐγὼ δὲ οἷον ἐγίγνετο λέξω,² κ.τ.λ.

¹ The idea goes back to Gail, as Canfora, *Testo* 35 n. 6, acknowledges.

² The use of the first person in a context which opened with the third has a parallel in i. 1. 1 Θουκυδίδης — — — ξυνέγραψε~ 1. 3 νομίζω. Apart from ii. 48. 3 λέξω, the introductory formula ἔξηγήσομαι in v. 26. 6 recalls iii. 90. 1 μνησθήσομαι and vi. 54. 1 διηγησάμενος ἀποθανῶ (cf. διηγήσομαι in X. *HG* iv. 3. 16, 8. 1, v. 4. 1). In Hdt. ii. 3. 2 ἔξηγεσθαι is used of reporting what another has said, from which Canfora (14) argues that in Th. v. 26. 6 the verb 'indica l'esposizione fondata sul racconto di altri'; but this is plainly not true of (e.g.) Hdt. ii. 115. 2 f., iii. 79. 1, ix. 73. 2, 122. 1, Th. i. 138. 3 (and cf.

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and Pl. *Chrm.* 156 αού γάρ τι σοῦ δλίγος λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις ήλικιώταις, μέμνημαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ πᾶς ὃν Κριτίᾳ τῷδε συνόντα σε. As for the second, Thucydides was, after all, one of the two strategoi (iv. 104. 4) operating in the Thraceward area in 424/3, was called upon urgently to save Amphipolis (104. 4–105. 1), and failed to arrive in time (105 f); the loss of Amphipolis mattered more to the Athenians than anything else in that region, as is clear from their immediate reaction (108. 1) and from their later attempts to recover it.¹ However, the possibility that section D was put into its present form by Xenophon is raised independently by other considerations (cf. p. 437), so that an examination of its language is justified; equally, the sequence of thought in v. 24. 2–26. 6 must be scrutinized for possible signs of editorial intervention and compilation.

This sequence in fact presents no problem on the assumption that the whole passage was composed by Thucydides. The kernel of the argument is patently: the period 421/0–415/14 was not a period of peace between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, but a period of war, and (since no one would wish to deny that they were at war from 414/13 to 405/4) ‘the war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians’ thus lasted for twenty-seven years. The presence of the word *ξυνεχῶς* in 24. 2, summarizing the narrative of the years down to 422/1, suggests that the sentence was written in its present form with the essentials of the next two chapters in mind.² It is understandable that Thucydides refrained from adding a self-reference to the last sentence of the chapter, *ταῦτα δέ – γέγραπται*, or to the preceding year-formula, *καὶ τὸ θέρος ήρχε τοῦ ἑδεκάτου ἔτους*, since he had already chosen the right place for such a reference, some 120 words later.³ The nature and duration of the unreal peace which followed the treaties of 422/1 are stated in ch. 25; *ἀνοκωχῆς οὐ βεβαίου* in 25. 3, applied to those treaties, exemplifies both Thucydides’ penchant for rhetoric (cf. vol. iv, pp. 274, 328) and his impatience with formalities which obstruct one’s view of reality (cf. vi. 46. 2 n.).

¹ *ξένηγησις* in i. 72. 1). Readers of Thucydides could no more understand *ξένηγήσομαι* as ‘I have edited and will present in coherent form ...’ than they could understand *γέγραφε* as ‘has left discrete notes about ...’.

² Thucydides might have said *τὴν ἐπὶ Θράκης στρατηγίαν*, but preferred to focus on the particular operation most significant to his own career, to Athens and to readers of his narrative. *τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν* is analysable as ‘my leading of a force with Amphipolis as its object’; cf. *IG* 1². 396 *τῆς ἀπο[κίας] τῆς ἐς Ἑρ[.]* ML 84. 10 *ἄρχοντι ἐς Πύλον* (ctr. ML 90. 19 f. *τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν ἐν Σκιάθῳ*), ML 77. 52 *στρατηγοῖς ἐς Σικελίαν* (ctr. ibid. 78 *στρατεύοις ἐν τοῖς Θερμαῖσι κόλπο[ι]*).

³ In ii. 1 *ξυνεχῶς ἐπολέμουν* is contrasted with the operations at Kerkyra and Poteidaia.

³ It must again be emphasized (cf. p. 390) that *γέγραφε*, κ.τ.λ. is in no sense a deviation from an established formula but the communication of a datum not communicated elsewhere by the author.

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The reasons for treating the years 421/0–415/14 as a period of war are given in 26. 2 f., from which the consequence follows (26. 3) that the war as a whole lasted twenty-seven years. Between the description and the argument comes 26. 1, where we are told that the account of 'these events too' (*καὶ τὰῦτα*) has been composed by the person who, having set out (i. e. 1) to write a history of 'the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians', has reminded us of his name at regular intervals. If the continuity of the war needed argument, the identity of authorship needed to be stated (that is the point of *ὅτι αὐτός*), since Thucydides was known to the reader as the narrator of '*the war* between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians'. For similar reasons it needed to be said that the narrative of the years of unreal peace is presented in summers and winters, as that of the ten-year war had been (ii. 1, v. 20. 3). The addition of the words 'to the point at which the Spartans and their allies put an end to the Athenian empire ...' shows that *ταῦτα* refers not only to the period which ended when 'having no option but to dissolve the treaty ... they again became involved in undisguised warfare' (25. 3), but also the period of 'undisguised warfare' itself. If we are surprised (Canfora, *Testo* 17 f.) that nothing is said of the war in Sicily, surprise should be allayed by recollection of vi. 105 and recognition that this whole passage concerns Athenian relations with the other party to the peace treaty, Sparta and her allies. 26. 1 cannot have been intended by Xenophon, or by anyone, to communicate: 'Thucydides wrote notes about (a) the period 421/0–417/16 and (b) the period from 411/10 to the end of the war'. Whether any possibility of corruption in the sentence need be entertained depends on our interpretation of the sequence of thought in 26. 4 f.

This sequence rambles, whoever wrote it. 26. 3 ends with the comment (an afterthought, without which the sentence would have been syntactically complete and would have made a complete point) that the total duration of the war was the only thing which people who trusted oracles got right. 26. 4, a γάρ-clause, gives the evidence, namely the writer's own recollection, for the existence of an oracle which predicted a duration of twenty-seven years. Since 'I remember' is amplified with the words 'both at the beginning of the war and down to its end', the next sentence offers justification of that amplification; and having assured us that he was able to observe and understand the whole war as an event in time, the writer makes a fresh point (which has nothing to do with oracles) that he was also in a favourable position to observe it and understand it as a complex event in space.¹

¹ *αισθανόμενος τῇ ἡλικίᾳ* is not an unreasonable reminder to future readers of Thucydides' *κτῆμα ἐσ αἰεί*, unacquainted with the author and not necessarily bearing *continued*

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The idiom *τι αὐτῶν --- αἰσθέοθαι* in 26. 5 (cf. i. 83. 3, vi. 90. 4, 92. 1, in all of which, as here, *πάντα ταῦτα* in place of *τι αὐτῶν* would be consonant with the argument of the context) is not to be found in Xenophon, and at least two other clauses in v. 26 are equally un-Xenophontean: 26. 2 οὐκ ὁρθῶς δικαιώσει and 26.5 ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι. The verb *δικαιοῦν* occurs twelve times in Thucydides,¹ but never in Xenophon. The application of ἀκριβής to speaking or learning, in the sense 'accurate' is found also in Thucydides vi. 54. 1 ἀκριβές οὐδὲν λέγοντας, 82. 3 ἐσ τὸ ἀκριβές εἰπεῖν, and 91. 1 τοῦ τὰ ἀκριβέστατα εἰδότος; Xenophon does not use the adjective in anything like that sense, and with εἰδέναι he prefers the adverb ἀκριβῶς (*Cyr.* i. 3. 16, iii. 3. 70, *Oec.* 2. 3; contrast τὰ ἀκριβέστατα in Th. vi. 91. 1). The language of section D as a whole is distinctively Thucydidean, not Xenophontean.² Certainly D, excluding documents, contains no less than 77 words which occur nowhere else in Thucydides, and 40 of these 77 occur in Xenophon. It is no matter for surprise that terms relating to Spartan organization appear among the 40, viz. λοχαγός, πολέμαρχος, ἐνωμοτία, ἐνωμοτάρχης, πεντηκοντήρ, πεντηκοστύς, and γυμνοπαιδία. Nor is there any significance in the distribution of (e.g.) αὐλητής (70), ἡνίοχος (50. 4), παγκράτιον (49. 1) or other words whose denotations have no synonyms in normal use and cannot be expressed periphrastically without awkwardness; if Thucydides had no occasion to speak of a piper except in v. 70, well and good. The case might seem different with (e.g.) ἀθρεῖν (26. 2), βάθος (68. 3), βαίνειν (70), ἐντόνως (70), ἐπαναγκάζειν (31. 3), εὐφρεύν (30. 3), εὔρημα (46. 1), and ξυγχεῖν (39. 3). However, if we perform a similar analytical exercise on the vocabulary of a (necessarily discontinuous) narrative portion of the same size as section D, namely ii. 1-10, 12-34, 66-70, 75-86, 90 (inclusion of the chapters on the plague would distort any lexical comparison), we find there 111 words which occur nowhere else in Thucydides, and 54 of them occur in Xenophon. The same distinction as before may be drawn between words for objects,

continuously in mind the point which was made in i. 1. 1 and was of very great importance to the author (because he was attempting a new kind of historiography). *καθ' ἡσυχίαν* is adequately explained by the sentence in which it occurs; so far from being inappropriate (as suggested by Canfora, *Testo* 22) to a historian in a world largely at war, it can even be applied to military operations conducted from a position of strength (e.g. i. 74. 4) or to withdrawal from a perilous position under less pressure than might have been expected.

