

A  
HISTORICAL COMMENTARY  
ON  
THUCYDIDES

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VOLUME I

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on Book I

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## PREFACE

THIS work is planned to be in three volumes. The first contains a general Introduction and Commentary on Bk. i; the second is intended to cover the Archidamian war (i.e. ii. 1 to v. 25); the third the rest. It was inevitable that the commentary on the first book should be longer than that on any other; not only is the scope so much wider, but (in consequence) much of the subject-matter is dealt with by Thucydides in a summary manner, and needs therefore the more comment; for the fuller his narrative, the less comment is required.

I have tried to keep always in mind that this is a commentary on Thucydides, not a history of Greece. I do not mean that I have not allowed myself an occasional digression; but it is Thucydides' own narrative that has, or should have, determined the shape of the work. This will, if I have done my work properly, explain not only the relative length of the various notes, but also, in some cases, the places where they are found; a note on Athenian financial documents, for example, including the Kallias decree, will be found in the commentary on ii. 13, where Thucydides says most about war finance, not on any of the passages in bk. i where he briefly alludes to it.

I cannot of course claim to have mastered, or even to have read, all the books and articles which modern scholars have written on my subject. In spite of the invaluable volumes of Bursian and Marouzeau, there must be much which I have missed, though I hope the value of the work has not been greatly impaired. I hope also I have remembered when a view which I support is owed to another. Of the many editors of Thucydides I am most conscious of my debt to Stahl, who nearly always saw the problem, even if he did not solve it; of historians to Busolt: not only the all-embracing notes, but the sober, if uninspiring, judgement of the narrative, makes Busolt's history still the most valuable help to the student. Of other scholars, most of them contemporaries, I owe most to the epigraphists, Wilhelm, Hiller, Kirchner, Tod, and, above all, the great American school; it is difficult to imagine what the historian's task would be like without their help, particularly for one who has not himself had much opportunity for studying inscriptions directly. I sometimes differ from their historical conclusions, for it is the business of the historian to use his judgement on the evidence; but they will approve the principle, for no other group of scholars have so well shown that rare virtue, of changing their own views when new evidence or new examination of old has shown the change to be needed.

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Owing to the war I have seen no continental books or periodicals later than the summer of 1939, and by no means all American work since the end of that year—not, for example, Finley's *Thucydides*—some gaps therefore will probably be visible in this commentary; but it has been thought better to proceed with the publication rather than to wait for a vain attempt at completeness. This is, practically, a 1939 book.

The business of proof-correcting and checking of references has been made more onerous than it might have been by war conditions; but in this and in the making of the index I have received much help in difficult circumstances from Mr. Stavros Papastavru, to whom I must here express my gratitude. Some of the travel and of the leisure necessary for the writing of the book were made possible by the generous grant of a Fellowship by the Leverhulme Trustees and the equally generous grant of a year's leave of absence by the University of Glasgow.

The maps I again owe to my wife.

A. W. G.

Nov. 1944

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<sup>1</sup> In the second Index I have given under the name of each 'lost' historian the reference to the edition of his *fragmenta* in F.H.G. or F.Gr.Hist., or elsewhere. The single letter 'F.' is used in the enumeration of fragments in the latter, 'fr.' in the former.

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## INTRODUCTION

A HISTORICAL commentary on a historian must necessarily derive from two sources, a proper understanding of his own words, and what we can learn from other authorities. The first needs no comment; the second needs a long one, and it is the purpose of this introduction to supply it. As we are dealing with Thucydides, not anyone else, our other authorities serve rather to supplement than to correct him; our first need therefore is to see what gaps there are in his narrative, our second to examine the means of filling these gaps. My introduction is therefore divisible into two parts, *What Thucydides does not tell us* and *An examination of other sources of information*. The former includes both what he deliberately omitted, in accordance with his self-imposed limitations, and what he takes for granted—for example, the work of his predecessors in historiography, normal economic conditions, and normal conditions of land- and sea-warfare. It will readily be seen that this first part of the introduction should be, like most introductions to editions of classical authors, an appendix; for it implies that the author has already been studied. But here this is unavoidable; for the second part, the examination of other sources, depends for its relevance on the first, and throughout the commentary an acquaintance with this second part is assumed.

### I. WHAT THUCYDIDES TAKES FOR GRANTED<sup>1</sup>

#### A. THE WORK OF HIS PREDECESSORS. WITH A NOTE ON CHRONOLOGY

Thucydides assumes in his readers a knowledge both of the epic and of the work of his chief predecessors in prose, especially of Herodotos and others who wrote about the past up to and including the Persian wars (i. 97. 2); when he feels that an excursus is necessary to explain the period before that of his own history, he begins where Herodotos left off, paying him the tribute which was more clearly and splendidly paid to Thucydides himself by Kratippos, Xenophon, and Theopompos; that he thought this and not a longer excursus necessary is evidence that he did not wish to rewrite in essentials the story of the Persian war.<sup>2</sup> There is no need for anything to be

<sup>1</sup> See Forbes, pp. cii ff.

<sup>2</sup> "In jedem Falle hat er Herodot fortgesetzt, Hellanikos aber ersetzt und durch dieses Ersatzstück die Verbindung zwischen dem Herodoteischen und dem eigenen Werke hergestellt, wie Herodot selbst durch den Exkurs in seinem Prooimion (*Περοέων μέν νυν . . . Φύλακες λέγουσι*, c. 5) die Verbindung mit den Genealogien gesucht hat": Jacoby (2), 100. 2.

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said here about these predecessors, the *λογογράφοι*,<sup>1</sup> except in one branch of their work, chronology; for this was developed after Herodotos and before Thucydides. Or at least, if the dates of the earliest chronologists are uncertain, and some of them may have published before Herodotus, they did not influence him;<sup>2</sup> he remained unconcerned about dates, and this is one of the great differences between him and Thucydides. The latter takes for granted the necessity for an accurate chronology, and can dispute about the best method of obtaining it (v. 20; cf. i. 97. 2).

There had indeed been concern with chronology long before Herodotus at the hands of Hekataios and the genealogists; one of whose principal tasks it had been, in bringing order out of the chaos of different local and family traditions, to fix roughly the dates, by generations, of the heroic age; and the influence of this work is to be seen in Herodotus, as when he gives in detail the Lydian dynasties (of which the first descended from Herakles, and so must fit in with the date of Herakles in Greece), and criticizes the Greek genealogies in the light of Egyptian records; and in Thucydides, when he gives the intervals between the Trojan war and the Boeotian and Dorian migrations (i. 12. 3). This work, however arbitrary in detail, had established something like a chronological canon; but more important for history was the publication in literary form of the annals, *ἀποι*, of various states. Official lists, of magistrates, priests, victors in the festival games, had been preserved; and their publication helped the construction of the indispensable chronological framework for history—most of the magistrates were annual, as the archons of Athens and the ephors of Sparta, and the festivals were either annual or at fixed intervals; where the tenure of office was for life, as with the Spartan kings or the priestesses of Hera at Argos, the number of years of tenure in each case was preserved. Events could now be accurately dated, especially by the annual magistrates who, in most cases, gave their names to the years (like the consuls who, in Roman *fasti*); and a summary history of a state, an *Ἀτθίς* or

<sup>1</sup> For the name see i. 21. 1 n.; for an account of *ἰστορία* before Thucydides see Jacoby (2), and now, for four of the predecessors, Hekataios, Xanthos, Charon, and Hellanikos, Pearson, *Early Ionic Historians* (1939). Cf. too Gisinger, art. 'Geographie', R.E. Supplb. iv.

<sup>2</sup> According to Wilamowitz (2), p. 6, he consciously turned his back on them. Jacoby (2), 113–14, thinks their work appeared too late to affect him. Probability seems on the whole to be against Jacoby; but I would not judge Herodotus as Wilamowitz does. Rather he was unaware of the relevance of such chronological research to his purposes. He was not writing a systematic history of Greece, but of the Persian wars only (for which he does attempt an internal chronology; and perhaps his one official date—see below, p. 3, n. 1—is a half-hearted attempt at relative chronology too), together with a description of the great empire which had expanded so greatly and so rapidly as at last to attack Greece: earlier Greek history in Herodotus is only incidental to the main theme.

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*Μιλησιακά*, could be given in chronicle form. This valuable work was continued throughout the fourth century; but much of it had already been done before Thucydides had completed his history of the Archidamian war (whenever that was), above all, the *Ἄτθις*, the *Priestesses of Hera at Argos*, and the *Victors at the Karneia* by Hellanikos, and perhaps the *Olympic Victors* by Hippias. And it should be added that whereas the great majority of such chronicles, the *'Ατθίς*, *Μιλησιακά*, *ἄροι Λαμψακηνοί*, were local, and their Hellenic importance depended on the relative importance of the states, others, such as the *Olympic Victors* and the *Priestesses of Hera*, were panhellenic in their range. Thucydides both criticizes (v. 20) and uses this method of chronology (ii. 2. 1 and v. 19. 1, Athenian archons and Spartan ephors; ii. 2. 1 and iv. 133. 2–3, priestesses of Hera at Argos, both for a Hellenic and for a local event); it was therefore established or beginning to be established in his day.<sup>1</sup>

His criticism is pointed and interesting, though, like most of his particular criticisms, it is somewhat captious and pedantic in tone; and it is obscure in expression and says less than it should (he is not giving a full account of his own method).<sup>2</sup> He expresses clearly only one weakness of dating by priests or magistrates: that this does not further specify in what part of a year an event happened; so that, for the problem which he is discussing at the moment, the exact length of the Archidamian war, it would be inaccurate to say 'it

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus once uses the Athenian archon for a date—viii. 51. 1, the arrival of Xerxes in Attica, three months after the Hellespont had been crossed, *Καλλιάδεω ἄρχοντος Ἀθηναῖοι*. No *Ἄτθις* had (so far as we know) been published when Herodotus wrote, and this dating is unique; he is not using an *Ἄτθις*; so "dieses Datum des Persereinfalles hافتete im Gedächtnis nicht zwar der Menschen, aber der Athener. Von ihren λόγοι ἄνθρες hat Herodot den Namen erfahren und hat ihn aufgenommen in das Manuscript des ursprünglich wohl für Athen bestimmten Vortrages. Er hat ihn, als er später sein für alle Griechen bestimmtes Werk aus den vorhandenen λόγοι componierte, stehen lassen, ohne zu bedenken, dass er den meisten seiner Leser nichts bedeutete, wenn nicht der Abstand bis auf die Gegenwart in ἔτη ἐσ ἐμέ angegeben werde" (Jacoby (2), p. 117). I would only modify this by saying that the archon's name was preserved not in the memory of Athenians but in the record, even if the record had not been published in book form; it was, that is to say, a true date; and I doubt whether a public reading in Athens of part of the *History* had anything to do with the mention of it (even Athenians did not carry lists of archons in their heads: Plat. *Hipp. mai.* 285 E). But Herodotus perhaps inserts it only to give greater emphasis to so capital an event.

<sup>2</sup> I do not think iii. 59. 4, *πρότεροι γὰρ Σάμοι ἐπ' Ἀμφικράτεος βασιλεύοντος ἐν Σάμῳ στρατευσάμενοι ἐπ' Αἴγυνα κ.τ.λ.*, quite on all fours with viii. 51. 1 (Jacoby, ibid.). The name of Amphikrates may well have been preserved in the *memory* of Samians; for as king he probably led the expedition—he was a personality, as Kalliades was not. *ἐπ' Ἀμφικράτεος βασιλεύοντος* is not *only* a date.

<sup>2</sup> For the detailed discussion of the passage see notes *ad loc.* Cf. Jacoby (2), 113 n.; and West, C.P. xx, 1925, 219–20.

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lasted from the archonship of Pythodoros to that of Alkaios', or 'from the ephorate of Ainesias to that of Pleistolas', or 'from the 48th year of the priesthood of Chrysis to the first of her successor', for that might mean anything from nearly eleven years (if the war began early in Pythodoros and ended late in Alkaios) to little over nine years (if it began late in Pythodoros and ended early in Alkaios). This may seem obvious, and a weakness that could easily be corrected in any full narrative of events; at the same time it must be remembered that even for the recent past, the archons' names were often all that a historian had for dating: so that if for *Θάσιοι τρίτῳ ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι* (i. 101. 3) the only authority were the three archons at Athens—Lysitheos, Archedemides, and Tlepolemos—it remained quite uncertain whether the siege lasted fourteen or thirty-four months.

Thucydides implies another weakness: *τῶν ἐκασταχοῦ η ἀρχόντων η ἀπὸ τιμῆς τωὸ ἐτὰ προγεγενημένα σημαιωντων*. These magistrates and priests were local, unknown and of little significance outside their own states; and he is writing, of course, for the whole Greek world. (Later, the Athenian archons were adopted as one means of dating all Greek history; but a long time was to elapse before that happened.) Even where, as with the *Priestesses of Hera*, their years were used for panhellenic dating and Hellanikos had recently so published the record, the names of the priestesses had little meaning for the rest of Greece. Only the kings of Sparta might have had a panhellenic significance. Attempts could be, and had already been made by Hellanikos, to equate the dates of magistrates of different states (cf. Thuc. ii. 2. 1); but this, necessary as it was for a chronicle, would be absurdly clumsy in a narrative history, and even so was insufficient; for magistrates in different states did not take office at the same time—their years did not coincide, and confusion might result. This can easily be seen from two examples in Diodoros, who uses an equation not only of Athenian archons, who took office some time after midsummer, and Olympiads, which were also reckoned from about the same time—the date of the festival—but of Roman consuls, who took office in March, that is, about the beginning of the campaigning season:<sup>1</sup> he equates the consuls of 431 B.C. with Euthydemos, archon from July 15, 431, to July 4, 430, and with Olympiad 87. 2, and therefore begins the Peloponnesian war in this archonship (xii. 38. 1), though it actually began, and everybody knew it began, in that of Pythodoros some months before.<sup>2</sup> He does the same thing with the Syracusan ex-

<sup>1</sup> The ephors' year at Sparta began in August/September, according to Beloch, ii. 2. 270 ff. (accepted by Lenschau, *R.E.* vi A, 1937, 2357).

<sup>2</sup> Diodoros did not, with the present text of Thuc. ii. 2. 1 and 19. 1 before him, argue that, since the attack on Plataia took place when Pythodoros had but two

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pedition (xiii. 2. 1) and probably with Kimon's to Cyprus (xii. 3). On the other hand, he makes one campaign and therefore only one archonship for the Samian war (xii. 27-8), when it covered two; while he dates the battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta in two different archonships (458-457 and 457-456), and *therefore* in different consular years and different campaigning seasons (xi. 80, 81); the former may well be right (the battles may have been fought in June and August), the latter is wrong.<sup>1</sup>

And this is not quite the end. No Greek state used a reasonable calendar; all used the lunar year of 354 days, and had every now and again to intercalate months of 30 days to bring back the official into rough harmony with the solar year; and though a nearly accurate cycle of nineteen years (= 235 lunations) was then known to astronomers, it was not officially adopted and the intercalation was not systematic and was made at different times in the several states; so that not only might one archon-year at Athens differ from the next by as much as 30 days, and no archon took office on the same day of the solar year as his predecessor, but an 'equated' year of archon and ephor might also differ by the same amount.<sup>2</sup>

It will thus readily be seen why Thucydides rejected such a calendar for his chronology. In the narrative of a war, with its 'natural' campaigning seasons, he needed a 'natural', that is, the solar year; and this is in effect what he uses. *"Αμα ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ* and *τοῦ στροφής ἀκμάζοντος* give nearly the same dates for every year, and for most parts of Greece, and were always the same for military purposes; the 'first of Anthesterion' and 'the tenth day of the eighth month of X.'s archonship', besides being local to Athens (for the names of the months, and even, sometimes, the dates within the

months of office still to run, and the invasion of Attica, the true beginning of the *Peloponnesian* war, was 80 days later, therefore the war did begin in the next archonship, that of Euthydemos; for he narrates the attack on Plataia, as the first event of the war (xii. 41. 2), also in Euthydemos' year.

A smaller anomaly, but equally interesting because it is official, arising from this equating of dissimilar years, is to be seen in Attic financial documents (Meritt, *C.P.* xxv, 1930, 241).

<sup>1</sup> See i. 108, 112. 2-4, 115. 2 nn. It will be observed that we cannot systematically correct Diodoros from his own dates: we cannot say, for example, that an event which took place in the first half of a solar year will always be placed by him in the following archonship. On the system which he adopts for the year 431, he ought to have placed both Tanagra and Oinophyta in the same archonship, that of 457-456. See further below, pp. 52-3, 411-12; Beloch, ii. 2. 212.

<sup>2</sup> There was even more confusion at Athens in Thucydides' own day, for there were two *official* years, bouleutic and civil (see Meritt, *Athen. Calendar*, and in *Hesp.* v, 1936, 376-80); the former, with its ten prytanies, was practically equivalent to the solar year; but the archon held office by the old lunar year. The months themselves had got out of time with the moon too, and people were grumbling (*Arist. Pac.* 406-15, *Nub.* 615-26; Meritt, pp. 103-5).

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month, differed from state to state<sup>1</sup>), did not mean the same day in every solar year, and so not in every military year, and for both reasons Thucydides did not use them. We may regret that he did not give this extra information as well as his own indications of season, for from inscriptions we have occasionally the official dating of a campaign, and we could equate the two; but we should not be surprised.

Since we know that Hellanikos' *Athis* was based on archon-years and included the Peloponnesian war (*F. Gr. Hist.* 4 F. 171, 172), and that it, or part of it, was already published when Thucydides wrote i. 97. 2 (see below, p. 362, n. 2), it is reasonable enough to suppose that at least the part that included the Archidamian war was also published when Thucydides wrote his criticism of the method in v. 20; whether anyone else had done the same we do not know.<sup>2</sup> The form of such a chronicle by Hellanikos (who διεγγέι τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεῖνα—*F. 171*) would have been somewhat as follows (taking events mentioned by Thucydides, in his 'sixth' and 'seventh' year of the war):

In the archonship of Euthynos Demosthenes attacked the Aitolians and was defeated by them. With the Akarnanians he defeated the Amprakiotai and Peloponnesians at Olpai. Agis at the head of the Peloponnesians invaded Attica. Athens sent an expedition to Sicily, and on its way Demosthenes occupied Pylos, and, defeating the Spartan fleet, cut off a force in Sphakteria.

In the archonship of Stratokles Sphakteria was captured by Demosthenes and Kleon. Nikias invaded Corinth. The Athenian fleet arrived in Sicily. Nikias seized Kythera.

Such a method, even if every event is correctly dated by the archon and given in its proper order, not only lacks the proper accuracy—for it was essential for the understanding of strategy to know at what season of the year a campaign was undertaken—but it could lead to confusion, for example, by combining in one year two different campaigns of Nikias, and by splitting up between two years a single campaign, that of Pylos. Thucydides, for the narrative of a war, must take the chronological method 'natural' to it, from spring to spring of the 'natural', that is, the solar year.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Plutarch, *Arist.* 19. 8-9.

<sup>2</sup> A list of archons, presumably official, was set up in the Agora c. 430-420, if the fragmentary inscription, *Hesp.* viii, 1939, no. 21, was, as Meritt thinks, part of such a list; and it is difficult to see what else it could be. The six names in it belong to the twenties of the 6th century.

<sup>3</sup> I have above accepted, in deference to Jacoby (who is followed in this by Pearson, pp. 153-5, where a good résumé of the evidence will be found), the view that Hellanikos continued his *Athis* to 407-406 B.C., probably to the end of the war; but I do not feel certain about it. If Pamphila (as quoted by Gellius:

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Besides all this, his method enabled him to adopt the simple device of numbering the years of the war instead of naming them, and naming them in a clumsy way by several eponymoi of different states. Numbering years was a device half adopted by the Romans (A.U.C. together with the consular names), but, by one of the curiosities of history, it long eluded the Greeks.<sup>1</sup>

*F. Gr. Hist.* 4 T 3) is following Apollodorus, as Diels, *R.M.* xxxi, 1876, 47-54, and Jacoby, *Apollodorus Chronik*, 44-5 and *R.E.* art. 'Hellanikos', believe, then one who is by far our best authority said he was born in 496 and so died in 412 (for he was supposed to have lived 84 years); and such dates are in general supported by Dionysios of Halikarnassos, a respectable authority on authors' dates, who says he was a predecessor both of Thucydides and of Herodotus (*F. Gr. Hist.* 4 T 5, 11-12). See also Rühl, *R.M.* lxi, 1906, 473-6, who shows the nature of the 'combination' better. This evidence is rejected because of *F. 171-2*, where events of 407-406 are related; and Jacoby insists on the absence of reliable biographical dates for the 5th century and the readiness of later writers to make up combinations (e.g. Thucydides 40 years old at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, a purely conventional figure for his *floruit* combined with the contemporary event which he related). This argument, however, does not help him. I agree that there may well have been no evidence (and that the 84 years of his life is probably a fiction); but if Apollodorus, and before him Eratosthenes, and Dionysios had no independent evidence, but only what could be got from Hellanikos' own writings, they would at once have concluded from his *Athis* that he was an exact contemporary of Thucydides—he too would have been 40 or 30 in 431; i.e. the fewer the facts the more likely are they to have made him live from 471 to c. 400 (or 387). That is what the chronologists did for Thucydides: he was either 30 (because he was able to begin writing his history) or 40 (the conventional *floruit*) in 431, so he was over 50 or over 60 when he died (see Marcellinus)—because he says himself that he survived the end of the war. It looks as though there was some good reason for thinking that Hellanikos' *Athis* ended in 412 and that the later years were included in a second edition published after his death (as in Ephoros' history, where book xxx is called either his or, more accurately, Demophilos'). Cf. Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, vi, 1906, 127-39.

The question is an important one for Thucydides, for it affects the date at which he wrote i. 97. 2, as well as that of influences at work on him.

It must be remembered that any dated event will serve for a year 1, whether uncertain, fictitious, or false: as the Fall of Troy, or the Foundation of Rome, or the Birth of Christ. The nearest the Greeks of the classical period got to this was the clumsy four-year Olympiad; and that naturally was not adopted by them for a general chronology. After Alexander many new eras were begun with a new year 1; the *Marmor Parium* (below, p. 44) attempts a kind of 'B.C.' method, numbering, but numbering backwards from 264-263 B.C.; and even so no one thought of combining this with the forward reckoning of a new era.

In the same way, for the chronologers it was more important that the archon-list (or Olympic victor or any other list) should be fixed than that it should also be true. If (let us assume), there was a reliable tradition that Drakon's legislation was 28 years before Solon's, then the statement that it was ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Αρισταιχμού was sufficient, provided that everybody meant by it the same thing, even if Aristaichmos was not in fact the 28th archon before Solon; for it is only intended to mean '28 years before Solon', or '132 years before Marathon'; it makes a statement about Drakon, not about Aristaichmos. Only if the tradition

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This does not mean that Thucydides did not appreciate the value of the fixed tables of eponymous archons for the chronology of earlier events.<sup>1</sup> He must depend on it for his own dating of such events as the first alliance between Athens and Plataia, the overthrow of the tyrants, the war with Thasos, and the Thirty Years' Peace.<sup>2</sup> When he wishes to date the opening of the Peloponnesian war and the close of its first part in relationship to the past and so also to the future (ii. 2. 1 and v. 19. 1), to place the war, that is, in the whole chronological scheme, he naturally adopts the system which was then coming into use; for it was the only one known. He was bound to do this, unless he was to use a new scheme of his own—a scheme adapted to past history as well as to the war itself, that is, unless the task he set himself as a historian was to be quite different from what it was. In dating the beginning of the war to Pythodoros, Ainesias, and the 48th year of Chrysis, he knew he was placing it so many years after Salamis, so many after Solon, so many (perhaps) after the fall of Troy, and also so many before future events which men will desire to record.<sup>3</sup>

gave the archon's name but not the number of years intervening between Drakon and Solon, is it of importance for Drakon's date whether Aristaichmos is in his right place. On the other hand, the general history of 7th-century Athens is affected by the answer to this problem; for if the archon-list is not historical, can we trust any account of events in that age? See n. on Kylon, i. 126. 12; A. R. Burn, *J.H.S.* iv, 1935, pp. 143–4.

<sup>1</sup> The most convenient comparison of a dated and an undated narrative is that between Herodotos' account of the Peisistratidai (i. 59–64, v. 55–65) with that of Aristotle (*Aθn.* 14–19: see *J.H.S.* xlvi, 1926, 173–8); for the latter is based closely on the former, both in general outline and in detail. This dating of Herodotos' narrative was not of course the work of Aristotle himself; it had been done long before, first presumably by Hellanikos.

<sup>2</sup> See Beloch, ii. 2. 199–202, 213–14, who sees that for past events Thucydides uses archon-years (against Busolt, iii. 199). See below, nn. on i. 55. 2, 125. 2, and pp. 392–3.

<sup>3</sup> So Jacoby (2), p. 113 n., though there is no need to call this use of the eponymoi in ii. 2. 1 a 'concession' to a system Thucydides disapproved, unless we mean that he had thought of, though not worked out, a better one for past history; nor do I understand why Jacoby says ii. 2. 1 is unique, because v. 19. 1 is from an official document—did not Thucydides himself use the document? Still less can we say with Wilamowitz that the dating by eponymoi is *in contradiction* to his practice elsewhere. It is supplementary to it, for it has a different (and a very necessary) purpose.

Thucydides twice uses Olympic dates, when the scene was at Olympia and in a festival year: iii. 8, v. 49. 1. But note that (1) he does not give the number of the Olympiad, and (2) he gives not the victor in the stadion—the later practice (cf., e.g., Diod. xii. 49. 1 and 77. 1 for the same years)—but the pankratiast. In the first case at least we have rather a descriptive term of a famous Olympic festival than a date. See Burn, *J.H.S.* iv, 1935, p. 144.

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### B. GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Thucydides was well aware of the importance of the economic factor in history. In his sketch of the early development of the Greek states in his opening chapters he lays more stress on it than on anything else, both in general (e.g. 2. 2–4, 7. 1) and for particular states, as Athens (2. 5) and Corinth (13. 5), and particular events, as the Trojan war (11). But he does not give a general survey of economic conditions in Greece in the last third of the fifth century, because it would be familiar to his readers (it is a little absurd to complain, as we do by implication, that he did not foresee his modern readers, that he did not foresee the course which European history was to take after the conquests of Alexander and the Romans as one result of which he was to become a 'classical writer' in the modern sense); he does not describe the importance of the independent small-farmer class in nearly every Greek state, especially in Athens, most of the Peloponnese, and Boeotia; of the large land-owners in Thessaly; of the presence of an indigenous serf-class in Lakonia, Argos, and Thessaly, and its absence in Athens; of the commercial and industrial development in Corinth, Athens, and Syracuse, and the consequent great increase in the non-indigenous slave population and in the number of foreign free men, nor the apparently peculiar conditions in a few states such as Chios and Kerkyra with their large numbers of slaves—not serfs—working on the land. He understood such things, and frequently mentions economic factors which directly affected the conduct of the war (and which are so closely bound up with strategy that they will be best dealt with in the next section). But he gives no survey of the whole such as we should have welcomed. How much we should have welcomed it can be seen by one instance. Many modern scholars have thought that the economic factor was an important, or the principal, cause of the Peloponnesian war itself; Thucydides did not—he supposed a political cause. The moderns may be right and Thucydides wrong, though it is quite a mistake to suppose that he misunderstood the matter because he knew nothing of economic factors in history;<sup>1</sup> but how much more intelligently we should have been able to discuss the question, if Thucydides had himself supplied us with the data. We have not, however, any right to claim that he ought to have done: the general conditions of Greek economy were simple and known to his readers.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> As another example of his awareness, in addition to those mentioned above, compare i. 100. 2, the cause of the war between Thasos and Athens, in a region where he himself had interests.

<sup>2</sup> The best modern works are: Böckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener* (1886: still indispensable); Ed. Meyer, *Kl. Schriften* (1910), 79 ff.; Franotte, *L'industrie dans la Grèce ancienne* (1900–1); Guiraud, *La Main-d'œuvre*

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### C. CONDITIONS OF WARFARE

In practically all land-wars between Greek states previous to the Peloponnesian war, and in most of them after it, victory and defeat depended on the issue of a battle on level ground between two armies of hoplites, with occasionally some cavalry to play a minor, defensive part—to hinder an outflanking movement and to cover a retreat. This is at once a paradox in a land so mountainous as Greece, where level ground is hard to get at, a land one would have thought made for mountain-fighting by quick-moving light-armed infantry. The Aitolians, who in the greater part of their lands had no plains, were masters of this kind of warfare, which was completely effective against hoplites, as the Athenians on one occasion discovered; just as, at the other extreme, the Thessalians knew how to defend their wide plains with cavalry, which was almost as effective. But the great majority of states relied almost exclusively on a hoplite army, large or small according to the size of the state, and fought in the small plains. Hoplites, with good defensive armour and with offensive weapons for hand-to-hand fighting only, must fight in close formation, must maintain their cohesion; the best trained of them preserved best a kind of parade-ground stiffness; hence they could only fight on level ground. Attempts at more open fighting by hoplites were generally failures (cf. Thuc. iv. 129; Polyb. xi. 15. 7–16. 5, a notable instance); even a small break in the level could disturb their ranks—*ῶσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις αἱ διαβάσεις τῶν ὁχετῶν καὶ τῶν πάνυ σμικρῶν διασπώσι τὰς φάλαγγας, οὐτως ἔσικε πᾶσα διαφορὰ ποιεῖν διάστασον* (Arist. *Pol.* v. 2. 12, 1303 b 12);<sup>1</sup> so they chose the plain. But that does not explain why no state with a plain to defend developed a light-armed force to attack enemy hoplites in the hills before they reached the plain. Demosthenes, after his defeat in Aitolia, made good use of his experience when he fought the Spartans on Sphakteria with his light-armed troops; but this had little effect on the

industrielle (1900), and *Études économiques* (1905); Gernet, *L'Approvisionnement d'Athènes en blé* (1909); Nilsson, *Die Grundlagen des spartanischen Lebens* (1912); Andreades, 'Ιστορία τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς δημοσίας οἰκονομίας' (1918; Eng. transl., 1933); Glotz, *Le Travail dans la Grèce ancienne* (1920; Eng. transl. 1926); Wilamowitz, *Staat u. Gesellschaft* (1923); Jardé, *Les Céréales dans l'antiquité grecque* (1925); Heichelheim, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums* (1938); Beloch, i. 1, c. x; ii. 1, c. iii; iii. 1, cc. viii–ix.

For an argument for the economic cause of the war see Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, 1907); and for what is to me a wrong-headed view of Greek economics, Hasebroek, *Staat und Handel im alten Griechenland* (1928; Eng. transl. 1933): see my answer, 'Traders and Manufacturers', in *Essays*, 42–66.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. note on *τειχοπαχεῖν*, i. 102. 2, below.

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military organization of Athens or of any other state. Even after the spectacular success of Iphikrates in the fourth century, the old methods in essentials were continued.

Grundy, in the ninth and tenth chapters of his *Thucydides*, has discussed the problem at length. He points out that the immediate cause of the preference for hoplite-fighting in the plains was economic. In the ordinary warfare between neighbouring states, waged in spring and early summer, the essential thing for the invaded state was to defend its crops, particularly its corn, on which it depended for the ensuing year. Every state, even every inland state, was not necessarily self-supporting in its food-supply (cf. i. 120. 2);<sup>1</sup> but it depended to a large extent on its own crops. Hence the battle to protect them; hence also the decisive nature of the one battle—if the defending state won it, it had saved its means of life, and the war was over unless it wished to retaliate. If the invading state won it, it could, more or less, dictate terms; for its army could quickly destroy or carry off the enemy's corn. The problem for the invading state was to destroy the enemy's harvest without losing a large part of its own through taking away the farmers from their fields for the invasion; hence generally an invasion before harvest time with a view to the destruction rather than the capture of the enemy's crops, and the necessity for a quick decision so that the men can get back in time for their own harvest.<sup>2</sup> That was one of the causes of the superiority of the Spartan army. Sparta possessed—for Greece—abundant and very fertile land; but her citizens did not have to farm it themselves; that was done for them by the helots, and the citizens were free to indulge not only in a more intensive military training than was possible for others, but in warfare in seasons that were very inconvenient for the enemy, and for longer periods. Only the contingent of Perioikoi in her army consisted of men who were normally employed in productive work.<sup>3</sup> Athens equally with Sparta was capable of conducting prolonged campaigns, but for a different reason. The Peloponnesians would

<sup>1</sup> Grundy, 89–91, brings out this point well, and that "to Herodotus and Thucydides it was an axiom of Greek warfare whose truth needed no demonstration to a people to whom it formed a most ordinary fact of their daily life".

<sup>2</sup> Ps.-Xen. *Ath. resp.* 2. 6 is in part thinking of this, if the logical connexion with what has just been said is close.

In the Mantinea campaign of 418 B.C., which took place in August and September, the corn-harvest had long been gathered; so the confederate forces could take their stand on the hills overlooking the plain, in a position practically impregnable to hoplite attack, and leave Agis to the fruitless task of ravaging fields of stubble.

<sup>3</sup> Hence the Spartan army alone, without her Peloponnesian allies, could indulge in a winter campaign too, against neighbouring Argos: Thuc. v. 83. 1, 116. 1; vi. 7. 1. Cf. p. 422, n. 1. (For the Perioikoi, see now Hampl, *Herm. lxxii*, 1937, 1–49.)

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be able to invade Attica and destroy the crops, even perhaps at their leisure vines and olive-trees and buildings—a much more serious matter, for they represented capital, and would take years to replace—but the Athenians were not dependent on these for food; the country people could withdraw every year within the walls, and so long as they controlled the sea they could import what they wished—not food only, but timber for the fleet with which to control the sea—so long also as they had money to buy the food and timber, or goods to give in exchange for them. Hence the importance to Athens of her accumulated capital and her manufacturing industry. This ability of both Sparta and Athens to wage a long war (though Sparta was badly handicapped by her allies who were *avtouppoi*), and the very different causes of this ability are the principal matter of difference between the Peloponnesian and all previous Greek wars, as Thucydides, always alive to the economic factor, brings out clearly in the first book, in the speeches at the conferences at Sparta and in that of Perikles.<sup>1</sup> His contemporary, the Old Oligarch, in his superficial way, or in spite of it, also shows appreciation of the good economic position of Athens, and of its effects in a war against a Greek land-power.

The above explanation, however, of the ordinary Greek preference for hoplite warfare, correct enough as far as it goes, does not really solve the problem. It explains why Tegea or Elis or Argos must defend her plains against the Spartan invader, and cannot, like the Athenians, retire behind impregnable walls; but it does not answer the question, why were not the strategy and the tactics of mountain warfare by light-armed troops developed in order to prevent the invasion reaching the plains? Almost every state had a mountain barrier easily (one would have thought) defensible against hoplites, if we bear in mind the vulnerability of hoplites on rough ground.<sup>2</sup> It is not that the passes are in themselves very difficult to cross, from spring to autumn: those over Taÿgetos and into Arkadia from

<sup>1</sup> Grundy, 257, I think, misunderstands Thucydides here: "he ascribes their brevity (that is, of most campaigns) to lack of capital (i. 141). That no doubt had something to do with it. But the dislike of the agriculturist to be called away from home during a season of harvest, which, inasmuch as it included the gathering of the produce of cereals, vines and olives, extended throughout the greater part of the campaigning season, had a great deal more to do with it; and the fact, to which attention has been already called, that a state when invaded had, either by submission or battle, to bring matters to a prompt decision, was most of all responsible for this feature of Greek warfare." But this last fact was due to lack of capital—there were no reserves of food and no capital with which to buy food from elsewhere (unlike Athens); and this lack meant not only that the farmer disliked being away from the harvest, but that the state could not afford to let him, even if he wanted to.

<sup>2</sup> Mantinea is an exception, on the south against Tegea, and so against Tegea and Sparta combined.

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north and east are the most difficult in the Peloponnesian; but they are no ground for hoplites against active light-armed, and in many of them there are long distances in which marching must be in single file. Nor do any passes in Greece (except in the north-west over the Pindus) stand alone—they can be turned by not-distant alternative routes; but again, light-armed men can change direction quicker than hoplites. Yet we hardly ever hear in Greek history of a defensive use of mountain country to prevent invasion. Lamachos, in the *Acharnians* (1073–7), is ordered to the hills, and in winter, but to stay a border-raid, not an army; hence the order was necessary in winter as well as in summer; Lamachos' force was to act in the same way as cavalry in the plains when the enemy was in Attica. Thucydides tells us that in 457 the Spartan army in Boeotia could not get home because an Athenian fleet patrolled the gulf of Corinth (across which they had arrived in central Greece) and Athenian forces held Megara and Pegai, δύσοδός τε γὰρ η Γερανέα καὶ ἐφρουρεῖτο αἱ̄νη ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων (i. 107. 3). This looks like a sensible defensive policy, which could be used against the Peloponnesians coming from the south as from the north. This particular line was lost when Megara was lost; but the next, that between Megara and Eleusis, was almost as defensible, yet was never defended, not even, as far as we know, used to harry and delay, if not to stop, an invading force.<sup>1</sup> Argos has a fine natural barrier against Sparta both on the south-west and on the west (if the Spartans advanced through Arkadia); but in the many wars between these two states the battles were all fought by hoplites in the plains. The classic example of the use of a narrow pass by the Greeks, Thermopylai, is the exception which proves the rule. This was narrow, so that a small army could defend it with no danger of being outflanked, or surrounded, provided the sea was safe and the mountains on the south adequately guarded; but it was level, and had room enough for hoplites to move, and a wall across it, like the Isthmus at Corinth, which hoplites could defend; it was not defended by light-armed mountaineers. The pass at Parapotamioi between Phokis and Boeotia was another of the same kind, though nothing like so easily defensible; so was the position at Mantinea in 362, and that at Chaironeia taken by the Greeks in 338. But when the Greeks were driven out of Thermopylai and had to retreat to Attica, they did not defend the passes over Kithairon and Parnes; they relied on their fleet. In the fourth century, and to some degree in the fifth, Athens had an elaborate system of frontier forts, from Eleusis to

<sup>1</sup> The ordinary pass between Eleusis and Athens over Aigaleos—the Sacred Way—was equally defensible; but it could be turned by the open pass north of the hills, between them and Phyle, a pass wide enough and level enough for hoplite manœuvre.

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Rhamnous; but they were not intended to stop, hardly even to delay, an invading hoplite army.<sup>1</sup>

I believe that the reason for the failure to develop a true mountain strategy was social and political rather than economic. Light-armed troops, able to fight in more open formation than hoplites, every man therefore more independent of his fellows, and to move rapidly from one threatened pass to another, if they were to be generally effective and not only in special circumstances, in Aitolia or Sphakteria or pursuing the dispirited Athenian hoplites retreating from Syracuse, needed a more prolonged and thorough training than the Greek states, other than Sparta, wished for their citizens; they must be almost a professional army, or rather there must be at least a cadre of professional officers, and so an officer class (corresponding both to our commissioned and our non-commissioned officers), a thing no Greek state (except Sparta in her own way) wanted or thought of. I am not among those who think the hoplite armies only half-trained militia. For their own purposes, that is, tactically in pitched battles, as heavy-armed, slow-moving troops, fighting in close formation, they were most of them admirably trained, as they showed on many occasions, against foreign troops, Persian, Macedonian, or Keltic, as well as in Greek wars; and against the weapons of the light-armed, arrows, javelins, and stones, they were, on their own ground, invincible. But the Greeks were not strategically well trained; for that professional officers are necessary. For ordinary hoplite fighting the Greeks, especially the farmer class, were prepared to undergo the training that was necessary, and to fight for their country when invaded. In spite of their many wars, they never regarded warfare as anything but a tragic interruption of ordinary life; it was not something permanent, a continuous activity, and so did not require a professional skill and a hierarchy of officers (contrast Sparta, v. 66. 3). Moreover, the hoplite system was in all states, for the hoplite class, a thoroughly democratic one; and the fact that every man could supply his own armour and weapons—for sword, shield, and buckler are not rapidly consumed like arrows and javelins, shells and bullets, and each man has his own, whereas guns and tanks must belong to an army—helped the Greek view of the relationship of the citizen to the State: a citizen contributed to the needs of the state when called upon, he was not taxed by a superior government; and there was no need for the state to possess a large store of arms which might fall into the hands of ambitious men and be as dangerous to normal well-ordered public

<sup>1</sup> See Chandler, 'The North-West Frontier of Attica', *J.H.S.* xlvi, 1926, 1-21; Kahrstedt, 'Die Landgrenzen Athens', *Ath. Mitt.* lvii, 1932, 8-28; Wrede, *Attische Mauern*, 1933; Säflund, 'The Dating of Ancient Fortifications in S. Italy and Greece', *Opusc. Arch.* i, 1935, 87 ff.

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life as (it was felt) would be a professional military class. So no well-organized light-armed force was ever formed by any Greek state: in those in which the hoplite class was predominant, light-armed fighting, such as it was, was left to the very poor, landless men, despised and neglected; in Athens, after the hoplites and the poorer classes had been merged politically into one demos and when the navy was organized, it was the poor who served as rowers—partly no doubt at first because, before the new naval tactics were developed, rowing was despised (and was never very desirable), partly because the poor could not contribute their own weapons and the state (of course) must supply the ships and their oars; and even in Athens, after the complete triumph of the radical democracy, both the social and the military distinction between the hoplite and the thetic classes survived.<sup>1</sup> Sparta, with the leisure for a professional army, could doubtless have trained a light-armed corps had she wished; but so long as her rivals were content with hoplites, she had but little need for them. With her strong hoplite force she was in little danger of invasion; and there were no enemy light-armed to prevent her crossing her own mountain frontiers whenever she liked.

Nor did the Greeks in Thucydides' day possess a *cavalry* technique. This, however, is not surprising when we consider the nature of the country, unsuitable most of it both to the breeding of horses—of cavalry horses at least—and to their use. Most states, including Sparta before 424 (iv. 55. 2), had no cavalry; Athens and Boeotia had small forces. These were used at home to prevent raiding beyond the enemy's armed camp (i. 111. 1, ii. 22. 2, iii. 1. 2), in enemy country to make a raid; in pitched battles they were present on the wings, to harry an outflanking movement (especially against the left wing) and to hinder pursuit (v. 67. 1, 2, 73. 1), seldom for a decisive action (iv. 93. 4, 94. 1, 96. 5 with n.).<sup>2</sup> Even in Thessaly, with its fine horses and its knightly ruling class, the cavalry, good as it was, could not defeat infantry: they could only confine it to narrow quarters, though for defensive purposes this might be decisive, for it could prevent raiding for supplies (i. 111. 1; cf. Xen. *Hell.* iv. 3. 3-8). Alexander the Great was the first to develop effective cavalry tactics. We must remember as well that in Greece the cavalry too

<sup>1</sup> Cf. below, i. 93. 6 n. One reason doubtless why Athens in particular had no organized light-armed troops (iv. 94. 1) was that the majority of the poor served in the fleet. See Grundy, p. 311 with n. 3 (he is in error in saying that slaves were among the rowers).

<sup>2</sup> Compare with this the use of cavalry in the early 18th century, when musketry fire by infantry was a slow business: e.g. Churchill, *Marlborough*, ii. 111-12.

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was, within its class, democratic: officers and men were alike gentlemen.<sup>1</sup>

Of this matter of supplies for an army we hear little in Greek historians. Campaigns were normally expected to be short; an invading army took a few days' rations with them, and for the rest expected to get their food either from a friendly city used as a base or by raiding the enemy. The Plataia campaign of 479, in which we hear of a supply convoy from the Peloponnese (Hdt. ix. 39. 2, 50), was exceptional: not only was the Greek army many times larger than the average, but their position on the northern slopes of Kithairon, with the enemy in possession of Boeotia, allowed them no supplies on the spot, and the country immediately behind them, Attica, had been denuded.<sup>2</sup> When an elaborate campaign like that to Sicily was planned, arrangements for supplies were made both by the state and by private individuals (vi. 44. 1; cf. 31. 5); and doubtless similar things were done for other less important but distant expeditions. Even so, not only purchase and requisition, but foraging and raiding by the soldiers themselves were necessary, with fatal consequences often not only to the raiders but to the discipline of the main forces. The classical example of such ill consequences is Aigospotamoi; where we must blame the generals, not for letting the crews on shore—that was necessary—nor for the foraging as such—some forces must go for supplies—but for keeping no proper watch and neglecting discipline.<sup>3</sup>

There is another apparent paradox in Greek warfare in the fifth century—the primitive nature of their methods of siege; but in this case the paradox is more easily explained. It was due to two causes. The first was the immense superiority of the defensive weapon, the wall whether of stone or mud-brick,<sup>4</sup> over the offensive —javelins, arrows, or hand-worked battering-rams. Even in the fourth and third centuries when engines of attack had been elaborated,

<sup>1</sup> Hence doubtless its comparative lack of discipline (Xen. *Memor.* iii. 5, esp. 18–19). See Wilamowitz, *Aus Kydathen*, 24, n. 45; who, however, exaggerates; and when he says, as an example of the ineffectiveness of the Athenian cavalry, that they never prevented supplies reaching Agis at Dekelia, he forgets that the supplies would have come from Boeotia: only a good light-armed infantry force could have stopped them.

<sup>2</sup> The general problem of supplies for the Persian forces and of producing food for the Greeks themselves is mentioned by Herodotos, viii. 108. 3, 109. 4.

<sup>3</sup> For the difficulties in keeping up supplies from home, by a long line of communications, see iv. 27. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias, viii. 8. 7–8, notes that mud-brick may be even more effective (if built thick enough) against ramming and the later artillery that shot bolts and stones, than stone-built walls. It could, however, be brought down by water, as was proved at Mantinea in 385 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 4–5). Compare Wrede, *Attische Mauern*, 59; Praschniker, *Oest. Jahresh.* xxi–xxii, 1922–4, Beiblatt, p. 34.

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ated, such as high towers from which men could shoot at the defenders, and a sort of artillery—cross-bows that fired iron bolts and large stones—the defensive was uppermost; for the 'firing' was all at short range and the engines and towers, to be movable, must be of wood, and an energetic defence could set them on fire. Mining was used to sap foundations; but counter-mining was as easy. Neither Philip nor Demetrios Poliorketes was successful in assaults on well-defended towns, Perinthos, Byzantium, Rhodes;<sup>1</sup> and neither Philip nor Alexander, neither Demetrios nor his son Antigonos, tried to take Athens by assault. There was only one effective method of taking a walled town, properly defended, by assault—a reckless expenditure of human life. Apart from the use of such siege-engines as were available, walls could be scaled by ladders; but here the defence had a great advantage—it could concentrate on the points of attack, and a handful could resist a large number; unless the attack had a great superiority in numbers and was prepared for heavy losses, it could not succeed against resolute men. This was the method successfully used by the Carthaginians in Sicily at the end of the fifth century; and it succeeded largely by its novelty; it took the Greeks entirely by surprise. We are reminded of the success of the Japanese in the Russian war of 1904: it had been supposed that the machine-gun had established the superiority of the defence over attack once more; and the Russians had not calculated on the reckless disregard of life by the Japanese. This method was not available to the Greek states with their small populations; success would have been much too dearly bought—we must remember what a large proportion of citizens were in the fighting line. This is the second cause for the Greek failure in siege operations. So that a defence properly organized was always successful so long as food and water lasted (no large supply of munitions was necessary when men fought mainly with swords); occasionally a place was taken by a sudden surprise attack; but the only sure way of taking a walled town was by a long siege which reduced it by hunger. A proper defence could be managed by but a small body of men (the siege of Plataia, described in detail by Thucydides, is the extreme instance in Greek history), or by the older and less active or inexperienced citizens (i. 93. 6, ii. 13. 7).<sup>2</sup> All this is easily to be understood; and the only matter for wonder is on occasion the very great disproportion of numbers, as at

<sup>1</sup> The name Poliorketes was surely first given to Demetrios in derision: he besieged towns, for months, went on besieging them, but did not take them. He was not *'Εκπολιορκητής*.

<sup>2</sup> It is interesting to observe that at a later time, and for a man who takes siege-warfare seriously and is contemplating a city defending itself in a last attempt to preserve its independence, the best troops are assigned to special work of defence: Aineias, i. 5. 8.

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Plataia, and the fact that surprise was not more often attempted—for example, why did not the Athenians, under the command of Alkibiades, ever try on some fine winter's night to capture Dekeleia? One can imagine Demosthenes making the attempt.<sup>1</sup>

A walled city therefore with access to the sea and to supplies from the sea was practically impregnable, as Athens proved to be throughout her history from the building of the long walls to 262 B.C. so long as she or her allies could use the sea; and Megara and Patrai were similarly made impregnable while they were allied with Athens (i. 103. 4, v. 52. 2). If the state attacking a coastal city itself commanded the sea, it would demand that the wall on the sea side be destroyed or in its permanent possession, as the Athenians at Poteidaia (i. 56. 2, n.) and Demetrios at Athens in 294, to avoid the necessity of a siege; the wall on the land side would be preserved for defence, as by the Athenians at Teos (viii. 16. 3).

To reduce a town by hunger, however, would in most cases take many months and even years; and the Greeks were as little reckless of time as of lives; to have a great part of the citizen population away for long periods meant too great a loss of production at home.<sup>2</sup> This difficulty, however, could be largely overcome. The besieging army built a wall round itself (of earth or stone according to circumstances), between its lines and the city-wall; behind this it could defend itself as effectively against sorties by the besieged as the latter could against assault by the besiegers. Hence but a small number of men could be left to hold this besieging wall, and it was the regular practice for the main part of the attacking army to leave after this wall had been built (Poteidaia, i. 65. 3; Plataia, ii. 77. 1, 78. 2; Skione, iv. 133. 4; cf. Dekeleia, vii. 27. 3). This helps to explain why in 458 the Athenians could only send their reserve forces against Corinth when they had just commenced the siege of Aigina and had their main army there and in Egypt, while in the next summer, though Aigina had not yet fallen, they could send such large forces to fight at Tanagra and Oinophyta (i. 105. 3-4, 107. 5-108. 4; cf. also nn. on 110. 1, 4). If the besieging army was in danger of attack from without as well as from the besieged city, it would build a double wall and encamp within it; if the enemy secured something like command of the surrounding country the besiegers became literally the besieged (the Athenians before Syracuse, vii. 11. 4).

<sup>1</sup> For a modern parallel to this Greek caution in risking heavy losses, due to a very different cause, compare the campaigns of professional armies in the 17th and 18th centuries. For example, at the storming of Schellenberg, before Blenheim, 1,500 were killed and 4,500 wounded: "the cost . . . was shocking in an age when soldiers were hard to find, and human life narrowly valued" (Churchill, *Marlborough*, ii. 389).

<sup>2</sup> Contrast in this the ability to maintain in the field the small professional armies of more modern times.

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If the siege was by both land and sea, conditions were only slightly altered: the land force of the besiegers built their wall round the land side of the town, and the fleet had or could have a palisade on or near the shore behind which the ships could retire as well as one round its camp on land as a protection against raids (Mytilene, Syracuse: see below, p. 20); the only difference lay in the fact that the section of the fleet which was actually patrolling the sea had necessarily no external protection (Samos, i. 116. 2-3, 117. 1).

Of naval warfare there is less to be said. Of the general principles of naval strategy, the advantages of sea-power, the ability for example of the state which holds it to attack where it will, and at a distance from home,<sup>1</sup> Thucydides gives no systematic account, though he mentions much by the way. In tactics, on the other hand, development had been so rapid and so recent that he everywhere explains them fully; and for general conditions we need to keep in mind but two things, which I have illustrated elsewhere:<sup>2</sup> that the trireme was a lightly built vessel, designed primarily for manœuvre in battle, not for voyages, and for drawing up on shore; and that with its total complement of nearly two hundred men, it was not possible to provide much storage space for food and drink nor sleeping quarters.<sup>3</sup> In the ordinary way, therefore, except on journeys of extreme urgency, the trireme, unlike the merchant vessel, must put in to shore every evening; only a day or two's supply of food could be carried, and men must sleep and find water to drink. That meant not only that a trireme must more or less hug the shore, as on the long voyage to Sicily, vi. 42, 44 (and because it must anyhow, for these reasons, hug the shore, the builders were

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ps.-Xen. 2. 5.

<sup>2</sup> J.H.S. liii, 1933, 16-24, reprinted with some additions in *Essays*, c. x. It has been pointed out by some reviewers that I ignored the fact that on a journey, though never in battle, triremes could go by sail. This is true; but it hardly affects the substance of my argument. On the main point Arnold long ago anticipated me: see his n. on i. 117. 1.

For further matter in Greek naval history see Lehmann-Hartleben, *Die antiken Hafenanlagen* (1923); Miltner, art. 'Seewesen', R.E. Supplbd. v; Graeffe, 'Studien zur Marinegeschichte', Herm. lvii, 1922, 430-49 (especially his account of harbour defences); Admiral Rodgers, *Greek and Roman Naval Warfare* (1937: reviewed by Tarn, C.R. lii, 1938, 75-7). This last work, though very inadequate (neither Tarn's nor Köster's name appears in it), yet contains some valuable matter, especially on the speed of triremes.

<sup>3</sup> For the method of rowing in the trireme, see Tarn, J.H.S. xxv, 1905, 137-56, 204-24, and *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments* (1930), App. iv; Cook and Wigham Richardson, C.R. xix, 1905, 371-7; Köster, *Das antike Seewesen*, pp. 111 ff.; Brewster in *Harvard Class. Stud.* xliv, 1933, 205-25. The last-named seems to me to be nearest the truth; but the difficulties are not all overcome.

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enabled to construct it so lightly), but that the shore must be friendly or neutral; and that if a fleet is taking part in the siege of a city, it must have a camp on land near by (iii. 6. 2, iv. 27. 1, &c.).<sup>1</sup> This explains much of the detail in the history of the Peloponnesian war.

The trireme could be rowed at some 4 to 5 knots, and for a short burst—that is, when making an attack in battle—it might reach 7 or 8; under sail it would also travel at some 5 knots with favourable winds. This means it would normally cover from 35 to 45 miles in a day, in a calm sea (for men cannot row more than 8-10 hours a day, except in a very urgent case), 80-90 at most under sail.<sup>2</sup> Bad weather, especially the choppy seas of the Mediterranean, would check considerably the lightly built trireme, with an upper deck not more than 16 feet above the water.<sup>3</sup> This made a voyage difficult and slow in the winter months (and often in the summer); but it must not be supposed that this stopped winter voyages altogether, as is often stated. Ambassadors sailed to Sicily, cavalry were conveyed to Methone in Macedonia, in the winter of 416-415 (vi. 7. 1, 3); communications were regular with Poteidaia and Syracuse during the siege-operations;<sup>4</sup> there was much winter sailing in the Ionian war, from 412. Nikias exaggerates when he says (ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας) μηνῶν τεσσάρων τῶν χειμεριῶν οὐδ' ἄγγελον ράδιον ἐλθεῖν (vi. 21. 3).

<sup>1</sup> This does not mean that *no* voyage across the open sea could be contemplated, without panic, for the trireme: see vi. 13. 1, 34. 4-9, vii. 19. 4. But normally this was for the merchant vessel; cf. Plut. *Per.* 26. 4 on the σάμανα, which was κοιλοτέρα καὶ γαστροεδής, ἀπότε καὶ ποντοπορεύν· καὶ ταχναντείν (i.e. was built both for the open sea and for rapidity of manœuvre). There is no need to adopt *X*'s conjecture φοροφορεύν for ποντοπορεύν, as Ziegler does).

<sup>2</sup> These are Köster's figures; Rodgers puts the *average* for a day's row at less than 3 knots. This seems too low. In more recent times (on which Rodgers bases his conclusions) speed seems to have been greater, if a galley could be rowed against contrary winds from Chalkis to Peiraean from early morning in October to late in the evening (C. G. Law, in *Classical Essays in Honour of E. Capps*, 1935, 235).

19 35, 235).  
A merchant ship went at about the same speed, but, as the crew was small, it had quarters and provisions for them, and so sailed through the night. Thucydides says it took four days and nights to sail from Abdera to the Danube mouths, about 450 miles, including the passage against the currents of the Hellespont and Dardanelles: ii. 97. 1. See Köster (2), 62-3, 78-9. (Plutarch, Dion, 25. 1-2, says that two merchantmen took twelve days to go direct from Corinth to Sicily, barely 400 miles, with light winds. Cf. E. L. Wharton, *Wine-dark Seas*, 291, who tells how a small sailing-boat was completely becalmed for three days in the Ionian sea, and might have been stayed longer, but for the help of petrol for the motor from a passing ship; and remarks that it was probably wiser to sail along the coast, where land-breezes are more to be relied on.)

<sup>3</sup> Köster (2), p. 87, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Köster (2), p. 87, n. 3.  
<sup>4</sup> With Pylos, the difficulty would have been to get food to the Athenian forces, in summer and winter alike (iv. 27. 1).

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Such were the general conditions, economic, social, and technical, determining Greek strategy and tactics, which Thucydides took for granted; the application of them in detail he abundantly illustrates. But there are other strategical factors particular to this war of which we should have expected a general survey, but he does not give it. For example, we expect an account of the principal routes by which the all-important supplies of food and timber must reach Athens, and which must be defended at all costs. It is not that he is unconscious of the importance of such factors; he often mentions them in the course of his narrative: food supplies, vii. 27. 4-28. 1 (*Dekelia*), ii. 69, viii. 35. 2 (ships from Egypt); timber, iv. 108. 1, vii. 25. 2, viii. 1. 3. But there is no general explanation, none for instance in ii. 13. 2: *παρήνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἀπερ καὶ πρότερον, . . . καὶ τὸ ναυτικόν . . . ἔξαρτύεσθαι, τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν, λέγων τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου,* κ.τ.λ. Why did Pericles not add: 'and especially guard the food-routes from the Pontos' and from Egypt (via Rhodes), and the timber-routes from Thrace and Macedonia, and above all Euboea'? Nor does Thucydides explain the strategic importance of Megara to Athens,<sup>2</sup> nor tell us anything of such problems on the Peloponnesian side, except in general terms, i. 120. 2, ii. 69; nothing for example of Corinthian interests west of the Adriatic, and Peloponnesian dependence on them. He is silent as well on the purely military side of strategy; he gives particulars when they are significant for his narrative, as the strategic value of Herakleia Trachinia, iii. 92, and of Amphipolis, iv. 108. 1, but no survey, no account, for example, of the means of communication, and so of joint action, between the Peloponnese and Boeotia and hence of the strategic importance of Plataia, and between the Peloponnese, via Amphissa and Doris, and Thessaly (note his very brief reference, iii. 92. 4); nor of the immediate strategical problems of Demosthenes in Aitolia and Akarnania, nor of Naupaktos and the Athenian position in the Gulf of Corinth. These are matters, of geography and elementary economics, of which he assumes a knowledge in his readers; but it is a somewhat rash assumption.<sup>3</sup>

It is the same with the topography of a campaign: except for a few cases such as Amphipolis and Pylos, he contents himself with the briefest description, as of the Epirus coast between Acheron and Sybota (i. 46-54: see below, p. 179), or with none, as of Memphis,

<sup>1</sup> Cf., e.g. *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 57, ll. 34 ff. for the guard on the Bosporos.

<sup>2</sup> See i. 103. 4 n.

<sup>3</sup> Wade-Gery, in his article in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, makes the interesting suggestion that Thucydides may have been a better regimental officer than commander, and that his understanding of strategy was in fact weak. See iv. 73. 4, 108. 5 nn.

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Prosopitis, and τὸ Μενδήσου κέρας in Egypt (i. 104. 2, 109–10). Did he take these last to be known, from Herodotos or some περίοδος γῆς, or are they just from his notes, never explained, like Derdas, Pausanias, and Philpos in i. 56–65? Or is it from literary principle, as Jacoby suggests?<sup>1</sup>

He assumes as well that he need not explain the organization of Greek armies and navies: the methods of recruitment<sup>2</sup> and of training, the division into battalions and companies, the officers, the trierarchic system; the docks and the shipbuilding yards. This is more understandable, for the essential elements were the same in most Greek states except Sparta, even though he expressly complains of popular ignorance of the Spartan system (i. 20. 3). We are most ignorant, and would most have liked enlightenment from Thucydides, about the officering of the armies. We can confidently infer, from their achievements, that the hoplite armies, at least of the larger and wealthier states, were well trained; we know, especially from Athenian history, that men for the higher commands, the *strategia*, were elected, by popular vote, often for their political eminence, as Perikles, Nikias, and Kleon, but often also for their military experience: to take a few outstanding examples in the Peloponnesian war, there is no reason to suppose that Phormion, Lamachos, Nikostratos, and Demosthenes, often elected *strategoi*, had any of them been prominent as politicians. But we do not know how they had first gained their experience, whether they had made a name for themselves as subordinate officers.<sup>3</sup> We do not hear anything of the training of officers as such; even in the training of young recruits there is no evidence that their officers, except the *strategos* in command and the technical experts, were men of military experience, as it were sergeants, captains, or colonels, or were chosen to train others because they were on the way to promotion in the army and would gain by the experience.<sup>4</sup> All we know is that under the *strategoi* at Athens there were ten *ταξιαρχοί*, popularly elected, each in command of the regiment consisting of the men of his own *phyle*, and under them and appointed by them (at least at the end of the 4th century) *λοχαγοί* (*Aθην.* 61. 3); and that there were also *τριττύναρχοί*, perhaps the lowest rank of officer but in unknown relation to the *λοχαγοί* (*Plat.*

<sup>1</sup> If I understand him rightly: Jacoby (2), p. 103. See further Pearson, *C.Q.* xxxiii, 1939, 48–54, and below, n. on i. 46. 4.

<sup>2</sup> See i. 105. 4, ii. 13. 7 nn.

<sup>3</sup> Lamachos may have been a subordinate in the Pontos campaign (*Plut. Per.* 20. 1); Phokion attracted Chabrias' notice at the battle of Naxos, when he was perhaps a trierarch, perhaps already strategos (*Phok.* 6–7, 1). Cf. *Mor.* 805 E–F.

<sup>4</sup> *Aθην.* 42. 2–5. (This account may apply only to the last third of the 4th century; we have no separate information for the fifth.)

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*Rep.* v. 475 A).<sup>1</sup> Similarly, in the cavalry there were two *hipparchoi* and under them ten φύλαρχοι, all popularly elected.<sup>2</sup> In the navy, the trierarch, though only a rich man and no more a skilled sailor than the *choregos* was a skilled χοροδιδάσκαλος, was apparently in tactical command and received orders from the *strategos*; the κυβερνήτης was the navigating officer and responsible for the safety of his ship, but in battle subordinate to the trierarch. Nor in all the details of the Peloponnesian war do we ever hear of a man distinguishing himself as a *ταξιαρχος* or *κυβερνήτης* and being elected *strategos* in consequence. The navy was well trained, and had developed a high degree of skill in manœuvre; but the officers—at least the higher officers—in both navy and army were essentially amateurs. Apart from the trierarchic system (so very amateurish, but which might have worked well, with the trierarchs serving as intermediaries between an experienced admiral and skilled captains), we may remember that Nikias, perhaps a competent enough army commander, was more than once in command of an Athenian fleet; and that Phormion and Nikostratos, who had shown such exceptional skill as sailors (and the former at least famous as a sailor—*Equit.* 559 ff.), were expected also to command armies on land. There is no reason to suppose that in any other state except Sparta the military forces were more professionally organized. In modern navies too, I believe, especially the Spanish, up to the end of the eighteenth century, there was a distinction between the gentlemen who commanded the ships and the professional officers who navigated them; and we must remember the crudities of our recruiting system then and later, not only the press-gang, which must often draft landsmen, including criminals, who had never been on board a ship in their lives, but also that the ship's officers (like the army officers) were themselves responsible for collecting a sufficient crew, before we unthinkingly condemn the Greek system as absurd. But there is this distinction: in the modern armies and navies there was a harsh and cruel discipline, made possible by social conditions that had no parallel in the ancient Greek world, which could at length make trained crews and regiments; Greek officers had to command, on land men who were their social as well as their political equals, at sea many who were, if of humble origin, not for

<sup>1</sup> As there were three *τριττύες* in every *phyle* there were presumably, at least originally, three *τριττύναρχοι* in each regiment. Perhaps, as Aristotle says nothing of them, their place had been taken by the *λοχαγοί* in a reorganization later than the writing of the *Republic*. Or were they sectional commanders in the navy? We know that the trittyes played some part in naval organization.

<sup>2</sup> Constitutionally the two *hipparchoi* for the cavalry correspond to the ten *strategoi* for infantry (both classes were elected ἐφ' ἀπάντων), as the *phylarchoi* to the *taxisarchoi*; but on a campaign they came under the general command of the *strategoi*.

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that reason less active as critics and voters in the ekklesia. *Πρόσεχε, Περικλεῖς*, Perikles used to say to himself when taking up a command: ἐλευθέρων ἄρχεις, Ἐλλήνων ἄρχεις, πολιτῶν Ἀθηναῖων.<sup>1</sup> For, let it be repeated—it explains much that has been said in this section, especially the reluctance to risk human lives and to engage in long campaigns—there was no officer class in any Greek state. The Spartiates were an exclusive body, but they served in the ranks in their own regiments; a cavalry regiment was generally aristocratic, but the aristocrats were troopers; in a hoplite battalion there were not more than half a dozen officers, and these would most of them be officers for one year and private soldiers for many more. Kleinias, very much a gentleman in 480, died fighting in the ranks in 447. And these hoplites and cavalrymen were all front-line troops, their officers as well, for there was no elaborate staff-organization, no complicated strategy nor tactics to keep generals in the rear (the mortality among Athenian strategoi in the Peloponnesian War seems to us extraordinarily high); the safer posts, the supply columns and the pioneers, were reserved for those inferior in station, and when we are given the numbers of an army, it means the fighting troops only, the rest are excluded.<sup>2</sup>

## D. CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE

By this I mean the actual working of the constitution in the different states. If we compare the Athenian with the Roman constitution of the century between c. 250 and 150 B.C., on paper they appear to be very similar: each with a council or senate, annual magistrates elected by the people, and an assembly of the people whose assent was necessary to new laws and to certain vital executive actions such as alliances and war and peace. We know that in practice they were very different; and Polybios is at some pains to explain the working of the Roman constitution to his readers. Thucydides felt no such need to explain Athenian practice; not only because his readers were familiar with the principal facts, but because his narrative illustrates these facts very fully throughout. We should know from his work even if we had no other evidence that the ekklesia did in fact control affairs, and control them directly; a wise statesman might guide it, a foolish or dishonest one mislead it, but it could never be ignored; neither a powerful magistrate nor a powerful council directed policy. Similarly we know from him that the apella at Sparta had a decisive voice in the decision of war and peace; so too had the general body of State-members of the Peloponnesian League; Sparta was not all-powerful in the League, nor any magistrates or the gerousia in Sparta. We

<sup>1</sup> Plut. Mor. 186 c, 813 D.

<sup>2</sup> Contrast vii. 75. 5.

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might well, however, have been given a fuller description of the League, especially of Sparta's position within it once war had been declared. We learn something of that from the introductory first book, from Archidamos' speech and the Corinthians' at the second congress, as well as in the course of the narrative (the peace negotiations after the capture of Pylos and towards the end of the Ten Years' War); but we would have welcomed something more explicit. Still more should we have welcomed an account of the organization of the Athenian empire, particularly of the garrisons in the cities, the cleruchies, the constitutional changes effected by Athens, and the recruitment of land-troops and crews for the fleet from the subject states; but in this case Thucydides would perhaps have given such an account if he had ever completed his survey of the development of the empire out of the Delian League, for he appears to promise it (see 97. 1 n., and pp. 370–85).

## II. THUCYDIDES' SELF-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS

Apart from these omissions, there are others (or so they seem to us) due to Thucydides' conception of his task, to the limits which he imposed upon himself. In the first place, he was writing a *History of the Peloponnesian War*, not a *History of Greece* (or of Athens) from 431 to 404, still less a political or cultural history of Athens from 479 to 404. He confined himself to the war. We may regret this, and wish that he had written of the glory that was Athens or some such noble theme; but we must recognize it. More than this: he interpreted his task as one with narrow limits. He not only omitted the cultural and economic history which would be proper to a *History of Athens*, or of *Greece*, but also political history where it did not seem to him to have a direct bearing on the war, directly to affect its course, as did the rivalry between Kleon and Nikias and between Nikias and Alkibiades, or to be caused by it, as were the *stasis* in Kerkyra and the revolution of the Four Hundred in Athens. They were part of the *κίνδυνος*, the great disturbance that was the war; but ordinary party strife or rival ambitions were to be ignored. "Thucydides reviews the mass of events and chooses by his own insight the part that is worthy of recital. This part he undertakes to describe while it is actually happening; he works to that end and what lies outside his theme does not interest him."<sup>1</sup> It interests him, as witness his digressions; but he will not let them divert him from his main purpose, as Herodotos did. Owing to this austerity we have lost much.

It is not (once again) that he did not understand cultural history, that he had no eye for a fine building, no ear for poetry, or no feeling

<sup>1</sup> Wilamowitz (2), p. 8.

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for that combination of freedom and order which was the Greek aim in politics and almost their achievement; the Epitaphios, to which he gives so prominent a place in his work, is itself one of the finest tributes ever paid to Athens. This was indeed one of the chief problems of which he was conscious: was this ideal Athens worth the risk of a great and destructive war? It was the central theme: it was this civilization, of which Athens was the head, which was in danger of destruction by the war. But he did not feel it his duty to describe its development, either before or during the war. Nor, as we have seen, did he undervalue economic forces; but he does not describe their particular effects. He does not, for example, tell us to what extent, if at all, the campaigns abroad restricted the Peloponnesian harvest or the Athenian fleet restricted Peloponnesian imports (cf. iii. 86. 4); not even the effect of the blockade on Megara (cf. iv. 66. 1)—of that we learn more from Aristophanes; nor what proportion of the Athenian fleet was engaged in the defence of the trade-routes for *their* imports, or what was the effect on Athenian finances of the increased import of food from abroad made necessary by the annual invasions of the Peloponnesians. In the matter of finance indeed we can unhesitatingly find fault. Thucydides knew its importance (i. 80. 3-4, 83. 2, 141. 3-5; iii. 13. 6; vi. 34. 2), and gives in detail some of Athens' financial resources (ii. 13. 2-5); but as he does not give the whole of the state's revenue nor—what is more important—the expenditure for any one year or over a series of years, the true value of these resources remains unknown. He occasionally mentions particular expenditure (the siege of Poteidaia: ii. 70. 2; cf. also iii. 17 with nn.); but he does not relate current expenditure with current income. He is content with generalizations, brief summaries, and hints (cp. especially vi. 31. 5: this partly because he had not trustworthy figures and would not guess). Nor does he tell us consistently how the money was raised: he tells us that the special property tax was imposed for the first time in 428 and produced 200 talents (iii. 19. 1), but after that there is silence. We do not know from him by how much the allies' tribute varied from year to year, nor—and this is the most remarkable omission in his narrative—of the doubling or trebling of the tribute in 425. And in consequence of this we do not know from him either the economic or the political consequences of the different taxes—the effects on men's minds as well as on their pockets both at Athens and in 'the cities'. For this, or for some of it, we turn to Aristophanes.

We can understand Thucydides' temper best, however, by observing his treatment of another element in history—the biographical. He clearly had a liking for biography, a keen sense of personality, as is shown by his account of Perikles, Nikias, Kleon,

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Alkibiades, and Brasidas, and above all by his long, and for his purpose quite unnecessary, excursus on Pausanias and Themistokles; where he goes out of his way to describe the fortunes and characters of the two men who *λαμπρότατοι ἐγένοντο τῶν καθ' ἑαυτούς Ἑλλήνων*.<sup>1</sup> But except for this he excludes all biographical detail from his narrative—not because he thought individuals had little effect on events<sup>2</sup>—he emphasizes the importance of Perikles, Brasidas, and Alkibiades—but partly because the detail is untrustworthy, chiefly because it is trivial: attractive, but in itself unimportant in the midst of great political events. It is in this more than in anything else that he shows his determination not to write like Herodotos, not to allow himself to be beguiled and to beguile others by what is simply attractive (cf. i. 22. 4, n. on *τὸ μὴ μνθῶδες*).<sup>3</sup> His superb silence on the anecdotes and gossip and the scandals about Perikles at the beginning of the war is the principal case in point. It proves not only that he regarded the stories themselves as too puerile to need refuting, but that he did not believe either that Perikles was guided in his policy by personal motives, or that his political position was shaken by the outbreak of the war.<sup>4</sup> If we turn from Thucydides to Ephoros' account of the origins of the war, as reflected in Diodoros, or to the fairer-minded but not more critical Plutarch, we seem to pass from a world of adults to a world of children. Yet we lose much from Thucydides' silence, and would have lost more if Aristophanes (who also wrote for adults) had not been preserved. For the gossip and the scandal are historical in this sense, that they did exist at the time; attacks were made on Perikles, though they left his supremacy undisturbed; stories were spread abroad and his friends prosecuted by men who were afraid to prosecute him himself. These all help to show the temper of the time; they throw light on the events and on the "critical and ungenerous" side of the Athenian character;<sup>5</sup> and the Olympian silence of Thucydides would have left these currents and eddies of opinion unrecorded. An equally clear, if not quite so important, a case is that of Alkibiades. Thucydides mentions the general lawlessness of his private life, and its effect on men's attitudes towards him (vi. 15. 3-4, 28. 2)—a matter of great importance for the history of the war, for Alkibiades, unlike Perikles, was overthrown and his overthrow had disastrous consequences for Athens; but he gives no details of it, because he will not tell anecdotes, and it would remain

<sup>1</sup> See too n. on *σκυτάλην*, i. 131. 1.

<sup>3</sup> It is perhaps unnecessary to refer to the foolish notion that there was no biography, because no sense of the individual, before Plato ('the individual was lost in the State'), though it has been revived by Uxkull, pp. 104-5. Herodotos is full of it; and there is autobiography in Archilochos. See Bruns' excellent pages, 3 ff., 46-8, with Leo's wise proviso, p. 86, n. 4.

<sup>4</sup> See also i. 45. 2, 92 nn.

<sup>2</sup> As Bruns, pp. 65-7.

<sup>5</sup> Adcock in *C.A.H.* v. 175.

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vague for us, lacking its proper significance, if we had not the invaluable Plutarch. It matters not whether the anecdotes told by Plutarch are true, provided they were told at the time and believed by many (provided, that is, that Plutarch faithfully reports contemporary gossip); for it was these anecdotes, true or false in themselves but true to Alkibiades' character, that affected the minds of his fellow-countrymen.<sup>1</sup> But Thucydides will not gossip; he will not give personal details. He refuses even to tell us that the famous Gorgias was one of the ambassadors from Leontinoi in 427 and made a great, if temporary, impression upon his hearers.<sup>2</sup> It need not be added that autobiography is even farther from his purpose, farther still any attempt at an apologia for his own failure.

For all these things that he omits, some because he will not mention them, some because he thought it unnecessary, others perhaps because he did not understand their significance, we must go to other sources. A short analysis of these sources follows; but before we get to that, a word needs to be said about Thucydides' own methods of obtaining information; for that is another matter on which he is silent. He tells us that he began making notes of events from the first, and that he got information from both camps and especially, after his exile, from the enemy's; that he himself witnessed some events and heard some speeches, but about others had to collect his information from elsewhere. But he does not specify; he never says which speech he heard or at which event he was present, nor what in any one case his other sources of information were, how long after the event he was able to make inquiries, what care he took to test what was told him, what battlefields he visited. There is only one event at which we know he was present—when he was in command, and there are a large number which we know he did not witness; but that is all. We are in his hands; we can only judge him by the result, by our own sentiments as we read him and by the testimony of others. That testimony is indeed as silent about Thucydides as he was about himself; but their silence is as eloquent as his: Ephoros, for all his efforts, varied from him but little (and

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> The best single instance to illustrate the contrast between the historian and the biographer is the account of the two unburied dead after the fighting near Solygeia in Thuc. iv. 44. 5–6 and Plut. *Nik.* 6. 5–7. This unimportant detail is recorded by the former, simply, one must suppose, because it was in his notes, and left in because he did not finally revise; it is without significance. In Plutarch it is significant, for it throws light on the piety of Nikias, the subject of the biography (it may have been only inference by later writers that it was Nikias who was responsible). Similarly in the story of the death of Lamachos, vi. 10. 6 and *Nik.* 18. 2–3: Plutarch adds the detail of the single combat and the name of Lamachos' opponent, though he is not writing a life of Lamachos, just because biographical detail is his chief concern.

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always for the worse), and added less; Xenophon, Kratippos, and Theopompos began their histories where he left off; Philistos wrote of the siege from the Syracusan point of view, but could find little apparently to add to Thucydides.<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes supplements his narrative admirably; contemporary official documents nearly everywhere confirm it. All who have written of the Peloponnesian war since Ephoros have had the same experience: they can only translate and abridge; Thucydides has imposed his will, as no other historian has ever done. Yet in very few cases can we test the truth of his narrative.

## III. SOURCES OTHER THAN THUCYDIDES<sup>2</sup>

All sources for the history of a period in the past can be divided into three kinds: (1) contemporary historians, men, that is, who derive their knowledge and their judgements from their own experience and from that of others directly, and who are consciously handing on their knowledge and judgement to posterity; (2) contemporary documents, that is, everything that throws light on the period to which they belong, but unconsciously—official and unofficial, comedy, pamphlets, works of art, learning; the writers or makers of them were not, at the moment of making, intending to explain events to posterity; and (3) later historians who may be using material now lost. These last are of value to us only in so far as they are using such material; as interpreters of the past they belong to the history of their own times.

### A. CONTEMPORARY HISTORIANS

For the history of the Peloponnesian war Thucydides is, in the first kind, unique. We know the names of one or two contemporaries who wrote of the war or of part of it—Hellenikos, who treated it briefly, chronicle-fashion,<sup>3</sup> Philistos of Syracuse, who had been a boy, perhaps of 15–17,<sup>4</sup> at the time of the great siege and wrote an account of it in the sixth book of his Σικελικά (*Plut. Nik.* 1. 5). No fragment referring to any event covered by Thucydides has survived from either of their works, and the latter cannot therefore be supple-

<sup>1</sup> See below.

<sup>2</sup> I do not by any means follow Busolt in all his opinions, but I cannot but express my debt to his analysis of the *Quellen*, both for the Pentekontaëtia and for the Peloponnesian war.

<sup>3</sup> Above, p. 3 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See Laqueur, R.E. art. 'Philistos'; Busolt, iii. 702, n. 5. They think Plutarch's words, *Nik.* 19. 5 Φ. ἀνὴρ Συρακόσιος καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δρατής γενόμενος, imply that Philistos was only a spectator and therefore probably under 18. I do not think Plutarch meant this; but it may be true for all that, for Philistos was killed in a naval battle in 356, so can hardly have been more than 18 in 415–413. He took an active part on Dionysios' side in 406 (*Diod. xiii.* 91. 4).

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mented from this source; but we are told that Philistos τὸν Ἀττικὸν δόλον πόλεμον ἐν τοῖς Σικελικοῖς ἐκ τοῦ Θουκυδίδου μετενήροχε (Theon, *Progymn.*, p. 9). If this is even a moderately accurate statement, it is a remarkable tribute to the completeness (as well as to the impartiality) of Thucydides' account; but we cannot be sure of its value, for we know that Philistos imitated Thucydides' style (Dion. Hal. *Epist. Pomp.* 5. 1, p. 779; *de imit.* 3. 2, p. 427; 'Siculus ille capitalis, creber, acutus, brevis, paene pusillus Thucydides', Cic. *ad Quint. fratr.* ii. 11. 4; cf. *Brut.* 17. 66; Quintil. x. 1. 74), Theon was a rhetorician of the first to second century A.D., and rhetoricians observed style far more closely than content.<sup>1</sup> As far as it goes, however, it suggests that we should not have known much more about the siege of Syracuse if Philistos' work had survived. Doubtless most of what is in Plutarch's *Nikias* and not in Thucydides is from him, directly or indirectly (especially, perhaps, 24. 1, the boys who took part in the fighting).<sup>2</sup>

Another writer, nearly contemporary, who in a better world should have been invaluable, was Ktesias of Knidos, who lived for years at the Persian court as physician to the king, and wrote a *Περσικά*, covering the period from the earliest times to 398–397 B.C., from Persian sources. But he was so careless of the truth that he cannot be trusted; most of his work that has survived—in epitome—is so obviously false where it can be tested, that we are compelled to doubt even where what he says may be true.<sup>3</sup>

## B. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Contemporary documents are to be subdivided into two important classes, official and unofficial. Fortunately for us, many Greek states, and Athens more lavishly than any other, were wont to inscribe documents on stone—laws, decrees of the ekklesia, accounts of receipt and expenditure of public moneys, casualty lists; and of these, owing to the material used, some have survived—often fragmentary, sometimes difficult to decipher, but of incalculable value.<sup>4</sup> Their value lies directly in the fact that they are *original documents and official*. Because they are originals they are not

<sup>1</sup> Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 740 (p. 428. 7, ed. Stählin) quotes Thuc. iii. 39. 4 as having been reproduced by Philistos. The passage is a commonplace; it is possible that if Philistos often copied Thucydides in this way—the γνῶμαι and generalizations—rhetoricians may have exaggerated his debt in the matter of content.

<sup>2</sup> Busolt, iii. 713, n. 5. See also below, p. 71.

<sup>3</sup> See i. 109. 3, 110. 1 n.

<sup>4</sup> Their value was early recognized by historians in antiquity, and a collection of Attic decrees, *ψηφισμάτων ἔνναγγη*, was published by Krateros in the early years of the third century; more will be said of this below in the section on later historians.

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liable to the errors of a manuscript tradition—such errors as they do contain are few, and most of them easily corrected, and prove only that no man is infallible; and because they are official, they are true statements of fact. This last may at first sight seem a hard saying; but it will be at once admitted, if its limitations are understood. That is to say, if we have an inscription containing a new law or an alliance, or a vote of money for a naval expedition, we are certain that the law was passed, the alliance made, or the money voted, and that the clauses of the law, the terms of the alliance, and the amount of the money are correctly given (contrast the evidence of orator, comic poet, or even historian); but, if we have nothing but the inscription for evidence, we are only certain of that; we do not know, for certain, whether the law or the alliance was effective, nor whether the expedition in fact sailed or whether, if it sailed, it received the money. We may recall the comments of Demosthenes on brave resolutions of the ekklesia that were never carried out. Still less do we know, without the literary evidence, the circumstances in which a law or decree was passed. When, however, as in the case of the Peloponnesian war, we have good literary evidence as well, nothing can be more valuable than inscriptions; when we have little or none, as with Athens in the third century, inscriptions give not only a fragmentary story but may actually mislead: we have to proceed with our attempts at reconstruction with the utmost caution (which does not mean that the attempts must not be made). If the literary evidence and the official document are in conflict, we must still go carefully, even though the document is a true statement of fact. To take an extreme case: Thucydides says that there were two commanders with the second squadron sent to Kerkyra in 433, Glaukon and Andokides (i. 51. 4; see note there); an official document says that money was voted to three commanders, Glaukon, Metagenes, and Drakontides. It is possible—not in the least likely, but *possible*—that Thucydides is right, that originally these three were selected, but for some reason two of them did not sail and that Andokides went in their place. Similarly with the new assessment of tribute in 425 (see note on iv. 51): if we had only the inscription containing the assessment, it would have been possible that this was passed by the ekklesia, but never put into effect,<sup>1</sup> and that that is why Thucydides makes no mention of it (though we could still criticize him for the omission); actually we have some record of tribute paid after 425, besides the dubious evidence of Plutarch,<sup>2</sup> and we know that it was put into effect. Take a slightly different case, the inscription recording the

<sup>1</sup> We remember that Melos was assessed by this decree, but did not pay tribute: i.e. this part of it was not put into effect.

<sup>2</sup> See below, p. 85.

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decree about the colony to Brea (*I.G. i<sup>2</sup> 45*; Tod, 44): this records the fact that the colony was voted, and it gives us invaluable information about the methods of settling the men in the new territory, about the political relations of the colony to Athens and to the neighbouring State-members of the Delian League, about the class of citizens from whom the settlers were to be taken. We know nothing further about the colony and its history from other sources: it is only by chance mentioned by a lexicographer (see Tod, *ad loc.*), whose information came either from comedy or from this inscription itself through Krateros' *Collection of Decrees*.<sup>1</sup> It may be therefore that the colonists were soon destroyed or dispersed, like those previously sent to Ennea Hodoi, or that they were absorbed in the larger colony of Amphipolis which was founded not long after; or it may be that the colony was never settled at all—the decree is to be dated about the middle of the forties of the fifth century, and perhaps it was voted in 447 or 446, and the colony given up in consequence of the serious military situation. If Kratinos mentioned it, it may have been to gibe at another unfulfilled promise of Perikles (see *i. 108. 3 n.*, p. 319).<sup>2</sup>

Bearing this limitation in mind, and also the fragmentary condition of so many of these inscriptions, we can give a brief analysis of those which throw light on Thucydides' history.<sup>3</sup> Of greatest value, if we had more of them, would have been the financial documents; for it is of finance that Thucydides tells us least.<sup>4</sup> As it is,

<sup>1</sup> Hesychios, s.v. *Bρέα*. The MSS. of Hesychios give *Kparīvōs* as the author who mentioned the colony (fr. 395 K.); but the emendation to *Kparēpōs* is tempting.

<sup>2</sup> "Immer wieder sprach er (U. Koehler) es aus, dass die Inschriften von den Schriftstellern ihr Licht empfangen, und dass es, wenn keine schriftstellerischen Nachrichten vorliegen, eine Utopie ist, einzig aus Urkunden Geschichte zu gewinnen. Erst indem wir die epigraphische Tradition mit der literarischen verbinden, . . . bahnen wir uns den Weg zur Wahrheit": Kolbe, p. iii. With this I would on the whole agree, as is clear from what I have said above, provided that we do not condemn or belittle efforts made by those scholars who understand both history and inscriptions to rebuild where little or no literary tradition survives, as with Hellenistic Athens.

With this compare official evidence at second-hand, such as reports of decrees in later writers: for example, the restriction on comedy in 440–437. We only know there was some restriction; we do not know its nature; and above all we do not know the circumstances in which the decree was passed—that is, we do not know its significance (below, p. 387).

<sup>3</sup> For a short general account of Greek inscriptions and their value for history, see Tod, *Sidelights on Greek History* (1932), c. i. For the lettering on Attic inscriptions, arranged in chronological order, with admirable photographs, see Kirchner, *Imagines Inscriptionum Atticarum*, 1935.

<sup>4</sup> Especially *I.G. i<sup>2</sup> 91–2, 293–309, 324* (see Tod, 50, 51, 55, 64, 75; cf. 81, 83, 92); Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*; Wade-Gery, 'The Financial Decrees of Kallias', *J.H.S.* li, 1931, 57–85; W. Kolbe, 'Kallias und "Sinking-Fund"', *Berl. Sitzungsber.* 1933. Below, n. on ii. 13. 5.

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they tell us something of the methods of financing the war, of the accumulation of capital during the years of the peace in the public treasury and in the temples—in actual coins, mostly, with some bullion, and nearly all in silver—of the spending of this in the war and of the borrowings and repayments of the temple-moneys; but there are not enough of them to tell us what we really want to know, the relationship of expenditure to income, and so of expenditure from capital to expenditure from income. More important than these, because more illuminating, is the great series of quota-lists—the documents giving year by year the quota paid by every tribute paying member of the Delian League to the treasury of Athena, one-sixtieth of the sum paid as tribute (*μνᾶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ταλάντου*).<sup>1</sup> Fortunately for us this sixtieth was not deducted at the end of the year by the Hellenotamiae in a lump sum from the total of tribute received, but was regarded as being contributed to the goddess of Athens by each state-member separately; so that we have the amounts paid by each state for a period of some thirty-five years from 454 to 420 (with a few payments of later date)—not by any means a complete record, on the contrary with some exasperating gaps and uncertainties, but sufficient to throw a great deal of light on the relative financial resources of the states, on the amount they jointly contributed to the war-chest of Athens, on the vicissitudes in the policy adopted by Athens towards the different states (raising and lowering of tribute, owing to increase of prosperity, or to cleruchies, or to politics), on the changes in the number of states contributing, and in general on the organization of the empire: a great volume of information which supplements not only our meagre sources for the history of the Pentekontaëtia but also to some extent those for the Archidamian war as well. To this group belong also the decrees relating to assessment of tribute, especially that of 425–424 (*I.G. i<sup>2</sup> 63*; Tod, 66; *A.T.L.* A 9).

Of equal or greater value for our understanding of the empire are the treaties with member-states, whether quite friendly as that with Phaselis (*I.G. i<sup>2</sup> 16*; Tod, 32), or after some trouble, as with Erythrai (10: 29) and Miletos (22), or after secession and defeat, as with Chalkis (39: 42), Hestiaia (40: 2), and Mytilene (60: 63). These last tell us something as well about Athenian *klerouchoi*; the decree concerning Brea already mentioned gives us details of an *ἀποκία*. Other important treaties with members of the League are those with Methone (57: 61) and Selymbria (116: 88). Treaties with other

<sup>1</sup> *I.G. i<sup>2</sup> 191–231; S.E.G. v*; Nesselhauf; Tod, 30, 46, 56, 71; and now Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *Athenian Tribute Lists*. This noble work gives us not only the latest arrangements and readings of the fragments, but a photograph and a facsimile-drawing of every one (including the tribute-assessments and decrees); a register which contains the individual record of every state in the lists; and a gazetteer of the states, with valuable geographical discussion.

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states survive, with Egesta (19: 31), Rheaton (51: 58), Leontinoi (52: 57), with Phokis (26: 39), with Perdikkas of Macedon (71), and with the Bottiaioi in 422, who had seceded from the League in 432 (90: 68), with Halieis (87), and with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis in 420 (86: 72), the treaty whose terms are recorded by Thucydides, v. 47.

Other inscriptions important for the history of the war are the decrees relating to the expeditions to Melos (*I.G. i<sup>2</sup>* 97; Tod, 76) and to Sicily (98, 99: 77), those in honour of Samos (101) and of Neapolis by Thasos (108: 84), and one passed in Eretria in honour of a Tarantine who assisted Eretria to revolt in 411 (xii. 9. 187: 82). The financial inscriptions already referred to, especially those relating to the expeditions to Kerkyra (295: 55), Poteidaia (296), and Sicily (302: 75), are also important for chronology.

Athens set up monuments to citizens killed in war, and sometimes to allies, and of these a few have been preserved in whole or in part (*I.G. i<sup>2</sup>* 927–968), of which the most interesting are the Erechtheid list of 458 (929; Tod, 26; see i. 106. 2 n., p. 310), and the monuments to the Argives and Kleonai who fell at Tanagra in 457 (931–2: 28).

Many ostraka exist which recorded votes given in ostracism (908–15: 15, 45—large numbers have been found recently, including a remarkable group against Themistokles; every man known to have been ostracized is now represented by at least one ostrakon, as well as others who are not<sup>1</sup>).

There are as well a number, but not a large number, of inscriptions from cities other than Athens, which throw some light on fifth-century history.

Outside the scope of Thucydides' *History*, as he planned it, are numerous inscriptions which illustrate economic and social history (for example, those relating to public buildings, *I.G. i<sup>2</sup>* 335 ff., especially 372–4; the accounts of the Poletai, 325–34; Tod, 79, 80<sup>2</sup>), religious history (Eleusis, 6, 76: 74; Athena Nike, 24–5: 40; the Hephaistia, 84; the shrine of Neleus, 94; the administration of Delos, 377: 54; the Asklepieia, *Syll.<sup>3</sup>* 88: *I.G. i<sup>2</sup>*, p. 293. 17 ff.), local administration (183–90; the evidence for the fourth century is more abundant). An interesting legal document is the republication on stone of Drakon's homicide laws in 409–408 (115: 87). We have no fifth-century inscriptions relating directly to the constitution of Athens, but the wording of the decrees and other documents itself tells us much of its working.

<sup>1</sup> Broneer, *Hesp.* vii, 1938, 228–43. See also Shear, *Hesp.* vi. 344–5; vii. 361; viii. 246 (an ostrakon of Hyperbolos, carefully painted, not scratched—so prepared beforehand), x. 2–3 (Perikles and Alkibiades: the former looks to belong to 461 rather than 443, or to have been written in 443 by a very old-fashioned man).

<sup>2</sup> And *Hesperia*, iii, 1934, 47–50; v. 382–6; vii. 81–2; viii. 69–76.

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Coins are another form of official evidence for history. Large numbers of these from all states of the Greek world have long been known, and numismatics is a comparatively old science. Its application to political history, especially to the detailed history of individual states, has been frequent.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately no systematic use of coins, as far as I know, has been made for the economic history of Greece—the total evidence of provenance and hoards, for example, for the movement of trade. This is one of the most pressing needs in ancient history.<sup>2</sup>

Other material evidence of trade, not official, but, as evidence, so closely allied to coins that it would be pedantic not to mention them here, are the articles of commerce that survive—above all pottery, especially Athenian—though this in fact tells us less about the history of the last third of the fifth century than of the century and a half preceding.

### C. UNOFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

A number of private monuments, mostly inscribed and sculptured tombstones and dedications in temples, illustrate the social and occasionally the political history of the period. But by far the most important of all unofficial documents, the most important of all the subsidiary evidence for the story of the Peloponnesian war, is literary. Amongst them is the contemporary political pamphlet which has come down to us under the title *Ξενοφῶντος βίτρωπος* (or simply *Ξενοφῶντος Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, preserved among the works of Xenophon the historian because it was thought to be his—to be a parallel to his *Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτεία*). It is the work of an Athenian oligarch of the extreme type explaining, largely for the benefit of foreign oligarchs, the efficiency—of course the perverted efficiency—of the democracy and in consequence the difficulty of overthrowing it from within; it was written according to the general opinion about 425 B.C., according to Gelzer in 431–430,<sup>3</sup> according to Müller-Strübing about 416–415;<sup>4</sup> which last seems to me the most probable view.<sup>5</sup> As it is a work both with a strong political bias and with

<sup>1</sup> See below, pp. 383–4 for coinage in the Delian League, for an example, and n. on i. 25. 3 for Corinthian coins in the west.

<sup>2</sup> See Addenda.

<sup>3</sup> *Hermes*, Einzelschr. 3, 1937.

<sup>4</sup> *Philologus*, Supplbd. 4, 1880, 1 ff.

<sup>5</sup> I have discussed the pamphlet in some detail in *Athenian Studies*, 211–45. How it came later to be included among Xenophon's works is quite uncertain. Its author may have been another, unknown Xenophon, and it was later rediscovered and mistakenly attributed to the historian; or, as it was probably circulated only amongst a few persons, a copy may have belonged to Xenophon's father and been kept by Xenophon, to be discovered and published after his death among his own minor works. The use of *βίτρωπ* in the title in some MSS. means little; it might be applied to the historian: cf. Theopompos, F. 255. Thucydides himself is called a *βίτρωπ* by Thomas Magister, in that epigram on the three stars of rhetoric, Demosthenes, Thucydides, Aristeides (*Anth. App. Plan.* 315).

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a sophistical tone, its direct statements must be received with caution; but it is very interesting as a document, and indirectly it throws some light on the strength of the democracy and the position of the extreme oligarchs who would have liked to overthrow it (by violence, if necessary), but at the time saw very little chance of success. Its historical value has, however, in recent years been a good deal exaggerated.

Another political pamphlet by an extremist was that of Stesimbrotos of Thasos, from which interesting details are quoted by Plutarch, mostly in his *Kimon* and *Perikles*. He was a *sophistes*, and wrote books *Περὶ τελετῶν* and on Homeric problems, and had pupils; his pamphlet, entitled (probably by the later grammarians, from its opening words), *περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους καὶ Θουκυδίδου καὶ Περικλέους*, was written certainly after 430, very likely during the Archidamian war.<sup>1</sup> Unlike Pseudo-Xenophon, it seems to have been only a violent personal attack on the Athenian popular leaders, including Kimon. That he should include Kimon was not unnatural; for he seems to have been attacking the empire, inciting the subject-allies against Athens, and Kimon had been a great imperialist and in particular had conquered Stesimbrotos' own city of Thasos when it seceded in 465–463; but it is interesting as illustrating a different tendency from the conventional picture drawn by the moderate democrat of the honest conservative Kimon (and Aristeides), leader of 'willing' allies, unlike Perikles and Kleon.<sup>2</sup> Theopompos may well have used

<sup>1</sup> F. Gr. Hist. 107, with Jacoby's judicious commentary. I differ from Jacoby only in a few details.

<sup>2</sup> I see no reason to doubt, with Jacoby, that the other stories in Plutarch about Kimon's relations with women, and of Elpinike's relations with Perikles and Polygnotos (including Athen. xiii. 589 E) are from Stesimbrotos too; Plutarch often quotes without naming an authority—cf. *Per.* 10. 5 and *Kim.* 14. 5 (F. 5), as Jacoby notes. In *Kim.* 4. 5 (F. 4) Plutarch's own 'additional note', ἐπειπεῖν, must include the praise of Kimon, not simply the quotation from Euripides which merely illustrates that praise; he combines a sentence from Stesimbrotos with his own judgement to make a complete picture (so that even δευόντως τε καὶ στωμάτις Ἀττικῆς ἀπηλλάχθαι may also be Plutarch's own; though there is no reason why, in Stesimbrotos, this might not be part of an attack on Kimon). If Theopompos F. 90 is genuine (and it is not at all inconsistent with F. 88–9, as Jacoby seems to think: see *Plut. Kim.* 10. 1, ἡδη δὲ εὐπορῶν and my comment, below, p. 64), that may also be from Stesimbrotos; but it is at least equally likely that Theopompos is misquoted.

We can understand too that Stesimbrotos could have attacked Polygnotos—his own countryman, who was yet happy in Athens and friendly with Kimon.

I have thought that the *Θαρία δλμη* of Kratinos' *Archilochoi* (fr. 6) may be a hit at Stesimbrotos; in the same play a picture is drawn of the simple Metrobios who had wanted to end his days εὐωχούμενος with Kimon, but Kimon died. Eupolis never had any objection to reviving old stories, and he doubtless gave to some a life that they would not otherwise have had: see fr. 208, *Plut. Kim.* 15. 4, quoted below, 102. 1 n.

That nothing is quoted from Stesimbrotos about Kleon may mean that the

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him (see below, p. 46); whether he influenced the biographical writers of the third century is unknown, but it seems probable enough; Plutarch is the first writer known to have read him, and Athenaios the only other to have quoted from this pamphlet.<sup>1</sup>

There were other sophistical pamphleteers at this time, among them Kritias<sup>2</sup> and Andokides<sup>3</sup>; but hardly anything of value (for our purposes) has survived. Ion of Chios, the tragedian, wrote *Memoirs*,<sup>4</sup> which included some interesting personal anecdotes preserved by Plutarch; others (as of Nikias and Alkibiades) to which Plutarch assigns no authority, may also be from him.

Of quite a different kind, and impossible to exaggerate, though it is only too easy to misunderstand, is the value of Aristophanes. In the earlier part of his career, during the Peloponnesian war, he dealt almost exclusively with public affairs (which include literature and philosophy); there survive an almost continuous series of plays from 425 to 421 (beginning, that is, just before Thucydides left Athens for good), the *Birds* was performed in 414, the *Lysistrate* and the *Thesmophoriazousai* in 411. (One great advantage to the historian is that we know their dates so precisely; as Bergk put it, with a little exaggeration: 'maximi momenti est, quod non solum annum, sed etiam diem, quo fabula acta est, satis certo definire possumus, quoniam sic demum intelligi potest, quae necessitudo intercedat inter spectaculum illud, quod poeta exhibet, atque ipsum illum rerum extrinsecus positarum statum'.)<sup>5</sup> In order to understand the comedy fully, we must know what the political situation was; but at the same time we must remember that it is the business of a comic dramatist who deals with politics not to tell his hearers what policy to pursue, not to offer solutions of difficult problems present in a political situation, but to extract the comedy from the situation. That Aristophanes, a man of genius, of immense

pamphlet was published soon after 429 (*Plut. Per.* 36. 6 = F. 11); but the ordinary tradition was so full of abuse of Kleon that there would have been no need to go especially to Stesimbrotos for it, and the omission may mean little.

<sup>1</sup> Stesimbrotos' historical accuracy can be judged by F. 2—Themistokles' naval policy was carried out against the opposition of *Miltiades*. F. 1, as Plutarch gives it (Themistokles a pupil of Melissos and Anaxagoras), is so clumsy an error—Melissos and Anaxagoras being but a generation or so older than Stesimbrotos and his readers—that I think Jacoby wrong to reject outright the possibility of a misunderstanding on Plutarch's part: Beloch's view (ii. 2. 9) that Stesimbrotos may have mentioned an acquaintance between the philosophers and Themistokles in Magnesia is not improbable. The fact that Plutarch notes the chronological absurdity is of course rather against this.

<sup>2</sup> Diels-Kranz, *Fragm. d. Vorsokratiker*, ii. 390 ff.; F.H.G. ii. 68. See 102. 1 n.

<sup>3</sup> Πρὸς τὸν ἑραίποντα: see Teubner and Budé editions.

<sup>4</sup> F.H.G. ii. 44 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Ap. Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* ii. 894.

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range, who understood his countrymen, did admirably. This means for one thing that mockery or satire of individuals, in the dialogue, illustrates the character of the speaker and not, or only incidentally, that of the individual attacked;<sup>1</sup> and since Aristophanes' characters are the contemporary Athenians, it is about them that we learn so much. To the historian of Athens, for the period covered by them both, he is the perfect complement to Thucydides; these two men, so different to one another in temperament, enable us to understand the Athens of the Peloponnesian war better than any other part of Greek history. Contrast that other period in the history of Athens which is brilliantly illuminated, that of the struggle with Macedon: the speeches of Demosthenes, and of a few others of the politicians, throw light on the contemporary scene as, in its different way, Old Comedy had done; but for this period there is no Thucydides. Contrast, too, an equally important period, that from 322 to 262, for which we have neither an Aristophanes nor a Demosthenes, nor a contemporary historian. If comedies of the years from 440 to 430 had survived, and not only a few scattered lines from them, we should know much more than we do of the temper of Athens in the years which saw the beginnings of the war—though I doubt whether Thucydides' considered judgement would need revision; as it is, their fragments must be treated in much the same way as those of the pamphleteers. Some of the fragments of the later comic poets, contemporary with Aristophanes, especially those of Eupolis, are also of interest. But comedy needs understanding, which Aristophanes has not often had from historians either ancient or modern.<sup>2</sup>

Of less value to us, because more personal to the author, and partly because less immediate (so that the actual date of production is less important than with comedy), but deeply interesting, are the political tragedies of Euripides—those which are directly inspired, or in which passages are directly inspired, by his feelings about the war: for example, *Andromache*, *Suppliants*, *Troades*. These contain not 'allusions' to contemporary events, which, if real, would not be interesting; but they show the effect of the war on Euripides' spirit and on his outlook. The fierce anti-Spartan tone of *Andromache* may have been inspired by such an event as the execution of the Plataia prisoners; the *Suppliants* is patriotic and pacifist as well. Later the whole war-spirit in Athens and her allies as well as in her

<sup>1</sup> So Bruns, p. 148. But a little farther on he goes strangely wrong. He says that the aesthetic purpose of the real characters, as Theoros or Lamachos in *Acharnians*, is to connect the whole fantasia of the plot with reality. The actual effect of introducing Lamachos into such a story is to increase, not decrease, the fantastic element; it is the lively character of Dikaiopolis, principally, that keeps the play fast to reality.

<sup>2</sup> See my paper in *C.R.* lii, 1938, 97–109.

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enemies, as Euripides felt it, determined the tone of the *Troades*.<sup>1</sup> He is extracting the tragedy from the situation, as Aristophanes the comedy. Sophocles, as we should expect, did not write such plays.

The other kind of contemporary literary document, the speech, is represented in this period only by Antiphon and Andokides (Lysias belongs almost entirely to the period after 411). Antiphon is too sophistic in manner to throw much light on history; Andokides is the reverse, always direct and to the point—but for this reason the light he throws is on his own character and on the situation at the moment of the speech rather than on the past events which he relates. He has to persuade the jury; and that is what makes his speeches valuable to the historian—we know the kind of speech which he, Andokides, thought, at this or that particular time, most likely to persuade; and they are therefore more valuable for the period just after the war when the speeches were delivered than for that to which his narrative so often refers.

The style of Antiphon—his arrangement of material and his language—and of the earlier sophists are naturally invaluable in comparison with that of Thucydides, especially in the speeches, whether we take that to be individual to him or in some way to illustrate the fashion of speaking in his day.<sup>2</sup>

For the sake of completeness we should mention as well the surviving monuments of the art and learning of the age—sculpture and architecture, philosophy and sophistic. In this sense comedy and tragedy alike belong here, and, no less than all these, Thucydides' *History* itself. They all belong to a history of Greece in the Peloponnesian war. Fortunately there is no need for me to describe them: better hands than mine have already done it, often enough.

## D. LATER WRITERS

Non-contemporary historical writing (that is, all that deals with events of a past epoch known only through oral tradition, earlier writings, and documents) can be divided into two kinds, research and interpretation. The dichotomy is not complete; for all research, or at least the record of the results of research, involves some interpretation if only unconscious, and all interpretation involves some research, however cursory. Nevertheless the distinction is a real

<sup>1</sup> See Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* (1939), 222–3, 235 n. 2: "that Euripides should first have written this anti-Spartan play (*Andromache*), and then, with deeper experience of the war, should have written the deeper anti-war tragedies, is a development as convincing as such things can be."

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of Thucydides' style, see J. H. Finley's two papers, 'Euripides and Thucydides' and 'The Origins of Thucydides' Style', in *Harvard Studies*, xlvi, 1938, 23–68 and l, 1939, 35–84.

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one: the researcher looks to the discovery and the meaning of primary sources, and the valuation of secondary sources; he looks for the origins of a statement before assessing its value, he searches for new documents whether written or material. The interpreter primarily accepts the statements of others as they stand, and does not look for new sources of knowledge; he exercises his judgement on those statements.<sup>1</sup> "What Gibbon does," said Wilamowitz, "is in essential to give the traditional material shape by his literary art, and illuminate it with the enlightened intelligence of a man of the world who has assimilated all the culture of France and England. Different as is the temperament of the sarcastic unbeliever . . . from the gentle piety of the Delphic priest, his method may be compared with that of Plutarch, whose *Lives* formed the favourite reading of the centuries between the Renaissance and the French Revolution. Plutarch also possessed great erudition; but he owes the material of his narrative entirely to the historians and the Alexandrian compilers; what he adds of his own is, apart from his charming presentation, only the criticism of a moralist and the political temper of the age of Trajan."<sup>2</sup> An excellent short example of such work of criticism and interpretation, as opposed to research, is the opening section of Thucydides' *History*: "his *Archaeologia* does not give an impression of personal research; it gives only a rational criticism of accepted tradition. We may not ask for more; but also we should not discover more."<sup>3</sup> And "accepted tradition", not only because Thucydides does not, apparently, doubt the existence of Eurystheus, Agamemnon son of Atreus, the ten years' siege of Troy, and such other things as we, at least till we have documentary proof, are disposed to place in 'the mythological', but because he accepts as well the traditional material of the 'historical' period from the migrations to the Persian wars. As Schwartz put it, "er untersucht nirgendwo die Überlieferung auf ihre Entstehung und die Bedingungen ihres Werdens, sondern nimmt sie als etwas Gegebenes und misst sie an rational konstruierten und aus der Gegenwart abgezogenen Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Man kann ihn mit der Aufklärung des 18. Jahrhunderts vergleichen, nicht mit der erst im 19. entstandenen Geschichtswissenschaft."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> To us of course, as I have said, the 'interpreters' may be at times of first-hand value if they preserve the record of events which is otherwise lost because earlier historians are lost. But primarily they are documents illustrating the history of the age in which they lived, not that about which they wrote.

<sup>2</sup> Wilamowitz (2), 3-4. (See also below, p. 59.)

<sup>3</sup> Wilamowitz, ibid., p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> P. 170. 1. It is worth emphasizing this, because Ziegler, 'Ursprung der Exkurse im Thukydides', *R.M.* lxxviii, 1929, p. 61, for example, quite misunderstands it. Modern archaeology has indeed confirmed many of the Greek traditions in their main outlines; but if we were to discover documentary proof of all the

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But with regard to Thucydides, 'we may not ask for more', 'he is of the eighteenth century', not because he did not understand the meaning of research, but because these chapters are ancient history, and his main work lay not in that field, but in contemporary history. His *Archaeologia* is for him only a side-line, a *parergon*, a brief essay written to explain his view of the importance of the Peloponnesian war. His main work did involve research, of a most arduous and painstaking nature; the fact that it is of a different kind from research into the past must not blind us to that.<sup>1</sup> There is a fundamental difference between his work and Gibbon's: the latter is interpreting a tradition, which in itself was in no danger of being lost; Thucydides' aim is to preserve the record of contemporary events and so to widen the boundaries of knowledge—work which we cannot say belongs in kind to the scientific nineteenth and twentieth centuries, only because the latter have not produced its equal. Similarly with Hekataios and Herodotus, and doubtless others of the early logographoi; it is true that their research was largely, though by no means entirely, geographical, sociological, inquiry into the customs of foreign peoples, rather than historical, and that Herodotus at least often accepted the traditional material of past history, but it is none the less research. The word *ἱστορίη* in the logographoi means research; and if Thucydides had ever described his methods in detail, and not only given us his results, he would doubtless have used the same word. Later, *ἱστορία* came to mean 'written history', and by a curious chance was applied especially to those histories which were interpretations, or even mere re-writing, of traditional material, not the result of independent research; Ephoros and his like, rather than Philochoros, were the ἀνδρες *ἱστορικοί*. Research nevertheless was carried on in the fourth and third centuries.

### i. The Researchers

The most important of these, and almost the only ones that concern us here, were the *Atticographoi*: most important, because more work was done on the past history of Athens than on that of any other state, and the only ones to concern us because practically nothing has been preserved of work on other states in the fifth century that affects Thucydides. The study of Athenian history was actively pursued by a number of scholars, of whom Philochoros, perhaps the most learned of them all and almost the last of them,

details about Atreus, Eurystheus, Chrysippus, and Agamemnon given by Thucydides in i. 9. 2, it would not make his *Archaeologia* any more the product of scientific research.

<sup>1</sup> His excursus on the Peisistratidai in bk. vi is based on research into the past; but being only an excursus, it is slight.

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died not long after the fall of Athens in 262.<sup>1</sup> All their writings are lost; but their *fragments* tell us something of what they did—their work on chronology, continuing that of Hellanikos and others in the fifth century,<sup>2</sup> which finally established the fixed archon-list, their collections of material, like the *Διδασκαλίαι* and *Pythian Victors* of Aristotle, the *ψηφισμάτων συναγωγή* of Krateros, the list of Olympic victors of Hippias<sup>3</sup> (though he was no historian), their studies in constitutional and religious history.<sup>4</sup> Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, itself a handbook which shows little original research, embodies some results of their work; but this, in the form in which we have it, is so unequal in merit, so haphazard in arrangement, so often superficial, anecdotal, and inaccurate, following now a careful record, now a rhetorical historian, that it is hard to assess the value of the works on which it is based.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, such accurate chronology as we possess for the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, as well as for earlier times, is very largely due to them; and we know from them some events which Thucydides omitted to mention. It is natural that for the period 431–411 they had not much to add.

It is to be observed that when we call these men 'scientific' and 'researchers', we are not implying that their work was well done, or that all of it was well done. We know that some of it was antiquarian speculation about the distant past, of the traditions of which they were not so critical as we should be, though probably not nearly so large a proportion as would appear from their fragments: naturally they are quoted for rarities, not for what was later regarded as common knowledge; some of their speculations were childish; some of them were more learned, some more

<sup>1</sup> Laqueur in *R.E.* s.v.

<sup>2</sup> Above, pp. 3 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Diels-Kranz, ii. 330.

<sup>4</sup> One branch of historical research was unknown to the ancients, archaeology, excavation. But it is wrong to think that because our field of research is wider, and we have thereby immensely increased the sum of knowledge—so that for instance we know more about the Bronze Age than Thucydides knew—therefore scientific method was foreign to ancient historians.

<sup>5</sup> The best section of the *Constitution* is that on Solon, best because it is the most independent in judgement and at the same time the most learned. It is another excellent example of what is meant by "rational criticism of accepted tradition" rather than research. In this case the accepted tradition was based largely on Solon's own poems, the best possible 'original sources'; Aristotle had read them for himself, for he was a man of culture and learning, and he uses them as historical material intelligently. But no more research than this is implied. The independence and freshness of his chapters on Solon (compared with the rest of the book) are due to an intelligent use of original sources; but it is only, so to speak, by accident that he uses those sources, because he was a man of culture—all men of culture had read Solon—not because he was a historian, a researcher into the past.

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intelligent than others.<sup>1</sup> They did not exclude myth nor unhistorical stories, any more than the logographoi had done. A Phanodemos could give conventionally exaggerated figures for the Persian force at Eurymedon, and be quoted for a pretty piece of rhetoric on Kimon's death;<sup>2</sup> and even their Athenian chronology was not infallible. All we mean by 'scientific research' in their case is that their method was that of discovery, comparison, and valuation of records, not that their results were in all cases sound; and even so, some of them, quoted by uncritical later writers as scholars, may have been charlatans.<sup>3</sup>

The work of these men was continued and enlarged in the third and second centuries by the scholars of Alexandria. Most of the Alexandrians, all of them perhaps except Eratosthenes, were literary rather than historical scholars, interested in the establishment and interpretation of the texts of earlier writers—whose works, stored in the great library and catalogued, were scientifically edited; but since many of these writers, Homer, Tyrtaios, Pindar, and above all Kratinos, Aristophanes, and other writers of the Old Comedy, and the orators, were full of historical matter and 'allusions', the work of interpretation involved much historical research. The last of these men was the learned Didymos (born c. 83 B.C.), who may or may not have done original work of his own, but who certainly in his numerous works included the results of Alexandrian scholarship. His writings, or some of them, were known to Plutarch, Athenaios, and others; and much of his learning is preserved—abbreviated, truncated, often mangled and confused—in the marginal scholia of our medieval manuscripts. That is to say, the better scholia, and the introductory *Lives* of classical authors, derive ultimately from Didymos and Alexandrian learning; unfortunately the scholia on Thucydides, including the small fragments on papyrus, are not among them.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The foolish story of Themistokles and the surplus money from the Laurion mines in *'Αθην. 22. 7*, may well be from some Attis. So *may* be the absurd account of conditions in Athens just before Salamis (23. 1), though in this case a rhetorical writer like Theopompos seems a more probable source, and one Attidographer at least, Kleidemos (first half of the 4th century), had already told a story which, though childish in itself, a typical Themistokles anecdote, is at least 'ethically' truer to Themistokles and the conditions of the time (Plut. *Them.* 10. 3–4). (Walker, *C.A.H.* v, p. 473, rejects Kleidemos' story because it is untrue to the spirit of the men of 480: it belongs to the 4th century, when crews of triremes were only to be got by bribery. The pupils of Isokrates still live on.)

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Kim.* 12. 6, 19. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See for a general account Wilamowitz (1), i. 260–90.

<sup>4</sup> For Didymos and the scholiasts, see the account in Schmidt-Stählin, ii. 432–4, and the bibliography there; and Gudeman, art. 'Scholion' in *R.E.* The Thucydidean scholia are somewhat better for lexicography than for history. The papyrus scholia on i. 1–9 (P. Rainer, 29247, ed. Gerstinger, *Akad. Wien*, 1925) have little in common with those in our medieval MSS., nor with those on ii. 1–48 (*Ox. Pap.* 853). See also J. E. Powell, *C.Q.* xxx, 1936, 80–93, 146–50.

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The Hellenistic was the age not only of learning but of epitomes. Every book that could be was epitomized, from Aristotle's onwards. Of the *Chronicles* some fragments of these epitomes survive, a small one on papyrus,<sup>1</sup> the *Marmor Parium* on marble and not notable for either fullness or accuracy,<sup>2</sup> and a little of Apollodoros of Athens, who wrote a long *Xroniká* in iambics, based on Eratosthenes whose work it superseded in popular esteem, and extending from the Fall of Troy ('1184 B.C.') to c. 115 B.C.<sup>3</sup> Something of the manner of these shorter *Chronicles* can be seen in c. 22 of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*.<sup>4</sup>

Krateros' work, the *Collection of Attic Decrees* (first half of the third century B.C.), was in a somewhat different category, a valuable publication of documents most of which would otherwise have been inaccessible to the historian. It contained not only the documents, but a commentary on them and more (Plut. *Arist.* 26, a most interesting passage; cf. *Per.* 17—not only is the account of the summoning of the Panhellenic Congress probably from a decree in Krateros, but the statement that it failed owing to opposition from Sparta may also be his).<sup>5</sup> We do not know, however, that later historians availed themselves of his work to any great extent.

### ii. *The Others*

Of the historical writers who were not researchers we are concerned mainly with **Ephoros**, **Theopompos**, **Diodoros**, and **Plutarch**. Ephoros, a pupil of Isokrates, of Kyme in Aiolis, but resident in Athens, wrote a *Universal History*, that is, a history of the whole Greek world, from the Return of the Herakleidai (he purposely excluded the 'mythological period') to his own day (341–340 B.C.). His work is all lost but for short quotations in other writers; but for the fifth century and for Greece proper it was the basis for the compilation of Diodoros, whose chapters from bk. xi. 38 to xii. 32 are our only continuous account of Greek history (apart from Thucydides' own brief excursus) between 478 and 435. Not only in

<sup>1</sup> *Ox. Pap.* i, pp. 25 ff. (an epitome apparently not earlier than 30 B.C.).

<sup>2</sup> Edited by Jacoby (Berlin, 1904). It is difficult to believe that a chronicle which omits all mention of Drakon, Solon, Kleisthenes, the Old Comedy, and the Peloponnesian war can have had an *Attis* as its main authority (or that it can be worth much if it had), or that its standpoint is Athenian; Ep. 41 suggests a Delphic source. I think too that its many variations from orthodox dating are mistakes rather than the result of systems of reckoning.

<sup>3</sup> Also edited by Jacoby (*Philol. Unters.* xvi, 1902). Both *Marm. Par.* and Apollodoros are now in *F.Gr.Hist.* (239 and 244).

<sup>4</sup> See also below, p. 364.

<sup>5</sup> He did not apparently comment on the Peace of Kallias! See Boeckh, *C.I.G.* i, p. viii; Krech, *de Crateri ψηφ. συν.* (1888), 5–6, 22; Jacoby, *R.E.*, s.v., 1618. We are promised a commentary on his fragments in the second volume of *A.T.L.* Cf. *Athen.* i. 2 C–3 A.

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the selection and narrative of events, but also in their arrangement, Diodoros seems here to have followed him closely, except in one respect—Ephoros did not write annalistically, and may have paid very little attention to chronology. Both the fragments and Diodoros suggest that his work was superficial in the extreme and his historical judgement of the poorest (the account of the origins of the Peloponnesian war given by Diodoros, xii. 38–41. 1 is expressly taken from him). There is no reason to believe in his accuracy; his style was flat, and he was given to moralizing on persons and events with deadening effect.<sup>1</sup> He had a weak-kneed bias in favour of Athens, but not especially of democracy; his attitude was Isocratean, that of the unthinking conservative democrat, and he was as much responsible as his teacher for the later conventional picture of the opposites in politics—Aristeides and Themistokles, Nikias and Kleon, Phokion and 'the politicians', Kimon and Perikles, too, except that Perikles would not fit into any scheme.<sup>2</sup> He had little to add to Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian war—a few details from Philistos—but is naturally of greater value in supplementing Xenophon. Yet, since Diodoros was a careless compiler and his inaccurate chronology is his own, Ephoros may have been a better writer than at present appears, and the loss of his work is to be regretted. It had considerable influence on later writers; but the extent of this influence is still a matter of dispute. Polybios had some respect for him, though criticizing him for his ignorance of military matters; Strabo even admired him (xiii. 3. 6, p. 622), and used him, especially for the geography of Asia Minor; Plutarch read him and often quotes him. All alike treat him as a historian of the first calibre, which is a mark of the great decline in intelligent criticism and scientific thought in general after the third century B.C.<sup>3</sup> And the fact that he was a chief authority for later compilers such as Diodoros in the first century B.C. and

<sup>1</sup> An interesting collection of small fragments of a papyrus has been discovered at Oxyrhynchos (*Ox. Pap.* xiii. 1610), on which was written a history that was certainly the basis of Diod. xi. 56–69, and almost certainly, for this and other reasons, part of Ephoros. From it we can see how closely Diodoros followed his original, both in arrangement and in the wording. At the beginning of it (fr. 3–5) was a digression on Themistokles and his harsh treatment by Athens, as dull in thought as in the wording, which is faithfully reproduced by Diodoros (xi. 59. 3). See *F. Hist. Gr.* 70, F. 191, with Jacoby's commentary, or Bilabel, *Die klein. Historikerfragm. auf Papyrus*, 3.

<sup>2</sup> See below, pp. 60 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Polybios was perhaps especially interested in Ephoros' history of the 4th century (cf. xii. 25<sup>1</sup>), which may have been of much greater value than that of earlier periods. But his idea of historians of the first class can be seen from his joining together Ephoros, Xenophon, Kallisthenes, and Plato, *οἱ λογισταὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων συγγράφεων*, as authorities for the mistaken view that the Cretan and the Lacedaemonian constitutions were almost exactly alike (vi. 45. 1).

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Pompeius Trogus in the first century A.D., and for many scribblers and writers of anecdotal stories from the third century B.C. onwards (of whom Polyainos and Aelian of the 2nd to 3rd centuries A.D. still survive), is a proof of his undeserved but lasting influence.<sup>1</sup>

Theopompos of Chios (born 378 B.C.) wrote a *Hellenika*, in continuation of Thucydides (a History of Greece from 411 to 394 B.C.) and a *Philippika* (History of Greece, including Macedon, in the reign of Philip II).<sup>2</sup> Like Ephoros he spent most of his working life in Athens, and like him is said to have been a pupil of Isokrates.<sup>3</sup> But he was a more learned man, and a much more industrious worker. His means gave him the leisure to devote himself to research (F. 25); he travelled widely and was, it would seem, tireless in the acquisition of knowledge (T. 20, especially; F. 181, 336), both from personal observation and from the writings of others. But his judgement fell far short of his energy. He was biased and prejudiced in his political opinions (against the democracies), violent both in thought and expression, therefore monotonous—there is hardly a king or a politician, whether pro- or anti-Macedonian, democrat or oligarch, or a whole people whom he does not accuse at length of luxury, drunkenness, and licentiousness; and his histories, or at least the *Philippika*, were swollen with monstrous digressions. In this he doubtless thought he was writing in the comprehensive manner of Herodotos; but he lacked the master's judgement both as artist and as historian. It is, however, to these digressions, and especially to the tenth book of the *Philippika*—τὰ περὶ τῶν Ἀθήνησι δημαγωγῶν—that we owe our few references by him to fifth-century history. He was familiar with Old Comedy (F. 94, 397), with political pamphlets (F. 86, from Kritias: see Jacoby), probably including Stesimbrotos, and with inscriptions (F. 154–5, the Kallias Treaty), or at least with some of them; he can show at times a minute learning

<sup>1</sup> For a general account, see Schwartz's article on him in Pauly-Wissowa, and G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus*, Cambridge, 1935.

<sup>2</sup> Not a biography of Philip, nor even necessarily a history in which the biographical element was to the fore (as Leo, p. 108), but a history of Greece at a time when it was dominated by one man. It recognizes his eminence, but need not write his life.

<sup>3</sup> There is no real reason to doubt this (Isokrates had many pupils). Jacoby (115 T. 1, Komm.) argues “das persönliche Schülerverhältnis wird unmöglich (115 T. 1, Komm.) argues “das persönliche Schülerverhältnis wird unmöglich durch das Selbstzeugnis T. 3 = F. 25 (*ουνακάσσαι δὲ λέγει αὐτὸς ἔαυτὸν Ἰσοκράτει τε τῷ Ἀθηναῖ καὶ Θεοδέκτῃ τῷ Φαστλήτῃ καὶ Ναυκράτει τῷ Ἐρύθραι, καὶ τούτους ἄμα αὐτῷ τὰ πρωτεῖα τῆς ἐν λόγου παιδείας ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησι*), wenn man in *ουνακάσσαι* nicht absichtliche Verschleierung sehen will”. But, since Theopompos was 58 years younger than Isokrates, there is in any case *Verschleierung* or something like it in *ουνακάσσαι*, if the text is correct. (Possibly *<παρ>* *Iοοκράτει [τε] τῷ Αθ.*, i.e. Theodektes and Naukrates were his fellow pupils in Isokrates' school? The next sentence, *ἀλλ' Ἰσοκράτην μέν, κ.τ.λ.*, suggests indeed that *τούτους* includes Isokrates, which would make this emendation less probable; but the suggestion may be false.)

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(F. 91, 95,<sup>1</sup> 387). Though he had, it seems, in essentials a conventional and commonplace mind, he took the unusual view of Athenian constitutional history. The ordinary democrat praised everything (Kleon is not just the vulgar demagogue in 4th-century orators); the moderate democrat, who thought he had said something profound when he ‘wanted liberty, not licence’, praised Kleisthenes and Aristeides, but not the subsequent development; the moderate oligarch disliked Kleisthenes but accepted Solon; the extremist hated all the popular leaders, and Theopompos seems to have taken this line—if so, he was the first learned man to do so.<sup>2</sup> That such an attitude, apparently novel and paradoxical but involving no deep thought, backed by real learning and vigorous presentation, should greatly influence contemporary and later writers is natural.<sup>3</sup> Kallisthenes (F. 16) accepted his opinion that there had been no Treaty of Kallias in 449, though Krateros later included the inscription in his collection. I believe we can get a fair idea of his work, in this section of the *Philippika*, from the summary in c. 24 of the *Constitution of Athens*: the ordinary oligarchic bias, the inclusion of Aristeides among the pernicious democrats—he was the honest conservative in the conventional view—the real but perverted learning (the sources include Thucydides and Aristophanes; a writer like Stesimbrotos may account for the responsibility being placed on Aristeides), the rhetorical exaggeration (*εὐπορία τροφῆς* on 2 obols

<sup>1</sup> Schol. Lucian, *Timon*, 30: ‘Υπέρβολος οὗτος, ὡς Ἀνδροτίων φησίν, Ἀντρίφανος ἦν Περιθολῆς. . . . Ἀνδροκίλης . . . ξένον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ βάρβαρον βούλεται . . . Πολύζηλος . . . Φρύγα αὐτὸν εἶναι φησιν . . . Πλάτων δὲ δ κωμικός . . . Λινδὸν . . . καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλως. ἔστι δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ Χρέμπτος, ὡς Θεόποιτος ἐν τῷ περὶ δημαγωγῶν. That is, probably, Theopompos rejected the ordinary abuse of orator and comic poet, but thought he had found out (as likely as not from another comedy) that Hyperbolos was not really the son of Antiphanes, his legal father (the official version, preserved in the *Attis* of Androton and now confirmed by the ostrakon of Hyperbolos: above, p. 34, n. 1), but of Chremes. With this and F. 96 contrast the sober, but not unbiased, account in Thucydides, viii. 73. 3; and cp. Stesimbrotos, F. 6, who said that two of Kimon's sons were illegitimate, and again the scholar, in this case Diodorus Periegetes, has preserved the correct—or at least the official—version (Plut. *Kim.* 16. 1; *Per.* 29. 2. Meyer, *Forschungen*, i. 49, thinks Stesimbrotos must be right, because he was nearly contemporary. What a tribute to the power of scandal!)

For F. 91 see Jacoby: Theopompos knew of another Thoukydides too, the son of Pantainetos, who had been in opposition to Perikles.

<sup>2</sup> It seems probable that the critics of Solon mentioned in *Aθην.* 6. 1–2, 9. 2, include Theopompos.

<sup>3</sup> Byron wrote of Mitford: “His great pleasure consists in praising tyrants, abusing Plutarch, spelling oddly and writing quaintly, and what is strange, after all, *his* is the best modern history of Greece in any language, and he is perhaps the best of all modern historians. Having named his sins, it is but fair to state his virtues—learning, labour, research, wrath and partiality. I call these latter virtues in a writer, because they make him write in earnest” (note to *Don Juan*, xii. 19).

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a day, and the flourish at the end: ἔτι δὲ πρυτανεῖον καὶ ὄρφανοι καὶ δεσμωτῶν φύλακες—all this bears the stamp of Theopompos.<sup>1</sup> So does c. 26. 1, κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τούτους συνέπεσε μηδ' ἡγεμόνα ἔχειν τὸν ἐπιεικεστέρους, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν προεστάναι Κίμωνα τὸν Μιλτιάδον, νωθρότερον<sup>2</sup> ὅντα καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὁψὲ προσελθόντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἐφθάρθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς κατὰ πόλεμον. τῆς γὰρ στρατείας γιγνομένης ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις ἐκ καταλόγου καὶ στρατηγῶν ἐφισταμένων ἀπέριων μὲν τὸν πολεμεῖν, τιμωμένων δὲ διὰ τὰς πατρικὰς δόξας, αἰεὶ συνέβανεν τῶν ἔξιόντων ἀνὰ δισοχιλίους ἢ τρισχιλίους ἀπόλληνθαι, ὥστε ἀναλογεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων. (Who were these generals, save Kimon and Perikles, particularly the former, son to Miltiades? To what campaigns were these exaggerated losses attributed?<sup>3</sup> Again I suspect Stesimbrotos to be an authority for Theopompos.) In later writers it is not always easy to detect Theopompos' influence; but we sometimes find his manner, and so perhaps his influence:

<sup>1</sup> I do not mean by this that we have evidence that this chapter is derived from Theopompos; but that, the *Constitution* being only a handbook, which shows no use of original sources (except Solon: see above, p. 42), written by a man who was not himself a historian, it is most probable that the author will have used and been influenced by recent important histories, and that the oligarchic bias and rhetorical style of the chapter are in the manner of Theopompos. 28. 3 on Kleon seems to be taken directly from him (see F. 92); and the account of Kleophon and Kallikrates and the διωβελία may be another instance (*κατέλυσε*, abolished the 2-obol dole, by turning it into 3 obols, is excellent rhetoric). There may have been other contemporary historians similar to Theopompos; but obviously he is the most likely to have influenced Aristotle. If the famous 'oligarchic pamphlet' of Theramenes was a source for Aristotle, it will have been through Theopompos (or some similar writer) that he knew of it.

For the date of the publication of the *Philipika*, see Jacoby, *Komm.*, p. 358, who shows that the first half of the book may have appeared as early as 340. The old idea that no part of it was published before 324, and it therefore could not have been used by Aristotle, has no evidence to support it; and in any case Theopompos was a ῥήτωρ as well as a historian and gave ἐμδελέεις all over the Greek world (see F. 25), and his excursus on the Athenian politicians, or some form of it, may have been known before the appearance of the *History*.

It is perhaps necessary to add that if Aristotle was greatly influenced by Theopompos, it does not necessarily follow that he could not be independent of him where he thought he had better evidence (for example, on Solon); he did not have to accept his authority throughout. Similarly I think that Plutarch, like other late writers, often reflects his way of writing (see below); but it does not follow that the *Aristeides* (as Uxkull thinks, p. 88) or the *Kimon* is based on him. I do not myself see Theopompos praising, almost unstintingly, Kleisthenes and the great Athenian empire builders.

<sup>2</sup> For the reading here, see Sandys. *νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὁψὲ προσελθόντα* makes no sense, quite apart from the historical mistake.

<sup>3</sup> The two failures to colonize near Eion in 475 and 465–464, under aristocratic leadership (see below, p. 391), and the Egyptian expedition, of the commanders of which we know nothing but where the losses must have been mainly among the thestes, are perhaps some excuse for the exaggeration. Cf. 100. 3, 104. 2, 106. 2nn.

Plutarch turns the first attempt at the colony into a success, and one of the peculiar glories of Kimon (*Kim.* 7. 3, 8. 2).

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see for instance Plutarch's narrative of the Harpalos affair (Theopompos gave some account of Harpalos, F. 253, 330, in his later writings): ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἀρπαλος μετὰ χρημάτων πολλῶν ἀποδρᾶς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας τῇ Ἀττικῇ προσέβαλε, καὶ τῶν εἰωθότων ἀπὸ τοῦ βῆματος χρηματίζεοθαί δρόμος ἦν καὶ ἄμιλλα φθειρομένων πρὸς αὐτὸν, τούτοις μὲν ἀπὸ πολλῶν μικρὰ δελεάζων προήκατο καὶ διέρριψε, τῷ δὲ Φωκίωνι, κ.τ.λ. (*Phok.* 21. 2); and καταφυγόντος δὲ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον αὐτοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτὸν παραδιδόντος, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ῥήτορες εὐθὺς ἐποφθαλμίσαντες πρὸς τὸν πλοῦτον ἔβοήθουν, καὶ συνέπειθον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους δέχεσθαι καὶ σώζειν τὸν ἱκέτην. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης, κ.τ.λ. (*Demos.* 25. 1).<sup>1</sup> The literary style is of course Plutarch's own; but the bias, the positiveness, and the rhetorical manner may be due to Theopompos. So may much in the first part of *Perikles*, in which Perikles is the demagogue (especially in c. 11), and one or two notable passages in *Nikias*, where even the style of some phrases may be his.<sup>2</sup> Ultimately due to Theopompos, that is: it was largely his writing that made this view of Athenian popular leaders conventional.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In the *Phokion*, we may note, Demosthenes is included in the tribe of politicians, which would be Theopompos' view.

<sup>2</sup> 2. 5–6, 11. 3 (Busolt, iii. 731. 4). The second of these passages is on Hyperbolos: cf. above, p. 47, n. 1. The interest Plutarch shows in ostracism (*Nik.* 11, *Arist.* 7, *Alkib.* 13) may be due to a learned discussion in Theopompos, though we must remember that the theme of Athens' ingratitude to her great men had become a commonplace; the anecdote in *Them.* 2. 8 might be from either of the pupils of Isokrates.

<sup>3</sup> That eminent scholars have disputed the authorship of the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* (ed. Grenfell and Hunt, Oxford, 1909: *F. Gr. Hist.* 66) between Ephorus and Theopompos, confidently attributing it to one or to the other, is only a measure of our lack of judgement or our ignorance. If we are entitled to judge from their scanty remains and from ancient criticism, these two men were of such contrary temper that we may be sure that a *History* which can be attributed to both was the work of neither. ("The Christ Church Van der Goes used to bear the label 'Rembrandt or Mantegna': and Pliny says of the group of Niobe's children that authorities differed whether it were by Praxiteles or Scopas. It was doubtless by neither; and the same may be said of several works which have been attributed now to the one and now to the other in modern times"—Beazley, *C.A.H.* vi. 538.) The *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* is not at all like either the superficial Ephorus or the rhetorical Theopompos. If it is argued that what remains of Ephorus and Theopompos (especially of the latter) is one-sided and misleading (as it may well be: the vagaries of later authors, the kind of things they were looking for in the classical writers, must always be kept in mind), and therefore that either might have been the author of the sober, accurate, quietly-written *Hellenika*, that means that Ephorus and Theopompos are but names to us; to say that the *Hellenika* is by one of them is equivalent to saying that it is by X—just as the old argument whether the Choiseul-Gouffier Apollo was by Pythagoras or Kalamis was equivalent to saying that it was by X, or at least by an X of the first half of the fifth century. To argue for Kratippus (*F. Gr. Hist.* 64) or Daimachos of Plataia (*F. Gr. Hist.* 65) is also to say that it is by X; for they certainly are only names to us. Of the former a

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Of Timaios of Tauromenion, who lived, it is said, 96 years (c. 352–256), nearly 50 of which he spent in Athens collecting his material, and who wrote an immense *Σικελικά*, from the earliest times to 264 B.C.,<sup>1</sup> little need be said. For all his business he was (as far as we know) a poor historian, much disliked by Polybios, and the few references in the fragments to fifth-century history, including the Athenian expeditions to Sicily in the Peloponnesian war, add hardly anything to our knowledge; though he upbraided all other writers for their inaccuracy, accuracy was not his strong point. He is of some importance as the probable source of many of Diodoros' chapters on Sicilian affairs; some of the detail in Plutarch's *Nikias* is from him; but he concerns us in the study of Thucydides hardly at all. As little need be said of other third-century writers (hardly historians), such as Douris of Samos and Idomeneus, whose works were used by Plutarch; nothing that we know of them suggests that they should be seriously regarded, at any rate for the history of the fifth century. Nor of Hermippus, and other Hellenistic biographers. Hermippus was thought highly of by Josephus, because he mentioned the Jews, and Dionysios of Halikarnassos speaks of his detailed knowledge of the orators; but in the main, the interest of these biographers for us lies mostly in the fact that Plutarch, though not uncritical, could take them seriously; something more therefore will be said of them below.

Far more both of the spirit and of the knowledge of Athens and Alexandria has survived in Strabo (c. 63 B.C. to A.D. 19) and Dionysios of Halikarnassos, *de Thuc.* 16—says that he οὐα-κράσσει Θουκυδῆη and wrote a continuation of his work, and Plutarch, *Mor. 345D*, confirms the second statement, with a list of notable events treated by him which date from 411 to 394, and implies the first. That is all we know; so he may be the author of the *Oxyrhynchia*, which was certainly written in the first half of the 4th century; but it means little to say so. (Schwartz, *Herm. xliv*, 1909, 496–502, prefers an arbitrary correction and interpretation of a corrupt passage in Marcellinus' *Life* of Thucydides to the definite statement of Dionysios, and then guesses that Kratippos was a fraudulent writer of the 3rd century, who pretended to belong to the first half of the 4th, but gave himself away badly by quoting a quite recent author. Jacoby strangely follows him. It is true that Dionysios is the first writer to mention him; but Stesimbrotos' pamphlet and Ion's memoirs are not quoted by any writer before Plutarch.) Of Daimachos we are told that an Alexandrine scholar said that Ephorus plagiarized whole chapters from him; and we can see from Diodoros that Ephorus almost certainly used the *Oxyrhynchia* as an authority for the events of 396 and 395 B.C. (but not that he plagiarized). That is all. The few quotations from Daimachos come in fact from mythology and (if it is the same Daimachos) from the story of the Seven Wise Men and a book on siege-craft; he may not have written a history of the early years of the 4th century at all, and Ephorus may have borrowed from him for quite a different period.

For a full discussion, see Bloch in *Ath. Studies*, 303–41, where will be found as well an interesting account of Ephorus and Theopompos.

<sup>1</sup> See Laqueur in *R.E.*, s.v.

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sios of Halikarnassos (in Rome from 30 to 8 B.C., when he finished his *Roman Antiquities*), both of whom had something of the scholar in them in an unscholarly age. The former has much historical material in his *Geography*, but little of it is from the fifth century; the latter, in regard to Thucydides, was a literary critic (in some things a shrewd, though not a profound one), and his own effort at history is a revealing commentary on his criticism of Thucydides as a historian.<sup>1</sup>

With Nepos (contemporary with Strabo) and Justin's epitome of Trogus (Trogus belonged to the first century A.D.; the epitome was made probably in the third) we are fortunately not much concerned. They may preserve a detail or two which go back ultimately to a good source; but they are so meagre, so entirely derivative—so many historians and scribblers had written and copied and epitomized—and so inaccurate at that, that they are, for the fifth century, scarcely worth analysis. Nepos indeed appears to use Thucydides directly in the *Themistocles* and *Pausanias*, that is, the one passage in which Thucydides tells a picturesque story, and this with a characteristic addition—the anecdote of Pausanias' mother—which is not in the historian.<sup>2</sup> How Thucydides would have despised him for the selection. Nor would he have been flattered at finding himself coupled with Theopompos and Timaios, *tres gravissimi historici*, who lauded Alkibiades with the highest praise (*Alc. II. 2–6*). Nepos' own pretensions to learning and sense do not add to our respect for him (*praef.*, and *Alcib. 2. 3*, especially the latter: 'multa delicate iocoseque fecit: quae referremus, nisi maiora potiora haberemus').

Diodoros of Sicily is (alas!) of importance because, by a singular chance,<sup>3</sup> his narrative of the years between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars is, with the exception of Thucydides' own brief essay, the only one that has come down to us. He was contemporary with Strabo, Dionysios of Halikarnassos, and Didymos; but he had very little of their learning. He was a compiler only, and his method of

<sup>1</sup> For his work as critic see now S. F. Bonner's book (Cambridge, 1939), which contains as well a full bibliography; the chapter on Dionysios' criticism of Thucydides is a valuable one; his scholarship is only incidentally discussed.

<sup>2</sup> It is worth noting *Paus. 3. 1–7* as a warning: it is narrative taken from Thucydides, i. 131–2, directly or indirectly, with two explanatory sentences—'licet enim legibus eorum cuivis ephoro hoc facere regi', and 'est genus quoddam hominum, quod Hilotae vocatur', etc. If we only had a quotation from Thucydides in summary form, it would certainly be assumed that both these explanations come from Nepos himself—part of his learning—or his immediate source, or possibly that both were in Thucydides (note the present tense in both). In fact we know that one is Thucydides, the other Nepos.

<sup>3</sup> Singular, not so much because he was so incompetent, as because he was so little regarded in antiquity (Pliny the Elder, characteristically, is the only writer even to mention his name before the 6th century) that it is surprising that so much of his book has been preserved.

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the simplest: he was writing a *Universal History*, from the beginning of things to Caesar's Gallic wars, and for different periods and places he took a single author and boiled down his narrative, for example Ephoros for the fifth and the first half of the fourth century in Greece proper, Timaios and perhaps Theopompos for Sicilian affairs, someone else for Rome; there is no evidence that he ever thought of comparing one authority with another, not even Ephoros with Thucydides for the Peloponnesian war.<sup>1</sup> It follows, therefore, that his value depends entirely on that of the historian he is following, and on the presence or absence of other authorities. For the Peloponnesian war he is of no value (except to show how Ephoros narrated it); for the history of the old Greek states from 330 to 294 (for the subsequent periods his work is lost), where he used Hieronymos of Kardia, and in the absence of all other continuous narrative, he is very valuable; but for the Pentekontaëtia, where we need so much help, Ephoros was nothing like so good an authority. Besides, Diodorus did one thing of his own: he took the chronological tables, in which the Athenian archons had long been equated with the Olympiads and, more recently, with the Roman consuls, and cut up his narrative accordingly—every event is dated. But he did this on so childish a principle and applied even this principle so carelessly, that he is more of a hindrance to truth than a help.<sup>2</sup> Ephoros had grouped a series of events in a consecutive narrative; one series followed another, though they overlapped in time; and he had, in all probability, taken no great care to be exact in the chronology. Diodorus kept the groups, and dated them, consecutively; so that often a series of events covering several years is dated to one year,<sup>3</sup> and events in Sicily will follow events in Greece though in fact they were contemporary. It is impossible to believe that Ephoros, who had Thucydides before him, can, like Diodorus, have dated τὰ Κερκυραϊκά to 439–435 and τὰ Ποτειδαϊκά to 435–431, though he may have been vague about the dates. These dates given by Diodorus are the test of his value; no one would suppose from them, or from his narrative of the events, that Thucydides is his ultimate authority.<sup>4</sup> And two of his efforts, though they have often been

<sup>1</sup> For a good analysis of one part of his history (4th century) see Hammond's recent articles: *C.Q.* xxxi, 1937, 79–91; xxxii, 1938, 137–51; *J.H.S.* lvii, 1937, 44–78.

<sup>2</sup> For the inevitable inconvenience of the method itself of equating Roman consuls and Athenian archons, even in competent hands, and some of its consequences in Diodorus, see above, pp. 4–5.

<sup>3</sup> In the instance given above, p. 5, the Samian revolt, he not only puts in one year (441) the war with Athens which took place in two archonships (441–440 and 440–439); so that if it took place within one consular year, it must have been not 441 but 440, but the quarrel between Miletos and Samos which preceded it, as well.

<sup>4</sup> In xii. 37. 2 Diodorus gives his brief reference to Thucydides' *History*, as he did for Ephoros and others, explaining the ground they covered. Of Thucydides

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told, may be told again, to show what he was capable of in applying his method. First: he gives the conventional ten years for the duration of the Helot war, but puts the beginning in 469–468 and its end in 456–455, perhaps simply following different authorities. Second: he had reason to believe (or thought he had) both that Archidamos of Sparta succeeded in 476–475 and that he ruled for forty-two years, so he places his death among the events of 434–433—which does not prevent him from copying out from Ephoros the part he played in the Peloponnesian war in 431 and 429.<sup>1</sup> That is what happened when Diodorus did some work on his own. Yet some of his dates are correct, as the foundation of Amphipolis and (with the proviso mentioned above, pp. 4–5) those of the Peloponnesian war; others may very well be, as Tanagra and Oinophyta (above, p. 5);<sup>2</sup> but it is obvious that normally we need more than his authority to trust them, and when there is difficulty or doubt his evidence is of very little value.<sup>3</sup> We have indeed been scurvyly treated in the history of the Pentekontaëtia: Hellanikos' work was 'brief and inaccurate in its chronology'; Thucydides' own attempt is also brief and (though in a different sense) τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβέστερος; Ephoros' narrative, probably not very good, would have been something, but we have it only as it appears in Diodorus; only a few accurate dates survive from the *Atthis*.<sup>4</sup> It need not be added that for the

he just says that his work covers the first 22 years of the war; perhaps he did not know that it included a detailed account of 435–432 B.C. as well.

<sup>1</sup> For possible explanations of these errors, see below, pp. 404–7.

<sup>2</sup> And of course those in other sections of his history where he was following a good authority who also was careful in his chronology. If Thucydides had been lost, we should have had to rely for the main events of the Peloponnesian war on Diodorus. A sobering thought!

<sup>3</sup> The worthlessness of Diodorus as an independent authority for the chronology of the 5th century has often been demonstrated since Clinton (*Fasti Hellen.* ii. 315–17); the necessary task of demonstrating it afresh has recently been done by Kolbe (*Herm.* lxxii, 1937, 241–60).

<sup>4</sup> One date in particular, that of Aristeides' death in 468–467, is worth noting here. It depends on two pieces of evidence, that of Diodorus xi. 54–8 (471–470 B.C.) on the flight of Themistocles, and Nepos, *Arist.* 3. 3: 'decessit fere post annum quantum quam Themistocles Athenis erat expulsus.' But (1) Diodorus puts under this archonship everything that happened to Themistokles from a first unsuccessful prosecution for treason to his death, including his ostracism, his second prosecution and pursuit by the Athenians and Spartans, and his flight to Persia; and (2) Nepos' statement, apart from the vagueness of *expulsus* (the ostracism or the flight to Persia?), is not perhaps of any more value than his previous one that Aristeides returned to Athens five years after his ostracism (i. 5). Diodorus, even he, does not mean that Themistokles died in the same year as his first prosecution; but he does not say which of the many events belongs to the year 471–470; and it is idle to argue that he probably preserves the year of the ostracism because that, being for a fixed term, must have been dated, or the year of the expulsion because the decree summoning him to appear for trial was preserved (with the mover's, or the nominated prosecutor's name, *Plut. Them.*

## INTRODUCTION

Peloponnesian war we can hardly look to Diodoros to supplement the narrative of Thucydides.

Much the most important to us as well as the best of the later writers is Plutarch: of all the Greeks one of the easiest to enjoy and appreciate as a writer, but perhaps the most difficult of all for the historian who must extract and assess his historical material. A somewhat longer discussion of his writings than of others is therefore necessary; the more so as it will include something about the others, for Plutarch is often our source for them.

He was a man of sense and taste, cultivated, very widely read, but not in the strict sense a learned man, not a scholar, though accounted a great one in his day. He came after the great age of learning and research, a century after its end; he knew a good deal of its work, but could not appreciate its methods. Not unnaturally: for one thing, though the learned men of the third and second centuries B.C. had collected and sifted a great mass of historical material (work continued by Didymos in the first century), they had produced no scientific historians of the past, no men who, by learning, method, and historical judgement (a rare enough combination at any time), had produced a scientific history of classical Greece which would determine the outlook of future ages. Plutarch himself belonged, as it were, to the eighteenth century of Greece (which was not to be followed by any scientific nineteenth and twentieth centuries), well-read, re-interpreting the traditional material of a *classical age*;<sup>1</sup> and it was the eighteenth century which appreciated him best. Only Hirzel of modern scholars has rightly judged him, partly because he was himself so well read in those authors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with whom Plutarch was almost the favourite Greek author.<sup>2</sup>

He was not a historian, but a biographer; and not a biographer in the strict, or at least not in the fullest sense, but an essayist. His aim was not to describe a man's career, still less to give him his place in history, although all his heroes were statesmen or so he regarded them; he had no desire to describe the origins of a man's policy, nor its effects, other than the most immediate, on subsequent

23. 1). All we can say is that since in the spring of 472, when the *Persae* was produced with its reference to Themistokles' ruse at Salamis, he was probably not then a man convicted of treason, and since our other evidence is confused (see below, pp. 397 ff.), 471–470 may be the correct year for the ostracism or the prosecution or the arrival in Persia, and Nepos' 'three years after the expulsion' (whatever the expulsion means) may by chance be correct; and even so we are not arrived at the year 468–467 for Aristeides' death. Diodoros and Nepos together are not worth more than that. (Nothing is gained by adding to this the story of Aristeides and the *Seven Against Thebes*, as Busolt, iii. 113 n.)

<sup>1</sup> Above, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Leipzig, 1912 (in the series *Das Erbe der Alten*), a most admirable book.

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history. He wanted to get at the truth about his *character*, especially as a public man; he asks his readers not to cavil if he passes briefly over great deeds, well known and not so indicative of character perhaps as trifles may be: τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρον τοῦ βασιλέως βίον καὶ τὸν Καισάρος ὑφ' οὐδὲ κατελύθη Πομπήιος ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ γράφοντες, διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὑποκειμένων πρᾶξεων οὐδὲν ἀλλο προεροῦμεν ἡ παραιτησόμεθα τοὺς ἀναγνωσκούτας, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα μηδὲ καθ' ἔκαστον ἐξειργασμένως τι τῶν περιβοήτων ἀπαγγέλλωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτέμνοντες τὰ πλεῖστα, μὴ συκοφαντεῖν. οὕτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους, οὕτε τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας πρᾶξεσι πάντας ἔνεστι δήλωσις ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα βραχὺ πολλάκις καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ παιδιά τις ἔμφασιν ἦθους ἐποίησε μᾶλλον ἢ μάχαι μυριόνεκροι καὶ παρατάξεις αἱ μέγισται καὶ πολιορκίαι πόλεων. ὕσπερ οὖν οἱ ζωγράφοι τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἰδῶν οἰς ἔμφανται τὸ ἥθος ἀναλαμβάνονται, ἐλάχιστα τῶν λοιπῶν μερῶν φροντίζοντες, οὕτως ἡμῖν δοτέον εἰς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα μᾶλλον ἐνδύσθαι καὶ διὰ τούτων εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἔκαστον βίον, ἔάσαντας ἐτέροις τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἄγνωτους (Alex. 1; cf. Cat. Mai. 7. 3). It was for others to write detailed narrative history (*οἱ τὰς διεξοδικὰς γράψαντες ἱστορίας*, whom he cites in a summary of Hannibal's tactics at Cannae, *Fab.* 16. 6); he was only concerned with a man's character, as it showed itself in his deeds and in varying fortune (τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἔκαστα τῶν γενομένων ἀπαγγέλλειν ἀκριβῶς τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας ἔστιν, ὅσα δὲ ἀξια λόγου τοὺς τῶν Καισάρων ἔργους καὶ πάθεοι συμπέπτωκεν, οὐδὲ ἐμοὶ προσήκει παρελθεῖν: *Galb.* 2. 3)—though he was not in the least pedantic, and if he came across something of special interest, such as Hannibal's tactics at Cannae, which do not at all illustrate the character of Fabius, he would include it.<sup>1</sup> He was primarily an essayist whose principal interest was character and moral conduct, as it had been all his life;<sup>2</sup> one, however, with an inexhaustible interest in history, and a deep admiration for the classical past of Greece and Rome.<sup>3</sup> ἐμοὶ μὲν τῆς τῶν βίων ἄκασθαι μὲν γραφῆς συνέβη δι' ἐτέρους, ἐπιμένει δὲ καὶ φιλοχωρεῖν ἥδη καὶ δι' ἐμαυτόν, ὕσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώμενον ἀμῶς γέ πως κοσμεῖν καὶ ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον (*Timol.* 1. 1). When he wrote in *de cohibenda ira*, ὕσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ Φιλίππου τις εἶπε κατα-

<sup>1</sup> In *Aem. Paull.* 8–9 we have a rare instance of Plutarch giving a brief summary of past history (of the Antigonids, not of Aemilius) to show the historical background.

<sup>2</sup> It is generally thought that the *Lives* are among the latest of Plutarch's writings (as some of them certainly are), and that all were written within a comparatively short period of time (e.g. A.D. 105–15: see Schmidt-Stählin, ii. 519–20). There is little evidence of this; and much to suggest that they were written at more widely different times.

<sup>3</sup> It is characteristic of him that he knows the difference between the 'historical' and the 'mythical' periods roughly, but will yet attempt the *Lives* of Theseus and Romulus, Lykourgos and Numa, with the indulgence of his readers (*Thes.* 1).

σκάψαντος "Ολυνθον "ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνοικίσαι γε πόλιν ἐκεῖνος δύναυτο τηλικαύτην", οὕτως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν θυμόν "ἀνατρέψαι μὲν δύνασαι καὶ διαφθεῖραι καὶ καταβαλεῖν, ἀναστῆσαι δὲ καὶ σῶσαι καὶ φείσασθαι καὶ καρτερῆσαι πρᾶστρός ἔστι καὶ συγγνώμης καὶ μετριωπαθείας, καὶ Καμίλλου καὶ Μετέλλου καὶ Ἀριστείδου καὶ Σωκράτους· τὸ δ' ἔμφυναι καὶ δακεῖν μυρμηκῶδες καὶ μυῶδες" (*Mor.* 458 c), he had in mind the material for the *Lives*, if not the *Lives* themselves; when he wrote the introduction to his *Perikles and Fabius*, he was thinking in the terms of one of his essays.<sup>1</sup> It follows from this that not only does he not give a history of the times in which his heroes lived, nor attempt to assess the historical importance of their deeds, but that he is not interested as such in the order of events of their lives, except in the broadest outline, as in the distinction between youth and prime of life (especially in *Alkibiades* and *Demetrios*), or when he thinks there are two markedly different stages in a career (as in *Perikles*); still less in the accurate dating of events.<sup>2</sup> Since he is writing *Lives*, showing men's characters by their deeds (*Demos*. 11. 7; *Pomp.* 8. 6, etc.), not simply analysing character, his narratives are in general, from the nature of things, in chronological order, from the cradle to the grave;<sup>3</sup> but he is not primarily concerned with this,

<sup>1</sup> He had also a practical aim, hoping that his essays would not only throw light on the virtues and weaknesses of the human character, but would help others to act well. In the same way he thought that the study of the great lives of the past would increase the desire and the capacity for virtue, at least in himself *τῷ ιστορήσαντι*, hopefully also in others (*Timol.* 1. 1; *Per.* 1-2). This does not mean, I am sure, that he hoped his youthful readers would actually emulate the great deeds of a Perikles or a Caesar—he was not so ignorant of the difference in political conditions between the past and his own day (*Mor.* 814 A-C; but cf. also *Arat.* 1. 3). Hirzel, p. 56.

I may add that Weizsäcker's distinction: "Plutarch als 'Künstler' zu sehen und sein moralisches Interesse nur als 'Nebenzweck' zu werten (Leo, p. 148), diese Haltung Leos wird heute niemand mehr teilen" (p. 1), is a false dichotomy. Plutarch was an artist whose *material*, his subject-matter, was primarily human character and conduct.

<sup>2</sup> When he does give a figure, which is very rarely, as Perikles' 40 years as leading politician and 15 of these in sole eminence (16. 3), it is not to say, his political career lasted from 468 to 429 and his akme from 443 to 429, but only to emphasize the length of his career and hence, in this context, his many opportunities of self-enrichment. So in *Arist.* 8. 1, *τρίτῳ ἔτει*: it is the answer to his prayer (7. 8)—"within three years he was back in Athens". In *Them.* 5. 5 he quotes a date, the archonship of Adeimantos (476 B.C.), in a context which suggests in itself one earlier than the Persian wars (see esp. 5. 7 fin.); in *Kim.* 8. 8, he quotes another, without, however, any reference to a stage in *Kimon's* career.

<sup>3</sup> Leo, pp. 183-5. Leo's distinction in kind, and hence in origin, between a Plutarchian *Life* and such a *Machwerk* as the *Vit. X Oratorum* or *Diogenes Laertios* (pp. 179-83), seems to me to have no basis; the latter is lifeless and badly done, and there is nothing else to it.

Ordinary panegyrics as well, such as Isokrates' *Euagoras*, Xenophon's *Agesilaos*, presumably Theopompos' *Maussollos*, observe, naturally enough, a rough chronological order (cf. *Cic. de orat.* ii. 341-2).

and if an event is, for his purpose, worth mentioning out of chronological order (but in 'ethical' order), he will do so, generally without any note of time. And not in any case being interested in chronology, he is quite carefree about it, and often unconscious of problems raised by his own narrative: as, if Kimon was recalled within five years of his ostracism, what was he doing between 457 and 450 B.C. (both *Kim.* 17. 8-18. 1 and *Per.* 10)? and what was Perikles' foreign policy between the overthrow of the Areiopagos and his expedition to the Corinthian Gulf?<sup>1</sup> His silence in these cases is due to lack of knowledge: he knew nothing about Kimon and Perikles in these periods and he does not invent; but he seems unaware of the gaps.<sup>2</sup> We, however, desperately want history from him, particularly chronology; and we look in vain, and often quite mistakenly criticize him for not doing what he did not set out to do.

German scholars use the terms *das eidologische* and *das chronographische* for two separate elements in Plutarch's *Lives*: the latter for narrative of the hero's *πράξεις* in chronological order, the former for sections containing deeds or sayings which illustrate his character and are in no chronological relation to each other or to the *πράξεις* just narrated, or at most belong to a particular period of the life where the period is significant (*periodal-eidologisches*)—deeds and sayings which are 'timeless', as it were, within the limits of the life or the period. The distinction is too rigid and schematic for Plutarch, who throughout is illustrating character even when narrating deeds, and who was too good an artist to write *Lives* that can be thus divided into sections; who knew that a man's *eidos* is seen in his actions—in a sense it is always, if not growing and developing, at least 'happening';<sup>3</sup> but for all that it is a useful one for the historian, when he has to look for Plutarch's help in chronological problems. Take two instances: in *Per.* 18. 1 he says that Perikles' reputation as a military commander rested chiefly on his caution—*ἀεὶ λέγων πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ὡς ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῷ μενοῦσιν ἀθάνατοι πάντα τὸν χρόνον*,<sup>4</sup> to illustrate this, he mentions his warning against Tolmides' arrangements for the campaign against Boeotia which ended so fatally at Koroneia; then, c. 19, he goes on to mention Perikles' most popular and his most famous *strategiae* (in the Chersonese and to the Corinthian Gulf). This does not mean that he thought that Koroneia was earlier than the other two, nor that the Chersonese expedition preceded the one to the Gulf: the whole passage is not

<sup>1</sup> See below, pp. 306-7.

<sup>2</sup> This inexactitude is something quite different from definite errors, such as *Kim.* 16. 8-17. 3 (below, p. 411, n. 1), or *Lys.* 14. 1-4 (below, p. 58).

<sup>3</sup> Weizsäcker, to whose analysis of *Perikles* I owe much, has brought this out well. See esp. pp. 71-2 on the difference between Plutarch and Suetonius.

<sup>4</sup> It is interesting to note, however, that his other saying with this same intent is given in its chronological setting (38. 4).

'chronographic'; and he gives us no help in dates at all—each of the campaigns might belong to any stage of Perikles' career.<sup>1</sup> In 22. 1, on the other hand, he is definitely misleading—he misunderstood or forgot the connexion of events: 'The event proved how right Perikles was to concentrate the Athenian forces for defence against Sparta.'<sup>1</sup> πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ Εὐβοεῖς ἀπέστησαν, κ.τ.λ.—as though there had been no connexion between the Boeotian victory at Koroneia and the revolt of Euboea. An interesting second instance is *Lysandros*, 14–15: this is 'chronographic', a narrative of the surrender of Athens; in it Plutarch makes a definite mistake by putting the surrender of Samos before that of Athens. It is followed by Lysandros' determination to change the Athenian constitution, accompanied by a threat, 'because the peace-terms had not been carried out'; ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ προτεθῆναι φασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὑπὲρ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ γνώμην ἐν τοῖς συμμάχοις, ὅτε καὶ τὸν Θηβαῖον Ἑρίανθον εἰσηγήσασθαι τὸ μὲν ἄστυ κατασκάψαι, τὴν δὲ χώραν ἀνέναι μηλόβοτον. εἴτε μέντοι συνονοίσας γενομένης τῶν ἡγεμόνων, κ.τ.λ. This does not necessarily mean that Plutarch thought a second conference on the fate of Athens took place after its surrender, and there is no need to suppose that he followed any but the accepted view that there was but one (to which he has but briefly referred, 14. 6);<sup>2</sup> he is only pointing back, to illustrate a point in Lysandros' character, a very usual way with him—but he gives no clear indication that he is doing so. I may mention a third instance, for Weizsäcker (pp. 14–15, 75) has, I think, misinterpreted—*Per.* 36: this is not an excursus, with a chronological confusion (when did Perikles' sons die, before or after his dismissal?), but an excellent example of Plutarch's method—the narrative is not to be distinguished from the 'eidology' (here 'period-eidology'); the two sons died about this time, and it does not in the least matter, for his purpose, whether this was before or after the political event told in 35. 4–5.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to his indifference to our desire for an accurate chronology (he thought of course that those of his readers who needed it would have dated histories on their shelves), Plutarch had two serious weaknesses: inability to value his authorities, and no insight into the political conditions of the classical age, particularly

<sup>1</sup> See below, pp. 376–80.

<sup>2</sup> As Smits thinks, in his note *ad loc.*  
<sup>3</sup> Not that Plutarch was not aware of some chronological problems: *Them.* 2. 5 (a mistake by Stesimbrotos; he does not note that another statement by Stesimbrotos, 4. 5, must also be wrong if his own account of Themistokles' age at his death, 31. 6, is correct), and 27. 1–2 (see below, pp. 398–9); *Per.* 27. 4. In *Solon* 27. 1 he is scornful of pedantic chronological standards, and will tell the story of Solon and Croesus in spite of everybody; but he had some reason here—Greek dating of Lydian and Persian kings was by no means sure and precise. He was also very sceptical, as he had no right to be, of the value of Hippias' *Olympic Victors* (*Num.* 1 fin.).

of Greece. For the first of these: it is not that Plutarch is blindly credulous; on the contrary he can criticize many writers and is sceptical of much that he reads, contemporary and later writers in general (*Per.* 13. 16), Andokides (*Them.* 32. 4), Idomeneus (*Per.* 10. 7), even Theopompos (*Lys.* 30. 2), Krateros (*Arist.* 26: a very good instance), and he knows he can trust Thucydides. But this is due simply to his good sense; he has no scientific appreciation of the difference between first-hand and second- or third-hand authorities, and between the scholar and the man of letters, a learned man and an amusing writer: he refers to many an author of little or no importance with great respect; and when he quotes from a man of some learning, as Theophrastos or Demetrios of Phaleron, it is as likely as not from some philosophical essay or dialogue, not from a historical work (*Arist.* 1. 2, 25. 2). In *Per.* 28. 2–3 he writes Δούρις δ' ὁ Σάμιος τούτοις ἐπιτραγῳδεῖ πολλὴν ὥμοτητα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοῦ Περικλέους κατηγορῶν, ἦν οὐτέ Θουκιδίδης ἱστόρηκεν οὔτ' Ἔφορος οὔτ' Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀληθεύειν ἔουκεν, ὡς ἄρα, κ.τ.λ. . . Δούρις μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ ὅπου μηδὲν αὐτῷ πρόσεστον ἴδιον πάθος εἰωθὼς κρατεῖν τὴν διηγησιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, μᾶλλον ἔουκεν ἐνταῦθα δεινῶσαι τὰς τῆς πατρίδος συμφορὰς ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. This is sound judgement, but not the judgement of a scientist; he does not raise the question, what evidence in any case had Douris for the fifth century? Has he any independent value? Granted that this story of Athenian ferocity is untrue, is it fifth-century scandal or only a myth of 300 B.C.? Nor does he seem to see that the silence of Ephoros, though of some significance, has not the same value as that of Thucydides.<sup>1</sup> So in *Nikias*, 28. 5 he leaves a question (an unimportant one) open as between Thucydides and Philistos on the one hand and Timaios on the other; he should have known that Timaios (whom he did not specially admire), unless he had some independent contemporary evidence, was of no value against the other two.<sup>2</sup>

For the second weakness: "he had the political temper of the age of Trajan." How could Plutarch, born in a small town in a politically unimportant province of an empire comprising the whole civilized world that was known to him—elaborately organized, ruled by a careful bureaucracy and an autocratic prince, enjoying a profound

<sup>1</sup> He mentions Ephoros and Aristotle here, for they have just been quoted for details of the Samian war that are not in Thucydides (26. 3, 27. 3); and he might argue that the latter has not told the story of the war at great length. But he does much the same thing elsewhere, as we shall see; and the detail that he has quoted from Ephoros should have made him doubt his value; for he adds the refutation of the absurd story by Herakleides Pontikos.

<sup>2</sup> The best-known instance in which Plutarch puts good and bad authorities side by side, without any attempt at discrimination, is *Them.* 27. 1; the most remarkable is *Alex.* 46.

## INTRODUCTION

peace—how could he understand the political conditions of the Greek states in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.? That would have required a learning and a historical insight such as he could lay no claim to. Indeed it is doubtful if any age has properly appreciated one with an outlook radically different from its own; the eighteenth century, which knew, as Plutarch did not, what was meant by government by discussion, but did not know democracy, understood republican Rome but not Greece. So, instead of the political life in democratic Athens, the *ekklesia*, the fierce speeches, the intrigues, the prosecutions of public men, the endless talk, we have only a conventionalized picture of good conservatives and bad demagogues: the one all *σωφροσύνη*, honest, hoplite, popular with allies, pro-Spartan, the other all *ἀκολασία*, tricky, trusting to the navy, imperialist and oppressive, anti-Spartan—this is the background of Plutarch's Athenian statesmen and largely his portrait of the statesmen themselves.<sup>1</sup> It is a conventional picture which owes ultimately as much to the profound analysis of Plato as to the superficial orations of Isokrates and the histories of his pupils; but it has become so generalized that all of Plato has vanished, only Isokrates is left, and he as read by generations of men who had had no experience of the political life of which he had at least some personal knowledge, though he was not capable of understanding it. This again affects Plutarch's judgement of his sources. To take another instance from *Perikles* (13. 15–16): δεξάμενοι δὲ τὸν λόγον οἱ κωμικοὶ πολλὴν ἀσέλγειαν αὐτοῦ κατεσκέδασαν . . . καὶ τί ἄν τις ἀνθρώπους στυρικοὺς τοῖς βίοις<sup>2</sup> καὶ τὰς κατὰ τῶν κρειττόνων βλασφημίας ὥσπερ δαιμονὶ κακῷ τῷ φθόνῳ τῶν πολλῶν ἀποθνόντας ἔκαστοτε θαυμάσειν, ὅπου καὶ Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος δεινὸν ἀσέβημα καὶ μυθῶδες ἔξενεγκεῦν ἐτόλμησεν εἰς τὴν γυναικα τοῦ νιοῦ κατὰ τοῦ Περικλέους; οὕτως ἔοικε πάντῃ χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ δυσθήρατον ἱστορίᾳ τάλαθές, ὅταν οἱ μὲν νοτερον γεγονότες τὸν χρόνον ἔχωσιν ἐπιπροσθοῦντα τῇ γνώσει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν βίων ἡλικιῶτις ἱστορίᾳ τὰ μὲν φθόνοις καὶ δυσμενεῖαις τὰ δὲ χαριζομένη καὶ κολακεύοντα λυμανῆται καὶ διαστρέψῃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Nothing could show more clearly Plutarch's conscientiousness and his modesty—his awareness of difficulties; but his difficulty here is due to the fact that he did not know what political pamphlets and (still more) what political comedy meant in fifth-century Athens. They were so remote, so completely outside his own political experience, that he can only be shocked and distrustful (as here) or accept their statements implicitly (24. 1, 25. 1) or gravely discuss their evidence (30. 4–31. 2). The last sentence

<sup>1</sup> A simple instance of a statement based on such a conventional picture is *Kim.* 15. 2—the Areopagos was deprived of τὰ πάτρια νόμου by Ephialtes and Perikles. Diodoros, xi. 77. 6, has the same. Contrast Aristotle, *Aθη.* 25. 2.

<sup>2</sup> This is very likely based on stories of Kratinos' dissolute life.

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quoted above (ἥ δὲ τῶν πράξεων, κ.τ.λ.) would be relevant to historians of the calibre of Philistos, Theopompos, and Kallisthenes, and to many who recorded contemporary events in the third and second centuries, but not at all to Stesimbrotos and the poets of comedy, who were not writing ἡλικιῶτις ἱστορία. (Technically, it is wrong that Stesimbrotos should find a place among the *Fragments of Greek Historians*.) If we possessed his essay, πῶς κρινοῦμεν τὴν ἀληθῆ ἱστορίαν, Plutarch's attitude would perhaps be clearer; but it should be clear enough from his practice.

A summary analysis of the *Perikles* and a comparison of the other *Lives* which directly concern us will further illustrate these three problems—Plutarch's attitude to chronology, his judgement of earlier writers, and his political outlook. The *Themistokles* is almost pure narrative, divided into two sections, (1) to the close of the Persian wars (cc. 1–17), and (2) from 479 to his death (19–31; 32 on his descendants and his tomb); these are separated, at his *akme*, by a chapter of anecdotes, which as such are timeless, taken from τὰ ἀπομνημονεύμενα, his recorded apophthegms<sup>1</sup> (intended to illustrate his φιλοτιμία, though in fact they show rather his vanity, τὸ μικροφιλότιμον, and his wit; his φιλοτιμία was shown by anecdotes recorded earlier, as 3. 4). In this case narrative biography admirably fits with Plutarch's aim; for everything Themistokles did, both great and small, illustrates his remarkable, complex, but yet simply drawn, character, which for Plutarch is all high lights and darkness; and there was much material, full of interest if somewhat monotonous in tone.<sup>2</sup> His practice in quoting from his sources and his attitude to the primary authorities can be clearly seen. Normally he does not quote anyone for what is *Gemeingut*, the traditional narrative; in 7. 5–9. 2 (Artemision) he quotes Herodotos for what is personal to Themistokles (but incompletely: he is here very complimentary to his hero), Phanias for an additional detail, Pindar (very aptly), and finally the official epigram. Nothing could be better. From there to the end of c. 16 (Salamis), Herodotos is not quoted; where there are variations from his narrative, authority is not always given (11. 3–5—varied on purpose by Plutarch himself, or because Herodotos' anti-Corinthian bias had long been discounted?—12. 4 τὴν περὶ τὸν Σίκινον πραγμάτειαν, the well-known manoeuvre, 15. 2–3, 16. 2–4, 5—these last are very marked; and the emphasis on Themistokles' part at Salamis, 14. 3, 15. 4); for additions, others are sometimes cited (10. 6, 13. 1–5), sometimes not (11. 6, 12. 1 λέγεται).

<sup>1</sup> See below, pp. 78–9.

<sup>2</sup> There is one unexplained exception, the retort to Simonides (5. 6), which is worthy of Aristides. It occurs elsewhere in Plutarch, in the *Apophthegmata* (185 C), in *de virtuoso pudore* (534 E), and, more interestingly, in the *praec. reip. ger.* (807 B) together with the saying of contrary import which is also given in *Arist.* 2. 5.

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In 17. 1 Herodotus is quoted, and 17. 1-3 followed; 17. 4 is an addition (*λέγεται*), not from Herodotus. In 21. 1-2 he is quoted again, this time with an anti-Themistokles bias which Plutarch shares: Themistokles is *τοὺς συμμάχους ἐπαχθῆς* in accordance with the tradition that all democratic imperialists were oppressive; then follow the long and interesting quotations from Timokreon. In the last part of the *Life* Thucydides is the primary authority, and he is sometimes concealed among *οἱ πλεῖστοι* or *ἔνιοι* as though he were of no special value (19. 1, 29. 11, 24. 5). In 23-5 (the flight of Themistokles) he is followed, and once quoted (25. 2); details are added (credible, 23. 1, not so credible, 24. 1) without authority given, Stesimbrots, Theopompos, and Theophrastos (from an essay) quoted for more or less credible variations. Then 26 and 28-9 many stories of Themistokles in Asia: practically nothing from Thucydides, and no other writer cited; in 27. 1 we have the list of different authorities on the problem whether Themistokles met Xerxes or Artaxerxes (with the notably just remark, 'chronology seems to support Thucydides, though even on his view it is not clear'), then Phanias and Eratosthenes (from an essay) quoted for anecdotes not in Thucydides. Finally, in 31 we have a panegyric and an account of his death; in 32 the rejection of some stories in Andokides and Phylarchos, and a careful citation of the reliable Diodoros Periegetes. Had we only the *Themistokles*, or had we always the primary sources for the main narrative, we should have a good opinion of Plutarch's learning and not a bad one of his judgement.

The *Aristeides* is interesting in comparison: there is 'eidology' early on (2-4, 6), to show Aristeides in all respects the honest man, the opposite of Themistokles, white where the latter is black; in c. 5, Marathon, well told to show his part in the battle, 7-9 from the ostracism to Salamis, also 'narrative eidology'. But from c. 10 to c. 21 we have almost pure narrative of events, in which Aristeides really plays but a small and not very characteristic part—the ordinary, accepted narrative of the war from Mardonios' embassy to Athens to the Plataia campaign, based of course on Herodotus, but not in his order and with some criticism of him and some additions and embellishments<sup>1</sup> (especially in 12, 16, and 20); except for the

<sup>1</sup> 10. 7-10 is a characteristic addition: Aristeides' mission to Sparta in the spring of 479, as told by Idomeneus; ἐν δὲ τῷ ψηφίσματι τοῦ Ἀριστεῖδον πρεσβευτής οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ Κίμων καὶ Μύρωνίδης φέρονται, and Plutarch does not much mind which is right, in spite of the distrust of Idomeneus that he shows elsewhere. (It looks as though Idomeneus had heard of the decree and assumed Aristeides to be the ambassador because he was the mover; and that the embassy must be a good deal later, for both Kimon and Myronides would be too young. Kirchner, *P.A.*, s.vv., and Busolt, ii. 721, iii. 95, however, accept the statement that these were the ambassadors, Aristeides moving the decree. Herodotus, ix. 6, gives no names.)

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embellishments, it is almost true to say that Plutarch simply rewrites Herodotus with the substitution of *'Αριστεῖδης* for *οἱ Αθηναῖοι* or *οἱ Αθηναῖων στρατηγοί*.<sup>1</sup> From 22 to the end is still narrative, but now Aristeides' character plays a larger part (it is due to his and Kimon's good characters that the allies go over to Athens, his honesty over the tribute, and so forth). It is in fact a rather colourless *Life*, for the reason that, whatever his real merits, which were doubtless considerable, Aristeides has become simply the honest conservative, the negative to Themistokles—there was little in the tradition that was not already in Herodotus, and though that is also largely true of Themistokles as well, his was a much livelier character, and, if necessary, more anecdotes could be invented or attributed to him, but there was no variety about his rival. Even an authentic action which did not seem to square with his known character, his assistance to Themistokles in outwitting the Spartans in the matter of the walls of Athens (Thuc. i. 90-2), is passed over, both here and in *Them.* 19. Yet a hint of a divergent tradition is preserved: there is a brief and obscure account (22. 1) of how Aristeides, observing that the people wanted their democracy back, after Plataia, and deserved it and were too strong to be opposed, γράφει ψήφισμα κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Αθηναίων πάντων αἴρεισθαι<sup>2</sup> (the ordinary view was that it was the naval victory at Salamis and Themistokles that gave the impetus to democracy; here it is Aristeides and the hoplite victory); and he did not oppose Athens breaking her oath to her allies, Theophrastos indeed asserting that in his country's interests he was not particularly honest (25. 1-2).

As Aristeides to Themistokles, so Kimon to Perikles—the opposite in every way: conservative, old-fashioned, genial where Perikles was reserved and haughty, generous where Perikles was careful, pro-Spartan, not interested in the new learning. But there was more to be said about Kimon;<sup>3</sup> with the result, however, that his character

<sup>1</sup> So Uxkull, 86.

<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to say what is the meaning of this and what relation it has to the confused and apparently contradictory discussion over Aristeides' own archonship in 1. 2, 8-9 and 5. 9-10 (see below, p. 76). This discussion shows well both Plutarch's wide reading and his lack of real learning, his forgetfulness at least of elementary facts in Athenian constitutional history; it does not prove that he had not read Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, which he quotes elsewhere more than once, only that he did not read it again before writing this *Life*. (The omission of all reference here to Aristeides' democratic activities as given in *Αθην.* 23-4, as of the Dracontic constitution in the *Solon* and Themistokles' part in the attack on the Areiopagos in the *Themistokles*, I regard as part of the puzzle of the *Αθηναῖων πολυτεῖλα* rather than of the composition of these *Lives*.)

<sup>3</sup> The *Kimon* is a good deal shorter (it must be the shortest of all the *Lives*), and even so the first three chapters are pure introduction to him and Lucullus; and there is the digression in c. 16 on the earthquake at Sparta. But all of the rest is about Kimon personally, not about great events in Greece, like so much of the *Aristeides*.

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is less consistently drawn than Aristeides'; and the structure of the *Life* is also more complex. He was thought to be wild and rather stupid in his youth, and Stesimbrotos said he was not even well educated;<sup>1</sup> and there were stories about his sister Elpinike being his mistress, or his wife, till he gave her in marriage to the rich Kallias, who was prepared to pay Miltiades' fine; and in general he ran after women. (Cf. Eupolis, fr. 208; below 102. 1 n.) But everything else about him was admirable—οὐτέ γάρ τόλικη Μιλτιάδου λεπόμενος οὐτέ συνέσει Θεμιστοκλέους, δικαιότερος ἀμφοῖν ὅμολογεῖται γενέσθαι and far superior to either in civic virtue, even in youth (4-5. 1; cf. 5. 6); and a story told by Ion suggests that he was cultivated enough and Themistokles ill-educated (9. 1), a story followed by another about the clever Kimon who gets the better part of the spoils at Byzantium, in the manner of Themistokles. The latter of course would have kept the money, Kimon, says Plutarch, spent it in the service of Greece; yet the very next sentence (10. 1) begins ηδη δ' εὐπορῶν, which suggests that he had so far done well for himself, and we have at some length the well-known story of his generosity to his fellow-citizens. Plutarch admits that some said this was mere demagogery; but he insists that such a view is out of keeping with Kimon's noble and incorruptible character<sup>2</sup> and his Spartan outlook. C. 11 is highly interesting: 'The other Athenian strategoi wanted to force the allies to send contingents to the fleet when they preferred to contribute money instead; Kimon refused to use force, and let the cities fall into the trap, who thus became the slaves instead of the allies of Athens.'<sup>3</sup> Plutarch does not note the machiavellian policy of the good Kimon (who, with Aristeides, had been responsible for the Ionians joining Athens, 6. 3), any more than he points out that this leader of willing allies commanded the Athenian forces against the revolted Thasos.<sup>4</sup> Again 'he is said' to have begun the building of the Long Walls (13. 6), elsewhere a Themistoklean, democratic, anti-Spartan policy (*Them.* 19. 3-6);<sup>5</sup> and on occasion, when opposed by Corinth, ἐθρασύνατο ἐν δεόντι (17. 1-2). This last Plutarch would have admitted to be a blot on a noble character, one not to be unduly emphasized, though not to be passed over

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 36. Cf. also *Comp. Cim. et Luc.* 1. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Illustrated by another anecdote which is very like the one told of Phokion and Alexander (*Phok.* 18).

<sup>3</sup> See below, i. 98. 4 n.

<sup>4</sup> Elpinike had no justification at all for her attack on Perikles which Plutarch records (*Per.* 28. 5-6). He is faithfully, but not comprehendingly, drawing from different sources, not, as Uxkull, 78, says, from a writer who combined great admiration for Kimon with aversion from Athenian imperialism.

<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to observe that in *Them.* 4. 5 Plutarch admits a doubt whether the naval policy was ultimately disastrous to Athens (ἐστω φλοοσφάτερον ἐπισκοπεῖν); generally it is taken for granted, and Kimon's great part in it ignored.

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(2. 2-5); and here something done under stress of state necessity. The prosecution of political opponents for treason, bribery, or improper conduct of affairs, was generally held by good conservatives to be characteristic of democratic politicians—it was the hall-mark of the sykophantai, the worst form of πολυπραγμοσύνη; but Aristeides did it and Kimon (*Arist.* 4; *Them.* 24. 6), though Plutarch is unaware of what he is conceding. In fact the 'watch-dog of the people' might be either Aristeides or Kleon, either Lykourgos or Aristogeiton, though conservatives would not admit it and put them at opposite poles; they would only concede that men like Ephialtes and Perikles stood midway, πολυπράγμονες but personally incorruptible.

The composition of the *Kimon* is an excellent example of Plutarch's ability to blend narrative and 'eidology'; almost all the anecdotes are given their proper chronological position (c. 9 only is 'timeless'),<sup>1</sup> and the narrative is everywhere illustrative of character.

The *Perikles* is the most complex and the most interesting of these *Lives* (perhaps the most interesting of all), and the most valuable to the historian; it best discovers Plutarch's own strength and weakness. Here he was faced with a fundamental difficulty: was Perikles *σπουδαῖος* or not? Thucydides plainly thought he was; and moreover said the important thing, that he led rather than was led by the demos; therefore he was no ordinary democratic leader. Plato, on the other hand, thought he was not *σπουδαῖος*—Miltiades, Themistokles, Kimon, and Perikles were cleverer at administering to the popular appetites than their successors, but not essentially different;<sup>2</sup> and many others, including the contemporary comic poets, Ephoros<sup>3</sup> and Aristotle, supported him. What better authorities could he have than Thucydides and δ θεῖος Πλάτων? Both must be right. He does not ask himself, have

<sup>1</sup> The story of Kimon's judgement in the dramatic contest between Aeschylus and Sophokles (8. 8-9) is actually dated by the archon's name; but Plutarch does not tell us when the incident occurred relatively to events narrated before and after this. (I do not agree with Weizsäcker's analysis of 12. 1, that this refers back to the deeds of 6-8 and so confuses the chronology by ignoring the 8 years' interval. 12. 1 points forward to Eurymedon, and is repeated in 13. 4.)

There are one or two bad historical errors: as 7. 3 and 8. 2, and 17. 1-3 (for which see below, p. 411, n. 1).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch does not refer to this passage of the *Gorgias* (515 E-519 D) in the *Perikles*, though he does in *Arist.* 25. 9; perhaps because Plato included Kimon in his condemnation. (It may be noted that Plato first selected these men because they had been later punished by the demos they should have improved. Aristeides is excepted, 526 B. Cf. above, p. 45.) Plutarch refers to *Rep.* viii, 562 C in the *Perikles* (7. 8) in connexion with the overthrow of the Areiopagos.

<sup>3</sup> Ephoros is included in the πλεῖστοι μάρτυρες of 31. 2: see Diodoros, xii. 41. 1. Theopompos of course was another authority for Perikles' demagogacy; he is not named, but is probably responsible for much, e.g. in c. 11.

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Thucydides and Plato different standards? Are they thinking of different things? He does not distinguish between the aims and methods of comedy and those of history. He does not see that Ephorus is of very little value if he contradicts Thucydides (for Ephorus' history has become part of the accepted tradition which Plutarch does not question). He is not entirely uncritical: he does not believe Idomeneus' story that Perikles caused the murder of Ephialtes (though mainly because it is inconsistent with Perikles' character—he was too noble<sup>1</sup>—not because Idomeneus is of little value for 5th-century history); but his only solution of the problem, which is really not there at all, is that there must have been a radical change in Perikles' methods of conducting public affairs, amounting practically to a change in his character: he was first a demagogue, then a true leader of the people. Hence the structure of the main part of the *Life*, which centres round this *μεταβολή*—a change in time.<sup>2</sup> Cc. 3–8 describe his early years, his association with philosophers, his general character (including some demagogacy, 7. 8), his wonderful oratory to which Plato bore witness.<sup>3</sup> Then 9–14 contains the narrative of the demagogic period of his life, the first part—very brief, for he had little material—when opposed to Kimon, the second against Thoukydides. The demagogacy includes not only theoretic and dicastic doles and the ostracism of the great Kimon, but the institution of magnificent festivals, the training for the navy, the cleruchies, and above all the fine buildings and sculpture on the Acropolis and at Eleusis.<sup>4</sup> Plutarch is indeed far too honest and too sensible to dismiss this as mere demagogacy and nothing else, as did the 'Old Oligarch':<sup>5</sup> he agrees that the festivals afforded *οὐκ ἀμονούσι ἥδονα*, that the naval training was valuable,<sup>6</sup> and he has a noble chapter about the buildings in which he almost forgets their ignoble origin, and admits Perikles' *μεγαλοφροσύνη* (14. 2); but for all that they belong to the time when Perikles

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kimon's demagogacy, above, p. 64.

<sup>2</sup> 9. 1. You find Plutarch describing such *μεταβολή* in other *Lives* (especially in *Demetrios* and *Antony*); it is hinted at in *Kimon* (*comp. Cim. et Luc.* 1. 4), but not developed. But nowhere does it play so significant a part as in *Perikles*.

<sup>3</sup> He does not include in the *Life* two of Perikles' sayings recorded in the *Apophthegmata* (186 c), the excellent *όπότε μέλλοι στρατηγεῖν, ἀναλαμβάνων τὴν χλαισίδα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔλεγε* "πρόσσεχε, Περικλεῖς, ἐλευθέρων μελλεῖς ἄρχειν καὶ Ἐλλήνων καὶ Ἀθηναῖων", and *πρὸς φίλον τινὰ μαρτυρίας φευδοῦν δεόμενον, ή προσῆν καὶ ὄρκος, ἔφησε μέχρι τοῦ βαμοῦ φίλος εἶναι*—this last, which he elsewhere censures (*Mor.* 531 c, 808 A), perhaps because he thought it unworthy, not appreciating the irony, as he did not that in the answer to Ion on the Samian war (*Per.* 28. 7–8).

<sup>4</sup> It does not include the Peace of Kallias as a betrayal of the national cause against Persia: below, pp. 67, n. 2, and 68, n. 2.

Nor does it include Perikles' citizenship law, though Plutarch says a good deal about it later (37); for he probably approved of it (see *Them.* 1. 4).

<sup>5</sup> Ps.-Xen. *Ath. resp.* 1. 13, 20, 2. 9–10; see my paper (above, p. 35, n. 4), 221–2.

<sup>6</sup> For the cleruchies, see below, pp. 376–80.

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*μάλιστα τῷ δῆμῳ τὰς ἡγίας ἀνεῖς ἐπολιτεύετο πρὸς χάριν.<sup>1</sup>* This period ends with the ostracism of Thoukydides. Then Perikles took all power into his own hands and *οὐκέτθ' ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν οὐδὲ ὄμοιώς χειρούργης τῷ δῆμῳ καὶ βάθιος ὑπείκειν καὶ συνενδιδόνται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ωπερ πνοῖς τῶν πολλῶν* (15. 1); he became the great leader described by Thucydides. This gives Plutarch the occasion for 'eidology'—akme-eidology here: the source of Perikles' extraordinary power was partly his wonderful oratory (a good instance, this, of Plutarch's elaborate style, with another comforting reference to Plato, *Phaedr.* 271 c), partly his incorruptible character. This last he showed throughout his career (we go back, that is, in time to his early years in the sixties)—though he was by no means indifferent to money, as his careful management of his estate showed (16). When Sparta began to be alarmed at the growth of Athenian power, Perikles inspired his countrymen to even higher aims and proposed the Panhellenic conference; this came to nothing, but was a good example of his *μεγαλοφροσύνη* (17). As a general he was chiefly noted for his *ἀσφάλεια*, and warned the Athenians against Tolmides' rash preparations for the Koroneia campaign (18). His most popular campaign was that to the Chersonese, his most famous that to the Corinthian Gulf, which well showed his *ἀσφάλεια*; there was also the distant campaign to the Pontos (19–20. 2). For all that he discouraged the wilder ambitions of the people—the renewal of war against Persia, and that fatal passion for Sicily and the dreams about Carthage and Etruria which were already in Athenian hearts and heads; and concentrated the city's strength for defence against Sparta, as shown by the Delphi expedition (20. 3–21). His wisdom in this was shown by subsequent events, the revolt of Euboea and the attempted invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians, that ended in the Thirty Years' Truce (22–24. 1).<sup>2</sup>

From this point begins a new narrative sequence with the Samian war, which is virtually straightforward, that is, combines well narrative and 'eidology', till the end of the *Life*.

Since in the last sentence of c. 10 Plutarch states the end of the first half of the first stage in Perikles' career (the death of Kimon), and in 14, so very definitely, the end of the second half of this stage (the ostracism of Thoukydides), and since he gives no indication of dates, the impression might easily be given that, after the two chapters of 'eidology', 15–16, all the events narrated in 17–24. 1 were subsequent to the ostracism, though we know from other

<sup>1</sup> In *Comp. Per. et Fab.* 3. 7, however, the reference to the buildings is wholly panegyrical.

<sup>2</sup> The list of his triumphs does not include the Peace of Kallias—probably because by the tradition established in the 4th century the glory of this belonged to Kimon (hence probably its misdating in later times: *Kim.* 13. 4). Cf. above, p. 66, n. 4; below, p. 68, n. 2.

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sources that all or nearly all were before it, and one at least (the expedition to the Gulf) before the death of Kimon; and some modern scholars think that Plutarch himself believed this. For myself I am confident that this was not his meaning, that he did not muddle things so badly, even though he does write of these events, those of 447–445 especially (19. 1–2, 22–24. 1), as though Perikles were in sole control and Thouskydides not there to fight him at every stage; not only was there Thucydides i. 111. 2–115. 1 to guard him from some of these supposed errors, but any ordinary history, as even the confused narrative of Diodoros makes clear. It may well be that he consulted here two main authorities, a Theopompean source for 8–14, and one favourable to Perikles for 17 ff. (so Weizsäcker, who suggests a narrative of the Athenian struggle for hegemony for this latter; I should have thought a panegyric on Perikles, with events not necessarily in chronological order, and covering cc. 15 and 16 as well, far more probable);<sup>1</sup> but it does not follow that he thought that all these events took place in the fifteen-year period of sole control, any more than that Perikles' incorruptibility was confined to that: in fact, the reference to the forty years of his career warns us against any such assumption. The difference of source is shown by a certain contradiction between 16. 1–3 and 11 (not because incorruptibility and demagogy are not to be found in one person—they were, confessedly, in Ephialtes—but because the one is favourable to Perikles, the other antagonistic), as well as by the more definite conflict between 11. 5 and 19. 1 (the cleruchy to the Chersonese); Plutarch is almost as indifferent to such conflicts as Herodotos.<sup>2</sup>

Be that however as it may, it is clear from this, and many other instances, how carefree Plutarch was about chronology, and how

<sup>1</sup> Note that the panegyric includes the great buildings (cc. 12–13) in *Comp. Per. et Fab.* 3. 7, the impressive final sentence, and that this at least cannot be from a Hellenistic source, for it was written in imperial times.

<sup>2</sup> See below, pp. 376–80. Cf. the instances from *Them.*, *Arist.*, and *Kim.* given above, which are not so striking as these in *Perikles*, Uxkull, p. 114.

We may note as well a much more important contrast between *Kim.* 19. 3: μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου τελευτὴν πρὸς μὲν τὸν βαρβάρον οὐδὲν ἔτι λαμπρὸν ὥπερ οὐδενὸς μετά δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου τελευτὴν πρὸς Ἑλλήνων, ἀλλὰ τραπέντες ὑπὸ δημαγογῶν καὶ πολεμοποιῶν ἐπράχθη στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἀλλὰ τραπέντες ὑπὸ δημαγογῶν καὶ πολεμοποιῶν, ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους, οὐδενὸς τὰς χεῖρας ἐν μέσῳ διασχόντος, συνερράγησαν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, ἀναποῆ μὲν τοῖς βασιλέως πράγμασι γενόμενοι, φθόρον δ’ ἀμύθητον τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς δυνάμεως ἀπεργασάμενοι (cf. 16. 1–3), and *Per.* 21–22. 1: Perikles was against further attack on Persia and other wild schemes, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῆς δυνάμεως ἔτρεπεν εἰς φυλακὴν καὶ βεβαιότητα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, μέγα ἔργον ἡγούμενος ἀνείργειν. A good many years δύναμιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων συνεῖχεν, ἐμαρτύρησεν αὐτῷ τὰ γενόμενα. A good many years doubtless elapsed between the writing of the *Kimon* (to all appearances an early *Life*) and the *Perikles* (in the 10th book of *Lives*); but I doubt if this is the principal explanation of the discrepancy—rather was Plutarch exclusively concerned with his hero in each case, and to some extent dependent on his source (see Bock in Bursian clxx, p. 271).

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careful we must be in drawing any chronological inferences from his *Lives*, quite apart from the possibility of his making a definite mistake. It is clear also how little he understood his sources when he described the μεταβολή in Perikles' conduct. It is not that it is impossible or improbable that a man should rise to power by the usual demagogic arts and retain it by unusual gifts of character and intellect; on the contrary, this may be true of Perikles, though it is not very probable that he delayed showing these gifts for twenty-five years. But this is not the picture of him as it was drawn by his detractors, either by Plato or by contemporary comedy and political pamphlets or by Theopompos; they did not approve of the last fifteen years of his career. As I have said, Plutarch did not see that Plato and Thucydides were thinking of different things, nor that comedy had other aims, and pamphlets and later historians other values than Thucydides. Nor is it indeed a consistent picture that Plutarch himself draws. Apart from certain phrases in the first part of the *Life* which suggest a doubt whether Perikles had any genuine ἀρετή (7. 6, compared with c. 5), and the statement, made without any qualification, that he deliberately sent Kimon's son Lakedaimonios to Kerkyra with weak forces in order to discredit him (29. 1–3), there is the cardinal problem of the causes of the Peloponnesian war: 'all agree that the Megarian decree played a decisive part, and that Perikles was principally responsible for the Athenian refusal to withdraw it; but some say this was a statesmanlike refusal to give way to dictation, others that it was mere αὐθάδεια and φιλονικία; and, worst motive of all, but attested by most witnesses, was it due to Perikles' personal fears—did he stir up the war to avoid a dangerous impeachment? The truth is uncertain (31–2). But he seems to have had a private grudge against the Megarians (30. 2–4).' Though Plutarch does not think of Perikles as a man without blemish (10. 7), no conception of him as a great statesman, distinguished especially by μεγαλοφροσύνη and by political courage, or even as an ἀνήρ σπουδαῖος, is compatible with such a doubt as this.<sup>1</sup> It is not consistent with Thucydides: Plutarch is misled by his silence (though he probably had Perikles' first speech—i. 140–4—in mind in 31. 1: οἱ μὲν ἐκ φρονήματος μεγάλον μετὰ γνώμης κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀπισχυρίσασθαι φασιν αὐτὸν, κ.τ.λ.); see his characteristic remarks in *de Herod. malign.* 5–6 (*Mor.* 855 E–6 A: cf. 855 C, which shows a better understanding). He did not see that Aristophanes, in the famous passages in *Acharnians* and *Peace*, was not writing history, but giving a picture of his fellow Athenians—and who can cast a stone at him for this? many ancient

<sup>1</sup> In *Nik.* 9. 9 he seems even more confident that Perikles had no adequate motive for the war, unless he there means only to quote contemporary opinion (ἔδοκε). Cf. too *Comp. Per. et Fab.* 3. 1 (λέγεται).

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historians and many moderns (for 'scientific' history is not necessarily good history) have done the same; but he also did not see that Ephoros and Theopompos and the rest of 'the majority of witnesses' are not *additional* evidence to Aristophanes, but only repeat what he said.<sup>1</sup> It is all ultimately due to his ignorance of political conditions in a Greek democracy: he did not know what comedy and political speeches and lampoons really were, even though he could reject their evidence on occasion; he did not understand Plato's criticism; and he could not estimate the worth of the later conventional picture of democratic leaders.<sup>2</sup> But it all shows both the width of his reading and the weakness of his judgement; with that, his honesty. Like Herodotus, though in a much more selective manner, he will write down what is recorded and leave the decision between contradictory sources to others (cf. *Demos*. 15. 5–6)—because he lacked essential historical insight and 'because he never mastered—he did not see the need of it—the vast amount of learning which was at hand for the true researcher.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For once Hirzel (p. 36) has gone astray: "Auch was er über die Ursachen des peloponnesischen Krieges sagt, verdient den landläufigen Tadel nicht: er kennt die allgemeinen und tieferen Ursachen des weltgeschichtlichen Ereignisses, so wie sie Thukydides angegeben, gar wohl (17); daneben aber hält er auch das Mitspielen persönlicher Interessen und Leidenschaften für möglich; und dies, vorgetragen mit dem bescheidenen Bekenntnis des Nichtwissens (32), macht ihn eher unseres Lobes würdig, die wir dasselbe Zusammenwirken dieser zweierlei Ursachen . . . auch sonst aus der Geschichte, der alten wie der neuen und neusten, kennen." That is true, and pertinent against some historians who have criticized Plutarch; but it is not the main point—which is that Plutarch thinks of Thucydides and Aristophanes as *rival* authorities, and that Ephoros *confirms* Aristophanes.

<sup>2</sup> It is worth noting another small but instructive example of this ignorance. Plutarch (as indeed many another, ancient and modern, and without the biographer's excuse) regularly writes, *Perikles* nominated Lakedaimonios, Perikles sent an additional squadron, Perikles drove out the inhabitants of Hestiaia and settled Athenian cleruchs, where Thucydides, the contemporary and the historian, writes *Αθηναῖοι*. There is one particularly good instance of this: 13. 13, Perikles cured the excellent workman who was badly injured by a fall from the Propylaia, and thereupon τὸ χαλκοῦν ἄγαλμα τῆς Υγείας Αθηνᾶς ἀνέστησεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει παρὰ τὸν βωμόν, ὃς καὶ πρότερος ἦν, ὡς λέγουντος. For the basis of the statue survives, with the inscription *Αθηναῖοι τῇ Αθηναῖᾳ τῇ Υγείᾳ* (*I.G. i.2* 395), and Plutarch had very likely seen it as well as read about it in some *periegesis* (*ὡς λέγουντος*).