¹ Von Essen mistakenly classifies *δικαιώσει* in v. 26. 2 as dative of *δικαιώσις*.

² My data on Thucydides' vocabulary are taken from Béたnt and von Essen. For X. *An.*, *HG*, and *Cyr.* I am greatly indebted to the Oxford University Computing Service (and in particular to Mrs. Susan Hockey) for a concordance of those works derived from machine-readable texts, prepared by Ms Cordelia M. Birch (Beaver Falls, Pa.); for other works of Xenophon I depend on Sturz's *Lexicon Xenophonticum*. I do not count *Cynegeticus* as Xenophon's.

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functions and events which happen not be mentioned elsewhere in Thucydides, e.g. *πέλεκυς* (ii. 4. 4) and *κάλαμος* (76. 1), and words whose distribution might surprise us, e.g. *ἀναπέμπειν* (67. 1), *ἀπειθήσ* (84. 3), *ἐκφεύγειν* (4. 2), *κατοκνεῖν* (18. 5, 94. 1), *πελάζειν* (77. 5), *προήκειν* (34. 6), *ὑπενάντιος* (2. 2) and *φῶς* (3. 4). It is important to note that none of the 'Xenophontean' words is a particularly common word, let alone a 'favourite' or characteristic word of Xenophon; *βαίνειν*, for example, rare in Greek prose literature generally, is not to be found in *HG* and occurs only once (iii. 2. 19 *βεβηκότας*) in *An.*

More significant than a bare list of words is the fact that of the 77 words which are found in section D but not elsewhere in Thucydides 11 are abstract nouns in *-σις*, and of these only two (42. 1 f. *καθαίρεσις* and 66. 4 *παράγγελσις*) occur anywhere in Xenophon. The number of *-σις* nouns confined in Thucydides to the portion of book ii defined above is five, of which only one (ii. 70. 1 *βρώσις*) is in Xenophon. The total number of *-σις* nouns used by Thucydides is 224, and little more than a quarter of them (59) are also in Xenophon. By contrast, Xenophon has 120, so that half his total is shared with Thucydides. This is one respect in which the language of section D is strongly Thucydidean. That the prominence of *-σις* in Thucydides is the product not of a purely aesthetic predilection but of a consistent tendency, just as much in section D as elsewhere, to observation, analysis, and expression in abstract terms is suggested by the great disparity between Thucydides and the historical narrative of Xenophon in the use of the definite article with a neuter adjective. At least in *An.* and *HG* substantival expressions of this type are virtually confined to very common adjectives (the only exception is *HG* ii. 3. 56, contrasting *τὸ φρόνιμον* with *τὸ παγνιώδες*), and no two of them are combined except in *An.* ii. 6. 18 *σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ καλῷ*, *ibid.* 22 *τῷ ἀπλούν καὶ ἀληθές* and *HG* vi. 5. 16 *ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ φανεροῦ*. In Th. v. 68. 2 *τῷ ἀνθρώπειον κομπώδες* we have an example of a construction, adjective qualifying substantivized adjective, which is unparalleled in *An.* and *HG* (and poorly represented in Greek literature generally) but exactly like Th. i. 37. 4 *τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἄσπονδον* and vi. 34. 4 *τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον* (vi. 55. 3 is more complex).

If Xenophon had wished to imitate Thucydides' style, we can hardly imagine that he would not have been able to do so; modern learners of Greek prose composition do, sometimes convincingly. Any imitator could model Th. v. 80. 2 *οὐ μέντοι εὐθύς γε ἀπέστη* --- ἀλλὰ διενοεῖτο, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἔώρα *on* ii. 86. 4 *ώρμισαντο* --- ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἶδον *or* vii. 69. 1 ἀντεπλήρουν τὰς ναῦς εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἥσθανοντο, and, if more ambitious, he could model v. 69. 1 *παραινέσεις* --- *τοιαῖδε ἐγίγνοντο*, *Μαντινεῦσι μέν* --- Ἀργείοις δέ, κ.τ.λ. *on* vii. 70. 7 *πολλή* --- ἡ *παρακέλευσις* --- ἐγίγνετο, *τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις* --- *τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις*, κ.τ.λ. Imitators are fond of

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'tags', and this term could perhaps be applied dismissively to *ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο* in v. 46. 4 (cf. iv. 73. 4, v. 14. 4, viii. 47. 1, i. 50. 5, viii. 39. 3, 72. 2, the last three lacking *καὶ*) or to v. 70 *ὅπερ φίλει τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα* --- *ποιεῖν*; there are other comments by the historian, using *ὅπερ φίλει* --- or *οἷον φίλει* ---, on the behaviour of assemblies (ii. 65. 4, iv. 28. 3, vi. 63. 2, viii. 1. 4; cf. iii. 81. 5, on stasis) or large armies (iv. 125. 1, vii. 80. 3; cf. vii. 69. 2 *ὅπερ πάσχουσι, κ.τ.λ.*). Yet is it obvious that neither of these tags can be treated as a purely linguistic phenomenon; the former gives expression to a way of ordering the events in a narrative, and the latter to a wish on the historian's part to relate particular events to generalizations about human behaviour. The extent to which issues of language and issues of historiographical method can be raised by one and the same passage is well illustrated by v. 74. *Ι τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τόντων* --- *πλείστουν δὴ χρόνου μεγίστη δή* --- *ξυνελθοῦσα, κ.τ.λ.* At linguistic level we may note that (a) the first five words have obvious affinities with i. 22. 4, 143. 3 *τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια*, vii. 78. *Ι τοιαύτα τε καὶ παραπλήσια* and vii. 86. 5 *τοιαύτη ἥ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τόντων αἰτίᾳ*, but not with anything in Xenophon's historical narrative; (b) *ἐγγύτατα*, 'very close to ...', in a figurative sense, occurs elsewhere in Thucydides (i. 13. 2, 22. 1, 143. 5, vii. 86. 5) but not in Xenophon; (c) reinforcement of a superlative, especially *μάλιστα*, *μέγιστος*, and *πλείστος*, by a following *δή* is common in Thucydides (e.g. i. 1. 2, 50. 2, 122. 4, 138. 3 bis), and in section D 74. 1 is supported by 28. 2, 66. 2, and 72. 2, whereas there are only two examples in *An.* (i. 9. 12 *πλείστοι δή, ibid.* 20 *κράτιστος δή*) and only three in *HG* (iv. 8. 24 *ὑπεναντιώτατα δή*, v. 1. 3 *μακαριώτατα δή* and vii. 3. 6 *πλείστον δή*). The historiographical aspect of v. 74. 1 overshadows the linguistic; the passage is a comment of a kind peculiarly characteristic of Thucydides (cf. pp. 406f.) but exemplified in Xenophon's historical narrative only by *An.* i. 9. 12 (opportunities for it exist in *HG* iv. 3. 16 and vii. 5. 26, but are not taken). It calls not only for a particular way of looking at events, but also for a particular degree of confidence, on the part of the historian, in the completeness of the data at his disposal and in the adequacy of his comprehension of them.

Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that in constructing section D from Thucydidean material Xenophon succeeded in imitating both the language of Thucydides' own revised work and the terms in which Thucydides analysed and commented on military and political events; the hypothesis requires us to suppose that in addition he achieved a remarkable balance in the frequency with which he used certain very common Thucydidean words and eschewed certain other words which came naturally to him in his own writing but were not favoured by Thucydides. On the one hand, we find the pronouns *σφεῖς*, *σφᾶς*, *σφῶν*, *σφίσι* 70 times in section D, constituting

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one-eighth of their total occurrences (559) in Thucydides but more than in the whole of *HG* (60) and far more than in the whole of *An.* (18). On the other hand ἔνθα, which (with ἔνθαπερ) is found 61 times in *An.* and 39 times in *HG*, but only seven times in Thucydides, is absent from section D, as it is from books i and ii; ἐπει, one of Xenophon's favourite words (265 in *An.*, 393 in *HG*), occurs only once in section D (69. 1) and 43 times in the rest of Thucydides (are we to suppose that imitation overreached itself here?); and the preposition ξύν or ούν is confined in section D to the phrase ξύν ὅπλοις (50. 3, 50. 4) and to the sense 'including ...' with a number (26. 3, 74. 3), in conformity with Thucydides' general usage (35 instances of ξύν in all), whereas we find it 150 times in *An.*, and 129 in *HG*, commonly in the same sense as μετά c. gen. (*HG* i. 1. 32, 2. 18, 3. 15, etc.).