<sup>3</sup> "Die Ursachen sind natürlich für beide diametral entgegengesetzte. Während Herodot dank seiner Ursprünglichkeit und Naivität nicht fähig war zur Kritik der Berichte, um die Einheit der Erzählung zu wahren, vorzudringen, sind sie bei Plutarch fast umgekehrt. Er ist belastet mit dem ungeheuren Wissen einer Zeit, das schon seit Jahrhunderten anschwoll"—Uxkull, p. 114. 'Burdened' is not the right word for Plutarch—he did not feel the weight, for he was not a professional scholar; and this is a strange judgement coming from one who thinks that Plutarch when writing his *Lives* had only to consult a simple history of events (of about the 2nd century B.C.) and two or three *Collectanea*, selections of sayings, anecdotes, topographical details and the like from learned

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A few points may be noted from the *Nikias*. This *Life* is, in the main, narrative, based on Thucydides, as was inevitable, though Plutarch will not, like the foolish Timaios, attempt to rewrite what Thucydides did so well (1. 1–4); he will only briefly recount those episodes which illustrate Nikias' character, and add as much as he can from other sources—τὰ διαφεύγοντα τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑφ' ἔτερων δ' εἰρημένα σποράδην ἢ πρὸς ἀναθήμασιν ἢ ψηφίσμασιν εὑρημένα παλαιοῖς πεπείραμα συναγαγεῖν, οὐ τὴν ἄχρηστον ἱστορίαν ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς κατάνοσιν ἥθους καὶ τρόπου παραδίδοντα. In essentials, therefore, its structure is most like that of the *Aristeides*, mainly dependent on one source, or on the accepted tradition based on that source; but much fuller and more satisfying, partly because Thucydides told so much more about Nikias than Herodotus about Aristeides, partly because there was more additional matter. These additions are (1) details of history, some from Athens (11, the ostracism of Hyperbolos—Plutarch was much interested by ostracism—with a characteristic note on a different account in Theophrastos; 12. 6, Demostratos; 23. 7, Stilbides; 30, the story of how the news of the Syracusan disaster reached Athens), more from Sicily, i.e. probably from Philistos or Timaios (14. 6–7, 16. 5, 18. 3–4, 19. 5, 21. 9–11, 24. 1–2, and much in 28–9 on the fate of the Athenian prisoners); (2) expansion or embroidery of Thucydides' narrative, to emphasize the part played by Nikias (16. 7, 19. 4, 20. 5–8—though Thucydides is here quoted—21. 3 and 22. 1); (3) stories of Nikias' private life and character: among these 4. 2 and 5. 2–6 are especially notable, for it suggests a doubt of his hero's sincerity even in his piety, just as in the *Perikles* (note especially the use of ὅγκος, *Per.* 7. 6 and *Nik.* 5. 3); 10. 1, where Theophrastos is quoted for a trick he played on Sparta (as for Aristeides: above, p. 63); and 3. 1 (*Perikles'* ἀληθινὴ ἀρετή, wanting in Nikias). Perikles' avoidance of society is also superficially like Nikias (5. 1). There is as well, as we should expect in Plutarch, a great deal about omens and their import which Thucydides omits. Where the latter's narrative especially illuminates Nikias' character, as in the Pylos episode, Alkibiades' trick on the Spartan ambassadors, and the clever manoeuvre by which the Athenians enticed the Syracusans out of the city (7, 10, and 16), Plutarch follows it closely (though in the last case Thucydides has *οἱ στρατηγοί*, Plutarch *Nikias*—cf. the *Aristeides*, above);<sup>1</sup> but he generalizes and shortens editions of classical authors, *Κωμῳδούμενοι*, and *Periegeses*, already made and arranged biographically: Plutarch looked up 'Perikles' and 'Kimon' in these collections, took what he wanted and dotted it about the simple narrative which someone long ago had already carved out of a history (below, p. 83, n. 1).

<sup>1</sup> With the addition τοῦτον ἄμιστα *Nikias* ἐστρατήγησε περὶ Σικελίαν, which is certainly his own, like the criticism in 14. 2, and should make us pause before we assert that similar remarks in *Kim.* 12. 1; *Per.* 19. 1, etc., reveal a panegyric or some particular kind of biography as his source.

the story of the great battles in the harbour and the retreat (the topographical details are irrelevant to his purpose), and the campaigns of Mantinea and Melos, so important for history, are not even mentioned because there was no record of Nikias playing any part in them. He cannot, however, refrain from 're-writing' the story of the night attack on Epipolai, though Nikias was absent; it was too dramatic to be omitted, and he was glad to remind his readers that it was the Boeotians who first stood their ground and broke the Athenian onslaught.

All this narrative is necessarily in chronological order, from c. 7 to the end with hardly a break, though no dates and no intervals of time are given and Nikias' age is not mentioned; in 9. 7, in the account of the Peace of Nikias there is a reference to the year's truce of 423, but *πρότερον* is the only indication of time though the interval was easy enough to find in Thucydides, had Plutarch wanted it. Cc. 2-6 are all 'eidological' in form; they include in 6 a brief account—surprisingly brief—of Nikias' early successes, and some of these were subsequent to the Pylos campaign, which is told in 7, the beginning of the narrative proper. What is most interesting in the 'eidology' is that, whereas there is the conventional contrast between Nikias and Kleon the demagogue (with an anecdote told about the latter in 7. 6-7, 'timeless', but well-timed here), no attempt is made to whitewash or simplify Nikias' character; although nothing very subtle or profound is indicated, still it is left with both its honourable qualities and its weaknesses.

Because it is principally based on Thucydides the *Nikias* is (on the whole) historically sound, within Plutarch's self-imposed limits, and biographically true;<sup>1</sup> contrast the *Phokion*, so readable and of such doubtful value to the historian. Phokion's character was a simple one, as Plutarch saw it (and he is our principal authority), and by an admirable series of anecdotes—most of them 'timeless': there is but little narrative in the *Life* and only the broadest distinction of stages, till we approach the end—he is described as blunt, honest, and conservative, a soldier, in all ways the direct contrary to the politicians and opposed to them;<sup>2</sup> therefore, Plutarch implies rather than states, his policy too was honest and right, theirs wrong, in external as well as internal affairs, and so the opposition to Macedon mistaken. Note especially his account of the Lamian war

<sup>1</sup> Note, however, that the description of Nikias' *φιλοτιμήματα* in c. 3 is coloured more by Plutarch's experience of Roman magnificence than by his historical knowledge of the 5th century.

<sup>2</sup> Very much like Aristeides: in both the assumed poverty (highly improbable in fact) is essential to the picture; *Arist.* 4. 2 and 4. 6-7 are very much in Phokion's manner; and the story in 3. 2 recalls *Phok.* 33. 5, though in this latter Phokion is not the speaker. But there were good anecdotes about Phokion, so the structure of the *Life* is very different.

(23 ff.): ὡς δὲ φέρων ἐνέστειν δὲ Λεωσθένης τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὸν Λαμιακὸν πόλεμον, κ.τ.λ. Yet he cannot quite believe that (after all he had already written his *Demosthenes*): he can say that the pusillanimous commanders at Krannon (being democrats) *προήκαντο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν* (26. 1), and, with great inconsistency, he criticizes Phokion himself for his friendly attitude to Nikanor, which 'endangered his country's safety', when it was already much too late to secure it, the Macedonians being then in Mounychia, and when, incidentally, Phokion was over eighty and any weakness might be excused on account of his age (32. 3-5). Similarly in the *Demetrios* he writes, in the wholly conventional manner, of Antigonos and Demetrios: ἐνδόξου δὲ τῆς φιλοτιμίας ταύτης γενομένης ὅρμη παρέστη θαυμάσιος αὐτοῖς ἐλευθεροῦν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν ὑπὸ Κασάνδρου καὶ Πτολεμαίου καταδεουλωμένην. τούτου πόλεμον οὐδεὶς ἐπολέμησε τῶν βασιλέων καλλίων καὶ δικαιότερον. ἂς γὰρ ἄμα τοὺς βαρβάρους ταπεινώντες εὐπορίας συνίγαγον, εἰς τὸν Ἑλληνας ὑπὲρ εὐδόξειας καὶ τιμῆς ἀνήλισκον (8. 1); but how can that policy, in 307 B.C., be noble and the fight put up by Demosthenes, Hypereides, and Leosthenes be, without argument, demagogic folly? Still less does Plutarch understand the difference between the strategia in the fifth and in the fourth centuries (7. 3, 8. 1), and what that difference meant. In fact he gives no clear picture of Phokion's policy (perhaps he had no consistent policy, but that is not what Plutarch wishes to convey), and therefore, since Phokion was essentially a public man, not of his character either; he is personally brave and honest, defeatist, with a genius for the happy retort—but that is not all that Plutarch intended either; and the reason is that he did not understand democratic political life and made no attempt to envisage for himself the situation in Greece in the second half of the fourth century. He takes instead, with the traditional narrative, the conventional picture of the 'Liberators of Greece' (which got its vitality from the Roman 'Liberators') and an equally conventional picture (again in part due to Roman history) of the honest conservative soldier and the democratic politician.<sup>1</sup> We cannot here always

<sup>1</sup> It is instructive in this respect to compare the parallel Roman Lives. The parallels are not in general very close, though Plutarch does his best with them and was doubtless often intending to note a contrast as well as a likeness ('Aristeides is the Greek honest man, the elder Cato the Roman'); but in the closest of them, as *Demosthenes and Cicero, Phokion and Cato the Younger, Demetrios and Antony*, Plutarch does not see the differences in the political conditions: Demosthenes' struggle against 'princes and tyrants' is for him much the same as Cicero's and Cato's (see especially *Demos.* 3, *Phok.* 3. 3: Phokion ought therefore to be on the same side as Demosthenes, sharing in the common struggle; he does not feel this difficulty, partly because Cato οὐ κεκλιμένης μὲν ἥδη τῆς πατρίδος, ὥστερ δὲ Φωκίων, πολὺν δὲ χειμῶνα καὶ σάλον ἔχοντας . . . (ἐπολιτεύσατο): a most remarkable statement seeing that Phokion had played a notable part in the battle of Naxos, and was over 60 in 338, as Plutarch well knew); and Pericles' constitutional position is very like that of Fabius (*Comp.*

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control it; if we had a Thucydides for the period, we should probably have a very different version of the Tamynai campaign (12-13), at least on its political side. Contrast the *Nikias*: not only is Plutarch bound to Thucydides, but we are independent of him. Sometimes we can control him, as 14. 3, Phokion's strictures on the Athenian strategoi; for we know that Demosthenes (the opposite of Phokion) had said the same thing, and as vigorously. It is not that Plutarch had not read Demosthenes' speeches; but he did not re-read them with a view to testing the traditional narrative—like most of the later Greeks he thought much more of their literary aspects, with which he was not concerned in the *Life* (*Demos.* 3. 1), than of their historical value. An excellent example of conventional history.

For all this, in spite of what we may properly criticize in him, and however much we may regret that he did not do something other than what he designed, Plutarch is of great value to the historian, and not least to the historian of the period from 478 B.C. to the end of the century: because for the pentekontaëtia our other information is so scrappy, and because he preserves something of what Thucydides purposely omitted, the biographical detail, the political lampoons, the mockery of the comic poets: "though some make slight of *Libels*, yet you may see by them how the wind sits: as take a Straw and throw it up into the Air, you shall see by that which way the Wind is, which you shall not do by casting up a Stone. More solid things do not show the complexion of the times as well as Ballads and *Libels*."<sup>1</sup> He could do this because of his wide and varied reading. He belonged to an age of classical revival; he goes back to the classics for his heroes and to the classical tradition (for Rome as well as for Greece, republican Rome and the struggle for liberty, though he did also, apparently, attempt a series of the emperors), back to them also for his favourite literature. With one of the greatest of these writers indeed, Aristophanes, he found himself in but little sympathy, and he was critical of Herodotus, though susceptible to his charm; but he knew them all well, from Homer to Demosthenes, and quotes freely from them, in the *Essays* as in

*Per. et Fab.* 1. 3-5). This, however, is mainly because he was writing biography—and his kind of biography—not history. As a comparison of characters, as he sees them, they are excellent, especially the *Demetrios* and *Antony*; as a history of statesmen they fail, for the divergent history of the states is not taken into account. Plutarch did not feel the want; we, who must use him for history, must be on our guard.

He was not a specialist either, and did not think of his readers as such. We should remember, in fact, that Plutarch thought that his readers would all be equally at home with his Greek and his Roman *Lives* and would never separate them; his readers of the 17th and 18th centuries were thus at home: we, the unhappy historical experts, can only hope to criticize and value the Greek or the Roman, so different are our standards.

<sup>1</sup> Selden, *Table Talk*, lxxxi.

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the *Lives*. He had read as well some of the earlier and more popular Hellenistic writers, Douris, Idomeneus, and Hermippus. For the dry and learned, authors of *Chronika*, *Attidigraphoi*, Krateros, he had not so much use, though he knew something of them too—after all they did not often illustrate men's *characters*, and constitutional and chronological details were not to his purpose. He was not a pedant (though he was a little vain of his learning), and we need not be pedantic about him: when he quotes Charon of Lampsakos, once and once only, in support of Thucydides (*Them.* 27. 1),<sup>1</sup> that may well be at second hand, very likely from a learned edition of Thucydides; Phanodemos the Attidograph he quotes three times, twice for small details (*Them.* 13. 1; *Kim.* 12. 6), once for a rhetorical phrase (*Kim.* 19. 1)—perhaps all at second hand; but that the large majority of his quotations are the result of his own reading should never have been doubted. When he says in the introduction of the *Nikias* that he will touch but lightly on events that have already been described by Thucydides and Philistos, that means, in an honest man, that he has read them both; when he criticizes a writer, as he often does,<sup>2</sup> the same conclusion is unavoidable. When he wishes to quote at second hand, he can say so.<sup>3</sup> He says that he has tried to collect together incidents from the scattered writings of others to supplement Thucydides and Philistos, and what has been observed

<sup>1</sup> Elsewhere he quotes Charon in *de Her. malign.* 20 (859 A-B) and 24 (861 C-D).

<sup>2</sup> e.g. Theopompos (*Lys.* 30. 2; *Mor.* 855 A), Timaios (*Nik.* 1), Idomeneus (*Per.* 10. 7; *Dem.* 23. 4), Douris (*Per.* 28. 2-3; *Alk.* 32. 2), Phylarchos (*Them.* 32. 4), Neanthes (*Mor.* 628 B-D), Aratos (*Arat.* 3. 3). So when he praises Ephorus (*Lys.* 25. 3-4—I feel confident that the ἀνὴρ ἱστορικὸς καὶ φιλόσοφος is Ephorus; but see Smits *ad loc.*), Phanias (*Them.* 13. 5), Aristoxenos (*Mor.* 1093 C), Krateros (*Arist.* 26. 1-4). This last is a very good instance: Krateros was not a classic and cannot have been easy reading; nor need we suppose that Plutarch had read him thoroughly, but enough to understand the sort of writer he was, and to get some matter from him.

<sup>3</sup> e.g. *Kim.* 4. 10; *Sol.* 6. 7, 11. 2; *Demos.* 5. 7, 30. 1. (Similarly Didymos refers to Anaximenes at second hand (*Commentary on Demosthenes*, II. 10, 6. 60), probably through Hermippus or an epitome of Hermippus' *On Demosthenes*; but, so far, this suggests that other quotations are at first hand, not the reverse, as Diels and Schubart, *Didymos Kommentar*, pp. xxxiii-xlii, and Wormell in *Yale Cl. Stud.* v. 1935, 81, say, though I would give no opinion about such a man as Didymos. Wormell goes on to give arguments for attributing the whole of Didymos' comment on Hermias, with its quotations, to Hermippus, on the ground that the "tendency to anecdote and the accumulation of somewhat pedantic learning" was characteristic of the Peripatetic biographers, as far as we know; and that the balancing of quotations "suggests a constructive critical faculty which there is no reason to believe Didymus possessed". This may be correct; but our evidence, namely this papyrus, is that this is characteristic of Didymos; while we know very little of the methods of Hermippus. Satyros, the only Hellenistic biographer of whom we possess any considerable fragment (*Ox. Pap.* ix, no. 1176), certainly does not accumulate pedantic learning. There is anyhow no sign here of a "constructive critical faculty".)

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in decrees and ἀναθήματα (*Nik.* i. 5: above, p. 71); if we are wise we will believe this, and not that someone had already done the work for him, labelled it all 'Nikias', and Plutarch need only sprinkle the contents between extracts of narrative. And we will not exaggerate its importance—a reading of the *Nikias* alone will prevent that: as a student and as a visitor he had seen many actual inscriptions on ἀναθήματα at Athens, Delphi, and elsewhere; decrees he had read in Krateros; the rest came from wide but not systematic reading—none of this was research, and not a very great deal is added to Thucydides. *Aristeides*, 1 and 5. 9–10 (together with 22. 1), will serve as a good example of his reading and (as it is extreme) of his lack of scholarship: 'different opinions have been held as to whether Aristeides was poor or rich; Demetrios of Phaleron in his *Sokrates* said he was rich, instancing amongst other things his being selected, by lot, to be eponymous archon, an office then only held by the pentakosiomedimnoi, and his choregia' (a sound argument). 'Panaitios' (another philosopher, not a historian) 'answered the latter argument, by pointing out that the choregos was quite a different Aristeides, and Idomeneus says that Aristeides was elected by vote, not by lot, and if that is so, he may have been chosen for his great successes and his fine character to an office to which others were selected by lot according to their wealth—if, that is, Demetrios is right in saying he was archon after Plataia.' Then in c. 5 (a passage of narrative): 'Aristeides was eponymous archon for the year after Marathon; Demetrios says he was archon after Plataia, shortly before his death; but the archon-lists show no Aristeides, not even an ὁμώνυμος, in any year after Plataia, and they do show him after Phainippos.' In 22. 1 Plutarch makes the surprising statement that after Plataia Aristeides proposed a democratic measure κανήν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἱρεῖσθαι. We can observe, first, the lack of any connecting link between the three passages, second, the ignorance of Athenian constitutional history (or rather, carelessness about it: Plutarch does not go farther into the problem, which he could have solved without trouble—he was only interested in c. 1 in the question whether Aristeides was poor or not, which he answers boldly in the affirmative in 6. 1, in accordance with the traditional view, as *Mor.* 97 c); and thirdly the nature of his reading, Demetrios in an essay on Sokrates, Idomeneus, and Panaitios, though elsewhere he uses Aristotle's Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία which would have answered two of his questions.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demetrios was actually the author of a list of Athenian archons, as well as of books on the Athenian constitution and laws. One cannot help suspecting that he used some such phrase as ἥρξεν ἄρχοντα, but meant by it another office confined to the pentakosiomedimnoi—that of ταῦτα (the same as the προσόδων ἐπιμελητῆς reported by the untrustworthy Idomeneus, *Arist.* 4. 3–4?), and that

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The comparison between the wealth of quotation in the Greek *Lives* with the meagreness in the Roman is interesting. It is partly due to the fact that, learning being mainly Greek (and mainly earlier than the middle of the second century B.C.), not so much had been written about the Romans; but the principal reason is that Plutarch learnt Latin late and with difficulty and never mastered it (*Demos.* 2. 2–4). He studied it principally, we may suppose, in order that he might read Livy, Cicero, and others for his *Lives*; and he did read them, or parts of them, perhaps with the help of his Roman friends. But he could not do much—he was too busy, for one thing, when in Rome, ὅποι χρειῶν πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν διὰ φιλοσοφίαν πλησιαζόντων. He had to confine himself to the general tradition and to what others reported; hence the multitude of φασί, λέγουσι, and λέγεται, the scarcity of reference to authors. The variety in the Greek *Lives* is also to be noted: the *Phokion* almost as bare as the Roman, because it consists so largely of anecdotes which had been told often enough and had no specific author; *Demetrios* also sparing, not because there was not much material, but because it was all of a kind; *Aristeides* and *Themistokles* are much fuller, because though in the main based on the histories of Herodotos and Thucydides, there was much additional detail (of such varying value!) from later authors; *Perikles* fullest of all because contemporary as well as later sources were varied and even, so Plutarch thought, contradictory, and therefore worth recording.<sup>1</sup>

Further, when we criticize the weaknesses of Plutarch, especially the lack of systematic research,<sup>2</sup> we must keep in mind, not only his aim—biography, the delineation of character, not history—but also

Plutarch, perhaps misled by Panaitios, misunderstood him. If Idomeneus is the author of the story in 22. 1, as is possible enough (Busolt, iii. 31. 4), he may be responsible for the confusion (cf. 4. 5, σπονδάζοντας ἄρχοντα πάλιν αἱρεῖσθαι), though he was right when he said Aristeides was elected to the archonship by vote. Or did Demetrios, in an essay, simply make a slip—'after Plataia' instead of 'after Marathon'?

<sup>1</sup> The first index to the new Teubner edition by Ziegler (1939) is of the authors cited by Plutarch, with full references.

<sup>2</sup> And we must beware: "einem Mann, der allzu genaues Inschriftenlesen sittlich gefährlich findet (*de cur.* II, p. 520 D–E), dem ein Thukydides zu viel Geschichte bietet (ἡ ἀχρηστὸς ἱστορία, *Nik.* I. 5), . . . wird man keine tieferen und wahrhaft kritischen Quellenstudien zutrauen" (Schmidt-Stählin, ii. 522). Plutarch, speaking of mischief-making, prying into other people's faults and misfortunes, asks how can we cure ourselves of this weakness? by what practice? πράττον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν βραχυτάτων καὶ φαινούτων ἀρέσμεθα. τί γὰρ χαλεπόν ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς ὄδοις τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τάφων ἐπιγραφὰς μὴ ἀναγιγνώσκειν, η̄ τὶ δυσχερές ἐν τοῖς περιπάτοις τὰ κατὰ τῶν τοιχῶν γράμματα τῇ ὅψει παρατρέχειν, κ.τ.λ. What has this to do with the study of inscriptions for history? In the *Nikias* passage ἀχρηστὸς ἱστορία means (of course) history irrelevant to my purpose, and has not even a reference to Thucydides; it means only: 'I am not, in giving this new information from varied sources, going to make an idle display of learning.'

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the conditions in which he wrote. He was living at home in the little town of Chaironeia, busy with local affairs and his innumerable writings; he had his own books, but for the *Lives* he ought, he says, to have lived in a large town with access to several libraries and where there would be as well a living memory of the past (*Demos.* 2. 1: the second point means Rome and Cicero, rather than Athens and Demosthenes). He had doubtless read many books, some of a learned character, in such libraries in Athens and perhaps in Rome, and made notes from them; but back in Chaironeia he had only his own to refer to, and a capacious memory. We can imagine, indeed we know from the essays, what these books would be—not collections of learned scholia, not *Kωμῳδούμενοι*, but the classics, favourite reading; some of them perhaps in learned editions, a few authors that he would need for his special purposes—a Polybios perhaps, an Aratos' *Memoirs*, perchance even something of Didymos or (more likely) of his own contemporary Symmachos; but mainly his favourite authors. He was not surrounded by books of all kinds, as was Athenaios at Alexandria. He had been in the habit of collecting and arranging anecdotes for his essays, and he used many of these for the *Lives*: *de cohib. ira* 9 (*Mor.* 457 D)—‘ordinary victories are easy enough’, τὸ δ’ ἐν ψυχῇ στήσαι κατὰ θυμοῦ πρόπαιον . . . μεγάλης ἐστὶ καὶ νικητικῆς ἰσχύος . . . διὸ καὶ συνάγειν ἀεὶ πειρῶμαι καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὐ ταῦτα δὴ μόνον τὰ φιλοσόφων, . . . ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὰ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τυράννων, οἷον Ἀντιγόνου, κ.τ.λ.; *de tranq.* 1 (*Mor.* 464 F)—‘having no time to write to you properly’, ἀνελεξάμην περὶ εὐθυμίας ἐκ τῶν ὑπουρημάτων ὃν ἔμαντρῳ πεποιημένος ἐτύγχανον. Collections of sayings attributed to great men of the past are included among his works, and he often refers to them or similar collections.<sup>1</sup> Many of the

<sup>1</sup> *Them.* 11. 3, 18. 1; *Luc.* 41. 1; *Lyk.* 19. 4, 20. 1-2; and esp. *Cat. Mai.* 7. 3. There seems to be no good reason against supposing that the *Apophthegmata* are collections made by Plutarch himself (see Nachstt and Babbitt in their introductory notes in the Teubner and Loeb editions respectively). Some scholars think that they were made later, made from the *Lives* and *Essays*, with some additions, because in some cases they are found in the same order as in the *Lives*, and No. 7 of Scipio the elder, which is closely connected with No. 6, is a saying not of Scipio, but of L. Terentius, with the tell-tale suffix *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον*, as though it were taken from a biography. But though in many cases a rough chronological order is observed (as in those of Agesilaos, Epaminondas, Scipio the elder, Caesar), in only three cases, I think, are all to be found in the corresponding *Life* and all in the same order (Phokion, Marius, and Caesar; Pompey is almost another); and even in these some anecdotes are omitted from the *Apophthegmata* which are found in the *Life*, which is difficult to explain if they were taken from it (e.g. *Phok.* 25. 1-2 and *Apophth.* No. 13, 188 E), and there are many variations. We need not suppose that Plutarch either prepared or even intended them for publication; but he may in the course of writing the *Lives* have arranged anecdotes he had already collected under their proper headings, and even have put some into the order he wanted for the *Life* (this would be especially valuable for the *Phokion*, which consists so largely of anecdote),

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sayings recur in the *Lives* and the *Essays*, often, however, with variations. Besides these there were the extracts he had made from books that he had been able to consult, the rarer and the more learned books: Diodoros Periegetes he may obviously have read, as he was interested in the monuments of Athens;<sup>1</sup> when we read in *Kimon*, 12-13, his account of the Eurymedon campaign and the consequent treaty of Kallias (as he supposed), the natural, and therefore the proper, assumption to make is that he had read Thucydides and Ephoros, and perhaps other general histories as well, and finding no outstanding contradiction among them, wrote according to the generally accepted tradition; that he had read Kallisthenes and had noted that he differed from Ephoros as to the name of the Persian commander and denied the reality of the treaty of Kallias, and that somewhere he had read that Phanodemos gave a different number of Persian ships from Ephoros.<sup>2</sup> Ion of Chios and Stesimbrotos are other authors he will have read, probably in Athens, and not had by him in Chaironeia;<sup>3</sup> so too, the rarer comedies, though not every citation need be at first hand; he did not much like the Old Comedy, but he may have possessed Kratinos and Eupolis, for copies of their plays were still being made after his lifetime. Remember as well the mechanical difficulty of citation: no codices, only rolls; no convenient division into chapters; no indexes.<sup>4</sup> Hence the occasional faulty reference or mistake in quotation,<sup>5</sup> and the variation in many

just as he had apparently also arranged some for the essays (*Mor.* 457 D and 464 F, above). The question is an interesting one; for, if Plutarch made these collections (or if they were made from his own works), there cannot have been a closely similar collection before his time for him to use—he did not simply repeat the work of others; though other collections, especially of Spartan sayings, existed. See Zimmermann, *Rh. Mus.* lxxix, 1930, 61.

It is to be noted that no authority is given for any of those sayings which are found both in the *Apophthegmata* and in the *Lives* and *Essays* (with one exception, *Ages.* 13. 7 and 191 A). They belonged to the general tradition, and many of them were repeated often enough, as Themistokles and the Seriphian (the well-known story), 185 C, *Them.* 18. 5, etc.; and they are used to illustrate character (*Them.* 18. 1; *Cat. Mai.* 7. 3), not to establish the truth of an event. If Satyros is characteristic of the Hellenistic biographers (above, p. 75, n. 3), it would be natural to suppose this absence of citation to be in part due to them.

<sup>1</sup> But clearly he had not made a thorough study of the monuments with Diodoros in his hand: see *Them.* 32. 5-6 (below, p. 446).

<sup>2</sup> See below, i. 100, 1 n.

<sup>3</sup> Not only is Stesimbrotos often quoted, and not often with approval, but there is one detail from him, trivial in itself and quite irrelevant to Plutarch's purpose, *Per.* 26. 1, which is surely a mark of Plutarch's own learning—a piece of harmless, unconscious vanity (*ἄχηρος ἴστορα*, in fact); there would be no point whatever in repeating it from someone else.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Prentice on Thucydides, *C.P.* xxv, 1930, 117-23.

<sup>5</sup> e.g. the slip in *Nik.* 6. 3, *Καλλιάδον τε καὶ Σενοφῶντος*, which is a confusion between Thuc. ii. 79 (cf. 70. 1) and i. 61. 1 (cf. 63. 3), and in addition *Καλλιάδον* is a mistake for *Καλλίτον* (son of Kalliades).

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of them, often in *Lives* that were probably written at many years' interval: *Kim.* 16. 1 and *Per.* 29. 3 (the greater detail in the former is, as well, relevant there), *Kim.* 10. 1-2 and *Per.* 9. 2, *Demos.* 1. 1 and *Alkib.* 11. 2, *Demos.* 1. 2, and *Per.* 8. 7 (a notable instance, for the saying was well known: Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 1411 a 14; Plut. *Mor.* 186 c, 803 A).<sup>1</sup> We can see Plutarch at work, *Mor.* 384 D (*de E ap. Delphos*, 1): στιχιδίοις τισν οὐ φαύλως ἔχοντων, ὃ φίλε Σαραπίων, ἐνέτυχον<sup>2</sup> πρώτην, ἀ Δικαιάρχος Εὐρυπίδην οἴεται πρὸς Ἀρχέλαον εἰπεῖν·

οὐ βούλομαι πλοντοῦντι δωρεῖσθαι πένης,  
μή μ' ἀφρονα κρίνης ἢ διδοὺς αἴτεν δοκῶ,

taking a roll from his shelves, a Euripides with a learned commentary, or perhaps he recalled from earlier reading what Dikaiarchos had said. When he says ταῦτα μὲν ἐπελθόντα τῇ μνήμῃ κατὰ τὴν γραφήν (*Per.* 24. 12), we may take him literally, that he remembered something which he had read but did not, probably because in Chaironeia he could not, verify the reference; similarly his ὡς εἰρηκέ που καὶ Θεόπομπος, whether he had Theopompos by him or not.<sup>3</sup> He naturally does not quote authority for what was generally accepted, the main core of the narrative, nor for the well-known anecdote; but for details as well he sometimes either prefers the vague φασι or can do no better than that. And in any case, we must repeat: Plutarch was an artist, an essayist and not a historian; to cite authority for every statement was, like *Quellenkritik*, far from his purpose; and even if he had read every word of every book that he quotes from, this does not imply any scientific research. In general, he takes the traditional material, which for the fifth century means Herodotos and Thucydides as in part supplemented and in part modified by later historians such as Ephoros and Theopompos; he likes to note variations in his authorities and sometimes to discuss them; but his main purpose was delineation of character as seen in the πράξεις recorded by the historians (good and bad) and in the small anecdotes and sayings recorded by any number of writers (good and bad). The *Lives* are not wise and learned history, any more than the *Essays* are profound philosophy; and we are sometimes left stranded, ignorant of just what we should like to know: we can judge for ourselves how much truth there is in the statements that

<sup>1</sup> *Nik.* 4. 2 may be another, a quotation from Pasiphon's dialogues; for Diog. Laert. ii. 7 says that Aischines' dialogues were said by Persaios to be by Pasiphon, and Plutarch elsewhere quotes Aischines. Zimmermann, *Rh. Mus.* lxxix, 1930, 59-61, has some good remarks on this subject.

<sup>2</sup> For ἐντυχεῖν, 'meet with in the course of reading', or simply 'read', see Holden's note on *Nik.* 1. 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Mittelhaus on the *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*, Diss. Berlin, 1911 who argues that in this essay Plutarch is often quoting from his own *Lives*, generally abridging and often with variations which suggest that his memory was at fault. (I know of this dissertation only through Bursian, clxx, p. 282.)

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Perikles' policy of cleruchies, dikastic pay, fine festivals, and military service was simply a demoralizing bribery of the people and Kimon's feeding and clothing his fellow-citizens a noble generosity; but we want to know as well, were these statements made by contemporaries? is Plutarch recording, as he does elsewhere, attacks made at the time, or only the summary of a Theopompos? Because it was *Gemeingut*, Plutarch does not here give his authority, any more than for the outline history of the Persian wars.<sup>1</sup>

This is no place in which to discuss in detail Plutarch's sources and his use of them; but the foregoing short survey of some of our problems will show where I differ from most modern critics, Meyer, Busolt, Leo, Uxkull, and Weizsäcker. In brief, Plutarch is far too individual a writer and too good an artist ever to have copied a single author for a *Life*; the argument 'he did not have Herodotus before him for the *Themistokles* and the *Aristeides* because of the differences in detail and in the order of the narrative; therefore he copied closely an *anonymus'*, lacks understanding of his genius as well as logic, particularly since we are sure that he knew Herodotus well, and was critical of his truthfulness; we can be confident that the doubts he expresses about Perikles' character and the difficulties he found with his sources are his own, even though another may have

<sup>1</sup> I have quoted above Wilamowitz's comparison of Plutarch with Gibbon. The comparison would have been even more illuminating if the latter had carried out his plan of a series of biographies that he contemplated towards the end of his life. In a letter to Lord Sheffield (Jan. 6, 1793) he wrote: "I have long resolved in my mind another scheme of biographical writing: the Lives, or rather, the Characters, of the most eminent Persons in Arts and Arms, in Church and State, who have flourished in Britain from the reign of Henry VIII to the present age. This work, extensive as it may be, would be an amusement rather than a toil: the materials are accessible in our own language, and for the most part ready to my hands; but the subject, which could afford a rich display of human nature and domestic history, would powerfully address itself to the feelings of every Englishman". (Compare also his earlier plans for a life of Raleigh, mentioned in his *Autobiography*, years 1761 and 1762—especially his note from his *Journal*, July 26, 1762.) This might almost be Plutarch himself writing. And I cannot refrain from continuing the quotation from this letter to Sheffield: he asked his friend to sound a bookseller on the subject as if the idea came from him, Sheffield, "as it is most essential that I be solicited and do not solicit. . . . If he kindles at the thought, and eagerly claims my alliance; you will begin to hesitate. 'I am afraid, Mr. Nichols, that we shall hardly persuade my friend to engage in so great a work. Gibbon is old, and rich, and lazy. However, you may make the trial.' " This is not Plutarch. (I quote this last from Bury's Introduction to the *Autobiography* in the World's Classics Series; who regrets that Gibbon never carried out his plan—"we might have had from his brilliant pen portraits of Elizabeth and Cromwell, Wolsey and Laud, Marlborough and Bolingbroke, to name but half a dozen of the host that crowd to one's mind".)

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felt them before him. He *selects* from a mass of material,<sup>1</sup> as he says more than once (*Nik.* 1, *Alex.* 1), and arranges it himself. He does not rewrite another's biography, any more than in his essays he simply epitomized Theophrastos or Poseidonios, though we can find parallels in Cicero and Dion of Prusa.<sup>2</sup> If stories in Plutarch reappear, occasionally, in almost the same form in Aelian; if a learned discussion, with citation of much the same authors, reappears in Athenaios or in *scholia*: this does not prove the use of a single common source closely copied. Apart from the possibility that Aelian used Plutarch, who was a popular author, an argument from the former's probable practice is quite irrelevant to the latter—they were not men of the same kidney; and for the learned parallels: in how many cases could we not find modern scholars repeating (inevitably) the 'references' and even the arguments of their predecessors, without assuming that they had not themselves read the authorities?<sup>3</sup> Amongst authors thus quoted in a *Zitatenkompelx* is Aristophanes, whom Plutarch had certainly read. I do not in fact believe that a man, universally declared to be widely read and universally admitted to be honest, used only one or two books for an essay or a *Life*, keeping closely to their form and content, using all their learning (which may also be second or third hand), pretending to quote from so many authors, criticizing some of them, and suppressing the name of one author in particular—the one from whom he took nearly everything he knew. It is this assumed disingenuousness on Plutarch's part which enables these critics to say, after confident assertion that he copied from such and such kind of source, 'it is useless to guess at a name': a sensible remark, and one which at the same time avoids the difficulty of solving the problem. We are asked to take for granted the existence of an author or school of authors so obscure that their very names are not recorded, or little

<sup>1</sup> It is the recognition of this fact that puts Powell's article on the *Alexander* (*J.H.S.* lix, 1939, 229–40) on a different plane from most discussions; but in this case too I hesitate to believe that Plutarch used two books only (an elaborate *Life* and the spurious *Letters*), and that his quotations are fakes—especially the bunch of them in 46. 1 (though one or two of these may be at second hand). Powell argues mainly from the similarity to Arrian; but the parallel does not always work: Arrian often cites Ptolemy and Aristoboulos; Plutarch cites the latter six times, Ptolemy only once, amongst the rest in 46.

<sup>2</sup> The similarity of thought between the *de Monarchia* and Dion is attributed to a common source, Poseidonios. I should have said that a common monarchy was a more likely cause, though I would not deny the predominantly literary, classical, character of the *Essays*.

<sup>3</sup> I have before me at the moment Stahl's, Classen-Steup's, and Marchant's editions of Thucydides. On ii. 49. 3 all quote Grote's not very profound remark that Thucydides seems to have been familiar with medical terminology; on ii. 56. 2 all refer to Herodotus, vi. 48 (so do Widmann and Croiset), none to vi. 95.

Athenaios may have got some of his references from Plutarch, whose work he knew, in the same sense as moderns do; so may, for that matter, the scholiasts.

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more than their names, yet so dominating the historical or biographical writing of his century that Plutarch drew upon them wholesale.<sup>1</sup> It is easier to believe that the widely read Plutarch, the man of classical sympathies, did some reading in the classics for himself. It may be true, in a sense, that "er hat nicht, wie man vielfach annimmt, vielerlei gelesen und dann mehr oder minder frei unter dem Eindruck des von ihm aufgelesenen Materials seine Biographien geschrieben, vielmehr hat er zunächst auf Grund einer Quelle einen Grundbericht verfasst und sodann weitere Autoren gelesen die er dazu benutzte, um seinen Grundbericht auszubauen und zu bereichern";<sup>2</sup> but we must remember as well two things—first that Plutarch was a widely read man before he wrote his *Lives* or the majority of them, and secondly that he did not, and could not, use the same method with every *Life*: for one thing if he had already read and annotated Theopompos, say, for an early essay (the *de Herodoti malignitate*: see 855 A) and an early *Life*, he would already have notes from him for a later one;<sup>3</sup> for another, the material varied so much for the different *Lives*, for the Greek and the Roman, *Theseus* and *Alkibiades*, *Aristeides* and *Perikles*, *Nikias*

<sup>1</sup> Uxkull, p. 110, invents a whole school of biography in the 2nd century B.C., which is the basis of Nepos and Plutarch's narrative sections: "Die Vorbilder des Pl. und N., wie sie zu rekonstruieren gelang, sind kunst- und schmucklose Produkte, die nicht dem Geschmack einer Zeit entsprachen, die sich bald an Dionysius von Halikarnass berauschen sollte;" and so no names or titles are preserved. Yet they directed the pen of Nepos, a contemporary of Dionysios, and of Plutarch; Nepos and Plutarch are joined, as though they were similar writers; and there is, says Uxkull, one invaluable witness to the existence of this otherwise unknown biography, these *kunst- und schmucklosen Produkten*, namely Cicero, *de Orat.* ii. 341 ff. (cf. above, p. 56, n. 3)—"nec illud tertium laudationum genus est difficile, quod ego initio quasi a praecepsis nostris secreveram; sed et quia multa sunt orationum genera et graviora et maioris copiae, de quibus nemo fere praeciperet, et quod nos laudationibus non ita multum uti soleremus, totum hunc segregabam locum; ipsi enim Graeci magis legendi et delectationis aut hominis alicuius ornandi quam utilitatis huius forensis causa laudationes scriptitaverunt; quorum sunt libri, quibus Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Philippus, Alexander aliique laudantur; nostrae laudationes, quibus in foro utimur, aut testimoni brevitatem habent nudam et inornatam aut scribuntur ad funebrem contionem, quae ad orationis laudem minime accommodata est." Uxkull does not reproduce the passage; but others before him had seen its meaning, as Leo, p. 211.

Uxkull's is, for the understanding of Plutarch, the most perverse of recent writings; yet it contains much that is valuable, and many shrewd comments, mostly in criticism of others.

<sup>2</sup> Lenschau, in *R.E.* xix. 2422 (art. 'Philistos').

<sup>3</sup> The puzzle of the cross-references may in part be solved by this: he may have been at work at two or more *Lives* at the same time, in this sense at least that he was making notes for more than one from the same author. We cannot answer that every book formed a pair—that therefore *Phokion* and *Cato Minor* were being composed together, but not *Phokion* and *Demosthenes*. *Dion* and *Brutus* were composed together, *Brutus* and *Caesar* were not; but so different were

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and Demetrios or *Philopoimen*.<sup>1</sup> We must think of him as *in the main* writing from memory, often doubtless from a memory recently refreshed. We inevitably picture a man writing with books around him. We call him scientific if he uses all the proper authorities, if he judges their values correctly, and if he is careful and thorough, unscientific if he fails in one or more of these virtues; but scientific or not, we imagine him with his sources at hand. So do we imagine Plutarch, whether we think he was following one source or many; but wrongly. Plutarch was an unscientific historian, not only and not principally because he failed in the first two of the three virtues mentioned above, but because he sat down to write essays, not history at all, and if not with no books before him, at least mainly using his memory, a memory of a great number of books, including many of the best and many of the least valuable, referring frequently to the notes he had made, occasionally to a book in his library, but again not methodically, but as memory prompted him. In no way must we suppose his methods identical with those of a Didymos, or a Nepos, with Aelian, or Stobaios, or Photios.

## IV. PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL CRITICISM

I wish to state one or two principles in the use of historical evidence for the period covered by Thucydides. If the foregoing analysis of the nature of the evidence, brief as it is, is accurate in essentials, certain conclusions will follow. If official documents contradict Thucydides, we must believe the former, even though they are not infallible and even though we must keep in mind their limitations (above, pp. 30-2); it is possible to *imagine* a case in which common sense compels us to say that a document (a genuine, not a forged document) cannot be trusted, but we have not to consider such. We must, however, be cautious with restored inscriptions: it is the historian's duty to accept the epigraphist's statement as to what is on the stone and his latest view as to fragments and their relative position and the possibilities of restoration; but he recognizes that epigraphists change their minds. Secondly, if Thucydides states or clearly implies something that contradicts a contemporary pamphleteer or a later historian of the type of Ephoros, Douris, or

the sources in the pair which made up a book, that all the preparatory work at least of the two *Lives* must have been done separately, and so similar were those of Brutus and Caesar that theirs must have been done together. In *Nik.* ii. 2 there is a reference to the *Alkibiades* with the present tense used, δηλοῦται; and there is no reason why this should not be taken literally ('I am now at work on my *Alkibiades*'), for it was practically impossible not to be preparing the two at the same time. See Mewaldt's interesting paper, *Herm.* xlii, 1907, 504-78; and cf. Bonner, *Dionysios of Halikarnassos*, p. 32. 1, 36. 1.

<sup>1</sup> See Westlake's article on the *Timoleon*, *C.Q.* xxxii, 1938, 65-74, *ad fin.*

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Diodoros, or Plutarch, Thucydides is to be believed. It is commonly said, when a man wishes to neglect his authority, that Thucydides was not infallible. He was not; he must have been sometimes wrong, and Diodoros (I am thinking only of 5th-century history) was sometimes right; but obviously the chance of the coincidence of Diodoros being right just where Thucydides was wrong is so small that it will be generally neglected by prudent men. Thucydides sometimes omits what he ought to have included; and in one well-known case, the increase in the tribute of the allies, Plutarch preserves part of the truth. It is worth considering this: Plutarch describes the actions of the just and honest Aristeides in the first assessment, and how this time was regarded by the allies as a golden age, καὶ μάλιστα μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον διπλασιασθέντος, εἰτ' αὖθις τριπλασιασθέντος. ὃν μὲν γὰρ Ἀριστεῖδης ἔταξεν, ἦν εἰς ἔχηκοντα καὶ τετρακοσίων ταλάντων λόγον. τούτῳ Περικλῆς μὲν ἐπέθηκεν ὀλίγου δεῖν τὸ τρίτον μέρος· ἔξακοσια γὰρ τάλαντα Θουκυδίδης φησὶν ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου προσένει τοῖς Ἀθηναῖς ἀπὸ τῶν συμμάχων. Περικλέους δ' ἀποθανόντος ἐπιτείνοντες οἱ δημαρχοὶ κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς χιλίων καὶ τριακοσίων ταλάντων κεφάλαιον ἀνήγαγον, οὐχ οὕτω τοῦ πολέμου διὰ μῆκος καὶ τύχας δαπανηροῦ γενομένου καὶ πολυτελοῦς, ὡς τὸν δῆμον εἰς διανομὰς καὶ θεωρικὰ καὶ κατασκευὰς ὄγαλμάτων καὶ ιερῶν προαγαγόντες (*Arist.* 24. 3-5). The discovery of *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 63, has substantially confirmed this, though not μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον διπλασιασθέντος, εἰτ' αὖθις τριπλασιασθέντος, nor the demagogic motives,<sup>1</sup> and though one piece of genuine learning, the 600 talents of *Thuc.* ii. 13. 3, is known to be mistaken; but before that discovery a careful historian would not have preferred so rhetorical a passage to the silence of Thucydides. It is our duty to follow the best evidence, not to neglect it in favour of a view of our own "supported" by a weak writer on the ground that the best is not infallible. So long as we have only Diodoros' evidence or Plutarch's, or that of Hellanikos or Ephorus to oppose to Thucydides, we must in general follow the latter until some other evidence turns up to show that they are right. If by some chance Diodoros had preserved the name Drakontides as one of the strategoi against Kerkyra, we should still have been right to follow the text of Thucydides before the discovery of *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 295; a guess that the former was right would have been a lucky instance of intuition, but it would have remained a guess, not scientific criticism. Especially must we be careful how we let our views of the general character of Greek history ('the Athenian democracy, or Persia, or intelligent Spartan statesmen, would not have acted like this') interfere with this principle. We are, of course, entitled to and must use our

<sup>1</sup> εἰς διανομὰς καὶ θεωρικά, κ.τ.λ., is practically a repetition of the motives attributed to Pericles twenty years earlier (*Per.* 9-12).

With Περικλῆς ἐπέθηκεν, cf. above, p. 70, n. 2.

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independent judgement; we do not follow any author blindly, not even Thucydides; but if our judgement, against him, is correct, it helps nothing to say that it relies on Diodoros or Nepos. "There is a point at which probability must be allowed to prevail over authority", says Mr. Walker in a sensible note on the political situation in Boeotia in 457<sup>1</sup> (especially, it may be added, when the 'authority' is partly a political pamphlet, partly modern inference from that authority).<sup>2</sup> There is; we are certain, for example, that Xerxes did not lead five million men into Greece; and Grote was right, before the discovery of the *Constitution of Athens*, to doubt Herodotos' statement that Kallimachos the polemarch had been chosen by lot,<sup>3</sup> even though Herodotos is our best authority in each case. But *Thucydides* did not deal in absurdities; and we must think twice before we apply the principle to him. Above all, we must not reject our only good authority for an event, and then think that we know something about the event; that is only to cut the ground from under our feet.

Judgement between Thucydides and other evidence is more difficult in two other classes of cases. One is where not a direct statement but a natural inference from an official document conflicts with the historian. It is a natural inference from the headings of the Quota-lists that the office of Hellenotamiae was instituted when they begin, in 454–453; but Thucydides expressly states that it was instituted, as an Athenian office, at the beginning of the League, when the *φόπος* was first collected (see i. 96. 2 n., p. 279). In this case I believe we should follow the historian. The other class is of cases (very few in number) where Thucydides conflicts with later writers not of the stamp of Ephoros or Douris, but with the scholars of the fourth and third century. If in a matter of medieval or renaissance history a reader found in a modern book, of a careful and scholarly character, a statement that was in conflict with a writer contemporary with the event, he would conclude that later research had shown the contemporary writer to have been wrong; and of two such modern books, equally careful and scholarly, but the one written fifty years after the other, he would rightly believe the later.<sup>4</sup> It might be supposed therefore that when Aristotle contradicts Thucydides directly about an event before the latter's own time, the murder of Hipparchos (*Aθην.* 18. 4 and *Thuc.* vi. 58. 2; cf. *Aθην.* 16. 4 and vi. 54. 5) we should without hesitation follow the later writer. But we must hesitate. The original work of the scholars

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is lost; we are certain that it was valuable, but we do not know how consistently valuable. We know it only as embedded, part of it, in the *Αθηναίων πολιτεία*, and in numerous quotations by later writers; and the former is, a good deal of it, so carelessly written, and the quotations by others were made so long after the decline of historical science and so often by men who lacked historical sense, that we cannot even be sure that all our *fragmenta* survive in accurate form. We must therefore remain in doubt when they contradict a writer as careful as Thucydides.<sup>1</sup> When they contradict an Ephoros or a Theopompos, we believe them, in the absence of other and respectable evidence. When we have such a conflict as that between Thucydides and Aristotle in their accounts of the Four Hundred, a contemporary event to the former, we are still in doubt; for Thucydides was not an eye-witness of the events, and his eighth book is unfinished—we do not know for certain that he was satisfied with the information that he had got.<sup>2</sup>

When we are dealing with additional matter, events and stories told by later writers that are not found in any form in contemporaries, we can only use our judgement in each case, according both to the nature of the authority and of the thing stated. Especially is this so with 'anecdotes' about great men: they must not be all dismissed any more than they can be all accepted. An anecdote may be entirely true, rare though this is; it may be embroidery of something true, an exaggeration; it may be invention (and both in character and not). If invention, is it contemporary, showing 'which way the wind sits', or a later fiction? If the former, it may be as valuable to the historian as if it were true. But every anecdote must be considered on its merits.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Busolt, *Staatskunde*, i. 598. 4, would give unqualified belief to Thucydides, vi. 54 and 58, because he was specially well informed about the Peisistratidai. So should have been, however, and perhaps was, the authority on whom Aristotle relied.

<sup>2</sup> This is the chief reason why we cannot give his narrative unqualified support (as Schwahn does, *R.E.* art. 'Theramenes', 5 A, 2304).

<sup>3</sup> Naturally I have not thought it proper to include in the following commentary every variation from or addition to Thucydides to be found in Diodoros, Plutarch, or others, but only what is significant for the history of the Peloponnesian war.

<sup>1</sup> C.A.H. v. 469.

<sup>3</sup> C. xxxi, vol. iii, p. 366, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> But see Chambers's *Sir Thomas More* (1935), pp. 274–87, for an instance of how stories both of historical and biographical import can grow, even in a comparatively scientific age like the 19th century.

<sup>2</sup> See i. 108. 3 n.

## COMMENTARY

### BOOK I

#### I-23. PREFACE

**1. 1. Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε:** the title-page, as it were, of the book—first the author's name, and then his subject. Herodotus began his book in a similar way; Xenophon did not, either *Hellenika* which professes to continue from Thucydides' last sentence, or the independent *Anabasis*.

**Ἀθηναῖος:** Thucydides, like most Greek historians, is writing for a Greek, not for a specifically Athenian public; hence the name of his *polis* is given. So 'Ἐκαταῖος Μιλήσιος' and 'Ηρόδοτος Ἀλικαρνησσεύς' (or Θούριος) in the first sentences of their *Histories*. Clasen notes that in iv. 104. 4, when he has to describe himself as Athenian strategos he uses the normal patronymic.

**ξυνέγραψε:** for the meaning of the aorist here, in connexion with the problems of the composition of the *History*, see Appendix to vol. iii. **τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Π. καὶ Ἀθ., ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἄλλήλους:** Th. exactly defines his subject, which is the war, not a history of Greece during the war. Not only will he not digress nor wander at large over a wide field, but he will confine himself to military and naval affairs and to politics in so far as politics influenced them (Introduction, pp. 25-9). Herodotus' definition of his subject allows him his wider scope.

**ἐλπίσας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων:** the first twenty-three chapters (not the first nineteen only) are (with some additional matter) Thucydides' justification for this statement. Most commentators have regarded it as an obvious exaggeration of the importance of his subject, whether pardonable or not, especially in the comparison with the Persian wars. See, for example, Macan, *Herodotus, Books iv-vi*, vol. ii, pp. 184 ff., and *Books vii-ix*, vol. ii, pp. 17 ff., and in *C.A.H.* v, p. 413; or Schwartz, pp. 168-72, who (after making very clear the main points in Thucydides' argument) says that the *Prooimion* serves only as rhetorical *αἰξῆσις* of the theme of the book, exactly as if Thucydides *was* composing an *ἀγάνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν*. For a different view see my *Essays*, 116 ff.: Thucydides' argument, in my view, is (1) that Greece was now at the height of her prosperity, at all previous periods had been comparatively poor, and wars on a large scale, except *τὰ Περικά*, therefore impossible, and (2) that in fact previous wars had been either confined to a few states or had been of short duration; and that therefore this war was far more *destructive*,

materially and morally, than any other in Greek history. That is why he emphasizes certain events which had little effect on the result of the war (in the sense of victory for one side or the other), as the judicial murder of the Plataians, the stasis at Kerkyra, the expedition to Melos, the destruction of Mykalessos, and gives so much space in the speeches to ethical arguments ('might is right', etc.); if Thucydides wanted his readers to draw any one moral from his work it was *βίας διδάσκαλος δ τόλεμος*.<sup>1</sup> My view has not been generally accepted; and I will add one or two things to make it clearer. Thucydides does not say that the Peloponnesian war was 'the most important event in history', but the most notable of all wars; and *οὐ μεγάλα* below, § 3, does not mean 'unimportant' or 'uninteresting', but 'not on a large scale' (and even this he later modifies, by implication, for the Trojan and Persian wars). He does not in fact say what Dionysios, and so many moderns after him, make him say, *ἐν τῷ προοιμίῳ διαισθύων τὰ παλαιὰ ἔργα μάλιστα θαυμασιώτατα τὰ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἐπιτελεσθέντα φησὶν εἶναι* (*Eph. ad Pomp.* 3. 6, p. 769 R.); he does not "weigh the *civilization* of earlier centuries by the standard of Athenian imperialism, and find it wanting", nor does he "utterly neglect the rich intellectual and aesthetic heritage of the past".<sup>2</sup> Dionysios is more accurate, though silly, when he says (a few lines before) that Thucydides puts his readers off at the very beginning by his statement of the numbers of cities destroyed, of unexampled proscriptions and massacres, of earthquakes and droughts and plagues. Thucydides assumed (like Herodotos), he does not assert, that war is an evil and that everybody would agree with him; it is implied throughout his introduction and his history.

This is not to deny another side to his character which helped him in his work, his interest in the technique of military affairs, nor a possible (even a probable) belief in the Athenian empire as, on the whole, doing more good than harm; these are quite consistent with a belief that war is an evil. A Frenchman or an Englishman, a German or an Austrian (still more the inhabitants of the invaded countries, Belgium and Serbia) might well have thought in 1914, and still more in the ensuing years, that the war would be a major

<sup>1</sup> Schwartz says the narrative of the war and its *Wirkungen* itself should have provided the proof of Thucydides' argument that this war was the greatest of all; "aber grade von den Wirkungen des Krieges ist nirgends die Rede", a fact which, he says, can only be explained as Ulrich explained it, that the *Prooimion* was written for the Ten Years' War only, which ended without a clear decision, and so Thucydides must explain the greatness of his theme. This seems to show that by *die Wirkungen*, Schwartz means only victory for one side or the other; Thucydides was thinking of more than that.

<sup>2</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia* (Eng. trans.), 383–4. (When Jaeger says: "this account of early Greek history expresses Thucydides' historical outlook with unsurpassable clarity, although far from exhaustively", the last three words are very true, but have been ignored by their author in his previous judgements.)

disaster for his own country and for Europe, and at the same time that it could not be avoided; and even if he attributed the greater part of the responsibility to his own country, he could still have a reasoned desire for his country to win (as for example many Englishmen did in 1899). This is even more obvious in 1940. It is curious that in the face of our own cares and difficulties—hatred of war as such, horror of modern warfare at this particular time with its threat of ruin for all Europe, combined with a conviction that we could do nothing else but fight—we do not see that there might be a similar conflict of opinion and feeling in Athens in 431.

ἀκμάζοντες . . . ἀμφότεροι παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσῃ: see below, 19 n., and 118. 2 n. (p. 360).

1–2. καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικόν, κ.τ.λ.: the whole of Greece was involved, sooner or later, and a good many non-Greek peoples as well (e.g. Epeirots, Macedonians, Thracians, Sikels), almost, one might say, the majority of mankind. This last points to the Persian empire; but even as qualified is an exaggeration. For not only were many non-Greek peoples, of those known to Thucydides, not involved, as the Illyrians, the Celts, or the Italians, but the Persian empire was very little affected. But for the rest it was the greatest *κίνησις, disturbance*, known, a breakdown of the fabric of Greek society. Note that this is truer if it refers to the whole war, not to the first ten years only.

3. τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτι παλαιότερα: there is a difficulty here well discussed by Steup. τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν must mean, both in language and logic, 'Greek history before the Peloponnesian war', the whole of it, and τὰ ἔτι παλαιότερα is therefore a subdivision of this; but (1) 'still older' than what? and (2) it could not be said of the period from 510 to 435 B.C. that it *συφάς εὑρεῖν διὰ χρόνου πλήθος ἀδύνατα ἦν*, nor does Thucydides in his excursus on the Pentekontaëta (i. 89–118; esp. 97. 2) suggest that it was.<sup>1</sup> This is true only of the period before 510; and that Thucydides means this seems to be shown particularly by the contents of c. 2 and the opening words of c. 3: *δηλοῖ δέ μοι καὶ τόδε τῶν παλαιῶν* (another *τεκμήριον*). Hence cc. 2–17 contain the arguments in support of the statement here made that these earlier wars (from the Trojan to those of the tyrants) were not on the large scale of the Peloponnesian, nor Greece in general so prosperous and civilized. Cc. 18–19 are then concerned with the period c. 510 to 435 (before τὰ Κερκυραϊκά, 24 ff.), but only with one aspect of it, the increase in wealth

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides' freedom of expression is remarkable: cf. 3. 2 *κατὰ ἔθνη δὲ ἄλλα τε καὶ τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀφ’ ἐντῶν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν παρέχεσθαι*, where 'other races' are not in sense part of the subject of *παρέχεσθαι* (note the singular *τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν* = *Πελασγοῖς*). But even if this could justify the grammar of 1. 3, it does not help the phrase τὰ ἔτι παλαιότερα.

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and in military preparations; the other aspect—the Persian wars not so big as the Peloponnesian—is reserved for 23. 1. This division between the periods before and after c. 510 B.C. seems to be clear;<sup>1</sup> and there is therefore much to be said for Steup's suggestion that a clause, saying something about the period 510–435, has dropped out after *τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν*; we may suggest *τὰ τε Μηδικὰ φανερῶς λειποσθαι δοκεῖ*. Delachaux takes *τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν* as itself 'the period immediately before 431', and suggests *τὰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν φαίνεται οὐ μείζω γεγενημένα, τὰ δὲ ἔτι παλαιτέρα, κ.τ.λ.*

**τεκμηρίων:** not so much *evidence* as *inferences* from evidence, as always in the law-courts, and as *τεκμαιρόμενος* above. See 20. 1 n. Thucydides is not discovering new evidence, but interpreting the accepted tradition (Introd., pp. 40–1).

**2. 2. τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὖσης:** inter-state commerce is the first sign, for Thucydides, of a settled life and higher standards of living. This should be noted both by those who think that commerce was at no time important in Greece and by those who think that, though it was important, Thucydides was unaware of it. He also understood the significance of the accumulation of capital (*περιουσίᾳ χρημάτων*), and the opportunity this afforded for planning ahead. In these early times in Greece men only grew corn and vegetables, enough for each year's need; they did not plant trees (*γῆν φυτεύοντες*, in Greece principally vines and olives); for trees take time before producing a profitable crop (the vine 3–4 years, the olive 6–7), and will still not be profitable unless the fruit of several years can be gathered. This requires, not only a settled life, but capital by which the grower may support himself in the period before the trees reach the fruit-bearing stage.

Thucydides is here thinking primarily of the pre-Trojan era; for he knew of course that the vine and the olive were commonly cultivated in Homeric times. Though he knew something, by tradition, of Minoan Crete (c. 4), he knew practically nothing of the flourishing civilization of the Aegean period on the mainland and the islands long before the Trojan wars (3. 1).

**3. ἡ τε νῦν Θεσσαλία καλουμένη, κ.τ.λ.:** Boeotia and Peloponnesos were also comparatively recent names, the Thessaloi, Boiotoi, and Pelops being all new-comers. It must be kept in mind that Thucydides accepts as unquestionably historical the main outline of the Greek traditions as far back as Deukalion and Minos. Cf. 2. 5 below.

Thessaly and Boeotia contain the best wheat-growing districts

<sup>1</sup> For *τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαῖ*, 20. 1, see n. ad loc. In view of this distinction, and still more of Thucydides' careful note of commercial and military progress and increase of settled conditions of life in cc. 2–17, I cannot understand Jaeger's view that the past was all one to him (*Paideia*, p. 383).

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in Greece, and Thessaly easily the largest plains. Of the Peloponnesian the valleys of Lakonia and Messenia are exceptionally fertile (it is possible, for example, to grow first barley and then maize within an olive-grove, thus getting three crops in one year from one piece of ground); Elis and the strip of northern coast are not far behind.

**5. τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικήν:** the lightness of the Attic soil, well suited to the olive, but not to corn, especially not to wheat, is well known. Less certain is the early freedom from internal and external strife. According to the Attic tradition, accepted by Thucydides, not only was the mass of the people autochthonous, that is, had lived there as far back as tradition told,<sup>1</sup> but such new-comers as there were were refugees from disturbed countries coming to a safe one, not invaders; Thucydides argues that the migrations from Attica to Ionia were not caused by invasion nor by internal strife, as in the rest of Greece, but were regularly planned colonies necessitated by the growth of population in a country too poor to support it. In fact a good many noble Athenian families were descended from these early "refugees", and Herodotus seems to take pleasure in pointing this out (the Peisistratidai, v. 65; both Harmodios and Aristogeiton, v. 55, 57 ff.; Isagoras probably, v. 66; Miltiades, vi. 35); when he says of the Alkmeonidai *γένος ἔοντες Αθηναῖοι* (v. 62, immediately after the account of the Gephyraioi from whom came the tyrannicides), he may mean that they were autochthonous; yet they too, like the Peisistratids, claimed descent from the Neleids of Pylos: see Macan ad loc.

For the date and nature of the Greek settlement of Ionia see below, n. on 12. 4.

**ἀστασίαστον οὖσαν:** yet there were traditions of wars within Attica, before the synoecism, as that between Eumolpos of Eleusis and Erechtheus mentioned by Thucydides, ii. 15. 1: presumably, in his view, 'political' wars only, on the issue of unity for all Attica.

From *τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικήν* to the end of the chapter is, as it were, a footnote, giving a reason for the inference that Thessaly, Boeotia, and the greater part of the Peloponnesian, though naturally rich countries, were yet in continual disturbance and so not prosperous: 'we can support this from the *later* (post-Trojan) history of Attica (see 12. 4), which has poor soil and therefore, not being subject to internal strife nor the object of envy, was not invaded; and increased in population to a greater extent than the rest of Greece owing to the arrival of refugees driven out by war or civil strife (cf. 12. 1)'. What Thucydides says here, that is, does not contradict the gener-

<sup>1</sup> It is by no means certain that Hellanikos, whom Thucydides probably used freely for the primitive period of Greek history (Introd., pp. 3 ff.), shared this view: see F. 161, and Jacoby's note. He may of course have shared it, without expressly stating it.

ally accepted view that before and up to the time of the Trojan wars, Athens, as can be seen from Homer, was a comparatively unimportant place.

6. διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὅμοιας αἰξηθῆναι: this is the reading of all the MSS. (except that G has ἀποικίας); but it is unsatisfactory for three reasons: (1) it makes this clause, instead of the next (ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος, κ.τ.λ.) contain the proof, the explanation of τόδε: 'here is a very good example to prove my point: Attica increased in prosperity more (than the rest of Greece) owing to the settlements of strangers within the territory.' This is contrary to normal usage: cf. 3. 1; Hdt. vii. 221, etc. (2) Thucydides would be guilty of a vicious circle in reasoning: 2. 2 δι' αὐτοῦ (frequent ἀπανάστασις) οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων ισχυον οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ, a fact which would now be used as a proof of the fact (see Delachaux). (3) 'Athens increased in other respects' (for ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα cf. 6. 4); but to what are 'the other respects' related? All we are told is that Athens was poor but secure; that by refugee immigration it increased in population beyond its capacity, and sent out colonies in consequence. For these reasons Ullrich's emendation *μετοικήσεις* for *μετοικίας* ἐστὶ has been approved by the majority of editors (Böhme, Stahl, Classen, Forbes, Hude)—'Here is a very good example to prove my point that, owing to the continual shifting of population, the rest of Greece did not advance (in security) as much as Attica: from the rest of Greece', etc.; though Thucydides would have been more likely to write τὸ ἄλλο (cf. 15. 3) than τὰ ἄλλα. It may be noted that the scholia (ABf), while clearly reading ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα, give two possible explanations, in one of which ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα is explained ἐστὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῆς μέρη, which gives the required sense.

Nicklin, C.R. xviii, 1904, 199, sees that the logic of the passage is as above, but thinks that, without changing the MSS. reading, 'the rest of Greece' may be taken as the subject of *αἰξηθῆναι*, and *ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα* translated 'in other respects than in the wealth derived from the soil'.

(H. Hommel, R.E. s.v. 'Metoikoi', 1419, would read *μετοικίσεις* for *μετοικήσεις*, on the ground that in classical Greek *μετοικεῖν*, and so *μετοικησις*, means 'living with', the essential idea in the technical use of *μέτοικος* in Attic, not 'changing one's abode'. This is unnecessary, for both meanings are possible, and the active sense in *μετοικίσεις* is unsuitable.)

3. 2. οὐδὲ τοῦνομα τοῦτο ξύμπασά πω εἶχεν: this was the usual Greek view, and is certainly true (Homer not knowing the name Hellene except for the inhabitants of Phthiotis). But with the problem of the spread of the Hellenic name was involved a much

more important one, the spread of a common Hellenic language. It is not possible to say how far Thucydides here agreed with Herodotus;<sup>1</sup> nor is the latter always consistent with himself. He states his view clearly, i. 56-8, that of the two divisions (only two) of the Greek race in the sixth century, the Ionian and the Dorian, the former had originally been Pelasgic, the latter Hellenic through Doros son of Hellen son of Deukalion, and that (as he argues, scientifically enough), if we are to judge by the speech of contemporary Pelasgians who though now widely separated from each other speak the same language, which is quite different from Greek and from their neighbours', the Ionians did not speak Greek until they were hellenized.<sup>2</sup> This hellenization presumably took place after Homer's time, who knows Hellenes only in Phthiotis, and after the Dorian migration, since the 'Pelasgians' were hellenized by the Dorians, though Herodotus nowhere expressly faces that awkward aspect of the problem; cf. vi. 53 where Perseus is already Dorian,<sup>3</sup> and ii. 51 where the Athenians, 'who by that time counted as Hellenes', are distinguished from those Pelasgians who settled in Attica. In viii. 44 the Athenians, who were at first Pelasgians, when Pelasgians inhabited Greece, were successively called Kranaoi, Kekropidai, Athenaioi, and finally Ionians when Ion son of Xouthos became their *στρατάρχης*; in vii. 94-5 the Ionians, when in the Peloponnese, were called Pelasgians till the arrival there of Danaos and Xouthos (cf. i. 145, ii. 171); the implication is that Ion (as grandson of Hellen, presumably) was as Hellenic—and as Dorian?—as Doros.<sup>4</sup> In ix. 26. 3 the Achaeans and Ionians of the Peloponnese defeat the first attempt of the Herakleidai under Hyllos to return to their homes; and the Ionians of Asia are not pure-blooded, but mixed with Minyans and Kadmeans and many others, including Pelasgians from Arkadia (i. 146). So all Crete in the time of Minos and Sarpedon, including the ruling family, is βάρβαρος (i. 173). On the other hand, the Ionians were the first *Hellenes* to learn the Phoenician alphabet from the Kadmeans and later to adapt it to the Hellenic tongue; and Herodotus thought he had seen Hellenic inscriptions in the Kadmean alphabet of the time of Laïos, long before the Trojan war.

<sup>1</sup> Hellanikos may equally have influenced Thucydides' views: see his F. 4, with Jacoby's commentary, p. 433.

<sup>2</sup> He does not say, as he has often been made to say, that the Ionians spoke a non-Aryan language. He was neither learned nor unscientific enough for that, which was reserved for modern scholars. Not only Persian and the Italic languages, but Macedonian, closely allied to Greek, were for him βάρβαροι γλώσσαι.

<sup>3</sup> See Macan, ad loc.

<sup>4</sup> The statement that they were called Ionian after Ion would not of itself imply Ionian or Hellenic blood in the mass of the population: the Lykioi were so called from Lykos son of Pandion of Athens (i. 173), but Herodotus hardly thought of them as kin with the Athenians.

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(v. 57-61); similarly, 'the Ionian dress worn by the Athenian women was strictly speaking not Ionian but Carian', ἐπεὶ οὐ γέ 'Ελληνικὴ ἐσθῆς πᾶσα οὐ ἀρχαίν τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ αὐτῇ οὐ τὴν νῦν Δωρίδα καλέομεν (v. 88). This last is perhaps only a verbal discrepancy; but the description of the Hellenic alphabet is quite inconsistent with the account in book i of the spread of the Hellenic language through the Dorians. So is the statement (ii. 52) that the original Pelasgians had no separate names for the gods, but called them θεούς, ὅτι κόσμῳ θέντες τὰ πάντα πρήγματα καὶ πάσας νομὰς εἶχον.

It is of no importance in itself to point out Herodotos' inconsistency; but it is of value to show that his account, being thus inconsistent, cannot be all from tradition, but is in part learned theory, probably Herodotos' own, well argued as far as it goes, but ignoring essential facts known to him and recognized by him in v. 57-61 and elsewhere; and he does not ask himself how this hellenization of the autochthonous and unconquered Athenians (and therefore of the Ionians of Asia, and so of Homer himself) took place. But did Thucydides agree with the theory? There is nothing in this chapter to prove that he did. He agreed that the name of Hellene for all the inhabitants of Greece began in Phthiotis, and that the majority of the inhabitants were before that called Pelasgians; but he does not here attribute this 'hellenization' to the Dorians, nor does he say that a Hellenic language spread *pari passu* with the name. He may, however, mean both these things by the phrase ὅσοι ἀλλήλων ξυνίεσσαν, 3. 4, 'as they came to understand each other', 'to learn a common language'; for elsewhere he seems to imply that the pre-Dorian peoples of the Peloponnese did not speak Greek: ii. 68. 3-5—Argos Amphilochikon was founded by Amphilochos son of Amphiareos after the Trojan war and only ἡλληνισθησαν τὴν νῦν γλώσσαν many generations later by settlers from neighbouring Amprakia (which, as a colony of Corinth, was Hellenic and Dorian); and in iv. 109. 4 he clearly means that he agrees with Herodotos (i. 57) that at least the scattered Pelasgians of his own day spoke a non-Greek language. It is, however, possible that he means only that originally the inhabitants of Greece spoke different dialects and not that some spoke 'Hellenic' and some a 'barbarian' tongue; for after his statement of the 'hellenization' to their present language (Doric Greek) of the Amphilochian Argives', he goes on *οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἀμφιλόχοι βάρβαροι εἰσω*. This may well mean not the rest of the settlers from Argos in the time of Amphilochos, but the indigenous inhabitants; just as the Macedonians were βάρβαροι though their kings were Hellenic, and the Molossians βάρβαροι though their kings were as Hellenic as anyone, descended from Achilles of Phthiotis. In that case the Amphilochian Argives are distinguished from the non-

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Greeks among whom they settled. On the other hand, *οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀμφιλόχοι* may refer only to οὐ ἄλλη Ἀμφιλοχία also settled from Argos, mentioned just before. See also below, on 3. 4.

The statement of Herodotos that the Pelasgians of his day spoke a 'foreign' tongue and his theory that the early Pelasgians of Greece spoke the same tongue and that Ionians were Pelasgians, have a lot to answer for. We may, however, say that the opinion that the Dorians were the first Hellenes (i.e. Greek-speaking people), and therefore the first Indo-Europeans to appear in Greece is not now widely held; it is generally held that the first Hellenes arrived in Greece about 2000 B.C. and were the Ionians. (1) There are various elements in the Greek language, both in vocabulary and in word-formation, that are not Greek in origin, especially in certain place-names, such as the suffixes in -σσ- (-ττ-) and -νθ- (*Μυκαλησσός*, *Υμηττός*, *Κόρυθος*, *Τίρυνς-Τίρυνθος*) which have their congeners in Karia in south-west Asia Minor (*Ἀλικαρνασσός*, *Μύλασα*, *Καλυνδῆς*, *Καρνανδῆς*).<sup>1</sup> (2) There is good reason for the view that Ionic is the oldest of the Greek dialects. (For the linguistic arguments see especially Kretschmer, *Glotta*, i, 1909, 6-59.) (3) The archaeological evidence suggests a marked break in culture in nearly all parts of Greece<sup>2</sup> c. 2000 B.C., both in pottery (the first appearance of the distinctive 'Minyan' ware) and in building (round and apsidal houses superseded by an early 'megaron' type). Whether thereafter there occurred two further major invasions, of Achaians and Dorians (both akin to the Ionians), c. 1500 and 1100 B.C., or only one, the Dorian, is disputed;<sup>3</sup> and where these Hellenes came from to invade Greece,<sup>4</sup> and how pure they were in blood and speech when they invaded Greece, and how much they mixed with the indigenous peoples, is quite uncertain. Accepting for the present the above statement on the arrival of the Hellenes in Greece, I would only make the following qualifications. The statement can only be tentative, and we must be ready to change it in the light of further evidence; for (1) the

<sup>1</sup> That these suffixes are non-Greek seems clear; I do not know that it is certain that they are non-Indo-European. Kretschmer, *Einleitung in d. Gesch. d. gr. Sprache*, 383, concludes that the Karian tongue is not Indo-European. For the distribution of such non-Greek place-names in Greece see Haley and Blegen's articles, *A.J.A.* xxxii, 1928, 141-5, 146-54.

<sup>2</sup> Not apparently everywhere. Valmin's excavations at Malthi in Messenia showed no break between Early Helladic (which ends c. 2000) and Middle Helladic; the settlement lasted from neolithic times to Late Helladic, when it was destroyed and not rebuilt (see H. L. Lorimer's review, *C.R.* liv, 1940, 50-1).

<sup>3</sup> See, further, n. on 12. 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> They ultimately came from the early home of the Indo-Europeans, wherever that was; but what is important for the history of Greece is where, and for how long, they had been settled in the period before their invasion of the Greek peninsula. This is what we do not know.

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linguistic evidence of non-Greek words and forms has very little value in dating; foreign elements may be later than Greek, particularly—surprising as it is, at first thought—in place-names: in the later history of Greece Albanian and Turkish place-names are much the commonest foreign element in the Greek language, and of rivers and mountains even more than of villages and towns; if there is any truth in the tradition that the Pelopidai came from Asia, the Asiatic place-names may have come with them. To equate without proof, as is so often done for ancient Greek, non-hellenic with pre-hellenic is quite unscientific. And (2) the archaeological evidence must be used with caution as proof of invasion by alien peoples: great changes in culture can take place without any invasion; destruction of towns by fire and sword can take place in a civil war or in a war with neighbouring peoples of the same race—the Macedonians were kinsmen of the Greeks, the Normans of the English. Finally, it must still be said that though these two or three main prehistoric invasions were doubtless made by land and so came from the north of Greece, this does not prove that the Hellenes were a 'Nordic' people, either tall or fair-haired.

See *C.A.H.* ii, cc. i, ii, xv–xvii and the relevant bibliographies there; and for more recent discussions see Myres, *Who were the Greeks?* (1930); Mylonas, *'Εφ. Ἀρχ.*, 1930, 1–29; Bilabel, *Heidelberger Jahrb.*, 1932, 1–20; Bittel, *Prähistorische Forschung in Kleinasien* (Istanbul, Arch. Inst. d. Deutschen Reiches, 1934), which is very valuable for the contacts between Greece and Anatolia (to be supplemented by the more recent excavations of Miss Lamb in Lesbos and Blegen at Troy). Myres's 'The Cretan Labyrinth', *Journ. Anthropol. Inst.*, 1933, 269 ff., gives a most useful account of the whole problem of prehistoric Greece.

3. "Ομηρος" πολλῷ γάρ υστερον ἔτι καὶ τῶν Τρωικῶν γενόμενος: here too Thucydides agrees with Herodotus (ii. 53), and indeed the ordinary Greek view.  
οὐδαμοῦ *⟨οὗτῳ⟩ τοὺς ξύμπαντας ὀνόμασεν*: τὸ γάρ "Ἐγχείη δ' ἐκέκαστο Πανέλληρας καὶ Ἀχαιούς" [Il. ii. 530] νενόθενται.—schol. ABFG. οὐδὲ βαρβάρους εἴρηκε: τὸ γάρ βαρβαροφώνων Καρῶν [Il. ii. 867] νενόθενται.—Schol. ABFG. This seems the natural explanation, that Thucydides rejected or did not know the lines; Strabo, xiv. 2. 28, p. 661, noted the apparent contradiction.

One notes an illogicality here. The absence of a generic term *barbaros* is not due to the absence of the one generic term *Hellen*, but of any generic term for the Greeks; yet he has just said that Homer calls them Danaoi, Argeioi, and Achaioi.

Whether the Achaioi are the *Akaiwasha* of the Egyptian monuments and the *Ahhijava* of the Hittite is still disputed. Prentice (*A.J.A.* xxxiii, 1929, 206–18) points out that the former were a

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circumcised people, but thinks all three identical, and that the Achaioi were foreigners in Greece, arriving perhaps early in the twelfth century;<sup>1</sup> Forrer's view of the identity of *Ahhijava* and the Achaioi, attacked by Sommer ('Ahhijavafrage und Sprachwissenschaft', *Bayr. Sitzb.* ix, 1934), has received the valuable support of Kretschmer (see *P.W.*, 1935, 516–23). For the Danaoi see Holland, *Harvard Stud.* xxxix, 1928, 59–92, who thinks they came from Syria and built the beehive-tombs.

4. οἱ δ' οὖν ὡς ἔκαστοι "Ελλῆνες, κ.τ.λ.: the subject is not "Ελλῆνες but *οἱ ὡς ἔκαστοι Ελλῆνες κληθέντες*: i.e. the general sense is 'Hellas did nothing as a whole before the Trojan war—indeed the term Hellas is a misnomer; there was no general name Hellenes for the inhabitants of what we call Hellas; but these people (later called Hellenes, but who only gradually got the name as they learnt to understand each other's language—*ξυνίεσαν*, imperfect—and were only all so called long after the Trojan war) did nothing in common before this'.<sup>2</sup> Forbes (Appendix, p. 115) points out that "we may also translate; 'the several Hellenic tribes, I mean all who, while dwelling in separate communities, understood each other's language, and who afterwards had a common name'. Thucydides would then be explaining his anticipatory use of the term 'Hellene' for all who afterwards bore the name: and would imply that he conceived the Pelasgians and other tribes who 'gave their own names to different parts of Greece' to have spoken the same language as the original Hellenes. But . . . see iv. 109, ii. 68." See above on 3. 2.  
Θαλάσσῃ ἥδη πλείω χρώμενοι: see 9. 4 n.

4–8. Thucydides continues his account of Greece before the Trojan war (the first united effort of the Greek people): the first break, so to speak, in the general disorder was made by Minos with his sea-empire comprising Crete and most of the islands. Before him the sea was at first but little used, and then mostly for piracy. On land, too, brigandage was common; which was why most men went about armed. Then Thucydides in a digression says that it was at Athens that men first gave up carrying arms, and goes on with a further note about dress which carries the story down to the sixth century; then reverts to the conditions before Minos and, in c. 8, to Minos' empire, and the immediately succeeding age. The comparison of the

<sup>1</sup> The Pelopidai and the Asiatic place-names (above, pp. 97–8)? This would not suit the special connexion of the Achaioi with S. Thessaly.

<sup>2</sup> "Ελλῆνες, that is, is predicate to *κληθέντες*. There is no need to alter the order of the words to obtain this meaning, though it might have been a little clearer if "Ελλῆνες had immediately preceded *κληθέντες* (cf. K. Fr. Schmidt, *B.P.W.* xxxii, 1912, 383 ff.; his other change, *κατὰ πόλεις σοις τε* for *κ. π. τε σοις*, is considerably for the worse). I gather from a rather obscure note in Powell's *app. crit.* that a Cairo papyrus fragment—No. 26—confirms the MSS.

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old Greek world with the present non-Greeks (Thucydides will be thinking primarily of the Macedonian, Illyrian, and Thracian peoples of whom he had personal knowledge) is also part of the digression.

Note again what emphasis Thucydides lays on the use of the sea as a measure of progress.

4. Μήνως γάρ . . . ναυτικὸν ἔκτησαν: see Marinatos, 'La marine créto-mycénienne', *B.C.H.* lvii, 1933, 170–235, which shows the contemporary drawings of ships.

Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. 7. 2, 1271b 32, notes the favourable geographical situation of Crete, designed by nature for a thalassocracy.

*Kāpas ἔξελάσας*: see 8. 1 nn.

5. 1. πόλεσιν . . . κατὰ κώμας οἰκουμέναις: a good instance of the meaning of *πόλις* = political community, even one which had no *πόλις* = permanent centre of administration (which always became a town, generally walled). The meaning here is probably that there had been no *ξυνοικισμός*, that the community consisted of loosely federated *κώμαι*, rather than that the inhabitants lived scattered over the territory belonging to them—just as the majority of Athenians continued to live in the country long after the synoecism. Yet, as Stahl points out, *ξυνοικισθῆναι* can itself refer to manner of living, in a central city, and not to closer political unity, as in 10. 2 below; for there could not be a closer *political* unity than that at Sparta.

2. τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων: *Od.* iii. 71 ff., ix. 252 ff.; *Hymn. Apoll.* 452 ff. (which is Homeric for Thucydides: iii. 104. 4–5). As Forbes points out, there is a more normal attitude to brigandage in *Od.* xiv. 85–8 ('even marauders fear the wrath of the gods').

τῶν τε ἡπειρωτῶν τινές: such as many communities in Ozolian Lokris, Aitolia, and Akarnania (§ 3).

3. καὶ κατ' ἥπειρον: 'by land also'; which would be true especially of the Aitolians. This is certainly the meaning, not 'along the coast of the mainland', as Steup maintains. It is an additional footnote.

μεχρὶ τοῦδε: this, like Herodotos' *μεχρὶ ἐμέο*, suggests autopsy. τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ νέμεται: i.e. 'lead a generally unsettled life, with much *ληστεία*, and without ordered civilization in a *πόλις*, but *κατὰ κώμας οἰκούμενα*'. This connects with § 2, δηλοῦστι δὲ τῶν τε ἡπειρωτῶν

6. 1. ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι: this should be, strictly, uncivilized peoples only, not Egypt or Persia (cf. n. on 4–8, above); but §§ 5–6 show that Thucydides is hardly conscious of the distinction.

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3. οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων: the custom was confined to the nobility and to older men. (*οἱ πρεσβύτεροι* must mean not the older men of the last generation only—in my youth some could remember older men who still adhered to the custom—but the older men in each generation, so long as the custom obtained; this is clear from the following clause, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ Ἰώνων τὸν πρεσβυτέρους, κ.τ.λ., where ἐπὶ πολὺ κατέσχεν means 'prevailed with them over a long period'. So Lucian, *Nau.* 2–3, quoted below.)

χρυσῶν τεττίγων ἐνέρσει κρωβύλον ἀναδούμενον: the absence of the article before *κρωβύλον* shows that it too was part of the fashion here described—the particularity is not the fastening of the *κρωβύλος* with golden *τέττιγες*, but the wearing of a *κρωβύλος* and its fastening with *τέττιγες*.

The association of this fashion with the men of the days of Marathon is shown by Aristophanes, *Equit.* 1321–34:

ΑΛΛ. τὸν Δῆμον ἀφεψήσας ὑμῖν καλὸν ἐξ αἰσχροῦ πεποίηκα.

ΧΟ. καὶ ποῦ στιν νῦν ὁ θαυμαστὸς ἐξευρίσκων ἐπινοός;

ΑΛΛ. ἐν ταῖσιν ιστεφάνοις οἵκει ταῖς ἀρχαίαισιν Ἀθῆναις.

ΧΟ. πῶς ἂν ἰδοιμεν; πολὺν τιν' ἔχει σκευὴν; ποῖος γεγένηται;

ΑΛΛ. οἵδε περ Ἀριστείδη πρότερον καὶ Μιλιάδῃ ξυνεσίτει.

ὅδ' ἐκεῖνος ὄρâν τεττυγοφόρας, ἀρχαῖω σχῆματι λαμπρός.

ΧΟ. χαῖρ' ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων· καὶ σοι ξυγχαίρομεν ἡμεῖς.  
τῆς γάρ πόλεως ἄξια πράττεις καὶ τοῦ ν Μαραθῶνι τροπαίου.

*Nub.* 984–6:

ΔΔ. ὀρχαῖα γε καὶ Διπολιώδη καὶ τεττύγων ἀνάμεστα  
καὶ Κηκείδουν καὶ Βουφονίων.

ΔΙΚ. ἀλλ' οὖν ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνα  
ἐξ ὧν ἄνδρας Μαραθωνομάχας ἡμὴ παίδευσις ἔθρεψεν.

And Herakleides Pontikos, *On Pleasure* (ap. Athen. xii. 512 B–C): many are the advantages of *τρυφή*. καὶ ἡ Ἀθηναίων πόλις, ἔως ἐτρύφα, μεγιστῇ τε ἦν καὶ μεγαλοψυχοτάτους ἔτρεφεν ἄνδρας. ἀλουργῇ μὲν γάρ ἡμιτσχοντο ἴματα, ποικίλους δὲ ὑπέδυνον χιτῶνας, κορύμβους<sup>1</sup> δὲ ἀναδούμενοι τῶν τριχῶν χρυσοῦς τέττιγας περὶ τὸ μέτωπον καὶ τὰς κόμας ἐφόρουν. . . . καὶ τοιοῦτοι ἦσαν οἱ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι νικήσαντες μάχην.<sup>2</sup>

The *χιτῶνες λινοῖ* (and *ποικίλοι*, as Herakleides says) are familiar enough from vase-drawings; but what the *κρωβύλος* and the 'grass-hoppers' were has been much disputed: see Studniczka, *Jahrb.* xi, 1896, 248–91 and, more briefly, in the appendix to Classen-Steup

<sup>1</sup> κόρυμβος appears to be an Ionic word expressing the same, or a similar, fashion as *κρωβύλος*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also Lucian, *Navigium*, 2–3.

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(4th and 5th editions); Hauser, *Jahresh.* ix, 1906, 75–130, and x, Beiblatt, 10 ff., xi, Beiblatt, 87 ff.; Petersen, *ibid.* ix, Beiblatt, 77 ff., *R.M.* lxii, 1907, 540; Bremer in *R.E.*, 'Haartracht', vii. 2120–4; Kjellberg, *Eranos*, ix, 1909, 164 ff.; and Rhomaios, 'Εφ. Αρχ. 1906, 89–95. There is a general agreement that Conze's view of the *κρωβύλος* (represented by Studniczka and the majority of the scholars here mentioned, against Hauser) is correct, that it was a fashion of tying long hair into a particular kind of 'bun' at the back, on the nape of the neck, not on the crown of the head (as L. and S.), nor a *toupe* in front (as Hauser);<sup>1</sup> this is abundantly illustrated on vases from c. 550 to 470 B.C.; e.g. Achilles on Exekias' amphora with Achilles and Ajax playing draughts (both moving at once!), Buschor, *Greek Vase-Painting*, fig. 96; the girl on the left on the hydria by Hypsis, Buschor 106; both Theseus and Korone on Euthymides' amphora, Buschor 107; Achilles on the skyphos with the Ransoming of Hector by the Brygos painter, and three of the heroes on the reverse, Buschor 120 and Furtwängler-Reichhold-Hauser, pl. 85; Chryses, Menelaos, and Helen on Makron's lovely skyphos in Boston, F.-R.-H. 84; Croesus on the vase by Myson, F.-R.-H. 113; and Hipparchos on the tyrannicide vase (by the Copenhagen painter, c. 480 B.C.), M. Hirsch in *Klio*, xx, 1926, 129–67, pll. 1–4 (an older drawing in Harrison and Verrall, *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, p. 84). In these the *κρωβύλος* is confined to *εὐδαιμονες* (gods, heroes, or men: everything about the Croesus on the pyre for example is sumptuous, while the servant—*Εὐθυμος*, Mr. Gay—who lights the pyre has short hair and a loin-cloth only); but by no means all *εὐδαιμονες* have it (Hipparchos has it, but not Aristogeiton nor Harmodios). Nor is it by any means confined to older men: Euthymides' Theseus and the Brygos painter's Achilles are both young; and it is as common among women as men. How far these variations are true to life (and Thucydides therefore so far mistaken) or whether they are due to artistic conventions, it would be difficult to say.<sup>2</sup>

The *τέττιγες* are a harder problem, for we have no representation of anything resembling them together with the *κρωβύλος*, not even

<sup>1</sup> Lucian's *ἀναδεδεμένοι ἐς τούπια τὴν κόμην ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα τοῦ μετώπου ἀπηγμένην* (*Nav.* 2), though agreeing about the back of the head, describes a different method of fastening the hair. If Studniczka is right, Lucian has made a mistake.

The scholia on Thucydides show that in later times there was no certainty in the matter: *κρωβύλον δὲ οἱ ἐπίσημοι ἐφόρουν Αθηνῆς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἐγκαθήμενον, ὡς δ’ ἄλλοι, ἐπὶ τοῦ τραχίδου.* (This is from schol. Hermogenes, *Rhet. Gr.* iv, 79, n. 40: see Schuppe, *R.E.* 5 A, 1112.)

<sup>2</sup> Lucian in this follows Thucydides: *ΤΙΜ. τοῦτο μὲν εὐγενεῖς . . . σημεῖον ἔστιν Αἰγυπτίοις ἡ κόμη ἀπαντες γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ ἀλεύθεροι παῖδες ἀναπλέκονται ἔστε πρὸς τὸ ἐφθικόν, ἐμπαλιν ἡ οἱ πρόγονοι ήμάν, οἰς ἐδόκει καλὸν εἶναι κομᾶν τοὺς γέροντας, ἀναδουμένοις κρωβύλον ὑπὸ τέττιγι χρυσῷ ἀνειλημμένον.* ΣΑΜ. εὖ γε . . . ὅτι ἡμᾶς ἀναμυμήσκεις τῶν Θουκυδίδου συγγραμμάτων, κ.τ.λ. (*Nav.* 3)

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on the few heads in marble which have the *κρωβύλος*. Hauser's view that they formed a sort of tiara over the forehead, a gold adornment of the *toupe*, falls with his view of the *κρωβύλος*; Studniczka's that they were spiral rings which at one time kept together the long hair at the back and later served to fasten it up to form the *κρωβύλος*, shares with Hauser's the weakness that they could not possibly have been called grasshoppers.<sup>1</sup> Gold and bronze ornaments in the form of *τέττιγες*, and of the right date, have been found (see Rhomaios and Studniczka ap. Classen-Steup); but these are not fitted with pins to enable them to be used to fasten hair. They are also mentioned in temple treasury-lists: *I.G.* ii. 2 1377 (Parthenon, 400–399 B.C.), 1533<sub>20</sub> (Asklepieion, 339–338); Curtius, *Inscr. . . v. Samos*, No. 6<sub>52</sub> (the *κόσμος τῆς θεοῦ* in the Heraion in Samos, 346–345 B.C., under control of Athenian cleruchs). Bremer thinks that gold ornaments in the form of leaves attached to a band round the head, often represented on vases—the band serving to keep the *κρωβύλος* in position—might have been likened to *τέττιγες* if in a wind they made a sound like the cicada; but this is not in itself very probable, and, as Studniczka points out, Thucydides does not say *οἱ χρυσοὶ τέττιγες καλούμενοι*. The problem in fact has not been solved. An excellent summary of the question, with many illustrations, can now be read in Cook's *Zeus*, iii. 250–6. (I owe many references in this note to Prof. Beazley's kindness.)

οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ: if the above interpretation of the *κρωβύλος* is correct, on the evidence of vase-painting the fashion will have ceased between 480 and 470; Thucydides in his youth will have known older men who remembered it.

ἄφ’ οὐδὲ καὶ Ἰώνων, κ.τ.λ.: most modern scholars think that the reverse is true, that Athens got the fashion from Ionia, with many other things in the sixth century. If the poet Asios belongs to the seventh century and if his verses refer to the fashion, they are right: Douris (*F. Gr. Hist.* 76 F. 60) contrasting Ionian luxury with an earlier and more warlike habit<sup>2</sup>—note the difference between this and the association of this luxury in Athens with the Marathonomachai—quotes Asios (fr. 13, Kinkel):

οἱ δ’ αὐτῶς φοίτεσκον ὅπως πλοκάμους κτενίσαιντο  
εἰς Ἡρας τέμενος, πεπυκασμένοι εἴμασι καλοῖς,  
χιονέουσι χιτῶσι πέδον χθονὸς εὐρέος εἶχον  
χρύσειαι δὲ κορύμβαι ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τέττιγες ὥστε  
χαῖται δ’ ἡιωρεῦντ’ ἀνέμῳ χρυσέοις ἐνι δεσμοῖς,  
δαιδάλεοι δὲ χλιδῶνες ἄρ’ ἀμφὶ βραχίσσιν ἥσαν.

<sup>1</sup> Still less can they have been likened to grasshoppers, as in Asios' verses (see below), quoted by both Hauser and Studniczka. But I am not certain of the relevance of these to our problem.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Xenophanes on the luxury of Kolophon, quoted by Phylarchos (F. 66).

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But *κορύμβη* here is clearly not the same as *κόρυμβος* = *κρωβύλος* (above, p. 101), but an ornament and not necessarily in the hair, perhaps on the chiton; and the long hair waving in the wind, though held by a gold ribbon, seems to have little to do with the *κρωβύλος*, and to resemble the older fashion of long hair on to the shoulders (Douris says, *κατεκτενισμένοι τὰς κόμας ἐπὶ τὸ μετάφρενον καὶ τοὺς ὄμοις*). This may have been a forerunner of the later fashion.

The poets of the Old Comedy in the thirties and twenties of the fifth century, following Kratinos who 'blazed the trail' with his *Πλοῦτοι* (Athen. vi. 268 D-E), were fond of giving pictures of a golden age, so different from the miserable present. They may have been inspired not only by the conventional theory of a long-past age happy because it was simple (the Hesiodic picture), but by memories of a not distant generation—οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἀβροδίαιτον οὐ πολὺς χρόνος, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Athen. xii. 553 E καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ Θεμιστοκλέους δὲ βίον Τηλεκλείδης ἐν Πρυτάνεσι<sup>1</sup> ἀβρὸν ὅντα παραδίδωσι. Kratinos δὲ ἐν Χείρωσι τὴν τρυφὴν ἐμφανίζων τὴν τῶν παλαιτέρων φῆσιν.

ἀπαλὸν δὲ σισύμβριον ἦ δόδον ἦ κρύνον παρ’ οὖς ἔθακει·  
παρὰ χερὶ μῆλον ἔκαστος ἔχων σκίπωνά τ’ ἡγόραζον.<sup>2</sup>

And from the same play of Kratinos:

μακάριος ἦν ὁ πρὸ τοῦ βίος βροτοῖσι  
πρὸς τὰ νῦν, ὃν εἶχον ἄνδρες  
ἀγανόφρονες ἡδυλόγω σοφίᾳ τριποτῶντι περισσοκαλλεῖς,<sup>3</sup>  
contrasted with the present age, when

Στάσις δὲ καὶ πρεσβυγενής Κρόνος ἀλλήλουσι μηγέντε  
μέγιστον τίκτετον τύραννον,  
ὅν δὴ κεφαληγερέταν θεοὶ καλοῦσσι.<sup>4</sup>

For all the pictures of the Golden Age cited by Athenaios (vi. 267 E ff.) describe not the simple life, but one of luxury, when, amongst other luxuries, there is no need of servants, not because Adam delves and Eve spins, but because neither digging nor spinning is wanted, but everything that the heart of man can desire arrives spontaneously, food and drink racing to get into the mouth, and so forth.<sup>5</sup> Some of them are pictures of the past, as Kratinos' in the *Ploutoi* and Telekleides' in *Amphiktiones*; others of the future, promising a new

<sup>1</sup> Fr. 22. Kock thinks fr. 26, *εὐχροεῖν, δρυιδοθηρᾶν, σωφρονεῖν*, belongs to the same context.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 239. The text is very doubtful; I give Meineke's restoration.

<sup>3</sup> Fr. 238. *βροτῶν* is not possible, though Meineke was content. But we cannot accept Kock's *ἡδυλόγου σοφίας πόθῳ, sapientiae amore*, for *πόθῳ* means 'longing' for something lost or distant—which would be felt by the moderns, not by the happy men of old.

<sup>4</sup> Fr. 240. Kronos is *not* here the god of the Golden Age.

<sup>5</sup> Hence presumably the disgust of the Cynics (Athen. 268 E).

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luxury, *εὐπαθῆ βίον παρουσίαν τε χρημάτων*, as that of Krates in his *Theria*<sup>1</sup> and Pherekrates' *Persai*. In his *Μεταλλῆς* (interesting title!) Pherekrates depicts the Golden Age at the present time, but in Hades, and the speakers who describe it, who have apparently been down the mines to visit Hades, are women.<sup>2</sup> Eupolis' *Golden Age*, not cited by Athenaios, was presumably in part parody of these idyllic pictures:

ὦ καλλίστη πόλι πασῶν, ὅσας Κλέων ἔφορᾶ,  
ὧς εὐδαιμών πρότερόν τ’ ἥσθι νῦν τε μᾶλλον ἔσει.

So perhaps was Metagenes' *Θουριόπερσαι*, in which the Krathis and Sybaris were the rivers that brought all good things to men. Aristophanes' lines in the *Taygetostal* Athenaios unfortunately does not cite: πάντες γάρ τῆς καταχήνης αὐτοῦ πλήρεις ἔστε. ἀφ’ οὐ καὶ ἰώνων: contrast Hdt. v. 88.