Weighed against massive phenomena of this kind, which do not constitute the whole of the linguistic features aligning section D with the rest of Thucydides against Xenophon, the choice of λίγοντος instead of τελευτῶντος in v. 81. 2 (cf. X. *HG*. i. 3. 1; Canfora 84) and of ἄρχοντος 'Αθήνησι instead of ἄρχοντος 'Αθηναῖοις in v. 25. 1 (cf. X. *HG*. i. 6. 1; Canfora 92) do not assume great importance.¹

II. Xenophon's Continuation

The only ancient testimony to any kind of personal connection between Thucydides and Xenophon is a statement by Diogenes Laertios (ii. 57); all other argument for the involvement of Xenophon in the preservation and circulation of Thucydides' work rests on inference from the relation of *HG* i.-ii. 3. 10 (the 'continuation') to Th. viii or from features of Th. v (see pp. 434 f.) and on a certain reluctance to believe that Thucydides' notes and drafts simply perished. Diogenes says λέγεται δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰ Θουκυδίδου βιβλία λανθάνοντα ὑφελέσθαι δυνάμενος αὐτὸς εἰς δόξαν ἥγαγεν, 'and it is said that although' (or 'when') 'he was in a position to claim as his own the books of Thucydides, because' (or 'when') 'no one knew of them, he himself' (or 'of his own accord') 'made them famous' (the point of καὶ is that the sentence immediately follows a list of the works ascribed to Xenophon). The translation '... those of Thucydides' books which were not known', as if the text had τά - - - Θουκυδίδου βιβλία (or τῶν - - - βιβλίων) <τὰ> λανθάνοντα, is not justifiable,² and the sentence therefore offers no support to the hypotheses that Xenophon prepared section D of Thucydides for circulation or that Thucydides' name

¹ The use of 'Αττικός as an adjective qualifying σπονδαί (v. 29. 2) and πόλεμος (28. 2, 31. 3, 31. 5), to which Canfora 93 draws attention, is indeed alien to Thucydides' usage elsewhere; but it is no less alien to Xenophon's.

² Examples of the type τὸν πᾶσι νόμον καθεστώτα (*KG* i. 624) are irrelevant, since Θουκυδίδου is not semantically linked to λανθάνοντα as πᾶσι is to καθεστώτα.

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was originally part of the title of the continuation. Diogenes frequently introduces a historical statement of any kind (commonly anecdotal and trivial) with 'it is said' (e.g. ii. 119, iv. 25 f., vi. 76, ix. 56), 'they say' (e.g. ii. 10) or 'some say' (e.g. ii. 55), leaving us to guess at the source, date, and quality of the evidence underlying such an expression. In ii. 57 the sentence preceding *λέγεται δέ, κ.τ.λ.* cites Demetrios of Magnesia as having denied the Xenophontean authorship of *Lac. Pol.*, but the transition from *φησί* - - - *Δημήτριος*, attached to the last item in a list of Xenophon's works, to *λέγεται δέ* does not at all encourage us to understand 'by that same Demetrios' with *λέγεται*, though Adcock (98, 137 f.) seems inclined to do so. Diogenes' source was presumably one of the many ancient writers who (like many scholars of later times) enjoyed constructing hypotheses which linked together famous names, ignoring the nameless majority through whose agency Thucydides' work survived: his own kinsmen, friends, and (possibly both devoted and well-educated) slaves, and the people of his time who in varying degrees interested themselves in history, oratory, and literature in general. The kind of speculation which permeated ancient biography manifests itself in Marcellinus, *Vita* 43, whence it appears that book viii was attributed by some to Xenophon, by others to Theopompos, and by others again to a putative daughter of Thucydides.¹

Within *HG* the continuation is distinguished from the rest by several criteria, of which the most important is that it completes the history of the war which Thucydides took down to the autumn of 411; secondary criteria are differences (in degree) of method and language which make it more Thucydidean than the rest. The fact that Harpokration refers Xenophon's mention of the Athenian Theognis (*HG* ii. 3. 2) to 'book ii' but his mention of *πενέσται* (*HG* ii. 3. 36) to 'book iii' shows that there existed in antiquity an edition of *HG* in which the end of the continuation at ii. 3. 10 was treated as a book-division. Did there also exist in antiquity (as occasionally in the late medieval period)² an edition in which the continuation was physically attached to the work of Thucydides and separated from the rest of *HG*? If so, was that Xenophon's intention? And did he have Thucydidean material at his disposal in writing the continuation?³

¹ Hemmerdinger 116 f., adopting an idea of Niebuhr's (cf. C. Peter, *Commentatio Critica de Xenophontis Hellenicis* [Halle 1837] 69) that the 'nine-book' division of Thucydides known to us from Diod. xii. 37. 2, xiii. 42. 5 (see further Schmid-Stählin I v. 19 n. 3) actually comprised Th. i-viii and X. *HG* i-ii. 3. 10, suggests that Marc. *Vita* 43 has its origin in a misunderstanding of a statement to the effect that the 'last' book (sc. of nine) was not by Thucydides.

² The fact that in some late medieval manuscripts *HG* is called *Θουκυδίδου παραλεπόμενα* (Canfora 57 n. 1, Testo 7 f.) may provoke us to ask whether this happened also in antiquity, but it cannot tell us what did happen.

³ For the history of this idea from Krüger (1832) onwards see Henry 54-88.

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Marc. *Vita* 45, 'the events of the remaining six years are completed by Theopompos and Xenophon, οἷς συνάπτει τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἱστορίαν' suggests that Marcellinus may possibly have thought of *HG* ii. 3. 11-vii as ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ ἱστορία and of i-ii. 3. 10 under some other name, but it would be hard to draw a clear conclusion from his wording, and equally hard to decide whether he means that Xenophon carried on a narrative of Greek history from the end of the Peloponnesian War or that the continuation and the rest were designed by Xenophon as a single work. Dion. Hal. vi (U.-R.), p. 241, 11 f. καὶ τρίτην ἔτι τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν καὶ ἣν κατέλιπεν ἀτελῆ Θουκυδίδης, ἐν ᾧ καταλύονται τε οἱ τριάκοντα καὶ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων - - αὐθις ἀνίσταται means 'and as a third theme' (*ὑπόθεσιν* is understood, as the earlier part of the sentence shows) 'that theme which is Greek' (sc. by contrast with *An.* and *Cyr.*, the first and second themes in Dionysios' list) 'and was left uncompleted by Thucydides'. Dionysios' point (cf. J. Hatzfeld *RPh* lvi [1930], 114-16) is that Xenophon chose glorious and creditable subjects, whereas Thucydides (p. 233. 8-11) wrongly chose to write the history of a war in which his own city was defeated; naturally he does not blame Thucydides for not living long enough to write the story of the rebuilding of the walls of Athens, but simply takes account of the fact that Thucydides' story ends with Athens on her way to defeat, and that Xenophon completed the story of the defeat before going on to subsequent events is evidently of no great interest to him. No conclusion bearing on ancient editions of Thucydides or Xenophon can be drawn from this passage of Dionysios.

The opening words of *HG* i. 1. 1, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλαῖς ἡμέραις ὕστερον, presuppose that the reader is turning to *HG* directly from something else, and it is natural to suppose that this 'something else' is book viii of Thucydides. Yet if we go straight from the one to the other, the immediate reference of *ταῦτα* is obscure, and the lack of information on the destination at which Thymochares arrived and fought a naval action 'again' (*αὖθις*) against Agesandridas is puzzling. The last statement in *Th.* viii. 109 is that Tissaphernes, on his way to the Hellespont, arrived 'first' at Ephesos and sacrificed to Artemis. According to X. *HG* i. 1. 9 he actually reached the Hellespont three battles later; a stage on his journey is a very curious point of reference for the dating (*οὐ πολλαῖς ἡμέραις ὕστερον*) of the movement of an Athenian naval contingent elsewhere (cf. Defosse 6, Henry 15-18). One possible explanation is that Xenophon originally wrote a paragraph preceding *HG* i. 1. 1 (cf. H. R. Breitenbach 1674, Defosse 14), in which he summarised the events of the last part of *Th.* viii (something rather like the interpolated résumé at the beginning of *An.* iv), in the light of which the reader would understand (~*Th.* viii. 95) that the encounter of Thymochares and Agesandridas took place not in the eastern Aegean but off Euboea (cf. Hatzfeld, *Mélanges*

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Desrousseaux [Paris, 1937], 211–17, Defosse 18 f.);¹ if there existed an ancient edition of Thucydides in which Xenophon's continuation was attached to book viii, if the résumé was deleted for that purpose, and if for some reason the edition enjoyed a prestige superior to that of editions which combined the continuation with the rest of *HG*, it is understandable (though only just, since it is contrary to what the transmission of ancient literature would have led us to expect) that the résumé would be deleted also from the edition of Xenophon which was the ancestor of the medieval texts of *HG*.²

The continuation resembles Thucydides, and differs from the rest of *HG*, in marking the end of a season or of a war-year more frequently, in giving a 'round-up' of miscellaneous events at the end of a war-year, in stating figures more often and more precisely (cf. H. R. Breitenbach 1671, Delebecque, *Essai* 43–7, 81 n. 60), and in avoiding certain words and phrases which are characteristic of Xenophon elsewhere but are not Thucydidean.

In the existing text of the continuation the time-markers are i. 1. 2 ἀρχομένου χειμῶνος, I. 37–2. I καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν --- τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἔτει --- ἀρχομένου τοῦ θέρους, 2. 14 καὶ χειμῶν ἐπήσει, 2. 19–3. I καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν οὗτος --- τοῦ δ' ἐπιόντος ἔτους --- ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ χειμῶν ἔληγεν, 4. I f. τὸν χειμῶνα --- ἀρχομένου δὲ τοῦ ἔαρος, 5. 21–6. I ὁ δ' ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν --- τῷ δ' ἐπιόντι ἔτει, ii. I. 8–10 τούτῳ δὲ τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ --- τῷ δ' ἐπιόντι ἔτει, 2. 24–3. I καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν --- τῷ δ' ἐπιόντι ἔτει, 3. 9 τελευτῶντος τοῦ θέρους. The variations of the formula are greater than in Thucydides, and the passage from winter to summer is noted in some years but not in others. Moreover, one year-end passes unnoticed. The summer which ends in ii. 3. 9 is that of 404 (the solar eclipse of 2 Sep. 404 is mentioned in 3. 4), and the year beginning in i. 6. 1 is 406/5 (the lunar eclipse mentioned there occurred on 15 April); by working backwards we can identify the summer which begins in i. 2. 1 as that of 409. The relation between Th. viii and *HG* i. 1 shows that the winter beginning in *HG* i. 1. 2 is that of 411/10; the spring of 410 must therefore fall in the region of i. 1. 9–12 (cf. H. R. Breitenbach 1655 f.), but this is not said explicitly.

¹ Xenophon was not necessarily right in thinking that Thymochares fought a second battle; cf. pp. 441 f. on his deficiencies in dealing with the events of 411.

² A. E. Raubitschek (*Vestigia* xvii [1972], 322–4) thinks that Xenophon himself cut out the original beginning of *HG* i. 1. Arguing that the interpolations also were made by Xenophon, he admits (322) that Xenophon must have misunderstood the implications of what he had written earlier, but that does not go far enough; it entails the supposition that in revising and interpolating Xenophon became so profoundly confused that he forgot the time of year at which ephors took office, thought that Lysander did not return from Samos until the late summer of 403, and failed to notice that he was not able to square 'X being ephor' and 'n years of the war had passed' with the list which (on this hypothesis) he had inserted in ii. 3. 9 (cf. Underhill's commentary, p. xxxvii; and on Raubitschek's argument as a whole, cf. D. Lotze, *Philologus* cxviii [1974], 215–17).

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If Xenophon himself wrote all these passages as we have them, then he did several things quite contrary to Thucydides' practice: he omitted, except at three places (i. 3. 1, 6. 1, ii. 1. 7), to note how many years of the war had elapsed; he noted Olympiads (i. 2. 1, ii. 3. 1); he named the ephor and archon in five of the years (i. 2. 1, 3. 1, 6. 1, ii. 1. 10, 3. 1); and he included in his summary of events at the end of a war-year activities in Sicily (i. 1. 37, 5. 21, ii. 2. 24, 3. 5) and Persia (i. 2. 19, ii. 1. 8) which were independent of the Peloponnesian War. The dating by war-years, ephors, and archons is, however, internally inconsistent, as the following sequence suffices to show:

- i. 3. 1 End of winter; Pantakles ephor, Antigenes archon; 22 years of the war had elapsed.
- i. 4. 2 'At the beginning of spring'.
- i. 6. 1 'Next year'; Pityas ephor, Kallias archon; 24 years of the war had elapsed.
- ii. 1. 7 25 years of the war had elapsed; i. 10, 'in the next year', Archytas ephor, Alexias archon.
- ii. 3. 10 (the ephor-list): 'Ainesias first, in whose period of office the war began'; then Pantakles, Pityas, and Archytas are the 26th, 27th, and 28th names in the list.

Apart from the possibility of wholesale corruption of numerals in the text, which could be posited as a means of removing some (but not all) elements of inconsistency, there are two alternative explanations of the data: one is that Xenophon himself, at a considerable distance of time from the events narrated, imported these haphazard and largely erroneous chronological indications, and the other (the more probable) is that they were imported by interpolators (cf. Baden 50–8, Lotze *Philologus* cvi [1962], 4) who wished to convert Xenophon's comparatively sparse indications into a more impressive chronological framework but missed a cue at i. 4. 2 and were not seriously concerned to reconcile the framework with Thucydides' sequence of war-years, or even (ii. 3. 9) his clear statement that the war lasted twenty-seven years. Whichever hypothesis is adopted, it follows necessarily that a clear Thucydidean framework of war-years for the events of 411–404 was not available to Xenophon or, if available, was rejected by him. That it was not available is strongly suggested by the fact that the coming of spring in 410 passes unmarked. The reader who comes to *HG* from Th. viii will see that the winter of *HG* i. 1. 2 is 411/10, will incorrectly take the spring of i. 2. 1 as 410, and will be a year out of step thereafter. It is improbable that Xenophon was so perverse as to choose to leave the actual spring of 410 unmarked, and the simplest explanation is that he did not know its relation to the events of i. 1. 9–12. If he had had access to Thucydidean material, we should expect him to know most about the earliest years of the period from 411/10, onwards, but there is another important

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indication that those are the years about which he knew least: his version of the exile and deposition of Hermokrates, which he places (i. 1. 27–31) in a context belonging chronologically to 410. He cannot be deriving his information from Thucydides, for he gives, as Th. viii. 85. 3 does not, the patronymics of the three new generals sent out from Syracuse, and the context in which he puts the story contradicts Thucydides; given the sequence of 85. 1, ‘Astyochos sailed off (§ 2) and Tissaphernes sent an envoy with him ... to complain about the Milesians ... and justify himself, since he knew that the Milesians and Hermokrates with them were going to denounce him ... (§ 4) So Astyochos and the Milesians and Hermokrates sailed off to Sparta’, there can be no doubt (see n. ad loc.) that Thucydides believed the replacement of Hermokrates (§ 3) to have occurred before his departure for Sparta with Astyochos. The fact that in *HG* i. 1. 31 the new generals arrive at Miletos (although according to 1. 26 the Syracusan fleet was at Antandros) indicates that although the content of Xenophon’s story is reconcilable with the other evidence at our disposal (cf. Th. viii. 85. 3 ἐτέρων ἡκόντων — — — ἐς τὴν Μίλητον στρατηγῶν)¹ his dating of it is an error of his own or of a source other than Thucydides or Thucydidean notes. Furthermore, there is a striking contrast between the focussing of interest in Th. viii. 108. 3–109 on Tissaphernes and his relations with the Peloponnesians and the perfunctory mention in *HG* i. 1. 9 of his arrival in the Hellespont, where no reason is given for his journey and nothing is said about what passed between him and the Peloponnesians; Xenophon’s interest there is directed to Tissaphernes’ relations with Alkibiades.

Not only does the hard core of genuinely Xenophontean references to the beginnings and ends of campaigning seasons in the continuation fall far short of Thucydides’ system; it is not as strongly contrasted as has sometimes been suggested with the sporadic indications of time in the rest of *HG* (cf. Lotze, *Philologus* cvi [1962], 11), for the end of winter is marked in iii. 2. 6, 2. 30, 4. 16, iv. 1. 41, 7. 1, 8. 7, v. 4. 47, 4. 58 f. (with ἔαρ ὑπέστη in v. 4. 47 and ἔαρ ὑπέφαινε in three of the others) and autumn in iv. 6. 12 (cf. 1. 1).

In respect of figures too the contrast between the continuation and the rest is far from clear-cut (cf. Defosse 16). ‘About’, ‘more than’, and ‘a few’ occur in *HG* i in 1. 1 ‘with a few ships’, 2. 3 ‘killed all except a few, and took about (ω s) 200 shields’, 2. 9 ‘having killed about 100 ... and about 300 of them perished’, 5. 20 ‘the previous ships, which were more than 100’, 6. 25 ‘more than 30 further ships ... more than 150 ships in all’, 6. 34 ‘more than 60 ships’. Conversely, precise figures occur in the rest of *HG*, with a notable concentration in book v: 1. 5

¹ We should not be impressed by the addition of ‘led by Hermokrates’ in Diod. xiii. 39. 4 to mention of the Syracusans (Th. viii. 104. 3) at the battle of Kynossema; cf. *JHS* lxxx (1960), 71 f. on Diod. xiii. 106. 1.

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'he left 12 triremes at Aigina . . . and the Athenians manned 13 ships', 1. 7 'with their 32 ships they besieged Nikolochos with his 25', 1. 9 'Gorgopas captured 4 triremes', 1. 10 'with 800 peltasts and 10 triremes', 1. 26 'bringing the 20 ships from Syracuse and Italy', 1. 27 'when his lookouts told him of the approach of 8 ships, he manned his best 12', 4. 65 'although the 6 Ambrakian ships were absent, and he fought with 55 ships against the 60 of Timotheos'. In iv. 8. 10 f. the Corinthians, and then the Spartans, man fleets of unspecified size; but a subsequent passage, 8. 23 'Teleutias with his 12 ships', shows that Xenophon in fact knew the size of the Spartan fleet, and it raises the possibility that he knew more than he said about Chabrias' 'other ships' (v. 1. 10) or the 'many ships' which had earlier rescued the garrison of Aigina (v. 1. 5), not to mention Thymochares' 'few ships' in i. 1. 1. Comparison of the continuation with those parts of the rest of *HG* which are concerned with naval operations does not reveal a difference in precision substantial enough to serve as a foundation for the hypothesis that Thucydidean material underlies the continuation; and whatever comparisons we make, for whatever purpose, we must make allowance (cf. Baden 58–60) for the fact that after ii. 3. 10 the majority of figures relate not to ships but to contingents of troops (counted in hundreds, and therefore commonly rounded up or down) and distances (inevitably estimated, not accurately surveyed). Even if Xenophon had no written sources for the continuation (and we are not in a strong position to say that he had none [cf. H. R. Breitenbach 1674–80], since we do not know at what point in his life he wrote the continuation), it by no means follows that he could not discover a great many precise figures, even after a long lapse of time, by conversation and interrogation; both he himself and the kind of men he knew, at Sparta and elsewhere, were engrossed and technically accomplished in the conduct of war, and quantitative details in the story of a military or naval operation were significant, vivid and memorable to them.