**4.** πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μεῖψα κεκτημένοι ἴσοδιαιτοι: with reference to τῶν εὐδαιμόνων of Athens just above. It is interesting to note that the greater freedom and variety of Attic life in comparison with the Spartan had led to wider class distinctions (within the citizen body), at least in externals. These were now narrowed, under Dorian influence; but I find it difficult to believe that there was any such law as that given in the scholia to *Equit.* 580: Κινέας γάρ καὶ Φρύνος εἰσηγήσαντο μεταστῆναι τοὺς νέους νόμον γράψαντες μηκέτι ἀβροδιαιτούς εἴναι ὃν τρόπον τὸ πάλαι μηδὲ κομᾶν—how was ἀβροδιαιτούς defined in application? even to forbid *κομᾶν* by law would have been difficult, in spite of Hdt. i. 82—still less that Thucydides is here referring to the law, as Hauser (pp. 127-8) and Kalinka (n. on Ps.-Xen. i. 10) suppose. Eustathios' note on *Il.* xiii. 685, quoted by them, μεχρὶ γάρ φασι τῆς Περικλέους στρατηγίας ποδήρεις εἶχον

<sup>1</sup> There are two speakers in this: one describes how there will be no need for servants, for plates and dishes will lay and wash up themselves, and fish will cook itself to a turn; the other is called by Athenaios ὁ τὸν ἔναντιον τούτῳ παραλαμβάνων λόγον, as though there were a regular *ἄγων*; but this other gives an even more fanciful picture, of an Athens with an adequate water-supply, hot water being brought to every house, and the taps turning off of themselves. Is this an ironic parody of the other, or are two men, A and his 'opposite number', backing each other up to produce the Golden Age? Or are two opponents now reconciled and ready to do good all round? If this last is true, then fr. 17 comes before 15 and perhaps before 14; doubtless Demiańczuk fr. 5, ἀντάκους νῦν ἐμοῦ is from the same scene. (I cannot help thinking that ἐρεῖ δὲ θύδωρ "ἀνέχετε" in 15 is laughing at taps in the hospital marked "on" and "off". Cf. Wade-Gery, *B.S.A.* xxxvii. 264.)

<sup>2</sup> In 268 E Athenaios expresses no doubt that the *Μεταλλῆς* is the work of ὁ Ἀττικώτατος Φερεκράτης, but in xv. 685 A he speaks of ὁ πεποικώς τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναφερομένους Μεταλλεῖς. Certainly one can see little Attic wit in the long passage he quotes; and it is difficult to believe that a few years later the same poet wrote another passage of the same tenor in the *Persai*.

*χιτῶνας φοροῦντες καὶ τέττυας*, may be a reference to a genuine law regulating the official dress of strategoi,<sup>1</sup> though the vagueness of the date given does not inspire confidence; and the scholiast may be confusing this law with Thucydides' statement of a change in habit. That is the most we can say. In Aristophanes, it will be remembered, *τὸ κομᾶν*, though characteristic of the young aristocrat and so of the luxurious, is also symbolic of Lakonomania.

Ps.-Xen. i. 10 says there was no means of distinguishing by appearance and dress slave and free, metic and citizen, in Athens, if the latter were poor. This may be roughly true; but it has little to do with the adoption there of the more Dorian custom by which *πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μεῖζω κεκτημένοι ἴσοδάτου μάλιστα κατέστησαν*. 5. οὐ πολλὰ ἔτη ἐπειδὴ πέπαυται: so Plat. *Rep.* v. 452 c, οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐξ οὗ, κ.τ.λ., though he says nudity was begun by the Cretans whom the Spartans followed (in accordance with the belief that most Spartan customs derived from Crete). The usual story (given, e.g., by the scholiast here) is that Orsippus of Megara was the runner who first cast his loin-cloth in the race, at the 15th Olympiad (720 B.C.). This seems a good deal too early for the language of Thucydides and Plato, who may be following a different tradition. Orsippus, who later commanded the Megarians in a successful war against Corinth, had a memorial with a six-line inscription said to be by Simonides, set up at the order of Delphi; it was seen by Pausanias (i. 44. 1), and a Hadrianic copy of it has survived (H. and H., 1). It is probable that Ol. 15 is a mistake, and that a shorter interval elapsed between Orsippus' lifetime and Simonides' epigram.<sup>2</sup>

*διεζωμένοι τοῦτο δρῶσιν*: so Hdt. i. 10, παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λύδοισι, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα δόθηναι γυμνὸν ἐσ αἰσχύνην μεγάλην φέρει.

7.1. τῶν δὲ πόλεων ὅσαι μὲν νεώτατα ὡκίσθησαν: Thucydides is thinking mainly of the Greek colonies, as Miletos, Thasos, Samos, Syracuse. (The story of these cities can be illustrated by that of Samos in more modern times: see R.E. i A, 2186.) Corinth, if not right on the sea, certainly *τὸν ἴσθμὸν ἀπέλαβεν*; cf. also Knidos and many another.

αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ: e.g. Argos, Athens, Knossos.

8.1. Κάρες τε ὅντες καὶ Φοίνικες: Thucydides gives no evidence for the latter, but relies on well-known Greek traditions of their presence in Rhodes, Thasos, and other islands. For the Karians he

<sup>1</sup> There may be something in the scholion already quoted (p. 102, n. 1) *κρωβῆλος. ὃν οἱ ἐπισημοι ἐψόρουν Αθήνας*.

<sup>2</sup> Even if we put the 15th Olympiad c. 630–615 B.C., as some scholars have proposed (see below, p. 430), it seems too early for Thucydides, Plato, and Simonides.

gives archaeological evidence which, unfortunately, has not been confirmed by modern discovery. Modern belief in at least active communications in the Bronze Age (i.e. *πρὸ τῶν Τρωϊκῶν*) between Karia and Greece rests rather on the similarity of certain word-formations in place-names (see above, p. 97). The 'Cycladic' culture, as shown by material remains found in the Cyclades (not in the islands off the Asiatic coast), shows the influence not of any Asiatic people, but of Crete first (as Thucydides implies, §§ 2–3), and then Mykenai (cf. 9. 4). Lesbos in the early Bronze Age shows a close cultural connexion with north-western and central Asia Minor, but not with Karia. See Bittel, and W. Lamb, cited above, p. 98.

Herodotus also believed that the Karians once inhabited 'the islands', and indeed originally came thence to the mainland, though 'they themselves said' they were autochthonous on the mainland of Asia and kin to the Lydians and Mysians (i. 171); when in the islands they were, he says, subject to Minos. He adds that they made three inventions which were later adopted by the Ionians and Dorians—crests for helmets (which are, of course, as Herodotus knew, common enough in Homer: cf. 3. 2 above, note), and devices and handles (the inner cross-bars) for shields. These are all parts of *ἡ σκευὴ τῶν ὅπλων*; but it would be difficult to say that this is what Thucydides had in mind, for *ex hypothesi* the Greek *σκευὴ* was in these respects similar, and he is clearly thinking of differences between contemporary Karian and Greek practice.

There were traditions too of Karians on the mainland of Greece, in the Argolid (Aristotle, fr. 491), and in Megara (Steph. Byz. s.v. *Kαρία*). See A. Diller, *Race-Mixture among the Greeks* (Illinois Studies, 1937). Strabo, xiv. 2. 27–8, pp. 661–2, follows Thucydides (without referring to him) and quotes Anakreon and Alkaios for the Karian crest and shield-handle; and also speaks of a general mingling of Karians with the Greeks before their expulsion from the islands, and explains the *Κάρες βαρβαρόφωνοι* of Homer by their faulty speaking of Greek.

The scholia here mention the 'inventions' of the Karians (*τοὺς ὄμφαλοὺς τῶν ἀσπίδων καὶ τοὺς λόφους*), stating that small copies of these were buried in their graves; and add that the Phoenician burials were recognizable because they laid their dead towards the west and not, like the rest of mankind, to the east. Plutarch, *Solon*, 10. 4, gives another instance of ancient archaeology: Solon, according to the Athenian story, to prove the Athenian claim to Salamis, pointed to the ancient burials—for the Megarians buried towards the east (a statement vigorously denied by Hereas of Megara—*F.H.G.* iv, p. 426) and three or four in one tomb, his own countrymen

to the west and singly. (It does not seem that our scholiast had much authority for his statement.)

Modern scholars, for example Meyer, tend now to believe that the period of Phoenician activity in the Aegean—a trading activity, not a thalassocracy—was c. 1000–900 B.C., long after both ‘Minos’ and ‘Agamemnon’, not long before Homer himself; and doubtless there was much piracy in the years after the breakings of the bronze-age civilization by the Dorian invasion (below, pp. 118–19), in which the Karians will have taken part. One would suppose a priori that the traditions of Karian piracy which Thucydides knew would refer to this rather than to a much earlier period.

For Karian adventuring in general see A. Schulten, *Rh. Mus.* lxxxv, 1936, p. 293, who, in connexion with the Etruscan name Tartessos in Spain, maintains that the Karians and Mysians too, kindred peoples of the Etruscans, travelled as far as the Atlantic, as can be seen from the names Mysokaras and Karikon Teichos, and the Maussoloi, near Mogador in Morocco. “Wir bedürfen sehr einer Monographie über die Karer, die einst ein bedeutendes, zu Lande und besonders zur See weitverbreitetes Volk waren.”

**2. οἱ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νήσων κακούργοι ἀνέστησαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ:** this should mean the Karians (*οὐχ ἥσσον λησταὶ ἥσαν*, above). On the contrary, according to Herodotus, i. 171. 1, they were loyal subjects of Minos, manning his warships when required and, as far as Herodotus could say after long research, paying no tribute. Cf. also Hdt. iii. 122. 2, quoted in note to 9. 4.

**3. ἔφεμενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν, κ.τ.λ.:** as we put it now, in times of economic expansion the non-possessing classes are content to go on being non-possessors, because their standard of living is rising, while the possessors of capital increase both their possessions and their power.

**4. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ, κ.τ.λ.:** resuming the main theme—economic growth and, in consequence, ability to wage war on a large scale, to be seen in the Trojan as in the Peloponnesian war.

**9. 1. τῶν τότε δυνάμει προύχων, κ.τ.λ.:** a characteristic difference between Thucydides and Herodotus. In the long but not shapely sentence<sup>1</sup> which follows the former shows that he accepts not only the general truth but the details of the Greek tradition as readily as the latter (cf. 9. 4 n., p. 109); but in his interpretation of this tradition he prefers political and economic causes to purely personal motives.

<sup>1</sup> I am confident, however, that ‘Ατρεῖ after *κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον* should be deleted, which will improve the sentence a little. Note that ABEF have in their text *οἷον Ἀτρεῖ Ἀγαμέμνονι* after ἐκγόνους and that E has *τὸν Πέλοπα τὸν πατέρα* for *τὸν πατέρα*.

**τοῖς Τυνδάρεω δόρκοις:** not in our Homer, but doubtless in the epic tradition. See Apollodorus, iii. 10. 9.

**2. οἱ τὰ σαφέστατα Πελοποννησίων μνήμη πάρα τῶν πρότερον δεδεγμένοι:** Thucydides does not tell us who they were. But a large part of the work of the predecessors and contemporaries of Herodotus and Thucydides had been the collecting and sifting of local traditions; Hellanikos had been particularly active in this work, and we know that he dealt with this story of Atreus and Eurystheus (F. 155 and 157, with Jacoby's commentary); Thucydides may be thinking especially of him, but he doubtless had other writers in mind as well, and the dates of Hellanikos' publications are uncertain.<sup>1</sup> (*Πελοποννησίων* is doubtless a partitive genitive; but it would not follow that Thucydides is not here referring to Hellanikos of Lesbos, who recorded *Peloponnesian* traditions. See below on 12. 2–3.)

Thucydides has nothing to say of the gallant conduct of Athens in resisting Eurystheus (Hdt. xi. 27). Cf. ii. 34. 5 n.

**τῶν Περσειδῶν:** Eurystheus was a Perseid, son of Sthenelos and grandson of Perseus. There was one tradition that the Perseids belonged to Tiryns, the Atreidai to Mykenai, implying a transference of the centre of power in the Argolid from the former to the latter; but Thucydides does not follow this. The archaeological evidence shows that the two cities were contemporary in prosperity, and that the most prosperous period (or the period of most active rearmament) of Tiryns was rather later than that of Mykenai. For a short authoritative account of them and their relation to ‘Minoan’ and ‘Mycenean’ civilization in general, see Wace, *C.A.H.* i, c. xvii and ii, c. xvi; and for more detailed accounts Karo's articles in Pauly-Wissowa, ‘Mykenai’, ‘Tiryns’, ‘Mykenische Kultur’ (Supplbd. vi).

**4. εἴ τῷ ίκανὸς τεκμηριώσαι:** “Homeri enim fides et auctoritas a Thuc. in rebus historicis non magna iudicabatur. Cf. 10. 3, ii. 41. 4, vi. 2. 1”—Stahl. “Diese gelegentlichen Bedenken gegen die Autorität des Dichters (vgl. 10. 3, vi. 2. 1) richten sich gegen einzelne Angaben, wobei der Gesamtinhalt seines Werkes unberührt bleibt”—Classen. Classen's interpretation is sounder than Stahl's (ii. 41. 4 is nothing to the point); but Thucydides is in fact relying on Homer's authority both here and in 10. 3. “And he should be sufficiently good authority” (“provided”, we may infer from 10. 3—and 11. 3—“we do not take everything he says literally”). For he is quoting Homer to prove his particular point that it was the widespread power of Agamemnon, especially at sea, that made the expedition to Troy possible; and the whole of c. 10 supports Homer's authority. (Cf. also 12. 3 for a detail.) It is indeed possible that Thucydides has in mind Herodotus' incredulity, who was prepared to disbelieve, as

<sup>1</sup> See Introd., p. 6, n. 3, and below, p. 362, n. 2.

a μάταιος λόγος, so important an element in Homer as the presence of Helen in Troy (ii. 118). Herodotus in fact expresses himself sometimes with great scepticism about events of the 'mythical' period, as in iii. 122, *Πολυκράτης γάρ ἐστι πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς οἵδμεν Ἑλλήνων ὃς θαλασσοκρατέειν ἐπενοίθη*,<sup>1</sup> πάρεξ Μίνω τε τοῦ Κνωσσίου καὶ εἰ δῆ τις ἄλλος πρότερος τούτου ἦρξε τῆς θαλάσσης, and i. 5, ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἔρεων ὡς οὗτως ἡ ἄλλως καὶ ταῦτα ἐγένετο, τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τὸν Ἑλληνα, τοῦτον σημῆνας προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ λόγου: both of which passages suggest a contrast between the 'prehistoric' and the 'historical' period almost in the manner of the nineteenth century. In view of Herodotus' other references to the past (as, e.g., i. 56-8 or i. 171: see above, 3. 2, 8. 2 nn.), it seems probable that this scepticism is less of the epic tradition than of the reconstructions of it by his immediate predecessors,<sup>2</sup> still his was a sceptical spirit. It may have been partly Herodotus' example that led Ephoros a century later to reject the mythical period altogether and to begin his *Universal History* with a 'historical' event, the return of the Herakleidai.

For modern belief in the general trustworthiness of Homer's picture of the Mycenean age, see Thompson, 'The Distribution of Mycenean Remains and the Homeric Catalogue', *Liverpool Annals*, iv, 1912, 128-39; Karo, 'Mykenische Kultur' in *R.E.*, Supplbd. vi (1935), with a valuable *Fundstatistik* up to date; Myres and Frost in *Klio*, xiv, 1915, 447-67, an ingenious but not always convincing attempt to prove that the Greek genealogical dates fit in well with the archaeological data; Nilsson, *Homer and Mycenae* (London, 1933); and, above all, Allen's *Homeric Catalogue* (1921). Cf. too Stählin, 'Thessalia' in *R.E.* vi A (1937), 80-2; Mackeprang, *A.J.A.* xlvi, 1938, 535-59; Broneer, *Hesp.* viii, 1939, 421-6. It is worth mentioning one major difficulty. The archaeological evidence from Troy shows that the sixth city was destroyed, probably by earthquake, c. 1300 B.C., and that city VII A, Homeric Troy, was destroyed by fire in the twelfth century (Blegen, l.c., p. 98 above); this suits the traditional Greek date well. But the walls of Mykenai and Tiryns, the series of beehive tombs, the spread of Achaian culture in the Cyclades, Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus, and the Achaian power

<sup>1</sup> See 13. 6 n.

<sup>2</sup> See the judicious remarks of Jacoby (2), 99-100. Cf. also Grote, i, p. 271: "If the great historian [Thucydides] could permit himself thus to amend the legend in so many points [as in c. 11—but see below], we might have imagined that a simpler course would have been to include the duration of the siege among the list of poetical exaggerations, and to affirm that the real siege had lasted only one year instead of ten. But it seems that the ten years' duration was so capital a feature in the ancient tale, that no critic ventured to meddle with it." Not more a capital feature, however, than Helen's presence at Troy, doubted by Herodotus.

in SW. Asia Minor (if the Ahhijava are the Achaeans: above, pp. 98-9), all show that the great period of the Achaian dynasties was the fourteenth and early part of the thirteenth centuries; whereas the generations of Atreus and Agamemnon must belong to the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the twelfth centuries. This is especially clear at Mykenai, where Agamemnon's time is one of decline; the 'tomb of Atreus' belongs to the fourteenth century, the later beehive tombs are poor and were frequently re-used. This difficulty has not, as far as I know, been solved.

It has also been pointed out that none of Homer's heroes have more than two or, occasionally, three human ancestors; beyond this are the gods; and that this implies that there did not exist in the traditions any longer genealogies, that is, that the dynasties began, as upstarts, not earlier than 1300 B.C., if the expedition to Troy was in the first years of the twelfth century.

Ἐν τοῦ σκῆπτρου τῇ παραδόσει: II. ii. 101-9.

εἰ μή τι καὶ ναυτικὸν εἰχεν: cf. Ps.-Xen. 2. 5, τοῖς μὲν κατὰ θάλατταν ἄρχοντος οἴλον τε ἀποπλέντας ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ὅποσον βούλει πλοῦν, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ γῆν οὐχ οἴλον τε ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἀπελθεῖν πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ὀδόν. This, without its exaggeration, is one of Thucydides' cardinal principles; hence his frequent reference to the importance both of naval power and of sea-trading in the course of his Introduction (3. 4, 4. 7. 1, 13. 1), the latter providing the capital resources as well as the training for the exercise of sea-power. A simple example of the general truth of the principle is afforded by the events of 479-478: Sparta, a land-power, withdrew from the distant expedition in the Hellespont, Athens continued it.

εἰκάζειν δὲ χρή, κ.τ.λ.: 'imaginative inference and interpretation or reconstruction of the past'; not quite so strong a word as *τεκμήριον*, which is more certain inference (i. 3, 20. 1, n.).

**10. 1. ὅτι μὲν Μυκῆναι μικρὸν ἦν:** The sequence of thought is: 'the small size of Mykenai city is not to be used as an argument against Homer's picture of the forces engaged against Troy, nor for its having been unimportant' (Nicklin, C.R. xviii, 1904, 199). Mykenai had retained or recovered a precarious independence as a diminutive state and sent a contingent of 80 men to Thermopylai and together with Tiryns one of 400 to Plataia (Hdt. vii. 202, ix. 28), when Argos was neutral. The names of the two states were engraved on the memorials at Delphi and Olympia (Tod, no. 19). Mykenai was soon after destroyed by Argos (in 468-467, according to Diodoros, xi. 65; but see below, pp. 408-9). Its massive walls and the Lion Gate, as well as some of the beehive tombs, were seen by Pausanias in the second century A.D. (ii. 16. 5-6); but the walls enclosed the acropolis only, a very small place compared with many of the cities of Thucydides'

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own day, and the evidence of Mykenai's old wealth and splendour dug up in modern times was then hidden. Hence his warning against a contempt of the centres of the older civilization by his contemporaries; he prefers to rely on Homer.

**2. τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας νέμονται:** "two-fifths of the actual area, not 'two of the five divisions'. For the language of Thucydides always implies the ordinary division of the Peloponnesian into six parts; Argolis, Achaea, Elis, and Arcadia, besides Laconia and Messenia"—Forbes. The interpretation is correct, but the reason given false: there were only five 'political' divisions, for since the final conquest of Messenia, Messenia and Lakonia were one—ἡ Πύλος . . . ἔστιν ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ πότε οὕσῃ γῆ (iv. 3. 2); ἐς Μεθώνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς (ii. 25. 1: Stahl, ad loc.). That is the point of νέμονται: Lakonike, the territory of the Lacedaemonians, corresponding to Attike, the territory of the Athenians, was about two-fifths of the Peloponnesian. Sparta was much the largest state in Greece since the absorption of all Lakonia proper and Messenia. The rest of the Peloponnesian she only dominated, as Athens dominated her allies in the early years of the Delian confederacy.

**τῆς τε ξυμπάσσους ἥγοῦνται καὶ τῶν ἔξω ξυμμάχων πολλῶν:** for the organization of the Peloponnesian confederacy and Sparta's position in it, see Larsen, *Class. Phil.* xxviii, 1933, 257 ff., xxix. 1 ff. There is an exaggeration here—Argos held aloof; just as Sparta and her allies are generally called *οἱ Πελοποννήσοι*, though some Peloponnesians were not among them. Outside the Peloponnesian she was accepted as the natural leader of all the allies by the Boeotians, the Amprakiots, and discontented subjects of Athens, as she had been by the Greeks generally in 480–479.

The sentence has a bearing on the question of the composition of the *History*. Ullrich, *Beiträge*, 124 f., maintained that it could not have been written after 404 when Sparta was the leader not of the rest of the Peloponnesian and of her allies outside it only, but of practically all Greece: πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος προστάται (*Xen. Anab.* vi. 6. 12, vii. 1. 30; *Hell.* iii. 1. 3), ἥρχον δὲ τότε πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι (*Anab.* vi. 6. 9; *Hell.* iv. 1. 8); for the argument is the greatness of Spartan power in spite of her lack of external splendour; and Thucydides himself was familiar with the idea of Sparta leading all Greece (vi. 92. 5, viii. 2. 4). See Steup's note here. Forbes, on the other hand, thinks it was most likely written after 404, "for Thucydides could hardly have left out the case of Argos" (see above); as, however, he admits that the position of Argos was uncertain after 404 and in fact it did not then acknowledge Spartan leadership, the argument is a poor one. Ullrich would seem to be right: Thucydides is describing the position of Sparta between the early sixth century

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(cf. Hdt. i. 56, 68 ad fin., 69) and the Peloponnesian war, not after the war.<sup>1</sup> We may suppose too, with Steup, that he did not write this sentence between the capture of Pylos and the battle of Mantinea. See also on ἦ ἔστιν below; and Appendix on the Composition of the History in vol. iii.

**οὕτε ξυνοικισθεῖσης . . . κατὰ κώμας δέ, κ.τ.λ.:** see 5. 1 n.

**ἡ ἔστιν:** this also Ullrich and Steup argued could not have been written after 404 (or even 413). The ruins of a place will indicate (though not exactly—they will exaggerate in one case, minimize in another) its previous power *when at its height*; for no one would argue from their magnificence that it had always been powerful; and in this case of Athens "power at its height" is said still to exist (*ἔστιν*, present tense). Stahl, on the other hand, thinks Thucydides points the contrast between the still magnificent buildings of Athens and its political weakness after 404. Ullrich is more logical; and though there is no need to press for strict logic here, he is again probably right. For the reference is to Athens' *political* power relatively to other Greek states, Sparta, Argos, Thebes, Thessaly. If we had only material remains and no written history, we should exaggerate her relative power; from the appearance of Athens, we should suppose that, in the fifth century, she was twice or three times as powerful as Thebes and Argos, and had an even greater superiority over Sparta. Which is a word of warning to us when we make confident statements about the Bronze Age.

Plutarch, *Per. 12*, does just what Thucydides says later generations will do, judge of Athens' power and wealth by the buildings that remain.

**3. τὰς δυνάμεις:** their military forces (which in Sparta's case were formidable, stronger than, or as strong as, the Athenian).

**λειπόμενην δὲ τῶν νῦν:** cf. Hdt. vii. 20. 2, στόλων γὰρ τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν πολλῷ δὴ μέγιστος οὗτος (that of Xerxes) ἐγένετο, ὥστε μήτε τὸν Δαρείου τὸν ἐπὶ Σκύθας παρὰ τοῦτον μηδένα φαίνεσθαι μήτε τὸν Σκυθικόν, . . . μήτε κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα τὸν Ἀτρειδέων ἐς Ἰλιον μήτε τὸν Μυσῶν τε καὶ Τευκρῶν τὸν πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν γενόμενον. And see 23. 1.

**4. τὰς μὲν Βοιωτῶν . . . τὰς δὲ Φιλοκτήτου:** Il. ii. 510, 719.

**εἰκόσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν:** Köster (1), p. 79, says that such ships would be structurally unsound, and must be either fantasy or monsters which did not survive. See 13. 2 n. on *τριήρεις*.

**αὐτερέτα:** i.e. we do not have to consider men who were rowers only and add them to the fighters on shore.

**οὐδ' αὖ τὰ πλοῖα κατάφαρκτα:** i.e. according to Köster (1), p. 116, without protection for the rowers on the ship's sides, against sun, cold, or rain, and against missiles. This, however, seems hardly

<sup>1</sup> Later writers, as Strabo, viii. 5. 5, p. 365, could describe the Spartans as ἄρχοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων for the whole period from the time of Lykourgos to Leuktra.

relevant here. It should mean 'decked', i.e. able to carry passengers (the fighting forces) as well as the rowers.

**5. οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες:** 102,000, or allowing for some poetic exaggeration (10. 3), say 70,000–80,000—a very large number for an overseas expedition (*στρατέα*, 10. 3), and much larger than any that sailed in the Peloponnesian war. Compare, for instance, Thucydides' own comment on the armament for Sicily, vi. 31. 1, 6. Forbes says: "the context shows that Thucydides is comparing it with the combined forces of the whole of Hellas [§ 5, below]; and the land forces of the Peloponnese alone are estimated at 100,000." But this cannot, or should not, be so: it is the ability to send large expeditions overseas that is in point, as is shown clearly by the first two sentences of the next chapter. Thucydides cannot in fact be acquitted of a certain inconsequence; this excursus, like most of the others, has not been fully thought out. Some of the sentence constructions, as 9. 2, 11. 2 (if the MSS. are right), and 18. 1, point to the same conclusion.

**11.** The argument of this chapter is: in the Trojan war large numbers were involved and it lasted for ten years, as long as the Archidamian war; but (1) we must allow for poetical exaggeration (10. 3, 11. 3), and (2) only a portion of the fighting forces were employed at any one time. It was therefore a smaller war than the present one.

**1. αὐτόθεν πολεμοῦντα βιοτεύσειν:** this was a general principle of all Greek warfare—armies took a few days' supplies with them and for any longer campaign expected to live on the country. The Athenians took more than that with them to Sicily (vi. 30. 1, &c.: the corn was to be made into bread in Sicily), but even so the great bulk of their supplies were to be purchased or seized in the island. That, and the absence of expendable munitions, is why defending a long line of communications was not so important a matter for the Greeks as for a modern expeditionary force.

**ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχη ἐκράτησαν, κ.τ.λ.:** the right interpretation of this sentence is difficult. Two principles must be observed. First, Thucydides had the whole epic (the *Cypria*, the *Iliad*, and the *Aethiopis*, &c.) before him, and at least the *Cypria* in mind; for he mentions the cultivation of the Chersonese and the *ληστεία* (referred to indeed in the *Iliad*), and rationalizes the story that he found. (Even if, like Herodotus, ii. 117, he did not believe that the *Cypria* was written by Homer, he might still have called the whole epic 'Homer', just as modern scholars who disbelieve even in his existence can speak of 'Homer'.) On the other hand, *τὸ ἔρυμα* with the article must refer to a well-known wall built by the Greeks. If there was one in the *Cypria*, built soon after the Greeks landed, that would be in marked contrast to the *Iliad*; contradictions between the two

did exist (cf. Hdt. ii. 117), but in such a case as this Thucydides must surely have been conscious of it. The only Greek wall in the *Iliad* is that built in the tenth year of the war, on the advice of Nestor, as an urgent defensive measure against the onslaught of the Trojans (vii. 337 ff., 436 ff.). It seems that *τὸ ἔρυμα* must refer to this. (It is true that the *Iliad* later ignores this wall; it may be thought that if it equally ignored a wall built in the first year of the war, Thucydides may well have accepted the inconsequence.)

Secondly, we must bear in mind the methods of Greek warfare in the case of an overseas expedition (Thucydides believed that the same conditions would obtain in the Trojan as in the Peloponnesian war—see Schwartz, quoted above, p. 40; in the main, correctly). The first essential for the invading force was a victory on land, *μάχη κρατήσας*, by which it secured mastery on the land in whole or in part, *τῆς γῆς κρατεῖν*; cf. the campaigns against Samos, Poteidaia, Mytilene, Syracuse, esp. vi. 23. 2, 37. 2. (This in itself disposes of Thiersch's emendation *ἐκρατήθησαν* for *ἐκράτησαν*, to which even Cobet gave his assent,<sup>1</sup> apart from the fact that Thucydides' point is the ease with which the Greeks should have conquered Troy, but for *τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ*.) The nearest analogy to the Trojan campaign, as Thucydides sees it, in the Archidamian war, is that against Mytilene (iii. 6): the Athenians land troops and win a battle (or rather, the enemy fail to take advantage of a drawn battle), and then, because they have not enough forces to invest the town closely, build two camps which they fortify with a wall; the two sides share the mastery of the land. If the invading army is strong enough, as, according to Thucydides, the Greeks at Troy were not, because a great part of their forces was always engaged elsewhere, it invests the town by building its own wall round it, as at Poteidaia, Plataia, Syracuse, and later at Mytilene (iii. 18. 4); if it succeeds in this, the great part of its forces may be released (Poteidaia, Plataia).<sup>2</sup> It would seem then natural to suppose that the picture of the Trojan war which Thucydides has in mind is as follows: the Greeks won the first battle on land (this was not expressly told in the epic, but it must be inferred; for otherwise they would have had no fortified *στρατόπεδον*, and could not have carried on the war at all: hence it cannot be, as the scholiast thinks, the battle in which Protesilaos fell; Thucydides is only *inferring* the victory), and in the ordinary way, with so large a force, would have proceeded to invest Troy which could not have held out for very long; as it was, they had to scatter their forces, with the result that the Trojans (like the Mytileneans in the early stage of their revolt) were able to dispute the mastery of the land

<sup>1</sup> Supported again by Girard, *Mélanges Nicole* (1905), 165–76; who refers it to an incident in the *Kypria* given by Proklos. See also Delachaux, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> See above, Introduction, pp. 16–19.

with them (*ἀντεῖχον βίᾳ*, 'in the field'), so that the city could not be invested; while the Greeks were, at any given time, strong enough (but only strong enough) to keep their hold on their camp in Trojan territory.<sup>1</sup>

This would be satisfactory, if *τὸ ἔρυμα* may refer to a wall (well known) mentioned elsewhere in the epic, but not in the *Iliad* and ignored there (so the scholiast; see also 13. 5 n.). If it may not, if it must refer to the wall of *Iliad* vii, one or the other of two emendations of the text is possible: either Robertson's ingenious *τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἀν ἔτει ἵ ἐτειχίσαντο*, that is, their camp was unwalled until the tenth year (which it could not have been, if they had not won an early victory on land), which would be contrary to Greek practice as shown at Mytilene;<sup>2</sup> or, as F. L. Lucas and I both suggested independently to Prof. Robertson at the time, place the parenthesis after *πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι* (Mehlhorn long ago made a similar suggestion: see Stahl here): "we know (*φαίνονται*) that even after their victory<sup>3</sup> the Greeks did not use all their forces (this is obvious; otherwise they would not have had to build the wall)." In this case the date at which, according to Homer, the wall was built, is left in the background. But I doubt whether with this arrangement Thucydides would have written *φαίνονται δέ, in apodosi*; and I should expect *οὐδὲ ὡς* for *οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα*. Besides, the argument that they did not use all their forces seems to be sufficiently derived from the agricultural activities in the Chersonese and the forays.

The repetition of *εἰλον* in § 2 seems to me intolerable. But we cannot just delete it after *κρατοῦντες*, with Krüger (still less delete *δέ* after *πολιορκίᾳ* as well—if we do bracket *εἰλον*, we must explain *δέ* as in vii. 33. 2, *οἱ δ' ἄλλοι*, with Croiset and Delachaux); far better is Sitzler's *εἰργον*.

**12.** The continued weakness and insecurity in Greece after the Heroic Age. *καὶ μετὰ τὰ Τρωικά* shows that Thucydides (in the absence of the archaeological evidence) did not fully understand Aegean civilization. (Cf. below on § 3.)

<sup>1</sup> Forbes says "*πολιορκίᾳ προσκαθεξόμενοι* is opposed to *μάχῃ κρατοῦντες*": they represent two alternative ways of taking Troy—either victory in the field and assault or a regular siege. Apart from the need for *ἡ κάν πολ. προσκ.*, which Forbes saw, this is to assume that *μ. κρατοῦντες* is the same as *μ. κρατήσαντες* and to forget that *μ. κρατεῖν* is an indispensable preliminary to a regular siege. Widmann has a correct note.

<sup>2</sup> C.R. xxxviii, 1924, 7. I do not feel confident that Thucydides would have written *ἔτει δεκάτῳ, tout court*, for *τότε πρῶτον ἔ. δ., anno demum decimo*, especially in a negative sentence.

<sup>3</sup> Bauer, *Philol.* 1, 1891, 427–8, followed by Steup, translates *ἐνταῦθα* 'there, before Troy'; but what is the point of 'not even before Troy', or 'not before Troy either'?

**2–3.** Thucydides is again accepting the Greek traditions as historical (perhaps rightly). In § 2 he is referring to the troubles following the return of the Greeks from Troy, with which the migrations of the Boeotians and Dorians (§ 3) are not directly connected. Classen therefore (following Stein) bracketed *γάρ* after *Βοιωτοί τε*, which seems right. No other change is necessary (such as *οἱ ἐκπίποντες* and *νέας* or *ἄλλας πόλεις* for *τὰς πόλεις*).

**2. τὰς πόλεις ἔκτιζον:** the scholiast mentions Teukros, Philoktetes, Diomedes, and Menestheus amongst these founders. Hellanikos wrote a *Κτίσεις Πόλεων*, and also told the story of many such foundations in his *Τρωικά*, including that of Rome by Aeneas, apparently at great length (F. 31).

**3. ἔξηκοστῷ ἔτει . . . δύδηκοστῷ ἔτει:** precise dates, fixed to the satisfaction of Thucydides and others, after much calculation, by the early logographoi, probably by Hellanikos in his *Τρωικά*. Note that the reckoning is not, at least not in both places, by generations.<sup>1</sup> The Melians asserted in 416 that they had inhabited their island for 700 years (v. 112. 2); that is, that the Dorian migration thither took place c. 1100 B.C., or very shortly after the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese. Many Greeks, perhaps Thucydides among them, believed that the Trojan war could be accurately dated, from 1192 to 1183 B.C., with the Thessalian and Dorian migrations taking place between 1124 and 1104; this was Eratosthenes' and may have been Hellanikos' date. Others, such as the *Marmor Parium*, placed the fall of Troy in 1209–1208. The date of the Dorian invasion (the Return of the Herakleidai) was calculated back by the figures of the Spartan kings.<sup>2</sup> The archaeological evidence of the Mycenaean age confirms the general correctness of these dates.

**ἀναστάντες ὅπο Θεσσαλῶν:** the Thessaloi were thought to come from Thesprotia in Epeiros, Hdt. vii. 176. 4, as perhaps, to judge from dialectal affinities, the Boiotoi had done before them. Thessaly as far south as the Spercheios valley remained in the neolithic stage of development till c. 1400 B.C., long after the Bronze Age had appeared in central Greece, the Peloponnese, and the Islands, that is, in the last phase of the Late Helladic period. If those who introduced the Bronze Age culture into Thessaly were new-comers, they will have been the Achaians whose descendants were the Homeric heroes, Peleus and Achilles, Protesilaos, Philoktetes, etc. These in turn were driven out by the Thessaloi, c. 1100. For the archaeological

<sup>1</sup> 80 may be two generations of 40 years, 60 is very likely two of 30; but these are not the calculations of one man. Or 80 may mean three generations after the beginning of the Trojan war (80+10); but it will still be true that the dates of the two migrations are not simply calculated on one system of generations. (Cf. also n. on 13. 1.)

<sup>2</sup> See Jacoby, *Apollodorus Chronik*, 75–80 (F. Gr. Hist. 244, F. 61–65).

evidence from Thessaly, as from Boeotia, see again Wace in *C.A.H.* ii, c. xvi; and for more detail, Wace and Thompson, *Prehistoric Thessaly* (1912); Fimmen, *Kretisch-mykenische Kultur* (1921); *R.E.*, art. 'Thessalia' (Stählin and v. Gaetringen), 80-2, 112-15, 'Thebai' (Schober), 1434-5, 1450 ff., 'Mykenische Kultur' (Karo, Supplbd. vi); Heurtley in *B.S.A.* xxvi-xxix (1924-8).

**ἀποδασμός:** as has been frequently pointed out, there is much more than an **ἀποδασμός** of Boeotians in the Homeric Catalogue (to which Thucydides, of course, is referring). This is an attempt to reconcile the Homeric story with the well-established tradition that the migration of the Boiotoi was some two generations later than the Trojan war; but in Homer the Boiotoi occupy all the country except the west, which, with Orchomenos as its chief city, was still held by the Minyans, the only other difference between Homeric and classical conditions being the submergence of Thebes. The invading Boiotoi, according to Strabo (who is following Ephorus) ix. 2. 3, p. 401, united the western with eastern half of the country into a single Boeotia. See Grote, pt. i, c. xviii. 2, for the various ancient stories of the Boeotian migration.

It should be observed that the remains of the 'palace of Kadmos' on the Kadmeia show that it was built between 1600 and 1400 B.C. and was destroyed by fire, and not rebuilt, before the end of the Mycenean age; the acropolis wall was also probably destroyed at the same time (Keramopoulos, *'Εφ. Ἀρχ.* 1909, 105-7; *'Αρχ. Δελτ.* iii, 1917, 25-32). The palace was a rich one, and in plan after the Cretan style, in method of building and in its decoration more like the older palace at Tiryns. The archaeological evidence thus here as elsewhere supports the general outline of the Greek tradition—the wealthy city of the Kadmeans and its destruction (by the 'Epigoni') before the coming of the Boiotoi from Thessaly; hence the detail that the Kadmeans of Thebes took no part in the Trojan war may well be correct (Schober, in *R.E.*, 'Thebai', 1453-5); and while a good part of the invading Boiotoi were in the country before the Trojan war, Thebes itself was not occupied by them till later.

**ἔνν Ήρακλείδαις:** note again how Thucydides keeps to the tradition in detail.

The reality of the Dorian invasion has been denied by Beloch (i. 2. 76-96); but the evidence for it is overwhelming. It is not simply, or principally, the change in culture as seen for example in the geometric style in pottery and the introduction of cremation; indeed it is doubtful if the Dorians were responsible for either of these (see below), and a gradual change from the older more naturalistic style of drawing to schematic and geometric designs (which culminated not in any Dorian state, but in Athens) can be traced

from the latest Helladic period both on the mainland and in Crete. Moreover, a change in culture of this kind can well take place without any invasion; and the destruction of many Mycenean towns might be due to internal disorders. But the destruction is too widespread, over all the Greek lands; and it is the destruction not of towns only but of a civilization. The eleventh and tenth centuries were, to judge from their material remains, a time of poverty and disorder, far less civilized than the preceding centuries, with scarcely any of that free communication between the different districts that is a characteristic of the later Bronze Age. So that, as Lenschau puts it (Bursian, clxxvi, pp. 161-2), if there were no tradition of an invasion, we should still have to suppose one. In fact, where we find a change of style in pottery or the like, but no tradition, we generally assume an invasion, perhaps wrongly; where we have both, as in this case, Beloch denies it.

It is generally agreed that the immediate origin of the Dorians was Epeiros and western Macedonia. See Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.* ii, c. xix; Ehrenberg, 'Sparta', in *R.E.*; Hammond, 'Epirus and the Dorian Invasion', *B.S.A.* xxxii, 1931-2, 131-79; Heurtley, op. cit. (above, p. 118), and *Prehistoric Macedonia* (1939); Miltner, 'Die Dorische Wanderung', *Klio*, xxvii, 1934, 54-68 (who argues, not very convincingly, that the Dorians invaded by sea, from the Amprakiot Gulf, first to Crete, then to the S. Aegean, and last to the Peloponnese; he also emphasizes the gradual change from Mycenean to geometric pottery); Schachermeyer, 'Ägäische Wanderung', *Athen. Mitt.* xli, 1916, 375-426 (cremation appears first c. 800 B.C., and so is later than the Dorians); H. Lorimer, 'Pulvis et umbra', *J.H.S.* liii, 1933, 161-80 (first appearance rather before 1000 B.C., and its spread coincident with that of geometric pottery).

**4. ἀποκίας ἐξέπεμψε:** for the Attic origin of the Ionians in the Cyclades and Asia Minor, see Hdt. i. 146 (a characteristically sceptical passage), viii. 46. 2-3; Thuc. vii. 57. 4.

**ηγιωτῶν τοὺς πολλούς:** a minority of the Cyclades, Melos and Thera, as well as Crete, Rhodes, and other islands in SE. Aegean, were colonized by Dorians.

**Ιταλίας . . . τὸ πλέον:** Antiochos, the first historian of the Greeks of Magna Graecia (an older contemporary of Thucydides), defined 'Ιταλία as the country south of the river Laos and extending east only as far as Metapontion, Taras being included in Iapygia (fr. 6: Strabo, vi. 1. 4, p. 254). Thucydides, like Herodotus (iii. 136, 138), included Taras but not Iapygia: vi. 44. 2, viii. 91. 2; though in vii. 33. 4 he would appear to be following the more exact definition of Antiochos.

**τῆς τε ἄλλης Ἐλλάδος:** Kerkyra, Leukas, Amprakia and other Corinthian colonies in the west.

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The view that the colonization of the Cyclades and Ionia took place in peaceful conditions and was as much a formal act of state as the later colonization of the west (*ἀπὸ τοῦ πρυτανῆσ τοῦ Ἀθηναῖων ὄρμηθέντες*, Hdt. i. 146), and that Athens was the only or even the principal origin of the colonists, has not commended itself to modern historians. That there was originally some connexion between Athens and the colonies is proved by the occurrence of the Attic *phylai* in the latter and by certain common religious rites, as the celebration of the Apatouria; but these *phylai* recur only sporadically, and always with others that are not Attic, and many important rites are also different; and Herodotos in the same passage (i. 145–8) in which he says *εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες "Ιωνεῖς οἵσοι ἀπ' Ἀθηναῖων γεγόνασι καὶ Ἀπατούρια ἀγονοὶ ὄργην,* shows as well much divergence in Ionian practice and great variety in their origin. Other traditions, too, support this. (See Wilamowitz, *Sitzb. Berlin*, 1906, 59–79 = *Kl. Schr.* v. i. 152–76.) The fact that Athens took no part in the colonization of the eighth and seventh centuries may also throw some doubt on traditions of an earlier activity, though it cannot be denied that the rationalized account in Thucydides (2. 6: see n. there) is self-consistent: over-population and internal strife were the main causes of the colonization, and Athens had little strife and by the eighth century had got rid of her surplus population by the migrations to Ionia.

Meyer held that the main migration took place in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries, and this view has been supported by Bilabel, 'Die ionische Kolonisation', *Philol. Supplbd.* xiv, 1920, and by Lenschau (Bursian, cclxviii, p. 7; ccxliv, p. 15). The absence, however, of any considerable quantities of Late Helladic pottery, which can no longer be attributed to the accidents of excavation, and Homer's silence, seem fatal to this view. Wells, *Studies in Herodotus*, c. 1, argues for the Herodotean view, that the colonization was from Athens, and was post-Dorian.

For the causes of Greek colonization in general see Gwynn, *J.H.S.* xxxviii, 1918, 88–123, who supports Thucydides' view (see 2. 6, 15. 1) that over-population was the chief.

Thucydides is as silent here about the Dorian and Aeolian colonies in Asia Minor as Herodotos in a different context.

**13–14.** 'With more settled conditions Greece became wealthier, trade by sea particularly increased and with it came the growth of navies. But even so, before the Persian wars, there were few big navies; and though progress had been made in the design of ships, it had not got very far.' Thucydides, as throughout the Introduction, emphasizes the economic causes of change and especially the development of trade across the seas.

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**13. 1. τυραννίδες . . . καθίσταντο:** mentioned here because the increasing wealth was their chief cause, and because in their turn they added to it, and paid especial attention to naval power. See 17. The transition from the Dorian invasion to the age of the tyrants involves a severe compression of history; but he goes back to an earlier age in his sketch of Corinth, §§ 2–5. "Thucydides says nothing of the aristocracies which as a rule followed the heroic monarchies. . . . But he is not giving a history of early Hellas: he is refuting the prevalent belief that great deeds were done in early Hellas: he may therefore have passed over the aristocracies because there was no widespread belief, as in the case of the kings and the tyrants, that they had done great deeds"—Forbes.

For the general chronology of the archaic period from the Dorian invasion to the tyrannies, see, besides the general histories, Burn's article, 'Dates in Early Greek History', *J.H.S.* iv, 1935, 130–46; who argues that most of our dates are too early by one-fourth, and that the error is due to Eratosthenes calculating forty years to a generation instead of thirty.

**ἐπὶ ρήτορις γέραστ πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι:** the kingships of the Homeric period, which lasted long in many states, and in Sparta (in the curious double form) to Thucydides' own day. Cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* iii. 9. 1284 b 35 ff., esp. 85 b 3 τέαρτον δ' εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωικὸς χρόνους ἐκούσαι τε καὶ πάτραις γυνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον . . . κύριοι δ' ήσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, σοι μὴ ἱερατικαὶ, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον.

Many suggestions of bracketing and transposing clauses in this sentence have been made (see Steup; and Richards, *C.Q.* vi, 1912, 138), through failure to see that *τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν . . . ποιουμένης* means 'general economic progress' (which is one cause or factor in the rise of tyranny), and *τῶν προσδόων μείζονων γυνομένων* 'public revenues thereby increased' (one of the *results* of tyranny, due to the establishment of a strong central authority). The latter clause is a note to explain why tyrannies could result in larger navies. The sentence would be clearer if δέ were inserted before *προσδόων* and the whole clause then placed after *βασιλεῖαι*.

**2. τριήρεις:** the advantage of the trireme over the pentekonter (14. 1) was the greater number of rowers, that is, an increase in, if I may say so, horse-power, not entailing a corresponding increase in the length of the vessel. The old triakonters and pentekonters were open vessels with 30 and 50 rowers, 15 and 25 on each side; the pentekonter must be about 32 metres long, which is the limit of practical length for an open, wooden ship (Köster (1), p. 97, n. 1: that is why Köster doubts the 100-oared vessels of Homer, above, 10. 4 n.). In a dieres two rowers, in a trieres three, occupied not much more longitudinal space than one in the pentekonter, whether

they sat on superimposed banks, one above the other, as Köster and Miltner believe, or three together, using one port-hole, as in the Venetian galleys, according to the opinion of Tarn, Cook, and Brewster.<sup>1</sup> The further improvement in the trireme was the provision of decks and bridges (cf. 14. 3 ad fin., and as well 10. 4) which served both for the protection of the rower and the easier movement of officers and *ἐπιβάται*; though at the same time this made it heavier and clumsier to manoeuvre. The special Athenian improvement after Salamis was the lightening of the whole ship: the build was improved, and the *ἐπιβάται* reduced in number from 40 to 10; no longer was boarding the enemy vessel the principal aim, but the relief of the rowers, to avoid exhaustion before battle, and, above all, ease and rapidity of manoeuvre in the battle itself. Cf. e.g. the account of the battle of Sybota, 49. 3; and see n. on the ships at Erymedon, 100. 1.

**3. Ἀμεινοκλῆς:** nothing further is known of this notable inventor. **τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου:** the second instance (see 8. 1) of the phrase which has played so large a part in modern theories of the construction of Thucydides' *History*. Does he mean only the Archidamian or the whole twenty-seven years' war? If the former, then clearly he wrote this after 421, but before 415, almost before the battle of Mantinea 418. Cf. above, 10. 2 n., below, 18. 1 n.

Jacoby (2), p. 115, thinks Thucydides' figure here comes from a Samian *Xρονικά* (e.g. that of Euagon of Samos if we could be sure it was published before Thucydides wrote his Preface), and contrasts this precise chronology with Herodotos' *naïveté* on the two occasions on which he gives an exact date—mentioning local eponymoi whose names would have no meaning to the wide public for whom he was writing (iii. 59. 2, viii. 51. 1: see Introd., p. 3, n. 1). It seems to me that Thucydides' 300 years *ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου* is much more like Herodotos' *'Ηστοδὸν γάρ καὶ Ὀμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίων ἔτεσι δοκέω μεν πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι καὶ οὐ πλέοσι* than a date from *Annals*—deduced, like that of Herodotos, from various traditions rather than calculated from given figures.

**4. ναυμαχία τε παλαιτάτη:** nothing further is known of this battle either, if Thucydides' date, c. 660 or 680, is correct. Kerkyra was settled by Corinth about 730 B.C.; Periandros forced the island into subjection (Hdt. iii. 52. 3), c. 610, according to the received Greek chronology. So this battle is anterior to the tyranny at Corinth, which only began c. 650. (See Wade-Gery, *C.A.H.* iii. 764-5, a convincing argument against Beloch's much lower dates.) Cf. n. on § 1 above and on § 6, p. 124, below.

<sup>1</sup> See Introduction, p. 19, for these references; and Tarn's review of Rodgers's

was already wealthy because the isthmus was the bridge between central Greece and the Peloponnese which served for trade by land. Later, with the increased use of the sea, she had the great advantage of harbours both on the Saronic Gulf and the Corinthian, convenient for trade with the east and the west; she gained by both sea- and land-traffic (*ἐμπόριον παρέχοντες ἀμφότερα*, below). Note that Thucydides says nothing of Corinth being on an 'isthmic' route between two seas—of sea-traffic passing through her harbours between east and west: see my article in *B.S.A.* xviii, 1911–12, 189 (republished in *Essays*, c. 2). For early Corinthian trade in the west see Blakeway's model articles, *B.S.A.* xxxiii, 1932–3, 170–208, and *J.R.S.* xxv, 1935, 120–49.

**ἀφειόν:** II. ii. 570. Doubtless Thucydides had other instances as well in his mind from the now lost epics, as in 5. 2.

6. "Ιωσιν: principally Phokaia, Miletos, Samos, and Chios.

**έκρατησάν τινα χρόνον:** the only account we have of Ionians at war with Persia in the reign of Cyrus is Hdt. i. 162-9, which is far from suggesting an Ionian control of the sea; for not only did Harpagos capture every city on the mainland except Miletos (which prudently refused to join the Greek resistance), but *ώς τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡπέρω "Ιωνας ἔχειρωσατο Ἀρταγαος, οἱ τὰς νήσους ἔχοντες "Ιωνες καταρρωδήσαντες ταῦτα σφέας αὐτοὺς ἔδοσαν Κύρῳ.*<sup>1</sup> We should have expected rather a reference to the successful resistance of Miletos against the Lydians in the first half of the sixth century, which was due to her command of the sea (*τῆς γὰρ θαλάσσης οἱ Μιλήσιοι ἐπεκράτεον*, Hdt. i. 16-22), or to the freedom of the islands from attack by Croesus (i. 27).

Note that Thucydides says nothing of the widespread trade of the Ionians, particularly Phokaia, Samos, and Miletos, except in so far as that is included in the phrase ἐπειδὴ οἱ "Ἐλλῆνες μᾶλλον ἔπλωζον. He is concerned with past wars and their importance. Yet we must suppose that they possessed navies to protect their trade; Herodotos indeed, i. 163, says they traded with war vessels. See 15. 1, 16 nn.

He also says nothing of any other thalassocracies, between Minos and the Ionians, of which later writers thought a lot, therein again agreeing with Herodotos (iii. 122. 2, quoted below). For these thalassocracies, see Myres, *J.H.S.* xxvi, 1906, 84-130; xxvii, 123-30; Fotheringham, *ibid.* 75-89; Aly, *R.M.* lxvi, 1911, 585-600; Burn, *J.H.S.* xlviij, 1927, 165-77.

**Πολυκράτης:** Hdt. iii. 39–47, 54–7, 120–5 (*Πολυκράτης γάρ ἐστι πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ὃδεν Ἑλλήνων ὁ θαλασσοκρατέειν ἐπενοήθη, πάρεξ Μίνω τε τοῦ Κυρωσίου καὶ εἰ δή τις ἄλλος πρότερος τούτου ἥρξε τῆς θαλάσσης—*

<sup>1</sup> Cf., however, i. 151, where the islands are said to have had nothing to fear. (The scholiast on Thucydides here says simply: *ἡ ιστορία δῆλη ἐν τῇ ἀ Ηρόδοτου.* Alas, that it is not.)

122. 2). Thucydides refers again to his dedicating Rheneia to Apollo—iii. 104. 2.

Polykrates had a navy of 100 pentekonters, according to Herodotus (iii. 39). The Phokaians in their battle against the Carthaginians had sixty vessels (i. 166), presumably pentekonters. The invention of the trireme long before had not apparently as yet had much effect.

**Φωκαῖς τε, κ.τ.λ.:** another event of which we know nothing from other sources. Massalia was founded from Phokaia, according to Aristotle, Timaios, and the later chronologists, c. 600 B.C. Herodotus, i. 166, tells of the 'Cadmean victory' over the Carthaginian and Etruscan fleets of the Phokaians who had left their native place for ever in 546 to avoid subjection to Persia; but this was off Alalia in Corsica, and had nothing to do with the foundation of Massalia—these Phokaians escaped to found Hyele (Elea, Velia) in South Italy (Hdt. i. 167). Antiochos too (above, 12. 4 n.), fr. 9 ap. Strab. vi. 1. 1, p. 252, mentioned this battle, in which the Phokaians were frustrated in their attempt on Corsica, in connexion with the founding of Hyele.

(Isokrates, vi. 84, and some later writers, as Pausanias, x. 8. 6, connected the foundation of Massalia with the flight of the Phokaians from Ionia in 546; and Steup believes that Thucydides shared this view, and that he is referring here to the battle recorded in Herodotus: Ionian power at sea is placed by him in the time of Cyrus and Cambyses, and the Phokaian victory should belong to the same period, not to two or three generations earlier. But (1) Herodotus does not describe a true victory; it was tactically a victory, strategically a defeat, as a consequence of which the Phokaians had to leave Corsica and retire first to Rhegion, then to Hyele; he says nothing of Massalia; (2) Antiochos, who was probably Thucydides' chief authority for the early history of the Sikeliot Greeks at the beginning of bk. vi, definitely calls the battle a defeat for the Phokaians, and only mentions the foundation of Hyele (the Phokaians, he says, on leaving Ionia were making for Corsica and Massalia); and (3) the Phokaian expedition was in any case earlier than the reign of Polykrates, so Thucydides is not observing chronological order—he is not in fact writing a history of early Greece. If we must assume that Thucydides means an event in 546 and, as well, bring him into some harmony with Herodotus, I would suggest reading here Αλαλίαν for Μασσαλίαν—a change that has already, quite unnecessarily, been proposed in the fragment of Antiochos.)

The archaeological evidence, not very abundant, is consistent with a foundation of Massalia as early as 600 B.C.; for Greek vases of an even earlier date have been found. Greek trade in the west generally, as we might expect, preceded colonization: see Blakeway (above, § 5 n.). In regard to this passage, Blakeway thinks that Thucydides

is referring to the battle of 546, and means that some of these Phokaians went as additional settlers to the already founded Massalia; cf. Antiochos, above.)

The great period of Ionian prosperity, with Miletos in the van, was c. 650–550 B.C., when trade both with the Pontos (where were so many Milesian colonies) and with Egypt through the common settlement of Naukratis was at its height. It was ended by the Persian conquest of Egypt under Cambyses and Darius' conquest of the Propontis region and Thrace. For the pottery of Naukratis see R. M. Cook, *B.S.A.* xxxiv, 1933–4, 1–98.

**14. 1. πλοῖοις μακροῖς:** war vessels, presumably of a different build from pentekonters (see 13. 2 n.). Trading vessels, which were not rowed, but went under sail, were *πλοῖα στρογγύλα*: that is, they had a deep hold, being built to carry as much cargo as possible. Cf. Hdt. i. 163.

**3. Ἀθηναῖος Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔπεισε:** Hdt. vii. 144 and (a more childish version) *Aθπ.* 22. 7; 483–482 B.C.

**Αἰγινήταις πολεμοῦντας:** for a reasonable account of the hostilities between Athens and Aigina from 506 to 481 B.C., of which Herodotus gives us such confused details (vi. 49–50, 85–93), see Walker in *C.A.H.* iv, c. viii, 254–65.

**αἱστόπερ καὶ ἐναυμάχησαν:** cf. Herodotus, vii. 144, *οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστάσε ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Αθηναῖους.*

**καταστρώματα:** fore and aft decks, not running the whole length of the ship (as in merchant vessels), according to Miltner, *R.E. Supplbd.* v, 932. Bridges connecting the two decks (*διὰ πάστρης κ.*, also called *πάροδοι*) were not used till after Salamis; they are first mentioned as being used at Eurymedon, by Plutarch (see 100. 1 n.). Cf. above, 10. 4, 13. 2 nn.

**15. 1.** A summary of the previous argument: 'we have seen that naval forces before the fifth century were comparatively weak, though some states by paying particular attention to the sea became more powerful than others.'

**χρημάτων τε προσόδῳ, κ.τ.λ.:** one must suppose this to refer to Corinth and Samos (in the reign of Polykrates), perhaps also to Miletos and Phokaia—though see 13. 6 n., 16. *ὅσοι μὴ διαρκῆ εἴχον χώραν* would seem to point to Athens and Aigina, and perhaps Megara; but Athens only secured Salamis, and the other two, as far as we know, though at one time great trading centres and more wealthy than their own small territories would suggest, did not 'rule over other states' nor 'obtain revenue' from them. Thucydides is by no means precise in his details in this section. (Classen's

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suggestion to read *τὰς <ἐπικειμένας> νήσους*, 'neighbouring islands', would make the sentence easier; for *ai νῆσοι* normally means the Cyclades as a whole or even all the islands of the Aegean, as in 16.) 2-3. A further stage in the main argument: land wars were quite unimportant, affairs of neighbour against neighbour only, no expeditions far afield and no joint efforts by several states in alliance (except to some extent in the Lelantine war).

*ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο*: *ὅθεν* shows that the *result* of a war is meant, and we should therefore read *περιεγένετο* with Tournier, Stahl, Hude (1908), or *τιοὶ* for *τις* with Wilamowitz and Hude (1913); though even with *τιοὶ* we should expect *προσεγένετο*. Croiset, however, keeping the MSS. reading, translates: "par suite de laquelle des forces vraiment considérables aient été mises en ligne"; which is perhaps right.

Two omissions in Thucydides are notable here: first, he says nothing of Pheidon of Argos and his brief domination of the Peloponnes. We cannot argue from this that he knew nothing of it and that we should therefore doubt it, because of the second omission, which is yet more remarkable. He does not here make an exception of the Spartan wars, which were the great example in Greek history of wars resulting in a lasting increase of power—both the earlier which gave Sparta a territory in Lakonia and Messenia far larger than that of any other Greek state, and the later, against Tegea, Argos, and Elis which gave rise to the Peloponnesian League and Spartan predominance in the Greek world of the sixth and early fifth century; for he has already had this predominance in mind (10. 2; cf. 18. 1). In fact almost the only *ὑπόκοοι* who might have combined against a more powerful state (even if they could be rightly so called) were the smaller Peloponnesian cities. Thucydides may have been thinking of the stronger and weaker members of the Thessalian and Boeotian Leagues (as to which, see C.A.H. iii. 603, 609).

*ἐκδήμους στρατείας πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν*: cf. 9. 4 n., p. 111.

3. The Lelantine war was primarily a land war between neighbours, though the fact that the allies on either side were mostly sea-powers suggests that it was a phase in a commercial and colonial struggle. Herodotus makes a brief mention of it, v. 99 (Miletos the ally of Eretria, Samos of Chalkis—Samos and Miletos being ever at enmity); from later sources we learn that the Thessalian cavalry helped Chalkis and played a decisive part in the final victory. See C.A.H. iii. 622-3. The date is quite uncertain: c. 700, Busolt, i. 455-7; c. 570, Beloch, i. 338-9; seventh century, Cary in C.A.H. Burn, J.H.S. xliv, 1929, 14-37, gives c. 700; but see his later paper referred to above, 13. 1 n. P. Gardner, 'A numismatic note on the Lelantine War', C.R. xxxiv, 1920, 90-1, maintains that it was but a local war, in which perhaps Thessaly joined, but no other state.

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16. The advance of the Ionians was checked by the quick growth of Persian power in the reigns of Cyrus and Darius. This is more in accordance with the truth than 13. 6 above; but we must remember that these chapters are *notes* to early Greek history for the establishment of a particular thesis, not a systematic history; hence, too, the disjointed treatment, so well illustrated here. See Hdt. vi. 31, 44, 96-9, viii. 46. 3.

"Ιωσὶ προχωρησάντων ἐπὶ μέγα τῶν πραγμάτων: this is in marked contrast with Herodotus, i. 143 (just after the fall of Sardis)—*ἀσθενέος δὲ ἔόντος τοῦ παντὸς τότε Ἑλληνικοῦ γένεος, πολλῷ δὴ ἦν ἀσθενέστατον τῶν ἔθνεών τὸ Ιωνικὸν καὶ λόγον ἐλαχίστου· ὅτι γάρ μη Ἀθῆναι, ἦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πόλισμα λόγιμον.* See How and Wells there, who hold that the prosperity of Ionia, especially of Miletos, was then largely a thing of the past, and only Samos still flourished as before; but I think the opinion that Herodotus is talking the language of the fifth century to be nearer the truth. Cf. 18. 2 n., p. 133.

17. *τύραννοί τε, κ.τ.λ.*: the last stage in Greek history before the Persian wars (or rather before the re-establishment of constitutional governments, oligarchies or democracies). It may at first sight seem strange that Thucydides should thus belittle the achievements of the tyrants, even the most splendid of them; but we must remember once again what Thucydides has in mind—wars on a large scale. In that respect it is true that *ἐπράχθη οὐδὲν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀξιόλογον*; he was perfectly well aware of the other services that the Peisistratidai, for example, had rendered Athens (vi. 54. 5). Here he may be thinking of Herodotus, i. 59-64 (65. 1 *τοὺς μὲν νῦν Ἀθηναῖος τοιαῦτα τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἐπινθάνετο δὲ Κροῖσος κατέχοντα*: compare *ἡ Ἑλλὰς . . . κατείχετο, κ.τ.λ.*, below): Peisistratos was a competent and powerful man, but at that time he was occupied with other things—his own safety and success—and this prevented any joint Greek effort to help Croesus against Persia.

See 13. 1 n.: the tyrants were not the principal cause of the prosperity of some of the Greek states, but one of the results of it.

*τύραννοί τε* (CF), rather than *τύραννοι* δὲ (ABEGM) may be the right reading here; but it does not mean, as Classen supposed, 'the tyrants were another hindrance to Greek progress, like the Persian monarchs'; but simply 'in the age of the tyrants too no great action in common was possible'.

*οἱ γάρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἔχωρησαν δυνάμεως*: bracketed by Stahl, Classen, Steup, Hude, as a 'marginal note by a reader' (from Hdt. iii. 125. 2, *ὅτι γάρ μη οἱ Συρηκοσίων γενόμενοι τύραννοι, οὐδὲ εἰς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλληνικῶν τυράννων ἀξίος ἐστι Πολυκράτεϊ μεγαλοπρεπεῖν συμβληθῆναι?*); an unlikely supposition. It may mean: 'something

notable *was* accomplished in wars against neighbours; and in this kind of warfare, the Sicilian tyrants became more powerful than any others.' That is, *γάρ* means 'I make this reservation (to my general statement that they did nothing notable in war) because the Sicilian tyrants really did attain to some considerable power by this means; but Greece proper was still divided and achieved nothing in common.' But the sentence is unnecessarily obscure. Delachaux points out as well that the most famous exploits of Gelon and Hieron were against the Carthaginians and Etruscans; but Thucydides is thinking of the period before 480, and possibly of Phalaris rather than of the Deinomenidai (note *καὶ τελευταῖοι*, 18. 1).

**18. 1.** The last step in the argument: after the overthrow of the tyrants came the Persian wars and, during the second invasion, the first effort of a united Greece on a large scale since the Trojan war.

*οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ:* unnecessary difficulty has been found in the meaning of this, though the expression is admittedly not very clear: the majority of the tyrannies in Greece were put down by Sparta (but not all; not the Corinthian, for example); they were all finally put down, except those in Sicily, a few years before the campaign of Marathon.

*στρατιάσασα:* so Hdt. i. 65–6, *τὸ δὲ ἔτι πρότερον τούτων* (the unsuccessful wars against Tegea in the first half of the 6th century) *καὶ κακονομάτατοι ἥσαν σχεδὸν πάντων Ἑλλήνων κατά τε σφέας αὐτοὺς καὶ ξείνουσι ἀπρόσμεικτοι μετέβαλον δὲ ὅδε ἐς εὐνομίην. Λυκούργου . . . ἐλθόντος ἐς Δελφούς*, κ.τ.λ. In this connexion *εὐνομία* has a very precise meaning: it implies two things, a constitutional government (the rule of law, as opposed to the tyrannies, however benevolent) and internal peace, absence of *στάσις*. This is what the Greeks in general, so much given to *στάσις*, admired in Sparta; it does not necessarily mean that they admired the Spartan constitution as such, nor the military mode of life; only that internal peace and the rule of law are things to be desired for their own sake, almost above all else. "*Εὐνομία* is a condition of the state in which citizens obey the law, not a condition of the state in which the laws are good" (Andrewes, C.Q. xxxii, 1938, 89. We may compare Kleon's words, iii. 37. 3 *χείροις νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἡ καλῶς ἔχουσσις ἀκίροις*; cf. Dem. xxiv. 139–40, rightly explained by Andrewes, p. 90, n. 5).

The passage in Herodotus is a well-known *crux*, perhaps the most remarkable instance of a carefree chronology in his history. He implies quite clearly that Sparta only achieved *εὐνομία* about 600 B.C., just before the reigns of Leon and Hegesikles; he then states that this achievement was due to the institution of *ὁ νῦν κατεστέως*

*κόσμος* by Lykourgos, who was regent for Leobotes, that is, not later than the early tenth century; and in c. 66, when he returns to the wars against Tegea, the transition is equally smooth and the chronology equally unnoticed. Now if by this *κόσμος* we mean, as we should, not the political constitution of Sparta (which, except for the anomaly of the two kings, was of a normal aristocratic type), but the way of life that was peculiar to her, we know from the archaeological evidence that this hardly existed before about 600 B.C. The contempt for the arts and for trade, the dislike of the foreigner, the refusal of what almost all other peoples have regarded as essential amenities of life—all of which the Greeks of the fifth century and later especially associated with Spartan *εὐνομία* and with the Lycurgan constitution—these were not prevalent before the first half of the sixth century. The evidence makes it clear that in the eighth and seventh centuries Sparta shared in the renaissance of art and letters in Greece; that Alkman and Tyrtaios were not isolated figures. Lakonian pottery is among the best and most individual of its time; sculpture and carving on ivory and bone was equally practised and admired; foreign poets and artists were welcomed, and trade with other countries flourished.<sup>1</sup> After about 600 B.C. contact with foreigners gradually ceased (Corinthian pottery, very common before that, becomes rarer and ceases about 550); Sparta's refusal to adopt the new coinage, which was spreading rapidly in the second half of the seventh century throughout Greece, was doubtless both a symbol and a cause of the change. (On the other hand, as we should expect, her own pottery and carving—on bone, not on imported ivory—continued to flourish till about 550, when the decadence sets in and is rapid.) It is natural to suppose from half of what Herodotus tells us that the Greeks of the fifth century, though unaware of most of this archaeological evidence, had a tradition that the great change in Spartan culture took place about the turn of the seventh and sixth centuries; the poems of Tyrtaios, writing in the second half of the seventh century, with their appeals for discipline, *εὐνομία*, support the date and were well known; but how in this case the change came to be associated universally with a Lykourgos who was dated in the ninth or tenth century is not yet explained. The political constitution may indeed well be older than the *ἀγωγή* and *εὐνομία* and go back to the ninth century, though Tyrtaios seems to know nothing of the ephorate; and it would be easy to suppose that the later association of the *ἀγωγή* with the constitution led to the antedating of the former as well, if it were not that Herodotus seems to preserve so clearly the

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus' *ξείνουσι ἀπρόσμεικτοι* for the older period is a minor puzzle within the greater one—not only for the fact, but because the lack of welcome to foreigners by Sparta in the fifth century was a *popular* belief.

tradition that *εὐνομία* was unknown in Sparta before the beginning of the sixth century.<sup>1</sup> By the time of Xenophon (*Lac. resp.* 1. 2) and Ephoros (F. 149, 173–5: see Jacoby on 175) both ἀγωγή and constitution, and their consequences, *εὐνομία* and success, are firmly associated with Lykourgos.

To return to Thucydides. He says nothing of Lykourgos, and in this he may be consciously following Hellanikos (F. 116) who was blamed by Ephoros for not mentioning the lawgiver;<sup>2</sup> but he appears to put both the cessation of *stasis* and the constitution in the late ninth century (c. 810 or 830 B.C.: see 13. 3 n.), which might be his date for Lykourgos (against Herodotos' 10th century; Ephoros put him c. 870). Andrewes in the article cited above (p. 128) makes an ingenious attempt to show that this may not be so: he suggests taking *αιεὶ ἀτυράννευτος ἦν* as a distinct clause embodying a new idea, and the succeeding sentence *ἔτη γάρ ἔστι κ.τ.λ.*, as qualifying it and not *ἐκ παλαιτάτου ηὐνομήθη* as well; he translates, "though Sparta suffered the longest period of faction of any state we know, yet at a very early time she brought herself to order, without undergoing a tyranny; indeed she never had a tyrant, for it is about four hundred years, and a little over, to the end of this war, that the Spartans have enjoyed the same constitution, and from this they gained the influence by which they regulated the affairs of the other states." This would bring Thucydides more or less into line with Herodotos and with the possible facts: the *εὐνομία* may date, according to him, from c. 600 and the constitution may in reality

<sup>1</sup> Blakeway, reviewing Ollier's *Le Mirage Spartiate* (C.R. xl ix, 1935, 184–5) wrote: "It is difficult to see how this evidence (the archaeological) can be used to support the theory of a revolution in sumptuary laws, manners, and morals brought about by the legislation of one man at any one specific date within the Sixth Century. A gradual falling off in imports points to an economic rather than to a political or social cause, and such an economic cause can be found in Sparta's retention of an iron currency, which by c. 600 B.C. was obsolescent if not obsolete throughout the Greek world. It is probable enough that this retention of an obsolete currency was deliberate policy rather than stupid conservatism, but such a policy is something very different from the series of disciplinary and moral measures instituted in the interest of military efficiency so often 'deduced' from the archaeological evidence." All of Blakeway's opinions are entitled to respect; and he would doubtless have developed this thesis had he lived; but an economic policy may have—nay, should have—a political and social basis, and I see no reason why the retention of the obsolete currency cannot have been one of a series of measures, economic, disciplinary, and moral, all designed to the same end. Whether they were designed by one man or were the result of some unexplained growth, is a different question; for the date, I would accept the end of the 7th century.

It is perhaps worth noting the tradition which associated the end of *stasis* at Sparta with the odes of Terpandros: see Meineke on Kratinos, *Cheiromēnes*, 19 (243 K.).

<sup>2</sup> Hellanikos, however, attributed the constitution to Eurysthenes and Prokles, the first kings, and so a good deal earlier than Thucydides' date.

belong to the ninth century; and the suggestion is tempting.<sup>1</sup> But I find it difficult to separate *ἔτη γάρ ἔστι κ.τ.λ.*, from *ἐκ παλαιτάτου*; and a long period with the same constitution, uninterrupted by a tyranny, would have helped little to establish Sparta's influence in the Peloponnesian if its first 200 years or so had been conspicuous for *στρατός*. It seems more likely that Thucydides, whether as the result of independent thought and inquiry or following another, is correcting the anomaly in Herodotus' narrative and at the same time lowering the date of the constitution by a century and a half.

For the details of the archaeological evidence see *B.S.A.* xii–xvi; xxviii (1926–7); and Lane, 'Laconian Vase-painting', *ibid.* xxxiv, 1933–4; and for discussion of the problem, Nilsson, *Klio*, xii, 1912, 308–40 (who points out the many primitive elements in the ἀγωγή, which suggest an early date); Helbig, *Sitzb. Münch.* 1911, Abh. 12, who argues that the introduction of the phalanx in the army organization was the most important factor in the change in Spartan culture, and that this was after the Lelantine war and after Tyrtaios;<sup>2</sup> Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.* iii. 557–69, and the bibliography to that chapter (especially Ehrenberg, *Neugriinder des Staates*, 1925); and more recent articles: Ehrenberg, 'Der Gesetzgeber v. Sparta', in '*Επιτύμβιον Swoboda*', 1927, 19–28; 'Sparta' in *R.E. (Geschichte)*, by Ehrenberg; Jaeger, 'Sparta um 590', *Sitz. Berlin*, 1932, 537–68 (see his *Paideia*, pp. 76–84); Lenschau in Bursian, cclxi (1938), 227.

**δι' αὐτὸ δυνάμενοι:** their influence was due at least as much to their military victories (see 15. 2–3 n.); but Thucydides may mean that the permanence of their victory was due to the stability of the constitution and ἀγωγή (and to the military organization which was part of it), though they had had much trouble in Messenia and were to have it again before the Peloponnesian war broke out.

**2. δεκάτῳ δὲ ἔτει:** that is to say, from the archonship of Phainippos, 490–489 B.C., when Marathon was fought, to that of Hypsicrides, 481–480, when Xerxes' invasion began, inclusive, ten names occurred in the archon-list. This is the precise meaning of the figure given: in the tenth year, or nine years after, *μετὰ ἐννέα ἔτη*. When writers said that the second invasion occurred *μετὰ δέκα ἔτη* (= *ἐνδεκάτῳ ἔτει*), they are either using a round number or mean that Thermopylae and Salamis were fought ten years, within a month or two, after Marathon, which is also true. Or Thucydides himself may be

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that on this view Thucydides may be placing *εὐνομία* after the second Messenian war, which he rather unaccountably omits if he thinks of Spartan prosperity and influence as dating from the 9th century.

<sup>2</sup> The five territorial phylai which took the place of the old three Dorian phylai, and which may have been the basis of the new army organization (see 20. 3 n.), seem to have been later than Tyrtaios.

using a round number here, for ἐνδεκάτῳ ἔτει, from Phainippos to Kalliades (480–479), eleven archons. Plato, *Legg.* iii. 698 c, is very precise: Marathon was σχεδὸν δέκα ἔτεσι before Salamis, both battles, according to the usual view, having been fought in the month Boedromion (the third of the Attic year).

Thucydides' date here is thus no evidence for Munro's view that the date of the Marathon campaign is 491, not 490 (*C.A.H.* iv. 232–3). In vi. 59. 4 he says that Hippias ruled for three years after his brother's assassination and was expelled in the fourth, and ὅρμωμενος ἐς Μαραθῶνα ὕστερον ἔτει εἰκοστῷ . . . μετὰ Μῆδων ἐστράτευσεν. The three years are 514–513, 513–512, and 512–511, and the year of his overthrow therefore (archon Harpaktides) 511–510.<sup>1</sup> The twentieth year after this is not 491–490 as Munro takes it, but 492–491 (twenty archontates inclusive). Thucydides must therefore in any case be there using a round number. In viii. 68. 4 he expressly uses a round number, ἐπ' ἔτει ἑκαστῷ μάλιστα, for the interval between the overthrow of the tyrants and 'the end of freedom' for the democracy, though in fact, reckoned by archon-years, it was exactly a hundred (511–510 to 412–411). It was only 'about a hundred' if Hippias was expelled early in 511–510, since the Four Hundred were established in power late in 412–411 (in May 411). Or, as the overthrow of the tyrants was popularly associated with the assassination of Hipparchos by the 'liberators' Harmodios and Aristogeiton, Thucydides may have been thinking generally of the period of 103 years 514–411.

Nor do the dates in *Aθπ.* 21. 1, 22. 2–3 support Munro. They are ἔτει τετάρτῳ μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν, i.e. 508–507, archon Isagoras, for the constitution of Kleisthenes; ἔτει πέμπτῳ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν, i.e. 504–503, archon Hermokreon, for the oath of the boule, and ἔτει μετὰ ταῦτα δωδεκάτῳ, i.e. 493–492, archon Phainippos, for Marathon. No amount of juggling with 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' reckoning can alter that; there must be, as almost all have recognized, a lacuna or a mistaken figure in Aristotle's text. On the other hand, the figures in *Aθπ.* 22. 3–8 (2+1+3+2+3) do give eleven archons from Phainippos to Hypsicrides inclusive; but in this case the alteration of the last figure from τετάρτῳ to τρίτῳ (whether the slip is Aristotle's or a copyist's) is supported by Plutarch, *Aristeides*, 8. 1.

**δυνάμει προύχοντες:** "nach demselben natürlichen Verhältnisse, das schon Agamemnon an die Spitze des troischen Zuges gebracht hatte (9. 1)"—Classen.

**οἱ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι . . . καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι:** the leading states of the Peloponnesian war now for the first time both prominent. Hdt. i. 56. 1, says that Croesus found Sparta and Athens the two most

<sup>1</sup> Hdt. v. 55 says the tyranny lasted four years after the death of Hipparchos.

powerful states in Greece in 546; but he is probably antedating the importance of the latter.

**3. καὶ δλίγον μὲν χρόνον, κ.τ.λ.:** this goes back to the time before the Greek states διεκρίθησαν πρὸς τε Ἀθ. καὶ Λακεδ., the construction being the same as in *Αθπ.* 13. 1, Σέλωνος δ' ἀποδημήσαντος, ἔτι τῆς πόλεως τεταραγμένης ἐπὶ μὲν ἔτη τέτταρα διῆγον ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ (see Kenyon's translation of the passage in the Oxford *Aristotle*).

**οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν . . . πρὸς ἀλλήλους:** the fighting which occurred at intervals between 459 and the Thirty Years' Peace of 445 (i. 103–15. 1). The phrase used shows that in the famous passage on the portent of the Delian earthquake—the evils that befell Greece in the three generations of Persian kings, Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes, first from the Persians, τὰ δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν κορυφαίων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς πολεμεόντων (vi. 98. 2)—Herodotos may not be referring to the Peloponnesian war of 431–421, but to this earlier one, however natural it may be to us, influenced by Thucydides, to think of the Peloponnesian war as the only one; for Macan is surely right in interpreting τριῶν τουτέων ἐπεξῆς γενεέων, not as = 100 years (c. 521–421 B.C.), but as the three generations of father, son, and grandson.

This fighting, such is Thucydides' argument, served only to add to the preparations and experience of all parties in the Great War; it did not weaken them, and the periods of truce enabled them to recover from any losses incurred and to equip themselves even more efficiently for the final struggle. This is a very different conception from that implied for Athens by oligarchic accounts, as represented by *Aθπ.* 26. 1—see Introd., p. 48; and wholly inconsistent with the view that Sparta suffered a catastrophic fall in population by the earthquake of 465–464 (see below, 101. 2 n.).

#### 19. The difference between the sources of Spartan and Athenian power.

**καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.:** see Forbes's note here, who follows Stahl and Steup in supposing αὐτοῖς to refer to Athens alone. I believe, however, that Classen (in his earlier editions), Grote, and Croiset were right in referring it to both Athens and Sparta (and in punctuating therefore with a full stop, not a colon, before this sentence). Thucydides is concerned with the fact that both sides were at the height of their military preparedness in 431 (see i. 1, ἀκμάζοντες . . . ἀμφότεροι, 123. 1, and ii. 11. 1, ἐπὶ πόλιν δυνατωτάτην ἐρχόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ πλεῖστοι καὶ ὄριστοι στρατεύοντες: Delachaux, 29–30); they were both of them wealthier and better equipped than in the Persian wars when they were allies (μετ' ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας). It is the comparison with the Persian wars which is relevant, not that

between Athens' power now and what it was in 456–447 before the Boeotians and Megarians broke away (= *μετ' ἀκρ.* τ. ξ., Steup) or what it was before the Delian Confederacy had been converted into the Athenian empire (= *μετ' ἀκρ.* τ. ξ., Stahl, Forbes). ἡ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε . . . ἥρθησαν means naturally the height of their prosperity at previous times, which, especially in the case of Sparta, some might have supposed to be greater than now. It is not *potestas* (as Stahl says), which is in point; Spartan *potestas* may well have been greater in earlier days before Athens could rival her. It is her and Athenian *παρασκευή* (or *δύναμις* in its narrow sense, 'military strength') which is here emphasized. *ἐκατέρους* for *αὐτοῖς* would of course have made the sentence clearer and we might have expected *ῶστε* in place of *καὶ*, if Thucydides is summing up; but a little darkness is not un-Thucydidean.

If, however, it is felt that *αὐτοῖς* must refer to Athens only, because Sparta had gained no special wealth or new accession of strength since the Persian wars and Athens had, then, to make the meaning clear, we need *ἀμφότεροι* or *ξυναμφότεροι* after *ποτέ*, preserving the meaning 'when their alliance still held' for *μετ' ἀκρ.* τ. ξ.: 'Athens' own military resources (including, of course, finance) were greater than the combined resources of both sides in 480–479.' This I should have thought to be a great exaggeration;<sup>1</sup> but neither Stahl's nor Steup's interpretation of *μετ' ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ἔνυμαχίας* is satisfactory: it is too obvious to need statement that Athens' individual power was stronger when the other members of the League were her subjects than when they were free allies; and it is too paradoxical to say that her power was greater than when the League was at its height.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand (if one of these interpretations is correct), there is no reason to doubt the truth of Thucydides' statement that Athenian *παρασκευή*, her resources ready to hand, were greater in 431 than in 465 or 455, and a good deal greater than in 445. Cf. vi. 26. 2, where he relates the progress made between 421 and 415.<sup>3</sup> It is, however, the comparison with conditions in 480–479 which is chiefly intended.

Thucydides gives a few, very few, details of Athenian *παρασκευή* in 431 in ii. 13; where see nn.

<sup>1</sup> Croiset takes the meaning to be that each of the two powers ("grâce au concours de ses alliés et sujets") was stronger than their combined forces when they were allies against Persia: an even greater exaggeration; for Sparta clearly had more allies and 'satellites' in 480.

<sup>2</sup> It is paradoxical, that is, in *expression*, which is not in Thucydides' manner.

<sup>3</sup> Contrast Macan, *C.A.H.* v, p. 414 (supported by Adcock, *ibid.*, p. 481), who regards as "demonstrably false" the assertion "that Athens and Sparta were at the height of their powers in 431 . . . ; Athens at least had been vastly more powerful from 461 to 445 than she was after the Samian war". If only such things were "demonstrable"! Athens was more energetic, active, and victorious

**20. 1. τεκμηρίω:** it should be remembered that *τεκμηρίον* is not *evidence*, but the *inference* drawn from the evidence, as Thucydides' own from the Catalogue as to the numbers of the Greek force at Troy. Cf. i. 3 n. In the law-courts *μαρτυρία* is evidence, the direct evidence of the witnesses—what they have themselves seen or heard—*τεκμηρία* the inferences drawn from all the known, or asserted, facts—hence often equivalent to what we call circumstantial evidence. It is *probable* inference; often necessary inference, the indisputable conclusion to be drawn from the premisses of a syllogism: *Ar. Rhet.* i. 2. 14–18 (see Cope's Introduction, pp. 160–6). In 21. 1 it is 'from the foregoing arguments'.

**παντὶ ἔξῆς τεκμηρίω:** not 'any and every such inference', but 'each inference that we make in the course of our inquiry'; 'difficult though it is to trust every inference that we make'—for the evidence on which these inferences are made cannot always be tested, so careless are men in accepting stories told them. I do not think, with Widmann, that *παντὶ ἔξῆς* has the same meaning as *πάντας ἔξῆς* in vii. 29. 4, 'indiscriminately'; or rather the effect is different—to kill everybody you meet in turn is to kill indiscriminately, but to test every *τεκμηρίον* in turn is to discriminate.

There is good reason to suppose, with Herbst and Steup, that Thucydides means by *τὰ παλαιά* (cf. also *ὡς παλαιὰ εἶναι*, 21. 1) only events down to, roughly, the end of the sixth century, thus excluding the Persian wars which have been mentioned in c. 18: not so much because he would not have made this statement as to the difficulty of making trustworthy inferences about the fifth century,<sup>1</sup> as because he makes no statement about the relative importance of the Persian wars till 23. 1. Besides, the period between 479 and 431, briefly referred to in 18. 3–19, is certainly excluded from *τὰ παλαιά*, for during that period both Athenians and Peloponnesians were, not weak, but increasing in power and rapidly improving their equipment for war. It need not follow, however, that cc. 18–19 formed a separate section, a note written by Thucydides but not worked into the context of the Introduction and inserted here after his death by his 'editor' (any more than 5. 3, also supposed by Steup

in the earlier period; but she was still struggling for empire, she had not consolidated her power, nor had time to build up any reserves. It would be more sensible to say that the assertion is false (though again, alas, not demonstrably) of Sparta; for she had been perhaps permanently weakened by the Helot revolt (see below, 101. 2 n.). This, however, might have been obscured by the Spartan victory in 404, an argument for the late composition of this passage (cf. Adcock, l.c.).

<sup>1</sup> We should at the same time remember that it was true for Thucydides, as it is for us, that it was difficult to get at the truth about the Persian wars: *παντὶ ἔξῆς τεκμηρίω*, a hint at just what was lacking for *τὰ Μηδικά* and at what Thucydides tried to find and provide for the Peloponnesian war?

and others to be a separate note); for they are very pertinent to his present discussion; only that the whole of the Introduction is a thesis supported by a few arguments (with some interesting, but not relevant, matter added, as about the Karians in the islands, 8. 1), not a full *dissertatio*.

Whether Thucydides ever intended to make it longer and more systematic, or would have made it so, had he lived to complete his work, is quite another question; but I doubt it. Look at 95. 2-6 for an instance of a quite simple narrative which is, however, not in strict logical order. If we attempt to find an 'original' preface by Thucydides with all events mentioned in logical or chronological order, we must break up not only the present sequence of chapters but individual sentences: for example, 18. 1, which begins at c. 560 B.C. (*οἱ πλεύστοι*), goes on to 511 (*τελευταῖς*) and to 480 (*πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ*), then back to the ninth century and the intervening period down to c. 560 again, finally to 490 (then § 2, 480 and 479-435); and nothing could be more involved than 9. 1. It would anyhow be difficult to decide whether the illogicalities and roughnesses of the preface as we have it are due to its being a first draft or to its having been originally shorter, with later notes not very harmoniously worked in. It may be the latter, but certainly (I feel) the additions are by Thucydides, not by an editor, and there was not necessarily any great distance of time between the original and the last notes.<sup>1</sup> We do not know at all in what sort of circumstances he wrote the preface (at his leisure when in exile? in the brief intervals of travel? in Athens in the midst of political disorder?);<sup>2</sup> for he gives us no autobiography. Our only evidence for what he would have done is what he has done. We know that that is unfinished; but it is idle to pretend that we know what every part of it would have been like if it had been finished. Cf. below, pp. 139-40.

*τὰς ἀκοάς*: not of course 'hearsay', with any immediate implication of doubt as to credibility, but 'all that has been said and written of the past', 'all that we have heard or read of it'; the contrast being with what we know by our own experience. For the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides had, as evidence, the personal experience of himself and others, which had to be tested by a different criterion (22. 1-3).  
**2. Ἀθηναίων γοῦν, κ.τ.λ.**: Herodotus did not share this delusion (v. 55), any more than the popular admiration for the tyrannicides as the liberators of Athens (vi. 123). Plato, or Pseudo-Plato, did, in the *Hipparchos*. Aristotle (*Αθην. 18. 1*), who is following the accepted

<sup>1</sup> This hypothesis, that the preface is unfinished, and that the later notes were not made much later than the first draft, does not involve the conclusion that Thucydides was working on it at his death. He may have begun it much earlier and put it on one side till he had finished the main narrative.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Prentice, 'How Thucydides wrote his History', *C.P.* xxv, 1930, 117-27.

historical tradition (perhaps fixed by Thucydides), agrees with Thucydides, except in so far as he definitely associates Hipparchos with Hippias in the tyranny, the latter, however, being the real ruler.

Thucydides relates the story of the tyrannicides at much greater length, vi. 54-9; see nn. there on Beloch's view (i. 2. 294) that the author of the *Hipparchos* is right and that Herodotus agrees with him, and on some new evidence.

It is to be presumed that the two accounts were written at different stages in the composition of the work, and that the longer is the later. The details given here are scarcely relevant to the argument (though we must understand the line of thought in *ὑποτοπήσαντες δέ, κ.τ.λ.*: 'and that it was only because Harmodios and Aristogeiton suspected that Hippias had been forewarned that they did not attack him, or did not attack him first'—the killing of Hipparchos and not Hippias being one of the causes of the popular error Thucydides is correcting); it is possible, but not certain, that he would, in a final revision, have eliminated them.

*τὸ Λεωκόρειον*: see vi. 57. 3 n.

**3. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ, κ.τ.λ.**: it is an interesting, if not very important, question whether Thucydides here has Herodotus directly in mind. On the second point, the *λόχος Πιτανάτης*, Herodotus is definite in stating its presence at the battle of Plataia—the famous Amompharetos was its *λοχαγός* (ix. 53); and he had himself been to Pitane (iii. 55). On the former, he only implies that the Spartan kings each had two votes in the gerousia, when he says that in their absence the two *gerontes* most nearly related to them could exercise their prerogatives (vi. 57. 5, *ἔχειν τὰ τῶν βασιλέων γέρεα, δύο ψῆφοις τιθεμένους, τρίτην δὲ τὴν ἔωντάν*); that is, he shares the popular opinion without expressly stating it, and implies that it was a well-known thing not worth special mention—the privilege which he does mention being that of voting by proxy, not that of having two votes. Thucydides therefore almost certainly has other writers, and common opinion, in mind as well as Herodotus. See below, 22. 4 n.

(The view, held by Forbes and others, that Herodotus' sentence "probably means that each proxy gave one vote, and then voted on his own account", is untenable. Not only would Herodotus have said *δύο ψῆφοις τιθεμένους, τὴν μὲν ἐτέρην ὑπὲρ τοῦ βασιλέος τὴν δὲ ἐτέρην ὑπὲρ ἔωντο*; but, if the first votes given are the two royal votes, and only two, *τρίτην δὲ τὴν ἔωντάν* would mean that, for themselves, these two *gerontes* had only one vote between them. In a roundabout way How and Wells do think Herodotus meant this, for they say that he was not only muddled, but thought that there was only one proxy for the two kings, which would mean that he forgot not only that one next-of-kin for both kings would be difficult

to find, but the kings' mutual enmity which he has just mentioned (52. 8). If he did mean this, he can at least be accused of such obscurity as to give support to a prevailing error.)

**προστιθέσθαι:** the use of this compound verb is curious, and may mean that the kings voted last in the gerousia—"added" their votes to the rest (Classen; Schömann-Lipsius, *Griech. Alt.* i<sup>4</sup>. 239. 1). **τὸν Πιτανάτην λόχον:** according to Wade-Gery, *C.A.H.* iii. 560, the reforms at Sparta (c. 600 B.C.) included the substitution of five territorial phylai (four, of which Pitana was one, constituting Sparta itself, and Amyklai to the south being included) for the old three hereditary phylai of the Dorians, and the Spartan army was reorganized on this basis, one *λόχος* from each phyle (practically the system adopted by Kleisthenes at Athens a century later). In that case it is difficult to see how there could have failed to exist a *Πιτανάτης λόχος*. In the article on Sparta in *R.E.*, Ehrenberg (col. 1375-6; cf. Bölte, *ibid.* 1362-3) argues that Amyklai had already been absorbed in the three Dorian phylai, but now formed a new *ωβά* with the four other *ωβαί* in Sparta, and that the army was not based on these *ωβαί*. As there were five Spartiate lochoi, Herodotus' mistake is understandable.

**οὕτως ἀταλαπώρος, κ.τ.λ.:** "Aristoph. Danaides (Fragm. 254 K.) οὕτως αὐτοῖς ἀταλαπώρως ή ποίησις διέκευτο. The date of the Danaides is unknown; but the resemblance between the two passages cannot be accidental, and Aristophanes must have taken the phrase from Thucydides, not Thucydides from Aristophanes"—Forbes. This, like the arguments that Thucydides must always be criticizing Herodotus whenever the two differ, comes from forgetting what a small fraction of ancient literature we possess. A dozen writers may have used the phrase; and was Thucydides a popular author?

**21. 1. λογογράφοι:** prose-writers in general, as opposed to the poets, and therefore in this connexion, the historians of an earlier generation or contemporary with Thucydides (since both poets and prose-writers related events of the past). See Introd., pp. 1 ff.; and 22. 4 n.; Wilamowitz (1), ii. 19. Herodotus, of course, frequently refers to parts of his work as *λόγοι*.

The word *λογογράφος* could include in its meaning 'unreliable teller of stories' (cf. Ar. *Rhet.* ii. 11. 7; Polyb. vii. 7. 1), just as later it was a term of *abuse* for a speech-writer—a man, that is, who would compose a speech for another, without sincerity; and similarly *λογοποιός* can mean both 'prose-writer' (Hdt. ii. 143. 1 of Hekataios, ii. 134 of Aesop) and 'spreader of false stories', or writer of romances.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There seems to be no justification for Bux's view (art. 'Logographoi', *R.E.* xiii. 1021-7) that the meaning 'prose-writer' is Ionic only and 'spreader of false stories' Attic. See L. and S. s.v.

Many suppose that Thucydides includes the idea of unreliability in his *λογογράφοι* here, unnecessarily; that element comes from *ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον κοσμοῦντες* in the case of the poets, *ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον* in that of the prose-writers.

**τῇ ἀκροάσει:** like *ἀκοή*, this may include reading (here and 22. 4). Owing to the prevalence of the spoken over the written word, at least to the end of the fifth century, listening was commoner than reading in all kinds of literature and *λέγειν* and *ἀκούειν* tended everywhere to be used, in this connexion, in place of *γράψειν* and *ἀναγνώσκειν*. We still say of a writer—poet, novelist, historian, or orator—"he says", not "he writes so-and-so". We have not therefore necessarily an express reference here to public recitations, such as Herodotus is said to have given of parts of his history at Olympia and in Athens; though *ἄγνωστα*, 22. 4, hints at them.

**ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνευκηκότα:** see 22. 4 n.

**ώς παλαιὰ εἶναι:** see 20. 1 n.

**22.** This chapter in a sense interrupts the argument, the next continuing and summarizing the historian's view that the Peloponnesian war was the greatest in Greek history. But it joins on closely with the last sentence of c. 21, *ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων*: 'it is very difficult to get at the truth about the past; but it is not easy to establish that of contemporary events either. The facts themselves do, however, in my view, prove my point; and though it was difficult always to find out the truth, yet I have done my best, with both speeches and deeds.' So Steup. That is, a statement in support of his argument leads him to a statement of his method. But when Steup goes on to argue that 22. 1 is a later insertion by Thucydides not properly worked in, 22. 2 naturally following on 21, he forgets that both *ὅσα λόγια εἶπον* and *τὰ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων* are included in *αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα* of the war; that is why he uses the somewhat clumsy phrase *τὰ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων* in place of *τὰ πραχθέντα* or *τὰ ἔργα*. (Or, more strictly, it is only 'the deeds done' which prove the magnitude of the war; but when this phrase suggests to Thucydides to make a note of his method, it then includes the speeches.) The sequence of cc. 21, 22, 23 is in fact characteristic of the whole introduction: the analysis is not perfect, the run of the argument not always smooth; Thucydides adds details which interest him for their own sake, and here combines with his main thesis a brief statement of his aim and method. Cf. 20. 1 n.

Richards, *C.Q.* vi, 1912, 139, goes farther: "there should not be much doubt that cc. 22 and 23 have changed places." He notes that c. 23 itself cannot be divided; but see what results. What is the connexion between the end of 23 and the beginning of 22? And how can we separate the end of 23 from the beginning of 24? Richards

notes this last point, and thinks c. 97 is a parallel; for there *τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον*, which introduces 98 ff., is interrupted by the explanation *ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτά . . . ἐπεμνήσθη*; similarly he says the end of 23, introducing 24 ff., may be interrupted by 22. But, apart from the length and nature of the interruption in this case, Richards has not observed how the last sentence of 97 resumes the argument from *τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον*, κ.τ.λ., and so introduces 98 ff. There is no such sentence at the end of 22. This is a good example of the confusion which results from altering Thucydides' own order. This is itself admittedly not perfect; but he was not composing a rhetorical *αιξησις* of his theme.

**1-3. ὡς δ' ἀν ἔδόκουν μοι, κ.τ.λ.:** 'I have given the speeches roughly as I thought the several individuals or groups would have said what they had to say, keeping as close as possible to the general purport of what was actually said.'<sup>1</sup> *τὰ δέοντα* cannot mean 'the ideal argument', that is, "what, to the best of Thucydides' own judgement, the circumstances called for" (Forbes), the best arguments for and against severity towards revolted allies, for and against the expedition to Sicily, and so forth; for in that case, he could not have kept close to what was actually said, and would have had no difficulty in "keeping as close as possible"; for once he had ascertained that there was a debate about Mytilene, in which Kleon spoke for severity, another about Syracuse, in which Alkibiades was for the expedition, Nikias against, which was simple enough, he could have gone on to compose his own speeches. Note the parallelism between the speeches and the deeds: 'I heard some myself and had reports of others from other men; I was present myself in some actions, of others I learnt παρὰ τῶν ἀλλων'; *χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμημονεῦσαι* and *ἐπιπόνως δὲ ηύρισκετο, διότι, κ.τ.λ.*; *ἔχομένῳ στὶ ἐγγύτατα* and *ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβεῖᾳ περὶ ἔκαστου ἐπεξελθών*. His method is different in dealing with two different things, speeches and actions; but the difference is not an exact contrary. That is sufficient to show that there is no intended contrast between *ὡς δ' ἀν ἔδόκουν μοι* and *ὡς ἐμοὶ ἔδόκει* in the sense that in the one case Thucydides means 'I did not write the account of a battle as I imagine it ought to have taken place', in the other, 'I did compose the speeches as I imagined they ought to have been spoken'. *οὐδ'* *ὡς ἐμοὶ ἔδόκει* perhaps contrasts his own practice with that of some other writers, but not with his practice in regard to his own speeches. There was of course this important difference between speeches and

<sup>1</sup> Μέν in *ὅσα μὲν λόγων* is not of course answered by δέ in *ὡς δ' ἀν ἔδόκουν* (which answers *χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν, κ.τ.λ.*), but by τὰ δέ ἔργα (*μέν* doing double duty, in *ὅσα μὲν λόγων* and 'understood' after *χαλεπόν*; cf. 142. 3-4 n.). It is necessary to say this as Pohlenz, p. 117, in an otherwise correct interpretation, apparently has this wrong.

actions: if he was to give a speech as such at all, the *words*, the style, that is the *literary* quality (as opposed to the historical content) must be his own, and to that extent he was substituting his own personality for that of the speaker; there was no such *substitution* in his account of actions, even though the style is still his own; for here his style takes the place of that of his *informants*, in the speeches it takes the place of that of the real performers. But that was inevitable when no verbatim reports were available, and even if there had been, Thucydides would have had to abridge them severely, which is a form of substitution; and he therefore frankly writes in his own style, making no attempt to imitate the oratory of the different speakers (though he may preserve one or two sentences or phrases actually used and remembered)—that would have meant falsifying the evidence, pretending that the speeches were closer to the originals than in fact they were.