'Then', 'next', and 'after that' are expressed in *HG* by *μετὰ ταῦτα*, *μετὰ τοῦτο* and *ἐκ τούτου*. The distribution¹ is uneven: *μετὰ ταῦτα* occurs 21 times in the continuation (it is very frequent in Thucydides) and 8 times in the rest, *ἐκ τούτου* (unexampled in Thucydides) 4 times in the continuation (i. 3. 8, 5. 7, 5. 14, 6. 4, of which 3. 8 and 5. 14, introducing a sentence immediately following one introduced by *μετὰ ταῦτα*, are undoubtedly temporal, while the other two, though not destitute of a causal flavour, easily admit of the translation 'thereupon' or 'thereafter') and 76 times in the rest, while *μετὰ τοῦτο* appears only in iii. 3. 1, iv. 1. 31, 4. 1, 4. 13, 6. 1, 8. 11. The adversative

¹ The sharpness of the distinction between the continuation and the rest in this respect is somewhat exaggerated by Delebecque, *Essai* 81 n. 57 and Canfora 61.

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particle-combinations $\gamma\epsilon\mu\eta\nu$ and $\gamma\epsilon\mu\eta\nu\tau\omega i$, characteristic of Xenophon in general but unknown to Thucydides,¹ only occur in *HG* after the end of the continuation: $\gamma\epsilon\mu\eta\nu$ first in ii. 3. 33 and thereafter 39 times, $\gamma\epsilon\mu\eta\nu\tau\omega i$ first in ii. 3. 27 and thereafter 7 times. These distributions, however, lose something of their significance when it is observed that $\gamma\epsilon\mu\eta\nu$ is absent from *An.* ii–iii, $\gamma\epsilon\mu\eta\nu\tau\omega i$ from *An.* v and vii, and both from *An.* iv and vi. The word $\mu\alpha\lambda\alpha$, first in *HG* ii. 3. 56 and thereafter another 84 times in *HG*, is absent from the continuation and also from Thucydides (save in a document [iv. 118. 14] $\alpha\eta\tau\iota\kappa\alpha\mu\alpha\lambda\alpha$, and in a poem [iii. 104. 5]); it occurs 20 times in *An.* and 28 times in *Cyr.*

Data of this kind are a warning against exaggeration (as in Delebecque, *Essai* 40, 53) of the scale and nature of the differences which the reader encounters in passing from the continuation to the rest of *HG*. They suggest on the one hand that Xenophon regarded the continuation not so much as the supplementation of a great literary work in fidelity to the spirit of the original author as the completion of the story of a war of which what he regarded as the most authoritative account was unfortunately left unfinished; on the other hand, the tincture (positive and negative) of Thucydidean usage present in the continuation suggests that at the time he wrote the continuation his own language was more strongly influenced by Thucydides' than it later became.

¹ A. Roquette, *De Xenophonis Vita* (Königsberg 1884) 35–44 and Hatzfeld, *RPh* lvi (1930) 217–26. Other lexical, syntactical, and stylistic differences between the continuation and the rest are assembled by M. MacLaren *AJP* lv (1934), 129–138.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS 421-411 B.C.

This table continues that given in vol. iii, pp. 716-21.

<i>Thuc. year</i>	<i>Thuc. season</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Julian year</i>	<i>Athenian Archon</i>
II	ἐπειδὴ ἀι πεντηκοντούτεις σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο...	Negotiations about Al- give alliance, etc.	v. 27-31	421 B.C.	ALKAIOS
	π. τ. α. χρ.	Capture of Skione	32.1		
		Restoration of Delians			
		War of Phokis and Lokris	32.2		
		Corinthian diplomatic moves	32.3-7		
	τ. α. θ.	Sp. exped. to Parrasia	33		
	τ. α. θ.	Brasideioi and <i>neodamodes</i> settled at Lepreon	34		ARISTION
	τ. α. θ. τ. θ. τοῦτο	Capture of Thysos	35.1		
		Relations of Sp. and Ath. Messenians withdrawn from Pylos	35.2-8		
	τ. ἐπιγ. χ.	Negotiations of Sp., Corinth, Boeotia	36-7		
	ἐν δὲ τούτῳ	Boeotians reject Cor. proposals	38		
	τ. α. χ.	Olynthians take Mekyberna	39	420 B.C.	
	μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα	Alliance of Sp. and Boeotia	39.2-3		
		End of eleventh year			
—	—	—	—	—	—
I2	ἄμα τῶν ἡρι εὐθὺς τ. ἐπιγ. θ.	Argos negotiates with Sp.	40.1		
	ἐν τ. χρ. τ.	Destruction of Panakton	42		
		Argive embassy to Ath.	43-4		
	κατὰ τάχος	Sp. embassy to Ath.	44. 3-46.3		
		Nikias' embassy to Sp.	46.4		
	εὐθὺς	Alliance of Ath., Argos, Elis and Mantinea	46.5-48		
	τ. θ. τούτου	Olympia	49-50.4		ASTYPHILOS
	μετὰ τὰ Ὀλύμπια	Conference at Corinth	50.5		
	τ. ἐπιγ. χ.	Battle at Herakleia Trachinia	51	419 B.C.	
		End of twelfth year			
—	—	—	—	—	—
I3	τ. ἐπιγ. θ. εὐθὺς ἀρχ.	Boeotians take over Herakleia	52.1		

Chronological Table (contd.)

<i>Thuc. year</i>	<i>Thuc. season</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Julian year</i>	<i>Athenian Archon</i>
	τ. α. θ	Alkibiades in Pelopon- nese	52. 2		
	τ. α. θ.	War of Epidauros and Argos	53		
	κ. τ. α. χρ.	Sp. exped. turns back	54. 1-2		
		Operations in Epidauria, and conference at Mantinea	54. 3- 55		ARCHIAS
	τ. ἐπιγ. χ.	Sp. reinforces Epid., fur- ther operations	56	418 B.C.	
		End of thirteenth year			
14	τ. ἐπιγ. θ. μεσοῦντος	Agis invades Argolid, but makes truce	57-60		
	μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο	Ath. arrive in Argos, op- erations in Arkadia	61-2		ANTIPHON
	ἐν τούτῳ	Sp. measures against Agis	63		
		Campaign of Mantinea	64-75. 3		
	τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ... τῆς μάχης ταῦτης	Epid. invade Argolid	75. 4		
	ὑστερὸν τῆς μάχης	Operations in Epid.	75. 5-6		
	τ. ἐπιγ. χ. ἀρχ. εὐθύς	Sp. negotiations and treaty with Argos; joint actions	76-80. 2		
		Ath. withdrawal from Epid.	80. 3		
	μετὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων ἀπόστασιν	Mantinea submits to Sp.	81. 1	417 B.C.	
		Oligarchic coup in Argos	81. 2		
		End of fourteenth year			
15	τ. ἐπιγ. θ.	Revolt of Dion from Athens	82. 1		EUPHEMOS
		Sp. action in Achaea			
		Counter-revolution in Argos	82. 2-6		
	τ. ἐπιγ. χ.	Sp. invade Argolid	83. 1-2		
	μετὰ τοῦτο	Argives invade Phleious	83. 3	416 B.C.	
	τ. α. χ.	Ath. action against Macedon	83. 4		
		End of fifteenth year			

Chronological Table (contd.)

<i>Thuc. year</i>	<i>Thuc. season</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Julian year</i>	<i>Athenian Archon</i>
16	<i>τ. ἐπιγ. θ.</i>	Alkib. to Argos. Ath. exped. to Melos, and conference	84. 1 84- 114		
	<i>κ. τ. χρ. τ. α.</i>	Argives invade Phleious	115. 1		
		Ath. raid from Pylos	115. 2		
	<i>τ. ἐπιγ. χ. ὕστερον</i>	Sp. and Argos Second Ath. force to Melos, and surrender of Melos	116. 1 116. 2- 4		ARIMNESTOS
	<i>τ. α. χ.</i>	Ath. plan exped. to Sicily	vi. 1-6	415 B.C.	
	<i>τ. α. χ.</i> <i>οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον</i>	Sp. invade Argolid Ath. exped. to Argos Ath. operations against Perdikkas	7. 1 7. 2 7. 3		
		End of sixteenth year			
17	<i>τ. ἐπιγ. θ. ἄμα ἥρι</i> <i>ἐν δὲ τούτῳ</i> <i>θ. μεσοῦντος ἥδη</i>	Ath. debate on Sicily Mutilation of Hermai Exped. sails	8-26 27-9 30-32. 2		
		Debate at Syracuse	32. 3- 41		
	<i>ἥδη</i>	Ath. at Kerkyra review forces	42-3		
		Ath. at Rhegion, debate of generals	44-9		
	<i>μετὰ τοῦτο</i>	Ath. to Naxos, Katane and Kamarina Salaminia arrives at Katane	50-2 53. 1		
	<i>ἐπειδὴ ἡ στρατιὰ</i> <i>ἀπέπλευσεν</i>	Investigations at Ath. about Hermai and Mysteries	53. 2- 61. 4		CHARIAS
	<i>μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα</i>	Alkibiades escapes Ath. to Hykkara and Segesta	61. 5-7 62		
	<i>τ. ἐπιγ. χ.</i>	Ath. landing at Syr., battle, and return to Katane Reform of Syr. generalship Ath. attempt on Messene, winter at Naxos	63-71 72-3 74		
	<i>ἐν τ. χ.</i>	Syr. fortifications Debate at Kamarina	75. 1 75. 3- 88. 2		
				- - -	

Chronological Table (contd.)