**2. οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος . . . οὐδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἔδόκει:** 'not from the first person I chanced to meet' may be intended for a criticism of Herodotus, though not directly of the principle he lays down in ii. 123. 1, *ἐμοὶ δὲ παρὰ πάντα λόγον ὑπόκειται, ὅτι τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπ' ἕκαστων ἀκοῇ γράφω*, and in vii. 152. 3, *ἔγώ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαι γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὀφείλω, καὶ μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἔχετω ἐς πάντα λόγον*; for Herodotus does not say that this is his only principle. Rather does it refer to his habit (not his principle) of *accepting*, uncritically, the first report to hand; hence the inadequacy of his accounts, for example, of Marathon and Plataia, of the conduct and motives of Themistokles, or of the Corinthians at Salamis, and his frequent inconsequences. He had not been at sufficient trouble to collect as many reports from different sources as possible and to sift and examine them (*ἐπεξελθεῖν περὶ τῶν ἕκαστοτε λεγομένων*).

*οὐδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἔδόκει* cannot be directed, as Pohlenz, p. 74 f., supposes, against Hekataios, whose opening words were *τάδε γράφω, ὡς μοι ἀληθέα δοκέει εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοὶ τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν*; for not only is it every historian's duty to relate the truth as he conceives it, but Thucydides has himself just given instances of 'absurd Greek reports' and his own version, *ὡς αὐτῷ ἔδόκει*, of the early history of Greece (or rather, of one aspect of it): *τοιαῦτα ἀν τις νομίζων μάλιστα ἢ διηλθον οὐχ ἀμάρτανοι . . . ηύρισθαι δὲ ἡγησάμενος ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων ὡς παλαιὰ εἶναι ἀποχρώντως, and ἢ μοι δοκεῖ, κ.τ.λ., 9. 3.* In Hekataios' sense (which Thucydides must have understood) every historian must write *ὡς εἴναιτῷ δοκεῖ*.<sup>1</sup> Still less can the words be a criticism directed at

<sup>1</sup> Strictly we should say (since Hekataios' work is lost and we do not really know what it was like), these words of Thucydides cannot be a criticism of his opening sentence.

Herodotos, as Grosskinsky (p. 50) thinks. *He* is the most objective of historians, relying so often on the reports of others; his weakness, if any, is that he is not subjective enough, that he does not exercise his own judgement in selecting and comparing reports. If the words are a polemic against any writer or class of writers (and this is by no means certain), they are directed against the sophistic tendencies of the time, the tendency to 'write up' events out of the imagination, according to a set plan, as, later, Ephoros, the pupil of Isokrates, did with his set battle-pieces; who was content if it was true that a battle took place on such and such an occasion and issued in such and such a way, and took no further trouble to examine the accounts of the fighting.

Pohlenz, p. 58, notes, in connexion with Thucydides' emphasis on ἀκρίβεια and τὸ σαφές, the opening words of Antiochos' history (his probable authority for the early history of the western Greeks): Άντιοχος Ἐποφάνεος τάδε συνέγραψε περὶ Ἰταλίης, ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων λόγων τὰ πιστότατα καὶ σαφέστατα (fr. 3). If we look at Thucydides' Sicilian ἀρχαιολογία at the beginning of book vi, we find in 2. 1, παλαίτατοι μὲν λέγονται . . . Κύκλωπες καὶ Δαιστρυγόνες οἰκήσαι, ὃν ἔγώ οὐτε γένος ἔχω εἰπεῖν οὐτε δόπιθεν ἐστήλθον ἢ ὅποι ἀπεχώρησαν ἀρκείτω δὲ ὡς πουητᾶς τε εἴρηται καὶ ὡς ἔκαστος πῃ γιγνώσκει περὶ αὐτῶν—the scepticism is in Herodotos' vein, and ἔγώ suggests that he will not here follow an earlier authority; in 2. 2, Σικανοί . . . ὡς μὲν αὐτοί φασι καὶ πρότεροι διὰ τὸ αὐτόχθονες εἶναι, ὡς δὲ ἢ ἀλήθεια εὑρίσκεται, κ.τ.λ.—cf. Herodotos, i. 171–2 on the Karians and the Kaunioi (ὅσον καὶ ἔγώ δυνατός εἴμι ἐπὶ μακρότατον ἔξικέσθαι ἀκοῇ . . . κατὰ μὲν δὴ Κάρας οὕτω Κρῆτες λέγουσι γενέθθαι οὐ μέντοι αὐτοὶ γε διμολογέοντο τούτουσι οἱ Κάρες, ἀλλὰ νομίζουσι αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι αὐτόχθονας ἡπειρώτας . . . οἱ δὲ Καύνιοι αὐτόχθονες δοκέειν ἔμοι εἰσι, αὐτοὶ μέντοι ἐκ Κρήτης φασὶ εἶναι); in 2. 4, ὡς μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ λέγεται. In these two last cases, Thucydides is probably accepting his authority's conclusions.

ἀλλ' οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ . . . ἐπεξελθών: a great deal of discussion has taken place on the question whether ἐπεξελθών is to be taken with both parts of this sentence, οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ *τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀλλῶν*,<sup>1</sup> or with the latter only; to little profit. Grosskinsky in his lengthy analysis (pp. 102 ff.) tries to prove that it must be with the latter only; but his argument is based on two faulty assumptions, that the two halves of this sentence (*οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος, κ.τ.λ.*, and *ἀλλ' οἷς τε . . . ἐπεξελθών*) must formally correspond with each other in every detail (but formal correspondence in antithesis is not at all in Thucydides' manner), and that Thucydides must be saying everything that he thought. In fact either transla-

<sup>1</sup> The insertion of *τὰ* (by Ullrich) seems to me an improvement whichever way we take the sentence.

tion is possible: 'I have thought it my duty to narrate the events not on information from the first-comer only nor out of my own head, but only after careful research, aiming at as much accuracy as possible in each case, both where I was present myself and when I rely on reports from others'; or ' . . . not out of my own head, but from my personal experience and after careful research . . . into the reports of others'. In any case, even if the latter is linguistically the better, we may be sure that Thucydides did compare his own experiences with those of others in the case of events at which he was present; it is not to be supposed that, if he was with the first Athenian squadron at Sybota, he made no attempt to get reports from Kerkyraians and Corinthians, while, if he was with the second or remained in Athens, he did; nor, if he was on one wing at Poteidaia, that he did not make inquiry into what happened on the other or from the troops facing Olynthos. To say that Thucydides is here proudly asserting his own complete knowledge and trustworthiness when he was present at an action in contrast to the bias and faulty memories of others, is, to me at least, singularly perverse.

Grosskinsky has, however, furthered the understanding of this chapter as a whole. I agree with his analysis except in three points: (1) he rightly points out the close connexion of thought between c. 22 and 20–1—the implied criticism of others in *οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πινθανόμενος . . . οὐδὲ ὡς ἔμοι ἐδόκει* continues the open criticism of 20 and 21, and the statement of method follows on the mention of *αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα* in 21. 2; but I would put more emphasis on the logical connexion in the latter instance than on the former; and Grosskinsky does not see that *αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα* includes *λόγοι*, with the qualification mentioned above, p. 139. (2) He thinks that *ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβεῖται . . . ἐπεξελθών* is directly contrasted with *χαλεπὸν* (= 'practically impossible') *τὴν ἀκριβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμημονεῖσαι*, instead of being parallel with *ἔχομένως ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῶν ἀληθῶν λεχθέντων*; and maintains therewith that Thucydides makes no claim to any degree of objective accuracy in the speeches. (3) *ἀλλ' οἷς τε παρῆν, κ.τ.λ.*, as to which see above.

I do not at all agree with his interpretation of 22. 1, that Thucydides makes no claim to objective accuracy, and therefore not with his application of it to the speeches themselves. This is not the place to discuss this, or the related problem—on the assumption that Thucydides does make this claim, how far has he succeeded in his aim, that is, how far does the content of his speeches represent what was actually said? (and we must remember the difficulty he must have experienced in getting adequate reports of most of them). On this I have said something in one of my *Essays*, c. ix; and there may be a further occasion to consider the speeches at the end of this work. Here I will only make two comments, one particular and one

general. First: the contrast between Herodotus and Thucydides is as great in their speeches as in their narrative of events. The former always gives his speeches, whether of Cambyses to Gyges in the eighth century, or of Themistokles to Eurybiades before the battle of Salamis, whether dialogue or set speeches, in the novelist's manner, as though he knew the actual words used. Hence he introduces practically all of them with *τάδε*; Thucydides, on the other hand, uses *τοιάδε* invariably—he only uses *τάδε* when quoting verbally from a document (as iv. 117. 3; v. 17. 2, 22. 3, 46. 5).<sup>1</sup> If he has Herodotus especially in mind in this statement of his method (as to which see on 22. 4, below), he is certainly thinking as much of his predecessor's speeches as of his narrative, though, as stated above, *ἐκ τοῦ παρανυχόντος πνυθανόμενος* does indicate one of the weaknesses of Herodotus as a historian.

Second: there is great confusion of meaning in the use of the words 'objective' and 'subjective' in this connexion. Take an example from a play, Menander's *Epitrepones*. Many have thought that Onesimos' speech in the last act is serious or half-serious moralizing—Menander's own thoughts, not meant to be in character, unlike Onesimos' other two speeches, *τοπαστικὸν τὸ γύναιον* and *ὑπομνήματος οὐτος*; if that is correct, it is subjective, and the other two objective. Yet all alike are subjective in that they are the poet's own creation. But in a history, for the speeches, there are not two, but three possibilities. (1) Truly subjective: Thucydides composed what *he* thought, at the time he was writing (perhaps after 404), in the light of his later knowledge, the best speeches possible for the occasion, whether he had notes of arguments actually used or not, and not using the notes he had except in so far as they might suggest to him the best arguments (as a man of Perikles' calibre may actually have used some of them). In this case anachronisms and impossibilities, in the strict sense, are allowed; the speaker is only, as the Germans say, a *Sprachrohr*: e.g. to take the extreme case, the Melian dialogue, 'these were the principles by which, in my opinion, the Athenians ought to have been guided, but they would never themselves have so expressed them'. The speeches are not *in character*; they are like Onesimos' last speech, if that expresses the author's own thoughts. (2) Objective in the dramatist's or novelist's sense: these are the sort of speeches Perikles, Kleon, Nikias, particular individuals, or 'the Athenians, the Corinthians', representing particular cities, would have said on the particular occasions, the men or the cities and the occasions being known to Thucydides, and the speeches being as much his own composition as Menander's are *his*. In this case anachronisms and impossibilities are not allowed; the speeches

<sup>1</sup> And in introducing Teutiaplos' short speech, iii. 29. 3. See E. Harrison, *Proc. Cambr. Phil. Soc.* Oct. 22, 1908; Gomme, *Essays*, pp. 166-7.

are in character and proper to the occasion:<sup>1</sup> e.g. 'not only were these the real Athenian motives at Melos, but they were openly glorying in them at the time; they used to express themselves like this, and therefore might have done so at Melos, though I have no authority for saying that they did'; and 'the Funeral Speech is not *my* ideal democratic Athens [far from it, perhaps], but what I believe Perikles' ideal to have been, though I have no memory nor record of the actual speech'. This is Herodotus' method; he inserts the Athenian speech in answer to Alexander, viii. 143 (at least, I suppose he made it up himself), not because he wants to do some patriotic writing on his own account (in the manner of Dionysios of Halikarnassos), but because he thinks it will illustrate what (as he believes) was in fact the attitude of the Athenians on that occasion.<sup>2</sup> (3) Objective in the historian's sense: Thucydides used arguments and thoughts which he knew, or thought he knew from the reports of others, had in fact been used on those occasions; e.g. 'my information is that the Athenian delegates did use these arguments at Melos'.

It is necessary to emphasize this distinction in order to get our meaning clear.<sup>3</sup> Grosskinsky, for example, points out that when Thucydides gives a speech of Perikles of the year 432 (i. 140-4) he may well be including in it arguments used at other meetings of the ekklisia besides this, the decisive one; Kleon spoke twice in the Mytilenean debate (iii. 36. 6), and Thucydides may have combined the two speeches into one; and may have included in the Corinthian speech at Sparta arguments that had been used by the other allies (i. 67. 4-5); and that therefore we must not take too literally *τὰ ἀληθέως λεχθέντα* and *τὰ αἰεὶ παρόντα*. This is possible enough, though we must remember that politicians must necessarily often repeat themselves, and that Perikles may himself have summed up all his

<sup>1</sup> Except in so far as this is modified by the literary quality of the speech, in Thucydides as in Menander (an Onesimos would not use these actual words).

<sup>2</sup> To say that Herodotus used his speeches simply to decorate his history ("blasse Kunstmittel und Schmuckstücke", Pohlenz, p. 118) is a strange misunderstanding. Meyer (2), ii. 394, writing of Perikles' last speech, says it is Thucydides who is speaking to us, not Perikles, but that he is right to put these words (ii. 64. 3) in the latter's mouth, "weil diese Gedanken die nothwendige Consequenz der Auffassung des Perikles sind, weil sie seiner Denkweise durchaus entsprechen, mit einem Worte nicht weil er so geredet hat, sondern weil er so geredet haben würde—*αἰσ ἀδόκει ἐμοὶ τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ’ εἰπεῖν*—nämlich wenn er die ganze Situation, d.h. hier die Entwicklung bis zum Jahre 404, hätte übersehen können". Note that he leaves out from his quotation *περὶ τῶν (τότε) παρόντων*: which is just the point at issue.

<sup>3</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, 388-9, says the speeches contain what Thucydides thought *τὰ δέοντα*; but which of the first two alternatives given above does this mean? (It should only mean the second, for in i. 88 Thucydides corrects the impression which would be natural to a reader of the speeches and the voting at the first conference at Sparta.)

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previous arguments in one final speech on the occasion of the decisive vote, as Thucydides records. Grosskinsky goes on to say that this implies new arrangement of arguments by the historian (and that there must anyhow have been selection from the many speeches delivered), and that this means subjectivity in practice; that therefore Thucydides can be making no claim to objectivity either in *τὰ ἀληθῶς λεχθέντα* or in *τὰ αἰὲν παρόντα*. And he quotes with approval Meyer's well-known judgement:

"Jede wirkliche Rede ist nur ein Product des Moments und haftet an der momentanen Situation mit allen ihren Einzelheiten. Darum ist sie für ein Geschichtswerk niemals brauchbar. . . . Die Rede des Geschichtswerks soll die gesamte Situation überschauen; und zu dieser gehört auch der Verlauf. . . . Es ist zweifellos: keine Rede bei Thukydides entspricht der ephemeren, sondern nur der idealen Wirklichkeit, sie alle sind nicht Reden, wie sie gehalten sind, sondern 'wie sie der jedesmaligen Situation entsprechend hätten gehalten werden können'. . . . Wo bleibt nun aber bei diesem Ergebnis die vielgerühmte und vielgescholtene Objectivität des Thukydides? Wird sie da nicht zum leeren Schein?"

"Von dem Begriff aus, den man gewöhnlich mit dem Worte 'historische Objectivität' verbindet, ist diese Frage unbedingt zu bejahen; in diesem Sinne ist Thukydides nichts weniger als ein objectiver Historiker. Die Aufgabe, die er sich gesetzt hat, ist, die Dinge unmittelbar auf uns wirken zu lassen, wie sie gewesen sind, das heißt aber nichts anderes, als wie sie ihm selbst erscheinen. . . . Wer das tadelt, verkennt, dass es eine objective Geschichtsschreibung im populären Sinne überhaupt nicht gibt. . . . Die wahre historische Objectivität besteht darin, dass der wissenschaftliche Forscher die Dinge so zur Darstellung bringt, wie sie seinem Geiste als wahr erscheinen. Je vollkommener ihm das gelingt, um so vollständiger hat er seine Aufgabe erfüllt: und hierin ist Thukydides von keinem Späteren übertrffen, ja auch nur erreicht worden."<sup>1</sup>

What Meyer here says of the inevitable subjectivity of all historical writing is true; but it is nothing to our immediate problem. For it applies equally to the narrative of 'the deeds done', as Meyer himself recognizes in this same passage, "selbst wenn der Schriftsteller die trockenste Chronik schreibt, die nur die 'Thatsachen' verzeichnen will". The historian must narrate events, "wie sie ihm selbst erscheinen"; but we do not conclude therefrom that Thucydides' claim to objectivity in the narrative of deeds done, *οὐδὲ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἔδοκει ηγείωσα γράψειν*, means nothing, has no application, or that he failed in his aim. So with the speeches: having established

<sup>1</sup> Meyer (2), ii. 384-7.

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their inevitable subjectivity in Meyer's sense, which they share with the narrative of the deeds, and also the special difficulty of record and memory in their case, we are still faced with the problem: from what material did Thucydides compose them? what are their sources? Did he compose them from his own notes and from the information given by others? or entirely out of his own head—whether dramatically ('this is what *Perikles*—not I nor anyone else—might have said on *this*—not on any other—occasion') or in order to give his own considered judgement, reached in the light of later events, as Onesimos' last speech in *Epitrepontes* gives, maybe, Menander's own summing-up of the meaning of the play? Or did he do sometimes one and sometimes the other? "Die Aufgabe . . . die Dinge unmittelbar auf uns wirken zu lassen, wie sie gewesen sind": *die Dinge* includes speeches as well as deeds; is Thucydides' method of letting them *unmittelbar auf uns wirken* the same (as far as possible) for the speeches as for the deeds? And the related problem: which method does he claim to have followed in i. 22. 1? The answer to this last question does not seem to me to admit of doubt.

A last point. It is said that the ancient feeling for unity of style (which should, by the way, have deterred Thucydides from quoting poets and inserting documents in his history), the tradition of historiography and his own training with the sophists, would all alike have prevented him even contemplating the record of speeches actually delivered. But in that case they should have made him also quite unconscious of any problem to be faced; he would have said nothing of the difficulty of remembering what had been said, nothing of keeping as close as possible to the general sense; he would have been unaware that any problem existed.

Note that Thucydides makes no defence of the general practice of introducing speeches into history. For him they were an essential part; only by a use of them (in some form) could he show the emotions and motives of men, which were as important as their deeds. A modern author, writing the history of a contemporary war with a similar intent to Thucydides, would have at his disposal, for the 'psychology' of the conflict, the printed reports (summary or in full) of hundreds of speeches, he would have newspapers and pamphlets; he would make his analysis, in his own words, from them, with some verbatim extracts; and such an analysis would be no less subjective and perhaps not more 'authentic' than Thucydides' speeches.<sup>1</sup> A modern historian of the fourth century B.C. will include, in some form, the 'general sense' of Demosthenes' speeches; he will not include any single speech from beginning to end—that would throw his whole work out of balance, by throwing too much

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Meyer (2), ii. 385, n. 1.

weight on one speech, emphasizing what is only momentary, "using what is not usable in a history";<sup>1</sup> he will summarize one or more. So far he is writing 'subjectively', for he is using his own judgement; but his sources are authentic. Moreover, in the course of this summarizing and rewriting in his own language, a certain amount of schematization is inevitable, and this will make them yet more the historian's own; and the stronger the personality of the historian, the more they will be his own. This much is to be conceded at once to those who think Thucydides' speeches his own; but it does not make them 'free compositions', nor mean that when he said he was keeping as close as possible to the general sense of the actual speeches, he was saying nothing.

What we can find fault with in Thucydides (if we like) is his limitation, in this as throughout, to a strictly military and political history, that he makes no use, for example, of contemporary comedy to illustrate the story of 'what was said' (cf. Introd., pp. 25 ff., 35 ff.). He is not to blame that later historians used his example to justify their own practice of inserting speeches which were not only in all respects their own composition, but were nothing but occasions for oratorical display.

**4. καὶ ἐσ μὲν ἀκρόαστος, κ.τ.λ.:** For *ἀκρόαστος*, see 21. 1 n. Herodotus looms so large for us, as all the work of his predecessors and contemporaries is lost, and Thucydides is so austere (*τὸ διερπές*) just where he is so clearly attractive (*τὸ προσαγωγόν*, 21. 1), that we inevitably think that the implied criticism here is meant for him and him alone. It may be so, for Herodotus was soon recognized as the greatest of the early historians; but we must beware of seeing criticism of Herodotus wherever Thucydides happens to differ from him. In much of the introduction Thucydides agrees with him (3. 2, 8. 1, 9. 1, 12. 3-4, 18. 1, 20. 2); elsewhere (4. 6. 3, 8. 2, 13. 6, 20. 3) he differs, but Herodotus was clearly not in every case alone in his error. In ii. 8. 3 (the earthquake at Delos) he differs, but is probably not correcting him.<sup>2</sup> He had not, as we have, Herodotus, and no one but Herodotus, ever at his elbow while he wrote. He does not think it necessary to correct the main outlines of his narrative of the Persian wars, but in 89-118 begins where he left off. See Jacoby (2), p. 100, n. 2 (quoted above, p. 1, n. 2).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Though even Demosthenes' speeches, as we have them, are probably not exact records of what he had said in the *ekklesia*, but edited by the author for publication, the purely momentary and fortuitous being excluded (Meyer (2), II. 384, n. 1).

<sup>2</sup> Nor is there any reason to suppose Thucydides has Herodotus in mind in i. 89. 3, 126. 8, ii. 97. 6, where see nn. (We may note that the scholiast on 20. 2 has '*Ηροδότου καθάπτεται*', when both in fact are in agreement.) Cf. also 41. 2 n.

<sup>3</sup> Jacoby adds, p. 102, n. 1: "Ich habe das Gefühl, als ob Wilamowitz *Die Griech. Lit.* S. 56 die Stellung Herodots in der Entwicklung der Historiographie

*τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες*: 'the absence of the story-telling element', so common in Herodotus in his account both of earlier and later times: for example, Candaules and Gyges, Croesus and Adrestos, Polykrates and his ring, Xerxes' dream before the sailing of the armada and Hippias' dream before Marathon, Themistokles and the allied admirals before Salamis; i.e. historical romance. It has nothing to do with belief or disbelief in the main traditions of what we call the 'mythical' period of Greek history (the Theban and Trojan wars, the migrations, and so forth, which Thucydides accepted). Cf. 21. 1, *ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνευκηκότα*, 'fanciful history'. Plut. *Per.* 13. 16, *Στησίβροτος δεινὸν ἀσέβημα καὶ μυθῶδες ἔξενεγκεών ἐτόλμησεν*. Isokr. iv. 28, *καὶ γὰρ εἰ μυθῶδης ὁ λόγος γέγονεν, ὅμως αὐτῷ καὶ νῦν ρήθηναι προσήκει*, where the story, the wanderings of Demeter, belongs to the mythical period, but Isokrates means to express a doubt of its truth. Lykourgos, 95, *εἰ γὰρ καὶ μυθωδέστερόν ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν ἀπασι τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀκούσαι*, where the story is of the historical period, but probably untrue (and if untrue, one would have thought, a poor moral for the young). This is well brought out by Bruns, 101, 109-12.

*τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν*: his aim is a purely scientific one, to relate what happened and (23. 5) the causes, just as Herodotus' was (i. 1)—to widen the boundaries of knowledge, or to prevent them contracting; but *καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὐθίς, κ.τ.λ.*: his scientific work may be brought into relation with practical affairs. For a particular instance, see his statement about the pestilence, ii. 48. 3 (though he will refrain in that case from saying anything about causes—see n. there): *ἔγώ δὲ οἶον τε ἐγίγνετο λέξω καὶ ἀφ’ ὅν ἀν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐθίς ἐπιπέσοι, μάλιστ’ ἀν ἔχοι τι προειδὼς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας*. Here the applicability of scientific knowledge to practical affairs is an obvious one.

It should not be necessary, but it is, to explain that *τῶν μελλόντων . . . ἔπεσθαι* is future to Thucydides, not to his readers: the latter will not find his work useful in order to divine what will happen in the future, as though it were a sort of horoscope, but for the understanding of other events besides the Peloponnesian war, future to Thucydides, but past or contemporary to the reader (cf. A. R. W. Harrison, *C.R.* li, 1937, 6-7). That is why it is to be a *κτῆμα ἐσ αἰεὶ*; and the events of the last twenty-five years in Europe only prove that Thucydides' hopes for his *History* were to be fulfilled much

doch unterschätzt oder wenigstens ihn dem Leser zu sehr nur als liebenswürdigen Erzähler vorführt; wenn ich auch alles einzelne zugebe, was er über den Historiker Herodot sagt (es ist im Grunde das Urteil des Thukydides), so muss doch m. E. das Schlussurteil anders lauten." So I think would Thucydides' final judgement on Herodotus.

more completely than even he ever expected. Nor should there be any need to say that *ώφελιμα κρίνειν* does not mean that he thought of his work as a practical handbook for statesmen. Housman in a famous lecture poured scorn on the practical utility of scientific work; but he would have been 'content' if his edition of Manilius were found 'useful' for the understanding of Manilius and of Latin, and his Juvenal was written *editorum in usum*. Later writers, Polybios among them, Plutarch, Hobbes,<sup>1</sup> believed that to show the way to statesmen was the chief or one of the chief aims of history; Thucydides was of a different temper. Polybios, indeed, as Classen notes, echoes Thucydides' language, iii. 31. 12: the historian must recount the causes and the concomitant circumstance and the results of events, as well as the events themselves (he must not be a mere chronicler); otherwise *τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μέν, οὐδένης ὥφελεὶ τὸ παράπαν*. This whole chapter of Polybios—on the practical value of history—is worth reading, in order to understand the difference in outlook between him and the great historians of the fifth century (and probably the scholars and antiquarians of the fourth and third); he is almost as 'practical' in his view of history as Plutarch of biography. (It is interesting to note that the opinion that history-writing needs this practical justification increased in strength as the number of persons who could benefit in this way by the reading of it decreased. Most of Polybios' readers, and all of Plutarch's, were in no position to apply the valuable lessons they would learn from their works, for the 'political' life had come to an end.)

**23.** The argument resumed from 21. 'The Trojan war had lasted a long time and involved many men, but discontinuously—only a small number were at Troy at any one time. The Persian war involved even more (the whole empire and most of the Greek states); but it was soon over, in two campaigns. The Peloponnesian war, on the other hand, was protracted to an immense length and involved far greater suffering and more numerous disasters.' See 1. 1 n.

**1.** *τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἔργων μέγιστον ἐπράχθη τὸ Μηδικόν:* so Herodotus had argued that the Persian was greater than the Trojan war (vii. 20. 2; above, 10. 3 n.). 'Der Vergleich dieser Kapitel (Hdt. vii. 19–21) mit dem Eingange des Thukydideischen Werkes ist recht

<sup>1</sup> "I could recommend the Author unto you, not impertinently, for that he had in his veins the blood of Kings: but I chuse rather to recommend him for his Writings, as having in them profitable instructions for Noble men, and such as may come to have the managing of great and weighty actions" (Epistle Dedicatory of his Translation of Thucydides, addressed to the Earl of Devonshire).

interessant. Er zeigt auch, wieviel Gedanken Thukydides dem Vorgänger verdankt"—Jacoby (2), p. 102, n. 3; and with how much more historical sense he develops them.

**δυοῖν ναυμαχίαιν καὶ πεζομαχίαιν:** presumably Artemision and Salamis, Thermopylai and Plataia, as the scholiast, and Plutarch, *de Her. mal.* 43 (873 E). A pedant might object that this not only ignores Mykale, which was part of the same campaign as Plataia, but the capture of Eion, Eurymedon, and even the Egyptian war; that the war with Persia in fact, far from ending quickly, lasted till the Peace of Kallias in 449. But Thucydides is concerned with war as a *κίνησις*, a destructive agency, and in that sense (as well as dramatically, and in popular estimation) for Greece the Persian war ended with the expulsion of the invaders. Cf. 89. 2 *init.*, which implies a similar interpretation.

Shilleto objected to this on the ground that Thermopylai and Artemision were not Greek victories. That is because, like most moderns, he takes a romantic view of war; Thucydides is not thinking in terms of victories. (Dionysios, *Ant. Rom.* xi. 1, has ἐνίκησαν Ἀθηναῖοι τε καὶ Δακεδαιμόνιοι δυοὶ ναυμαχίαις καὶ πεζομαχίᾳ μᾶς: this will mean Plataia and Salamis, and either Artemision or Mykale, probably the latter, even though it was not much of a sea-battle.)

**3.** Stories of earthquakes, eclipses, droughts, etc., that is, of *natural* phenomena occurring in a time of war and adding to the disasters, came to be believed. Whether Thucydides himself thought there might be some connexion between such natural events and human actions is not clear; from the statement that eclipses were more frequent during the Peloponnesian war, it would seem that he did. Yet eclipses are not disasters, like earthquakes, and their natural cause was known to Anaxagoras in Thucydides' youth; when in iii. 89 he gives an account of the great tidal wave, he does not think of anything but natural causes, and suggests no portent. He may therefore mean here only that popular opinion put all these things together as inevitable accompaniments of a human disaster.

Thucydides mentions two eclipses of the sun, that of 431 B.C. (ii. 28) and that of 424 (iv. 52. 1), which followed closely on one another. It is perhaps noteworthy that he says nothing here of eclipses of the moon, one of which, in 413, plays an important part in his history.

**ἀκοῇ λεγόμενα:** not 'mere hearsay', as Classen, any more than *τὰς ἀκοὰς*, 20. 1, where see n. In this case it is opposed not only to what we know from our own experience, but to what we know from certain evidence, e.g. for us, our knowledge of past eclipses.

**αὐχροὶ . . . καὶ λυροί:** Thucydides does not relate any instances of these in the course of his history.

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Note once more what it is that in Thucydides' view makes this war μέγιστον καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων: not simply because Athens (or Athens and Sparta) was more powerful in 431 than ever before, or Sparta more powerful in 404—he is not measuring in terms of power—but because more and greater disasters happened in its course than in any other equal period of time; and this was due to the great power and wealth of the two leading states, which enabled them both to prolong the war and to extend its area, all Greece and so many foreign states as well being involved.

5. τοῦ μὴ τινα ζήτησαι, κ.τ.λ.: this object has not been achieved; the ζήτησις is as lively as ever, if not very fruitful. Perhaps, however, because we do not trust Thucydides enough. (He gives his detailed account of the symptoms of the pestilence also partly in order that future generations may understand; and again we have failed to benefit by his narrative—we do not recognize the disease.)

6. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους . . . μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις: the main cause of the war was Athenian imperialism and Spartan fear of her rival; for Athens only 'became great' through her empire. That is, the Athenians were the provocative cause; the Spartans were, however, animated by fear lest their own position should be weakened, not by any unselfish desire to defend the principle of autonomy. Beyond this Thucydides makes no moral judgement; he will not say whether, in his opinion, the Athenian empire did more good than harm, whether, that is, the almost inevitable provocation must be risked for the sake of the political union in the Greek world which it in part secured. The actual "aggression" came from the Peloponnesian side (cf. 44. 1 n.); but Thucydides may have thought of Athens, as her enemies did, as morally the aggressor, by her imperial policy, against the rest of Greece.<sup>1</sup>

The ἀληθεοτάτη πρόφασις is stressed here, because it needed much persuasion by Corinth and others to provoke Sparta, ever slow to go to war, to take action now; and Thucydides gives this persuasion later at length. He means that Sparta would not have decided for war on the strength of her allies' arguments, had she not feared for her own position (c. 88).

The growth of Athenian power, the true cause of the war, is related in the excursus, cc. 89 ff.; the immediate causes, τὰ Κερκυραϊκά and τὰ Ποτειδαιατικά, in the chapters which follow. But Thucydides in giving this long account of the immediate causes (24–66, with the conference at Sparta which follows, 67–88), is not only relating what

<sup>1</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, 390, 394–5, 401–2, thinks that the words ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, involving "the rule of necessity", "take away the moral judgement". I can do no more than record this opinion; I cannot answer it. Thucydides can and does.

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was, in effect, part of the war itself, but also, as it were incidentally, describing the political conditions of Greece at the time—among them στάσις, especially in small states, leading to intervention by the more powerful—which were in themselves among the real causes of the war, taking advantage at the same time of the opportunity to describe Athens and Sparta (for example, in the Corinthians' speech at the Congress); so that we have a much better account of the ultimate cause—Athenian imperialism and Sparta's fears, and divisions in the other states—than is given in the bleak summary of the pentekontaëtia (89–118) or than could be given except by a full-length treatment of that period.

αἰτίαι and πρόφασις: both these words have a wide range of meaning. αἰτία is 'complaint' as in αἰτίαν ἔχειν, 'to be accused' (cf. 69. 6, μὴ ἐπ' ἔχθρα τὸ πλέον ἡ αἰτία), 'cause of complaint', and 'cause' in the fullest sense, whether ultimate (τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡ κοινωνία, Plat. *Rep.* v. 464 B) or immediate, as here, where it is practically *casus belli*, διότι ἔλυσαν τὰς σπονδάς (rather than 'grievance': Adcock, *C.A.H.* v. 481 n.), or without such distinction, as Hdt. i init., τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλουσι. πρόφασις is properly a 'plea', something 'alleged', whether true or false, and hence 'alleged cause'; often, perhaps most frequently, a false 'excuse', but often the true cause (133, ἐρωτῶντος τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς ἵκετείας), even an external cause without any implication of motive or anything alleged, as ii. 49. 2, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ὑγείεις ὅντας . . . φλόγωντις ἐλάμβανε ('without visible cause', apparently a medical usage: see L. and S.; contrast τὰς αἰτίας in 48. 3, the ultimate causes of the pestilence). In iii. 13. 1 we have both words, τοιαύτας ἔχοντες προφάσεις καὶ αἰτίας, 'with these allegations and complaints to make'. In the present passage πρόφασις is a psychological cause—Spartan fear—true because it is so described, ἀληθεοτάτη, but in no sense alleged, for it was ἀφανεστάτη λόγῳ, exactly as in vi. 6. 1, ἐφίμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεοτάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἀμά τι πρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἔνυγγενέσι. In i. 118. 1 what are here the αἰτίαι are called the πρόφασις; and in i. 146, where he sums up his previous narrative (24–88, 119–45), he uses first the same words as here, αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοραί, then σπονδῶν γὰρ ξύγχυσις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν, the external occasion of the war, referring to the same events as αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοραί. Similarly, iii. 82. 1, οὐκ ἔχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτοίμων <ὅντων> παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς. There is thus no linguistic reason, and no reason of style, against taking αἰτία and πρόφασις as of equivalent meaning in this passage, and the use of both as a simple example of μεταβολή (see Steup, *Thuk. Stud.* ii. 2–3); we may translate either of them by 'cause', even though the former is actually 'an immediate cause of the war' and the latter a deep-seated psychological motive.

We must at the same time bear in mind, not only that in ordinary parlance is the same word, *cause*, used for different things, but that the 'immediate occasions', even 'the complaints and quarrels', are also among the true causes of a war; they are not to be dismissed as mere symptoms. If Athens had decided not to interfere in the quarrel between Corinth and Kerkyra, Spartan fears might not have been sufficiently provoked to lead her into war (that is, Pericles' judgement may have been wrong); for another thing, these quarrels helped the war-spirit on both sides, and weakened the influence of an Archidamos. When therefore Thucydides says that he will relate first these *αἰτίαι* and *διαφοραί*, τοῦ μή τινα ζητήσω<sup>1</sup> ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοούντος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἑλλησι κατέστη, he is not simply mistaking symptoms for causes; the war did arise out of them, though there was as well the deep underlying cause; nor in the words themselves and the construction of the sentences is there any reason to believe, as some scholars do, that 23. 5 and 6 were not written at the same time, or that at different stages of his writing Thucydides had different ideas as to the origin of the war. Whether there are other reasons to believe that he had will be discussed later.

## ANALYSIS OF cc. I-23

It will be as well to give an analysis of the whole of Thucydides' Introduction, as I understand it, making full use of modern devices of paragraphs, brackets, footnotes, etc., to bring out the meaning. (There is a sense in which this is illegitimate: a writer who does not use these devices should not write, and so should not be analysed, as if he did; the following analysis will itself make that clear because some of the divisions are too sharp, and even so some of the intricacies are not made clear. But it is after all only an extension of our use of a punctuation which the ancients did not use; and it serves the purpose of a logical analysis.) This I hope will at the same time make clear three things: (1) that Thucydides is writing notes on ancient history to support an argument, not a consistent history (still less a rhetorical thesis); (2) that he includes from time to time matter only inserted because of its intrinsic interest, not because it supports his argument (it illustrates, that is, his interest in the past for its own sake);<sup>1</sup> and (3) that the argument does not end with c. 19, but goes on to 23.

<sup>1</sup> Ziegler has brought this out clearly in his article 'Der Ursprung der Exkurse im Thukydides', *R.M.* lxxviii, 1929, 58-67, though I do not follow him either in his conclusions as to the necessary date (before 431) at which it, and other digressions must have been written, or as to the rhetorical aim of the *Prooimion* (in which he follows Schwartz: above, pp. 89-90).

I  
2. I-2  
3-4  
5  
6  
3. I  
2  
4  
3  
4  
5. I  
3  
2  
4  
5  
6. I-2  
3  
4  
5  
7  
8. I  
2-4

This war was the greatest disturbance Greece had known, previous wars having been on a comparatively small scale. The cause of this, in the oldest period, was the unsettled state of the country, no trade, little communication, no capital accumulation, and much border fighting and stasis; this last was most evident in the richer districts [where otherwise we should have expected greater prosperity] (at least, Attica, with its light soil, escaped invasion and stasis (1)).

(1) Hence the movements of political exiles from elsewhere into Attica, the increase in population beyond what the country could hold, and the subsequent colonization of Ionia.

Another thing supports my argument about ancient weakness: nothing was done in common by all Greece before the Trojan war. (They had not even the common name of 'Hellene' then—it spread gradually, driving out 'Pelasgian' and others (2).) This first action in common, against Troy,

(2) See Homer, who does not use 'Hellene' for the Greeks in general (nor, incidentally, *βάρβαρος* for non-Greeks, for the same reason).

was undertaken when they were making more use of the sea [which was all-important].

Minos had been the first master of the sea, driving out the Karians from the islands and putting down piracy. (The Greeks and the barbarians of the coast had taken to piracy as soon as they used the sea at all, and there was no shame in it (3). And in many parts of Greece it still obtains. That

(3) There are still places where no shame is felt; and see the older poets.

There was piracy by land as well.

is why in those parts men still carry arms in ordinary life (4).

(4) Originally men carried arms all over Greece; for life was insecure. Athens was the first state to take to a more refined and gentler life, with some luxury. (Older men can still remember the luxurious dress of those days, which has stayed on in Ionia. The modern simplicity is due to the Spartans. They were also the first to compete naked at the games—originally competitors wore loin-cloths, as those foreigners who have games still do. In fact, there are many ways in which present-day foreign customs resemble the primitive customs in Greece.)

That is why too, whereas more modern cities are built on the coast, the ancient ones were built some distance inland, for fear of the pirates.

The Karians and Phoenicians of the islands (5) were among

(5) For the Carians, see the archaeological evidence from Delos.

the most active pirates.) Minos' suppression of this piracy led to much greater prosperity through maritime trade, and this to the extension of the dominion of the more powerful

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states. This was the condition of things for the Trojan war, which was some time after Minos. Agamemnon, though of a dynasty of foreign origin, was the most powerful prince of his time (not simply the leader of romantic nobles held together by an oath), at the head of a wealthy state, with a large fleet and controlling most of the islands (6). (It

9. 1, 3, 4 (6) The old Peloponnesian records give the story of the Pelopid dynasty; and see Homer for the strength of Agamemnon's fleet.

10. 1 would be quite wrong to conclude that Mykenai was *not* powerful because its existing remains are insignificant; this would be a false criterion to take, as can be seen from the Athens and Sparta of to-day.)

10. 2 3-4 The Trojan expedition was the largest till that time, but smaller than modern ones. Homer's evidence is clear on this point, apart from a probable exaggeration of numbers (7).

11. (7) In calculating his numbers we do not have to make any allowance for rowers apart from the fighting men.

The reason for this comparative weakness was poverty rather than a small population; otherwise with a force of those numbers they would have taken Troy much sooner (8).

(8) The details of the operations before Troy make this clear: e.g., etc.

12 There was further unrest after the Trojan war (see the accounts in the *Nostoi*, and the Thessalian, Boeotian, and Dorian migrations). Then came a more settled period and organized colonies to Ionia and to Italy and Sicily.

13. 1 With the increase in wealth tyrannies arose (9), and (9) Quite unlike the old *constitutional* monarchies.

2-5<sup>1</sup> Greece took to the sea, both for commerce and for war, more than ever. Corinth with her exceptionally favourable position on the Isthmus had taken the lead in this (especially in the invention of the trireme by Ameinokles (10)); then

6 (10) Three hundred years before the end of this war. The first recorded sea-battle, between Corinth and Kerkyra, was 260 years before.

14 the Ionians, Polykrates and Phokaia. Even so the fighting ships were still old-fashioned, and most of the navies small, before Xerxes' invasion.

15 The naval states extended their power most; the reason why the land-wars of those times were on no great scale was that there was no union of states, voluntary or compulsory. (The Lelantine was the biggest war.) Persia put an end to Ionian progress in the reign of Cyrus; and in Greece proper

<sup>1</sup> 13. 2-5 go back to a period before 13. 1; but one cannot punctuate differently, for both sections belong to the main argument.

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the tyrants were too much concerned each with his own position to engage in any large undertaking together.

18 Then after the overthrow of the tyrants, by Sparta mostly (11), came Marathon and then Xerxes' invasion.

(11) Sparta had had no stasis and no tyrants like the other states; this was the secret of her strength, and she now dominated other states by controlling their constitutions.

Sparta was recognized as leader; Athens developed her naval power; and after the expulsion of Xerxes these two were the leading states, the one strong at sea, the other on land, and the rest of the cities tended to group themselves round one or the other. They were soon at war with one another, which proved the occasion both for experience and for increased equipment. (Sparta's strength rested on her influence on the governing classes in the states she led, Athens' on her financial resources gained by the tribute of the allies.) Thus by 431 they were both [*or*, Athens was] better equipped for war than ever before.

19 20 That is my view of the past history of Greece, as far as one can test so difficult a matter. (Most people accept traditions without any examination: as witness the belief, even in Athens, that Hipparchos, not Hippias, was tyrant when he was killed (12); and wrong ideas about present-day

(12) Hippias was the eldest of the brothers; the details of the incident are as follows, etc.

21 22 details of the Spartan constitution and army.) I think my view sounder than one based simply on the untested statements and romantic tales of early writers, whether in verse or prose. I know that we are all inclined to think a war in which we are engaged must be the greatest; but I am convinced that the history of the events of this one will show

I am right about its magnitude. (I have tried to relate these events as accurately as possible, both the speeches and the deeds done, difficult as this was. My work is intended for posterity, not to be a best-seller of the moment.) The greatest war before it was the Persian, and this was over in two campaigns. The Peloponnesian was of great length and involved very many states, and brought about unparalleled disasters of all kinds. It began with the breaking of the Thirty Years' Peace, made between Athens and Sparta after the capture of Euboea.

24-55. *Tὰ Κερκυραϊκά*

Diodoros, xii. 30-3 (439/438-436/435), gives a parallel narrative, presumably from Ephoros. For his characteristics as a historian of Thucydides' period and his value to us, see Introd., pp. 51-4. Plutarch, *Per.* 29. 1-3, is mainly from Thucydides, with one

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significant exception (see 45. 2 n., and Introd., pp. 26–8). For the chronology, see 55. 2 n.

**24. 1. Ἐπίδαμνός ἔστι πόλις, κ.τ.λ.:** cf. the beginning of Herodotos' narrative, after his introduction (i. 6), *Κροῖτος τὸν Λυδὸν μὲν γένος, κ.τ.λ.* The form is similar, the content very different. See also Croiset's note; but I doubt his translation, 'there is a city, Epidamnos'. For the form of the geographical information given here, see 46. 4 n.

Epidamnos, the later Dyrrachium,<sup>1</sup> Durazzo, important again in Roman and Byzantine times as the starting-point of the via Egnatia across Illyria to Thessalonike and thence to Byzantium. The date of the colony is said to be 626 or 625 by the ancient chronologers (ap. Eusebios and Hieronymos). It was built at the south end of a rocky promontory running NNW. to SSE. between the sea on the west and a large lagoon on the east. The promontory is about 10 km. long and 3 km. at its widest point, and 184 m. high, with steep slopes to the sea and rather less steep to the lagoon. It is almost an island, being connected with the extensive plains to east and north only by two narrow sand-bars at its northern and southern ends. Its harbour is open to the south, but protected by the promontory from northerly winds, and is the best on this part of the Illyrian coast; and the hinterland, both the plain and the lower hill slopes, is the most fertile in central Illyria (cf. Praschniker, *Oest. Jahr.* xxi–xxii, 1922–3, Beibl. 106–8). The modern Durazzo occupies the site of the Greek, Roman, and Byzantine towns. (This is the view generally held, and it has recently been defended by L. Rey in *Albania*, 1925, 26 ff. It is denied by Schober, *Oest. Jahr.* xxiii, 1926, Beibl. 231–40, who puts the Greek city in the plain to the north and NE. of the hill. The Romans, he argues, when this site became marsh and swamp owing to the incursions of the sea, built nearer to the hill, but still below it in the main; and only the Byzantines (Anastasios II, c. A.D. 500) walled the hill and the nearest part of the lower town. The problem cannot be solved till further excavation; but it does not seem probable in itself that the Greeks would neglect to occupy and fortify the hill, and Thucydides' phrase, *ἔστι δὲ ἵσθιμος τὸ χωρίον*, 26. 5, does not support Schober's view.)

**τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον:** the Adriatic Sea (cf. ii. 97. 5) as far south as the ordinary crossing from Kerkyra to the Iapygian promontory (vi. 13. 1, 30. 1, 34. 4, 44. 1, vii. 33. 3) or that from Leukas (vi. 104. 1, vii. 57. 11). The geographical information here given is thus of the vaguest. Herodotos also uses *δὲ Ἰόνιος κόλπος* for the Adriatic

<sup>1</sup> "It seems likely that the city was called Epidamus and the headland Dyrrachium. As the city grew larger and spread over the cape it came to be called Dyrrachium, which it sometimes was in the fifth century"—Beaumont, p. 166 (see 25. 3 n.).

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(ix. 92. 2), though (unlike Thucydides) he has *δὲ Ἀδρίτης* as well, perhaps only for the northern part (i. 163. 1, iv. 33. 1, v. 9. 2). Cf. Theopomp. F. 129–30.

**Ταυλάντιοι:** known to Hekataios (F. 99, 101). Cf. 46. 4 n.

**2. Κορίνθιος γένος τῶν ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους:** probably therefore of the great Bacchiad family (*C.A.H.* iii. 534–5). The oikistai of Kerkyra itself and of Syracuse (both in 734 B.C. according to tradition) were also Bacchiadai.

**ξυνώκισαν δὲ καὶ Κορινθίων τινὲς καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου Δωρικοῦ γένους:** joint settlements of this kind were not uncommon (cf. vi. 4. 3, 5. 1), two of the most famous examples being the Athenian colonies Thourioi and Amphipolis. For the custom of sending for an oikistes from the original *metropolis*, when a colony itself founded another colony, cf. the foundation of Selinus by Sicilian Megara, vi. 4. 2. It was by no means always observed: see vi. 3. 3; and there is no suggestion that it was observed by Miletos, Paros, or Andros when they founded their colonies.

**5. τὰ δὲ τελευταῖα πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου:** for the chronology of *τὰ Κερκυραϊκά*, see n. on 55. 2.

**7. τὸ Ἡραιον:** a precinct inside the walls of the city; see iii. 79 n.

**25. 1. ὁ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀνεῖλε παραδοῦναι:** the religious centre of Greece plays its part in precipitating the war.

**3. κατά τε τὸ δίκαιον . . . ἂμα δὲ καὶ μίσει τῶν Κ.:** it is to be noted that Thucydides, who in his Introduction is careful to stress political and economic motives, should here mention only sentimental ones. One naturally suspects an economic motive, such as rivalry in the Adriatic trade, as well as a purely political one—Corinth making another attempt to establish her power in the southern Adriatic and to secure her connexions with the west. Not that a series of pinpricks, a constant provoking of touchy sensibilities, may not be a cause of greater quarrels; and in the course of previous conflicts (cf. 13. 4), Kerkyra had been conquered by Periandros, who sent his son to rule it in his name—that is, it had been subject to Corinth, part of a Corinthian empire: Hdt. iii. 48–53. For the abiding enmity, see Hdt. iii. 49, *αἰεὶ ἐπειτε ἔκτισαν τὴν νῆσον εἰσὶ ἀλλήλοιστι διάφοροι*.

Corinthian economic interests in the west were important. Corinth had "imparted the use of her standard of weight to her colonies . . . and to the Achaean cities of Magna Graecia", and her money was the principal medium of exchange all along the coasts of the Corinthian Gulf and in Italy and Sicily, where the largest hoards of her coins have been brought to light (Head, p. 399: it was a convenient coinage, being easily exchangeable with both Attic and Aeginetan money—see 27. 1 n.). For the archaeological evidence of Greek trade in the Adriatic, see Beaumont, 'Greek Influence in the Adriatic Sea

before the iv. century B.C.', *J.H.S.* lvi, 1936, 159-204; and for Epidamnos and Apollonia (26. 2, below) especially, 166-70. He suggests that a principal cause of the enmity between Corinth and Kerkyra was the silver trade (See Addenda.)

4. γέρα τὰ νομιζόμενα: cf. the regulation for the Attic colony to Brea, *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 45. 10-13 (Tod, n. 44), though the organization of the Athenian empire was much closer than the loose connexions of Corinth with her colonies; for all the subject states, whether colonies or not, had to contribute both to the Panathenaia and to the Eleusinian mysteries, and thereby took some official part in them.

**Κορινθίω ἀνδρὶ προκαταρχόμενοι:** "in den hellenischen Staaten konnte ein Fremder vielfach nur in der Weise opfern, dass ein Bürger ihm mit Vollziehung der Zeremonien des κατάρχεσθαι voranging, und die Versagung einer solchen Beihilfe Korinthern gegenüber wird hier als ein zweiter Beweis der Impietät der Kerkyräer gegen ihre Mutterstadt aufgeführt"—Classen. This is as possible an explanation as any that has been given; but I suspect it was the insistence by Kerkyra on treating Corinthians as foreigners in such matters—she gave them no *privileges*. E.g. "Les καταρχαῖ sont les prémisses des sacrifices qu'on distribuait aux personnages de marque pour leur faire honneur. Cf. *Il.* iii. 273"—Croiset.

τῇ ἐς πόλεμον παρασκευῇ δυνατώτεροι: not as clearly expressed as it might be, for this suggests that Kerkyra was more powerful in this respect than any Greek state, which is clearly wrong; what is needed is 'than Corinth', or, better, 'than she herself had been at any other time', ἔαυτῶν δυνατώτεροι. 29. 3 hardly seems to bear out even this.

τὴν τῶν Φαιάκων προενόικησιν τῆς Κερκύρας: apparently a belief universally held by the classical Greeks, which Thucydides shared. There was a shrine of Alkinoos in the city (iii. 70. 4).

κλέος ἔχοντων: see *Od.* vii. 34-6. Note the poetic κλέος.

26. 1. Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων: also Corinthian colonies.

2. πεζῇ ἐς Ἀπολλωνίαν: not all the way by land, but by sea (within friendly waters) as far as Leukas and the Amprakiot gulf, thence by land: through Epeiros past the modern Jannina, thence to the Aoos valley and down it to Apollonia on the Adriatic coast (the modern Avlona or Valona). There was no one to force them to go by land through the mountainous country of Aitolia as far as Amprakia. From Apollonia they presumably went by sea to Epidamnos, not by land along the difficult coastal route, via the Petra pass where Caesar and Pompey met.

Note that on such a journey the Greeks (then, as they would now) go as much of the way as possible by sea, as little as possible by land. Cf. 27. 2.

Apollonia was also a joint colony of Corinth and Kerkyra, not of Corinth only, according to Strabo, vii. 5. 8, p. 316,<sup>1</sup> Ps.-Skymnos 439-40, and Pausanias (?), v. 22. 4 (Ephoros probably being the authority for all three). It was built near the mouth of the Aoos. Recent excavations have been fruitful, but chiefly of buildings of the Roman period: for a description of the remains and of the surrounding district, see Praschniker, *Oest. Jahr.* xxi-xxii, 1922-3, Beibl. 1-106. For evidence of earlier finds, which may place the Greek settlement in the beginning of the sixth century or late in the seventh, see Beaumont's article cited above, 25. 3 n. It is mentioned in *Hdt.* ix. 92-5: Deiphonos, a seer with the Greek forces under Leotychidas in 479, was an Apolloniate (*μάντεις* were a wandering class); and a story is told of his father Euenios in Apollonia.

3. πλεύσαντες εὐθύς: the distance between Epidamnos and Kerkyra is some 150 miles. For a description of the sea journey from Kerkyra, in detail as far as Apollonia, see Leake, i. 1-8, 78.

οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων φυγάδες: one expects *καὶ* οἱ, in reference to the visit of the other party (24. 6).

4. ἀλλὰ στρατεύουσιν: Delachaux, on the ground that this but repeats what has already been said above (πλεύσαντες . . . καὶ υστερὸν ἐτέρῳ στόλῳ), would transpose καὶ υστερὸν ἐτέρῳ στόλῳ here, after ἀλλά. This suggestion makes clear the awkwardness of the narrative; but it will not do, for it makes the second squadron consist of 40 ships instead of 15—there were only 40 besieging Epidamnos all told (29. 4).

5. ἔστι δὲ ἵσθμὸς τὸ χωρίον: and so made a siege the easier for an enemy which commanded the sea; they needed fewer troops to cut off the city on the land side. So viii. 25. 5, the Athenians prepare to besiege, by means of περιτείχισις as usual, Miletos, ἵσθμαδος ὄντος τοῦ χωρίου. Syracuse, on a bigger scale, is the classic instance. But in the case of Epidamnos, the siege would be more difficult because of the lagoon (if topographical conditions have not changed): see 24. 1 n.

27. 1. παρεσκευάζοντο στρατείαν: Forbes notes that Corinth could be involved in a war with Kerkyra and could get help from Megara, Epidauros, Troizen, Phleious, and Elis, without the Peloponnesian League and Sparta, its leader, being concerned in the matter; and that therefore Kerkyra could retaliate on Elis (30. 2) without becoming involved in war with the League.

ἐπὶ τῇ ἵσῃ καὶ ὥροις: i.e. with the original Epidamnians (except of course the exiled oligarchs), including the new settlers already sent (26. 1-2). It was to be a grand new foundation, with everybody starting equal, it being hoped that there would be enough land (from

<sup>1</sup> By a slip Beaumont, *J.H.S.* lvi, p. 168, n. 66, gives Strabo as authority for a settlement by Kerkyra alone.

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that confiscated from the oligarchs and taken from the *barbaroi* allied with the oligarchs) to put the fresh colonists on an equality with the older inhabitants. There is no hint, as Forbes supposes, at the oligarchical government of Corinth herself—all Greek colonies began in this way, even though many of the intending settlers were probably landless at home.

**δραχμὰς . . . Κορινθίας:** the Corinthian stater of 130 gm. could easily exchange with the Attic (the tetradrachm): as it was divided into 3 drachmai, the drachme of c. 44 gm. was about two-thirds the size of the Attic and half as large as the Aiginetan (Head, 398–9).

**2. ἐδεήθησαν . . . ἐδεήθησαν . . . ἤτησαν:** aorists, they asked and they obtained. All these reinforcements from other states were ‘volunteers’ in the sense that none of the states (except perhaps Kephallenia, Leukas, and Ambrakia—colonies and allies of Corinth) regarded itself as being at war with Kerkyra in consequence, though they laid themselves open to reprisals.

**ναυσὶ σφᾶς ξυμπροπέμψαι:** this time they were going all the way by sea; cf. 26. 2 n.

**ναῦς κενάς:** i.e. warships without their crews, which Corinth would supply, not transport-ships. Apparently seven of them, to make up the total in 29. 1. The Corinthians’ own contribution of 30 is surprisingly small, especially as Kerkyra possessed, old and new, 120 ships.

**τρισχίλιοι ὄπλιται:** see 29. 1 n.

**28. 1. μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Σικουωνίων πρέσβεων:** “*πρέσβεων* cannot mean accredited ‘ambassadors’ from these states: for the Lacedaemonians cannot formally have declared the Corcyraeans in the right against their own allies the Corinthians”—Forbes; or, if they had, it would surely have been expressly stated. Kerkyra was not entirely without friends (28. 3);<sup>1</sup> but this must mean “private persons, willing to lend their influence for what it was worth to the Corcyraean government and to testify afterwards if necessary to what had been said on either side” (as the scholiast). But the Greek for private persons is *ἴδιωταί τινες*, not *πρέσβεις*. We must suppose, though it is curious that Thucydides should not have made the matter clear, that Sparta and Sikyon had sent ambassadors, at Kerkyra’s request, to attend the parleys between the disputants or take part in a wider conference, and that though they had made no declaration in favour of Kerkyra on the point in dispute, they were anxious to restrain Corinth from any action that might lead to a widening of the area of conflict: they supported, that is (probably very weakly), Kerkyra’s proposal of arbitration.

**2. τούτους κρατεῖν:** ‘that side should possess it’, Epidamnos: as

<sup>1</sup> Classen compares iii. 70. 2 as well: *ἐψηφίσαντο Κερκυραῖοι . . . Πελοποννησαῖοι δὲ φίλοι (εἶναι) ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον*.

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though Epidamnos were not an independent state which might have some say in the matter itself.

**3. οὓς οὐ βούλονται: οὐ, not *μή*, so this is not generic. Kerkyra hints at particular allies, namely Athens. So Shilleto.**

**4. αὐτοὺς δὲ δικάζεσθαι: αὐτούς = Kerkyra and Corinth. Hude keeps *ἴαντούς*, the reading of C only, which would mean Corinth. This would be excellent, if only we had *πολιορκεῖν* for *πολιορκεῖσθαι* so that *τούς* could mean the Kerkyraians, not the Epidamnians. It is to be observed that in logic *πρότερον* goes only with *αὐτούς δὲ δικάζεσθαι*; that is, the *μέν*-clause is, as so often, subordinate: ‘it was unreasonable to expect arbitration first, while the siege was going on.’ The contrast between the subjects of the two verbs is not to be forced; *πρότερον* is the emphatic word.**

**5. σπονδὰς δὲ πούρσασθαι:** Poppo, Stahl, and Hude bracket *δέ*, to get over the difficulty of *ἔτοιμοι εἶναι ὥστε ἀμφοτέρους μένειν*—there should be some verb after *ἔτοιμοι* to govern *ώστε*. But, as Classen points out, *σπονδὰς πούρσασθαι* suits the besieged and besiegers better than Corinth and Kerkyra. *σπονδᾶι* can indeed mean not only an armistice between two parties engaged in fighting, but a treaty between two that have not been fighting: see Hampl, *Staatsverträge*, 1938 (review by Larsen, C.P. xxxiv, 1939, 375–9); but neither meaning fits the present state of negotiation between Corinth and Kerkyra. We must, if we cannot have *ἔτοιμοι ὥστε κ.τ.λ.*, either suppose *δικάζεσθαι* to be ‘understood’ after *εἶναι* (with Krüger and Classen)<sup>1</sup> or that another infinitive has dropped out.

Kerkyra (if sincere) makes the greater effort to avoid hostilities and is more reasonable than Corinth. How familiar these diplomatic exchanges seem.

**29. 1. δισχιλίοις τε ὄπλιται:** 3,000 but a few lines above, 27 ad fin., from Corinth alone. We can easily imagine reasons why eventually only 2,000 were sent, but not why Thucydides should not have explained the discrepancy. One or other of the figures is probably wrong in the MSS. (the scholiast notes the discrepancy, so the mistake probably goes back, as we should expect, to an early date). We must not, however, base a correction on the normal number of hoplites, that is, land-forces (not *ἐπιβάται*)<sup>2</sup>, which accompanied a fleet, as for example the 2,000 hoplites and 40 ships i. 61. 1 (to which 1,600 hoplites were sent later as a reinforcement i. 64. 2), or the 4,000 hoplites and 100 ships ii. 56. 1–2. For, on the one hand, there

<sup>1</sup> Not *ποιεῖν ταῦτα* (Forbes); for that does not here mean ‘arbitrate’, but ‘withdraw their troops’. Böhme supported the construction *ἔτοιμοι ὥστε* by viii. 9. 1, ē. with acc. c. inf., and vii. 86. 3, *ώστε* after *προθυμεῖσθαι*.

<sup>2</sup> It is clear from the next sentence, *τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ, κ.τ.λ.*, that the hoplites are not just *ἐπιβάται*.

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is no reason to suppose that all of these friends of Corinth who supplied ships also supplied hoplites; on the other hand, most of the new settlers would either themselves be hoplites, or would be supplied with ὄπλα, so that the contingent would be larger than usual. In fact, there is no 'normal' number: it depended entirely on the purpose for which the land-forces were intended. If the hoplites on this occasion were most of them the new settlers, 2,000 may be a correct figure, and that given in 27. 2 should be emended; if Corinth contemplated a landing and siege of Kerkyra in the event of a victory at sea (which is perhaps improbable), then a larger figure than 3,000 would be expected: that is, 27. 2 would then stand as the Corinthians' own contingent, and that given here must be emended. πεντακισχιλίοις would be easy palaeographically after πέντε; Herwerden ingeniously suggested ἐβδομήκοντα ναυοῖς (Diodorus' figure, xii. 31. 2) καὶ πεντακισχιλίοις ὄπλίταις. This would imply that Elis only supplied two ships (27. 2 n.), which is unlikely. But it is really idle to guess at the true figure: for one thing, it depends on whether, when the mistake was made, the numbers were written out in full or in figures, and, if the latter, what kind of figures: σέ ναυοῖς β τε ὄπλίταις or ΠΔΔΓ ναυοῖς XX τε ὄπλίταις (with this, the earlier, notation 5,000 is Π).

3. ἐν Ἀκτίῳ: doubtless the meeting-place for the contingents from Kephallenia, Leukas, and Amprakia, perhaps also from Elis.  
**ζεύξαντες:** explained by Gregory of Corinth, a grammarian of the twelfth century A.D., as ζυγώματα κρατύναντες. ζυγώματα δὲ καλοῦνται τὰ ξύλα τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ τοίχου τῆς νεώς πρὸς τὸν ἔπερον διατείνοντα τοῖχον. η ζυγώματα τὰ ξύλα τὰ ἐμβαλλόμενα τὰς σανίδας, ὥστε συζεύξαι τὰς σανίδας τὰς διηρημένας ἔστιν ὅτε (ad Hermog. vii. 2, p. 1125 Walz; quoted by Stahl). To fasten cables round a ship to strengthen it was properly ζῶσαι or ὑποζῶσαι, not ζεύξαι. But Thucydides may have been thinking of both processes, without using a technical term. See Miltner, R.E. Supplbd. v, 945.

**ἐπισκευάσαντες:** the ordinary term for 'repair', but presumably used here of lighter work, a new coat of paint or pitch (as Gregory says), than that required for the older vessels. Οὐδεμίᾳ κανὴ ναῦς ἦν, remarks the scholiast.

5. τοὺς ἐπήλυδας: the οἰκήτορες of 26. 1-3, 28. 1, and presumably those φρουροὶ who were not Corinthians (26. 1).

30. 1. ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ τῆς Κερκύρας ἀκρωτηρίῳ: the southern promontory of the island (not τῆς Κερκυραίας with C G, as Hude and Stuart Jones). The cape, or one near by, is still called Léskimmo or Aléskimmo: see 47. 2 n. The battle had presumably taken place near it, not near Aktion.

ἀπέκτεναν: "violata pactione 29. 5" Stahl. More probably, as

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Classen, these are only the prisoners taken in the battle. To sell as slaves or kill free men who had surrendered after a siege was a practice which became common in the course of the war; but these men were 'privateers'; the killing of the prisoners was an act of justice, because the states to which they belonged were not at war with Kerkyra.

**Κορωθίους δὲ δήσαντες εἶχον:** apparently they were soon ransomed; at least there is no mention of them in 55. 1 (Classen).

2. **Κυλλίνην τὸ Ἡλείων ἐπίνειον:** often used by the Peloponnesian fleet as base for operations in the west and north-west, ii. 84. 5, iii. 69. 1, vi. 88. 9. The site is not certain. It was first thought to be at Glarentsa, which has an "excellent summer anchorage" (*Medit. Pilot*<sup>6</sup>, iii. 44-6, 50-1); but Curtius, followed by Bursian, ii. 308, Philippson, 307, and Frazer (*Pausanias*, vi. 26. 4 n.), placed it somewhere on the coast between Glarentsa and Kounoupéli, or at Kounoupéli itself; which is 13½ miles NE. of Glarentsa, an isolated rocky height, 200 ft. above the sea, the coast being "low and sandy, wooded and cultivated within". This view is based on Strabo, viii. 3. 4-5, pp. 337-8, and Ptolemy, *Geogr.* iii. 14, pp. 236-7 Willberg; but they also assert that the river Peneios flowed into the sea between Glarentsa and Kyllene, which, according to Philippson, p. 299. 3, is impossible (there has been no such alteration of its course, as Curtius and Bursian had to assume). Their evidence therefore is untrustworthy; and, since there is no good harbour on this stretch of sandy coast, and it is ill-situated for Elis, it is possible that Glarentsa is the ancient site. See Bölte, *R.E.* ix, 1170, and Pieske, ibid. art. 'Kyllene'.

3. **περιόντι τῷ θέρει:** so must we read with the *recentiores* and Reiske (Steup, Stuart Jones), or (with Herwerden and Hude) take *περιόντι* as a variant spelling for *περιόντι*.<sup>1</sup> And it can only mean 'in the summer as it came round', i.e. early next summer (like *περιελθόντος τοῦ χρόνου*, Hdt. ii. 93 ad fin.—Steup, pp. 416-17, and *Thuk. Stud.* ii. 7-8; Steup would insert πάλιν here, unnecessarily). *περιόντι τῷ θέρει* could not mean 'for the remainder of the summer', nor *περιόντι τῷ* 'in the same summer as it was coming to an end'.<sup>2</sup> For the chronology, see below, pp. 196 ff.

**τὸ Χειμέριον:** see 46. 4 n.; and for Aktion, 55. 1 n. Between the two is the shallow bay, 6½ miles long, between C. Mýtika and Kastrosykiá, with a sandy beach and anchorage with off-shore winds, and shelter beneath Kastrosykiá; beyond the coast consists of small sandy

<sup>1</sup> As Pherekrates, fr. 186; see Meineke (Incert. fr. 25).

<sup>2</sup> *περιόντι τῷ ἐναντῷ*, Xen. *Hell.* iii. 2. 25 (cited by Steup), can mean in practice 'as the year drew to an end', for the year is a *cycle*; it is literally 'as it was coming round to the same point (of the solar cycle) again'. This is not true of a summer. So Hdt. ii. 4. 1, of the Egyptian year of 365 days: καὶ σφὶ δύκλος τῶν ὡρέων ἐτάντο περιών παραγύνεται. See L. & S.

beaches, separated by rocky points, but with no anchorage for any large number of vessels before Phanári,  $11\frac{1}{2}$  miles NNW. of Kastrósykiá. See Map 1.

**31. 1. τὸν δ' ἔνιαυτὸν πάντα:** in a phrase of this kind *ἔνιαυτός* means a period of twelve months, not an archon-year, a date (not, that is, 'the remainder of this archon-year'). So often, e.g. 109. 4, 125. 2, 138. 2, iii. 68. 3, 87. 2, iv. 117. 1, and, in an official document, iv. 118. 12 (see below, pp. 392-4); and in the Erechtheid inscription, *I.G. i<sup>2</sup>* 929 (Tod, 26).<sup>1</sup> Cf. *ἔνιαυτίζομαι*, 'to pass a whole twelve months', Plat. Com. fr. 113.

**2. ἐσ τὰς Ἀθ. σπονδάς:** on *σπονδαῖ* see 28. 5 n. This is not the Delian Confederacy, not even what remained of its independent part—Lesbos and Chios—but the Athenian alliance, which at times included Troizen, Achaia, Akarnania, Zakynthos, and other states. See also 35. 2, 40. 2.

**4. οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ἔλεξαν τοιάδε:** the regular formula when the personality of the actual speaker was of no importance. Whether more than one of the ambassadors actually addressed the assembly we do not know, for we do not know how these meetings, at which foreign delegates were invited to speak, were managed. Was each side, in a case like the present, given a specified length of time, as in the law-courts? and were the delegates asked to withdraw when the debate among the citizens began, as at Sparta (79. 1)? Cf. iv. 21. The meaning of the sentence is 'These were the arguments which the delegates of Kerkyra used'. If more than one speech was made by them, then they are combined into a single logical whole.

This is one of the debates Thucydides himself may have attended. He may not yet have begun making memoranda for his history (i. 1): the detailed account of the ensuing campaign, e.g. 46. 1-2 and 47. 1, suggests that he had, the vagueness of the chronology perhaps (below, pp. 197-8) that he had not.

### 32-36. Speech of the Kerkyraians

**32. 4. σωφροσύνη:** not simply 'self-control' (still less 'temperance'), but that kind of good sense and good conduct in which self-control plays a large part; in states that quality which prevents them from

<sup>1</sup> See Wilamowitz (1), ii. 297; Meyer (1), iv.<sup>2</sup> 1. 556 n.; Beloch, ii. 2. 199. Honours to those killed in the war were paid in winter; the dead were the casualties of the previous twelve months (i.e., for the great majority, of the campaigning season of 7-8 months), not those of the previous archon-year.

In *I.G. i<sup>2</sup>* 338 (as restored, with some new fragments, by Meritt, *Hesperia*, v. 367-8) *ἔτος* and *ἔνιαυτός* are both used for the official year; the former for the present and forthcoming year, the latter for the past year; but whether there is any significance in this I do not know.

rush into doubtful or dangerous enterprises, or indeed into any action, under the stimulus of excited feeling (see 84. 2 especially). It is "an intellectual rather than a moral virtue" (Forbes), the Greeks normally stressing the intellectual element in *ἀρετή*; yet, compared with *ἔννεσις*, it is a moral quality (79. 2). Its application naturally differed according to circumstances; in the case of Kerkyra, a state on the border of the Greek world, it involved little more than a policy of isolation, a sensible refusal to be mixed up in quarrels which did not concern her, that is, *ἀπραγμοσύνη*, as in § 5 below (though the result was now that the refusal to indulge in dangerous enterprises had led them into danger). In the case of Sparta, the classic instance of *σωφροσύνη* (i. 68, 84; cf. 79, and 86 n.), because of her responsibilities as leader of the Peloponnesian League, it could not mean strict *ἀπραγμοσύνη*, even though they laid claim to that—for one thing they interfered in the constitutional affairs of other Peloponnesian states (19. 1); but it did mean that their external policy was not in general provocative, and was not determined by the excited feelings of the moment (cf. 42. 2 where *σώφρον* means almost 'common sense', but is still contrasted with *τῷ αὐτίκα φανερῷ ἐπαρθέντας*). In the case of Chios (viii. 24. 4-5, where she is compared with Sparta), it means a commendable caution, a refusal to run risks—she was not a leader, like Sparta, and so had not her responsibilities; she was dominated by, and in danger from, Athens, and should not take a *rash* step in revolt.

In the internal affairs of a state *σωφροσύνη*, owing to the influence of Sparta, came to have a party meaning, like *εὐνομία*: a sensible, self-controlled and controlling government by the few wise, opposed to uncontrolled government by the masses: cf. iii. 62. 3, 82. 8, viii. 64. 5.<sup>1</sup> See Neil's Appendix in his edition of the *Knights*, who, however, over-simplifies the matter.

*ἀπραγμοσύνη* (§ 5) is also a virtue: the virtue which Athens, 'never quiet herself and never leaving others in quiet' (i. 70. 9), so conspicuously lacked. It means, for states, a policy of inactivity in external affairs, but not of "indolent neutrality", as Forbes translates

<sup>1</sup> It is this political meaning which gives point to the retort of Phokion to Demosthenes, Plut. *Phok.* 9.8: *Δῆμοσθένους μὲν εἰπόντος, “ἀποκτενόθαι σε Ἀθηναῖον, Φωκίων, ἀν μανῶν”, εἶπε· “οὐ δέ γε, ἀν σωφρονῶν”* (where we should probably read *σωφρονήσων*, 'come to their senses', corresponding to *μανῶν*, 'go mad'; and perhaps, as Mr. D. Atlas suggested to me in a seminar class, "... ἀν μανῶν" "ἄν γε μανῶν," εἶπε "οὐ δέ ἀν σωφρονήσων").

There is a remarkable instance of the use of *σωφρονέν* in connexion with a state's conduct in foreign affairs in Strabo, viii. 5. 5, p. 365: *οἱ δὲ (the Dorians on the return of the Herakleidai) κατασχόντες τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ ὅρχας μὲν ἐσωφρόνουν, ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν Λικούργος τὴν πολιτείαν ἐπέτρεψαν, τοσοῦτον ὑπερβάλλοντο τοὺς ἄλλους ὅστε μόνοι τῶν Ἐλλήνων . . . ἐπῆρξαν*—where *σωφροσύνη* is the mark of the pre-Lykourgos constitution, because before him Sparta did not engage in wars abroad: 'they were quiet.' (Cf. 18. 1 n.)

here. It is the virtue of not being provocative, not unnecessarily interfering with your neighbours; a part of *σωφροσύνη*, or rather, resulting from it. It is always a complimentary term (see on ii. 40. 2); that is why Kerkyra can use it of herself.

*τῇ τοῦ πέλας γνώμῃ ξυγκινδυνεύειν*: ‘to be involved in the risks of others’ plans’. This is twisted by the Corinthians into *οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ξυναδικῶσιν ἑτέρους* (37. 4).

5. *μὲν οὖν*: see Forbes. *μέν* has its concessive meaning: ‘So though we have defeated the Corinthians in the last battle without help, we cannot expect to win the war in view of the great armada they are now collecting.’

*εἰ μὴ μετὰ κακίας, κ.τ.λ.*: note the paradoxical use of *τολμῶμεν*—‘if from no cowardly motive, but because we recognize our mistake, we have the courage to break entirely with our former isolationist policy’. (*δόξης ἀμαρτίᾳ* is ‘because we have missed what we expected to win’, like *γνώμης ἀμαρτάνει*, 33. 3, not ‘owing to an error of judgement’: see Stahl and Forbes.)

33. 1. *μετ’ αἰειμήστου μαρτυρίου*: in fact Kerkyra did little for Athens in the war. In 431 she sent 50 ships to join the Athenian fleet of 100 which was by itself successfully ravaging the Peloponnesian coast (ii. 25. 1); in 426 15 for a short time to help against Leukas (iii. 94. 1, 95. 2); in 415 the island was an indispensable station for the expedition to Sicily. But the great *στάσις* of 427 and 425 crippled her will and her energies. See Forbes, p. 38.

2. *ἀρετήν*: ‘reputation for virtue’. Note the purely moral connotation of *ἀρετή*, ‘righteousness’, because Athens will be helping the victims of oppression. Cf. with Croiset, 69. 1, iii. 56. 7; but not, I think, ii. 40. 4, in spite of the apparent similarity. See note there.

3. *τὸν δὲ πόλεμον*: the essential point. If war with the Peloponnesians could be avoided, it would clearly be rash for the Athenians to interfere in the Adriatic. See 36. 1.

*φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμησείοντας*: this was Thucydides’ view of the true cause of the war (23. 6); but there is no reason to suppose he was alone in his opinion. *πολεμησείειν*, ‘are anxious for war’, is the speaker’s exaggeration.

*μηδὲ δυοῖν φθάσαι ἀμάρτωσιν*: ‘not to fail in two aims’ implies succeeding in one of them—‘either they will injure us if we fight alone and they win, or they will secure themselves against you if we give way and they add our fleet to their own’. But the contrast is frigid. For the phraseology, see Delachaux’s note.

34. 3. *τεκμήριον*: “a clear warning”, Forbes. Properly ‘you can infer from their behaviour to us what they will do if you grant their request’. Cf. 20. 1 n.

35. 1–2. *τὰς Λακεδ. σπονδάς*: the treaty of 445 B.C.; see 115. 1. This article of the treaty is only mentioned here and in the Corinthian reply, 40. 2. ‘Either confederacy may enlarge itself by the acceptance of new members, provided such new members are not states who have broken away from the other confederacy.’ Note the unconscious contradiction with 33. 3 (and 35. 5, 36): Kerkyra will have it both ways—‘the war is anyhow coming’ and ‘this action will not involve a *casus belli*’.

3. *καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑπηκόων* (31. 1 ἐκ . . . τῆς ἀλλῆς ‘Ελλάδος ἐρέτας μισθῷ πείθουτες): an interesting sidelight on the working of the Athenian empire. By now its members, with the exception of Lesbos and Chios, are quite openly ‘subjects’. But the original conception of a league of independent, or at least of separate, states survived in many respects. Not only could any individual citizen of these states volunteer in a foreign war (in which Athens was not involved: Athenian citizens could also so volunteer if they wished); but the recruitment of the crews of the Athenian navy itself, that is, the navy of the Delian League, after sufficient Athenians had been enrolled, was also carried out by voluntary enlistment from among citizens of the subject states—at least in theory; political pressure was doubtless used as well. See below, 124. 3 n. The Kerkyraian ambassador suggests that Athens could stop Corinthian recruitment from among her subjects, if she would (35. 4). *τῆς προκειμένης ξυμπαχίας*: ‘the alliance which is open to us (as neutrals) under the terms of the Thirty Years’ Peace’. If in the next sentence we keep *εἴτα* of the MSS., we have probably the rhetorical use, *indignationis*; and we should punctuate with a full stop or colon after *ἀφελᾶς* and question-mark after *δεόμεθα*. This perhaps is too abrupt. Stahl and Hude read *εἴ τε* for *εἴτα*, introducing a third clause after *δεινόν*; Krüger and Steup also read *εἴ τε*, but punctuate with a full stop after *ἀφελᾶς*, a comma after *δεόμεθα*, and read *πολὺ δή* for *πολὺ δέ*, beginning the apodosis after *ἀ δεόμεθα*. This is preferable to Stahl’s reading: see Delachaux. The scholiast’s note on *εἴτα . . . θήσονται* is *ἡ ἐν ὑποστημῷ* (‘after a comma’) *ἢ εἰρωνικῶς*: that is, *εἴτα* either = ‘and then’, ‘and as a consequence’ (as Shilleto, Widmann, Croiset, Stuart Jones); or ‘we should begin a new sentence, and take it ironically’. Widmann notes iii. 63. 3 (not, however, an exact parallel) and vi. 86. 5 for the rhetorical use of *πολὺ δέ*, against Krüger’s emendation. Cf. Headlam, *On Editing Aeschylus*, 76–8. Observe that those who will be charged with dishonesty are the Athenians, not Kerkyra, *πεισθέντων ὑμῶν*, not *πεισάντων ὑμᾶς* *ἥμῶν* (cf. § 4): ‘they will cry to heaven against the wickedness of your granting our request.’

5. *τοὺς μεταστάντας*: either ‘who have broken away from them (the Corinthians)’—that is, they will remain loyal to the Athenian

alliance from fear of the powerful Corinthians who would certainly take vengeance on them for their desertion (as Forbes); or 'if we were to break away from you' (Hünnekes, Stahl, Classen). The former is the easier Greek, but the more difficult logic to follow. A characteristic piece of Thucydidean darkness, where the idea to be expressed is not a difficult one.

**οὐχ ὁμοία ή ἀλλοτρίωσις:** generally taken to mean (sc. καὶ η̄ οἰκεῖωσις or the like), 'it is not an indifferent matter to you whether you unite with a naval power or drive it into the arms of others'. Cf. 36. 1 δ μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν οἰκειοῦται τε καὶ πολεμοῦται. But the meaning is more probably 'the renunciation of a naval alliance is more serious for you (οὐχ ὁμοία, like οὐκ ἴση, 'not merely equal': Jebb on Soph. O.T. 810) than that of a land alliance'. Stahl's parallels for the former meaning from Hdt. viii. 79. 4 and 80. 2 are not true parallels: 'it is no matter to us whether they speak true or false' has more point to it than 'it matters to you whether our navy is friendly or hostile'.

In the following sentence we have an instance of infinitive for imperative (hence μηδένα, not οὐδένα). "Quod contra dicunt ita orationem nimis abruptam fieri, malumus Th. abrupta loqui quam quae intellegi nequeunt, et ipsum hoc praecisum dicendi genus nobis maxime videtur idoneum esse ad vim admonitionis augendam"—Stahl.

"*Εἴ δύνασθε expungit Cobet. ad Hyperid., p. 66, sed iure Ullr. Symb. iii, p. 30 talibus pleonasmis non offenditur*"—Krüger. Moreover, it is needed to make it clear that ὑπᾶς is to be understood as the subject of ἔαν.

**36. 1. τὰς σπονδὰς λύσῃ:** Steup contrasts 35. 1, with some justification, and suggests διαλύσῃ ('end the treaty', not 'break it'). This would be an improvement; but we are hardly entitled to make it. **ἐσ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ δσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον:** so 33. 3. It is by no means clear that this is Thucydides' own view, though he may have thought that sooner or later a clash between Sparta and the Athenian empire was inevitable (23. 6). But it is a likely enough argument for Kerkyra to have used; a big war was certainly in the air. The long sentence beginning τὸ μὲν δεδίσ αὐτοῦ, one of the most artificial in Thucydides, though there is point in the way the thought is turned, shows on the other hand how completely he makes the literary style of the speeches his own. 'Your anxiety (about breaking the treaty) will cause more fear in the enemy when you are strengthened by alliance with us, while your confidence, shown by refusing our offer, will cause him no anxiety when he is strong and you are weakened by it.' It is by no means clear whether τὸ δεδίσ αὐτοῦ refers to φοβεῖται above (which at first seems natural),

'your anxiety not to break the treaty', or means 'the fear of your enemies which will lead you to make this advantageous alliance' (which *ἰσχὺν ἔχον* and the antithesis make probable); but in either case, in spite of Shilleto, whose note, however, is still worth reading, no such distinction is here drawn between δέος and φόβος as Prodigos would draw, Plat. *Protag.* 358 D, as is sufficiently shown by the parallel between μᾶλλον φοβήσον and ἀδεέστερον ἐσόμενον. Cf. too Soph. O.T. 885 Δίκας ἀφόβητος. See also 84. 3 n.

**2. τῆς τε γάρ Ἱαλίας, κ.τ.λ.:** cf. Alkibiades' speech in 415, vi. 16–18, esp. 18. 1. Those who suppose that Thucydides not only composed the speeches out of his own head without reference to what was actually said, but that he composed them after 404 and so clumsily that he put in anachronistic matter quite unsuitable to the time and circumstances (*not ω̄ς ἀν ἐδόκουν μοι ἔκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ’ εἰπεῖν*), give this sentence as an instance of it: he is really looking forward to the later expeditions to the west. They forget that Athens had founded Thourioi ten years before, and had had treaties with Egesta twenty years and Rhegion and Leontinoi perhaps a dozen years before (see on 55. 2 and 118. 2 n., pp. 198, 365–6, and iii. 86. 3). Thucydides says in so many words in 44. 3 that this motive did influence Athens at this time. (So does Plutarch, *Per. 20. 4*; but we do not know whether he had good and independent evidence).<sup>1</sup>

Others, on the other hand, who suppose trade rivalry in the west to have been the main cause of the whole war, think this sentence a proof of it, and that it barely penetrated the unseeing mind of Thucydides.

**καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται:** for war-vessels, not necessarily for merchantmen unless they wanted to call at intermediate ports for the sake of trade. See my paper on 'Naval Strategy', *J.H.S.* liii, 1933, 16–24 (reprinted in *Essays*, c. x), and above, Introd., pp. 19–20. *παράπλον* is a coasting voyage, along the coast of NW. Greece and Epeiros to Kerkyra, and that of S. Italy from the Iapygian promontory to Rhegion, as in vi. 30, 42–4.

**Πελοποννησίους ἐπελθεῖν:** cf. ii. 7. 2 for the hopes of the Peloponnesians at the beginning of the war; and vi. 18. 1.

**3. βραχυτάτῳ δ’ ἀν κεφαλαίῳ:** E. A. Thompson (who kindly sent me the MS. of some notes on bk. i) would read ἐν for ἀν, which seems an improvement.

<sup>1</sup> πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ Σικελίας δύνασεν ἐκεῖνος ἥδη καὶ δύσποτμος ἔρως εἶχεν, δύνασεν δὲ καὶ Τυρρηνία καὶ Καρχηδόνας ἔνειρος, οὐκ ἀπ’ ἐπίδοσι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ὑποκειμένης ἡγεμονίας καὶ τὴν εὔροιαν τῶν πραγμάτων. The content may come from Theopompos (cf. Introd., p. 49), but the style is Plutarch's own: the outlook is too steady, the rhetoric too controlled for the former.

37-43. *Speech of the Corinthians*

**37. 1.** “If our opponents had kept to the point, we should have done the same; as they have not done so, we must reply to their wanton attack”—is a regular commonplace with Thucydides in the opening of a reply. Cp. the Athenians in i. 73, the Thebans in iii. 61, the Athenians at Camarina in vi. 82”—Forbes. i. 73 is hardly a good case; for the Athenians there refuse to answer the attack and keep strictly to the point, or what they choose to regard as the point. vi. 16. 1, Alkibiades’ reply to Nikias, is a better parallel.

**ἀλλ’ ὡς καὶ . . . περὶ ἀμφοτέρων:** there is something to be said for Steup’s view that *ἡμεῖς τε . . . πολεμοῦνται* are not two matters but one, and that therefore there is a lacuna after *ὡς*, as for example *καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ἀγάθοι διετέλεσαν* (cf. 37. 5), though it would be better to put this after *πολεμοῦνται*, so that *αὐτοί* may be the subject of both (or after *αὐτοῖς*: *εἰς τε τὰ ἄ. ἀ. δ. καὶ νῦν οὐκ εἰκ. πολεμοῦνται*). But it is unnecessary (cf. 40. 1); and his objection to *καὶ* before *ἡμεῖς* is of no weight: it means ‘that actually *we* are the aggressors and they the innocent victims’.

**2. ξύμμαχόν τε, κ.τ.λ.:** to avoid a unique instance (at least in Thucydides) of *τε . . . οὔτε*, many emendations have been made, of which the best is Croiset’s *πρὸς τὰδ. ἔχειν οὐδὲ μάρτυρα παρακαλοῦντες αἰσχύνεσθαι*; with this reading *τε* connects *βουλόμενοι* with *ἐπὶ κακουργίᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἀρέτῃ*. I should prefer to adopt Croiset’s emendation and bracket *τε* (which in many places in one or other of our MSS. is wrongly inserted); unless, with Stahl, we join *τε* with *καὶ ἡ πόλις, κ.τ.λ.*, by a not uncommon anacoluthon. The justification for Croiset’s reading, as for Stahl’s easy and improbable bracketing of *οὔτε παρ. αἰσχ.*, is that this clause adds nothing, in sense, to *οὐδὲ μάρτυρα ἔχειν* (for we must ‘understand’ *μάρτυρα*, or *ξύμμαχον καὶ μάρτυρα*, as object of *παρακαλοῦντες*); it should, however, be observed that in § 4 below the same idea is expressed in a threefold, not a twofold, sentence—*εἰν φιλέν . . . οὐδ’ ἀν . . . ηὖν δέ που . . .*, each clause of which might correspond to those of the present sentence, and in which too it is difficult to distinguish between the sense of the second and the third. If this is compelling, we should emend *οὔτε* before *παρακαλοῦντες* to *οὐδέ*, as Krüger and Hude; but it is possible that in § 4 the meaning is ‘where they are stronger, they use force; when they can act in secret, they enrich themselves by guile; in either case they keep their dishonest gains without blushing’, as Croiset takes it, so that § 4 will not be parallel with § 2.

**3. αὐτοὺς δικαστάς, κ.τ.λ.:** they are judges in their own cause instead of arranging matters by treaty with other states. The only form of international law in Greece (as opposed to custom, like the reception of foreign suppliants—*οἱ Ἑλλήνων νόμοι* of 41. 1) was that

contained in the treaties between states—not a general convention agreed to by all or most states, but a series of separate treaties between states. Such treaties (which can be called *σπονδαί*) often included an agreement by which disputes between citizens of the contracting parties were to be settled in a stated manner (*κατὰ ξυνθήκας, διδοῦσι καὶ δεχομένοις τὰ δίκαια*, below, § 5), e.g. in the courts of the defendant’s state or in those of the state in which the contract was made; cf. the treaty between Athens and Phaselis, *I.G. i.2 16* (Tod, No. 32), and see note on 77. 1 below. They might also include an agreement by which all disputes between the contracting states themselves were to be settled by arbitration. The Kerkyraians (according to the Corinthians), by refusing to enter into any *σπονδαί* with other states, made themselves judges in all disputes in their own territory, and this was an advantage to them, because their geographical and economic situation (*αὐταρκὴ θέσις κειμένη*) made it certain that large numbers of foreigners would go to Kerkyra (traders to Italy and the Adriatic), while few of their own citizens (who abroad would also suffer from the absence of *ξυνθῆκαι*) needed to go to other states. They were not compelled, for example, to import any of the necessary foods, wine, oil, and corn, from abroad, as most Greek states were.

Whether this is a true picture either of the economic situation of Kerkyra or of her policy is a different matter. We hear of warehouses containing *χρήματα πολλὰ ἐμπόρων*, iii. 74. 2; and one would suppose, in the ordinary way, that Kerkyrian merchants went abroad to purchase their goods like those of any other state. Perhaps, however, they mainly traded in the Adriatic with non-Greek peoples, and made their city, as Forbes suggests, an emporium for goods from there, to which merchants from the rest of Greece proper resorted. Athenian merchants may have been among those who suffered from the extortionate, or supposed extortionate, methods of Kerkyra, which would give point to the Corinthian argument here; but we do not hear of such.

**ἀνάγκη καταίροντας:** compelled by their commercial needs to put in to Kerkyra, not, as some have thought, by stress of weather. That would be too casual.

**δέχεσθαι:** a curious word to use when the speaker means, practically, ‘robbing’ (*ὑποδέχεσθαι φιλικῶς, δέχεσθαι ληστρικῶς* schol., which is logical, but untrue—cf. 39. 2, 40. 1, 4, 6, etc.).

**38. 2. τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι:** see 25. 4 n. It is not likely that Syracuse, for example, would have accepted the idea of Corinth as her *ἡγεμών*; and it is not surprising that Athens was not convinced by these arguments. See, however, 56. 2.

**4. οὐδ’ ἐπεστρατεύομεν:** I prefer the imperfect (sc. *ἄν*, from the

previous clause), conjectured by Ullrich from the scholiast,<sup>1</sup> to the present tense of the MSS. ‘We should not now be preparing an expedition against them in a manner so exceptional (so contrary to our usual behaviour towards our colonies), if we were not the victims of exceptional aggression.’

5. Ἐπίδαμνον ἡμετέραν οὐσαν: it was not, of course, in any sense.

39. 1. οὐ τὸν προύχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦ προκαλούμενον: it would appear, on the contrary, more honourable for the party which is in a strong position to offer to submit to arbitration—

ὅτ' εὐτύχηκας, τότε δέχεσθαι τὴν δίκην  
τεκμήριον τοῦτον ἔστιν Ἑλληνος τρόπου

(Menander, *Perik.* 429–30),

and the statement seems to be contradicted by the next sentence, which says Kerkyra only offered arbitration when she had got into difficulties, through Corinth’s unexpected opposition to her aggression. But there is something to be said for the argument that, if sincere, you should offer arbitration before rather than after successful aggression.

40. 2. δστις μὴ ἄλλου αὐτὸν ἀποστερῶν: “Corcyra was bound, as a colony of Corinth, to side with her mother city in matters of external policy, and by joining the Athenian League she was defrauding Corinth”—Forbes. That is to say, the Corinthians would assert that Kerkyra is really their own subject ally: but if she were, then she was not one of the ἄγραφοι πόλεις just referred to (for the ἔνσπονδοι on both sides were included in the Treaty, for example the members of the Delian League), and even Corinth does not go so far as to assert that.

With the wording “compare Antiphon, whose scholar Thucydides is said to have been: οὐκ ἀποστερῶν γε τῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἔαντὸν οὐδενός [v. 78]”—Arnold.

4. δι’ ἀνοκωχῆς: a brief armistice, in the middle of the war. An illogical point, because its consequence is ‘you have never even been at war with Kerkyra’; he means ‘you have never had any diplomatic relations of any kind’. Cf. 66, where it means ‘a holding-off of war’: war had not yet come.

5. Σαμίων ἀποστάντων: in 440–439; see 115–17, where, however, nothing is said of the Peloponnesian conference nor of Corinth doing anything for Athens. The circumstances were not the same then as now: Samos, though an independent state, was within the Delian confederacy, and can be rightly said to have ‘broken away’ from Athens and the League; she was under certain obligations to it. Kerkyra was not an ally of Corinth nor within the Peloponnesian

<sup>1</sup> Not, however, a genuine variant reading (Powell, *C.Q.* xxx, 1936, 148).

League; she was an ἄγραφος πόλις as far as the Thirty Years’ Peace was concerned, which Samos was not.

Megara may have been among those who urged action against Athens in 440, for her colony Byzantium had joined Samos in the secession (Busolt, iii. 544, 760). See also 115. 1 n.

41. 1. κατὰ τοὺς Ἐλλήνων νόμους: see 37. 3 n. Cf. ὁ πᾶσι νόμος καθεστώς iii. 56. 2 (though that is rather ‘natural law’, the right of self-defence universally admitted).

2. τὸν Αἰγανητῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ πόλεμον: Hdt. vi. 89 (the loan of 20 Corinthian ships), 92 (the Athenian victory). See 14. 3 n. τὰ Μηδικά may mean the war of 480–479 only, excluding Marathon, as apparently in 14. 2; so that this reference tells us nothing about the date of the Aeginetan war. The Corinthians exaggerate when they say that Athens got Αἰγανητῶν ἐπικράτησις in this war (Shilleto). See Andrewes, *B.S.A.* xxxvii, 1936–7, 1–7.

They say nothing of their services to Athens in 510 when they were the leaders in dissuading Sparta from using the forces of the Peloponnesian League to restore Hippias, an event told at length by Herodotus, v. 91–3, and surely more important than their loan of ships against Aigina. Did Thucydides reject as untrue the whole story of the conference at Sparta in 510, as he would have rejected the speech of Sosikles, the Corinthian delegate on that occasion (cf. 22. 4 n., p. 144)?

Nor does the speaker here mention the Corinthian mediation in the dispute between Thebes and Athens over Plataia, when the latter first joined Athens (Hdt. vi. 108).

3. τὰ οἰκεῖα: hardly ‘their own interests’, as most editors, or *res domesticas* (Stahl), but ‘the claims of kinship’. Not only previously friendly, but kindred states are ignored in favour of an immediate victory.

42. 1. νεώτερός τις παρὰ πρεσβυτέρου αὐτὰ μαθών: it was a not uncommon rhetorical τόπος to contrast the ignorant and supposedly excitable young with the experienced and supposedly prudent older men. Cf. vi. 13. 1.

2. τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης πρότερον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑποψίας: ὑποψίαν εἶπε τὴν μάχην εὐφήμως· ἐρεῖ δὲ ταῦτην ἐν τῇ πεντηκονταετηρίδι (103. 4, 105. 4–106)—schol. See also 107. 3, 108. 2, 111. 2, 114–115. 1 for the continuation of the story till the evacuation of Megara by Athens under the terms of the Thirty Years’ Peace. But there is much to be said for Steup’s view that Thucydides is here referring to a more recent suspicion aroused by those Athenian measures against Megara which culminated in her exclusion from all the ports of the empire (τὸ μεῖζον ἔγκλημα, below; see 67. 4). An open warfare could

hardly be referred to as *ὑποψία*; and as far as Megara was concerned, this warfare had been ended by Athens giving up all her claims, and Corinth, by her own account, had since then supported Athens at the Peloponnesian conference of 440–439. *πρότερον* is a difficulty in the way of this view; but it is a difficulty anyhow, for the natural meaning of *ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον* is ‘which formerly existed’, not ‘which still exists owing to former quarrels’; yet the *ὑποψία* must still exist, for Athens is called upon to remove it. *ὑπαρχούσης ήδη* (or at least *ἔτι*) is in fact what we require.

We do not know when the Athenian pressure on Megara began. See 67. 4, 139. 1–2 nn.

Steup would transpose to the end of this chapter the last sentence of c. 40 (*εἰ γάρ . . . θήσετε*), on the ground that up to the end of c. 41 the Corinthians have been appealing to considerations of right and justice, and in c. 42, as in 40. 6, to the advantages and disadvantages to Athens of the proposed alliance. But not only would 40. 6 fit very ill here; but the argument assumes that Thucydides could not combine two aspects of the same question (that of giving help to the revolted subjects of another state), or that he thought that the Corinthian speaker could not, or again that the speaker actually could not, according to the view which we take of the manner of composition of the speeches. Delachaux’s support of Steup’s argument is not more convincing, even though he has discovered a cause for the transposition, viz. the repetition of *τοὺς . . . ἔνυμάχους αὐτὸν τινα κολάζειν*, 40. 5 and 43. 1.

**43. 2. ἐχθρός:** a word of wider import than *πολέμος* (which implies ‘being at war with’). So 41. 3. The Corinthians are not arguing that an alliance between Athens and Kerkyra is as such a *casus belli*; it is an ‘unfriendly act’ (Classen).

**44. 1. ἀπεδέξαντο:** the aorist suggests, at first sight, that the ekklesia actually voted against the alliance with Kerkyra (cf. *προσεδέξαντο*, 45. 1), and that another meeting was called to reconsider the decision, as in the case of Mytilene. But we are rather to suppose simply that the debate was adjourned; on the first day the Athenians ‘had accepted’ the arguments of the Corinthians rather than their opponents’.

**ἔνυμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι:** actually *ἔνυμαχία* is a term of wider import and includes *ἐπιμαχία*; see vi. 79. 1, and i. 53. 4 below where the Kerkyraians are called *ἔνυμαχοι*, under the terms of this treaty. For *ἐπιμαχία* cf. too v. 48. 2: *ἀρκεῖν . . . τὴν . . . ἐπιμαχίαν, ἀλλήλους βοηθεῖν, ἔνωπιοντατείνειν δὲ μηδενί*—a non-aggression pact. See Schaefer, *Staatsform u. Politik* (1932), pp. 62–93, esp. 72–4; and Hampl, cited above, p. 163.