Thuc. year	Thuc. season	Event	Reference	Julian year	Athenian Archon
.	τ. χ.	Ath. to Katane Syr. ambassadors at Corinth Debate at Sp.	88. 5 88. 7-8 88. 10- 93. 1	414 B.C.	
.		Appointment of Gylippos Money and horsemen from Ath. to Sicily End of seventeenth year	93. 2-3 93. 4 :		
18		<i>Aristophanes' Birds</i>	—		<i>Elaphebolion 10</i>
	άμα τῷ ἡρι εὐθὺς ἀρχ.	Ath. to Megara and Kentoripa	94		
	τ. ἐπιγ. θ.				
	τ. α. ἡρος	Sp. to Kleonai, Argives to Thyreatis	95. 1		
	ἐν τ. α. θ. οὐ πολὺ ὑστερον	Unsuccessful rising of democrats at Thespiae	95. 2		
	τ. α. θ.	Syr. preparations	96		
		Ath. seizure of Epipolai	97		
		Walls and counter-walls	98- 103		TEISANDROS
	ἐν δὲ τούτῳ	Gylippos at Leukas, Thouria and Taras	104		
	κ. τ. α. χρ. τούτου τ. θ.	Sp. invade Argolid, Ath. landing in Lakonia	105		
	ἐπεὶ ἐπεσκέυασαν τὰς ναῦς	Gylippos to Himera and Syr.	vii. 1- 2		
		Capture of Labdalon by Gylippos	3		
	μετὰ ταῦτα	Counter-wall started on Epipolai	4. 1-3		
		Nikias to Plemmyrion	4. 4-7		
		Fighting on Epipolai	5-6		
	μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο	Remaining Pel. ships arrive	7. 1		
		Syr. embassies	7. 2-4		
		Nikias sends for help	8		
	ἐν τ. α. θ. τελευτῶντι	Euetion in Thrace	9		
	τ. ἐπιγ. χ.	Nikias' letter reaches Ath.	10-15		
	εὐθὺς π. ἥλιου τροπὰς τὰς χειμερινάς	Eurymedon sent to Sicily	16. 2	late Dec.	
		Demosthenes' preparations	17. 1	— — —	
		20 Ath. ships to Corinthian Gulf	17. 2-4	413 B.C.	

Chronological Table (contd.)

<i>Thuc. year</i>	<i>Thuc. season</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Julian year</i>	<i>Athenian Archon</i>
		Sp. prepare invasion End of eighteenth year	18		
19	<i>τ. ἐπιγ. ἡρος εὐθὺς ἀρχ.</i> <i>ἄμα... τῷ τειχισμῷ καὶ τ. ἡρος εὐθὺς ἀρχ.</i>	Sp. fortify Dekeleia Pel. hoplites sent to Sicily Ath. send 30 ships round Pel.	19.1-2 19.3-5 20.1		
		Demosthenes leaves for Sicily	20.2-3		
	<i>ὑπὸ τ. α. χρ. τούτου τοῦ ἡρος</i>	Gylippos brings allies to Syr.	21		
	<i>μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο</i>	Capture of Plemmyrion 12 Syr. ships to Italy Skirmishing and embassies	22-4 25.1-4 25.5-9		
	<i>ἐν τ. α. θ. τούτῳ</i>	Demosthenes to Kerkyra Thracians arrive at Ath.; effects of Dekeleia Massacre at Mykalessos Dem. and Eur. in W. Greece	26 27-8 29-30 31		
	<i>τότε μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Πλημμυρίου ἄλωσιν</i>	Nikias ambushes Syr. allies	32		
	<i>π. τ. α. χρ. τοῦτον</i>	Dem. and Eur. to Thouria Battle in Corinthian Gulf Dem. and Eur. to Rhegion	33.3-4 34 35		
	<i>ἐν τούτῳ</i>	Syr. naval preparations Indecisive battle followed by Syr. naval victory	36 37-41		
	<i>ἐν τούτῳ</i>	Dem. and Eur. reach Syr.	42		KLEOKRITOS
	<i>μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο</i>	Attack on Epipolai Gylippos goes to collect further forces	43-5 46		
	<i>ἐν τούτῳ</i>	Conference of Ath. generals	47-9		
	<i>ἐν τούτῳ</i>	Return of Gylippos, Syr. preparations	50.1-3		
	<i>ἡμέρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκουν ἴκαναι εἶναι τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ</i>	Eclipse of moon Skirmishing, followed by Syr. attack Syr. victory Further preparations, and catalogue of forces	50.4 51 52-4 55-8	27 Aug.	
	<i>εὐθύς</i>	Harbour closed by Syr. Last battle	59.3 60-71		

Chronological Table (contd.)

<i>Thuc. year</i>	<i>Thuc. season</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Julian year</i>	<i>Athenian Archon</i>
	<i>μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο</i>	Retreat planned Retreat and surrender of Ath. (For detailed timetable see vol. iv, p. 455)	72-4 75-87		
	<i>τ. ἐπιγ. χ.</i> <i>ἐν τ. χ. τούτῳ</i>	News reaches Ath. Feeling in Greece Agis' northern campaign Sp. preparations	viii. 1 2 3. 1 3. 2		
	<i>ἐν τ. α. χ. τούτῳ</i> <i>ἐν τ. χ. τούτῳ</i>	Ath. preparations Euboeans and Lesbians approach Agis Chians etc. at Sp. Sp. plans etc. End of nineteenth year	4 5. 1-3 5. 4- 6. 1 6. 2-5	412 B.C.	
20	<i>(ἄμα δὲ τῷ θρι;) τ.</i> <i>ἐπιγ. θ.</i> <i>ἐν τούτῳ</i> <i>μετὰ τὴν ἔορτήν</i>	Sp. naval plans Isthmia Sp. fleet blockaded at Peiraios Chalkideus sets out for Chios	7-9 10. 1 10. 2- 11 12		
	<i>ὑπὸ τ. α. χρ. τοῦτον</i>	Return of Pel. ships from Syr. Revolt of Chios and Erythrai	13 14		
	<i>τοχύ</i>	News reaches Ath., Strombichides sent to Ionia	15. 1		KALLIAS
	<i>οὐ πολὺ μετέρον</i> <i>ἐν τούτῳ</i>	Thrasykles follows Strombichides and Chalkideus at Teos	15. 1 16		
	<i>εὐθύς</i>	Revolt of Miletos First Sp. treaty with Persia	17. 1-3 17. 4- 18		
	<i>μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα</i> <i>ὑπὸ τ. α. χρ.</i>	Chians to Anaia Pel. fleet breaks out from Peiraios	19 20. 1		
	<i>κατὰ τ. χρ. τοῦτον</i> <i>μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τ. α. θ.</i>	Diomedon at Teos Revolution in Samos Chians to Lesbos Astyochos in Lesbos Ath. recover Lesbos and Klazomenai	20. 2 21 22 23. 1-4 23. 5-6		

Chronological Table (contd.)

Thuc. year	Thuc. season	Event	Reference	Julian year	Athenian Archon
	τ. α. θ.	Ath. landing near Miletos	24. 1		
	τ. α. θ. τελευτῶντος	Ath. victories in Chios	24. 2-3		
		Phrynicos etc. to Samos	25. 1		
		Battle of Miletos	25. 2-5		
	ἐν δέ τούτῳ περὶ δείλην ἥδη ὄψιαν	Arrival of Pel. fleet under Therimenes	26		
		Ath. decline battle	27		
		Capture of Iasos	28		
	τ. ἐπιγ. χ.	Sp. negotiations with Tissaphernes on pay	29		
	τ. α. χ.	Charminos etc. with fresh Ath. forces	30		
		Astyochos at Klazomenai, Phokaia and Kyme	31-33. 1		
	ἐν τούτῳ	Ath. to Chios and Lesbos	33. 2- 34		
	τ. α. χ.	Hippokrates to Knidos	35		
	ὑπὸ τ. α. χρ.	Astyochos at Miletos	36. 1		
		Second Sp. treaty with Persia	36. 2- 37		
	μετὰ ταῦτα τὰς ξυνθήκας	Troubles of Chios	38		
	ἐν τ. α. χ. . . . περὶ ἥλιου τροπᾶς	Antisthenes and Lichas from Pel. to Kaunos	39	late Dec.	
				— — —	
	ἐν τούτῳ	Further troubles of Chios	40	411 B.C.	
		Astyochos to Knidos	41		
		Charminos defeated at Syme	42-43. 1		
		Quarrel of Tiss. and Lichas	43. 2-4		
	ἐν τ. α. χ.	Pel. to Rhodes	44		
	ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πρότερον	Alkibiades and Tiss.	45-6		
	μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο	Alkib. negotiates with Ath. at Samos	47-9		
	—	Phrynicos' correspondence with Astyochos	50-1		
	ἐν τ. α. χ.	Alkibiades works on Tiss.	52		
		Peisandros at Athens	53-4		
		<i>Aristophanes' Lysistrata</i>	—		Gamelion
	μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα	Leon and Diomedon off Rhodes	55. 1		
		Chios; death of Pedaritos	55. 2-3		
		Conference of Ath. with Tiss. and Alkib.	56		
	εὐθὺς μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τ. α. χ.	Tiss. and Sp. at Kaunos	57		
		Third Sp. treaty with Persia	58-9		

Chronological Table (contd.)

<i>Thuc. year</i>	<i>Thuc. season</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Julian year</i>	<i>Athenian Archon</i>
	τελευτῶντος ἥδη τ. χ.	Boeotians take Oropos Pel. return to Miletos <i>Aristophanes'</i> <i>Thesmophoriazousai</i>	60. 1 60. 2-3 —		<i>Elaphebolion</i>
	—	End of twentieth year			
21	τ. ἐπιγ. θ. ἄμα τῷ ἡρι εὐθὺς ἀρχ.	Naval battle off Chios	61		
	μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο εὐθύς κατὰ τάχος	Derkylidias to Hellespont Strombichides to Hellespont	62; 1 62. 2-3		
	ἐν τούτῳ	Astyochos to Chios and back	63. 1-2		
	ὑπὸ τοῦτον τ. χρ. καὶ ἔτι πρότερον	Peisandros to Athens Revolt of Thasos etc.	63. 3-4 64		
	ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ	Reign of terror at Ath. Meeting of Assembly at Kolonos	65-6 67-8		
	ἥδη ὕστερον	Dismissal of Council of 500	69-70		
	ἥδη... ὑπ' α. τ. χρ. τοῦτον ὅνπερ οἱ τε- τρακόσιοι ξυνίσταντο	Agis demonstrates against city	71		
	ὑπὸ τ. χρ. τοῦτον	Embassy of the 400 to Samos	72		
	ἐν τ. α. θ. μετὰ τοῦτο εὐθύς	Oligarchic coup sup- pressed at Samos	73-7		<i>MNASILOCHOS</i>
	κατὰ τοιαύτην δια- φορὰν ὅντων αὐτοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων	Trouble in Pel. fleet Klearchos to Hellespont Alkib. recalled to Samos Further trouble in Pel. fleet	78-9 80 81-2 83-4		
	τ. α. θ.	Arrival of Mindaros at Miletos	85		
		Envoyos of the 400 reach Samos	86. 1-7		
		Paraloi and Argives at Samos	86. 8-9		
		Tiss. to Aspendos	87		
		Alkib. follows	88		
		Theramenes leads dissi- dents among the 400	89		
		Phrynicos' embassy to Sparta	90. 1-2		
		Building of Eetioneia wall	90. 3- 92. 1		
		Murder of Phrynicos	92. 2		

Chronological Table (contd.)

<i>Thuc. year</i>	<i>Thuc. season</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Refer- ence</i>	<i>Julian year</i>	<i>Athenian Archon</i>
		Hoplite revolt at Eeti- oneia, and negotiations with the 400	92. 4- 93		
		Battle of Eretria, and ef- fects at Ath.	94-6		
		Overthrow of the 400 and establishment of the 5000	97-8		THEOPOMPOS
<i>ὑπὸ τ. α. χρ. τ. θ. τούτου</i>		Mindaros moves to Hellespont	99- 101		
		Ath. counter-moves	102-3		
		Battle of Kynossema	104-6		
<i>μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἡμέρα τετάρτη</i>		Ath. to Kyzikos	107		
<i>ὑπὸ τ. α. χρ. τούτους</i>		Alkib. returns to Samos	108. 1- 2		
		Antandros expels Persian garrison	108. 4- 5		
		Tiss. at Ephesos on way to Hellespont	109		

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Book viii

p. 17 (viii. 5. 5). H. D. Westlake, *Phoenix* xxxi (1977), 319–29, suggests that Andokides may have antedated Athens' support of Amorges, and that the breakdown of Athens' treaty with Dareios was due rather to Tissaphernes' negotiations with Sparta. His argument does not absolutely depend on Dareios having known of the Sicilian disaster before he sent his orders about the tribute to the western satraps, but without such knowledge the king's action would have been highly 'adventurous' (Lewis 87 n. 25). :

p. 35 (14. 3). H. D. Westlake, *CQ N.S.* xxix (1979), 9–44, argues that the position of most of the East Greek cities was more fluid than modern historians allow, since neither Athens nor Sparta could garrison them and they could not resist the forces of either combatant when they appeared (cf. esp. 20. 2). Thus Phokaia may have had to accept occupation and fortification by Thrasybulos in 407, and it may not be necessary to emend X.*HG* i. 5. 11.

p. 38 (16.1). On the region of Teos see L. and J. Robert, *Journ. des Savants* 1976, 153–235, esp. 165–88.

p. 43 (20. 1). R. Sealey, *Klio* lviii (1976), 335–58, contests the thesis of Beloch (ii². 2. 269–89) that the Spartan nauarchy was throughout an annual office, tied formally to the beginning of the Spartan year in the autumn; instead, at least till the Ionian War, the nauarch was appointed to command a particular fleet for a specific task, and retained his office till that fleet was disbanded. Annual tenure begins, for Sealey, not long before the point at which Xenophon's wording indicates it (*HG* i. 5. 1, cf. 6. 1); and in these years the nauarch certainly took over his command *de facto* in spring. Sealey therefore posits a law of c. 409 which instituted annual tenure beginning in spring, and presumably also the rule against the same man holding the office twice (*HG* ii. 1. 7). The change was due to changed conditions, with a large fleet operating for an unpredictable time at a considerable distance from Sparta.

This disposes of difficulties about the length of Knemos' command (ii. 66. 2, 93. 1). For the sequence Kratesippidas–Lysandros–Kallikratidas it fits Xenophon's wording rather better than does Beloch's system. The less clear data for tenure after 404 do not confirm Sealey's view, but he can fairly claim that they do not contradict it; some problems remain on any view. For Thuc. viii, Sealey (344–5) offers much the same explanation of Melanchridas' disappearance as in my

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n. to 6. 5 above; the phrase here (20: 1) under discussion does not seem to me markedly easier on one view than on the other; for the replacement of Astyochos the wording of 85.1 slightly favours Beloch, but not decisively. Though the commission of 39.2 apparently acquitted Astyochos, he may still have been thought unsatisfactory, or the reason for his replacement could have been a change in Spartan policy towards the Persians (99 n.).

p. 50 (22. 1). P. A. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (London 1979) 263, calls attention to the possibly perioikic admiral on the monument commemorating Aigospotamoi at Delphi: ML 95(k), with their comment.

On the description of the Spartan state as *οἱ Σπαρτιάται* at i. 128. 3 ff., see H. D. Westlake, *CQ* n.s. xxvii (1977), 95–110.

p. 118 (50. 3). On Thucydides' use of *λέγεται* see H. D. Westlake, *Mnem.* 1977, 345–62.

p. 193. A. H. Sommerstein, discussing 'Aristophanes and the Events of 411' in full detail in *JHS* xcvi (1977), 112–26, also assigns *Lys.* to the Lenaia and *Th.* to the Dionysia, but with a very different timetable for the events. For reasons stated in the text, I do not believe that the reign of terror had begun before *Th.* was staged; and I do not find that interpretation of the play is made easier by the supposition that Aristophanes was preoccupied by fear of a tyranny set up by Alkibiades.

p. 216 (*Aθ. π.* 29. 4). See M. H. Hansen, *Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis* (Odense 1976) 14 ff., who argues that *apagoge* is arrest in consequence of an *endeixis*.

pp. 248 ff. I discussed the question of Androton as source for the documents of *Aθ. π.* 30–1, and some related questions, in *PCPS* n.s. xxii (1976), 14–25, without substantial divergence from what is argued in this Excursus.

p. 257 (73. 2). R. Sealey, *CSCA* vi (1973) 286–7, discusses the use of *δῆμος* here, and compares X. *HG* v. 4. 46, where it is clearly not meant that the mass of the population of the surrounding cities had literally migrated to Thebes.

p. 280 (85. 1). See addendum to p. 43 (20. 1).

p. 291 (87. 4). D. Lateiner, *TAPA* cvi (1976), 267–90, supports Thucydides' conclusion that Tissaphernes wished to wear down both Greek powers and never intended to use the Phoenician ships. Against the hypothesis that they were recalled because of revolt in Egypt (87. 2 n.), his main argument is that Thucydides must have known the facts, or have learnt them before his death; but see pp. 251–4 above and many other passages in this volume. Against

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the view that Tissaphernes did intend to use the ships, he stresses the inferiority of the Phoenician fleet (cf. Lewis 107 n. 96); in my belief that is precisely why Tissaphernes wanted more than 147 ships (87. 5 n.).

p. 293 (88). I should have noted H. D. Westlake's argument (*Hermes* lxxxvi [1958], 447–52 = *Greek Historians and Greek History* [Manchester 1969] 153–60) that in all six places where Thucydides uses *ὡς εἰκός* the phrase means 'as was natural', not 'as is likely'. Here 'as was natural' would mean that Alkibiades might be expected to know the truth because of his confidential relations with Tissaphernes; but a casual *ὡς εἰκός* would be an odd way to make that point, especially as at 81. 2, 82. 3, Thucydides has cast some doubt on the relationship. More probably Thucydides here expresses a conjectural opinion, as at 56. 3 *δοκεῖ δέ μοι*.

p. 294 (88). Westlake, *CQ* n.s. xxix (1979), 23 with n. 2, is sure that Alkibiades actually visited both Kaunos and Phaselis, as on his view (see addendum to p. 35 [14. 3]) he might have done in spite of Kaunos' previous reception of a Spartan fleet (39.3). I am not persuaded that Thucydides' phrase, either here or at 108. 1, indicates more than the direction of Alkibiades' voyage, or that he did not go to Aspendos.