**ἐλύοντ' ἀν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους σπονδαί:** the Athenians were at least anxious not to be technically the aggressors in a general war, even if their conduct as a whole was provocative. See 23. 6 n., 45. 3, 53. 4, 87. 6 (n., pp. 253–4), 140. 2 n., 144. 2. With a full alliance between them Kerkyra could have asked Athens to attack Corinth at home and so prevent any expedition against her.

**3. τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, κ.τ.λ.:** see 36. 2 n. Grundy, pp. 324–6, points out that imports from the west were valuable not only to Athens, but to the Peloponnesian, which was not self-supporting (120. 2 n.), and that in the event of war it would be to Athenian interest to control this trade, and in peace was a natural imperial interest (Athens was not actually dependent on corn from the west; “but her general trade interests in Sicily were considerable, and she could not let Corcyra fall into Corinthian hands” (p. 328): i.e. she created an interest at a distance and then wanted control of all intermediate routes as a ‘necessity’). But he greatly oversimplifies the matter when he says, “if Corcyra fell into the hands of Athens she (Athens) would control the trade with the west, and would be able to close it if she so wished”. Normally trading vessels sailed direct from Sicily to the Corinthian Gulf (Dem. xxxii. 5–8); that was one of the reasons why Athens sought to control Zakynthos and Kephallenia. Another reason was that they were important ports of call for her triremes: ii. 80. 1. See Introd., pp. 19–21.

**45. 1. δέκα ναῦς . . . ἀπέστειλαν:** the date was on or shortly after the 13th day of the first prytany of 433–432 B.C., for we have the record of the moneys paid for the expedition, I.G. i.2 295 (Tod, 55: see J. Johnson, A.J.A. xxxiii, 1929, 398–400, for further details, with a photograph of the stone; Meritt, A.F.D. 68–71).

**2. The names of the three strategoi are preserved (at least, that of Proteas can be restored with practical certainty) on the inscription.** Thucydides gives their patronymics, in accordance with everyday usage in Athens;<sup>1</sup> the inscription gives only the *demotika*, the legal way. Actually both patronymic and *demotikon* were normally used in official documents; but the *demotikon* was essential, for a man’s citizenship was recognized by the entry of his name on the register of his deme. Cf. 1. 1 n.

**Λακεδαιμόνιος ὁ Κίμωνος:** he had been hipparch c. 446 B.C. and with two others had dedicated an equestrian statue on the acropolis from enemy spoils, I.G. i.2 400. Otherwise nothing more is known of him.

Plut. *Per.* 29. 2–4 (cf. Kim. 16. 1) reports the story that Pericles got

<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes, however, occasionally and Plato more often, use the *demotikon* in such a way as to show that it was coming into use in common parlance.

Lakedaimonios appointed to this small and difficult command in spiteful memory of his old rival Kimon: ten ships made too small a squadron for success and might easily be led into disaster. Herodotos would have mentioned the story and perhaps rejected it, as unworthy of Perikles. It is entirely characteristic of Thucydides that he ignores it and all similar scandal.<sup>1</sup> Yet, if it was told at the time (as there is no reason to doubt; the story probably comes from Stesimbrotos: cf. F. 6; Introd., pp. 36, 47 n. 1), it is part of Athenian history—it illuminates the opposition to the alliance with Kerkyra. That Perikles was attacked in any case for proposing so small a squadron, as Plutarch says ('either we should not ally ourselves with Kerkyra, or we should make the alliance decisive'), is also highly probable. **Διότιμος ὁ Στρομβίχου:** one of a family of which many members are known. See P.A. 4386. He may already have been on an expedition or embassy to Sicily: Timaios, fr. 99 (see below, p. 412, n. 2). He was head of a delegation to Susa, Strabo, i. 3. 1, p. 47, perhaps the one laughed at by Aristophanes, *Ach.* 61 ff. His son, Strombichides, was strategos in 412-411, viii. 15-17, *al.* **Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους:** strategos again in 432-431, ii. 23. 2, and I.G. i. 2 296. 31.

**46. 1. ἐπλεον:** 'began their journey', not 'were already sailing' (by the time the Athenians arrived at Kerkyra); the imperfect, because the action continues through the next sentence.

For the numbers on either side, see 54. 2 n.

**2. στρατηγοὶ . . . κατὰ πόλεις ἑκάστων:** this implies that the states (three of them originally colonies from Corinth) formally allied themselves with Corinth in the war against Kerkyra; they did not simply allow or encourage volunteers and lend ships, as some of them had done in the first campaign (27. 2). One notices the absence of contingents from Epidavros, Hermione, Troezen, and Kephallenia in this second fleet: doubtless because it was more likely to provoke a war with Athens; perhaps Sparta too had used some pressure (cf. 28. 1).

**πέμπτος αὐτός:** it seems clear that, in Athens at least, in the strategia as in other magistracies the collegiate principle prevailed; that is, that there was no one of them elected to be in supreme command throughout his year of office, and that therefore decisions on action were by agreement or majority vote. On the other hand, by decree of the ekklesia, any one, two, or more of the ten strategoi could be selected as commanders for the conduct of a particular campaign; often, perhaps more often than not, when more than one were selected, no one of them was put in supreme command—for example, Nikias, Lamachos, and Alkibiades were of equal status as strategoi of the expedition to Sicily, and plans of action were adopted after

discussion between them; but this common phrase, *τέταρτος αὐτός, πέμπτος αὐτός*, implies that on other occasions one of them was put in command. This has indeed been doubted by some scholars, who suppose that *Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῖς* (116. 1) means no more than that Perikles was one of ten legally equal strategoi on that campaign, his name alone being mentioned by Thucydides partly for the biographical interest, partly to indicate how seriously the Athenians took the campaign, that they sent their most powerful citizen with it. But such an argument cannot be applied to occasions like the present (and they are the majority); at least it is difficult to see what in that case Thucydides had in mind, or what his readers would understand, by this particular mention of one among five obscure Corinthians (contrast 29. 2 and 47. 1). It must mean that, for this expedition, Xenokleides was given some authority over his colleagues, just as the special mention of the Corinthian commanders shows that they enjoyed authority over the allied strategoi. See Wade-Gery, C.P. xxvi, 1931, 309-13; Accame, *Riv. Fil.* xiii, 1935, 341-55; and for the collegiate principle as a whole, Kahrstedt, *Untersuchungen z. Magistratur in Athen*, 1936, 148 ff.; and note on 116. 1.<sup>1</sup> There is, of course, no reason to suppose that Thucydides is wrong in suggesting the same principle in Corinth as existed in Athens. The three Kerkyraian strategoi were apparently on an equal footing: 47. 1, 48. 3.

**Ξενοκλείδης:** appointed commander of a Corinthian garrison in Amprakia after the Athenian victories of 426-425, iii. 114. 4.

**3. ἐς Χειμέριον:** where they already had a base, 30. 3.

**4. ἔστι δὲ λιμήν, κ.τ.λ.:** this careful description of a not very important locality suggests to me autopsy or information from a special source. Pearson, C.Q. xxxiii, 1939, 51-2, points out the very close similarity in style between this and similar descriptions in the earlier *periegeseis*, as, e.g., in Hekataios, and comes to the conclusion that it and all other geographical descriptions in Thucydides in which irrelevant matter is introduced (e.g. the Taulantioi of 24. 1, and Thrace, ii. 96), are taken by him directly from these earlier accounts.<sup>2</sup> The opposite conclusion seems to me more likely (in a writer like Thucydides): it is more probable that irrelevant information is a result of his own research; he is telling his readers something new (and therefore so far something worth telling), even if it is not strictly to the point, just as in his historical digressions. That he should adopt the conventional *style* of such geographical

<sup>1</sup> We should note, however, that Kallias, elected *πέμπτος αὐτός* (61. 1), at least consults his colleagues in matters of strategy (62. 4). So too Archestratos apparently (57. 6 and 59. 2).

<sup>2</sup> Hekataios had mentioned the Taulantioi, apparently, in a description of this coast, F. 98-106. Cf. below, p. 181, n. 1.

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description (which is in part dictated by the nature of things) is not surprising. Only on the assumption that such geographical notes were provisional, made by Thucydides in the course of his writing in case they should be needed, and that he would have done away with what is irrelevant if he had completed his work, is it likely that he copied them from books. The hypothesis of autopsy is, I admit, not made more likely by a mistake here made and by the obscurities in the whole account of this campaign (see below, pp. 186, 194); but it is equally difficult to understand why, if there existed a fairly detailed *periegesis* of this coast, Thucydides should select a description of Cheimerion and omit one of Sybota, and should not have recorded the distance between them. We may assume then that some informant (perhaps a Corinthian) gave him this account of Cheimerion, which, however, he did not fully understand.

Cheimerion has been identified with the small bay of Phanári (or Splántza) into which the river Gourlá (or Souliótikos) flows, or with that of H. Ioánnes just to the north of Phanári and some 6 km. east of Parga. The river Acheron is identified with the Gourlá, the marshy lake being 5 to 7 km. inland to the east (Kokytos R. is then the Vourós, flowing south from near Paramythiá to join the lake: Leake, i. 231-3, iv. 53-6). Strabo, in the course of a very inadequate account of the coast from the Akrokeranaunian Mts. to the Amprakiot Gulf, vii. 7. 5, p. 324, says, ἐπειτα (i.e. after Sybota Is.) ἄκρα Χειμέριον καὶ Γλυκὸς Λιμήν, εἰς ὃν ἐμβάλλει ὁ Ἀχέρων ποταμός, δέων ἐκ τῆς Ἀχέροντος λίμνης καὶ δεχόμενος πλείους ποταμούς ώστε καὶ γλυκανεῖν τὸν κόλπον. The *Mediterranean Pilot*<sup>6</sup>, 1929, 114-16, remarks of Phanári: "entrance 1½ cable, opening out to 4-5 cables northward, but silted up by the R. Gourlá and shallow to the W. of its mouth. There is anchorage in 5½ fathoms. Local vessels winter here." On the other hand, Pausanias, speaking of fresh-water springs rising in the sea, viii. 7. 2, says, γλυκὸν δὲ ὕδωρ ἐν θαλάσσῃ δῆλον ἔστω ἐνταῦθα τε ἀνιὸν ἐν τῇ Ἀργολίδι καὶ ἐν τῇ Θεοπρωτίδι κατὰ τὸ Χειμέριον καλούμενον, and this fits H. Joánnes better; where there is anchorage and "within the western point of the bay is a remarkable fresh-water spring, rising from a depth of 12 fathoms" (M.P. p. 116). This would seem to be the Γλυκὸς Λιμήν (so Frazer, on Pausanias, quoting Skene, *Journ. R.G.S.* xvii, 1847, p. 140); and as the harbour is a good deal larger than Phanári, it would serve much better as the Corinthian base.<sup>1</sup> Thucydides' description would suit either harbour; for Ephyre 'is inland from

<sup>1</sup> There is another small bay, Keréntza (Leake's Klaréntza), just south of Phanári. It is possible enough that in fact the large Corinthian and allied fleet used all three bays.

There is a village called Γλυκύ above Lake Acheron, some 12-13 km. in a direct line ENE. of H. Joánnes.

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the sea in Elaiatis τῆς Θεοπρωτίδος' and the Acheron 'flows by it into the sea'—he does not say that it flows into the sea at the harbour of Cheimerion, as Strabo does, if this harbour is the Γλυκὸς Λιμήν.<sup>1</sup>

But no one would suppose from Thucydides' words, ρέι δὲ καὶ Θύαμις ποταμός, ὅρίζων τὴν Θεοπρωτίδα καὶ Κεστρίνην, ὃν ἐντὸς ἡ ἄκρα ἀνέχει τὸ Χειμέριον, that the Thyamis is the modern Kalamás some 50 km. distance, in Chaonia, and a half-day's sail from the mouth of the Acheron (so Skylax), and that there is no one remarkable promontory between the two which can be safely identified with Cheimerion. It cannot be simply a mistake or a change in name, for there is no other river on this coast than these two between Buthrotum and the Amprakiot Gulf.<sup>2</sup> The promontory is presumably either C. Trophalé or Varlaám. Nor is the description in § 3, ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσέμειξαν τῇ κατὰ Κέρκυραν ἡπείρῳ . . . δρυμίζονται ἐς Χειμέριον, strictly accurate; it is not till you arrive at the Sybota Is. or a little south of them that you are opposite the SE. end of Kerkyra (C. Leukimme; so Strabo); in fact, this describes better the advanced Corinthian base (50. 3). H. Ioánnes is in fact a long way from Sybota to serve as a base for a Greek fleet attacking Kerkyra (see 48. 2 n.); on the other hand, it is excellently placed for a fleet that was to hinder the Kerkyraians operating farther south (30. 3). See Leake, *Northern Greece*, i. 232, iii. 3-8; Bursian, *Geographie*, i. 28; Philippson, *Thessalien u. Epirus*, p. 272.

<sup>1</sup> See also below, n. 2. Strabo mentions Ephyre: ὑπέρκειται δὲ τούτου τοῦ κόλπου (presumably the 'Sweet Harbour') Κίχυρος, ἡ πρότερον Ἐφύρα, πόλις Θεοπρωτῶν; and B. A. Müller, *Herm.* ix, 1925, 110-12, proposes to read in Hekataios, F. 105 (from Steph. Byz. s. *Xaovía*), δὲ κόλπος Κιχυράῖος (*Kíparos* codd.) καὶ τὸ πεδίον ἐν τῇ Χαονικῇ—referring to a time when the Chaones lived in the plain, before the Thesprotians (cf. Thuc. ii. 80, 5, 81. 4).

A further confusion, at least in nomenclature, is introduced by Skylax, 30 (G.G.M. i, p. 34), who says that the Acheron flowed into Elaia harbour; while Ptolemy, listing places on the coast from NW. to SE., iii. 13. 3, gives Thyamis R. mouth, Torone (i.e. Toryne), Sybota, Acheron R. mouth, Elaia, Nikopolis, making Elaia south of the Acheron.

Toryne is generally identified with Parga, in which case Ptolemy has it and Sybota in the wrong order. Parga, a deep harbour, with a narrow entrance between rocks, leading to a sandy shore, is really much the best anchorage in all this coast between H. Saránda (just north of Buthrotum) and the Amprakiot Gulf; and, though the immediate *hinterland* is more mountainous and difficult than that of H. Joánnes and Phanári, it is remarkable that Thucydides and Strabo both ignore it. It is also much closer to the headland which is probably the ἄκρα Χειμέριον (see above).

<sup>2</sup> Strabo also has, between his description of the Γλυκὸς Λιμήν and of Ephyre, ρέι δὲ καὶ δ Θύαμις πλησίον: which would appear to be due to Thucydides' account (doubtless via Ephorus). On the other hand, there is much geographical matter in his chapter not from Thucydides, and immediately after the mention of Ephyre, he goes on τοῦ δὲ κατὰ Βουθρωτὸν (κόλπου ὑπέρκειται) ἡ Φουίκη, which is remarkably out of place.

**47. 1. Μικαδῆς, κ.τ.λ.**: the names of the Kerkyraian commanders at the previous battle off Leukimme had not been given, those of the Corinthian had (29. 2, 5); perhaps owing to the fact that Thucydides had only Corinthian sources for the details of the first campaign, Athenian as well as Corinthian for the second (so Beloch, ii. 2. 227). Yet the decisive character of the Corinthian defeat at Leukimme (with some forty Kerkyraian vessels engaged at the same time off Epidamnos) is not in any way qualified. More likely Thucydides had not then begun 'taking notes'.

Diodorus, xii. 33. 3-4, gives the same figures for the two fleets as Thucydides (the Corinthian in less detail). See below, pp. 191-4.  
**τῶν νήσων αἱ καλούνται Σύβορα**: they still retain their ancient name (see Leake, *Northern Greece*, i. 103, iii. 3; the Greek staff map calls the western island Mávron Oros, the eastern H. Nikólaos; the *Mediterranean Pilot*<sup>6</sup>, 116-18, calls the former Sivota, the latter H. Nikólaos). They are uninhabited. 'Sivota is rocky, 384 ft. (117 m.) high, and water is deep within half a mile of it; H. Nikólaos is 237 ft. (72 m.),<sup>1</sup> its southern point united to Sivota by a reef of rocks. It is separated from the main by a channel 1½ to 3 cables wide and 7 long; at the SE. bend is Port Mourzo' (*M.P.*). The bay between the two islands, entered from the north, is sheltered, and there is another anchorage between H. Nikólaos and the main (Leake). Between the southern end of this islet and the main is only 2 fathoms' depth of water; at the north end of the inner channel the depth is 20 fathoms (*M.P.*). The Kerkyraian fleet could thus only 'encamp' either between the two islands to the north, or between H. Nikólaos and the mainland (or in Moúrtso Bay—Mourteméno on the map). The latter seems impossible owing to the barbarian forces there which were hostile (§ 3), besides being strictly inconsistent with Thucydides' words. If they encamped in the anchorage between the two islands, they would have sheltered waters; but they could not pass between them in a southerly direction owing to the reef uniting the islands; they could only enter and leave the anchorage by the north and west. Moreover, neither island affords a 'camping' ground for a fleet of any size; there is but the smallest of landing-places on the north of Mávron Oros, and both islets are too rocky to provide sleeping-quarters for the crews. Nor, I believe, is any water to be found on them. At the most therefore they afforded but a temporary anchorage, and there seems to be no reason why the Kerkyraians should have chosen them as an advanced base instead of waiting for the Corinthians to attack them off Leukimme. The farther they could make the Corinthians row before battle, the better for them; and if the enemy passed Sybota, sailing along the coast to threaten the town of Kerkyra, they

<sup>1</sup> The Greek map gives 118 and 66 m. respectively.

could easily keep pace with them along the eastern shores of the island.

**2. ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ**: the cape at the extreme south-east of Kerkyra is now called Asprókavo (or C. Bianco); 6½ miles NNE. of it is C. Léfkimmo. Since both names mean 'white' there is not much reason for choosing one more than the other for the ancient Leukimme. Asprókavo is much the more prominent, being 330 ft. (100 m.) high with white cliffs; Léfkimmo is a low sandy spit; and Asprókavo is a landmark to sailors coming from the south. On the other hand, the shore between the two is low and bordered by shallow waters interspersed with rocks extending ½ to ¾ miles off shore, whereas west of Léfkimmo the coast is equally low but the waters free of rocks—though there is a sand-bank which makes very shallow water (1-2 ft.) close inshore. There is excellent anchorage in the middle of this bay in 15-17 fathoms, and also towards its western end in 10 fathoms. The most likely place therefore for the camp of Kerkyra's land forces (which must be easily approachable by the fleet in case of need) is the shore to the west of Léfkimmo; and in that case that cape will be Leukimme.<sup>1</sup>

The western point of Sybota Is. is some 5 miles from the nearest point on the coast of Kerkyra, and about 7½ from C. Léfkimmo.

See *Mediterranean Pilot*<sup>6</sup>, 1929, iii. 125-6; Leake, *Northern Greece*, i. 94, iii. 2, 5; Bursian, ii. 357; Büchner, *R.E.*, art. 'Korkyra', 1407.

**Ζακυνθίων χίλιοι ὁπλῖται**: we are not told why Zakynthos sent this considerable force (they were not allied with Kerkyra: 31. 2); but they were on friendly terms with Athens and her allies on the outbreak of war (ii. 7. 3, 9. 4), and may long have been friendly with Kerkyra.

**48. 1. τριῶν ἡμερῶν σιτία**: in the ordinary course they will have brought some supplies with them from Corinth, Megara, Elis, etc. In the event of a long campaign they would obtain more from their base at Cheimerion, from the friendly tribes of the mainland (in the event of a decisive victory, from Kerkyra itself). Their advanced base is an uninhabited spot (50. 3 n.); so they take supplies with them for their immediate needs. This was the ordinary procedure too for armies invading the enemy's or encamping in allies' territory: to take supplies for a few days, and then expect to live on the country: cf. II. 1, etc.

**2. ἄμφι ἔω**: they had had to row some 25-30 km., 15-18 miles, at not more than 4-5 miles an hour, with comparatively heavily laden

<sup>1</sup> Leake, i. 94, decides for Léfkimmo—Leukimme, Asprókavo being Ptolemy's C. Amphipagos; but since the next cape mentioned by Ptolemy is Phalakron, at the NW. corner of the island, Amphipagos is more probably to be found on the west coast.

vessels (49. 1-3). See Introd., p. 20. They would know that the enemy had anchored at the Sybota islands. The latter, as explained above, will have had to row round the west coast of Mávron Oros in order to meet the Corinthians coming from the south.

3. ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας: the Attic ships did not form the right wing of the fleet, for the Kerkyraian fleet was itself divided into right, centre, and left, but were posted to the right wing, i.e. on the extreme right, as, in fact, a reserve force (cf. § 4 ad fin.).

τρία τέλη ποιήσαντες τῶν νεῶν: "offenbar entsprechend den drei Phylen, in welche die kerkyraische Bürgerschaft zerfiel"—Beloch, ii. 2. 223. Obviously not, but corresponding to the traditional tactical division of fleets as of armies into right, centre, and left.

4. Κορινθίους δέ, κ.τ.λ.: at first sight it would seem that their fleet was divided into three very unequal divisions (39 on the right, 21 in the centre, 90 on the left: 46. 1). So too 49. 6. This is improbable in itself, if they were tactical divisions; and *ταῖς ἄριστα τῶν νεῶν πλεούσαις* suggests that only some of the Corinthian ships, the best sailors, formed the left wing, the centre consisting of the Elean, Leukadian, and Anaktorian squadrons and the rest of the Corinthian fleet. (Which is not to say that *οἱ ἀλλοὶ ἔνυμαχοι*, followed by *αὐτοὶ οἱ Κορινθίοι*, can mean 'the rest of the allied force'—including Corinthians—as Steup translates, but that Thucydides has not expressed himself too clearly: he is giving the order of the squadrons from right to left rather than their tactical division.) See below, pp. 191-4.

49. 1. τὰ σημεῖα: the exact nature of the signals we do not know—some form of trumpet signal is indicated by 50. 5. The same phrase is used of land forces, 63. 2.

1-3. τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ: the best commentary on this description of the old-fashioned method of fighting is Thucydides' account of the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet in the Corinthian Gulf by Phormion, ii. 83-4, where see notes. Doubtless it comes, at least in part, from Athenian sources, perhaps, as Beloch suggested, from Lakedaimonios, one of the Athenian commanders; for he was a kinsman of Thucydides.

4. δεδιότες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν τῶν Ἀθ.: 45. 3, where the instructions are explicit, but none the less difficult to carry out. By not engaging in the battle (at some distance from Kerkyra Island) they would facilitate a Corinthian victory; but a landing on Kerkyra, or on territory belonging to Kerkyra, consequent on such a victory, they were to oppose. This was typical of the compromise reached at Athens to conclude only a defensive alliance with Kerkyra, as was the decision to send only ten ships: a compromise likely to involve Athens in difficulties, and to be ineffective in overcoming

them; the sort of compromise that has been fatal on many occasions to many countries. Fortunately for Athens, she at least half got out of it by sending the second squadron soon after the first.

5. μεχρὶ τοῦ στρατοπέδου: that is, we must suppose from 46. 3-5, Cheimerion, at least 4 hours' distance from Sybota (48. 2 n.). See below, pp. 194-5.

7. ὃστε ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους: σχετλιάζων ταῦτα λέγει, ὅτι οἱ ἔνσπονδοι οὐτως ἥλθον εἰς χεῖρας—schol. Scarcely 'in anger' or 'indignation'; but certainly with emphasis—the first break in the Thirty Years' Peace, "practically the first blow struck in the Peloponnesian War" (Forbes).

50. 1. τὰ σκάφη . . . τῶν νεῶν ἂς καταδύσειαν: the hulls of the ships which they had sunk to the water-line, waterlogged and helpless ships (Arnold). A ship might be rendered helpless through having all its oars broken (or most of its rowers killed) without being 'sunk' in this sense (cf. vii. 34. 5). A 'sunk' ship of the victorious fleet would be recovered and repaired.

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους . . . τούς τε αὐτῶν φίλους, κ.τ.λ.: doubtless a report from an enemy source (or from an indignant ally of Corinth). See 50. 3 n.

διεκπλέοντες: not, of course, in the tactical sense in which *διέκπλοι* was used just above, 49. 3. Shilleto compares vii. 69. 4, Hdt. vii. 36. 2.

Steup objects to the usual (and only possible) interpretation of this sentence, on the ground that the Corinthians could easily have recognized their allies in daylight, and that in any case there were no allies to kill, for the defeated right wing had been driven to the mainland (49. 5); and (bracketing *οἱ* and *ἀγνοοῦντες* as anyhow superfluous) translates 'proceeded to their killing (of the enemy) on the right wing as well, as they had not observed that their own friends had been defeated'. This is a mare's nest; and the cure quite impossible (for one thing, if there were no defeated allies there, there were certainly no victorious enemy to kill). The Kerkyraians had dispersed the right wing, mostly to the coast, but many ships would be left waterlogged—it resembled a land-battle, and there was much confusion; the Corinthians lose their heads as the result of the victory, kill rather than take prisoners, and among their victims are some men on waterlogged allied ships or swimming in the sea.

3. ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεδίωξαν, κ.τ.λ.: in the ordinary way after a victory, that is, on land after driving the enemy off the field, at sea after pursuing them ἐς τὴν γῆν—to their nearest friendly shore—the victors first collect their own dead<sup>1</sup> and the enemies' equipment, armour or disabled ships, and only then (if then) follow up their

<sup>1</sup> And wounded, though these are very seldom mentioned in a land-battle; they include the men on their own *ναυάγια* after a sea-battle.

victory. This is what the Corinthians are described, quite naturally, as doing here. But it seems hardly consistent with §§ 1-2 which have just preceded. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καρδίωξαν would follow easily on the last sentence of c. 49, whereas after 50. 1-2 one expects μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (after the killing, 'when they had had their fill of slaughter'). It looks as though 50. 1 contains a detail which came to Thucydides' notice after he had written his main account of the battle, and so from another source (Megarian or Amprakiot, i.e. the defeated right wing?). The Corinthians did in fact take a number of prisoners (52. 2, 54. 2). ἐς τὴν γῆν: Sybota Is., or Kerkyra itself? See below, pp. 194-5.

**πρὸς τὰ Σύβοτα:** unidentified, but presumably quite close to the Sybota islands; perhaps Σκάλωμα Ἀρίλας, a small bay just below the village of Pérdika or Arpitsa (apparently Leake's Bay of Arpitsa), 6-7 km. from the islands, or even Moúrtso bay, just to the east of them (47. 1 n.). It is natural enough that the Corinthians should have an advanced base, as well as their main base at Cheimerion which was some 4 hours' sailing away. Though uninhabited, and therefore useless for the purposes of a main base (for food and water supplies for a large number of men—perhaps more than 20,000 in 150 ships of an old-fashioned type—and for any but the slightest repairs to damaged vessels: 52. 2), it would serve as a temporary base for a day or two, mainly for sleeping, perhaps also for cooking (cf. τὰς ναῦς ἀραντες ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, 52. 2;<sup>1</sup> see 52. 1 n.); they had brought three days' supply of food with them from Cheimerion (48. 1). This harbour of 'Sybota on the mainland' served the same purpose for Alkidas' fleet in 427 (iii. 76). We must remember that there were no sleeping quarters on board a Greek trireme, and no room even for proper resting, except perhaps for the officers. (Similarly the main base of the Kerkyraians is at Leukimme, their advanced base at Sybota Is.) Also, it would be natural enough that the land forces (their Thesprotian allies) should move to this advanced base, to guard against an enemy attack in the event of defeat at sea. But why has Thucydides not already made this clear in the course of describing the Corinthian plans when they left Cheimerion (48. 1)? Beloch (see below, on 54. 2) suggests that Thucydides had two sources of information, Athenian-Kerkyraian (according to which the base was Sybota), and Corinthian (according to which it was Cheimerion), but this does not solve the problem. Another difficulty is the action of the victorious left wing of the Kerkyraians (49. 5): they pursue the enemy to the mainland, that is, drive them on to the shore, and then go as far as the camp, which

<sup>1</sup> Neither Leake nor the *Mediterranean Pilot* mentions water supply at Arfia Bay (abundant at Cheimerion); but the village is only c. 1 mile inland, and there is a hamlet just above the bay. There are one or two other small bays north of Arfia.

they find deserted and burn, and seize money left there. This must be the main base at Cheimerion, which is deserted because the Thesprotians, as we learn later, had moved to the advanced base, and at which the stores and money would naturally be left. But this means a long journey for this squadron of 20 ships, there and back; and we are not told of their return. Presumably they arrived back in time for the expected Corinthian attack on the evening of the day of battle (50. 4), unless the figure for the Kerkyraian losses is hopelessly wrong (see pp. 191-4), certainly in time for the offer of battle next morning (52. 1). It is possible indeed that the fighting took place some distance south of Sybota Is., nearer to Cheimerion; only there seems to be nothing that could be called Sybota Harbour south of Σκάλωμα Ἀρίλας until we come to the port of Parga; and not only is there no reason to suppose that that was uninhabited in the fifth century any more than now, but it is too close to Cheimerion to justify its use as an advance base and too far from Sybota Is. to be itself called Sybota Harbour.

It would be an improvement if we read here, ἔστι δὲ *ταῦτα* τὰ Σύβοτα τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος λιμήν ἐρήμος (coni. Hude).

4. δόσαι ἡσαν λοιπά: presumably some older ships that had not been engaged in the battle (up to 10 in number: 25. 4 and 47. 1). See below, p. 194.

5. πρύμναν ἐκρύουντο: τὸ κατ' ὀλίγον ἀναχωρεῖν μὴ στρέψαντας τὸ πλοῖον . . . τοῦτο δὲ ποιούσιν, ἵνα μὴ δόξωσι φανερῶς φεύγειν, κατ' ὀλίγον ὑπαπόντες, ἢ ἵνα μὴ τὰ νῶτα τοῖς πολεμίοις δόντες ρᾶσον τιτρώσκωνται—schol. The second reason is of course the right one, or partly right. A greater danger, if they turned their vessels, would be that they must first present themselves broadside to an enemy attack; the positive advantage of backing water is that they could at any time again reverse this and charge an enemy vessel which ventured to attack. It might also be a tactical manoeuvre (see iii. 78). Later, when it was getting dark and the battle was called off, the Corinthians do turn their vessels (51. 2).

51. 1-2. προϊδόντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι . . . τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις . . . ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς: the Corinthians 'saw them at a distance', for the Attic squadron was making for Leukimme (§ 4), well out to sea; if they were themselves facing west their look-out men would see the Athenians to the south-west. The latter may have been at this moment hidden from the Kerkyraian forces by Asprókavo, or by Léfkimmo headland if the Kerkyraians were to the west of this (47. 2 n.).

καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνεχόρουν: they had now no great fear of a Corinthian attempt to land, it was growing dark, and there was no need to risk further fighting.

4-5. τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις στρατοπεδευομένοις, κ.τ.λ.: if this is the

fleet, we have a very awkward repetition of § 2 (both stylistically and of the fact); we should have to assume again two 'notes' not properly worked into the narrative (cf. 50. 3 n.). It is simpler to write *⟨τοῖς στρατοπέδενομένοις* and to take it to mean the land forces, from whom the Athenian fleet was at first hidden either by Asprókavo or Léfkimmo according to whether their camp was west or south of Léfkimmo (47. 2 n.). (For the present tense in the sense of 'encamped', not 'making camp', see iv. 23. 2, 26. 3.) **διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ νευαγίων:** even making allowance for possible drift from the mainland towards the coast of Kerkyra, this indicates that the main fight took place not far from that coast. See 54. 1 (the trophy on Sybota Is.) and p. 195.

**Ὥν ἥρχε, κ.τ.λ.:** there were in fact three strategoi in command (so that six strategoi in all had been sent with but thirty ships—but the occasion was politically important)—Glaukon ἐκ Κεραμέων, Metagenes Κοιλεύς, and Drakontides (or possibly Drakon: ΔΡΑΚΟΝΤΙΔΕΣ; the name of his deme is also missing), as we know from the inscription, *I.G. i<sup>2</sup> 295* (= Tod, 55), which records the moneys handed to the strategoi for this as for the first squadron sent to Kerkyra (see 45. 1-2 nn.). Besides the mistake as to the number of strategoi, all the MSS. have Ἀνδοκίδης Λεωγόρου for the second, and this reading is as old as Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X Oratt.* 834 c and as the scholiast here,<sup>1</sup> both of whom suppose that Andokides the orator (*A. Λεωγόρου Κυδαθηναίεύς*) is meant. This is in any case impossible, for the orator was born c. 440 B.C.; his grandfather, another Andokides, who had been strategos in 446 and 440, is possible. There was another Leogoras, Θοραεύς (Ps.-Plut. l.c.); there was a Drakontides Αντιοχίδης φύλης, epistates in 446-445 (*I.G. i<sup>2</sup> 39*=Tod, 42); Thorai was a deme of Antiochis (Andokides' deme was of Pandionis); and Δρακοντίδει Θοραιεῖ would fit the lacuna in *i<sup>2</sup> 295*. Combining these facts Stahl, *R.M.* xl, 1885, 439, proposed to restore Δρακοντίδει Θοραιεῖ on the stone and Δρακοντίδης Λεωγόρου in the text of Thucydides. After Andokides the orator became famous (the only son of Leogoras known in later times) the mistake would be an easy one, while there is no particular reason why Thucydides should make it. (When he *had* opportunity to mention the orator, in the Hermai affair of 415, he does not do so).<sup>2</sup> Whether the omission of Metagenes is due to the historian or to a copyist is another question, and one that cannot be answered; probability is on the side of the former.

<sup>1</sup> The scholiast says δὲ τῶν δέκα ρήγρων, ὡς φησιν Ἀκουσίλαος: but Akousilaos was a historian older than Thucydides and Andokides and a good deal older than the canon of Ten Orators. See *F. Gr. Hist.* 2 F. 45. We should read Πλούταρχος? (Diels suggested δὲ Καικλίος.)

<sup>2</sup> It may be added that Andokides himself never boasts of this command of his grandfather.

The problem has been unnecessarily complicated by the fact that Hellanikos is quoted by Ps.-Plutarch (l.c.) for the descent of Andokides from Hermes (by way of Telemachos and Nausikaa: Suid. s. Ἀνδοκίδης and Plut. *Alkib.* 21. 1—all in *F. Gr. Hist.* 4 F. 170). Ps.-Plutarch adds that this descent (from Nausikaa presumably) was the reason for his being sent on this occasion, μετὰ Γλαύκων, to Kerkyra (the detail, 'with Glaukon', is clearly due to Thucydides). Jacoby supposes that this statement about his being sent to Kerkyra is also from Hellanikos; which would confirm, he says, the fact that Andokides sailed with the squadron (only Andokides the grandfather) and therefore Thucydides' text. He was not strategos, and Thucydides does not mean that he was: he was "eine Art Zivilkommisar". So too Pearson, 222-3. But (1) Hellanikos mentioned Andokides, presumably in his *Attis*, in connexion with the mutilation of the Hermai (see Plut. *Alkib.*), and therefore meant the orator, not his grandfather; yet he, a contemporary, cannot have made the mistake of supposing that the orator went to Kerkyra in 433. The Ps.-Plutarchian *Vita* is indeed "verwirrt oder interpoliert"; but the natural conclusion from this is that we cannot trust it as evidence for what Hellanikos said—he probably did not mention the Kerkyra campaign at all in connexion with Andokides (the *Vitae decem Oratorum* are very poor patchwork throughout). (2) Thucydides' ὅν ἥρχε Γλαύκων τε . . . καὶ Ἀνδοκίδης can only mean that both were strategoi (or, if ἥρχε might, in certain circumstances, though hardly here, mean another office, at least both held the same one). For the singular verb, cf. 29. 2, 45. 2, 47. 1 *et passim*; and for ἀρχειν = στρατηγεῖν, 47. 1, 48. 3, 57. 6, ii. 80. 4, etc. If we like to suppose that the elder Andokides did go with the fleet in some ambassadorial capacity, we may; but it will not excuse Thucydides' text, but only suggest (unnecessarily) another cause for the error, if it is a textual error and not Thucydides' own. It is clear that Stahl's solution of the problem is much the more probable.

Glaukon had been strategos at Samos in 441-440 and 439-438 (below, p. 352); he was connected by marriage with the families of Kallias, Perikles, and Andokides (see *P.A.* No. 828). His father Leagros was killed at Drabeskos in 465 (Hdt. ix. 75). Both father and son (who belonged to the Potters' deme) had been in their youth favourites with the potters, the former in the last years of the sixth century, the latter from 480 to 470 B.C. (Langlotz, *Zur Zeitbestimmung d. strengrofigurigen Vasenmalerei* (1920), pp. 48-54, 82, 117.) Leagros had dedicated an altar to the Twelve Gods: *Hesp.* iv, 1935, 356, v. 358-9, viii. 160-64.

Metagenes (the restoration is not certain, but highly probable): nothing more is known of him, but a little of his descendants. See *P.A.* 4804-5.

Drakontides was very likely the man who later joined in the attack on Perikles in 430 (Plut. *Per.* 32. 2). He was not the Drakontides who became one of the Thirty Tyrants; he was Ἀφιδναῖος, a demotic that does not fit the lacuna in the inscription.

**52. 1.** ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς Συβότοις λιμένα: a curious phrase (even with the addition of ἐν φὶ οἱ Κορ. ὥρμον) if it is meant to describe the harbour on the mainland called Sybota (50. 3) as contrasted with the harbour on the Sybota Islands. It may well be the latter, the Corinthians anchoring there for the night: see below, p. 195. On the other hand, ἀραντες ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς suggests a land encampment, viz. that on the mainland.

**2.** αἰχμαλώτων, κ.τ.λ.: not only must prisoners be guarded, but they would add to the burden of the rowers; the ships would be slower and would have fewer effective soldiers on board.

**53. 1.** ἀνεύ κηρυκείου: because the carrying of a 'flag of truce' (so to speak) would be a confession that the peace between Athens and Corinth had already been broken. Croiset quotes Dem. li. 13 in illustration. The κηρυκείου was a ξύλον ὅρθιον ἔχον ἑκατέρωθεν δύο ὅφεις περιπεπλεγμένους καὶ ἀντιπροσώπους πρὸς ἄλλήλους κευμένους (schol.), used only for messengers of parties at war with each other. Cf. 146.

**3.** δόσον ἐπήκουσεν: did the Corinthian speak through a megaphone? This story is also from an Athenian source; not necessarily untrue therefore, but Thucydides clearly did not care for the Kerkyraian allies. See his account of them in bk. iii.

**4.** The Athenian conduct is still, towards Corinth, perfectly 'correct'; cf. 44. 1 n. The Corinthians, anchored in a χωρίον ἐρήμον, would have been in a desperate position if the Athenians had decided to join in blockading them. But this they will not do, for it would have meant definitely taking the offensive against Corinth.

**54. 1.** τά τε ναυάγια καὶ νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο: normally a sign of victory, that they did not have to obtain them under a flag of truce (cf. 63. 3). The Kerkyraians therefore set up a trophy; but they had not been able to collect their dead the day before, immediately after the battle.

**2.** ναῦς τε καταδύσαντες περὶ ἐβδομήκοντα: see 50. 1 n. for the meaning of καταδύσαι. They had not got possession of all of these hulls, only very many of them (*ναυάγια πλεῖστα*), the evening before. The Kerkyraians recovered the rest the next day (§ 1). The scholiast suggests a distinction between καταδύσαντες (=τρώσαντες) and διαφθείραντες below (*ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἔτρωσαν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα ἔφθειραν*

ἀντάς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ μόνον κατέδυσαν, wrongly joining μάλιστα with διαφθείραντες); this is very improbable, but perhaps arises from an attempt to get over the difficulty of the numbers given here.

For, taken by themselves, these numbers suggest that Corinth had 120 vessels left (150 minus 30), Kerkyra at most 60 (110 minus 70, plus c. 10 old ships—50. 4 n.—plus the 10 Athenian which could be counted on to resist a second Corinthian attack, 50. 4; and that is assuming that the 20 ships of the left wing had by now rejoined the main fleet: see 50. 3 n.); this would be an overwhelming advantage. It may be that in covering their allies' retreat the Athenian squadron had already shown itself as formidable as it proved to be later in the Corinthian Gulf and off Kerkyra (ii. 84 and iii. 78); but Thucydides does not say so. It may be, as the scholiast perhaps intends, that of all the disabled ships some were so badly damaged as to be out of action for a long time, with a corresponding loss of life to the crews, others only temporarily disabled; the victorious side would be able to capture those of the latter belonging to the enemy (or most of them), and save those on their own side, but would not be able to use these last in a second attack on the same day. That is to say, besides the 30 Corinthian ships "destroyed", there were others sufficiently damaged to be out of action for some time (52. 2); to which may be added those ships of the right wing which had been scattered and driven ashore, or some of them; so that for the second attack the Corinthians would have not more than 80–90 ships. But there seems to be no reason why Thucydides should not have made this clear; and therefore the figure 70 remains suspect.

Beloch, ii. 2. 222–8, rejects wholesale nearly all Thucydides' figures in the account of the battle of Sybota. His arguments are as follows. (1) The numbers on the Corinthian side, 150 in all, must be exaggerated, for on no other occasion during the Archidamian war did the whole Peloponnesian fleet muster more than 77 (ii. 86. 4); the figure is quite artificial ("künstlich zurechtgemacht"), double the number at Leukimme (29. 1), as their losses at Sybota are double those at Leukimme (29. 5 and 54. 2), and the Corinthians' own contingent, 90 vessels, is just three times the earlier one (27. 2 and 46. 1). Leukas sends 10 ships on both occasions, Amprakia first 8 then 27, and this last effort is inexplicable. Besides, the right wing of the Corinthian fleet, if consisting of 39 ships (27 Amprakian, 12 Megarian: 46. 1, 48. 4), could not have been driven out of action by 20 ships of the enemy (49. 5).

(2) The Kerkyraian numbers are equally exaggerated, 120 in 435 (25. 4, 29. 4), 110 at Sybota (47. 1). Herodotus gives their fleet in 480 ('and, as usual, he is transferring the conditions of his own day to the time of the Persian war') as 60 (vii. 168. 2); and 60 is the number they man in 427 when they are threatened by Alkidas (Thuc. iii. 77. 1).

(3) We can correct these figures for Kerkyra from Thucydides himself. The three divisions of the fleet must have been about equal (48. 3: see n. there), and the left wing was only 20 ships strong (49. 5). So the whole number was 60, plus the 10 Athenian.

(4) Especially exaggerated are the losses on each side, 70 and 30. This would leave only 40 Kerkyraian and 10 Athenian to face 120 Corinthian vessels in the evening of the battle (50. 4); and as the Kerkyraian left wing had practically no loss, the 70 disabled must have belonged to the centre and right, i.e. 70 out of 90, and this means almost total destruction.

(5) It is implied that if the victorious 20 Kerkyraian ships had not pursued too far, they might have turned the tide of battle (49. 6); therefore on the Corinthian side there cannot have been more than about 80 (since Kerkyra had only 60). This is near the strength which Thucydides gives for their fleet at Leukimme (29. 1); but that fleet cannot have been as large as this, for the Kerkyraian fleet of about 40 ships (their total of 60 less one-third at Epidamnos, 29. 4) wins a decisive victory. So the figures given for Leukimme (which are credible in themselves for the various contingents) must really be the figures for Sybota. This suits certain details of the battle: the Corinthian right wing consisted of only 16 ships (8 Megarian, 8 Amprakiot), so could be defeated by 20; the centre, described as consisting of *οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμαχοι ὡς ἔκαστοι* (48. 4: see note there), cannot be Eleans and Leukadians and one ship of Anaktorion only, but Epidaurians, Hermionians, Troizenians, and Paleans too. Moreover, the Kerkyraians had burnt the Elean arsenal (30. 2); therefore the Eleans had not in fact sent any ships, and the total allied force at Sybota will have been 68 ships (27. 2), 16 on the right wing, 22 in the centre, 30 Corinthian on the left wing. We can now understand how the Corinthian centre and left defeated the enemy centre and right (40 ships only, with the Athenians not taking the offensive), and yet the defeated Kerkyraians (with the loss of about 20 ships, and after the return of the victorious 20 of the left wing), with the more active help of the Athenians, could be ready to face another battle; and why the Corinthians declined battle on the appearance of the second Athenian squadron.<sup>1</sup>

"Wir haben Thukydides' Zahlen nach Thukydides' eigener Darstellung korrigieren können." Yet Beloch's corrections are wrong; many of his errors are pointed by Ferrabino, 'Armate greche nel v secolo', *Riv. Fil.* iii, 1925, 340-51. It will be observed that much of his argument turns on the belief that Thucydides gives

<sup>1</sup> Beloch also thinks that 10 is a quite derisory number for the Athenian squadron, if the Corinthian armada was 150. But it is clear that the number was raised to 30 as soon as it was learnt at Athens how large the Corinthian fleet was to be.

20 ships as the strength of the Kerkyraian left wing. But he does not say that. He says that their left wing routed the Corinthian right and that 20 of their ships, not the whole left wing, continued the pursuit, driving the enemy ships *σποράδας* on to the mainland shore, and then going on to burn the camp. The fight was a confused one (49. 4), and we can naturally assume that most of the 30 ships 'sunk' on the Corinthian side were disabled in this part of the fight, and that some of them belonged to the centre as well; assume, say, 20 ships disabled (and many others damaged enough to lower their effective speed) and 20 dispersed, then, if the 20 victorious Kerkyraian ships had at once returned to the battle, the numbers would have been nearly equal and the issue doubtful (49. 6). Clearly, from Thucydides' own words, the Kerkyraian left wing could have consisted of 40 or even 45 ships, and there is nothing contradictory in the narrative of the battle, as far as these numbers are concerned.

So much for the correction from Thucydides' own description of the battle. Next consider whether he is to be corrected from other sources (including his own figures elsewhere). If we are to rely on Herodotus, we must take his narrative as he gives it; and there is no reason to suppose that Kerkyra, her mood in 480 being what he says it was, would have manned every available ship, or would have sent old ships on the long journey round the Peloponnese. Nor were conditions on that day in 427 when she manned 60 ships (iii. 77. 1) such that we may think that every vessel was sent to sea, even if we assume that the vessels lost and damaged at Sybota had been replaced. Lastly, for the comparison between the present Corinthian and the later Peloponnesian numbers, it would not be surprising if the Corinthians had learnt from Sybota that to fill old-fashioned, slow-going boats with large crews of rowers and hoplites was worse than useless against the Athenian fleet, and if in consequence most of their older ships had been scrapped; and with the war raging in so many quarters of the Greek world at once, a fleet of 77 ships in 429 was a large one for the Peloponnesians to collect—the Athenians did not often have a larger one at sea in any one place in the Archidamian war. Besides, a question of principle is involved (and this justifies discussing Beloch's arguments at length). When two figures are found to be inconsistent with one another, it is proper to reject one of them and attribute the mistake to the copyist or the author according to the degree of sense or nonsense which we allow the latter. But Beloch does not do this. He assumes, first that Thucydides, after diligent inquiry, got correct figures ("durchaus glaubwürdig") for the Corinthian and allied contingents, but attributed them mistakenly to the first instead of to the second campaign; secondly, that he got other figures which were obviously wrong, just made up by someone, as we can see (but he could not) both from what we

know (from *his* history) of the resources of the various states and from his own account of the battle. The first mistake is possible, though unlikely; the second is not, if we are to place any reliance on any of Thucydides' figures throughout the history, and on his elementary competence as a writer. Beloch accepts the figure 20 as what he supposes (wrongly) to be the Thucydidean figure for the Kerkyraian right wing; also 40 for the ships available to the Kerkyraians in the evening of the battle (47. 1 compared with 54. 2)—that is, he rejects the two figures 110 and 70, but accepts the difference between them. Yet he regards *Thucydides'* figures as "künstlich zurechtgemacht". Obviously, if his arguments against the figures for Leukimme and Sybota are sound, the only thing left for us is to say: 'we know nothing of the numbers engaged; and this being the case in this instance, we cannot rely on any figures in Thucydides, for he was capable of purely artificial combinations, of absurd exaggeration, and of quite inconsequent narrative'.

This is not to say that Thucydides' account of the campaign of Sybota is perfect and complete. As pointed out above, one figure, that of 70 for the Kerkyraian losses, is very doubtful (perhaps a MS. error); he apparently left out one of the Athenian strategoi of the second squadron; and there are two gaps: we are not told when the 20 victorious ships of the Kerkyraian left wing rejoined the main body, and the topographical description leaves much to be desired. There are many other cases in which his narrative is incomplete; but that is not to say that it is ever absurd.

I have noted the topographical problems as they have occurred in the text. I think a reasonable reconstruction of the battle is possible; but this leaves the obscurities in Thucydides' account. Two or three are particularly noticeable: the distance from Sybota to Cheimerion, covered by the Kerkyraian squadron in both directions apparently without trouble; the 'camp' on Sybota Island;<sup>1</sup> and 50. 3, ἐς τὴν γῆν—is this Sybota or Kerkyra itself by Leukimme? If Thucydides meant by it Sybota Island, he is guilty of a bad blunder; for the Kerkyraians will then have been driven on to the rocky south shore, where there is no landing and no safe anchorage. However, ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν in the next section must certainly mean Kerkyra itself; and that implies that the Kerkyraians had retreated towards Leukimme and were now prepared to dispute a landing, with the help of their land forces, so that ἔδιωξαν ἐς τὴν γῆν in all probability does mean 'had pursued them towards the coast of Kerkyra'. Besides, if they had been driven on the Sybota shore they should have been the first to see the approach of the second Athenian

<sup>1</sup> It is possible that Thucydides thought there was a camp on Sybota because the trophy was set up there.

squadron; the probability is that this was hidden from them by Asprókavo headland.

It may be supposed, therefore, that the Kerkyraian fleet on the night before the battle anchored (rather than encamped) in the bay between the two islands, and next morning sailed out round the north and west end of Mávron Oros, and met the Corinthians coming from Cheimerion somewhere south-west of that island. The latter had also arranged with their barbarian allies on land to fix an advanced base at 'Sybota on the main', that is, at Aríla anchorage or the next bay to the north of it. The Corinthians win the battle and drive the enemy westwards towards Leukimme; only on the left wing had the Kerkyraians been victorious and 20 of their ships had pursued the Corinthian right towards the camp, landed their crews, and burnt and plundered it. The time factor (more especially the time needed for these 20 ships to return to the main fleet now off Leukimme) makes it practically certain that this camp must be that at Aríla and not the base at Cheimerion. This is the principal error in Thucydides (who must mean Cheimerion, not only because the οἰκητοί and χρήματα would be there and not at the advanced base, but because he has not yet mentioned the latter). The cause of his error may be this: his description of Cheimerion is detailed and clear, except for one point—the distance between it and Thyamis R. (46. 4 n.); this he had misunderstood, supposing it to be much less than it is (supposing Cheimerion to be more to the north-west towards Sybota Island and 'opposite Kerkyra'), and therefore also misunderstood the informant who told him of the Kerkyraians who landed and plundered the camp.

Since the enemy had been driven back towards Kerkyra, the Corinthians may well have anchored on the night after the battle in the bay between the two islands of Sybota, where the Kerkyraians had been the previous night (δὲ ἐν τοῖς Συβότοις λιμήν, 52. 1 n.); it was sheltered and nearer Kerkyra than Aríla Bay. The Corinthians set up a trophy for their victory, but they must do it on the mainland, for they are no longer masters at sea; the Kerkyraians, setting up their trophy, do it on the islands, not at Leukimme, partly because the battle began near them, but mainly no doubt to emphasize the Corinthian retreat from the sea and their own return.

55. 1. Ἀνακτόριον: 40 stadia, according to Strabo, x. 2. 7, p. 451, from Aktion (to the SE.), which was also ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, within the territory of Anaktorion (29. 3). The mouth of the gulf extends from Préveza to Cape Panagía, about 10 km.; Panagía is north of Anaktorion. Strabo, x. 2. 8, p. 452, says it was founded by Corinth only, when the whole of the gulf and

Amprakia itself were settled; but this was done by Kypselos, that is, at a time when Corinth had established her ascendancy over Kerkyra, and Kerkyraians may well have joined in the settlement under his auspices. The Corinthians already controlled Aktion (29. 3, 30. 3), and Anaktorion had helped them with one ship (46. 1), showing the division of parties within the town which now led to the ἀπάτη and full Corinthian control. In 424 B.C. the Athenians captured it again, and settled Akarnanians there (iv. 49).

**δοῦλοι:** from the number of them, we must suppose that the majority of the rowers in the Kerkyraian fleet were slaves. This was contrary to Athenian practice, where all were free men (Arginousai is the first and almost the only occasion on which slaves served, and they were promised their freedom), and probably to Corinthian (cf. 31. 1) and Greek practice generally. In 427 we are not told that anyone but free men manned the Kerkyraian ships (iii. 77).

Where sea-fighting was more like land-fighting, and depended on the epibatai (49. 2-3), where the rowers had little to do but transport the fighters and be killed or captured, it was more likely that they should be slaves.

**ἔφύλασσον:** we are not told what Kerkyra did with their Corinthian prisoners (29. 5, 30. 1). They may have been already ransomed (so Classen); but it is not what one would expect, considering the preparations Corinth at once made to attack Kerkyra again.

**δήσαντες ἔφύλασσον καὶ ἐν θεραπείᾳ εἶχον πολλῆς:** a sentence which shows that we should be careful how we translate δήσαντες 'kept them in chains'.

**ὅπως αὐτοῖς τὴν Κέρκυραν ἀναχωρήσαντες προσποιήσειαν:** which they did, with a vengeance—iii. 70 ff.


**2. περιγίγνεται:** Kerkyra had in fact decisively won the campaign. Corinth had neither secured the freedom of Epidamnos nor reduced Kerkyra to obedience.

**καὶ αἱ νῆσες, κ.τ.λ.:** in accordance with the usual Greek practice, which in this case left Corinth free to sail against Kerkyra again next spring, if she wished, with a long start over the Athenians who must sail round the Peloponnese. The latter do not withdraw to Naupaktos only; for the crews must get home again.

#### Chronology of τὰ Κερκυραϊκά

The first Athenian squadron left Athens on or shortly after<sup>1</sup> the 13th day of the first prytany in the archonship of Apseudes, i.e., apparently, c. July 10, 433 B.C. (see 45. 1 n.; Meritt, *Ath. Cal.* 115); the second on the last day τῆς . . . . πρυτανείας. The six letters missing may be, theoretically, πρώτης, τρίτης, ἑκτης, δύδοης, or

<sup>1</sup> I.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 302<sub>63-5</sub> seems to show that it was possible that as many as 17 days might elapse between payment and sailing.



*ἐνάτης*. It is clear from Thucydides' narrative (46. 1 and 50. 5) that the three last, which would be February–May 432, are to be excluded (though we can hardly say, with Beloch, ii. 2. 217–18, that Thucydides must have mentioned the *winter* intervening between the dispatch of the two squadrons; for he omits the winter in any case, whether between the two squadrons or between *τὰ Κερκυραϊκά* and *τὰ Ποτειδαίκα*). As between *πρώτης* and *τρίτης* the former is to be preferred. The last day of the third prytany would be in the middle of October; as the battle of Sybota took place on the day on which this second squadron arrived off Kerkyra, it is to be placed at the end of August or the beginning of September if we read *πρώτης*, at the beginning of November, if we read *τρίτης*. This later date is not *impossible*; Thucydides says that the first Athenian squadron was arrived before the Corinthian fleet reached Cheimerion, not that it had just arrived (46. 1, 47. 1); the second squadron clearly sailed soon after the enemy fleet left Corinth (50. 5), but we do not know how long an interval there was between the sailing of the first Athenian squadron and that of the Corinthian fleet (46. 1, n.); nor therefore the interval between the sailing of the first and second Athenian squadron. But the earlier date is clearly the better: it is not probable that a large fleet such as the Corinthian would set sail for an important campaign as late as October; and had the battle been fought at the beginning of November, Thucydides ought at least to have noted the season. In addition, the ambassadors from Kerkyra seeking the alliance with Athens do not arrive there till the Corinthian preparations are, apparently, nearly complete (i. 31. 1–2: Beloch, ii. 2. 218). It will be observed below that the earlier date is also more suitable for the dating of Leukimme. Sybota, therefore, is to be dated end of August or early September 433; almost all modern scholars agree on this.

The preparations of the Corinthians had lasted two whole years since the battle of Leukimme, 31. 1 (see n. there). Since the Corinthian armada was finally ready about the same time as the first Athenian squadron or a little before (it had a shorter distance to go, but was slower, and had to collect contingents from Leukas, Amprakia, and Anaktorion), i.e. about mid-July 433, the battle of Leukimme took place in July 435 or thereabouts. This suits 30. 2–4 excellently: for the remainder of the summer after Leukimme, Kerkyra controls the whole of the Ionian Sea and raids Leukas and Elis; they remain in undisputed control until, early in the following summer (*περιόντι τῷ θέρετ*—see n. there), the Corinthians send a squadron to Cheimerion to defend their allies (to check raiding, that is, not to challenge finally the mastery of the Ionian Sea). *τὸ θέρος τοῦτο*, 30. 4, is thus the campaigning season of 434. There is really no difficulty here in Thucydides' chronology, though there is vagueness;

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for he does not tell us at what time of year (within the campaigning season) the events took place. We know that from the inscription (so Grundy, p. 403). Perhaps, therefore, he was not yet taking notes and waited for some time (busy with military duties as well as with writing) before he got details for the events of 435–433. See further 65. 2 n.

Diodorus' narrative of *τὰ Κερκυραϊκά*, xii. 30–3, that is, we presume, Ephoros' too, is only a réchauffé of Thucydides, with the exception of two trifling differences in numbers and many more words spent on the Corinthian preparations. For dates he gives the *στρατός* in Epidamnos, the intervention of Corinth and then of Kerkyra, and the first conference at Corinth to 439–438, Leukimme to 438–437, preparations to 437–436, and the alliance between Kerkyra and Athens and the battle of Sybota, 436–435. As we know that he is wrong for the date of Sybota, we need not worry about him (we need not, for instance, suppose that the *στρατός* at Epidamnos and the intervention of the other states occurred the year before Leukimme). As to why he went wrong, see 65. 2 n. (pp. 221–2), and Introd., pp. 52–3.

Thucydides does not mention that some time in the year 433–432 (after the first prytany), at the request of ambassadors from Rhegion and Leontinoi, and on the proposal of Kallias (perhaps the Kallias of 61. 1; but it was a common name), Athens renewed her alliances with those cities—alliances first made c. 446–440: *I.G. i. 2* 51–2 (Tod, 57–8). See pp. 171, 365–6. They had been perhaps ten-year treaties, made in 443, soon after the foundation of Thourioi; the stelai on which the older alliances had been engraved were preserved, and only the usual introductory formulae, which included the date, erased and new formulae engraved: not perhaps for economy's sake, but to show that it was a faithful renewal of older treaties. Thucydides was not ignorant of this alliance (iii. 86. 3). S. Accame, *Riv. Fil.* xiii, 1935, 73–5, would place the treaties yet earlier, 454–453, in connexion with the Egestan alliance, *I.G. i. 2* 19 (Tod, 31); and in the same year de Sanctis, *ibid.* 71–2, puts the Athenian expedition or embassy to the west under Diotimos (45. 2 n.). See 36. 2 n. (Cf. *Arch. Anz.* xlvi, 1931, 216–17, the epitaph on Silenos, one of the Rhegine envoys.)

Nor does Thucydides here say anything of an earlier Athenian expedition, under Phormion, to help Amphilochian Argos against Amprakia, and a consequent alliance between Athens and Akarnania (ii. 68. 6–9; cf. ii. 9. 4). Except that it falls within the active years of Phormion, this is for us dateless. Busolt, iii. 2. 763, thought it must be after the revolt of Samos, for Corinth would have resented

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Athenian action against Amprakia, yet was friendly in 440 (40. 5); and it clearly was not during the years 435–433, nor, one would suppose, early in 432 (Phormion was in Chalkidike in 432–431). He suggested 437, and is followed by Steup and by Adcock (*C.A.H. v.* 475).<sup>1</sup> But a date earlier than 440 is clearly not excluded; we can equally well argue that such an expedition in 437 would have called forth an earlier protest from Corinth than that of 433. Thucydides' omission to mention it in his summary of the Pentekontaëtia is no argument for a date after 439 (see below, pp. 361–3, 389–92).

*Tὰ Ποτειδαῖτικά (56–65)*

Diodorus, xii. 34, 37 (435–434, 432–431).

**56. 1. μετὰ ταῦτα δ' εὐθύς:** for the chronology of cc. 56–65 see pp. 222–4. *Εὐθύς*, apparently precise, is used more than once in the Pentekontaëtia (93. 8, 102. 4, 111. 3, 115. 5); cf. also 93. 4 and 146. 1. It may mean no more than the next possible event—that is, if the last event mentioned occurred in the autumn (in this case, the battle of Sybota or perhaps the return of the Athenian squadron from Kerkyra, probably in October 433), the next possible military expedition, normally, will be in the following spring. There would be no avoidable delay; so *μετὰ ταῦτα εὐθύς* is a possible expression, even though some months elapse. Cf. vii. 15. 2, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς καὶ μὴ ἐσ ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε: Nikias' dispatch for urgent reinforcements was sent before the 'summer' was out and arrived early in the 'winter' (i.e. c. November: vii. 8. 1, 9–10).<sup>2</sup>

**2. Ποτειδαῖτας, οἱ οἰκουμενικοί ἐπὶ τῷ ἰσθμῷ τῆς Παλλήνης:** see map, p. 221. The town was a little to the south of the narrowest part of the isthmus (62. 1). The isthmus is here 1,200 m. wide; through it a canal has been dug in recent years. In digging it remains of walls were found, apparently classical towards the east end of the canal but of poor construction, farther west medieval but made of large squared blocks of the classical period re-used. There is also a section of a classical wall of squared stone in the canal which is just visible at low tide. (The normal tide here is 30 cm.) Further small and rather indeterminate remains of a wall have been found under a

<sup>1</sup> Wade-Gery, however, *J.H.S.* lii, 1932, 216, n. 45, would put it in the spring of 432, Thucydides' narrative of events in the west after Sybota being by no means complete.

<sup>2</sup> It may be observed too that if, by reading ὁγδόης or ἑνάτης on the Kerkyra inscription (above, pp. 196–7), we placed Sybota early in 432, *εὐθύς* here will have its full force, 'immediately after', i.e. the same spring; for that will be the next possible opportunity. So that the date for the revolt of Poteidaia would not be greatly affected.

Frankish wall south of the canal, which bordered a moat. Nothing is visible in the poor modern village on the site of Poteidaia; the ancient city-walls were doubtless of sun-dried bricks.

**οἰκοῦσιν:** 'evidently written before the winter of 430–429, when the inhabitants were expelled and Athenian settlers took their place (ii. 70. 3–4); otherwise Thucydides must either have used the imperfect or have spoken of the position of the town instead of its inhabitants'—Steup, ad loc. and *Thuk. Stud.* ii. 35. Probably; but see Appendix to vol. iii.

Poteidaia was the only Dorian colony in the Chalkidic peninsula; but it seems to have been friendly with its neighbours.

**τὸ εἰς Παλλήνην τεῖχος καθελεῖν:** the Athenians, by their command of the sea, could be reasonably certain of controlling the peninsula, and from that side now demand free entrance into Poteidaia. The northern wall, towards Chalkidike, they and Poteidaia (so long as it remained faithful to the Athenian alliance) needed as defence against possible enemies by land. Cf. Introd., p. 18; Wade-Gery, in *Ath. Stud.* 141. 1. There will be further occasion to discuss the general attitude of Athens towards walled cities in the empire in vols. ii and iii.

**ἐπιδημουργός:** δημιουργός (a word of most varied meaning) was a not uncommon title of magistrates in Greece: see v. 47. 9 (Mantineia); L. and S. s.v.; Busolt-Swoboda, pp. 505–8.

The compound form is rarer (L. and S. s.v. and ἐπιδημιοργός), implying perhaps "une sorte de surveillance ou d'inspection supérieure" (Croiset). What the powers or influence of this Corinthian official were before and after Poteidaia joined the Delian Confederacy, we do not know; but his existence supports the Corinthian claim that their ties with their colonies were particularly close (38. 2–3).

**ὑπό τε Περδίκκου:** his action is explained in the next chapter, an unevenness of writing which Steup thinks occurred because this chapter was written after 57–65 to serve as a link with τὰ Κερκυραϊκά. But cf. 26. 3–4 nn., 132. 1–3; Thucydides often gets his order involved.

**τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης:** the regular name for the Greek settlements from the Thermaic Gulf to the Hebros R., who formed one of four sections of the Delian Confederacy (east of that came the Hellespontine region). Cf. ii. 9. 4.

**57. 2. Περδίκκας ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου: Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Φιλέλληνος καλούμενου, ὃς ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἥκμαζεν**—schol. (Hdt. v. 17 ff., vii. 173–4, viii. 34, 121, 136 ff., ix. 44 ff.).

A very brief résumé of the expansion of Macedonia under Perdikkas' predecessors is given in ii. 99. Alexandros and Perdikkas II are the first kings a little of whose history and personality is known.

The former is given a reign of 43 or 44 years; but there was a remarkable divergence of opinion in antiquity as to the number of years Perdikkas reigned: Athenaios, a collector of rarities, quotes six different authorities (v. 217 D–E), Nikomedes of Akanthos for a reign of 41 years, Theopompos 35, Anaximenes 40,<sup>1</sup> Hieronymos 28, Marsyas and Philochoros 23; and the later chronologies vary between 28 and 23. As at least three of these were learned men, and of the others Nikomedes and Marsyas (probably: see *F. Gr. Hist.* 135) were local historians, this looks like genuine historical controversy; and if so, the conflicting dates are almost certainly due to political quarrels between Perdikkas and other claimants to the throne—as in the case of the Macedonian kings of the first half of the fourth century, historians differed as to what years should be attributed to the various names when there was more than one claimant.<sup>2</sup> All that we know is that Perdikkas was on the throne for some years before 432 (this passage) and that he was still reigning in 414 (vii. 9); his son Archelaos was reigning in 410 (Diod. xiii. 49. 1). His predecessors had greatly expanded the kingdom; he helped to consolidate it and strengthened the central power; Archelaos organized and equipped it (ii. 100. 2).

See Beloch, iii. 2. 49–72; Geyer, 'Makedonia' in *R.E.* and 'Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II' (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, Beiheft 19, 1930); Papastavru, *Αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῆς βασιλείας Περδίκκου τοῦ Β'* (Athens, 1939).

**ἐπεπολέμωτο:** 'was at war', whereas the Corinthians were only φανερῶς διάφοροι, not yet at war; cf. ii. 2. 3, οἱ Θηβαῖοι . . . ἔβούλοντο τὴν Πλάταιαν αἱεὶ σφίσι διάφορον οὐσαν ἔτι ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ τοῦ πολέμου μήπω φανεροῦ καθεστῶτος προκαταλαβεῖν, and v. 29. 1, vi. 88. 1 (Steup, *Thuk. Stud.* ii. 14).

**ἕνυμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὄν:** he chopped and changed all his life, as far as we can see to no very good purpose, except that he kept his kingdom intact and his own throne. Hermippus, *Phormophoroi* (perhaps produced in 427 B.C.), fr. 63. 8, includes in a list of good things coming to Athens from all quarters of the Mediterranean

καὶ παρὰ Περδίκκου ψεύδη ναυσὸν πάνυ πολλαῖς,  
i.e. instead of timber.

<sup>1</sup> Beloch, iii. 2. 53, suggests this should be 30, as the numbers seem to go in descending order. But the list also may be in the chronological order of writers, as elsewhere in Athenaios.

<sup>2</sup> This view is rejected by Beloch and Geyer, who accept the eight kings from Perdikkas I to Perdikkas II because everybody in antiquity (including Herodotos, viii. 139 and Thucydides, ii. 100. 2) said the same thing, and attribute the doubts about Perdikkas to ignorance. It is quite likely that we ought to reverse the argument in a matter of which there was little knowledge—we should doubt the eight kings because this is merely a case of everyone following his predecessor, and give more credence to the historical controversy.

Athens had respected Macedonian sovereignty or 'sphere of influence' in the cities of Greek foundation on the Gulf of Therme, at least in so far that none of them (Dion, Methone, Pydna, Therme) was a member of the Delian League (see below, 61. 2 n.); nor did her position in the Chalkidic peninsula mean that Macedonia was hemmed in. This position, and still more the foundation of Amphipolis, prevented the *expansion* of Macedonia, which is a different matter; and expansion was equally prevented by the successors of Athens in the peninsula and in Amphipolis, till the reign of Philip II. As far as we know, when the two countries were at peace, trade between Athens and Macedonia flourished, especially in timber, of supreme importance to the former for her navy. Alexandros I had generally been friendly, but had perhaps encouraged Thasos in her revolt from the League in 465 (Plut. *Kim.* 14. 3). Theopompos tells us that in 445 the inhabitants of Hestiaia in Euboea, driven out by the Athenians, were settled 'by arrangement' in Macedonia (F. 387); but whether the arrangement was a friendly one with Athens or with the exiles only and hostile to Athens, we are not told.

**3. Φιλίππων:** he had an *ἀρχή* in eastern Macedonia with the Axios as his western border (ii. 100. 3); but whether this was a principality (subject to the king) allotted him by his father Alexandros, or by his brother Perdikkas, or whether he had carved it for himself out of his brother's kingdom when disputing the throne, we have no means of knowing or good reason for guessing. Alketas was another brother whom Perdikkas deprived of his *ἀρχή* (Plat. *Gorg.* 471 A-B), but we know no more than that—nothing of the nature of the *ἀρχή*, nor of the date of the quarrel. Papastavru (see above, p. 201) maintains that Alexandros would have stultified his own centralizing policy if he had given principalities to younger sons; but Geyer objects that even so, he may have done; and since Alexandros left some subordinate kingships (ii. 99. 2) and the government of the enlarged territory must be divided in some way, he may have hoped (vain hope in the Argead house) that brothers would work in concert.

We have, perhaps, a fragment of the treaty between Athens and Philippos, *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 53; see Bauer, *Klio*, xv, 1918, 193-5, and a new restoration by Schweigert, *Hesperia*, viii, 1939, 170-1.<sup>1</sup> Here also Philippos' territory is mentioned, but in the conventional words of a treaty; if he was disputing the throne and Athens was supporting his claim, it means simply Macedonia or such part of it as he could occupy. It should be noted that his *ἀρχή* as given in ii. 100. 3 was not far from Amphipolis. On the other hand, it is a treaty of *ἐπιμαχία* only, in the restricted sense of 44. 1, and so did not necessarily involve an immediate war with Perdikkas (Papastavru, p. 9, n. 3).

<sup>1</sup> But *μηδὲ ἐπὶ Φιλίππου . . . μηδέ* should be *μήτ’ . . . μήτε*.

The date of the treaty, however, except that it is probably c. 440-430, is uncertain. The most interesting point in it is the promise of Athens not to permit or support privateering against Philippos or his allies.

**Δέρδας:** ὁ Δέρδας Ἀρριδαίου παῖς, ἀνεψιὸς Περδίκκα καὶ Φιλίππου—schol., one of the rare useful historical notes in the scholia. For the slight, but perhaps sufficient reason that there was a Derdas ruler of Elimia in 382 (Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 38) who may have been a grandson, scholars are agreed that this Derdas too was ruler in Elimia. This district was on the middle Haliakmon in 'Upper Macedonia', to which went one of the main routes northward from Thessaly via Oloosson (cf. below, 61. 3 n.); so τῶν Δέρδον ἀδελφῶν ἄνωθεν στρατιᾶ ἐσβεβληκότων (59. 2) is consistent with this view, though it makes Aristeus' unhindered passage into Chalkidike more difficult to understand. Elimia had a semi-independent kingship (ii. 99. 2); and Beloch therefore made the sensible suggestion (supported by the fact that Derdas is not a name found in the Argead house) that Derdas was a nephew of Alexandros I through his mother, not through his father.

**4. ἔπρασσεν:** 'was already negotiating' or 'now began negotiating'? See 57. 6 n., pp. 209-10.

**5. τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης Χαλκιδεῦσι:** Harrison was the first to make it clear that this does not mean the inhabitants of the Chalkidike peninsula, nor the cities founded by Chalkis in Euboea (or inhabited by τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος), but a state, with definite boundaries.<sup>1</sup> The extent of its territory, the nature of the state (whether *πόλις* or *Bundesstaat* or *Staatenbund*), and its early history have been disputed. There are many difficulties; but certain things are clear, enough perhaps for the understanding of Thucydides. (1) Herodotos, in the course of giving what is practically a geographical description on the occasion of the sailing of Xerxes' fleet from the canal on Akte to Therme, vii. 122-3, mentions Olynthos among the Greek cities at the head of the Gulf of Sithonia; and in the winter of 480-479, he tells us, Artabazos, fearing that *οἱ Ολύνθιοι* would join the Poteidaians in revolt, besieged the city, then held by the Bottiaioi who had been driven out from the Thermaic Gulf by the Macedonians (see below); he took it and παραδιδοῖ Κριτοβούλῳ Τορωναίῳ ἐπιτροπεύειν καὶ τῷ Χαλκιδικῷ γένει, καὶ οὕτω "Ολυνθον Χαλκιδέες ἔσχον (viii. 127). The phrase τῷ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος does not suggest an already existing *πόλις*, but either a loose federal group<sup>2</sup> or that inhabitants of various cities of Chalkidic origin, as e.g. Torone, were

<sup>1</sup> Harrison denied the connexion of these Χαλκιδεῦσι with Euboic Chalkis; but in this he has not been followed by later scholars.

<sup>2</sup> This is what we should naturally infer from vii. 185. 2: πεζοῦ δὲ τὸν Θράκης παρείχοντο καὶ Παίονες . . . καὶ Βοτταιοῖς καὶ τῷ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος καὶ Βρύγοι, κ.τ.λ.

invited to settle in Olynthos, to form a new state; on the other hand, as will be seen, "Ολυνθον Χαλκιδέες ἔσχον agrees excellently with the evidence of Thucydides. (2) On the tribute-lists, Olynthos and two other towns, Skable and Assera (see below, p. 205), form a single group in 454-453, but thereafter each pays separately till they all fail in 432-431. (Olynthos was assessed again in 425.) Of the other towns which joined in the revolt in 432 all had paid separately before that year, except that Mekyberna, Stolos, and Πολυχνῖται παρὰ Στᾶλον formed one group in 454-453. The title *Χαλκιδέες ἐπὶ Θράκης* does not appear on the tribute-lists. (3) Thucydides regularly uses *Χαλκιδέες* to describe the state in whose territory the town of Olynthos lay, as here, 58. 1, iv. 124. 1 (*Χαλκιδέας καὶ Ἀκανθίους*, i.e. *Χαλκιδέες* is a state like Akanthos), and especially ii. 79. 2-7 (messages are sent to Olynthos for help, which is sent, and the Chalkidian hoplites and cavalry appear). Moreover, he implies by i. 58. 2 that the *Χαλκιδέες* occupied several towns besides Olynthos. He only twice uses 'Ολύνθιοι for the state,<sup>1</sup> and once implies it (*ἡρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Λυσιστράτος Ολύνθιος*, iv. 110. 2). (4) In the document of the Treaty of Nikias, quoted by Thucydides, we have "Ολυνθος" and 'Ολύνθιοι, not *Χαλκιδέες* (v. 18. 5-6).

Compare with this the practice of the fourth century: then official documents all used *Χαλκιδέες*, not 'Ολύνθιοι (e.g. I.G. ii.<sup>2</sup> 36;<sup>2</sup> Syll.<sup>3</sup> 135); Xenophon, Diodoros (Ephoros), and the orators almost invariably 'Ολύνθιοι, although Olynthos was then but the centre of a much larger federation.<sup>3</sup> From this the conclusion seems to be clear that *Χαλκιδέες* was the official name of the state, 'Ολύνθιοι the more popular (avoided by Thucydides, adopted by most writers in the fourth century: we may compare 'U.S.S.R.' and 'Russia'), and that Athens, in the fifth century, refused to recognize the official name;<sup>4</sup> and, since Herodotos uses *Χαλκιδέες* in the same way

<sup>1</sup> v. 3. 4, where ὁντον 'Ολυνθίων must, I think, mean the state, and 39. 1; but there may be a special reason for this: Olynthos was, by the Treaty of Nikias, to be separated from Mekyberna, Singos, and Stolos (v. 18. 5-6), and a change of name to one less comprehensive is not only natural, but accurate, especially in v. 39. 1, the recapture of Mekyberna by Olynthos. Or it may be only a concession by Thucydides to popular nomenclature, as in writers of the 4th century.

<sup>2</sup> In this, an alliance between Athens and the Chalkideis, probably 384-383 or 383-382, we have *Χαλκιδέων τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης τοῖς εἰσαγόμενοις*, a restriction not known elsewhere. Is it an Athenian precaution (if the alliance belongs to this occasion) to avoid hurting the susceptibilities of Akanthos and Apollonia (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 15, 16)?

<sup>3</sup> The more learned Theopompos often used *Χαλκιδέες*. Kahrstedt, p. 424, n. 42 (see below, p. 208), compares the frequent use by the orators of Θηβαῖοι for *Βοιωτοί*, the official name of the state.

<sup>4</sup> Kahrstedt, pp. 424, 431, for whom Thuc. v. 18 is so far from being an accurate transcription of the Treaty of 421 that it is "hardly more than a superficial excerpt of our author", thinks that 'Ολύνθιοι here is no exception to the universal use of *Χαλκιδέες* in official documents, because what we have is a translation

as Thucydides, that this refusal belongs to the period before 432 (the tribute-lists) as well as after (in the Treaty of Nikias). So far all modern scholars would agree, in general. But some, as West and Kahrstedt, put the union of the various Chalkidic states ('the formation of the Chalcidic League' in West's phrase, of the *πόλεις* of the *Χαλκιδέες*, as Robinson puts it, more accurately) in 432, others in 420 (Gaebl, basing his arguments on the coinage), or even c. 400-390 (Gude). The evidence is not decisive: on the one hand, we seem to have the relics of an old union in the grouping of Olynthos, Skable, and Assera and of Mekyberna and Stolos on the tribute-lists of 454-453; the disappearance of these groups may well be the last step in *ἀπόταξις* of what had been one state; and Thuc. i. 58. 2 would then describe what was politically a reversion to an older condition. On the other hand, Thucydides does not say it was a reversion; and perhaps the natural interpretation of his words is that it was a new movement.<sup>1</sup> If so, it is proper to date the new, or the greatly enlarged, state from this time. The evidence of the coins is, however, confusing. About this time there was a change in many mints of the Chalkidic peninsula, including that of Olynthos, from the Attic standard to the 'Phoenician',<sup>2</sup> which was in use in Macedonia; and many (including West) have connected this change with the revolts from Athens between 432 and 422. Now there is an old coin of the Olynthos mint with the legend ΧΑΛΚ, another with ΟΛΥΝ, both of the Attic standard; these can be easily explained—the former corresponds to Herodotus' evidence, the latter will belong to the period of Athenian pressure, when Olynthos was isolated; but there are also coins of the Phoenician standard with ΟΛΥΝΘΙ. These Gaebl puts in the period 431-420, and so the formation of the 'League' in the latter year; but this is inconsistent not only with Thucydides' general usage of *Χαλκιδέες*, but with his statement that some sort of union was brought about in 432; while the Treaty of Nikias allows for the break-up of the

into literary language. Why Thucydides should translate *Χαλκιδέες* by 'Ολύνθιοι in order to seem literary, when elsewhere he nearly always writes *Χαλκιδέες*, Kahrstedt does not explain.

We must remember that this is a treaty between Athens and Sparta, not Athens and the Chalkidians: the Athenians could use their own name for the state.

<sup>1</sup> Hampel, pp. 186-7 (see below, p. 208), maintains that it was not a *political* movement at all, but a change of dwelling only, a war-measure like the removal of the Athenians within the Long Walls. This is impossible, for two reasons: would Thucydides have said *τὰς πόλεις ἐκλιπόντας . . . μίαν πόλιν ποιήσασθαι* of such a removal? and secondly, we know that Athens had treated all these towns as separate units, and that therefore, when the inhabitants moved, some sort of synoecism did take place.

<sup>2</sup> 'Phoenician' is the wrong term, apparently; but numismatists are not agreed on a correct one (Robinson, pp. 209-10).

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union.<sup>1</sup> Since the dating of coins is notoriously difficult, I am inclined myself to put the change in the standard before 432 (tolerated by Athens for reasons now unknown), and the 'Olynthian' coins of the 'Phoenician' standard therefore to the 10 or 15 years before the revolt.<sup>2</sup> These currencies are anyhow proof that Athens' policy of common coinage for the whole empire, which was decided c. 450 B.C. (below, pp. 383-4), was not everywhere enforced.

There is no proper evidence to show what kind of state of *Χαλκιδεῖς* were. It is usually assumed that it was a federation of some kind, of several *πόλεις* with Olynthos as their centre. There is no proof of this before the fourth century, when in the eighties the Chalkidians enlarged their state by *sympoliteia* with neighbours; this does not indicate that the original state was federal, and Hampl thinks it was a *πόλις* of the ordinary unified type. Thucydides' words in i. 58. 2, given their full political meaning, do not imply a federation—far from it: a *synoikismos*, and still more an *anoikismos*, may result in the closest union, as in Attica. The only argument for some kind

<sup>1</sup> I think, with Kahrstedt, p. 432, that the clause *Μηκυβερναούς δὲ καὶ . . . Σιγγαίους οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἔαντάν, καθάπερ Ολύνθιοι*, is directed against Olynthos, guaranteeing the autonomy of Mekyberna (then held by an Athenian garrison) and Singos against a centralizing policy.

<sup>2</sup> It is also possible, though hardly (on our present evidence) likely, that Olynthos was the official name of the state for the short period after 421, when the state was, at least in part, broken up (cf. above, p. 204, n. 4). This is Robinson's view, and he would place the 'Olynthian' coins in this period, and explain the use of 'Ολύνθιοι' by Thucydides and in the Peace of Nikias accordingly (pp. 148-52).

Robinson gives what is now the fullest and best reasoned account of the Chalkidic coinage. The only reason why I do not unhesitatingly adopt all his dates, is that he thinks that the literary and inscriptional evidence make it certain that the Chalkidian state did not exist before 432; for me that evidence is very doubtful.

Besides these changes in the coinage, there is also evidence of an *alliance* (not a federation) in the type of a few coins (of small value, tetrobols, obols, and copper coins) of the Chalkidians, Bottiaioi, Akanthos, and Arnai (on the 'Phoenician' standard): obverse, head of Apollo laureate, reverse a cithara, and the name of the state. These have been connected by West (*History*, pp. 22-5) with the alliance between the first two of these states in 432 and with the revolt of Akanthos from Athens in 424 (also, though wrongly, with the formation of a federal state of the Chalkidians). This is probable enough, as we know of other alliances thus symbolized by coinages with a common type. (The coin of Arnai is, however, doubtful; and that of the Bottiaioi apparently of the 4th century: Robinson, 124-5. Arnai is a little known place; it was never in the Delian League, and was friendly to Brasidas in 424, Thuc. iv. 103. 1. It is there described as *τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς*, and it was a day's march for an army from the east end of Lake Bolbe. It must have been in the NE. of the peninsula, on the southern slopes of the mountains which divide it from Mygdonia and Lake Bolbe, and presumably west of Stageira (not near the coast, or it would have been in the Delian League). So Thucydides in calling it *τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς* is using the latter in its geographical, not its political, sense; which is what we should expect if this alliance-coinage belongs to Arnai—for the alliance of course is between independent states.)

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of federal state, at least in the beginning, is really the name *Χαλκιδεῖς* instead of 'Ολύνθιοι; in single-unit states, as *Ἀθηναῖοι, Θηβαῖοι*, the city gives the name to the state; where we have names such as *Ἄχαιοι* or *Βοιωτοί*, the states are federal.<sup>1</sup> The Athenian avoidance of the name *Χαλκιδεῖς* points in the same direction.

The story of the Bottiaioi is, in simple form, much the same as that of the Chalkidians, with one exception. We have again the name of a people as the official name of the state, used also by Thucydides (see again ii. 79), but ignored by Athens; in the Treaty of 421 and the tribute-lists Spartolos takes its place, as Olynthos that of the Chalkidians,<sup>2</sup> and other towns which we either know or can reasonably suppose to have been within the state (at least after 432), are listed separately. But in this case we have the valuable evidence of an inscription *I.G. i. 2 90* (Tod, 68), an alliance between Athens and some cities of the Bottiaioi c. 420:<sup>3</sup> from this we learn that a list of the cities of the Bottiaioi who entered this alliance was to be made, and copies of the treaty were to be posted in each of them, and that they had a common boule (and, probably, strategoi) and also (again, probably) local magistrates in each city. This is a true federal state, previously ignored or suppressed by Athens, now recognized for the purposes of an alliance. Unfortunately only three names of Bottic cities are preserved at the foot of the stele, all very obscure, one of which nowhere appears in the tribute-lists, and the other two once only, in 421-420;<sup>4</sup> we do not know whether Spartolos, the most important of all, was included. We cannot, therefore, say anything about the extent of the whole state, either before or after the revolt of 432, or of that part of it which joined Athens again c. 420. We know that it lay to the west of the Chalkidians, and that Spartolos was an inland city west or WNW. of Olynthos; but not how far it extended in a northerly direction towards Macedonia. See *A.T.L., Gazetteer*.

<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps worth noting Diodorus' *Περδίκκας . . . ἐπεισε τοὺς Χαλκιδεῖς ἀποστάντας Αθηναῖων τὰς μὲν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ πόλεις ἐκλιπεῖν, εἰς μίαν δὲ συνοικισθῆναι τὴν ὀνομαζομένην "Ολύνθον" (xii. 34. 2). This may support the view that the state was officially called Olynthos for a period after 432 and that the coins with ΟΛΥΝ belong to this time; but it is much more likely to be from a mere rewriting of Thucydides by Ephorus with the use of the name Olynthos for the state that was common in the fourth century.*

<sup>2</sup> There is one odd exception to this on the list of 446-445, where instead of Spartoloi we have *Bottiaioi καὶ συντελεῖς* (for the justification of this reading, see *A.T.L.*, p. 44). They are clearly identical—that is, we must not suppose that for one year Athens recognized a federal body which she ignored in other years—for the *Bottiaioi καὶ συντελεῖς* pay the same sum as the *Σπαρτάλοι* before and after 446-445.

<sup>3</sup> The date is disputed, whether before or after the Peace of Nikias. See below, vol. ii.

<sup>4</sup> *Τριποαι* seems to be wrongly restored in Tod, p. 161, l. 69: see *A.T.L.*, p. 158.

If we are to judge by the amounts paid in tribute to the Delian League these two states, Olynthos and Spartolos, were smaller than many others in the Chalkidic peninsula. Poteidaia paid 6 tal. up to 435–434, 15 tal. in 434–433 and 433–432 (see below, p. 211); Skione 6 tal. to 441–440, 15 tal. in 435–434 (4 tal. in 432–431); Mende, after varying between 5 and 15 tal., paid 6 tal. from 437 on; Aphytis 3 tal. to 446, 1 tal. to 439, 3 tal. again from 434: these four states on Pallene. Torone on Sithonia paid 6 tal. from 445; Aineia and Akanthos 3 tal. each. Olynthos, on the other hand, paid only 2 tal., and Spartolos the same till 433, when it paid a little over 3 tal. If we add to them the towns which revolted with them and therefore probably formed the new states of the Chalkidians and Bottiaioi, we have a further 4–6 tal. for the former, and 2½ tal. for the latter; Sermylia, which revolted later and under compulsion (65. 2), paid 3–5 tal. At their fullest extent the Chalkidians and Bottiaioi did not pay more than half what Poteidaia or Skione paid in 434. On the other hand, it may be wrong to estimate either their population or their wealth by this standard (as West, *History*, 153–67); the Chalkidians had an important cavalry force, at least in 429 (ii. 79. 3), and cavalry was normally a sign of wealth. There may have been other reasons for a comparatively light assessment.

See Harrison, *C.Q.* vi, 1912, 93–103, 165–78; West, *C.P.* ix, 1914, 24–34; *History of the Chalcidic League*, 1919 (Bull. Univ., Wisconsin); and *A.J.P.* lviii, 1937, 157–73; Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1502; Gaebler, *Zeitschr. f. Num.* xxxv, 1926, 193 ff.; Hampl, *Herm.* lxx, 1935, 177–96, and *R.M.* lxxxiv, 1935, 120–4; Kahrstedt, *A.J.P.* lvii, 1936, 416–44; Gude, *A History of Olynthus*, 1933 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies); Robinson, *Excavations at Olynthus*, ix, ‘The Chalcidic Mint’, esp. pp. 112–52.

6. ἔτυχον γὰρ . . . ἀποστέλλοντες: ‘just at that time they had been in the act of sending’, or, ‘preparing to send’. For the meaning of *τυχεῖν* in such sentences, see esp. iv. 9. 1 n.

‘Ἀρχεστράτου τοῦ Λυκομήδους’: Archestratos was a fairly common name in Athens, and we cannot identify this one with any of the others known. He may be the one who moved a rider to the decree regulating relations with Chalkis in 446–445 (*I.G.* i.² 39 = Tod, 42, l. 70): see *P.A.* 2411.

ῶν . . . αἰσθόμενοι . . . ἐπιστέλλοντι τοῖς ἄρχουσι: Steup, ad loc. and *Thuk. Stud.* ii. 33 ff., maintains that this is a quite distinct and much later order than that to Poteidaia itself to the same effect, 56. 2; and that Thucydides means that the long negotiations of 58. 1 intervened. We may admit that in fact some time elapsed between the ultimatum to Poteidaia and the orders given to Archestratos; but the logic of the two chapters 56 and 57 demands their practical identity, for 57. 2–6 is the explanation in detail of the

short statement in 56. 2–57. 1: ‘Athens sent an ultimatum to Poteidaia for fear she would revolt under pressure from Perdikkas and Corinth. She was already at war with Perdikkas, and he was intriguing in Corinth and the Peloponnese, and in Chalkidike. For all of which reasons, she gave an order to Archestratos, under whom an expedition was already preparing against Perdikkas, to see that the terms of the ultimatum to Poteidaia were carried out.’ Thucydides, that is, is not indicating any lapse of time beyond what must occur between the first preparations for an expedition and their completion.

There are many instances in Thucydides in which he does not write in strict chronological order, making a statement and then going back in time to give an explanation. The clearest cases in this book are perhaps 128. 3–131. 1, and 132. 2–3.

**μετ’ ἄλλων δέκα στρατηγούντος:** all editors but Steup reject the number, and most substitute for it Krüger’s *τεσσάρων* (Stahl, Hude; and it alone recorded by Stuart Jones). If Thucydides means ‘to other strategoi’ in the technical sense, it obviously cannot be right, for there were only ten strategoi in all. *τεσσάρων* is perhaps the easiest correction palaeographically ( $\bar{\delta}$  = *τέσσαρες* being mistaken for  $\bar{\delta}$  = *δέκα*, though we should remember that  $\bar{\delta}$  = *δέκα* is the older form and more likely to have been used by Thucydides himself and the early copyists). If it is correct, then (1) the six strategoi who had been sent to Kerkyra were already back in Athens, and some of them were sent with Archestratos; and this implies either that *εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίᾳν* may mean ‘as early as possible in the following spring’ (56. 1 n.), or that the strategoi were not appointed till shortly before the expedition sailed (which was in fact in the spring, at the earliest, following the battle of Sybota). Or again, some of the strategoi sent to Kerkyra may have been dismissed, though, as we do not hear of any such action<sup>1</sup> and do not know of any reason for it, we should not assume it. And (2), either Kallias and his four colleagues (61. 1) belong to the next year, 432–431 (for each group, by Krüger’s emendation here, consists of five strategoi, and Perikles was not one of them); or Kallias, in taking over the command from Archestratos, included in his four colleagues some of the five strategoi who went with the first expedition. The date of the battle of Poteidaia (62–3) is one of the most disputed and disputable in the history of the fifth century (see below, pp. 222–4, 420–5); the above arguments on the strategoi show that neither 57. 6 nor 61. 1 can be used to support a date in 432–431 rather than 433–432.

Moreover, I feel that, since we must emend, *μετ’ ἄλλων δυοῦν* is the more probable reading (so Busolt, iii. 795, after K. F. Hermann;

<sup>1</sup> We should probably have known through Plutarch if Lakedaimonios had been dismissed.

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Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* liii, p. 135); for probably Kallias did have all the strategoi in his command, as he had all the troops.

**58. 1. πέμψαντες:** 'had sent' or 'now sent'? The former, if the connexion is with the (implied) start of Archestratos' expedition in 57. 6, the latter if the reference goes back to 56. 2–57. 1, as it may. If we bracket ἐπρασσον just below (see next n.), 'had sent' is certainly the meaning: 'the Poteidaians, who had sent missions both to Athens and Sparta, now that they had got no satisfaction from Athens, revolted.'

**πέμψαντες μὲν καὶ . . . ἐλθόγτες δὲ καὶ:** the form of expression indicates that the two missions were simultaneous, not that the one to Sparta was consequent on the failure of the one to Athens (so Shilleto). **ἐπρασσον:** bracketed by Poppe and subsequent editors. But there is something to be said for keeping it and inserting δὲ after ἐπειδὴ (or, ἐπεὶ δὲ δῆ), in order to make it clear that the clause ἐπειδὴ . . . ἐπλεον is dependent only on τότε δῆ, κ.τ.λ., not on ὅπως ἔτοιμασσαντο τυμωρίαν, ἦν δέη. Omissions from MSS. are of course commoner than insertions.

**καὶ τὰ τέλη τῶν<sup>1</sup> Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπέσχετο αὐτοῖς:** a promise that was not carried out, and evidently one that was independent of any decision of the Peloponnesian League; probably a promise not published to the world, or Athens would have complained more explicitly (cf. 66). Also, one not made with the consent of Archidamos. It is a pity we do not hear more of the internal politics at Sparta just at this time. Cf. 101. 2 n.

**τότε δῆ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον:** a definite statement of time, but not a date.<sup>2</sup> It is, however, almost certain, especially in view of ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες above, that the long negotiations with Athens and those with the Peloponnesians occupied the winter of 433–432, that the orders to Archestratos (57. 6) therefore were given in the spring, and when the Athenian fleet sailed and Poteidaia heard of these orders, they then revolted. In fact, Poteidaia, Olynthos, and Spartolos all paid their tribute to the confederacy due in the spring of 432, as usual, but not that for 431: see *S.E.G.* v. 22 and 23 (Tod, 56 = 22), and *Athenian Tribute Lists*. As an earnest of their good intentions they may have paid earlier than the Dionysia, but there is no evidence of this.

**μετὰ Χαλκιδέων καὶ Βορρείων:** from the tribute lists of 433–432 and 432–431 (see above), we can judge the extent of the revolt (and

<sup>1</sup> We should read τὰ for τῶν?

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the similar, though vaguer, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τούτους, 107. 1, ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, 100. 3, from the Pentekontaëtia. The use of καιρὸν here perhaps implies 'they seized the opportunity' afforded by the promise of Spartan aid, as Widmann takes it.

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perhaps therefore to some degree the extent of these states: see 57. 5 n.). Besides the three principal states, Poteidaia, Spartolos, and Olynthos, the following towns, mostly small, failed in their tribute after 433–432: Assera, Mekyberna, Sermylia, Singos, Skable, Stolos (all τῶν Χαλκιδέων, and most of them on the coast—see below, τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλεις), Aiolitai, Dikaiopolis Ἐρετριῶν, Skapsa,<sup>1</sup> Strepsa (these in or to the north of Bottike),<sup>2</sup> Gale (on the Sithonian peninsula), a few other places in either Chalkidian or Bottiaian territory or near by,<sup>3</sup> and Argilos (isolated; some three miles west of the mouth of the Strymon).<sup>4</sup> Of these, Sermylia did not join in the revolt till defeated by Aristeus (65. 2). The rest of the cities of the Chalkidic peninsula remained loyal to Athens. See 61. 4–5 nn.

There are other interesting facts to be learned from the tribute lists. Poteidaia had its tribute increased from 6 tal. to 15 tal. in 434–433 and 433–432,<sup>5</sup> Spartolos from 2 to 3 tal. 500 dr.; that of Olynthos was unchanged. Sermylia, which had paid over 7 tal. in 453 and smaller sums in succeeding years (apparently only 3 tal. in 447 or 446), paid 5 tal. from 445 to 439, but 4½ tal. in 435–434 and 434–433 (this change probably made in the assessment year 438; we have not the evidence for its payment in 433–432). Of the other states which revolted, Mekyberna's tribute had been raised from ¾ to 1 tal., probably in 438 (it had been 1 tal. before 445); Singos, which had paid 4 tal. to 450, then 2 tal., paid 3 tal. in 435–434 (probably from 438–437), 2 tal. in 434–433, 1 tal. in 433–432; and Skable had its tribute lowered from ½ to ¼ tal. in 433–432. In the rest there was no significant change. Of the neighbouring cities which remained loyal to Athens, there was no change in the tribute of Akanthos and Torone; Aphytis, which had paid 3 tal. up to 446 and 1 tal. to 439, paid 3 tal. again from 435–434 (probably from 438–437); Mende, which had paid very varying amounts before, paid 8 tal. consistently from 438–437; and Skione paid 6 tal. to 440, 15 tal. in 435–434 (probably from 438–437), but only 4 tal. in 432–431 (the entries for 434–433 and 433–432 are missing): as it paid 9 tal. in 429 and 428, the marked decrease in the tribute paid in 431 was probably a political measure on the part of Athens to secure its loyalty.

<sup>1</sup> Skapsa had also not paid in 435–434; but it did in 433–432.

<sup>2</sup> For the site of Strepsa, see 61. 4 n.

<sup>3</sup> Some of these among the πόλεις αὐται ταξάμεναι of the tribute-lists; for which see my note, *C.R.* liv, 1940, pp. 67–8.

<sup>4</sup> Argilos' tribute history for the years 435 to 431 is similar to that of Skapsa, except that its tribute in 433–432 (and in 430–429) was lowered to 1,000 dr. from the earlier figure of 1 tal. All these changes may be due in some way or another to the foundation of Amphipolis. See also below, p. 277.

<sup>5</sup> The figure for 434–433 is missing, but the change probably belongs to that year, which was an assessment year. It is also more likely that Thucydides would have mentioned so big an increase if it had immediately preceded the revolt.

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Abdera and probably Maroneia (see 61. 2 n.), important places on the Thracian coast to the east, also had their tribute lowered in 432–431; this may be significant and connected with the revolt in the Chalkidic peninsula. See also the note on Argilos above, p. 211, n. 4.

2. τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλεις: see above, p. 211.

ἀνοικίσασθαι: for the meaning of this (whether some form of political synoecism or only a change of habitation) see above, pp. 203 ff. ἐς Ὀλυνθὸν: Olynthos is only  $2\frac{1}{2}$  km. from the nearest point on the sea coast itself, but just sufficiently far for it to be safer from attacks by sea than the coast-towns, for its land-forces would have room to take up position for a pitched battle. The coast-towns, moreover, being all small places, were probably unwalled.