On Phaselis see H. Schläger and J. Schäfer in *AA* 1971, 542–61.

p. 300 (89. 3). For a different view of Theramenes see P. Harding, *Phoenix* xxviii (1974), 101–11.

p. 306 (90. 4). Valla's actual words should have been cited: *quoniam ad ipsam alteram portus, cuius os angustum est, turrim terminantur, et antiquus murus terram versus, & interior nouus mare versus*. This clearly renders the reading of B, not of ACEFGM.

p. 308 (91. 3). On the attitude of the Athenian upper class to the empire see *JHS* xcvi (1978), 4–5.

p. 316 (93. 3). On attendance at the Pnyx see M. H. Hansen, *GRBS* xvii (1976), 115–34, with a slightly higher estimate of the numbers it would hold.

p. 344 (100. 2). The 'scouts' should have been called 'lookouts': see below, addendum to vol. iv, pp. 100–1 (v. 66. 1).

pp. 363–4. On Pylos and Sphakteria see now J. Wilson, *Pylos: 425 BC* (London 1979). He propounds a new and ingenious explanation of the Spartan plan at iv. 8. 5–8, to block two 'entrances'; Thucydides' misunderstanding of this plan is responsible for his (incurable) error at 8. 6 about the southern entrance to the main bay. For the other error in 8. 6, on the length of Sphakteria, Wilson favours emendation, probably rightly. For the question raised on p. 364 about iv. 14. 5, he has a factual solution but this does not absolve Thucydides.

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p. 391. On the correspondence between the texts of Thuc. v. 47 and *IG* i².86, F. Ferlauto, *Il testo di Tucidide e la traduzione latino di Lorenzo Valla* (Palermo 1979) 20–1, produces evidence hitherto neglected, in vol. iv, pp. 56–7, as elsewhere. At 47. 7 edd. have made two insertions based on the inscription, *〈τὴ στρατιὰ〉* and *〈ἀπάσαις〉*: Valla's *imperium super exercitum teneat* and *universis civitatibus* show that both these were present in his original. He also confirms two corrections made by Kirchhoff in 47. 6, *ἐλθωσιν* for *ἔλθη* and *βούληται* for *βούλωνται*. See the review of Ferlauto by D. M. Lewis in *CR* (forthcoming).

Book v

It has not been the practice of this edition to include addenda and corrigenda to previous volumes. But the account of the topography and battle of Mantinea in vol. iv, pp. 94–102, would have been substantially modified if W. K. Pritchett's *Studies in Ancient Topography*, pt. ii, ch. v (Univ. of California 1969), had reached us in time, which may justify a brief discussion.

p. 94 (v. 64. 5). Pritchett's search for the Herakleion (46–9) covered the area north of the Mýtika gap, both the western side of the plain where Kromayer wished to place it (so also, with a query, my map opposite p. 96) and the eastern side. South and a little east of the temple of Poseidon, and about as far from it as the temple is from Mantinea (see P.'s map on p. 40) he and R. S. Stroud found an accumulation of squared blocks sufficient to suggest an ancient building nearby, with four column drums and a marble basin (pl. 30) of a type found in gymnasia; a gymnasium is often associated with shrines of Herakles, and the ground is level. The identification is not certain, but no trace of a Herakleion has been found on the west side of the plain, so this is 'a likely candidate for the Herakleion' (48). For the site of the temple of Poseidon Hippios, and for an inscription which may well be the Mantinean casualty-list of 418, see pp. 50–4.

pp. 97–8 (65. 4). P. (41) argues (a) that the water in question must be capable of falling into either territory and causing harm, (b) that if the cities fought about the water, both must have ready access to the area in which it was possible to divert it. (a) is clear in Thucydides: (b) is less certain, in that a war might be fought to enforce an agreement about arrangements in an area to which one side had not easy access. Thus it is not an insuperable objection to Fougères' proposal, the unblocking of a channel by which the Sarandapótamos could be diverted into the Zanovísticas, that this channel is close under the walls of Tegea and could never have been controlled by Mantinea. But on Fougères' assumption that the course of the Sarandapótamos was the same in antiquity as now, Tegea lost nothing if the channel remained blocked and the water flowed

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towards its *katavóthra* beneath Parthenios, so that *βλάπτοντος ὄποτέρως ἀν ἐσπίπτῃ* is not applicable; while if Pritchett is right (*Topography* pt. i [1965] ch. ix) that the Sarandapótamos then flowed west into the Taka *katavóthra*, Fougères' scheme is not practicable at all. It was never a very attractive proposition.

P., looking to the area of the presumed frontier, suggested (43) that the Mantineians would block the *katavóthres* just south of the Mýtika gap, so that the Zanovistas would 'flood the Tegean plain, while the Tegeans would be equally anxious to keep the channels open till the waters reached the Mantinike'. I have not revisited the area and have no opinion on the question whether the blockage would have this effect rather than creating a swamp which would extend at least as far into Mantineian territory; but in any case Thucydides' phrase (above) still does not seem wholly appropriate. However, it is clear that conditions in the fifth century B.C. were not the same as now. The geologists consulted by P. were surprised that there should be flowing water to divert in this area late in the summer, but in 385 B.C. a river which Xenophon (*HG* v. 1. 4) describes as considerable flowed through the city of Mantinea, whereas nothing like this is to be found today at any time of year. It is clearly possible that in 418 there was, probably near the frontier, water which Thucydides' phrase would fit.

p. 99 (65.5) The question remains how the allies could be in doubt where Agis had gone. P. (57–8) remarks that 'men south of the Mytika gap might be invisible to men stationed low on Mount Alesion', and his pl. 34 illustrates this; but there was nothing to stop the allies from sending a man a short way up the hill so that he could see the area just south of the Mýtika gap. If Agis' waterworks were near the frontier, but he also marched clean out of sight (perhaps to camp for the night), Thucydides' description of his movements at 65. 5, 66. 1, is a little but not gravely misleading.

pp. 100–1 (66.1). In *The Greek State at War*, pt. i (1971) ch. x, P. rejects the proposition that 'Greek military history is full of scouts', which is fair to the extent that 'scouts' was the wrong word to use, but he goes too far in denying that Greek armies took any trouble to find out where their enemy was.

(a) Some of his examples will not bear much weight: at Thuc. vii. 73. 3–74. 1 no one will be surprised that Nikias, in the night after the last sea-battle, failed to check the false assertion that the Syracusans were guarding the roads.

(b) X. *HG* vii. 5. 9–10 is ambivalent: Agesilaos, at or beyond Pellana, did not know of Epameinondas' march on Sparta by the eastern road (vol. iv, pp. 91–3; it was out of sight of any observers Agesilaos might have sent up mountains beside his own route), but

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Epameinondas knew not only that Agesilaos had set out but how far he had got. We do not know whether Agesilaos had taken or neglected measures to discover whether there were enemy troops ahead of him. Ancient variations on Xenophon's version (Plb. ix. 8; Plu. *Ages.* 34. 4) should make us cautious; Diodoros in a notably confused passage (xv. 82. 6) even speaks of *hemerodromoi* sent out by 'Agis'.

(c) At the Nemea River in 394 Xenophon (*HG* iv. 2. 19) tells us that the Spartans, owing to the wooded country in between, were not aware of the allies' advance till they heard the paian, and, though Xenophon has not given us enough detail for clarity about this odd battle, this seems a clear case of one side not knowing about the movements of the other. But each side knew the other's general position, and the Spartans were apparently in no danger of real surprise. For the terrain see P., *Topography* pt. ii, ch. vi. The wood would provide cover from sight while the allies crossed the *charadra* behind which they had encamped (2. 15), and they would not advertise their movement with a paian till they were across it; the dispositions described in 2. 18 seem to have been adopted before they were visible to the Spartans, but the wood must have hampered close formation. The Spartans, close as they were (2. 15), evidently had adequate time to form up, so their camp was far enough back from the edge of the wood. Lookouts were hardly necessary, and their absence did no harm.

P.'s examination of the word *skopos* rightly concludes that it normally means a 'lookout' in a fixed position rather than a scout engaged in reconnaissance. He notes the partial exception at Xen. *Cyr.* vi. 3. 2, where Kyros sent ahead διερευνητὰς καὶ σκοπούς to the points from which they could see furthest ahead, and he takes this as possible evidence for Greek practice. See also *HG* iii. 2. 14–15, where Derkylidas was marching οὐδέν τι συντεταγμένω τῷ στρατεύματι, when suddenly *skopoi* were seen on the tombs opposite; so the Greeks sent men up on to the tombs and towers on their side, and they discovered the enemy drawn up across the road they were to take. The army of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos contained Greek elements (2. 15), but much of it was Persian like its commanders, so this is again equivocal evidence for Greek practice. Xenophon clearly criticizes Derkylidas, but his phrase rather suggests criticism of the formation in which he was marching, not of his failure to prospect his route ahead (so the translations of Hatzfeld and Warner).

In general lookouts are prominent enough in the record, but not what we should call 'scouts'. But lookouts are all that is needed here: for the allies, men posted high enough on Alesion to see what was going on to the south, for Agis *skopoi* who could see whether the allies had moved from their original position. If the Herakleion was on the

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site found by P. (above), my account on p. 101 must be amended: Agis did not leave the Tegea-Mantineia road, but followed it till he was clear of the wood and saw the allies drawn up in the plain. But they were at a distance which left him time to form up in battle order, indeed to try to alter that order; it still seems that the alarm of the Spartans was somewhat exaggerated by Thucydides' informants.

INDEXES

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