See below, 63. 2 n., for the topography of this region.

ἔδωκε νέμεσθαι: 'to cultivate', in place of their own fields which they were giving up, rather than 'to inhabit'; Olynthos was to be their city and their permanent centre (Forbes, Classen); when the war was over they could return to cultivate their own land on the coast, but this was all to be the territory of one state (Olynthos or Χαλκιδεῖς). At the same time, Lake Bolbe is 20 miles from Olynthos and separated from it by a broad range of mountains which rise to 3,000 and nearly 4,000 ft.; so that in fact they (except the men of military age during a campaign) would have to live on the land near Lake Bolbe, ἕως ἂν ὁ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλεμος γένηται.

59. 2. νομίσαντες δὲ οἱ στρατηγοί, κ.τ.λ.: Archeistratos' force had been intended to forestall the revolt and then help the Macedonian rebels; it was not strong enough to engage in two wars.

τῶν Δέρδου ἀδελφῶν: Derdas himself in 57. 3. We may perhaps infer that Derdas was dead. Cf. note on Pausanias, 61. 4. ἀνωθεν . . . ἐσβεβληκότων: ὥστε τὸν Περδίκκαν μεταξὺ ἀποληφθῆναι—schol. At least, so that he was attacked on two sides, from the south by the Athenians (61. 2), from the west by the rebel princes. ἀνωθεν means from upper Macedonia, the mountain country to the west and south of Pella and Berroia, especially the basin of the R. Haliakmon, the original home of the Macedonians. See above, p. 203. The perfect, ἐσβεβληκότων, perhaps implies that this was independent action on the part of Philippos and Derdas' brothers (Classen).

60. 1. ἔαυτῶν τε ἐθελοντάς, κ.τ.λ.: that is, there was still no declaration of war. Only 'volunteers' go to the help of Poteidaia.

2. Ἀδειμάντου: τοῦτον ἴσμεν ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς πρὸς τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα στασιάζοντα—schol. See Hdt. viii. 5, 59–64, 94. ἦν γάρ τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις, κ.τ.λ.: γάρ points back to ἐστρατήγει only,

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the previous sentence being a parenthesis; but it is awkwardly expressed. We expect 'he was both on friendly terms with the Poteideatai and popular in Corinth'.

3. ἀφικούνται . . . ἐπὶ Θράκης: loosely, for ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης, the kingdom of Thrace being confined east of the Strymon, but the 'Thraceward parts', as in *οἱ ἐπὶ Θ. Χαλκιδεῖς*, extending to the Axios (the earlier political boundary of Macedonia).

Thucydides does not tell us how they arrived, by sea or by land; almost certainly the latter, in which case they not only went through Thessaly, which was friendly to Athens (because they were only 'volunteers', and there was no war), as Brasidas did later, but managed to pass between the Athenian and the rebel Macedonian forces. The Athenians seem to have made first for Therme, then turned back to Pydna, presumably arriving too late to prevent the passage of Aristeus. See 61. 3 n.

τεσσαρακοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὑστερον . . . ἡ Ποτείδαια ἀπέστη: an exact time-period, but again not an exact date, for we have not been told when Poteidaia revolted (cf. 58. 1 n.). So again in the Pentekontaëtia, 108. 2. It gives rather one of the conditions of the war than a date.

61. 1. ήλθε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθ. εὐθὺς ἡ ἀγγελία . . . καὶ πέμπουσιν, ὡς ἤσθοντο, κ.τ.λ.: there was no delay in the sending of this expedition. See below, pp. 222–4.

ἐπιπαριόντας edd., ἐπιπαρόντας codd. "Nam praeterquam quod Th. nusquam alibi ἐπιπαρέναι habet, sed saepius ἐπιπαριέναι . . ., παρεληλυθώς § 3 ostendit Aristeum nondum adfuisse, sed adventasse demum"—Stahl. The second argument is not decisive for the reading; παρεῖναι might mean 'present in those parts' (Macedonia), not necessarily arrived in Poteidaia (so Poppo). Yet Athens would have heard of the preparations being made in Corinth, and have begun their counter-move before the arrival of Aristeus; and παρεληλυθώς at least suggests that the departure of Kallias from Athens took place before Aristeus reached Chalkidike.

Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου: very likely the Kallias who moved the financial decree I.G. i<sup>2</sup> 91–2 (Tod, 51, if the date of this is 434–433: see ii. 13. 3 n.), and the renewal of the alliances with Rhegion and Leontinoi in 433, I.G. i<sup>2</sup> 51, 52 (Tod, 57, 58).

2. Θέρμη: σημείωσαι ὅτι ἡ νῦν Θεσσαλονίκη πόλις πάλαι Θέρμη ἐκαλεῖτο—schol. (The older site was a little to the south of the later, near the hot springs of Sedes: Oberhammer, R.E., s.v.) Archeistratos, by taking Therme, had cut the easiest route by which Perdikkas could send help to the Chalkidians and Poteidaia (see below, § 3 n.). In the summer of 431 it was handed back to Perdikkas, who was at the moment in alliance with Athens against the Chalkidians (ii. 29. 6).

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The Greek cities within Macedonia, such as Therme, Dion, Pydna, and Methone, were perhaps never within the Delian League, except that Methone joined under special terms, paying the *ἀπαρχή* only, in 430–429, and remained on those terms for some years: *S.E.G.* v, p. 33. Cf. *Thuc.* iv. 129. 4, vi. 7. 3. Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, however, would make several modifications of this statement (see the *Register* and *Gazetteer* in *A.T.L.*): Dion and Pydna remain permanently out of the League; but (1) they now restore *Μεθωναῖοι* in the Thracian panel for 432–431 (col. ii. 67) in place of the older restoration *Μαρωνῖται*. This leaves Maroneia paying no tribute in 432–431 instead of the lower tribute which it paid in 430–429 (see above, p. 212); which seems very unlikely (but we are promised a full discussion of the place of Methone in the empire in the second volume of *A.T.L.*). (2) They identify Therme with the *Σερμαῖοι* of the lists. Serme paid the very small sum of 500 dr. (known from 450–449 onwards); and, unlike Poteidaia and the rest of the revolted cities, it paid in 432–431. This latter fact could be explained, as they explain it, by the early capture of Therme; and, as Serme did not pay in 430–429, nor as far as we know in subsequent years (it was assessed again in 421), this may be because Athens gave Therme back to Perdikkas in 431 (it will be remembered that we have no tribute list for 431–430). But the smallness of the tribute, and the fact that the capture of Therme by Archestratos is expressly part of the campaign against Macedonia and not of that against the revolted cities, weigh heavily against the identification. (3) The small state Haison, paying regularly 1,500 dr. from 450 to 431 and, like Methone, paying its *ἀπαρχή* only from 430–429, is placed on the map, *C.A.H.* v, p. 173 and in *A.T.L.*, near Pydna; but this is quite uncertain.<sup>1</sup> (4) Othorioi, who pay regularly till 434–433 and perhaps in 433–432, is hesitatingly placed near Methone. (5) Herakleion, on the site of Platamóna, north-west of the Peneios mouth and therefore well to the south of the southern borders of Macedonia in the fifth century,<sup>2</sup> it paid no tribute, as far as we know, at any time (certainly none in 443–442, 435–434, 432–431, and 430–429), but was

<sup>1</sup> Dikaiopolis *Ἐρετριῶν* is the other state in this district which enjoyed the privilege of paying *ἀπαρχή* only: a privilege due to proximity to Macedonia perhaps (*A.T.L.*), and it may therefore be placed not far south of Therme. But all that we know is that it was somewhere on the road between Aineia and Poteidaia. Its tribute history is different from that of Methone and Haison (for it had paid regularly to this date; Methone had not, and Haison, which had, also paid in 432–431): it joined in the revolt in 432, at least did not pay its tribute in 432–431, but perhaps willingly returned to its allegiance to Athens and assisted Kallias on his march to Poteidaia. It may be noted that Aineia, closer to Therme than Dikaiopolis, did not revolt in 432 and had its tribute substantially lowered (from 3 tal. to 1,000 dr.) in 430–429; cf. p. 211.

<sup>2</sup> Dion was the border town of Macedonia on the coast towards Thessaly, iv. 78. 6.

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assessed in 425 (probably) and in 421. It will be observed that the evidence for any place within Perdikkas' undisputed sphere having been a member of the Delian League, except Methone from 430–429 with its special privilege, is very slight indeed.

For the location of Strepsa, which is conjectured in *C.A.H.* v, p. 173 and in *A.T.L.* to have been north of Therme, see below, § 4 n.

3. ξυμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν: 'they patched up a treaty' with Perdikkas, on the best terms they could (not necessarily an offensive and defensive alliance: cf. 44. 1 n.).

δ. Ἀριστεὺς παρεληλυθώς: how did he get there, if Athens held Therme? He had first to make a fairly wide detour through lower Macedonia away from the marshy north coast of the Thermaic Gulf; and then could have gone over the mountains to the east of Therme; this he must have done if *ἐπιπαριόντας* is the right reading in § 2 above and if *παρεληλυθώς* here, as we must suppose, indicates a new stage in the campaign. In that case, Archestratos, though he decided to confine his operations to Macedonia, had attempted to prevent Aristeus from reaching Poteidaia and had succeeded in delaying him. He may also, after taking Therme (to cut off Perdikkas from Chalkidike), have hoped, by sailing across to Pydna, to intercept Aristeus on his way north, if the latter was taking the usual route from Thessaly by Oloosson and Dion, the route taken by Brasidas in 424 (iv. 78. 6); and then have continued the siege though his enemy had got by.<sup>1</sup> (Aristeus may in fact have gone by another route north from Oloosson, which reaches the middle Haliakmon, and have descended into lower Macedonia by the river, thus avoiding the coast and the Athenian forces altogether—if the rebellious Macedonians had let him through: 59. 2 n.) Pydna is in any case nearer than Therme to Poteidaia by sea, and almost on the way there. But, whatever the truth may be about the relative movements of Archestratos and Aristeus, Thucydides clearly had heard nothing but the bare outlines of the campaign before the battle of Poteidaia itself. (Classen supposes that Aristeus made the last part of his way by sea—from Dion?—to avoid the Athenians at Pydna; but he had no warships with him, and preparations to transport 2,000 men would take some time: what was the Athenian fleet doing to allow it? Thucydides' silence would be even stranger.)

4. καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κάκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου: a well-known crux, emended by one of the prettiest of conjectures, Pluygers's *ἐπὶ Στρέψαντες*,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The importance of Dion was that it was at the junction of both the usual routes from Thessaly, that by Tempe and the coast and that by Oloosson and then by the pass over the north shoulder of Olympos. The site of the town is probably that of some ruins 4 km. from the coast at the exit of the valley that descends from this part of Olympos.

<sup>2</sup> Donaldson gave the first hint of this: see Shilleto here.

which has been adopted by all recent editors except Forbes. The MSS. reading was also that of the scholiasts, who—such is their nature—do not notice any geographical difficulty. This difficulty is insuperable: Berroia is towards the interior of Macedonia, a long way from Pydna, and in the opposite direction to Poteidaia; yet we have just been told *ἐκ τῆς Μ. ἀπανίστανται*. Fortunately it is not one that can be explained by saying that Thucydides was ignorant of the geography; for the next words *κάκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου* make nonsense; and they are nonsense, even if we suppose that the Athenians would attempt to seize an important Macedonian town just after making as good terms as they could with Perdikkas. (Widmann points to the immediate defection of Perdikkas, 62. 2, to explain the attack; as though Thucydides had said that not he, but the Athenians, broke the treaty. See Grote's well-argued note, iv. 554.)<sup>1</sup> As to Pluygers's correction: we know that Strepsa was a town in the Delian League and within the Thracian district, and that it revolted (at least did not pay its tribute) along with Poteidaia and the rest (58. 1 n.); therefore it was a town in Chalkidike or Bottike or near by, as is also suggested by Aischines, ii. 27—Pausanias (the usual rebel Macedonian prince) had taken *Ἄνθεμοῦντα καὶ Θέρμην καὶ Στρέψαν*. Therefore the objections (1) that Herodotus does not mention it in his list of Greek towns from the Athos canal to Therme visited by the Persians, vii. 123, and (2) that it must have been in Mygdonia if it was two or three days' journey from Gigonos (§ 5), are not objections; for it was in any case a revolted city of the Athenian empire. But the sentence, with *ἐπὶ Στρέψαν*, can only be retained if, with Grote and Steup, we assume that there was another Berroia,

<sup>1</sup> It is necessary to emphasize this; for Geyer (above, p. 201), pp. 57–9, has attempted to defend the text, for the reason that the old coastline of the Gulf of Therme was much farther to the west and north than it is now, and Berroia, like Pella, was on or near the sea, and therefore actually on the route from Pydna to Poteidaia; and he objects to *ἐπὶ Στρέψαν* on the ground that Strepsa was too close to Gigonos for the march between them, on an urgent matter (*ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν η̄ Ποτείδαια*), to take over two days (61. 5). But (1) no one writes, 'they went to X and returned, and having first tried to take it and failed, went by land to Y'; (2) if they *returned* from Berroia (i.e. to Pydna), Berroia was not on their way anywhere; and (3) *κατὰ γῆν* in the next clause indicates that (as we should expect) the first part of the journey from Pydna was done by sea. As to the slowness of the march to Gigonos, Thucydides expressly says it was by slow stages, and it may have been hindered by other small towns which had revolted; giving up a siege which might have taken weeks in order to prosecute other operations does not mean that you must thereafter go by forced marches to the scene of battle. (To explain politically the attack on Berroia, Geyer has to assume that Derdas had recently taken it from Perdikkas and that Athens, as one of the terms of the hasty treaty, had not only withdrawn support from Derdas and Philippos, but had promised to retake Berroia for Perdikkas. All this in order to defend an indefensible text.)

like Strepsa on the opposite side of the Thermaic Gulf and near Strepsa; a place otherwise quite unknown, and (since the other Berroia was a well-known place) one that must have been distinguished from its namesake by Thucydides.<sup>1</sup> The assumption in fact is quite unjustified. We are compelled either to a further emendation, such as Herbst's ingenious *καὶ ἀφικόμενοι περιωθέντες ἐκεῖθεν ἐπὶ Στρέψαν*, or to suppose that the mention of Berroia has got out of place—that Athenian delegates went there, and returned,<sup>2</sup> when they made the treaty with Perdikkas.<sup>3</sup> This last would mean a considerable disturbance in the text<sup>4</sup> (*ἐπειτα δὲ ἀφικόμενοι εἰς Βέροιαν <καὶ> ξύμβασιν . . . ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, [καὶ] κάκεῖθεν ἐπὶ . . . κ.τ.λ.*), and we should still need a name for *τοῦ χωρίου*; but if we assume it, then Strepsa *may* be this place which the Athenians tried to storm.<sup>5</sup>

Strepsa should anyhow probably be placed south, not north of Therme, for there is very little evidence for supposing any town beyond C. Aineia (Buyuk or Mega Karaburnu) to have belonged to the Delian League (above, p. 214), and no reason to suppose that the Athenians went so far out of their way in the passage from Pydna to Poteidaia. They went by sea the shortest way to Chalkidike, landing probably near or at the town of Aineia which had not revolted, and went by slow stages to Gigonos (§ 5). Between Aineia and Gigonos they would have to pass Smilla and Skapsa (Hdt. vii. 123. 2), two small towns in the Delian League the latter of which had revolted. The site of Gigonos is unknown, except that it was north-west of Poteidaia. We cannot determine its distance from Aineia (or Strepsa), as the army marched slowly; but apparently it was near enough to Poteidaia for Kallias' army to march out from it and fight in front of Poteidaia on the same day (62. 4–5). Herodotus, however, mentions three small places between it and Poteidaia. See A.T.L. Gazetteer, s.v. *Πόλεις Κροσσίδος*. The only reason for supposing Strepsa to be north (or north-east) of Therme is the passage in Aischines already cited (p. 216), in which he is thought to

<sup>1</sup> That is, a failure to distinguish it would be as much a geographical blunder as a misplacing of the well-known Berroia.

<sup>2</sup> Editors have noted that *ἐπιστρέψειν* is not elsewhere used intransitively in Thucydides.

<sup>3</sup> Shilleto suggested that this was the purpose of the journey to Berroia, but thought no change in the text (other than *ἐπὶ Στρέψαν*) necessary.

<sup>4</sup> Of the kind of which Richards thought there were numerous examples: C.Q. vi, 1912, 137–51, 217–34.

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that the lexicographers apparently got their information (such as it is) about Strepsa from Hellanikos, not from Thucydides; so far as it goes, this is an indication that they did not find *ἐπὶ Στρέψαν* in their texts. In the Gazetteer of A.T.L. it is suggested that the variation in the lexica between *πόλις Θάρκυς* and *πόλις Μακεδονίας* may be due to the different evidence of Hellanikos and Thucydides, the latter statement coming from this passage. But, after *ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας*, it cannot be based on the reading *ἐπὶ Στρέψαν*.

be naming the towns in geographical order, and Anthemous was on the Chalkidic border of Macedonia (apparently: Dem. vi. 20); but even if we give so much authority to Aischines, it is clear that a site near Therme but to the south of it will suit equally well. Thuc. ii. 99. 6 and 100. 4 suggest clearly that Anthemous was on the *northern* side of the mountains which separate Chalkidike from Mygdonia.<sup>1</sup>

(Steup believes that the Athenians went round the head of the Thermaic Gulf (very marshy along the coast) by land, because they could not have taken all the land-troops, including the allies and the 600 cavalry, on board. But there was transport for the 3,000 hoplites from Athens by sea; and if necessary they could have made the short journey from Pydna to the opposite coast more than once. Certainly it is not probable that Perdikkas allowed the cavalry of the rival princes to march through his kingdom; and ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν does imply that the previous part of the journey was by sea.)<sup>2</sup> τοῖς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Παυσανίου: but Pausanias has not been mentioned before. This is a 'note' which Thucydides has not properly worked into his text. There are many such, some long, some short. οὗτος δὲ Παυσανίας κατὰ μέν τινας νιὸς τοῦ Δέρδον, κατὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἀδελφός (schol.; see 59. 2). (Are these authorities historians or commentators on Thucydides? If the latter, both suggestions are probably only guesses; Pausanias was a name common in the Macedonian royal house, to which, however, Derdas probably did not belong: see above, 57. 3 n.)

5. ἐς Γίγωνον: for the site see above. It was a small place, that appears once in the tribute lists, in 434–433, with four others in this district, under the rubric ἀσ οἱ ὁἰκισται ἐνέγραψαν φόρον φέρειν (see Tod, pp. 54–5). The five paid  $\frac{1}{2}$  talent between them.

<sup>1</sup> This was Leake's view (iii. 450). Geyer, p. 17, opposes it, putting Anthemous to the south of the mountain barrier; but his own arguments are against him.

I do not wish to be fanciful, but there may be some connexion (when we remember how long personal jokes lasted in comedy, especially in Eupolis) between Aristophanes, fr. 123 (from the *Georgoi*, the date of which, however, is quite uncertain): Στρεψαίους Ἀριστοφάνης Γεωργοί with which Bergk (ap. Meineke, ii. 993) tentatively connected Στρεψαῖος δὲ Ἐρμῆς, παρὰ τῷ Ἀριστοφάνει παρὰ τὸ διεστράφθαι τὰς ὅψεις (fr. 860 K.), and Eupolis, fr. 276 (from the *Xρυσοῦν Γένος*),

A. δωδέκατος δὲ τυφλός, τρίτος δὲ τὴν καλὴν ἔχων,  
οὐ στυμμαίας τέταρτος ἐντινέπτει,  
πέμπτος δὲ πυρρός, ἕκτος δὲ διεστραμμένος.  
B. χοδῶι μὲν εἰσὶ ἔκκαλδεκ' εἰς Ἀρχέστρατον,  
ἐς τὸν δὲ φαλακρὸν ἐπτακαΐδεκ'. A. ἵσχε δῆ.  
B. δὲ δύδοος τίς; A. δὲ τὸ τριβώνιον ἔχων.

(So, with Porson's emendation in the last line, I think we may divide the speakers.)

<sup>2</sup> Widmann notes as well that ἀπανίστασθαι in Thucydides always means 'leave by sea', except in i. 2. 2; but this may be accidental.

62. 1. προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθ.: they must fight in front of the town to prevent, if possible, a siege, when the more troops they had the sooner they could be starved out (cf. 65. 1).

πρὸς Ὁλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ: i.e. a mile or so to the north of Poteidaia, on the Olynthos side; almost at the narrowest part of the isthmus (above, 56. 2 n.). The isthmus widens rapidly to the north; there was plenty of room for Kallias' 3,000 men, drawn up at least 4 deep and each man needing a front of 3 ft., to manoeuvre and to be outflanked. ἀγορὰν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως: i.e. made arrangements for supplies to be brought to them from Poteidaia and from Olynthos. They did not know how long they would have to stay before the enemy confronted them. The πόλις is Poteidaia. It helped discipline that the men did not leave the camp to buy supplies in the town (cf. vi. 100. 1).

2. ἀπέστη γὰρ εὔθυς: Perdikkas seems to have been as anxious to get the Athenians out of Macedonia as they had been to secure his neutrality while they attacked Poteidaia.

'Ιόλαον: not further identified, like Pausanias, 61. 4. His appointment is a quite unimportant detail, a note which Thucydides had made. The reigning house of Macedon claimed to be Herakleids; so Iolaos, though a rare name, is not a surprising one for a member of it.

3–4. One of the instances in which a force was kept in reserve for an attack in flank or rear, which are not common in Greek military history; tactics which were here easily frustrated.

5–6. This was the battle at which Alkibiades distinguished himself and Sokrates saved his life: Plat. *Charm.* 153 A–C, *Symp.* 220 D–E. According to the former account Sokrates returned to Athens soon after the battle, according to the latter he stayed for the siege: this must be true, and fits better with Thucydides' narrative.

τὸ τοῦ Ἀριστέως κέρας: the right or the left wing? The former would make it easier to reach Olynthos; and as Aristeus did not attempt that, it is probable that he was on the left, near the west coast of the isthmus.

63. 1. διακινδυνεύσῃ: the danger, if he went to Olynthos, was from the Macedonian horse and the few allies posted to watch the enemy there (62. 4).

παρὰ τὴν χηλήν: χ. καλεῖται οἱ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ πρὸς θάλασσαν τείχους προβεβλημένοι λίθοι διὰ τὴν τῶν κυμάτων βίαν, μὴ τὸ τεῖχος βλάπτοντο. εἴρηται δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐουκένα χηλῆ βοός—schol. Presumably also, with the intention of protecting ships. But why an ox-hoof? A crab's claw (which is also χηλῆ) would be more probable, if in many cases there were two curved moles forming a harbour.

Artabazos and his army had an even more alarming experience of the sea at Poteidaia in 480, Hdt. viii. 129.

2. ἀπέχει δὲ ἔχηκοντα μάλιστα σταδίους καὶ ἐστὶ καταφανές: the

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
distance here given is correct. Olynthos lay on a hill, or rather two hills, stretching about 1,200 m. from south to north and from 100 to 200 m. broad at the top; on the left bank of a stream, and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  km. from the sea.<sup>1</sup> The southern hill is 16–25 m. above the plain, and 59 m. above sea-level; the northern 65 m. above sea-level, and c. 8 m. above the plain to the north. On west, south, and east the slopes of these hills are steep, though not rocky, forming a bluff. See Robinson, *R.E.* art. 'Olynthos', and photographs in *Excavations at Olynthus*, ii, figs. 1–3, 10–12 (also 276 and 282, of Mekyberna). From the southern hill can be seen, to the north the hills that bound the plain and the high mountains behind them, to the south the whole of the Gulf of Torone, with the west coast of Sithonia and the east coast of Pallene, including the isthmus and town of Poteidaia to the SSW. But to the south-west and west the view is limited by a bluff running north and south, higher and much longer than the hill on which Olynthos stands, with steep cliffs to the east (facing Olynthos) and north, much gentler slopes on the west. That is to say, though the statement in Thucydides that Poteidaia is visible from Olynthos is correct, he does not add that from Olynthos itself the Athenians marching along the coast road from Gigonos would not have been seen. It seems probable that the Chalkidians and Perdikkas' horse (or at least the latter) took up position on this bluff (which may well have been in Olynthian territory: ἐν Ὀλύνθῳ μένειν, 62. 3), or else that Kallias anticipated them by seizing it first to watch Olynthos (62. 4). A not unimportant detail in the topography is missing in Thucydides.

*τὰ σημεῖα ἡρθη*: the agreed signal for the troops in Olynthos to set out (62. 3).

3. δλίγω ἐλάσσους τριακοσίων: πλείους τῶν τριακοσίων Diod. xii. 34. 4 (but see 65. 2 n., p. 222).

Αθηναίων δὲ αὐτῶν: the tombstone of the dead, set up in Athens, with three four-lined epigrams inscribed, but without the list of killed, has been preserved, and is in the British Museum: *I.G. i.2* 945 (Tod, 59). The restoration of the first epigram is difficult: see Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* xxxiii, 1933, 77–8, who is not more convincing than others. It is not certain that the stone is a memorial of this battle; it may be of the subsequent siege.

<sup>1</sup> It is worth while perhaps pointing out a curious slip in West's *History of the Chalkidic League*, p. 170 (just because it was made by so careful a scholar): "we learn that there was abundance of fish in a little stream that flowed by the cities of Olynthos and Apollonia into Lake Bolbe. In certain months of the year the fish went up the river as far as Olynthos and were caught in quantities sufficient to supply the needs of the inhabitants (*F.H.G.* iv. 420, Hegesandros of Delphi, fr. 40)". No river flowing by Olynthos could of course reach Lake Bolbe, which is separated from it by the great mountain range of N. Chalkidike; nor does Hegesandros say so.



**64. 1. ἀποτεχίσαντες:** the orthodox procedure for a siege. See Introd., p. 18.

**ἀτείχιστον τὸν:** here for *οὐκ ἀποτεχίστον*, a curious use, for Poteidaia was a walled city and had been bidden to demolish its wall on the south.

**δεδιότες:** the fear of an attack from both sides (from the besieged town and from Olynthos) prevented them from releasing men, in the usual manner, as soon as their own wall was built, to build the wall on the south as well. See 65. 2 n.

**2. χρόνῳ μετέπειτα:** another vague indication of time, indicating hesitation and delay at Athens, but not giving any date. See below, pp. 222 ff.

**ἐξ Ἀφύτιος ὁρμώμενος:** his base of operations, a town on the east coast of the peninsula (Hdt. vii. 123), probably at or near the modern Athytos, about 7 miles SSE. of Poteidaia. Athytos is built above a cliff about 100 ft. high; between the foot of the cliff and the sea is a strip of land, about 100 yards wide and 600 long, forming a small natural harbour protected from north and south, but exposed to the east. The country between Athytos and Poteidaia is open, with low hills.

**65. 1. πλὴν πεντακοσίων:** an even smaller number sufficed to defend Plataia against assault by a larger army than the Athenian at Poteidaia, ii. 78. 3, iii. 24. 2.

**2. Σερμυλιῶν:** about 7 miles east of Mekyberna, between it and Gale (= Galepsos), Hdt. vii. 122. The name survives in the modern Ermylieś or Ormyliá, a village on the west bank of the river Miliáda, about 3 m. from the coast; Sermylia has been identified with an ancient site on a hill on the same side of the river, but near the shore (A.T.L., Gazetteer). It revolted in 432, at least did not pay tribute in 432-431 nor in 430-429; presumably either a party favourable to Athens had temporarily gained the upper hand when Aristeus attacked, or it only joined the revolt after this attack.

**Φορμίων . . . τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ Βοττικὴν ἐδήρου:** as soon as the wall was built the Athenians could afford to release part of their forces. The original 3,000 were sufficient to hold the two walls (especially as that on the south had a friendly country behind it), and Phormion goes on, not very successfully, with the attack on the rest of the revolted cities (Introd., p. 18). Chalkidike here means the territory of the Chalkideis who had Olynthos as their centre (57. 5 n.), not the whole peninsula.

**καὶ ἔστιν ἄ· καὶ πολίσματα εἰλον:** they may have been destroyed when captured, for some small towns do not reappear in the tribute lists.

The end of the siege is narrated in ii. 58 and 70.

Diodoros, xii. 34, 37, only confuses Thucydides' account. In c. 34

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
he puts the revolt, Perdikas' negotiations with the Chalkidians, and the Athenian victory, followed by the siege of Poteidaia, in 435–434; but only because that is the next year to that in which he has placed the battle of Sybota (above, p. 198), a purely mechanical dating where he had no express authority: see Introd., p. 52. (He mentions only one Athenian force, 2,000 strong, with no strategos' name, and the Corinthian, 2,000 strong. He gives the number of the enemy killed, with a slight variation on Thucydides—see 63. 3 n.—but not the Athenian losses.) Then in c. 37 he mentions the “decisive victory” of the Athenians under Kallias, and the latter's death, followed by the appointment of Phormion as his successor, the many attacks made on the Poteidaian walls and the stubborn resistance of the defenders. These events he puts in 432–431; but no reliance can be placed on this for exact dating. In the first place it is probably not from any independent authority, but inferred (by Ephoros) from Thucydides, i. 125. 2 and ii. 2. 1; and in the second, Diodoros' archon-year is in practice a consular year, so that his ‘year of the archon Pythodoros’ includes the spring and early summer of 432 (Introd., p. 4). His duplication of the battle is due to his trying to fit events into his chronological scheme.

Thucydides does not mention, in connexion with *τὰ Ποτειδαϊκά*, the foundation of Amphipolis some four years before, 437–436. This must have affected the other cities in the district, and those with no feelings of loyalty to Athens will at least have resented the strengthening of Athenian influence, even though we cannot be sure that the Chalkidians “saw in the new colony a favoured rival in trade which made them less able to pay a tribute which had ceased to be justifiable now that Persia was a hypothetical as well as a distant danger” (Adcock, C.A.H. v. 184). The most important article of trade with this whole district, Macedonia, Chalkidike, and the Strymon, was timber, which Athens needed in large quantities for building and, especially, for her ships (cf. iv. 108. 1); the importance of Amphipolis, apart from its very great strategic value, was that it gave Athens an additional source of supply in case Macedonia was hostile; Chalkidian trade need not have been affected.

For the alterations in the tribute of cities of the Thraceward district, which also Thucydides omits, see above, 58. 1 n.; and for Athenian activities in the Propontis and the Euxine perhaps about this time, below, pp. 367–8.

#### *Chronology of τὰ Ποτειδαϊκά* (cc. 56–65)

In these chapters, as in his account of *τὰ Κερκυραϊκά* and of the Pentekontaëtia, Thucydides gives many indications of time, some



more or less precise (56. 1, 57. 1, 60. 3, 61. 1, 5), some vague (58. 1, 59, 61. 2-3, 64. 2), but no dates; that is, he does not give a date relative to a fixed date, such as that of the beginning of the war. But in this case he certainly knew (or thought he knew) at least one important date, to within a month, that of the battle of Poteidaia (just as he knew some of those in the Pentekontaëtia which he does not mention in cc. 98-118), for he gives it elsewhere: in ii. 2. 1 he says (by our MS. evidence) that the Theban attack on Plataia, itself exactly dated by the Athenian archon and by the season of the year, took place in the sixth month after the battle of Poteidaia. In addition to that he gives other, somewhat less precise, indications of the interval between these two events in 67. 1, 87. 6, and 125. 2. Unfortunately, these are not all consistent with each other; and consideration of the whole problem must be deferred till the note on 125. 2. Here we can only summarize what appear to be the intervals of time indicated in cc. 56-65.

We have seen in the notes on 56. 1, 57. 6, and 58. 1 that Thucydides' narrative, though not immediately and obviously clear, is yet consistent with the view that Poteidaia and the other states revolted after the Dionysia (March) 432; and since we know that they paid the tribute due at that date, the revolt did in fact take place after it. That is to say, Athens sent her first demand to Poteidaia soon after Sybota (which was, in all probability, not later than September 433: above, p. 197); and the prolonged negotiations and the intrigues at Sparta occupied the winter and early spring of 432. Archestratos was sent with an order to see that the terms of the ultimatum to Poteidaia were carried out, as well as to fight Perdikcas, but arrived too late to prevent the revolt; and in consequence found himself with two wars on his hands. The news of the revolt reached Athens at once, and they sent reinforcements under Kallias (*ἢλθε δὲ . . . εὐθὺς ἡ ἀγγελία . . . καὶ πέμπουσι*, 61. 1). There is nothing in Thucydides to suggest any delay in the start of Archestratos' expedition, which was already being prepared against Perdikcas during the previous winter (he was sailing, be it remembered, against Perdikcas and to anticipate the revolt, not in consequence of it), still less in that of the squadron under Kallias. A candid reader, knowing that Sybota had been fought about September 433 and that Poteidaia did not revolt before March 432, would assume that Archestratos sailed at the latest in April or the beginning of May, and Kallias before the end of May; that Poteidaia therefore was already in revolt by the end of April. Aristeus arrived in Poteidaia 40 days after the revolt, i.e., on this hypothesis, about the beginning of June. Kallias heard of his arrival when he himself had joined Archestratos before Pydna (61. 3); whereupon a peace was patched up with Perdikcas, and the Athenian forces left Pydna, crossed to the

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peninsula, and marched in three days to Giganos. The battle took place thereafter, as far as we can see without delay; it cannot, therefore, if our starting-point is right and Archestratos had sailed from Athens by the end of April, be put later than June 20. The first day of the first prytany of 432–431 was July 2 (Meritt, *A.F.D.* 176). We might, by postponing Archestratos' sailing a little, extend the date of the battle by a week or two, even a month; but Kallias' expedition cannot, on this reading of Thucydides, have started in 432–431, and the battle cannot have been in the sixth month before the attack on Plataia. That attack was made at the beginning of March 431 (see ii. 2. 1 n.), and the sixth month before it was c. September 12–October 10, 432, that is, in the third prytany of the year 432–431.

As to Phormion, Thucydides only tells us that he sailed *χρόνῳ ὥστερον* (64. 2). This implies that there was no immediate haste, as in Kallias' case, but we should not put the date later than September, if the battle of Poteidaia was fought in June.

There is, however, an inscription, *I.G. i. 2 296*, the account of money spent on military expeditions in 432–431, which has been thought by many to support or to prove a date in the autumn for the battle, in accord with the MS. evidence of ii. 2. 1.<sup>1</sup> In spite of the eminence of the scholars who hold this view, I believe it to be mistaken. I have discussed it in a recent article, *C.R.* iv, 1941, 59–67; here I will only state my opinion, that no conclusion can be based on this inscription: at the best, if the MS. reading in ii. 2. 1 is independently shown to be correct or probable, it may be used to illustrate the resulting chronology. Whether this reading is correct or probable will be discussed in the note on 125. 2, below; at this point we are only concerned with inferences from Thucydides' narrative so far and the certain evidence of the tribute lists.

**66. αἰτίαι μὲν αὐταὶ:** this refers only to the affair of Poteidaia, not also to Kerkyra (it is in the plural because in this case there is a grievance on both sides, in that of Kerkyra on the Corinthian side only—Classen). That being so, we should read *προσεγγένηντο* with Ullrich (Stahl, Classen, Steup, Forbes) for the MSS. *προυγεγένηντο* (Stuart Jones, Hude).

**ἰδίᾳ γὰρ ταῦτα οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔπραξαν:** not 'separately, i.e. not in concert with the rest of the Peloponnesian states', as Forbes, Stahl, and others, but 'privately, not officially', not *δημοσίᾳ*, as Bloomfield and Steup (see the latter's unnecessarily long note). Cf. especially v. 30. 2;

<sup>1</sup> For the latest reading and a new fragment see Meritt, *A.F.D.* 71–83. Among those who have accepted this view are Kolbe, Beloch, Pohlenz, Adcock, Meritt, Wade-Gery, Swoboda, and D. M. Robinson.

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so Busolt, iii. 798. 3. If Corinth had had a formal alliance with the Chalkidians and sent forces to help them, there would have been war—between her and Athens, if not with the Peloponnesian League; Thucydides could not have said *οὐ μέντοι ὁ γε πόλεμός πω ἔνυερράγει*. The position is the same as after Sybota (see n. on *ἄνευ κηρυκείου*, 53. 1). That Corinth had done her best for Poteidaia is doubtless true; but officially Aristeus and his men were all 'volunteers', interfering in the internal affairs of the Athenian empire. The only difficulty in this interpretation is that in 60. 1–2 Thucydides uses phrases, *οἱ Κορίνθιοι πέμπουσιν* and *ἐστρατήγει αὐτῶν Ἀριστεύς*, which, taken by themselves, suggest an official expedition (see Delachaux); but it is a very slight one, for the context in c. 60 makes the position clear.

## 67–88. ALLIES' CONFERENCE AT SPARTA

**67. 1. πολιορκουμένης δὲ τῆς Ποτειδαίας . . . εύθυς:** for the chronology here implied see 125. 2 n. From this passage alone the siege might mean the partial siege (*ἀποτείχισις*) immediately after the battle (64. 1), or the complete siege *ἀμφοτέρωθεν* after the arrival of Phormion (64. 2).

**παρεκάλουν τε . . . τοὺς ἔμμαχους:** not 'formally summoned a conference of the Peloponnesian League', which was a privilege of Sparta (87. 4), but urged them to send delegates to Sparta. See 125. 1 n. *κατεβόων* means also in informal 'conversations' with the delegates and with leading Spartans, not their speech to the apella which follows in c. 68 ff.

**2. Αἰγινῆται τε:** 'furthermore, Aigina', for she was not an ally, having been forced into the Delian League a quarter of a century before, as an ordinary tribute-paying member (108. 4).

**οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς:** either, as usual in the narrative of these years, the Thirty Years' Peace, or the treaty by which Aigina agreed to become a member of the Delian League. If the former, there must have been some special clause relating to Aigina (cf., with Stahl, the clause in the treaty of Nikias referring to states in Chalkidike, v. 18. 5), of which we hear nothing elsewhere. See 115. 1 n. It may well be, however, the treaty between Aigina and Athens; and 144. 2, *εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα*, perhaps supports this. There is, of course, no objection to the use of *αὐτόνομος* in such a treaty and with such a meaning (combined, that is, with *φόρου ὑποτελής*, as in v. 18. 5). Though *αὐτόνομος* is often used, naturally enough, to describe those members of the League which had retained their own navies and had never been subjected by Athens, yet theoretically, and in some ways still in practice, all

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members were autonomous states, and Athens was perfectly ready at all times to use the word in formal treaties and informal promises and to interpret it to her own best advantage. Olynthos and the other states of the Chalkidike which were assured their *αὐτονομία* in 421 would not have found their subjection to Athens any easier, had Athens re-established her power generally in the Thraceward district. If, with Hude, we read *τῶν ξ. καὶ εἴ τις τι ἄλλο* (with ABEM) we make the invitation quite general, to include complaints against Athens that could not be described as complaints of breaking the treaty—hence *προσπαρακαλέσαντες*. If, with Reiske's emendation, we read *τῶν ξ. τε* (with CG) *καὶ εἴ τις τι ἄλλος* (Reiske's emendation), we imply that states other than allies were also invited—Aigina had already secretly sent delegates; possibly others (as Mytilene, nominally still an independent state) had been invited but feared to attend. This gives an excellent sense to *προσπαρακαλέσαντες*; but, as Steup, *Thuk. Stud.* ii. 48–9, points out, the invitation was not to send delegates to Sparta (they were already there, invited by Corinth), but to the delegates to attend the *ξύλλογος* of the Spartans; and it seems clear that neither Aigina nor any other state not a member of the Peloponnesian League openly made complaints before that assembly. (Aigina had been *ξύμαχος* in the past, 69. 1, and may even be loosely so described by the Corinthians at the present time, 68. 3; but could not be so described in this context.) Steup reads *τῶν ξ. καὶ εἴ τις τι ἄλλος*, i.e. not only the Corinthians, but the other members of the League too; this will serve, but it seems unnecessarily emphatic—it was the obvious thing for the Spartans to do. The least likely reading is that of CG, *τῶν ξ. τε καὶ εἴ τις τι ἄλλο*, kept by Stuart Jones. For the sense in general cf. 69. 2.

**ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν:** a regular meeting of the Spartan apella, of all citizens (over 30), that is, to hear proposals from foreign delegates and afterwards to consider them amongst themselves—the same procedure as at Athens (44. 1). The authorities at Sparta had already promised active help to Poteidaia (58. 1); either they were only putting off persistent and vexatious delegates with promises, or they had miscalculated their countrymen's willingness to go to war. The idea that either the ephors or the gerousia could of themselves declare war, assuming in advance that the apella would ratify all their acts, gives quite a false idea of the Spartan constitution. Public opinion, expressed when necessary in the apella, was powerful in Sparta, as elsewhere. Still less could the ephors have made a legal promise on behalf of the whole Peloponnesian League. See also ii. 22. 1 n. for the meaning of *ξύλλογος*.

**4. καὶ Μεγαρῆς:** see 139. 1–2 nn., 144. 2. Athenian pressure on Megara had presumably begun some time before (*ἔτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα*

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*διάφορα*) and had culminated in her exclusion from the Athenian market and all harbours in the empire (i.e., I suppose, they could neither buy nor sell in Attica, and they could not send their own ships into the harbours of the empire, though they might buy and sell there). Thucydides clearly regards their complaints as important, but not more important than the Aeginetan and only one of a series against the never-ceasing activities of Athens, her constant *πολυτραγμοσύνη*, her interference with the peace of others. Later authors put much more stress on the Megarian decrees as a cause of the war; see 42. 2, 139, 146 nn.

One should notice the importance of this trade to Megara. It cannot have been a trade in food only (as Hasebroek supposes); for she would not then have starved, but would have got her food from Corinth and Boeotia. (So Lenschau, in Bursian, ccxlv, p. 131.) **παρὰ τὰς σπονδάς:** probably only a general, not a specific, objection. 'The Athenians promised to behave in a neighbourly way.' There is no reason to suppose a specific clause in the treaty by which Athens promised free access to the markets of the League (as Grundy, 325). See Busolt, iii. 833; and below, 115. 1, 139. 2 nn.

68–71. *Speech of the Corinthians*

**68. 1. ἀπιστοτέρους ἐσ τοὺς ἄλλους ἦν τι λέγωμεν:** whether we punctuate with a comma after *ἀπιστοτέρους* with Kistemaker (Poppe, Stahl, Classen) or after *ἄλλους* (Shilleto, Hude, Stuart Jones), the meaning is the same: 'your good faith which makes you trust each other, both in public and private affairs, makes you distrustful of foreigners when they have something to say to you.' The latter is the easier punctuation, provided we may interpret *ἦν τι λέγωμεν*, in this context, as meaning 'when we have a complaint to make'; the former is adopted by those who feel that Thucydides must be more precise: 'when we have something to say against the rest'. The article with *ἄλλους* is in this case difficult (though cf. 71. 1): *οἱ ἄλλοι* is not the same as *οἱ πέλας* (32. 1), as Classen maintains; and *λέγεν εἰς* in this sense is doubtful. See Shilleto's note; and, as Jowett pointed out, the balance of the sentence requires that *ἀπ. ἐσ τ. ἄλλους* should answer to *τὸ πιστὸν τῆς καθ' αὐτοὺς πολυτείας*. Sparta had shown such mistrust (in the Corinthian view) when they gave moral support to Kerkyra in 435 (28. 1): see § 2.

Cf. Kleon's claim for Athens, iii. 37. 2.

**σωφρόσύνην μὲν ἔχετε, ἀμαθίᾳ δὲ πλέοντες:** answered by Archidamos, 84. 2–3. In a different context Kleon also praises the combination of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀμαθία*, iii. 37. 3. *σωφροσύνη* here means the general orderliness and law-abidingness in Sparta.

**3. ὃν τοὺς μὲν δεδουλωμένους:** the subject-allies of Athens in general

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(Classen), not Aigina in particular, as the scholiast (Stahl, Forbes); ὅν refers back to τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

**τοῖς δ' ἐπιβουλεύοντας, κ.τ.λ.**: many other states besides, especially Megara and the Greek states of the north-west (threatened by the Athenian alliance with Kerkyra); perhaps also Aigina. Classen, after Conradt, would read ἡμετέρους, an easy but unnecessary correction, for ἡμετέρους need not mean Corinthian only. See 69. 1.

**69. 1. τὴν πόλιν . . . κρατῦναι**: apparently referring to the city-wall, 90-2. For τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τείχη see 107. 1, 108. 3. Sparta tried to prevent the first, by diplomatic means, and had an opportunity to interfere with the second; but she could make no use of her victory at Tanagra (see 108. 1 n.). It was the Long Walls which formed the cardinal feature of Athenian defence.

Pohlenz, p. 107, can argue, in the middle of a sensible criticism of Schwartz, that this sentence is only understandable after the destruction of the walls, and therefore that the speech was composed after 404.

**ἀποστεροῦντες**: 'deprive' by default, as a debtor may deprive his creditor of the sum due; a regular use of ἀποστερεῖν. See Shilleto's note; who aptly compares iv. 87. 4, οὐδὲ ὁφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι . . . τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν.

**ὅς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα**: not only as the leader of the Greek states against Persia, but as the overthrower of tyrannies.

**2. ἐπὶ φανεροῖς**: either *ad finem plane cognitum ac perspectum* (*zu einem klar bestimmten Zwecke*), as Stahl, or we should read *<ῶς>* ἐπὶ φανεροῖς with Krüger ('we have not come here with the conviction that the issue is clear', as we ought to have done).

**οἱ γάρ δρῶντες . . . ἐπέρχονται**: if we may take οἱ as a demonstrative, as it is occasionally in old Attic with γάρ, we can translate: 'for they, when in action (cf. 73. 2, ὅτε ἐδρᾶμεν), go for their objective with a fixed purpose, against men whose minds are not made up, and without hesitation'; but ἐκεῖνοι (Rauchenstein) is far more probable than οἱ, as the Athenians have not been indicated since ὑπ' ἐκείνων 5 lines previously. A similar, but stronger objection lies against Classen's οἱ γέ for οἱ γάρ (adopted by Hude); τούτους, 'understood after ἀμνούμεθα', would be indispensable. Stahl's translation, taking οἱ δρῶντες as 'men of action' and the whole as a generalization ('men of action go for their objective', etc.), makes excellent sense; ('men of action go for their objective', etc.), makes excellent sense; (but his parallels for such an absolute use of δρᾶν are poor (Aesch. 73. 2 and Soph. l.c. is the closer; Soph. *El.* 350 is quite different).<sup>1</sup> Later, *Agam.* 1359 is the closer; Soph. *El.* 350 is quite different).<sup>1</sup> Later, *Agam.* 1359 is the closer; Soph. *El.* 350 is quite different).<sup>1</sup> Later, Archidamos wished to bracket this very Thucydidean sentence as a

<sup>1</sup> Stahl's *ii qui agunt* must mean 'men of action' (*Leute, welche handeln*), not 'men when in action' or 'who are acting', for in that case it means all men. That is the difference between οἱ δρῶντες, with his interpretation, here and 73. 2 and Soph. l.c.

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*Zusatz eines reflektierenden Lesers*, on the ground that it is inconsistent with κατ' ὀλίγον χωροῦσι below; but, if this objection exists, it is κατ' ὀλίγον χωροῦσι that should go or be corrected. Steup was naturally delighted with the suggestion of a *Zusatz*; but he thought Herwerden's bracketing of βεβούλευμένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας sufficient: which gets rid of no difficulty either of language or of consistency with κατ' ὀλίγον χωροῦσι, and these words are as Thucydidean in expression as the whole sentence.

**3. κατ' ὀλίγον χωροῦσι**: hardly what we expect of those who βεβούλευμένοι ἦδη καὶ οὐ μέλλονται ἐπέρχονται and ισχυρῶς ἔγκεισονται. It only suits καὶ λανθάνειν μὲν . . . ἥσσον θαρσοῦσι, which is concessive. If we had ἐπὶ <πάντας> τοὺς πέλας, so as to alter the emphasis, it would be easier. κατ' ὀλίγον is almost 'one by one'.

**4. τῇ μελλήσῃ ἀμυνόμενοι**: 'Defend yourselves by your hesitations', said with a fine irony. μέλλησις does not mean 'threats'. **τῶν ἐχθρῶν**: The Athenians were not yet πολέμοι, and the Corinthians do not mean that the Spartans oppose their πολέμοι by a 'wait and see' policy only. Cf. above, p. 176.

**5. ἀσφαλεῖς**: 'men that can be relied upon', 'sure men'—Forbes, L. and S.<sup>9</sup>; not 'cautious' (Stahl), nor 'safe, so that you can allow yourselves this sort of conduct' (Classen). It points forward to αἰ γε ὑμέτεραι ἐλπίδες, κ.τ.λ., below.

**αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῷ τὰ πλείω σφαλέντα**: ἐν τῷ στενῷ τῆς Σαλαμῖνος τολμήσαντα ναυμαχῆσαι, ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο αἵτιον τῆς ἡττῆς—schol. This, among other mistakes, is very likely what is meant; but Themistokles might have objected that the Greek victory was not entirely due to the enemy's blunders.

**πρὸς αὐτὸύς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, κ.τ.λ.**: their rashness before the battle of Koroneia, and the Egyptian expedition. Sparta might have replied that her policy worked quite well: 'wait for the enemy to make mistakes.'

**ἐπεὶ αἱ γε ὑμέτεραι ἐλπίδες, κ.τ.λ.**: as Thasos (101. 1-2), Euboea (114), and Poteidaia (58. 1).

**6. αἰτίᾳ . . . κατηγορίᾳ**: a distinction not normally observed in Greek, *aἰτίᾳ*, in the sense of 'complaint', including *κατηγορίᾳ*. 'We are complaining of friends who blunder, not attacking enemies who have committed a crime.' It will be remembered that fixing proper and precise meanings to words, and making fine distinctions, was characteristic of some of Thucydides' contemporaries, especially Prodigos; and he himself makes many such, some purely rhetorical, some of value (e.g. iii. 82). Archidamos replies that the Corinthians do use *κατηγορίᾳ* (84. 2).

**70. 1. πρὸς οἵους ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίους ὄντας**: against any other kind of enemy the Spartan policy of caution might have worked.

Archidamos answered that it was just this 'difference' in the enemy which made caution necessary.

2. οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοί, κ.τ.λ.: ἔστι τοῦτο τῶν δαιμονίων τε καὶ συντόμως ἀπηγγελμένων ἀντιθέτων—schol. Hermogenes, iv, p. 751 (ap. Stahl). Cf. Dionysios, cited below on § 3. *νεωτεροποιοί* here of course means 'ready to upset existing conditions in other states' and so 'aggressive' (Forbes, 56-7). Cf. vi. 18. 6-7, 87. 3; Eur. *Suppl.* 324 ff., 576-7 (cited below on § 8).

καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ: Kleon gives a very different picture, iii. 38. 4-7. Both give true, but one-sided aspects of a many-sided character. Cf. also Dem. iii. 15, καὶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τὰ δέοντα παρ’ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δυνάμενοι, καὶ γνῶναι πάντων ὑμεῖς ὁξύτατοι τὰ ῥηθέντα, καὶ πρᾶξαι δὲ δυνήσεσθε νῦν, ἐὰν ὅρθως ποιῆτε.

3. παρὰ γνώμην: 'against their better judgement', a paradoxical point; but 'their rashness comes off'. τι δ’ ἔστι 'Ἀθηναῖοι πρᾶγμα' ἀπώμοτον; Eupolis, *Poleis*, 217 (ἀπώμοτον: ὃ ἀν τις ἀπομόσεις μὴ ἀν γενέσθαι, as Phrynicos interpreted.)

εὐέλπιδες: one of the two heroes of the *Birds* is Euelpides (Croiset).

This is one of the passages censured by Dionysios for its μειρακιώδεις σχηματισμοὶ τῶν ἀντιθέτων τε καὶ παρομοιώσεων καὶ παρισώσεων, 'borrowed from Gorgias and little suited to Thucydides' austere style' (*Ep. ad Amm.* ii. 17, p. 808: a late and mature essay); iii. 82. 4 is another. The criticism does not make one respect Dionysios' judgement. There are passages in Thucydides' that deserve this kind of censure; but Dionysios does not distinguish the weighty from the more trifling. Moreover, he imitated this passage himself (perhaps had already done so), *Ant. Rom.* vi. 19. So did Livy, xlvi. 23. 15 (noted by Stahl).

4. τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἔτοιμα ἀν βλάψαι: as Nikias warned the Athenians would happen if they attacked Sicily; see esp. vi. 9. 3.

For this contrast between Athens and Sparta, cf. viii. 96, especially § 5, Thucydides' own judgement; which does not mean that it cannot have been others' judgement as well.

5. κρατοῦντες τε τῶν ἔχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἔξερχονται: cf. iv. 14. 3, κρατοῦντες καὶ βουλόμενοι τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐπεξελθεῖν. κρατοῦντες καὶ βουλόμενοι τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐπεξελθεῖν. νικώμενοι ἐπ’ ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν: τὸ ἀναπίπτειν κυρίως ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἔστιν, οἷον ἀθυμεῖν, δλιγοδρανεῖν. Θουκυδίδης α (quoting this sentence). *Kratînos* δ’ ἐπὶ ἔρετῶν χρᾶται τῇ λέξει ροθίαζε κανάπιπτε (345). καὶ Ξενοφῶν ἐν Οἰκονομικῷ (8. 8)—Athen. i. 23 B. This, I think, is the right interpretation—much the same as ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες above—and not 'give ground', as L. and S. Cf. the description of Kleon in the *Knights*, 758-9—

ποικίλος γὰρ ἀνήρ

κάκ τῶν ἀμηχάνων πόρους εὑμήχανος πορίζειν.

Themistokles, however, was the principal instance of this quality in Athens.

6. τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις, κ.τ.λ.: there is some artificiality of language here, and an awkwardness as well in the repetition οἰκειοτάτη . . . οἰκείων (§ 7); it is the one sentence of this chapter that deserves the censure of Dionysios. Yet Thucydides has an important distinction to make. The Athenians, just as much as the Spartans, will obey the orders of the state, whatever they are, *τοῖς σώμασιν*; with their bodies they are simply the servants of the state. Unlike the Spartans, however, they do not suppress the development of the mind, to keep it subordinate to the state; they recognize the value of personality; each man develops his own to the utmost, and they believe that the state benefits by this—every citizen can thereby contribute more to the whole life of the state. There is, I think, no doubt that *γνώμη* here is used of the mind in its widest sense, all that is not *σώμα*, intellect as well as will; if anything, intellect more than will; not simply their will, their spirit of enterprise, as Forbes takes it. Perikles expressed much the same idea in the Epitaphios, more clearly and fully, for example, ii. 37. 1-2, 40. 2, 41. 1.

Bender, *Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides* (1938), p. 24, takes *οἰκεῖος* here to mean 'in close union with the state', somewhat as *οἰκείως*, ii. 60. 6: "ihren Geist aber gebrauchen sie als die Kraft, die ganz als Eigentum dem Staate angehört (*οἰκειοτάτη*)"—just as though no contrast between *ἀλλοτριωτάτοις* and *οἰκειοτάτη*, in meaning as well as in expression, were intended. Such a view belongs only to those who suppose that the Greeks habitually, at least till the end of the fifth century, subordinated the individual entirely to the city. For the contrast expressed here, cf. *οἰκείᾳ* ξυνέστει 138. 3, *οἰκείων ἄμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια* ii. 40. 2; and see also nn. on the Epitaphios. Isokrates gives the more commonplace view in iv. (*Paneg.*) 1: *τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἴδιᾳ πονήσασι καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ψυχὰς ὅπτω παρασκενάσασι* ὕστε καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοις ὠφελεῖν δύνασθαι, and even this does not mean that a man's soul belonged to the state; but it implies that he was not *ἀχρέος* (as his enemies would call him), or completely *ἀπράγματος* (as he would call himself).

It is interesting to think of Sokrates in the light of this sentence. He was loyal to the city, if any man was; but, though he was always ready *τῷ σώματι ἀλλοτριωτάτῳ* ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῆσθαι, it would be but a small part of the truth to say that he *τῇ γνώμῃ ἔχορητο* ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς; it was more important to him that his mind should be independent.

8. μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι’ δλουτοῦ αἰώνος μοχθοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.: compare and contrast the Epitaphios, ii. 38, 39; though this is not the exact opposite of what is said there (Forbes), but another aspect of Athenian activity, as it was seen by their enemies at this time. The Athenians themselves could also boast of it: cf. the well-known

oracle often mentioned by Aristophanes, *Daitaleis*, fr. 230; *Equit.* 1011-13 (where it is cited with affection by Demos), 1086 (Kleon, in flattery), *Av.* 978, 987:

εῖδαμον πτολίεθρον Ἀθηναῖς ἀγέλαις,  
πολλὰ ἴδον καὶ πολλὰ παθόν καὶ πολλὰ μογῆσαν,  
αἰετὸς ἐν νεφελῇσι γενήσεαι ηματα πάντα.

Cf. *Vesp.* 684-5; *Eur. Suppl.* 321-5—

δρᾶς, ἄβουλος ὡς κεκερομημένη  
τοῖς κερτομοῦσι γοργὸν ὅμμ' ἀναβλέπει  
σὴν πατρίς; ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πόνοισιν αὔξεται·  
αἱ δ' ἡσυχοὶ σκοτεινὰ πράσσουσαι πόλεις  
σκοτεινὰ καὶ βλέπουσιν εὐλαβούμεναι.

576-7—

KP. πράσσεων σὺ πόλλ' εἴωθας ἢ τε σὴ πόλις.

ΘΗ. τοιγάρ πονῶσα πολλὰ πόλλ' εὐδαιμονεῖ.

See too, 339-45, and *Herakleidai*, 329-32. For a more realistic description of Athenian mentality, see Perikles' last speech (ii. 60, 62-3; esp. 63, compared with *Suppl.* 324-5) and that of Alkibiades in urging the Sicilian expedition. Nearly a century later Demosthenes said much the same thing of Philip in contrast with the Athenians as the Corinthians here say of the latter: i. 14-15, ii. 23, iv. 5-7, 42. μῆτε ἔορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι: Forbes quotes interesting parallels from Burke and Goethe.

9. εἰ τις αὐτοὺς ἔσυνειών φαίη, κ.τ.λ.: the true definition of the πολυπράγμων, whether individual or state.

71. 1. καὶ σίεσθε τὴν ἡσυχίαν, κ.τ.λ.: see Forbes here, and his quotation from Seeley's *Life of Stein*, i, p. 231. But his translation of the second half of the sentence has the emphasis wrong; it should be: '(you imagine those will enjoy peace longest) whose idea of right conduct (*τὸ ἵστον νέμετε*) is (not only) not to provoke others but to avoid injury even in self-defence'. You will not even defend yourselves, at least not soon enough (while you still have allies), unlike those who τῇ γνώμῃ, ἦν ἀδικῶνται, δῆλοι ὡσι μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντες. In ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ . . . τὸ ἵστον νέμετε, Thucydides varies the construction in his antithesis, as so often: the strict formal sequence would be ἀλλὰ τούτοις οἱ ἀν ἐπὶ τῷ . . . τὸ ἵστον νέμωσι: 'You think you will enjoy peace longest because your idea', etc. See Stahl, and Ros, pp. 271, 447.

2-3. ἀρχαιότροπα . . . κεκαινώται: a passage to be kept in mind by those who deny to the Greeks the ordinary concept of progress. ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει: cf. *Eur. Suppl.* 324-5 quoted above, and Perikles in ii. 63. 3, Alkibiades in vi. 18. 7.

4. ὥστερ ὑπεδέξασθε: ὑπέσχοντο γὰρ ἀνωτέρω (58. 1) τοῖς Ποτειδαιάταις —schol.

πρὸς ἔτεραν τινὰ ἔσυμμαχίαν: πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους—schol.; that is, if any specific alliance is meant. Corinth later allied herself with Argos through dissatisfaction with the Peace of 421 (and again, in the 4th century); and the Argives might be called οἱ ἔννηθεῖς (§ 6).

5. τῶν αἰσθανομένων: not 'men of sense' or 'perception', as the schol. (Stahl, Classen, Croiset, Shilleto, Widmann), but 'men who take notice of our actions', 'whose eyes are upon us' (Forbes, Jowett), corresponding to θεῶν τῶν ὄρκιων—the eyes of the gods are on one who breaks his oath.

Both those who believe that there is some historical content in Thucydides' speeches and those who believe that he made them all up in his own head, are convinced that his intention in writing this is to show one aspect of the forces at work both in provoking the war and in the fighting itself. The former belief is not inconsistent with the conviction. Thucydides was anxious to show the temper of the Athenians, Corinthians, and Lacedaemonians at the time; he selects and composes (with or without authority for it) this speech to throw some light on that temper. The following speeches of the Athenian delegates and of Archidamos throw further and different light on the same matter.

Presumably Thucydides will have heard of the Corinthian speech, as of the others at this debate, from one of the Athenian delegates, who, even if they had not actually listened to them, knew their content (72. 1, ὡς ἔσθοντο τῶν λόγων).

72. 1. ὡς ἔσθοντο τῶν λόγων: this suggests that the Athenian delegates did not ask permission to address the apella till the allies of Sparta had all delivered their speeches, till the meeting was half over. "This is not impossible (especially if the assembly took up more than one day), but it is very unlikely"—Forbes; who, while saying it is improbable that Thucydides "invented the whole affair as a device for introducing as early as possible a telling apology for the Athenian empire", thinks that he was writing from an imperfect report or recollection. It seems easier to suppose that we must not take his words too strictly—that the Athenians knew (as they certainly would) of the informal talks among the Peloponnesian delegates (67. 1: cf. *καταβοήν*, 73. 1 with *κατεβόων* there), and had asked permission to address the assembly before the meeting began. The implication in 85. 1 and 87. 1 is that the debate did not last more than a day.

τῶν μὲν ἐγκλημάτων πέρι μηδὲν ἀπολογησομένους: "partly because they were not bound to answer these charges before the Lacedaemonian assembly (73. 1): partly no doubt because a premature and unauthorized answer might have compromised Athens in subsequent negotiations"—Forbes.

ὡς οὐ ταχέως αὐτοῖς βουλευτέον εἴη: see below, pp. 253-4.

## 73-8. Speech of the Athenians

73. 1. οὐ γάρ παρὰ δικαστᾶς ὑμῖν: 'this is not a court of law, with you as the judges, your allies as prosecutors, and ourselves as defendants.'

2. τὰ μὲν πάνυ παλαιά: τὰ κατὰ Ἀμαζόνας καὶ Θρῆκας καὶ Ἡρακλεῖδας—schol. Possibly; but these were commonplaces in epitaphioi and such-like self-laudatory speeches spoken in Athens, hardly in other cities. However, it may be right: the speaker spares his audience, and us, a little. Thucydides may have Hdt. ix. 27. 2-4 in mind (especially ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ τι προέχει τούτων ἐπιμεμνῆσθαι . . . παλαιῶν μέν νν ἔργων ἄλις ἔστω).

εἰ καὶ δι' ὅχλους μᾶλλον ἔσται αἱεὶ προβαλλομένοις: boring to us or to you? or to both? To us, if the MSS. reading is to be kept and προβάλλεσθαι taken in its natural sense, as a middle (Stahl would take it as a personal passive 'I have this thrust at me', which is very improbable). To avoid this (and because ἡμῖν demands expression) Classen, followed by Steup and Delachaux, conjectured προβαλλόμενα—'the constant repetition of τὰ Μηδικά' may annoy. (For the meaning of δι' ὅχλους, cf. Dem. xviii. 214 ὑμᾶς δὲ δέδοικα, μὴ παρεληλυθότων τῶν καιρῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν εἰ καὶ κατακλυσμὸν γεγενήσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων ἡγούμενοι, μάταιον ὅχλον τοὺς περὶ τούτων λόγους νομίσητε, and Deinarchos, i. 2.)

3. παραιτήσεως ἔνεκα: 'by way of apology'.

4. Μαραθῶνι τε μόνοι: the Plataians left out, as in Hdt. ix. 27. 5, and as, more surprisingly, the Plataians leave out Marathon in their own apologia, iii. 54. 3-4.

ὅπερ ἔσχε μὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτὸν ἐπιπλέοντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν: κατὰ πόλεις suggests rather the danger that if the Greek fleet retreated from Salamis it would disperse each to its own home, as (acc. to Herodotus, viii. 57, 60. 1) Mnesiphilos warned Themistokles it would; e.g. κατὰ πόλεις *(διασκεδασθέντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων)*.

It will be remembered that when Herodotus gives so decidedly his opinion that it was this action of Athens that saved Greece (vii. 139), he says that that opinion will be ἐπίφθονον πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων. He may well have written that at the time of Athens' greatest unpopularity (Thuc. ii. 8. 4).

74. 1. ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας: 378 according to Herodotus, viii. 48, or 366 according to the sum of his items; to which Athens contributed 200, or 'somewhat less than two-thirds'. The argument in favour of reading τριακοσία here, as do Poppe and Stahl (with those copies of G which were made when it was still intact: see Powell, *Praefatio*), is not to rescue Thucydides, or the Athenian ambassadors, from an exaggeration, but that 300 ships, of which Athens had 200, is the

number usually mentioned, as Aesch. *Pers.* 338; Dem. xviii. 238; Nepos, *Them.* 3; it is the conventional number (but cf. Dem. xiv. 29), which would suit here. Cf. Diod. xv. 78. 4 (the 200 Athenian ships) and Isokrates, iv. 107 (in the time of the empire, Athens had twice as many ships as the rest of Greece together). But what is really curious is the use of the phrase ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας or τριακοσίας with ναῦς (*παρεσχόμεθα*), to mean not the number of the Athenian contingent but the whole of which the Athenian contingent was a part. This seems impossible (cf. e.g. 100. 1); and as we should probably read a number in agreement with Herodotus and the tradition, we should emend to ἐς τὰς διακοσίας δλῆγῳ Ἐλάσσοντος *(οὔσας)*, or, since this omits all mention of the whole of which the two-thirds were a part, perhaps more simply, πρὸς τὰς τριακοσίας or τετρακοσίας.<sup>1</sup> There is some confusion among the scholia on this passage; but this is more likely because they are but brief epitomes of older comments than because early MSS. had offered different readings.

καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὑμεῖς ἐτιμήσατε, κ.τ.λ.: Hdt. viii. 124, especially the last sentence, μοῦνον δὴ τοῦτον πάντων ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Σπαρτῆται προέπεμψαν.

2. τὰ οἰκεῖα διαφθείραντες: the speaker might have added that they were ready to do the same again now rather than yield to an enemy. ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς: which became a very trite phrase on Athenian lips. It occurs three times in this speech (73. 4, here, and 74. 4), and again 91. 5, 93. 6, of Themistokles' policy; it marks the turning-point in Athenian history. Cf. too *Aθην.* 23. 1, where it has a different colouring.

Plutarch, *de Her. malign.* 39, 870 D, notes that the Athenian speaker here says nothing of the 'Athenian story' in Herodotus (viii. 94) of the disgraceful Corinthian flight before Salamis, but he does so only in order to discredit Herodotus.

75. Cf. the Athenian speech at Kamarina, vi. 82-3.

1. ἄγαν: Lockwood, C.R. lii, 1938, 7-8, notes that λίαν was becoming commoner than ἄγαν and ousting it in prose;<sup>2</sup> and that Thucydides, characteristically, prefers ἄγαν, using it 15 times to λίαν once.

2. ὑπὸ δέουσι: τοῦ βαρβάρου ἢ τῶν κακῶν παθόντων ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὑπηκόων

—schol. Almost certainly the former (Classen, Stahl); the latter appear in οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι, κ.τ.λ., which is a further point—after the first step (*τὸ πρῶτον*) had been taken in turning the hegemony into an empire it was no longer safe to let it fall asunder. Cf. ii. 63. 1-2.

<sup>1</sup> Classen argued that the construction with ἐς was due to a desire to avoid a number of genitives. But 75. 1 shows that Thucydides would hardly have been influenced by this.

<sup>2</sup> He does not give Menander's use. According to Jensen's index he uses λίαν three times, and ἄγαν only occurs in the non-Menandrian prologue to *Heros*.

It will be observed that the speaker is now answering the complaints made by Sparta's allies, though not those made by the Corinthians: cc. 75 and 76 contain a general defence of the empire and its administration, 77 an answer to a particular charge.

**76. 1. τὰς ἐν τῇ Πελοπονῆστι πόλεις, κ.τ.λ.:** see 19.

2. The first frank expression of selfish imperialism, the natural right of the stronger to act as he would, in the *History*; though here spoken in self-defence. There are many others, culminating in the Melian Dialogue. It is hinted at also in 8. 3. Cf. Demokritos, fr. 267, φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν οἰκήτον τῷ κρέσσοντι.

2-3. There is something to be said for Classen's punctuation, a colon after χρῆσθε, though not for his comma after ἀπετράπετο.

**77. 1. καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γάρ . . . ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν:** there are two possible ways of translating this: (1) 'For even though we are at a disadvantage (*or*, are frequently worsted) ἐν ταῖς ἔνυμβολιμαῖαις πρὸς τὸν ἔνυμβαχον δίκαιοις and, on the other hand, our own courts are quite impartial, we are nevertheless regarded as litigious'; and this can be interpreted either, as Steup, 'though, when such δίκαιοι are tried in the courts of our allies we are badly treated, whereas we assure complete impartiality to our allies when they are tried in our own courts', or, as has been more common, 'though in ἔνυμβολιμαῖαι δίκαιοι with our allies we have been at a disadvantage and in other classes of δίκαιοι which are tried at Athens (namely, political trials) we have been impartial'.<sup>1</sup> (2) 'For just because we were at a disadvantage (*or*, were frequently worsted) ἐν τ. ξ. π. τ. ξ. δίκαιοις and therefore established courts for trying such cases in Athens, under our own impartial laws, we are regarded as litigious.' In the first of these the two participles are strictly co-ordinate (two instances of Athenian ἐπιείκεια are mentioned), and the contrast is either between the unfairness of the allied courts and the impartiality of the Athenian in the same class of case (Steup's rendering), or between Athenian submission to unfairness in ἔνυμβολιμαῖαι δίκαιοι (because half the cases would be tried in allied courts) and the good fortune of the allies in finding impartial courts (for both these and other cases) in Athens; and in τὰς κρίσεις the article will mean 'our well-known impartial courts'. In the second translation, ἐλασσούμενοι is, in sense, subordinate to ποιήσαντες, giving the reason for the latter; the class of trial is the same in both cases—these δίκαιοι were transferred to Athens; the difference in tense of the two participles and the article with κρίσεις ('the trials in these cases')

<sup>1</sup> Bonner (see below, p. 237, n. 1) translates ἐλασσούμενοι 'though we waive our rights': i.e. we might, as an imperial city, use force only, comparing Dem. lvi. 14. But this would apply to the trials in Athens as well. For other variations of this rendering, which seem to me impossible, see Steup's note.

are much in point, and the emphasis in the second clause (as we should expect from the order) is on παρ' ὑμῶν αὐτοῖς rather than on ἐν τοῖς δροτοῖς νόμοις. The whole gives only one instance of Athenian ἐπιείκεια.

I believe this second rendering to be in itself the easier. With the first we should need either some phrase in the first clause for 'in the allied courts' or one in the second clause for 'other classes of δίκαιοι'; secondly, 'though we were at a disadvantage in these δίκαιοι, we are nevertheless thought to be litigious' gives no adequate sense—the charge of litigiousness can only follow the establishment of courts in Athens; and finally, the argument from 76. 4 to 77. 4 is, 'we might have used force; instead, we establish law-courts, and the only reward we get for our moderation is a reputation for litigiousness—though we recognize that it is natural enough for subjects who are in the main generously treated to complain of occasional injustice'. Only the process of law in Athens, not Athenian submission to allied courts, is relevant.

This then seems to me the natural interpretation of this sentence, considered in itself. Two objections of another kind may be made to it. First (and this applies to Steup's rendering as well), it means that the Athenian speaker makes no reference to another and probably more serious complaint made by the subject states, namely the Athenian control of *political trials*, which were used to support the friends of Athens in the states and to suppress her enemies. The answer to this is that in any case the complaint would not have been expressed as φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν. Secondly, is it a fact that ἔνυμβολιμαῖαι δίκαιοι were transferred to Athens? for if they were not, no Athenian, we may suppose, would have said they were. We must look briefly at the evidence.<sup>1</sup>

Σύμβολα (or συμβολαῖ) are international agreements between independent states, by which the parties bind themselves to some restriction of full sovereignty (e.g. μὴ ἔξειναι μήθε εἰρξαι μήτε δῆσαι τὸν ἐλεύθερον—a citizen or metoikos of the other state: Andok. iv. 18; cf. Antiph. v. 17), and especially agree that their respective nationals will in any dispute δίκαιοι λαμβάνειν καὶ διδόναι. Thus Aristotle, in his definition of citizenship, says: ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που πολίτης ἔστιν (καὶ γάρ μέτοικοι καὶ δοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὐδὲ οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὡστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι (τοῦτο γάρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς <μετοίκοις καὶ τοῖς> ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσι), Pol. iii. 1. 3 (1275 a 7); cf. 5. 10 (1280 a 35);

<sup>1</sup> See Hitzig, *Altgriechische Staatsverträge über Rechtshilfe* (1907), and Lipsius, 965-77, for σύμβολα and δίκαιοι ἀπὸ συμβόλων; Robertson, *Administration of Justice in the Athenian Empire* (1924), and Bonner and Smith, *Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*, i (1930), 310-17, for their use in the Delian League. Also Bonner, C.P. xiv, 1919, 284-6; Kahrstedt, art. συμβολή, R.E. 4 A, 1088-90. Paoli's article in *Riv. d. diritto commerciale*, 1935, 36 ff., I have not been able to see.

Dem. xxi. 173; Aesch. *Syrph.* 701-3; Harpocr. σύμβολα: τὰς συνθήκας ἀς ἂν ἀλλήλαις αἱ πόλεις θέμεναι τάττωσι τοῖς πολέταις ὥστε διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν τὰ δίκαια. Δίκαια ἀπὸ συμβολῶν are lawsuits conducted according to the terms of such treaties.<sup>1</sup> Most states had agreements of this kind with one another, though Corinthians asserted that Kerkyra refused them (37. 3); and those that engaged much in foreign trade had especial need of them. Doubtless most of the lawsuits which were conducted ἀπὸ συμβολῶν arose in connexion with trade; but they were not confined to them,<sup>2</sup> and they were legally quite distinct from ἐμπορικαὶ δίκαια. In Athens they came before the courts of the Thesmothetai (Ar. *Aθην.* 59. 6); that is, in these lawsuits the plaintiff, if a foreigner, did not sue through the polemarch.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides appears to be the only classical author to use the adjective, δίκαια ξυμβολματα. Cobet, *Nov. Lect.* 167-8, pointed out that the form of the adjective should be ξυμβολματος, not συμβολαῖος, as ὑπο-, ἐκ-, and ἐμβολματος (or -ιος); and that in one of his two entries (ξυμβολματα δίκαια: αἱ κατὰ ξυμβολα) Hesychios preserves the correct form, probably from Thucydides. Steup, Stuart Jones, and Liddell and Scott keep ξυμβολματα, deriving it from ξυμβόλων, a commercial contract. The epigraphic evidence, especially the treaty with Phaselis (see below), is against this, and there is little point in narrowing the meaning here; but it should be noted that in both the entries in Hesychios the MSS. read ξυμβόλαια (*συμβ-*), which Cobet emends or corrects to ξυμβολα.

<sup>2</sup> The new fragment of *I.G. i.2* 66 = *A.T.L.* D 7 (below, p. 382), mentions ξυμβολα between Athens and the allied cities ὅπως ἀν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀδικεῖν τοῖς ἀπάγονοι τὸν φόρον. That is, both parties are to collaborate to prevent fraud in the course of the collection and transport of the tribute (see ll. 34-5: anyone, Athenian or ally, may prosecute; the trial is to be in Athens).

<sup>3</sup> The author of the speech *On Halonesos*, in the course of a casuistical argument, asserts that, before the middle of the 4th century, Athenians and Macedonians enjoyed mutual rights in each others' courts without any σύμβολα, and that this in no way impeded trade nor ordinary intercourse; and that in asking for σύμβολα Philip was demanding something that could only work for his benefit (Dem. vii. 9-13). This, if true, can mean only that, in default of σύμβολα, Macedonians resident or trading in Athens could bring actions (for fulfilment of contract, and the like) in the ordinary way in Athenian courts, through the polemarch (cf. the Phaselis decree), and similarly Athenians in Macedonia. This is possible enough; but we may doubt the truth of a passage which includes the statement ἐρότης ήμιν γάρ ήν η Μακεδονία καὶ φόρους ήμιν ἔφερον. (An exaggeration, because Methone had been tributary? See above, p. 214, and *I.G. i.2* 57.) Robertson, 13-15, seems to me to misunderstand the passage entirely.

Antiphon, v. 78, appears to assert that δίκαια ἀπὸ συμβολῶν were possible between citizens of states at war with each other. But again we must allow for rhetorical exaggeration, and the reading is doubtful: some supplement is necessary, and one can be made which avoids this possibility (e.g. that by Wilamowitz recorded by Thalheim, Teubner edition; Reiske's conjecture, adopted by Thalheim, lacks significance; see also Gernet, Budé edition). I believe that we may read, nearly as Blass, ἀσπερ ἐτέρους δρῶ τοὺς μὲν εἰς τὴν ἄπειρον ίόντας (τοὺς δὲ) καὶ οἰκοῖντας ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις τοῖς ὑμετέτοις καὶ δίκαια ἀπὸ συμβολῶν ὑμῖν δικαζομένους; and take it to mean that some persons, even though living in states now hostile (because they are disloyal to you) are trying, by δίκαια ἀπὸ συμβολῶν, to enforce contracts or the like made by them as citizens of an allied state.

In addition, the details of the σύμβολα themselves, after a general approving resolution of the ekklesia, were settled and confirmed in a court of the Thesmothetai (*Aθην.* 59. 6; Dem. vii. 9), and of course by the other contracting state, whatever the author of Dem. vii may imply.

The question in issue here is whether Athens, after the Delian League had become an Athenian empire, continued towards her subject states the same policy: her *subject* states—naturally she continued it towards her independent allies, both those within the League, Chios and Mytilene, and those without, as Zakynthos and Thessaly, as towards those states which were not allies, but with which she had trading agreements, as the kingdom of Kimmerian Bosporos. (οἱ ξύμμαχοι in this passage of Thucydides of course includes, and means primarily, the subject states.) We have only a little documentary evidence, for example, *I.G. i.2* 16 and 116 (= Tod, 32 and 88), treaties with Phaselis, c. 450 B.C., and Selymbria in 408; but we do not know whether these are exceptional or normal instances, and some important details of the former are uncertain.<sup>1</sup> In this, the Phaselis treaty, which is a measure for the protection of Phaselitan interests, suits arising from contracts (ξυμβόλων) made at Athens are to be tried at Athens before the polemarch's court, καθάπτερ Χίοις (according to the most probable restoration), all other suits 'in accordance with the existing ξυμβολα' between Athens and Phaselis. It is clear that Phaselis is treated here as an equal; the rights are reciprocal; but that the agreement was to be similar, at least in part, to that with Chios, an independent ally, suggests a privilege special to Phaselis, not common to all the other 'allies' (the polemarch's court tried cases in which foreigners were involved, so that the autonomous status of Phaselis seems to be recognized; but see above). 'The existing ξυμβολα'<sup>2</sup> may be those concluded when Phaselis first joined the League after the battle of Eurymedon, or may be much older, belonging to a time when she was quite independent of Athens; more probably the former, as Phaselis joined the League by persuasion of the Chians (Plut. *Kim.* 12. 3).<sup>3</sup> In any case,

Allowing for the exaggeration, this makes good sense. It does not at all imply that men left Mytilene in order to bring such suits, because they could not bring them in Mytilene, a subject state. (Blass says: "πολέμου sunt Lacedaemonii eorumque socii, quibuscum tunc temporis verbo pax erit Atheniensibus"; which is possible if the speech belongs to such a period. See below, p. 242.)

<sup>1</sup> The most difficult is l. 15 τὰς [δὲ ἐκκλήσ]τρους ἀφελεῖν, where, apart from the uncertainty of the restoration, the meaning of the restored phrase is much disputed. The probability is that it means those δίκαια in which a third state was called in to decide; but it might mean those properly belonging to Phaselis which had hitherto been sent to Athens as ἔκκλητος πόλις.

<sup>2</sup> Reading κατὰ τὰς σύστας ξ., or κ. τ. πρὶν ξ.

<sup>3</sup> The view, held for example by Kalinka (p. 158), that this inscription shows that Chios had submitted to some restriction of her autonomy in respect of δίκαια ἀπὸ συμβολῶν, is without any justification.

the inscription probably belongs to the middle of the century, perhaps a little earlier, that is, before the League had been fully converted into an empire.

In the treaty with Selymbria, for all disputes arising from existing contracts which cannot be amicably settled (whether between individuals or between the state and an individual), δίκαια εἶναι ἀπὸ ξυμβολῶν, which implies that Athens or some Athenians, or allies, were parties to the contracts and that δίκαια ἀπὸ ξυμβολῶν were a normal and well-known procedure. Selymbrian rights are being guaranteed; therefore this procedure was based on reciprocity, was not an exercise of Athenian power, as is indeed clear from the fact that δίκαια ἀπὸ συμβολῶν were the usual procedure in disputes between citizens of completely independent states. But again, Selymbria had surrendered to Alkibiades at a time when Athens may well have been prepared to act with more than usual moderation (Xen. *Hell.* i. 1. 21, 3. 10; Plut. *Alkib.* 30. 3); so once more we cannot say whether this treaty was in accord with normal Athenian practice in 432.

In addition to these we have in *I.G.* i.² 60, a treaty with Mytilene made c. 427 after her defeat and the settlement of Athenian cleruchs, a general reference to disputes between Athenians (not the cleruchs) and Mytileneans being settled κατὰ τὰς ξυμβολὰς αἱ ήσαγε πρὸς Μυτιληναῖς;<sup>1</sup> since Mytilene had been an independent ally these earlier ξυμβολαὶ must have been based on reciprocity, and the trials in accordance with them not therefore transferred to Athens. Similarly in the treaty with Samos, 405–404, *I.G.* ii.² 1 (Hicks and Hill, 81), ll. 17–18, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἢ ἄν γέγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι τὰς δίκαιας κατὰ τὰς ξυμβολὰς τὰς οὐσας: since Samians are being given by this treaty Athenian citizenship and complete equality, these ξυμβολαὶ also, which had been in force when Samos was a subject ally, must have been fully reciprocal.<sup>2</sup> In i.² 22, a treaty with Miletos of 450–449, we have a reference to some class of δίκαια being tried at Athens within a stated period—probably therefore ἐμπορικαὶ δίκαια (*Aθπ.* 59. 5); the limitation of period being of course a guarantee to Milesians against delay.<sup>3</sup> From these inscriptions we know then only that δίκαια ἀπὸ συμβολῶν, implying

<sup>1</sup> I read with Bannier and Hiller [δίκαια διδόντας] πρὸς Αθηναῖς καὶ δεχομένος κατὰ, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>2</sup> Kahrstedt, p. 1089, finds it curious that Samians, now made fellow-citizens, should have ξυμβολαὶ at all. This is to misunderstand the nature of this grant of citizenship: the state of Samos was not to be absorbed in Athens, they were not to be one state—see ll. 12–13, Σαμῖοις Αθηναῖοι εἶναι πολιτευομένοις ὅπως ἢν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται . . . τοῖς δὲ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν αὐτονόμους ὄντας. The citizenship, that is to say, was honorary except in the case of those Samians who settled in Athens.

<sup>3</sup> See Oliver, *Trans. A.P.A.*, 1935, 177. In this case too the parties had to pay τὰ πρωταγέα, the court-fees which according to Ps.-Xenophon, 1. 16, were one of the special attractions, for Athenians, of having cases tried in Athens. See below.

treaty rights, were open even to an allied state recently defeated and severely punished; as between Miletos, an ordinary subject state, and Athens, some cases were to be tried in Athenian courts; but it seems clear from the cases of Phaselis, Samos, and Mytilene (and, I should judge, from that of Selymbria as well) that δίκαια ἀπὸ συμβολῶν were not all of them tried in Athens.

Apart from these treaties we have only general statements, not very accurate at that. In Bekker, *Anecd.* i. 436, we read Αθηναῖοι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν ἔδικάζοντο τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης, as though these δίκαια were confined to subject states, while Pollux, viii. 63, defines ἀπὸ σ. δ. at Athens as ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἔδικάζοντο (distinguishing them at the same time from ἐμπορικαὶ καὶ ἐμπρησταὶ δίκαια). Hesychios, ἀπὸ σ. δ., has a similar statement, without the reference to Aristotle, but with the significant addition, καὶ τοῦτο ἦν χαλεπόν. If the reference to Aristotle is to *Aθπ.* 59. 6, it is wrong, for there is nothing there about the Athenian empire; and these lexicographers are quite mistaken in their definition of δίκαια ἀπὸ συμβολῶν (contrast Harpokration, quoted above, p. 238; and Pollux, viii. 88). But clearly they had some authority (good or bad) for believing that at the time of the empire such cases, when subject cities were involved, were tried at Athens; and these statements may all be based on inferences from this passage in Thucydides. Athenaios, ix. 407 B, makes a more sweeping statement, apparently from Chamaileon (end of the 4th century B.C.): a story about Alkibiades (not in itself credible) καὶ ὃν χρόνον θαλασσοκρατοῦντες οἱ Αθηναῖοι ἀνῆγον εἰς ἀστυ τὰς νησιωτικὰς δίκαια. This may also derive ultimately from Thucydides, or from Isokrates, *Panath.* 63, τὰς τε δίκαιας καὶ τὰς κρίσεις τὰς ἐνθάδε γυγνομένας τοῖς συμμάχοις καὶ τὴν τῶν φόρων εἴσπραξιν διαβαλεῖν. But if we compare § 66 of the same speech, ἦν μνησθῶσι τῶν ἀγώνων τῶν τοῖς συμμάχοις ἐνθάδε γυγνομένων, τίς ἐστιν οὕτως ἀφυῆς στοις οὐχ εὑρήσει πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντειπεῖν, ὅτι πλείους Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἀκρίτους ἀπεκτόνωσι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, ἐξ οὗ τὴν πόλιν οἰκοῦμεν, εἰς ἀγῶνα καὶ κρίσιν καταστάντων; (Thucydides' παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς δροῖσις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις), we see at once that Isokrates is thinking, mainly at least, of political trials.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the 'Old Oligarch' (not a writer to be relied upon in general or in detail) has a long passage on the advantages gained by the Athenian demos from compelling their subjects to bring their lawsuits to Athens (i. 14–18:

<sup>1</sup> *Paneg.* 113, often cited as well, may have nothing to do with the subject allies (so Lipsius, 971, n. 17).

Bodin, *Mélanges Glotz* (1932), 93–102, notes similarities between the *Panegyrikos* and this speech of the Athenians, and thinks that Isokrates had this passage of Thucydides in mind (and that the latter wrote it after 404, alluding to Spartan conduct at that time). It is possible; but Isokrates is too vague—he answers the sort of charge against Athens, and makes the sort of defence, that could be heard anywhere in the early fourth century.

with which may be compared Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 550–630, though there is no explicit reference there to the *allies* in Athenian courts);<sup>1</sup> but these suits are not said to be δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν. It is implied that there were a great many of them; but apart from the financial gain to poor Athenians, from the dicastic fees and from the money that reached the city through the influx of many foreigners, the advantage to Athens (it is asserted) was a political one—they could rule the empire while sitting at home, without any naval expeditions, and they could more easily support their partisans in the cities and suppress their opponents. Clearly the writer, like Isokrates, has political trials in mind,<sup>2</sup> and those arising out of tribute assessments, and the like, not contract disputes between individuals of Athens and of the allied states which would give rise to the largest number of δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν. At the same time, one must remember that these συμβολαὶ protected the citizens of the contracting states from arbitrary treatment in every kind of trial (cf. Andokides, quoted above); that is, some δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν will have been political.

Further, we know from the treaty with Chalkis made in 446–445 after the revolt and subjection of Euboea, *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 39 (Tod, 42), a treaty, that is to say, which was not likely to err on the side of moderation,<sup>3</sup> as, with less precision, from that with Erythrai, *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 10 (Tod, 29; Highby, 'The Erythrae Decree', *Klio*, Beiheft 36, 1936: but see below, pp. 291–4), that cases in those cities involving the penalty of death, exile, or citizen rights were to be referred to Athens (in the case of Erythrai, Athens had the final word—ll. 25–8); that is, treason-trials were to be held in Athens: Chalkis was guaranteed autonomy, in so far as she was to control her own magistrates καθάπερ Ἀθήνησιν Ἀθηναῖοι, πλὴν φυγῆς καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀτμίας: such cases were to be sent to the court of the Thesmothetai at Athens (ll. 71–6).<sup>4</sup> And in an often-quoted passage Antiphon, v. 47, asserts that his opponents have put a man to death, ὁ οὐδὲ πόλει ἔξεστιν, ἀνεὶ Ἀθηναῖον οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιώσαι,<sup>5</sup> as politics were only indirectly involved in the affair of the *Murder of Herodes* (the victim being an Athenian cleruch), this may mean that at the date of the speech (after the revolt and defeat of Mytilene, but perhaps as early as 424: Breuning, *C.Q.* xxxi, 1937, 67–70), all homicide-trials as well as treason-trials were referred to Athens. Or, more probably, only those homicide cases in which an Athenian citizen was concerned.

It seems clear from all this evidence that δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν were

<sup>1</sup> It is instructive also to contrast *Vesp.* 656–79 with Ps.-Xen. 1. 16–17.

<sup>2</sup> As *Vesp.* 281–5.

<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, Athens had just escaped from a great danger: perhaps her policy was moderate.

<sup>4</sup> See further below, pp. 293, 342–4, for the Erythrai and Chalkis decrees.

<sup>5</sup> Lipsius, p. 971, n. 15, who points out that πόλει here should not mean Mytilene alone.

not universally transferred to Athens (as Kahrstedt, for example, p. 1090, appears to infer from the Phaselis decree), though political trials were;<sup>1</sup> or, as we should more precisely put it, δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν, which imply reciprocity between the contracting states, were not abolished between Athens and her subject allies and another form of trial substituted for them; all that we can say is that the συμβολαὶ were modified to suit the new procedure in political trials. Yet, if we translate Thucydides' sentence in what seemed to be the most natural way, we must assume that between Athens and many, at least, of the subject states αἱ συμβολαὶ had been abolished, though we have no explicit evidence of this and the case of Mytilene—so soon after her drastic punishment—would be a surprising exception. The other alternative is to suppose, with many scholars, that Thucydides is giving two examples of Athenian ἐπιεικεῖα—her submission to (unjust) verdicts in many δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν where these take place in allied courts, and her establishment of impartial courts (for other cases) at home; though only the latter is relevant to the charge of litigiousness. Since there is no reason to suppose that the Athenian speaker would have said that all these δίκαι had been transferred to Athens if they had not been, this second alternative seems after all to be right.

We may note (1) that the Athenian speaker is here answering a particular charge, though he has said he will do no such thing (cf. 75. 3 n.); (2) that we have not heard of the charge before; and (3) that, as has already been pointed out, the allies are likely to have charged Athens with something much more serious than τὸ φιλοδικεῖν; they would have said that she showed no judicial spirit in these trials, but used them to strengthen her own power, for her own advantage, ἐπὶ καταδούλωσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων (as Ps.-Xenophon implies, though Mytilene makes no such complaint in the speech at Olympia before her revolt). It was Athenians like Plato who, in the interests of Athens, blamed the policy which made their fellow-countrymen so litigious, idle, and talkative.

It should also be observed that the Athenian boast, παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὅμοιοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις and (§ 3) οἱ δὲ εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσου ὄμιλεῖν, was not entirely idle. The story of the trial of Paches may be untrue (see iii. 50. 3, n.); but Thucydides makes Phrynicos the oligarch say, τούς τε καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὄνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσων αὐτοὺς (the subject allies) νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, παριστὰς ὅντας καὶ ἐστργητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἑκείνους εἶναι καὶ ἀκριτοὶ ἀν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνήσκειν, τὸν δὲ

<sup>1</sup> If we keep the reading ξυμβολαὶ δίκαι in this passage and translate 'contract cases', it would be still less true that they were thus transferred.

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δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονίστην (viii. 48. 6). With this in mind we can see how the Old Oligarch's view of the activities of the demos, περὶ δὲ τῶν συμμάχων . . . τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς ἀπιμούσι καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἔξελαίνουν καὶ ἀποκτείνουνται, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς αἴξονται, may be in fact interpreted: the oppressed in the subject cities had some redress against the oppressor, whether fellow-countryman or Athenian. 'I appeal to Athens.'

For a possible increase of δίκαιοι at Athens in which subject states were involved, caused by the new assessment of tribute in 425 (Meritt, *D.A.T.* 38-9), see n. on iv. 51.

2. τοῖς καὶ ἄλλοθι που ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι: "This cannot refer to the Peloponnesian confederacy, the members of which were not ὑπόκοοι. A scholium rightly says οὖν Πέρσαι, Σκύθαι. We may add the Carthaginians and Thracians, and compare § 5 below"—Forbes. The Persians, yes; but the speaker was surely not thinking of the rest; and if the Peloponnesian confederacy is excluded (which is not certain: it is an Athenian who is speaking), the whole of the Peloponnesian may not be—the treatment of Messenia by Sparta may be included.

3. παρὰ τὸ μὴ οὔτεσθαι χρῆναι: *contra quam opinaretur fieri non debere, contra opinionem suam fieri non debere [putantium]*—Seidler, quoted by Stahl; only παρά is not *contra*, but 'alongside of', 'compared with' (almost exactly our colloquial 'along of').

ἢ γνώμῃ ἢ δυνάμει τῇ διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν: "a subject city might be compelled [rather, ordered] to dismantle a fortification or to pay higher tribute . . . by a decree of the assembly [or it] or one of its citizens might lose a case which had been tried in Athens . . . or again (δυνάμει) an Athenian στρατηγός or ἐπίσκοπος might levy troops, make requisitions, suppress oligarchical clubs, etc."—Forbes.

τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς χαλεπώτερον φέρουσιν: a genitive of 'respect', as it is called, a kind of remoter object of χαλεπῶς φέρειν, as in ii. 62. 3. See Classen's note on iv. 11. 4, φύλασσομένους τῶν νεῶν. τὸ ἐνδεές is 'their inferiority', 'weakness'.

Arnold quotes Clarendon, who complained "that every man" (in the early years of Charles I's reign) "was more troubled and perplexed at that they called the violation of one law, than delighted or pleased with the observance of the rest of the charter" (*Works*, i, p. 119, Oxford, 1807). Polykrates of Samos acted on what in practice would turn out to be similar principles, but expressed himself differently: ἔφερε καὶ ἤγε πάντας διαιρένων οὐδένα· τῷ γὰρ φίλῳ ἔφη χαριεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἀποδιδούς τὰ ἔλαβε ἢ ἀρχὴν μηδὲ λαβών (Hdt. iii. 39. 3). τὸν νόμον: a rare use of the singular in the sense of Law, as opposed to violence, except in such phrases as κατὰ νόμον, ορ ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἔοντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροι εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος (without the article). But Plato, *Prot.* 337 D, has τὸ γάρ ὅμοιον τῷ δροὶ φύσει συγγενές ἔστιν, δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ἦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν

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φύσιν βιάζεται (of course a conscious paradox of expression). The parallels to this usage in Thucydides adduced by Stahl (ii. 53. 4, iii. 45. 3, 56. 2) are not at all close.

4. ἀδικούμενοι: 'wrongly treated in δίκαιοι', where law and justice should prevail; i.e. 'under the impression that they are wrongly treated'.

5. ὑπὸ γοῦν τοῦ Μήδου, κ.τ.λ.: the speaker has this much right on his side, that it is true we always judge Athens by the highest moral standard. We seldom speak of the 'aggression' or the 'selfish purposes' and 'narrow outlook' of the Persians, of Philip and Alexander, of the early Romans, not to mention later empires. The difference in our outlook is inevitable, for the moral question was raised at the time; ethically as well as politically the Athenian attempt at empire came too late in Greek history.

εἰκότως· τὸ παρὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ βαρὺ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις: for the difficulty in the sequence of thought here, which is a real one, see Steup's note. γοῦν introduces an example of the generalization ἀδικούμενοι οἱ ἀνθρώποι μᾶλλον ὄργιζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι; then with τὸ παρὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ βαρὺ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις we have a completely different cause of dissatisfaction, one indeed which, strictly speaking, is inconsistent with ἡνείχοντο—for when Median rule was present, it must have appeared hardest to bear. (Nor has τὸ παρόν, κ.τ.λ. anything to do with what follows in § 6; this, however, is not to be objected to, for § 6 has, and is intended to have, rhetorical, not logical force.) A new argument from psychology is introduced, very abruptly; but it does not much help to see the hand of Thucydides' 'editor' here.

6. ὥμεις γ' ἀν οὖν, κ.τ.λ.: a repetition in much greater detail and in pointed form of the idea expressed generally in 76. 4. This is another of the statements in speeches which, according to many, Thucydides was incapable of writing before the event here envisaged (*εἰ καθελόντες ἡμᾶς ἀρξατε, τάχα ἀν τὴν εὑνοιαν μεταβάλοτε*). One would have thought that the examples of Pausanias, alluded to by the speaker, and Kleomenes would have made the prophecy an easy one. Cf. i. 95 and 128. 3-130 for Pausanias, 95. 7 for the general rule, iv. 81. 3 for the exceptional Brasidas (*πρῶτος γὰρ ἔξελθων καὶ δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθός*); and iii. 93. 3, v. 52. 1, for other instances of Spartans abroad, after 432 B.C., but long before Sparta succeeded to the empire of Athens (Classen).

78. 1. βουλεύεσθε οὖν βραδέως: for the expression, cf. Isokr. i. 34, βουλεύον μὲν βραδέως, ἐπιτέλει δὲ ταχέως τὰ δόξαντα.

τοῦ δὲ πολέμου τὸν παράλογον: 'the incalculable chances of war' (not subject to λόγος, human reasoning); a commonplace in Thucydides—cf. 84. 3 ad fin., iv. 18, vii. 61. 3.

2. ἐσ τύχας τὰ πολλὰ περιστασθαι: Demokritos, fr. 269, generalizes

further, *τόλμα πρήξιος ἀρχή*, *τύχη δὲ τέλεος κυρίη*. Thucydides was always conscious of the importance of 'the fortunes of war'. (It is just that and no more.) Cf. 140. 1, and Ion of Chios quoted in the note there.

ἐν ἀδήλῳ κινδυνεύεται: "κινδυνεύεσθαι enthält hier nach dem Zusammenhang ebenso wie den Begriff einer Gefahr wie ii. 35. 1"—Steup. Thucydides did not write *κινδυνεύεται* for *ἐστι* without purpose; the idea of danger is present here ('the danger lies in the obscurity of the future') as in ii. 35. 1 ('endanger the reputations of many').

3. *ἴόντες τε οἱ ἀνθρωποι, κ.τ.λ.*: but not the Athenians themselves, in their best moments—ii. 40. 3.

4. *τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκη λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνθήκην*: like Kerkyra three years before (28. 2), Athens took the apparently proper pacific and non-aggressive attitude. Sparta remembered this afterwards, vii. 18. 2.

For the general tenor and motives of the Athenian speech see below, pp. 252–5.

79. 1. *κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς*: 67. 3 n.

2. *ἀδικεῖν*: 'were in the wrong'. *πότερον ἀδικεῖ ὁ φεύγων η̄ οὐ*: was the question put to the Athenian juries—guilty or no? *ξυνετός . . . καὶ σώφρων*: intellectual and moral (or predominantly moral) qualities respectively, as usual. Cf. *σωφροσύνη ἔμφρων*, 84. 2; *ἀμαθέστερον . . . σωφρονέστερον*, 84. 3. Also 32. 4 n.

### 80–85. Speech of Archidamos

80. 1. *πολλῶν ηδη πολέμων ἔμπειρός εἰμί*: Archidamos in effect succeeded his grandfather Leotychides when the latter went into exile c. 476 B.C., and formally perhaps in 469. (See below, pp. 405–7.) He may have fought in the Persian wars before that.

*ἀπειρίᾳ ἐπιθυμήσαι τινα τοῦ ἔργου*: cf. ii. 8. 1. The schol. quotes the well-known saying *γλυκὺς ἀπείρω πόλεμος* (see Pindar, fr. 110). The inexperienced may also be terrified into submission at the prospect of war (81. 6).

2. *σωφρόνως . . . ἐκλογίζοιτο*: 'soberly.' Cf. 32. 4 n., and above, 79. 2.

3. *οἱ γῆν ἔκας ἔχουσι*: by comparison with the Persians, however, they were near neighbours, 69. 5 (Classen).

*οὐχι ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνὶ γε χωρίῳ Ἐλληνικῷ ἔστιν*: whether *οὐχι* here means 'the rest of the population', apart from cavalry and hoplites (Stahl, Forbes), or 'total population' (*ἴπποις καὶ ὅπλοις* being taken literally, Classen: cf. vi. 17. 2) is doubtful; though *ναυσὶ* suggests that if we exclude any, we must exclude the rowers of the

fleet as well. It is surprising, however, to find a statement that the total population of Attica was greater than that of Lakonia (which included Messenia), unless slaves and Helots are excluded. Cf. 81. 1 n. (Note that *οὐχι* has not necessarily a derogatory sense, as often asserted. It depends on the context, as with our word 'crowd'.) *ράφινας*: 'lightly', 'without thought', as in 73. 1.

4. *τοῖς χρήμασιν*: cf. 121. 3, 5, 123. 1, 141. 3.

*οὐτε ἔτοιμας ἐκ τῶν ιδίων φέρομεν*: "ἔτοιμας nicht bereitwillig, sondern mit Leichtigkeit, nämlich von bereit daliegenden Mitteln"—Classen. 'Our wealth is not in cash, not in liquid assets, as is much of the Athenian'; Athens therefore could more easily manage *εἰσφοράι* (iii. 19. 1). Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. 6. 23, 1271 b 13, says that the Spartiates were reluctant to tax themselves; it was one of the weaknesses resulting from their constitution. Cf. 141. 4–5.

81. 1–2. Archidamos warns the Spartans against the idea that the ordinary methods of warfare, which had served them so well against other Peloponnesian states, will be effective against Athens (though he later, 82. 3–4, admits or implies that they will have some effect). See Introd., pp. 11–12. In fact he brings against the Corinthians' plea for immediate action some of their own arguments (71. 1–3). Cf. § 6 below, and 143. 4; also viii. 96. 5.

*τάχ' ἀν τις*: the asyndeton is abrupt; and Hude adopts Krüger's emendation *τάχ' ἀν δέ τις*. If the MSS. are right, it enhances the liveliness and directness of the speech.

*τοῖς ὅπλοις αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ πλήθει ὑπερφέρομεν*: there is nothing here inconsistent with 81. 3. The total Peloponnesian hoplite force far outnumbered the Athenian.

4. *ἡμῶν δὲ πόλεμος*: see 128. 3, n. on *τὸν Ἐλληνικὸν πόλεμον*.

*μὴ . . . η̄ . . . η̄*: 'if we fail in one or the other of two alternative policies' (not *μήτε . . . μήτε*).

6. *μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισίν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν*: another sentence which it has been thought Thucydides could not have written before the event, that is before at least, say, 412 B.C. Similarly in 82. 1, where Archidamos recommends getting allies among the non-Greek states; though in this case, we are told, ii. 7. 1, that already in 431 Sparta thought of seeking alliance with Persia and other states, and later did send ambassadors, ii. 67. 1, iv. 50. 1–2; cf. i. 100. 2. Athens did the same, iv. 50. 3, Ar. Ach. (cf. 45. 2 n. on *Διότιμος δὲ Στρομβίχου*).

82. 1. *ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ, κ.τ.λ.*: see previous n.

*ναυτικοῦ . . . δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα*: they had recently watched the strongest available naval force nearby go over to the *enemy*. The Corinthians had not reminded Archidamos that this was one of the results of *βραδύτης*; it had not been a glorious campaign for them.

**ἀνεπίθονον:** less than fifty years after the great invasion, and with Athens in the position of protector of the Greeks of Asia Minor, the Peloponnesians naturally still felt some reluctance in seeking the help of Persia; and enemies were always ready to be indignant. There is no reason why we should share their indignation.

2. **ἐσακούσωσι:** this (the reading of AE) seems better than **ἐσακούώσι**.  
 3. Archidamos is the typical pacific statesman, sensibly anxious to postpone a war and hoping by postponement to avoid it altogether, but not (as far as we know) having made earlier any serious attempt to avoid its causes.

4. See 81. 1-2 n.

6. **ἔνεκα τῶν ἴδιων:** τῶν Κορινθίων· οὐ γάρ ἦν κοινὰ τὰ ἔγκληματα πάντων τῶν Πελοποννήσων, ἀλλὰ μόνων τῶν K.—schol. This is presumably right (so all edd.), if we add Megarian and Aeginetan interests; but it is awkward after *καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἴδιωτῶν* just above. Archidamos may have meant that Corinthian and Megarian complaints were mainly those of merchants.

83. 2. **ὅστιν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὅπλων τὸ πλέον ἀλλὰ δαπάνης:** a truth that Thucydides more than once emphasizes, but seldom illustrates. Cf. Introd., p. 26. “Δαπάνη hat hier u. c. 99. 3, die Bedeutung ‘Geldmittel’”—Classen. Not quite; ‘finance’ is its meaning: i.e. the obtaining or possession of money *and* its right spending.

84. 1. **τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον:** not the words that Archidamos himself would have chosen to describe the Spartan method (he would say *καθ' ἡσυχίαν*, as in 83. 3, 85. 1); but he is prepared to use the Corinthians' own terms and defend them, as, though he is himself *ξυνετός* and praises *σωφροσύνη* *ἐμφρων*, he will defend *ἀμαθία* (§§ 2, 3 below).

Thucydides was under no illusion as to the value of Spartan slowness as it often showed itself in practice (e.g. viii. 96. 4-5); while for an instance of admirable *βραδύτης* in action, see v. 70.

2. **σωφροσύνη ἐμφρων:** Archidamos was *καὶ ξυνετὸς καὶ σώφρων*, 79. 2, both intellectually and morally wise (*ἐμφρων* here gives the intellectual aspect: *σωφροσύνη* *ἐμφρονα* λέγει τὴν μετὰ λογισμοῦ τυγχάνουσαν, οὐ τὴν ἀλόγιστον καὶ ἀπὸ φύσεως μόνον συμβαίνουσαν—schol.). In what follows we have an analysis of this *σωφροσύνη* in public affairs: it is a refusal to allow the *emotions* to dominate the judgement, whether those natural to success or to failure, whether pleasure at flattery or annoyance at blame—action determined by any kind of excitement is dangerous and wrong.

With *ξυμφορᾶς ἥσσον ἔτέρων εἴκουεν* cf. what the Corinthians said: *τὸ ὑμέτετον . . . τῶν δεινῶν μηδεπότε οἰσθαι ἀπολυθῆσθαι*, 70. 3. To support the Corinthian contention, one might quote the Spartan alarm at their defeat in Sphakteria.

**ἢν τις ἄρα ξὺν κατηγορίᾳ παροξύνῃ:** this refers not to the Athenian, but to the Corinthian speech (see below, p. 254); and *κατηγορίᾳ* is purposely used, because the Corinthians had disclaimed it (69. 6).

3. **αἰσχύνης:** here = *αἰδώς* just before, a notable and surprising instance of *μεταβολή* (Ros, p. 103). The use of *αἰσχύνη* to mean a ‘proper sense of shame’, a virtue, here especially essential to *εὐκοσμία*, the good order of the state, was common in Greek at all times; in Thucydides, cf. ii. 43. 1 (Perikles), v. 9. 9 (Brasidas), ii. 51. 5, etc. The scholiast here quotes *Il.* v. 531, *αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σόοι ἡὲ πέφανται* (the 4 lines, 529-32, are necessary to understand the meaning); better, cf. Soph. *Aj.* 1073-83, and, with Poppe, Plut. *Kleom.* 9, *ἔστι δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐ φόβον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ θανάτου καὶ γέλωτος καὶ τοιούτων ἄλλων παθημάτων ἕφρα. τιμῶσι δὲ τὸν φόβον οὐχ ὥσπερ οὖς ἀποτρέπονται δάιμονας, ἤγούμενοι βλαβερόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πολιτείαν μάλιστα συνέχεοθαι φόβῳ νομίζοντες. . . . καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐκ ἀφοβίαν, ἀλλὰ φόβον φύγον καὶ δέος ἀδοξίας οἱ παλαιοὶ νομίζειν. οἱ γάρ δειλότατοι πρὸς τοὺς νόμους θαρραλεώτατοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους εἰσὶ· καὶ τὸ παθεῖν ἥκιστα δεδίσσιν οἱ μάλιστα φοβούμενοι τὸ κακός ἀκοῦσαι.* See v. Erffa, ‘*Αἰδώς und verwandte Begriffe*’, *Philol.*, Supplb. 30. 2, 1937. Particularly in Thucydides' day both philosophers and sophists were playing with all the possible implications of words; hence the paradoxical praise of *ἀμαθία* in the next sentence (which is an answer to the charge of *ἀμαθία*, 68. 1). Cf. 36. 1 n.; and Shilleto's note here.

It is not correct to say, with the scholiast, most editors, and Powell in his review of Ros (*C.R.* liii, 1939, p. 13), that not only *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη*, but *εὐψυχία* and *πολεμικός, σωφροσύνη* and *εὐκοσμον* are also “distinctions without a difference, mere *variatio*”. The stages in the argument are three: (1) *αἰδώς* is an important part of *σωφροσύνη*, (2) *εὐψυχία* of *αἰσχύνη* = *αἰδώς*, and (3) *σωφροσύνη* is essential to *τὸ εὐκοσμον* and *εὐψυχία* to *τὸ πολεμικόν*; but this last step is omitted because it is obvious. To be brave is not the same thing as to be a good soldier, though it is an essential condition of being a good soldier; and, in this context, *τὸ εὐκοσμον* (in the state) is the result of *σωφροσύνη* in the individual, not identical with it. Similarly the Spartan upbringing, *ἀμαθέστερον . . . ἀνηκονοτεῖν*, is the cause of their *εὐβουλία*, not the same thing as *εὐβουλία*. Croiset takes the passage rightly; and Ros only notes the *μεταβολή* of *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη*. Cf. Plutarch, *de Fortuna*, 2 (*Mor.* 97 E).

It may be noted in passing that, fond as Thucydides was of *μεταβολή*, he could also frequently use the same word twice in one sentence with different meanings: e.g. *λόγος* in 73. 1 *ad fin.*, *ἐνθυμεῖσθαι* 120. 4-5.

**ἀμαθέστερον . . . καὶ . . . σωφρονέστερον:** cf. the words of Kleon (and they are as characteristic of him as these of Archidamos), *χείροις*

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νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις (cf. i. 71. 3, 85. 1) κρείσσων ἔστιν ἡ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις, ὁμοία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὠφελημώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολασίας, κ.τ.λ., iii. 37. 3-5; and contrast Pericles' proud claim for Athens, ii. 37. 2-3, 40. 2-3. Bagehot recognized the political advantages of stupidity, "Nature's favourite resource for preserving steadiness of conduct and consistency of opinion": see his 'Letters on the French Coup d'Etat of 1851' (in *The Works and Life*, 1915, i. 77 ff.), especially pp. 100-7, where, one would have thought, he must have had this passage of Thucydides in mind.

The advantages of discipline as such, of obedience to the law, was of course already a commonplace at this time.

**τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ὄντες:** so again Kleon, *ibid.* ξυνετός is always a complimentary word, 'intelligent', not 'clever' (see iii. 82. 5 n.). Contrast Euripides, fr. 16,

μή μοι τὰ κομψὰ ποικίλοι γενοίσθω,  
ἀλλ' ὅν πόλει δεῖ.

**καὶ μὴ τὰ ἀχρεῖα, κ.τ.λ.:** 'we do not (like some of our clever allies) make a brilliant denunciation of the enemies' plans and follow this up inadequately in action; we think our neighbours' minds are much like our own, and that the fortunes of war cannot be determined (or defined) by reasoning'. That is, as Croiset puts it, "l'idée générale est qu'il ne faut compter ni sur les défaillances de l'ennemi ni sur le hasard, mais uniquement sur soi". But (1) this is an abrupt change of direction from the idea of the first half of this sentence, and the abruptness is the more marked by the close grammatical connexion (the infinitives ἐπεξιέναι and νομίζειν being parallel to ἀνηκονοῦτεῖν); and (2) the application of the first part is obscure: the Corinthians may be *τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοί*, but they did not cleverly denounce the enemy's preparations; their 'cleverness' was shown in the picture of the enemy's and the Spartan characters; and there has been nothing to suggest that they would follow up their words by inadequate deeds (or is this an unkind hit at the Corinthian failure at Kerkyra and Poteidaia?). I am inclined to think that though formally the infinitives may be dependent on *ὅστε*, a pause is intended at *ἀνηκονοῦτεῖν*, and that the infinitives are equivalent to imperatives: 'we (who are not *τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοί*) should not indulge in clever denunciations which can at present, when we are unprepared (80-1), only be followed by inadequate action'. In § 4 it is better in any case, I believe, to read *παρασκευαζόμεθα* (ABEFM), with Widmann, Croiset, and Steup, not *παρασκευαζώμεθα* (CG; Stahl, Hude, Stuart Jones), for it is parallel to *ἔχειν δεῖ* in the next clause.<sup>1</sup> I can see no reason either for Stahl's lacuna after *παρασκευαζόμεθα* or for Steup's proposal to transpose the whole of § 4

<sup>1</sup> If we keep the indicative, Forbes' suggestion to read *καὶ <γάρ> οὐκ ἐξ ἑκενών, κ.τ.λ.*, is best.

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after 85. 1. Steup says we cannot have *ταῦτα . . . μελέτας* after a passage of exhortation which interrupts the description of the *μελέται* in 84. 1-3; but 84. 4 is still argument, in whatever form it is expressed—let us keep to our own way of dealing with these matters: Archidamos in *ώς πρὸς εὖ βουλευομένους* agrees with the Corinthians in principle, but not in application; with *πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἀνθρωπὸν ἀνθρώπου*, he dismisses their whole theory of Athens and Sparta and its elaborate presentation. 85 begins the exhortation, first in general terms, then in particulars.

**4. ὄστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται:** 'one educated in the necessary, and only in the necessary virtues', the bare minimum (as in *ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαιοτάτου ὕψους*, 90. 3), the opposite of *οἱ τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοί*; or 'one brought up in the hardest school'? Archidamos would doubtless have argued that the two amounted to the same thing.

**85. 1. ἔξεστι δ' ἡμῖν μᾶλλον ἐτέρων διὰ ισχύν:** the essence of Archidamos' case for delay, that Athens will not in the interval become any stronger at the expense of the Peloponnesian: 'we can afford to wait; time is on our side'. *ἐπειχθέντες*, like *ἐπαρθέντες* (cf. 82. 5, 83. 3), characteristic of those who have no *σωφροσύνη*, or are in desperate straits; who will not or who cannot afford to wait.

**2. ἐπ' ἀδικοῦντα:** 'one against whom the verdict of guilty has already been given.' Cf. 79. 2 n., 86. 5, 87. 2, 4.

The simplicity and directness of Archidamos' speech, both in thought and expression (with the exception of 84. 2-3), is in marked contrast with the elaboration of the Corinthian, as well as with the Athenian. The two give us an admirable picture of the general habit of the Spartans as they appeared to themselves and to their often exasperated allies; just as the Corinthian speech and Pericles' Epitaphios show Athens from two different aspects.

86. *Speech of Sthenelaïdas*

**86. 1. ὡς οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον:** Sthenelaïdas' speech is excellently in character. He is not concerned with the wrongs of Athens' subject allies, and says nothing, in the Spartan assembly, about freeing Greece; only Peloponnesian interests concern Sparta.

**διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοι:** this sophism is repeated in the Theban speech against Plataia, iii. 67. 2.

**2. ἦν σωφρονῶμεν:** this can mean simply 'if we act as sensible men', though here it refers to Archidamos' idea of *σωφροσύνη* as applied to the present situation.

4. ὡς ἡμᾶς πρέπει βουλεύεσθαι ἀδικουμένους μηδεὶς διδασκέτω: as both the Athenians and Archidamos had done.

87. 2. **βοῆ:** not a confused crying of *Aye* and *No*, but, at least according to Plutarch, in due order and quietly—*Lyk.* 26. 3: *βοῆ γὰρ ὡς τâλλα καὶ τὸν ἀμιλλωμένους ἔκρινον, οὐχ δροῦ πάντων, ἀλλ' ἐκάστου κατὰ κλῆρον εἰσαγομένου καὶ σιωπῆ διαπορευομένου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.*

We are not to suppose, with Classen, that there was any doubt about the result of the voting, or the size of the majority; Sthenelaïdas wanted to make his victory as impressive as possible.

4. **βούλεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν πάντας ρυμάχους παρακαλέσαντες:** there will be some delay, in spite of Sthenelaïdas' brave words. The allies' representatives who were then at Sparta had been informally summoned there by Corinth to urge Sparta to action (67. 1-2; in 67. 3 the Spartan authorities summon these representatives to a meeting of the apella); now there was to be a formal conference of the whole League, called by Sparta as its head. Whether those states who had sent delegates at Corinth's request had given them full powers to vote for war if asked, we do not know.

6. ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει: see 125. 2 n.

#### *Note on the First Debate at Sparta, 67-87*

The group of four speeches here given raises a more intricate problem of composition than perhaps any other in Thucydides, with the exception of the Melian dialogue. It is the speech of the Athenians which is awkward, for two reasons: its content and tone, and because Archidamos appears completely to ignore it—his main argument is that his hearers must not let their emotions get the better of their judgement, neither pleasure at being praised nor indignation at blame, any more than over-confidence after victory or despair after defeat (84. 2); yet he does not apparently refer to the emotions that would naturally be aroused by the Athenian speech, but only to those aroused by their allies' complaints. In addition it has been objected to on artistic grounds: it throws out the balance of the composition—how much neater and tidier the whole debate would be without it, the Corinthian argument on the one side, the king's on the other, then Sthenelaïdas' and the decisive vote.

Those scholars, and they are the majority, who believe that Thucydides' speeches are free compositions of his own, with little or no reference to 'what was actually said', point triumphantly to this Athenian speech, and say that it must have been composed and

inserted later than the others. They have not seen that this view aggravates the difficulty instead of lessening it. For Thucydides was a competent, not an incompetent, artist; if he felt himself free to make up what speeches he pleased, he knew well enough how to compose a 'well-balanced' debate—indeed it is an argument of these scholars that the ordered arrangement of other debates is itself a reason for supposing that he invented the speeches; neither at the time he wrote the speeches of the Corinthians and Archidamos nor later would he have inserted a third which upset the balance of the whole, if artistic composition was his aim.<sup>1</sup> Besides, Sthenelaïdas' speech is essential to the debate, and that presupposes the Athenian as well as both the other two speeches.<sup>2</sup> It is obvious, to me at least, that the artistic weakness, if it exists, is much better explained by the conscientiousness of the historian—the speech was delivered and was important—than by the clumsiness of the artist, just as the smoothness of the narrative of events is often broken by insertions that an artist might have avoided but a historian cannot omit (e.g. vi. 95, vii. 27-30).

There is no difficulty in believing that Athenian delegates were at the time present in Sparta, on other business, that they asked to be allowed to address the apella, and that their request was granted.<sup>3</sup> The difficulty of their speech (besides the lack of any reference to it by Archidamos) lies in its tenor. Taken by itself it would seem to have been purposely provocative. 'We are not going to answer charges against us (you are not our judges); but we should like to advise you that this is a serious matter.' 'We must remind you of our great achievements, however boring may be this constant repetition; and we do so, not to excuse ourselves, but as a warning to you.' The whole of c. 74 (*τὰ Μηδικά*), especially § 3, the poor spirit shown by Sparta, especially the parenthesis in § 3, *ὅτι γοῦν ἤμεν ἔτι σῶοι, οὐ παρεγένεσθε*; 'You refused to finish the war against Persia'; 'You were quite ready to allow us an empire till now, when you think your own interests in danger and so talk about right and wrong'; 'You would soon lose the goodwill of Greece if you succeeded to our empire—especially if you behaved as you did during your brief leadership against Persia; your ways do not suit others, *καὶ προσέπτι*

<sup>1</sup> Schwartz's view that the Athenian speech was inserted here by Thucydides' editor is thus, to this extent, more logical. But it leaves other problems unsolved: for example, to what end had Thucydides 'composed' this speech, if not to insert it here? See Pohlenz, p. 99.

<sup>2</sup> If we could transpose the Athenian speech and that of Archidamos, the logical connexion of all four would be improved; and since the Athenians spoke only by special favour, they might have been permitted to address the apella in the course of the debate that followed the withdrawal of the Peloponnesian delegates. But this is expressly denied by Thucydides (79. 1).

<sup>3</sup> See my *Essays*, pp. 157-8, 161. 1.

*εἰς ἔκαστος ἔξιών οὔτε τούτοις χρῆται οὐθ' οἷς ή ἀλλη 'Ελλὰς νομίζει'*—all this, ending with the bland βουλεύεσθε οὖν βραδέως, τὸ βραδύ being the taunt always levelled at Sparta (at least from the days of Marathon), quite apart from the Corinthian speech just delivered: 'go slowly, Lacedaemonians'—what other purpose can this have had than to provoke the honest Spartans to a hasty declaration of war? What other effect did it have? The simple Sthenelaïdas falls straight into the trap; he can be exactly described as one who ἐπειχθεὶς καὶ ἀχθεοθεὶς ἀνεπελοθη. This is just what Archidamos does his best to prevent. Yet when he refers to provocation, it is to that of the Corinthians, not of the Athenians: *ἢν τις ἄρα ξὺν κατηγορίᾳ παροξύνῃ* and *τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον, ὃ μέμφονται μάλιστα ήμῶν, μὴ αἰσχύνεσθε*—one would have expected the Spartans to have been sooner stirred to anger by the provocative irony of the Athenians than to shame by the φύγος of the Corinthians. Only the end of the Athenian speech (78. 2-4) reads like a serious attempt to warn, though not to placate, the Spartan audience.

There would be nothing surprising if the Athenian aim had really been to provoke a declaration of war. They did not of course desire a war for its own sake (all states prefer to get what they want without having to fight); and they were careful not to be the aggressors in the technical sense (44. 1 n.); but they thought, and rightly, that, if war was to come, the sooner the better for them, before their enemies were ready. That is why they allied themselves with Kerkyra, why they refused the Peloponnesian demands to rescind the decree against Megara; they would not go beyond the offer to settle disputes by arbitration, according to the terms of the treaty (and this only because they would be glad if the Peloponnesians seemed to be the aggressors). All this was seen clearly by Archidamos, who urges delay, not in the interests of peace for its own sake, but that they themselves may be the better prepared for war (80. 4, 82. 1-3)—the Athenians are all ready for it—and that they may not appear as the aggressors (85. 2). And the course of the ten years' war proved abundantly that he was right, in spite of the mistakes of the Athenians (cf. 84. 4). Yet, quite clearly, Thucydides did not think that it was the Athenian aim to be provocative, but the contrary (72. 1).<sup>1</sup> The puzzle remains; and it is not less, but much more difficult to explain on the assumption that Thucydides composed the whole speech himself; for he was artist enough to know how to make the Athenians say 'what they ought to have said', if they wanted seriously to keep the peace, if, that is to say, their and Archidamos' aims were the same. Why did he not make the two speeches rather more alike in tone?

<sup>1</sup> *Mutatis mutandis*, 72. 1 would serve excellently as a summary of Archidamos' aim.

This is the only occasion on which Thucydides gives four speeches in a debate; and it is interesting to discuss his purpose. He did not cramp himself by the principle of δισσοί λόγοι, but recorded what speeches he thought necessary. Here there are four sides to the problem, all of them significant: the allies of Sparta, or rather some of them, have their grievances against her and their own complaints (different from the Spartan) against Athens; Spartan opinion is divided, and both sides are important and must be represented—roughly the older and the younger generation (cf. 72. 1); the common enemy (disliked by all these three), the aggressive and imperialist state, the Athenian empire in its contrast with other empires—that also is important: an important factor in the ultimate decision to go to war, as well as showing a very significant aspect of the whole problem.<sup>1</sup> In the second conference at Sparta, on the other hand, only one speech is necessary—'all of us, who have suffered or will for certain suffer from Athenian aggression, must join in the war, and all together, or δίχα γε δυτας ήμᾶς ἀπόνως χειρώσονται' (122. 2): many of the members of the Peloponnesian League, perhaps the majority, had not been represented at Sparta on the earlier occasion; they must be persuaded, but other opposition had been overcome. In the earlier debate, that at Athens, the two opposing forces are given: forces making for and against an alliance which may hasten war, represented by the selfish, isolationist state, Kerkyra, who will never be a valuable ally, on the one side, and on the other by Corinth, willing to co-operate as a friend and dangerous as an enemy. The speech on the Athenian side which secured the majority of votes is not there given by Thucydides, as for some reasons it might have been, because it is to be reserved till the end of the book, as the decisive speech in the pre-war period; there was no need for more than one of Perikles' speeches at Athens at this stage, for the main arguments would be the same on each occasion—or at least the outlook remained the same. And when it is given, only Perikles' speech is recorded, though there was opposition, because this opposition was not important as was that of Archidamos at Sparta; Perikles was at the summit of his influence and power—he represented Athens. That is how Thucydides saw the position of groups and parties in Greece in 432.

<sup>1</sup> See Pohlenz, 100-6, who puts this well; but is in some ways too schematic. He compares this contrast of old and young at Sparta with the other pairs, Nikias and Alkibiades, Hermokrates and Athenagoras; and the comparison has point. But Thucydides, a wiser man than Pohlenz, does not say that Sthenelaïdas was young, nor that Hermokrates was old—indeed the implication in Athenagoras' speech (vi. 38-9) is that he belonged to the older generation, Hermokrates to the younger, and we may well believe it.

Grundy, *J.H.S.* xxviii, 1908, 94-5, ignores the difference of opinion at Sparta, which persisted long after war had broken out.

88. Thucydides repeats what he regards as the truest 'explanation' of the war, i.e. the underlying cause (23. 6). From 24 to 87 he has given at length the *airīai*, 'causes of complaint' (see above, p. 153); he now deals with the growth of the Athenian empire, the true cause of the war, in its two stages, first, the fortification of Athens (a necessary preliminary) and the transference to the leadership of Athens instead of Sparta of a large number of Greek states (89–96), and second, the development of the leadership into an empire (97–118).

### 89–118. 'Η Πεντηκονταετία

A discussion of Thucydides' aim and method in writing this excursus, and of the chronology of the events recorded, will be given below, 118.2 nn. The only other extant continuous narrative of the period 479–432 (or rather to 435, when the affair of Kerkyra began) is that of Diodoros, xi. 39–xii. 28.

89. 1. ἥλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ηὐξήθησαν: literally, 'arrived at the situation in which they had become so powerful'. Cf. ii. 36. 4, ἥλθομεν ἐπ' αὐτά. (Stahl also compares viii. 92. 2, ἥσαν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα; but the meaning there is somewhat different: cf. § 4, ἡπτοντο τῶν πραγμάτων. Antiphon, vi. 20, ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα, is again different.) Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* iv. 63. 3, imitates Thucydides: δι' οἵων τρόπων ἥλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δι' οἰνών πειράσομαι διελθεῖν (noted by Krüger). Stahl and Classen take ἥλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα to mean the obtaining of the hegemony of the allies only, related in 89–96; then follows 97–118. 2, the story of the *αὐξηθῆναι*. But the whole sentence is one; *ηὐξήθησαν* is pluperfect in sense (following closely on 88), and *τὰ πράγματα* is the position of Athens in the period before the war, say 445 to 432. Croiset rightly takes the sentence as a unity, but also divides the subsequent narrative: he translates *τὰ πράγματα les actes*, and says, 'le récit de ces actes ne commence qu'au ch. 97. Jusque-là Thucydide expose les circonstances qui les ont préparés. Cf. 97. 1.' This is nearer to, but not (I think) quite the truth. See 97. 2 n.

2. *Capture of Sestos*: Hdt. ix. 114–18; Diod. xi. 37. 5 (479–478).

ἐς Μυκάλην διεφθάρησαν: Hdt. ix. 100–5.

Λεωτυχίδης . . . ἀπεχώρησεν ἐπ' οἴκου: Hdt. ix. 106. 4, 114. 2, giving a more detailed narrative, tells us that the Peloponnesians sailed to the Hellespont with the Athenians and Ionians, but on finding the bridge of boats already destroyed went home, leaving the others to besiege Sestos.

οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἐλλησπόντου ρύμαχοι ἥδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως ('who had now revolted from Persia', not 'having revolted'): unnecessary difficulty has been made of the supposed discrepancy between this and Herodotus, ix. 106. 4. The latter states that, by their action at Mykale (103–4), οὕτω δὴ τὸ δεύτερον Ἰωνίη ἀπὸ Περσέων ἀπέστη; then, having related the dropping of the Peloponnesian proposal to transport the Ionians (of the mainland) to Greece proper, he says that Samos, Chios, Lesbos, and the other island states, presumably including the Dorian, were formally admitted into the Hellenic confederacy; Sparta, the leader of the confederacy, was naturally not prepared to accept as allies states on the mainland which she was unwilling to defend. These last joined Athens, and later, with her, broke away from the Peloponnesians (c. 95, below); this detail Herodotus does not mention, and that is the only difference between the two accounts. Thucydides in ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας includes Lesbos, and mainland Aiolis, and presumably the Dorian Hexapolis, or at least the Dorian islands as well; just as Herodotus in describing the proposal περὶ ἀναστάσιος τῆς Ἰωνίης must include Aiolis.<sup>1</sup> (The latter, as so often, is silent about the Dorians of Asia Minor, including his own Halikarnassos, which Sparta was ready to leave to Persia.) Similarly Αθην. 23. 4, ἡ ἀπόστασις ἡ τῶν Ιώνων, includes all the Greeks of Asia Minor and the islands. Nor is there any difficulty about this whole phrase *οἱ . . . βασιλέως*: 'those allies from Ionia and the Hellespont who had already revolted'; this neither implies that there were many who had not revolted, nor that they had formally become allies before they revolted. Cf. 95. 1 and 100. 1 nn.

ὑπομείναντες Σηστὸν ἐπολιόρκουν: Herodotus' own words, ix. 114. 2.

ἐπιχειμάσαντες: Hdt. ix. 117 says πολιορκεομένοισι σφι φθινόπωρον ἐπεγένετο, and that after that some time elapsed before the town was taken. His later sentence, 121, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔτος τοῦτο οὐδὲν ἔτι πλέον τούτων ἐγένετο, does not contradict Thucydides. Sestos fell at the end of 479 or early in 478 B.C.

3. Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ κοινόν: the same phrase, here for the simple *Ἀθηναῖοι*, is used by Hdt. ix. 117.

ὅθεν ὑπεξέθεντο: Troizen, Aigina, Salamis, Hdt. viii. 41. 1.

οἰκίαται αἱ μὲν πολλαί, κ.τ.λ.: those who will may see in this a correction by Thucydides of Hdt. ix. 13. 2 εἱ κού τι ὄρθὸν ἦν τῶν τειχέων ἡ τῶν οἰκημάτων ἡ τῶν ἵρων, παντὰ καταβαλῶν καὶ συγχώσας.

<sup>1</sup> This is true even though the objection of the Athenians is expressed as Ἀθηναῖοισι οὐκ ἐδόκεε ὄρχην Ἰωνίην γενέσθαι ἀνάστατον οὐδὲ Πελοποννησίοις περὶ τῶν σφετέρων ἀποικιέων βουλεύειν. The Ionians at Lade included the Lesbians.

**89. 3–93. 2.** *The Walls of Athens*: Diod. xi. 39–40 (478–477 B.C.); Plut. *Them.* 19.

**90. 2.** ὡς δὲ τοῦ βαρβάρου, κ.τ.λ.: a poor excuse, for the possession of walled towns such as Thebes and Athens had not determined the strategy of the Persians.

ἀναχώρησιν τε καὶ ἀφορμήν: ‘both a place of refuge (for armies as well as for non-combatants) and a base for aggressive operations’.

**3. ἀπῆλλαξαν:** “demoverunt ut molestos. Cf. viii. 46. 4”—Stahl (and viii. 86. 6). But it is a strong expression, seeing that they were trying to allay Spartan suspicions. ‘Succeeded in getting quit of them.’ “Mit Hindeutung auf das Lästige ihrer Anwesenheit”—Classen.

πανδημεῖ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, κ.τ.λ.: we should keep the MSS. reading here. πανδημεῖ by itself would normally mean men only (and with a large part of the Athenian forces away at Sestos they would not be sufficient); and Thucydides is giving the words of Themistokles’ resolution or of his speech—the emphasis and detail are eloquent. Classen would even add καὶ οἰκέτας, both on general grounds and in view of Nepos, *Them.* 6 and Diod. xi. 40. 1; but τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει makes this unnecessary.

Nor need we believe that the scholiast had not the words in his text (as asserted by Hude and Stuart Jones, crit. n.); for the scholia of Thucydides often repeat, almost word for word, the reading of the text: see, e.g., ii. 92. 3, 96. 1, and cf. i. 93. 5 n. (p. 265), where Hude and Stuart Jones do not suspect the text. (Besides, this scholion is a late one of as little value for the text as for its own sake: see Powell, *C.Q.* xxx, 1936, 180–2, 147–8.)

**4. καὶ ὑπειπών:** Diodoros, xi. 39. 4–5, says that Themistokles first in the ekklisia bade the Athenians keep quiet and not provoke Sparta, then explained his plan in a secret meeting of the boule. This has been accepted as true by Busolt, iii. 44—an addition by Ephoros to Thucydides’ narrative. Pfister, *B.P.W.*, 1915, 383, thinks that the whole is due to a misunderstanding of ὑπειπών here, Ephoros taking it to mean ‘saying in secret’, instead of the simple ‘adding the suggestion’. This seems right.

**91. 1. διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ:** cf. 74. 1 n. Themistokles’ reception at Sparta had taken place about a year before this. He and Alkibiades are the two Athenians who were socially the greatest successes in Sparta; not Kimon, Nikias, or Xenophon, nor Plato.

τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀφικνουμένων: I do not think it possible to defend this reading. Not only does ‘the rest’ meaning nothing here, but, after τῷ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀφικνουμένων could refer only to Themistokles’ colleagues, who are expected every day. ἄλλων δέ

τινων is a simple alteration or ἄλλων δὲ τῶν ἀφικνουμένων (and perhaps [καὶ])—cf. τῶν Ἐλλήνων τῶν ἀφικνουμένων, 95. 3;<sup>1</sup> but Shilleto’s ἀντοπτῶν for τῶν—ἀντοπ having dropped out after αὐτοῦ—must be mentioned. (This is his suggestion, not ἀντοπτῶν for αὐτοῦ τῶν, as Hude reports; αὐτοῦ is clearly indispensable.)

**2. μὴ λόγοις μᾶλλον παράγεσθαι:** cf. 68. 1.

**3. Ἀβρώνιχος ὁ Λυσικλέους:** who had acted as liaison officer between the Greek army at Thermopylai and the fleet at Artemision, Hdt. viii. 21.

**‘Αριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχους:** ὁ λεγόμενος δίκαιος—schol. It was not necessary to wait for the discovery of Aristotle’s *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* to be sure that the conventional picture of Themistokles all guile, restless, and democratic, and Aristeides honest as the day, the dignified conservative (Plutarch’s picture), was a false one. They had worked well together, though they may have been rivals. See too below, 92, n. Nor need we be Pecksniffian and say (with Forbes), “If Aristides the Just was an accomplice in the trick played on the Lacedaemonians, we may be sure that no other Greek saw much harm in it.”

**4. τὰ τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξύμφορα καὶ τὰ κοινά:** the rearmament of Athens put her into a position to defend both herself and all Greece more effectively.

**5. τὴν τε γὰρ πόλιν, κ.τ.λ.:** this might have come from the Athenian speech at Sparta in 432 (c. 74).

**6. καὶ νῦν ἄμεινον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.:** Stahl, Classen, and Forbes take *ἴδια* καὶ ἐσ τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους as co-ordinate and both with τοὺς πολίτας, showing different aspects of Athenian advantage—‘more advantageous to the people of Athens both on their own account and relatively to their allies generally’. This is impossible; apart from the vagueness of this expression, the necessity of *ἴδια τε*, and its inconsistency with the general argument, *ἐσ τὸ κοινὸν βούλεύεσθαι* in the next clause is sufficient to show that Themistokles is speaking of common Greek as well as of Athenian interests. ‘Unless Athens is strong, she can neither defend herself nor adequately do her part in serving the Greek cause.’ So Steup and Croiset.

**7. ὅμοιόν τι ἡ ἴσος:** often practically synonymous, and so here according to Croiset. But Widmann may be right in translating “im gleichen Sinne und mit gleichem Gewicht”; so Stahl. Athenian counsel might not be the same if she were weak as if she were strong (so the scholiast: ἐάν μὴ ἔχωμεν, φησί, τείχος ὡς οἱ ἄλλοι, μέλλομεν οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις. ἴσως γὰρ πολεμίων

<sup>1</sup> Classen quotes a number of examples to show that *οἱ ἀφικνούμενοι* is used almost as a substantive (“etwa wie unser die Reisenden in etwas anderem Sinn”), though not the best of all, Dem. xvi. 1; but they do not help τῶν ἄλλων here.

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ἐλθόντων ἡμῖν μὲν δόξει μὴ μάχεσθαι ἀλλὰ σπένδεσθαι ὡς μὴ ἔχουσι τείχος, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πολεμεῖν. οὐ γάρ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὴ ὄντα ἵσον τῶν ἄλλων θαρσῆσαι καὶ ὅμοιόν τι ἀποφήνασθαι), and the counsel which she would give, even if, as at Salamis, as courageous and as sensible as that of others, would not carry equal weight. We are reminded of Adeimantos' taunt to Themistokles: *σιγᾶν τε κελεύων τῷ μὴ ἔστι πατρὶς καὶ Εὐρυβιάδην οὐκ ἔῶν ἐπιψηφίζειν ἀπόλι ἀνδρί* (Hdt. viii. 61. 1) —Athens did not intend to be open to that risk again.

**92. ἀδήλως ἤχθοντο:** the significance of this episode, for Thucydides, lay both in the importance of the walls for Athens—they were indispensable for her later development—and in the fact that it caused the first weakening of the friendship between Athens and Sparta; cf. also 90. 1, *τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔξορυνόντων καὶ φοβουμένων, κ.τ.λ.* That he has told it in such detail is doubtless in part also due to his interest in Themistokles' personality.

Little is added to the story by other writers. Diodoros, xi. 39, gives it with characteristically exaggerated details (as that the first Spartan delegation, on failing to persuade the ekklesia, *προσιόντες τοὺς οἰκοδομοῦσι προσέτασθαι τῶν ἔργων ὡς ταχίστην*; and that the Spartans kept Themistokles and his fellow-delegates under guard, and the Athenians put the Spartan delegates under arrest), and does not give Aristeides' name. He says Themistokles made his proposals to go to Sparta *ἐν ἀπορρήτοις τῇ βουλῇ*, which is possibly true. Equally characteristically, Theopompos said that he bought off the Spartan opposition with a bribe (F. 85: Plut. *Them.* 19. 1), an idea to which Andokides gives colour (iii. 38). Plutarch adds the name of Polyarchos of Aigina as one of those who particularly urged Sparta to stop the building. Neither Plutarch nor Nepos, in their lives of Aristeides and Themistokles, says anything of the former's part in the episode, though Aristotle (*Aθπ.* 23. 4) had followed Thucydides.

With this silence about Aristeides in later writers, cf. Diodoros' lengthy account of the building of the Peiraeus walls (xi. 41-3, esp. 42. 2): Themistokles was the originator of the idea, and with him were Aristeides and Xanthippos, but chosen by the people not because they would make good colleagues, but because they were his rivals and personal enemies. Compare with it the similar anecdotes of Themistokles, Aristeides, and the Greek fleet at Pagasai, Plut. *Them.* 20. 1, and Themistokles and the money from the mines, *Aθπ.* 22. 7. See also 91. 3 n.

**93. 2. καὶ δήλη ἡ οἰκοδομία ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὅτι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγένετο, κ.τ.λ.:** modern discoveries have fully borne out Thucydides' description. See I.G. i. 2 971, 984, 1002; Noack, *Athen. Mitt.* xxxii, 1907,

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123-60 (esp. 127-31), 473-566, pl. 10-13, 21-5; Judeich, 124-35; Wrede, *Die attische Mauern* (1933), 10, pl. 22-3. The famous 'hockey-player' and dog-and-cat-fight reliefs are from the Themistoklean wall (Philadelpheus, J.H.S. xlvi, 1922, 104-6). On the other hand, it appears to be certain that the wall was in the main a crude-brick wall, and only the lower courses built as Thucydides describes (Frickenhaus, *Athens Mauern*, 1905; Noack, etc.). See below, p. 264.

The gates in the wall, as for example the Dipylon, were carefully built, and of stone throughout, though of heterogeneous material.

3-7. *The Peiraeus walls*: Diod. xi. 41-3 (477-476 B.C.).

**3. τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπά:** perhaps mainly the landward side, from Mounychia to Eetioneia, the rest, round the coast, being already built or designed; for Themistokles' aim was now to increase the importance of the Peiraeus, to persuade his fellow-countrymen to concentrate there, and for this a strong defence on the land side was essential. See below, n. on 93. 5.

**ἐπὶ τῆς ἑκείνου ἀρχῆς ἦς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἥρξε:** 493-492 B.C., according to Dion. Hal. *Antiq. Rom.* vi. 34. 1. Krüger and others have argued for 482-481 (this and 486-485 are the only years after 493 for which we have no archon-name in our authorities), i.e. the year after Themistokles had advised the building of the fleet (*Aθπ.* 22. 7). There is no evidence for this year (as for 493-492), and election to the archonship was then by lot and so very unlikely either to attract or to result in the appointment of a leading statesman; and Krüger's view must be rejected. But undoubtedly it would fit better with what we know of Themistokles' career. For a *novus homo* and one of outstanding ability, enterprise, and ambition, it is curious that after rising to the highest position in the state in 493, his subsequent activities for ten years should be so obscure. If the orthodox view is correct, it is a warning how little we know of the internal politics of this period. (Cf. 138. 4, note on the date of his death.)

Herodotos, however, vii. 143, says that in 480 Themistokles had but lately come to the front; and Plutarch as well, *Them.* 3. 4-4. 2 and 5. 4, supports by implication the later date. The latter's testimony, implicit only (for he says nothing of the archonship), is worth little;<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, the omission of all mention of the archonship may be significant—clearly it had left no mark in the tradition. It is quite possible that by *ἡ ἀρχὴ ἦν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἥρξε* Thucydides meant not the eponymous archonship but an office held

<sup>1</sup> Contrast with these passages *Them.* 4. 5, where Stesimbrotos is quoted that Miltiades, not Aristeides or Kimon, opposed Themistokles' naval policy, and Plutarch does not note the contradiction.

'year by year', not 'for a year', e.g. that of ἐπιμελητῆς τῶν νεωρίων (see, however, vi. 54. 6), and that these years were 483–482 (perhaps 484–483 too), 482–481, and the beginning of 481–480. It does not seem at all probable that Themistokles, whether or not he was archon in 493–492, began a naval policy then which was dropped for ten years. Nothing in Thucydides would suggest anything of the kind.<sup>1</sup> Philochoros indeed, according to Harpokration,<sup>2</sup> stated of the statue (or herm) known as Ἐρυής ὁ πρὸς τῇ πολίδι at the Peiraeus (see Dem. xlvi. 26): ἀρξαμένων τειχίζειν τὸν Πειραιᾶ οἱ θῆριοι τοῦτον ἀναθέντες ἐνέγραψαν

ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτοι τειχίζειν οἴδ' ἀνέθηκαν  
βουλῆς καὶ δύμου δόγμασι πειθόμενοι

(which reads like a tasteless parody of the Thermopylai epigram); but no mention is made of Themistokles (the names of the dedicators, οἵδε, will have followed the verses), which is surprising, for if he was eponymos, he should have headed the list—some record of a dedication connected with so famous a name and so famous a policy we should have expected to reach us. See also 138. 4, 6 nn.

That Themistokles had been one of the nine archons at least, if not the eponymos, is proved by Αθην. 25. 3 (or should be, if we could trust anything in §§ 3–4 of that chapter), for he is there stated to have been a member of the Areiopagos. Pausanias, i. 1. 2, Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ ὡς ἥρξε . . . τοῦτο (Peiraeus) σφισιν ἐπίνειον εἶναι κατεσκευάσατο, may be only a reflexion of Thucydides; but he probably understood the latter to mean the eponymous archonship.

If it is correct that Themistokles was never archon eponymos, this does not prove Dionysios wrong; but it will have been another Themistokles who was archon in 493–492.

Diodorus dates this completion of the Peiraeus walls in 477–476; which may (for all we know) be correct.

**ναυτικούς γεγενημένους κ.τ.λ.:** there is no doubt that this and § 7 below contradict Αθην. 24. 1–2, which attributes this policy to Aristeides; and little doubt that Thucydides is right. Herodotus, vii. 144, gives a more detailed story; and Αθην. 22. 7 the same story in a foolish disguise. Cf. also Plut. *Them.* 4. 2–4.

**4. καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ἔνεγκατεσκεύαζεν:** since Krüger editors have

<sup>1</sup> It is often stated (as recently by Lenschau in Bursian, cclxi, 1938, p. 232) that the Peiraeus walls were obviously begun (in 493) because of the war with Aigina; but it must be remembered that this fortification of *harbours* was quite a novel idea, part of Themistokles' whole naval policy. Hitherto (and often afterwards) hoplites defended a shore against attack by sea.

<sup>2</sup> Ἐρυής πρὸς τῇ πολίδι and (more fully) πρ. τ. π. 'E. He says this was in the 5th book of the *Attis*, which Boeckh (*Ueber d. Plan d. Attis d. Philochorus, Sitzb. Berlin 1832 = Kl. Schriften*, v. 411) emended to the 3rd book; so Müller in F.H.G. (Philoch. fr. 80–1). Photios, p. 462, ed. Porson, and Suidas, πρ. τ. π. 'E., have the same matter as Harpokration, but for the omission of 'in the 5th book of the *Attis*'.

translated τὴν ἀρχὴν 'the beginning' of the walls; "nam aptissime κ. τ. ἀ. (scil. τὸν τὰ λοιπὰ οἰκοδομεῖν) εὐθὺς ἔνεγκατεσκεύαζε (though his own interpretation that the sentence refers to the building of the city wall is quite impossible); and if τὴν ἀρχὴν here means 'the empire', as older editors thought, the sentence *aptissime cohaeret* with μέγα προφέρειν ἐς τὸ κτήσασθαι δύναμιν. 'Themistokles' fortification plans helped in the foundation of the empire.'

**5. ὅπερ νῦν ἔτι δῆλον ἔστι:** see n. on τὸ δὲ ὕψος below.

**δύο γὰρ ἄμαξαι:** there is no difficulty here either in the meaning or in the expression of it: two wagons, going in opposite directions, brought the stones up on to the wall (and, of course, passed each other; the wall would have had to be yet wider, if they were compelled to turn), just as iv. 23. 2, Αθηναῖοι δυοῖν νεοῖν ἐναντίαιν αἰεὶ τὴν νῆσον περιπλέοντες τῆς ἡμέρας—only two wagons being in use at one time in one place; for the stones had to be carefully fitted, not just dumped in. The sentence is essential to explain τὸ πάχος; yet Krüger, Steup, and others bracket it, and leave 'on Themistokles' advice they built the wall as wide as we can still see it was built'. Remember that Thucydides is not writing for an Athenian audience only. For the use of such phrases of dimension, cf. Hdt. i. 179; Arist. *Av.* 1124–9. So Laskaris, *Φῶς εἰς τὸ Θουκ.* ἔρεβος, i (Athens, 1922), pp. 81–4. Widmann, in Bursian, cxcv, 1923, pp. 215–16, also defends the text, but understands that the wagons approached on each side of the wall, not along its length; but how could that illustrate the width of the wall?<sup>1</sup>

**ἐντὸς δὲ οὔτε χάλιξ, κ.τ.λ.:** to be taken in close connexion with what has just been said. An ordinary wall (one built with rubble in the interior) wide enough to enable two wagons on it to pass each other would not be so remarkable; in one built solidly in ashlar masonry, such a width is notable.

Thucydides goes on to describe what was the normal Greek method of erecting buildings, such as temples, that were meant to be beautiful and imposing: closely fitting squared blocks of stone or marble, clamped together with iron clamps in molten lead. The walls of the Propylaia and the Parthenon had been built shortly before the outbreak of the war (during Thucydides' youth) in this fashion, and the Erechtheion not long afterwards. (In the case of so thick a wall as this usually only the outer stones, τὰ ἔξωθεν, were thus clamped; the inner only fitted into their places.) It was naturally rare to build city-walls so thoroughly; the normal method was

<sup>1</sup> J. E. Powell, *Proc. Cambr. Phil. Soc.*, 1936, 8, has an even stranger notion that the sentence means: "for the stones were so large that it required two waggons end-to-end (*ἐναντίαιν ἀλλήλαις*) to bring them".

either on a foundation of stone to build brick (as probably Themistokles' wall round the city itself), or, more imposingly, to build two walls of ashlar masonry each one course thick and fill the interval between them with rubble, earth, and small stones. (Cf. Introd., p. 16, n. 4.)

The existing remains of the Peiraeus walls are for the most part of those restored in 395-391, or even, according to Säflund, *Opuscula Arch.* i, 1935, 87 ff., a later restoration. These vary from 16 to 26 feet in thickness, amply sufficient for two wagons, and are built generally exactly as Thucydides says the Themistoclean wall was not built, namely with the two outer faces of squared stone and the interior filled with rubble; moreover, the beds cut in the rock to receive the foundations show that there never had been solid ashlar wall; and a good part of the circuit at least had its upper courses built of crude brick (Judeich, 148; Noack, *Athen. Mitt.* xxxiii, 1908, 33-8; Lenschau, *R.E.* art. 'Peiraieus'). The exception to this is the small stretch of the wall on the land-side north-west of Mount Chria hill, the only part of this wall now preserved; it was built of stone throughout.<sup>1</sup> If the walls were restored in 395-391 on the line of the old wall, as is implied by our authorities (cf. Xen. *Hell.* iv. 8. 9-10) and is certain in some sections (however thorough the destruction in 404 may have been, and there is no need to suppose that the foundations were removed—cf., with Arnold, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 11—the greater part of the stones will have been left lying nearby), then only the land-wall of Themistokles' peribolos can have been built of stone throughout. This may be what he means by *τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπά*, § 3, above; but it is hardly what is implied here, and if the coast-wall had been completed or nearly completed before the Persian invasion (at least to half the height Themistokles had wished), we should have expected it to play some part in the story.<sup>2</sup> *τὸ δὲ ὑψος ἡμίσιου μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὐδὲ διενοεῖτο*: i.e. unlike the width, which was completed according to Themistokles' design. This is clearly the meaning (so far, I agree with Widmann in Bursian, cxcv, 1923, 215-16); and we badly need *καὶ φόροδόμησαν* *〈μὲν〉 τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ τὸ πάχος τοῦ τείχους* above.

It has been supposed by most scholars that the words *ὅπερ νῦν ἔτι δῆλόν ἐστι περὶ τοῦ II.* can only have been written after the destruction of the walls in 404: 'we can now see their original

<sup>1</sup> See Leake, i. 2 411-12; Alten in Kurtius and Kaupert, i. 15-18. Leake saw a good deal more of the wall than later investigators. Part at least of the circuit-wall was also rebuilt of stone throughout in 307 B.C. (Judeich, l.c.).

<sup>2</sup> Some have laid emphasis on Thucydides' words in § 4, *καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ἐνυκατεσκεύασεν* (see n. above), and suggested that it was Themistokles' plan to build the wall of solid stone throughout, but this was never executed (see Lenschau, 86-7). This is not what Thucydides says (*ἐντὸς δὲ οὔτε χάλιξ οὔτε πηλὸς ἦν*).

width'. This is quite unnecessary, for three reasons: (1) the width could always roughly (*δύο ἄμαξαι ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις*) be ascertained when they were standing; (2) the similar statement *δήλη ἡ οἰκοδομία* *ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστίν*, above § 2, can have been written at any time after Thucydides began taking notes, for the peribolos of Athens itself was not destroyed in 404;<sup>1</sup> and (3) the justification for the statement is not archaeological evidence (which *might* have been available only after the destruction of the walls), but historical—*δύο γὰρ ἄμαξαι, κ.τ.λ.* Moreover, if Thucydides made a mistake as to the way in which the wall was built (see n. above), it is obviously more probable that he was writing before than after its destruction, when the method of building would have been plain for all to see. See Croiset, and E. Harrison, *C.R.* xxvi, 1912, p. 248. *Νῦν ἔτι δῆλον*, in fact, is not the phrase that would be used to describe something made known recently for the first time, but *ἥδη δῆλον*; it means 'it has long been clear and still is', as in *δήλη ἡ οἰκοδομία* *ἔτι καὶ νῦν*. Of Maiden Castle it could be said "the magnificence of the plan, or the outline of the plan, *can still be seen* (*ἔτι καὶ νῦν*) from the imposing remains to-day", and "the different stages in its development *can now be seen*" (*ἥδη*—since the excavations). The former could have been said any time since (shall we say?) A.D. 500; only the latter must have been written after 1935 or 1936.

I believe, however, that Laskaris (op. cit. on p. 263, above) is right that *ὅπερ νῦν ἔτι δῆλόν ἐστι περὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ* comes from a note by a much later antiquary, and was not written by Thucydides. The next sentence *δύο γὰρ ἄμαξαι, κ.τ.λ.*, does not explain *ὅπερ νῦν, κ.τ.λ.*; a fact which Herbst saw, but which misled him into bracketing *δύο γὰρ . . . ἐπῆγον*. Moreover, the scholiast's note on *τοῦ τείχους* is *τοῦ ἐν Πειραιᾷ, ὅπερ νῦν ἔτι δῆλόν ἐστιν*. Notes of this kind do not necessarily mean that the words were not to be found in the text; I believe for example that Classen and others are right in keeping *καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ γυναικας καὶ παιδας* in 90. 3, where see n. But here, I think, *νῦν ἔτι* in the scholion refers to the commentator's own day (whatever that may be). Note how different in sense are the two sentences, here and 93. 2: 'it is clear to-day how hasty the construction was' and 'they built it of the thickness which is still clear to-day'—for the former refers to a past *action* (which might have been forgotten), the latter to a past *and present state*. If Thucydides was writing this after 404 (see above), he might have said of the Peiraeus

<sup>1</sup> There had naturally been some considerable damage to the peribolos during the troubles of 404 and 403, and therefore some rebuilding of Themistokles' wall in 394-391 here as in Peiraeus: see Noack (above, pp. 260-1), 487-93; Wrede, p. 20, pl. 50. But there is no reason to suppose with Lenschau, *R.E.* xix. 74, that it 'must have been demolished' by the victors in 404. Certainly Xenophon, *Hell.* ii. 2. 20-3, says nothing about its destruction, nor in iv. 8. 9-10 of its rebuilding.

walls, 'it is still clear how thick they were, even after the destruction and the removal of all the stones', i.e. from the beds cut in the rock, or from the foundations, the lowest layers; but that is different; and besides he would have found that the greater part of the wall at least was not built as he says it was.

6. ἀνθρώπων τε ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακήν: this is in accordance with normal Greek practice. See Introd., pp. 16 ff.

τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆσθαι: it would appear to have been Themistokles' intention to do away with the main hoplite-force. (And to keep a regular force of 2,500, as hinted in *Aθπ.* 24. 3? Cf. above, p. 262.) Such a proposal may well have hastened the decline in his popularity that occurred after the Persian wars; in spite of the importance of the navy and the victory of the radical democracy, the hoplites had at that time the greater influence in Athens, and to some degree always kept it. Kleon was a hoplite, not a sailor.

Plutarch said, *Them.* 19. 4: Θεμιστοκλῆς δ' οὐχ ὁσπερ Ἀριστοφάνης δι κωμικός φησι τῇ πόλει τὸν Πειραιᾶ προσέμαξεν (*Equit.* 815), ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλιν ἔξηψε τὸν Πειραιῶν καὶ τὴν γῆν τῆς θαλάττης· ὅθεν καὶ τὸν δῆμον ηὔξησε κατὰ τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ θράσους ἐνέπλησεν, εἰς ναύτας καὶ κελευστὰς καὶ κυβερνήτας τῆς δυνάμεως ἀφικομένης. Earlier in the same *Life* (4. 4-5) Plutarch expressed some doubt as to the error in Themistokles' naval policy: κατὰ μικρὸν ὑπάγων καὶ καταβιβάζων τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν, ὡς τὰ πεζὰ μὲν οὐδὲ τοὺς ὄμάροις ἀξιομάχους ὄντας, τῇ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀλκῇ καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀμύνασθαι καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄρχειν δυναμένους, ἀντὶ μονίμων ὀπλιτῶν, ὡς φησιν δι Πλάτων (*Laws*, iv. 706 C), ναυβάτας καὶ θαλαττίους ἐποίησε, καὶ διαβολήν καθ' ἔαυτοῦ παρέσχεν, ὡς ἄρα Θεμιστοκλῆς τὸ δόρυ καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα τῶν πολιτῶν παρελόμενος εἰς ὑπηρέσιον καὶ κώπην συνέστειλε τὸν Ἀθηναῖον δῆμον . . . εἱ μὲν δὴ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἔβλαψεν ἦ μὴ ταῦτα πράξας, ἔστω φιλοσοφώτερον ἐπισκοπεῦν· ὅτι δ' ἡ τότε σωτηρία τοῦς Ἑλλησιν ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ὑπῆρξε καὶ τὴν Ἀθηναῖον πόλιν αὐθις ἀνέστησαν αἱ τριήρεις ἐκεῖναι, τά τ' ἄλλα καὶ ξέρεταις αὐτὸς ἐμαρτύρησε· κ.τ.λ.

It is remarkable to us, who are accustomed to a conservative outlook (*ἀσφάλεια καὶ σωφροσύνη*) in seamen, how Plato, in his old age, and those who thought with him, attributed the ills of a maritime and mercantile state at least as much to the sailors, and to the sailors in the navy equally with the traders, as to the merchants, traffickers, and bankers who sat at home. See this whole passage in the *Laws* (to 707 D) referred to by Plutarch (who was almost wholly under the influence of writers like Plato, Isokrates, and Theopompos), especially where Plato expresses his scorn for naval tactics and manœuvring (soldiers on land should *never* manœuvre, but

stand their ground<sup>1</sup>): for him they were too much like the tricks of politicians and hucksters. Aristotle, *Pol.* vii. 6. 6-7 (1327 a 40), though he would correct Plato and show himself more realistic, less academic, arguing that some commerce and a navy are desirable, yet shows little knowledge of his subject when he says defensively that a considerable navy need not lead to a dangerous increase in the citizen population, for the rowers will be recruited from *perioikoi*, while τὸ ἐπιβατικὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζεύντων ἐστίν, δι κύριον ἐστι καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας. (Compare too his omission to say anything about the training of sailors in the *Ἀθηναῖων Πολιτείᾳ*.) Most Athenians thought very differently, in spite of the social prestige of the hoplite: Aristeides and Kimon had assisted equally with Themistokles in the growth of her naval power, and Athens was proud of Phormion and her seamen. See above, p. 23 and 142. 9 n.

The memory of the close connexion of Themistokles with the Peiraeus and the navy was preserved later by his tomb on Akte: see below, 138. 6 n.

7. πολλάκις τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις παρήνει, κ.τ.λ.: a policy that was, with much better effect, carried out on the advice of Perikles by the building of the Long Walls (107. 1, 143. 5 n.). Compare the advice attributed to Aristeides by Aristotle, *Aθπ.* 24. 1 καταβάντας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀστεῖ (which in such a context includes the Peiraeus), though with a different aim, τροφὴν γὰρ ἐσεσθαι πόσαιν—the difference being due to the oligarchic bias of Aristotle and his authorities.

8. Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὖν οὔτως ἐτειχίσθησαν: the whole story of the opposition of Sparta to the rebuilding of the *περίβολος* of Athens and Themistokles' ruse by which it was side-tracked, has been rejected by Beloch (*Gr. Gesch.* i. 1 458. 1 and at length, ii. 2. 146-54), followed by de Sanctis (p. 392). It is instructive to examine his reasons.<sup>2</sup> First, it is only one of the many anecdotes about Themistokles and his wiles, some of which, in the form in which we have them, e.g. *Aθπ.* 22. 7, 25. 3-4, and *Plut. Them.* 20. 1, are obviously false, and all of them are unhistorical—this and the other two in Thucydides (Admetos and the *ναύκληρος*, 136. 2-137. 2), the Sikinnos-stories in Herodotus, and those found in later writers; they are all of a piece. 'Such stories always gather round an outstanding personality and reflect the impression which such a man makes on his contem-

<sup>1</sup> Compare the Corinthian tactics and their hopes in the battle of Naupaktos, ii. 83. 5, 84. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See also Stern, *Hermes*, xxxix, 1904, 543-62, who supported Beloch; and the replies of E. Meyer, *Hermes*, xl. 561-9, and Busolt, *Klio*, v, 1905, 255-79. Keil, *Anon. Argent.* 282-301, agreed with Beloch's conclusions, but for very different reasons: his criticism of Beloch is sound, but his own view, that Thucydides adopted (or invented) an artificial story in order to explain Themistokles' character, is very perverse. Nor does he see that Ephoros' version is, in the main, only embroidery, in his own flat manner, of Thucydides.

poraries and even on the next generation. "Darin liegt ihr historischer Wert; aber es wäre naiv, mehr darin zu suchen und solche Anekdoten als Geschichte behandeln zu wollen." Ancient historians, Herodotus, Thucydides, Aristotle, and the rest, all took them for good coin; and we cannot blame them, for they had scarcely any idea how legends grow up. But we should not follow them. Thucydides was indeed "der grosse Lehrmeister der Kritik" for his time; but we historians can learn as little from him in technical questions as modern physicians from Hippocrates.' Secondly, we can see the two elements out of which the legend rose: the fortifications of Athens were the great obstacle to Spartan victory in the Peloponnesian war, so men then<sup>1</sup> asked, why did not Sparta stop it when she could? (cf. i. 69. 1); and the rough manner of building made men think it must have been built hastily—in fact, it is no sign of haste, for old column-drums were built into the north wall of the Acropolis which was not hastily built. Thirdly: (1) a wall 7 km. long could not have been built even to *τὸ ἀναγκαστὸν ὥψος* in a few weeks or months (compare the years taken to build the Long Walls)<sup>2</sup>; (2) Sparta had no reason for objecting to the wall (she did not demand its demolition in 404), and according to Thucydides did not object to the Peiraeus wall, which she might as easily have done: in this Ephorus was at least more consistent than Thucydides in making Sparta oppose the Peiraeus wall as well, absurd though his story is (Diod. xi. 43); and (3) Thucydides contradicts himself, for he says Sparta and Athens were then on very friendly terms (92, 95. 7); nor were any of the other allies then at enmity with Athens (90. 1), except Aegina, who might have objected to the fortification of Peiraeus, but not of Athens; again we have a transference of later conditions (103. 4) to the earlier period.

None of these arguments is sound. Note in the first place that Beloch's reasons are given in the wrong order, first the generalization that all anecdotes are false (not suspect, but false), then the way in which this anecdote grew, then the historical difficulties in its way. Let us take them in their proper order. First: (1) it is obviously wrong to compare the time taken on this wall with that taken for the Long Walls—not only was the length to be rebuilt less, for in places the old wall stood (89. 3), but here there was no quarrying, no stone-cutting, no careful laying of foundations in marshy land; no selection of skilled labour.<sup>3</sup> (2) We begin by rejecting the authority

<sup>1</sup> Beloch believes that *ὅπερ νῦν ἔτι δῆλόν ἐστι* could only have been written after 404. See above, pp. 264–6.

<sup>2</sup> As to which, see 108. 3 n.

<sup>3</sup> Beloch says: "Rein theoretisch genommen, wäre die Sache ja möglich, wenn Geld genug da ist; aber gerade daran fehlt es damals in Athen"; and the Long Walls were built "unter viel günstigeren finanziellen Verhältnissen." As if money was required! All that was needed was strong and willing hands. At the time the Long Walls were built most of the population of Attica were busy doing

of Herodotus and Thucydides, and then, having got rid of what is almost our only evidence, pretend that we know all about the political conditions in 479: 'Sparta was friendly, so would not have objected; the allies were not yet jealous of Athens.' There is clearly no contradiction in Thucydides: Sparta's interference may have been in part well meant, when another Persian invasion was not impossible, and, after the rebuff in 479, and with her usual dislike of interfering at her allies' request, she may well have done nothing when the Peiraeus walls were built. The only one of Beloch's arguments that has a little substance is that Sparta had no reason to object to the wall round Athens; but this in itself is not sufficient to discredit Thucydides' narrative.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly: this is not the way legends grow. Men could not have said 'the city-wall has delayed the Spartan victory', but 'the whole system of fortification of Athens and Peiraeus' (cf. i. 69. 1), as Beloch makes clear when he argues that Sparta could have had no objection to the wall. Nor did men who had seen the wall and its rough construction all their lives suddenly say, in 432 or 421 or 404, 'this must have been built in a hurry'; and if they did, they would have been right. The manner of building is a proof of hurry; the north wall of the Akropolis is not built in this hasty manner, and no other fortification walls in Greece, and particularly not the Long Walls and the Peiraeus wall, were built in such a fashion; and in Thucydides' youth there were people still living who could remember the building and had taken part in it.

We may be sceptical, if we choose, about the details of the story (sceptical, literally; we must not say: 'I am certain it is not true'); but men did not say, only a generation or two after Themistokles' time, 'the wall has hindered Sparta in this war; why did not Sparta hinder its building?' Therefore she did try to, but was bluffed out of it. The only man capable of bluffing her was Themistokles; so he went to Sparta and did this and that, and Aristeides and Habronichos helped him'. If the details are wrong (and there is nothing as such absurd about them), they are wrong because they are embroidery of the plain facts; and the facts, the attempt of Sparta to interfere, the frustration of this by a delaying embassy of Themistokles and his two colleagues, and the hasty building, these facts remain. In the same way, the basis of the silly story of other things. This is very characteristic of the way "we modern historians" correct the ancients.

<sup>1</sup> "Also eines von beiden: entweder die Spartane haben widersinnig gehandelt [in objecting to the city and not objecting to the Peiraeus walls], oder Thukydides hat Widersinniges erzählt; und dieser Alternative gegenüber kann die Entscheidung nicht zweifelhaft sein" (p. 152). On the contrary, even granted the premiss, the decision would be a difficult one; and the probability would be in favour of Thucydides.


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Themistokles and the new fleet in *Aθπ. 22. 7* (which is correctly dated) is sound, and so is that of the many stories of his dishonesty in money matters, as Beloch himself recognizes elsewhere (ii. 2 i. 31, 33); while the story of his attack on the Areiopagos, on the other hand, has no basis in fact.<sup>1</sup> That is to say, every 'anecdote' must be tested for itself, both its inherent credibility and the evidence; they must not all be lumped together; and we must recognize that in such matters Thucydides is a better authority than Herodotus (not only from his greater critical ability, but from his very different attitude to biographical detail), and much better than Ephoros, Aristotle, and all later writers. The fact that Thucydides, equally with Herodotus and other Greek historians, believed details of the heroic age of Greece about which we are rightly sceptical (see cc. 3-12, above), slightly affects the question, for he is here too dealing with events before his own time, but does not settle it. He certainly claims to have studied the history of the period 479-431 with some care (97. 2).

**94. Greek expedition to Cyprus and to Byzantium: Diod. xi. 44. 1-3 (477-476 B.C.).**

The narrative, in the order of events, is resumed from 93. 2; or from 89. 3, if we consider only the war with Persia.

**1. Παυσανίας:** regent for his cousin Pleistarchos, who though a son of an elder brother, was younger than he and not yet of age (132. 1). Pausanias must have been quite a young and inexperienced man in 479. The genealogy of the Agiads at this period is as follows (see Beloch, i. 2. 173-8):



<sup>1</sup> There may have been at an earlier time some joint attack by him and Ephialtes on members of the Areiopagos, which gave rise to the story. But the evidence for the story is so poor that such a supposition is as unnecessary as it is unhelpful.

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**εἴκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου:** 50, according to Diodoros, xi. 44. 2 (he follows Thucydides in the number of Athenian ships and says nothing about *οἱ ἄλλοι ἔνυμαχοι*). His date is 477-476; presumably the expedition set sail before the end of 479-478, and the victories in Cyprus and Byzantium were in 478-477 (summer and autumn, 478).

This expedition does not, of course, involve, as some have supposed (e.g. Dickins, *J.H.S.* xxxii, 1912, p. 33), any change of policy at Sparta since the return home of Leotychidas after Mykale (89. 2). That was in the autumn of 479, and was in accordance with usual Greek practice, whether or no the war was to be continued the following year. The Athenians and Ionians were exceptional in staying out the winter to besiege Sestos.

**ξυνέπλεον δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι:** under the command of Aristeides according to Diodoros, of Aristeides and Kimon, according to Plutarch, *Arist.* 23. 1; *Kim.* 6. 1. Themistokles was at home still superintending the building of the walls? Aristotle, *Aθπ. 23. 3*, has it that the latter, *τὰ πολέμια δοκῶν δεινός εἶναι*, served his country in war as *στρατηγός*, Aristeides *τὰ πολιτικά δοκῶν δεινός εἶναι* (who, if not Themistokles, was *τὰ πολιτικά δεινός?*) *καὶ δικαιοσύνη τῶν καθ'* *ἔαντὸν διαφέρειν*, as *ἔνυμβολος*.

**2. ἐς Κύπρον:** the reason why the Greeks went so far afield before attacking those places nearer home which were still held by Persia was presumably that it was an important basis for the Persian fleet. They did not hold Cyprus permanently (see 104).

**ἐς Βυζάντιον:** of obvious importance to the Greeks; for it controlled not only one of the two passages from Asia Minor into Europe (the other, by Sestos, had already been taken), but the sea-communication with the Euxine, where so many Greek colonies had been founded. That there was already an active trade between Greece proper and the Euxine is shown by the readiness of the Athenians to settle in the Hellespont, at Sigeion, and in the Chersonesos, in the sixth century, after most of the land had been taken by the earlier colonies.

For a representation on a vase of stelai set up in honour of the dead of, perhaps, this campaign (or, less likely, that in which Pausanias was expelled, 131. 1), see Wolters, *Sitzber. Bayer. Akad.*, 1913, No. 5. *ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ:* I agree with those who keep the MSS. reading and join these words with *ἔξεπολιόρκησαν*, not with the next sentence (reading *δέ* after *ἡδη*). Thucydides is emphasizing Pausanias' leadership of all the Greek forces when Byzantium was captured; it permitted his treasonable actions.

**95. The conduct of Pausanias and his recall: cc. 128. 5-130 below, and Diod. xi. 44. 3-6 (477-476 B.C.).**

**1. κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές:** again the Ionians (who alone were akin to the Athenians: 2. 6, 6. 3) are taken for the whole of the Asiatic Greeks,

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even though some distinction is made just above. See 89. 2 n. There is no need to bracket the phrase, with Steup.

6. **Δόρκιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινάς:** probably in the ensuing spring, 477 B.C. The whole Peloponnesian force was then soon recalled; it did not wait for the campaign of that summer.

7. **χείρους γίγνωνται:** as the Athenians politely pointed out to them, 77. 6.

**96. Formation of the Delian League:** Ar. *Aθην.* 23. 5 (478–477 B.C.); Diod. xi. 44. 6, 47 (477–476). (I will take the opportunity of pointing out again that these dates of Aristotle and Diodorus are not necessarily conflicting. If the League was formed in the spring of 477, that would be in the consulates of M. Fabius and L. Valerius, which Diodorus equates with the archonship of Adeimantos, 477–476. See Introd., pp. 4–5.)

1. **τὴν ἡγεμονίαν:** not *τὴν ἀρχήν*, at the beginning of the League; and *ἐκόντων τῶν ἔνυμάχων*—it is part of Thucydides' purpose to show how a loose confederacy became a more or less well organized empire. (In Ar. *Aθην.* 23. 2 we read that the Athenians secured this leadership *ἀκόντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων*, which many have wanted to alter to *ἐκόντων οὐ εἰκόντων* to bring it into consonance with Thucydides and passages in Isokrates and others. See Sandys, *ad loc.*, who points out that *τῶν ἔνυμάχων* here does not include the Peloponnesians at all, but means the cities now willing to form the League. 95. 7, however, shows that Sparta was at least not opposed, and I believe that *ἀκόντων τῶν Λακ.* in Aristotle means 'Sparta being unwilling to keep the leadership', like 75. 2 above, *ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου.*)

**ἔταξαν ὃς τε ἔδει παρέχειν, κ.τ.λ.:** certainly 'settled which cities were to furnish money and which ships', not as Kirchhoff and Steup 'the amount of money and the number of ships which the cities were to contribute'. 'To determine a city's tribute' is *τῇ πόλει τάξαι τὸν φόρον*, not *τὴν πόλιν τάξαι*, as Steup says; see 19. 1, *I.G. i.2* 218<sub>45</sub>, and L. and S.<sup>9</sup> s.v. III. 3.

How many cities furnished ships by the first assessment we do not know: Naxos (98. 4) and Thassos (101. 3) certainly, besides Lesbos, Chios, and Samos; probably a good many others, as Chalkis and Eretria, but very likely none of those on the Asiatic mainland, whose fleets had been destroyed at Lade. See below, pp. 285–6.

**πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν, κ.τ.λ.:** explaining *πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον*. The 'announced intention' was aggression against Persia, a continuation of the war, not only preservation of the newly won freedom.

2. **Ἐλληνοταρίαι τότε πρῶτον Ἀθηναῖοι κατέστη ἀρχή:** a magistracy familiar in Thucydides' own day. Note (1) that it is a purely

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Athenian office, from the beginning; it is not elected by the *ξύνοδος* of the allies, though the *ταμεῖον* is at Delos; the auditors of the accounts were also Athenian magistrates (see Tod, p. 52); and (2) that they are called 'Treasurers of the Greeks', not of any section of the Greeks, because the League is an organization directed against Persia rather than because it is supposed already or hoped in the future to represent all Greece. Cf. the use of *οἱ Ἑλλῆνες* in the war against Persia in Egypt, 109. 4, 110. 1 (*Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἔνυμαχοι*, however, 100. 1, 109. 1, *Ἀθηναῖοι* only, 104. 1). At the same time, we may, with Forbes, compare the *Ἐλλανοδίκαι*, the judges at the Olympic games, who do represent all Greece.

Our 'quota lists', *I.G. i.2* 191–231, *S.E.G. v*, *A.T.L.*, are accounts of the Hellenotamiae, i.e. a list of the quotas of one-sixtieth paid by them to the tamiae of Athena from the *φόρος* received from each of the tribute-paying members of the League, from 454 B.C. onwards (the date at which in all probability the *ταμεῖον* was transferred to Athens, and the quota to Athena instituted).

ἢ δὲ ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἔξήκοντα: this was assessed by Aristeides in 478–477, *Aθην.* 23. 5.

If we had the evidence of Thucydides only we should assume that (1) the amount of the tribute was afterwards changed (*ὁ πρῶτος φόρος*); (2) that in 431 it amounted to c. 600 tal. (ii. 13. 3); and (3) that there was no substantial change after this till it was abolished and the tax on sea-borne trade substituted for it in 414–413 (vii. 28. 4). Yet of these three assumptions only the first is correct, and many have doubted the figure 460 tal. for 478–477 as well; while we know from the quota lists a number of changes in the payments of individual cities, many of which are significant (cf., for example, nn. on 58. 1, p. 211, 110. 4, 114. 3, p. 345, and iv. 120. 1), about which Thucydides is silent. For the 600 tal. of ii. 13. 3, see the note there; and for the important reassessment of 425–424 by which the tribute was doubled or trebled, see the note on iv. 51. Here we need to consider the known figures of tribute collected between 454–453 and 433–428 (one should say, rather, known and restored with reasonable certainty). Walker, *C.A.H. v.* 44–6, writing before the great work of revision of the tribute lists by Meritt, West, and others was published, accepted Pedroli's figures, that 455 talents was the largest sum ever collected in a single year, and that in many years much less was collected (in Beloch's *Studi di Storia Antica*, i, 1891, 101 ff.). Tod, p. 56, using the lists as published in *S.E.G. v*, gives much lower figures: c. 370 tal. in 454–453, c. 350 or 380 tal. in 443–442,<sup>1</sup> c. 390 in

<sup>1</sup> For the hesitation between 350 and 380 for this year, see below, p. 276, n. 3.

Meritt, *D.A.T.*, 96–7, reckons the amount collected in 454–453 at 350 tal. rather than 400 tal., by analogy with other years; but this assumes more *ἀπόταξις* already in 454–453 than I think probable. In 448–447 he says that not more than

433–432. My own calculations (based on *A.T.L.*) give somewhat higher figures than Tod's, but in no year more than c. 400 tal. In these lists we have the *ἀπαρχαι* paid over by the Hellenotamiae to the Treasurers of Athena, and so also proof of the sums actually received as tribute; Aristeides' figure was only an assessment, the sum that it was agreed to raise; but even so we cannot believe that year by year the sums received fell regularly so far short of the assessment. If Tod's figures are correct or nearly so, the assessments for these years must also have been less than 460 tal. (at most 400 tal.). There would, however, be nothing as such surprising if the assessment was substantially lowered after the battle of the Eurymedon, when the first object of the League, *ἀμύνεσθαι ὁν ἔπαθον δηοῦντας τὴν βασιλέως χάραν*, had been achieved; and so far there is no reason to doubt Thucydides' figure for the first assessment given here.<sup>1</sup>

There is besides another method of approach to the problem. After 454–453 there was a reassessment practically every four years (in 450–449, 446–445, 443–442, 438–437, 434–433, 430–429, 428–427, and 425–424, according to the latest view). If we make two assumptions which, it will be admitted, are in themselves quite reasonable, namely, (1) that a city which is known to have paid at least once within an assessment period paid the same tribute in every year of that period,<sup>2</sup> and (2) that a city which is known to have paid regularly in, say, four or even three of the first six periods (for which

280 tal. were actually received, and attributes the decrease to reluctance to pay tribute after the Peace of Kallias had removed the danger from Persia; but note which states, on this assumption, did not pay—Byzantium was one, whose reluctance and (perhaps) ability to refuse is understandable; but Aigina was another.

<sup>1</sup> On the question whether there was a large *addition* to the membership of the League after the Eurymedon, see n. on 100. 1.

The commonplace of later authors who contrasted the tribute afterwards introduced by the 'demagogues' with that assessed by the honest Aristeides is not against this view. In the first place, it is only repeating a rhetorical commonplace; in the second, the contrast with the assessment of 425–424 was a real one; and in the third, there had been many individual changes of assessment, and all those which meant increased tribute naturally appeared arbitrary and unjust to the cities which had to pay them. Further, as Forbes pointed out (p. lxxxvii, n. 2), we cannot draw any general conclusion from v. 18. 5, where, by one of the terms of the Peace of Nikias, it is agreed that Argilos, Stagiros, Akanthos, Stolos, Olynthos, and Spartolos are to pay *τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐν Αἰγαρέδον*. "These cities must have been half ruined by Xerxes' expedition: the previous inhabitants of Olynthos had been massacred by Artabazos in 479 (*Hdt.* viii. 127); Argilos was close to Eion, which the Persians held when the confederacy was established. Hence the first assessment of these cities may well have been exceptionally low." And even if it was lower still after the Eurymedon, a promise that the tribute of Aristeides' year would be enacted was still a guarantee against a future increase either on them individually or by a general reassessment such as that of 425–424.

<sup>2</sup> Excluding certain exceptional cases such as the Lykioi who are only known to have paid once in all the years of the League, and all those who, like Poteidaia and Olynthos, stopped payment on seceding from the League.

our records are much better preserved than for the years after 429–428) paid also in the other two or three periods, unless we have evidence to the contrary—if we make these assumptions, we reach very different, and very interesting, conclusions. This is the method adopted by Nesselhauf, pp. 95–120; and I have made the following calculations, based on *A.T.L.*, by the same method:<sup>1</sup> first period (454–453 to 451–450), 493 tal., with 170 states known to have paid in at least one of the four years (assumption one above), and c. 200 probably paying (assumption two); second period (450–449 to 447–446), 449 tal.; fourth period (443–442 to 439–438), 395 tal.; and sixth period (434 to 430), 422–431 tal. Nesselhauf points out that the excess over Aristeides' 460 tal. in the first period is nearly accounted for by the inclusion of Aigina in the League, with a tribute of 30 tal., in 457 B.C., and that in the second period many of the island states had their tribute lowered so as to bring the total (which he makes apparently rather higher than I do) back to c. 460 tal.; that in the fourth period (and probably the third) there was a considerable diminution in the tribute especially of the Ionian, Karian, and Hellespontine districts, so that the assessment was probably 400 tal. in all;<sup>2</sup> and that in the sixth the tribute was raised again, probably with the aim of regaining the old standard 460 tal. Many of the states whose tribute had been lowered in 446 were assessed in 434 (perhaps already in 438) at their pre-446 rates, showing that the decrease in 446 was in their case only temporary. Some of the other decreases in 446 were due to special causes, as the settlement of cleruchies (cf. below, pp. 276, 373 ff.).

But we cannot quite leave it at that. To get these figures of 493 tal. in the first period and 449 tal. in the second we have included the payments of 200 and of 190 states respectively (all, that is, who paid in any one year of each period, or can be reasonably supposed to have paid, on the assumptions mentioned above); but on the record itself there is no room for more than 141 paying states in 454–453, 163 in 453–452,<sup>3</sup> 147 in 452–451 and 157 in 451–450, while in the second period, there is room for 189 states in 450–449, 151 in 448–447, and c. 200 in 447–446;<sup>4</sup> and in consequence the amounts received by the

<sup>1</sup> My figures are very close to Nesselhauf's, who was using *S.E.G.v*. One difference is that he took 435–434 as the first year of the sixth assessment period instead of the fourth year of the fifth. He shows the changes from one period to another both for the several districts and for the individual states, in a very valuable survey.

<sup>2</sup> In the Thracian district the tribute of Thasos was, for special reasons, raised in 446 from 3 to 30 tal., but those of some other states lowered so that the same total was reached, somewhat as among the island states in 450.

<sup>3</sup> The difference between this and Tod's figure (p. 55) is due to the new discovery about the list for this year made by Wade-Gery: see *B.S.A.* xxxiii, 1932–3, 101–13, and *A.T.L.*

<sup>4</sup> One year's record, generally believed to be that for 449–448, though this is not certain, is missing. See Wade-Gery, *loc. cit.*; Meritt, *D.A.T.*, 66–9; Gomme, *C.R.* liv, 1940, 65–7; and Addenda.

Hellenotamiae were considerably less than 493 tal. in the first period and than 449 tal. in 448–447. For the fourth and the sixth periods, however, for which our records are better preserved, the number of possible states paying and the maximum total paid, calculated as above, agree closely with the figures got from the records of each separate year—the records within a period, and even those of the two periods taken as a whole, do not show any important variation other than the increase in some states already mentioned and the dropping out of a few unimportant places in the Karian district. How are we to explain the discrepancy between the actual amounts recorded on the lists and the maximum possible, in the first period and in 448–447, and the great variation in the number of states paying from year to year? Nesselhauf maintains that by his method of reckoning we get not “den geschätzten Phoros, aber doch einen Annäherungswert für die Schatzungsperiode: die Summe nämlich, mit deren Eingang man unter normalen Umständen rechnen konnte” (p. 96). But it is impossible to believe that year after year, and with a new assessment every four years, Athens counted on getting 490 or 460 tal., with some 200 states contributing, though in fact she got only 400 tal. from about 150 states. Now apart from the changes in the tribute of certain states already mentioned (p. 275: changes of the order of 30–50 per cent. decrease or less, or 50–70 per cent. increase), we know as well of certain very remarkable variations, which must be due to special causes. Sometimes we can make a reasonable conjecture about these causes: for example the decreases in the tribute of Andros (50 per cent.), Chalkis (40 per cent.), the Thracian Chersonese (from 18 tal. to 1 tal.), and Astakos (from  $\frac{1}{2}$  tal. to  $\frac{1}{6}$  tal. in 450–449, and disappearance altogether in 443–442), are doubtless due, wholly or in part, to the settlement of cleruchies—the old citizens lost some land and so paid less, the new cleruchs paid their contribution in military service.<sup>1</sup> The small amount paid throughout by Sigeion,  $\frac{1}{6}$  tal., may also be due to the old Athenian settlement there, though Lemnos, also an old cleruchy, paid a considerable tribute. Similarly the great increase in the tribute of Thasos from 3 to 30 tal. in 446–445 is probably a sign of the restoration of the valuable mainland territory which she had surrendered in 463 (Thuc. i. 101. 3).<sup>2</sup> Often, however, there is no such ready explanation. Thasos, for example, may be missing altogether from the lists of 443–442 and 442–441, though she paid in 444–443 and 440–439 and in subsequent years.<sup>3</sup> Ainos, after paying 12 tal. in the first and

<sup>1</sup> For Astakos see also below, p. 368; for Chalkis, p. 345.

<sup>2</sup> Beloch, ii. 2, 365–6, denies this; perhaps rightly.

<sup>3</sup> See Tod, p. 56 and No. 46, col. iii, l. 33; Nesselhauf, 100, n. 2. For 443–442 we have a complete list of the Thracian quota but for one line, the last, and Σερμαῖς (with a tribute of  $\frac{1}{12}$  of a talent only) has at least as good a claim to that line as Θάσοι. (The Register in A.T.L., s.v. Θάσοι, says positively “absent

second periods, and 10 tal. in the third and fourth, paid 4 tal. in 436–435 and nothing in 435–434 (within the same assessment period) and subsequently; Argilioi 15 tal. in 454–453, 1 tal. in the third, fourth, and beginning of the fifth period, and  $\frac{1}{6}$  tal. and sometimes nothing in later years; Galepsioi  $\frac{1}{2}$  tal. up to the third period,  $\frac{1}{2}$  tal. in the fourth,  $\frac{1}{6}$  tal. or nothing later; Maronitai, after having their tribute raised from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 10 tal. in the fifth period, perhaps paid nothing at all in one year, 432–431,<sup>1</sup> and 3 tal. afterwards; Selymbria, after paying 6 and 5 tal., paid only 900 dr. in the fifth and sixth periods, but 9 tal. in the seventh. Again, Sestos, an important town, is not known ever to have paid more than  $\frac{1}{12}$  or  $\frac{1}{6}$  tal. and may have paid nothing in the first two periods. Explanations have been suggested for some of these anomalies: the foundation of Brea (c. 445) and of Amphipolis (in 437–436 B.C., i.e. during the fifth assessment period) may have caused some of the changes (but not all) in Argilos and Galepsos;<sup>2</sup> it is possible, though for my part I think it very unlikely, that pressure from Sitalkes, king of the Odrysai, may account for the lowering of the tribute of Selymbria and Ainos.<sup>3</sup> But nothing of this kind explains the very small tribute of Sestos, and the occasional payment of nothing by Thasos and Argilos. Moreover, 170 states are known to have paid tribute in at least one of the four years of the first period (and, as we have seen, about 30 more probably did), though in no one year do more than 163 appear in the lists, and in two of them only 141 and 147 at most; therefore many states, within the same assessment period, apparently paid in one year and not in another. It is difficult to believe (in view of the much greater regularity in later years) that this was due simply to inefficiency of one sort or another, and that Athens expected to get a much larger tribute than she ever, at this time, succeeded in getting. It is much more probable that some states in some years paid their φόπος direct to Athenian strategoi (or other Athenian officers) when the fleet was stationed in their waters or

from full panel”. This is a mistake in method: elsewhere in the Register all restorations, however certain—for example, [X]XX Θάσοι in 433–432—are shown; and the restoration of Σερμαῖς here and with it the exclusion of Thasos are not as certain as that.) For 442–441 the problem is similar: see A.T.L. and Nesselhauf, ibid.

<sup>1</sup> For myself I doubt this: see above, p. 214. This is another case in which the Register in A.T.L. does not sufficiently indicate the doubt.

<sup>2</sup> Argilos was a port in the territory of the Bisaltae (Hdt. vii. 115. 1); Plutarch, Per. II. 5, mentions a cleruchy among the Bisaltae; and this may well have been the same as that to Brea. Nesselhauf, 131.

<sup>3</sup> Meyer (1), iv. 2 1. 722; Nesselhauf, 99–100, 103. It should be noted that Ainos was (probably) reassessed for tribute in 425–424, to pay 20 tal., and was paying in 415 (Thuc. vii. 57. 5); and that it sent troops for service to Athens in 425 as well (iv. 28. 4), as observed by Meyer. Besides this Berga, in Thrace and well inland of Amphipolis (A.T.L., Gazetteer), paid tribute (a small sum indeed) in 451, 450, and 446; it did not pay in 442, but paid again from 434 to 428 (except 429).

their territories garrisoned; and that in these cases no quota was paid to Athena and so no record made on the quota lists. In later years (430–427) we find in the tribute lists special rubrics, *αἵδε πόλεις καταδηλοῦσι τὸν φόρον, μισθὸν ἐπέλεσαν αἵδε ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἑλλησποντίου φόρου, μισθὸν ἐπέλεσαν αἵδε ἀπὸ τοῦ φόρου τῇ στρατιᾷ*, and *πόλεις αἵδε ἀρχαῖς ἔδοσαν τὸν φόρον* (see *A.T.L.*, 449, 453–4; cf. 455, note on *πόλεις ἀτακτοὶ*; Tod, p. 55); amongst these cities those of the important Hellenopontine region (including Sestos) are the most prominent, and the rubrics have been explained by the movements of the fleet.<sup>1</sup> I believe the same to be true of the earlier anomalies noted above: Sestos may well have been a permanent station for a squadron, Thasos and Selymbria often an occasional one; Ainos was more likely to be garrisoned against Sitalkes, at least in his earlier years, than to have had its revenues surrendered to him; and I am inclined to think that the very low tributes of Sigeion and the Chersonese were, at least in part, due to the same cause. The tribute-money of these states may therefore have been paid direct to the Athenian officers. Many of the states missing in all four years of the first period are from the islands; they were certainly in the League, and squadrons may have been stationed among them from time to time (though see below, p. 285). It is not in the least improbable that in the years immediately following the transference of the League treasury to Athens (when the payment of the quota to Athena began) no quota was paid when the tribute was expended on the spot by the Athenian strategoi. Later, such irregularities could be removed, in order to preserve a completer record of payments and a more orderly arrangement; they will also have become rarer in the more peaceful times following the treaty of 445.<sup>2</sup>

If this argument is correct, we have again no reason to doubt Thucydides' figure of 460 tal. for the assessment of Aristeides.

Another reason for not accepting Thucydides' statement, which has been put forward by many, is that since in the early years of the League more states contributed ships instead of money (cf. below, p. 285), the total money payment must have been considerably lower than it became later. This argument (with others) is clearly put by Walker, who (accepting the figure of 455 tal. as the highest sum received in any year after 454 B.C.) concludes: "the tribute when first assessed by Aristeides cannot have amounted to anything like so large a sum as 460 talents. It looks as if Thucydides had assumed that the total which Athens sought to secure after the transference of the treasury from Delos to Athens was also the total aimed at by Aristeides." I find this difficult to believe, and equally

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also the entries *εἰς Εἴονα* and *εἰς Τέρεδον* in the list of 447–446: *A.T.L.*, 453.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also Meritt's suggestion for the decreased payments of Aineia and Samothrake in 430–429, *A.F.D.*, 8, n. 1.

difficult that, had he done so, he would have emphasized δῆμος φόρος. It is not likely that after the Persian occupation many states had any ships to contribute; and it is certainly easier to believe, if necessary, that the assessment of individual states was lowered, as happened in many cases in later years.<sup>1</sup>

Walker also thinks Thucydides guilty of a similar confusion with the conditions of a later period of the League when he states that the Athenian office of Hellenotamiae was first instituted in 478–477. "The quota lists, however, are arranged in a consecutive series, in relation to a certain magistracy or board (*ἀρχή*), and the series starts with the year 454 B.C., which can only be the date of the institution of the board", this *ἀρχή* being the Hellenotamiae. But our lists are quota lists, not tribute lists; these quotas, the *ἀπαρχαὶ* to Athena at Athens, certainly began in 454; the list of this year is the first of its kind—it was the first year in which the Hellenotamiae handed the quotas to the tamae of Athena; there is no sufficient reason to suppose that it was also the first year in which Athenian Hellenotamiae received the tribute from the allies.<sup>2</sup>

It is not a matter of choice between exercising our judgement and refusing any "appeal from the authority of Thucydides", that is, believing him infallible. It is a question of evidence: on the one side we have a definite statement by Thucydides, supported (for what they are worth) by later writers; on the other a vague feeling of unease, about what the conduct of Athens 'would have been' after Eurymedon or some similar event ('they would not have lowered the tribute', or 'we should have heard of it if they had'), supported by uncertain inferences from the incomplete figures of the later quota lists. See further, nn. on 99. 3, τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, and 100. 1.

There is some reason to suppose that Aristeides adopted for his assessment the method originated by Artaphernes in 493, after the Ionian revolt, when the new Persian taxes were imposed; by this a survey was made, and the cities were assessed according to the area of territory of each, that is, presumably, of the cultivable land, and so according to its value: Hdt. vi. 42, on which see my note, *C.Q.* xx, 1926, 97–8, and Beloch, ii. 1. 63 n. (which I overlooked in my note); Plut. *Arist.* 24. 1.<sup>3</sup> There is also reason for believing that

<sup>1</sup> See Meyer (1), iv. 2. 1. 462–3; Nesselhauf, 109, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Walker allows that there may have been in 477 a *Delian* magistracy (whatever that may mean) of Hellenotamiae. But officials who received money for a fleet built at Athens and trained and commanded, and largely manned, by Athenians, must have been Athenian.

<sup>3</sup> We must suppose that wealth from manufacture and commerce was also taken into account—certainly in the League: cf. the high tributes of Thasos, Aegina, and Paros. From the middle of the century at least many anomalies in the tribute are to be explained by political causes. See Beloch's discussion, ii. 2. 356–71.

the amount of contribution paid by the mainland cities to the League was considerably less than what they had paid to Persia, even by the just assessment of Artaphernes (Cavaignac, *Population et Capitale*, 1923, pp. 32–46); hence the early popularity of Aristeides and the Athenians. Beloch, l.c., denies this, but on very slight grounds. **ταμεῖόν τε Δῆλος ἦν αὐτοῖς:** “the old custom of holding a festival for the Ionian race at Delos (iii. 104. 3), and the central position of the island, made it a natural place for the purpose”—Forbes. On the other hand, this emphasized overmuch the Ionian character of the League, which included many Dorian and Aeolian cities. This may have been one reason for the transference of the treasury to Athens in 454.

The **ξύνοδοι** must early have become only formal meetings for the registering of decisions reached by Athens; how soon they were given up altogether we do not know—certainly by 454. We do not, for instance, hear of any meeting of delegates, even of the most formal character, when they were in Athens at the Dionysia each year with the tributes.

**97. 1. τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον, κ.τ.λ.:** Thucydides promises us a summary of events both military and political to illustrate the change from the leadership of independent states to the empire (§ 2 ad fin.), i.e. the extension and the defence of the League by war against Persia and some Greek states and against seceding members, and its organization (*διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων*). It is in this last respect that the narrative is most defective.

For the relation of this ‘second preface’ to the whole excursus, see below, p. 363, n. 1.

**νεωτερίζοντας:** it was rather the Athenians than their allies who ‘introduced novelties’ (cf. 58. 1).

**2. ἡ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά:** Thucydides deliberately begins where Herodotus left off; he does not wish either to criticize or to rewrite what had been done by his great predecessor. See above, p. 1, n. 2.

**ὅσπερ καὶ ἤψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ξυγγραφῇ Ἐλλάνικος:** ‘the one who has touched on the subject in his *Attis*'. Hellanikos was of Mytilene, an older contemporary of Thucydides, according to some ancient authorities older than Herodotus. But the date of his *Attis*, at least of its first publication, is in my opinion uncertain (see Introd., p. 6, n. 3), and hence also the date when Thucydides wrote this is equally uncertain. Hellanikos only ‘touched on’ the subject because his work was a brief chronicle of events, covering the whole period from the earliest times to his own day.

**βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς:** for this, which is, taken in one sense, so apt a description of Thucydides’ own account, see the note on 118. 2, pp. 363 ff.

**ἄμα δὲ καὶ, κ.τ.λ.:** i.e. ‘not only is the excursus justified on its own account, as there exists no accurate history of the period, but it serves as well to show the growth of the Athenian empire, the true cause of the war; which is my main present purpose.’

**98. 1–2. Capture of Eion and Skyros:** Ephorus, fr. 191; Diod. xi. 60. 1–2 (470–469 B.C.); Plut. *Kim.* 7–8, *Thes.* 36. 1–2 (476–475).

**1. πρῶτον μὲν:** all problems of chronology must be postponed till the end of the excursus (118. 2).

**‘Ηιόνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι:** the town that was later the port of Amphipolis, saved from Brasidas by Thucydides, iv. 102. 4, 106. 4. There was another Eion, called *ἡ ἐπὶ Θράκης* though Eion on the Strymon was equally *ἐπὶ Θράκης*, a settlement from Mende, perhaps within the Chalkidic peninsula, iv. 7.

Thucydides does not mention an early attempt to found a colony at Ennea Hodoi at this time, 476–475 (below, p. 391, n. 1).

The story of the heroic defence of Eion against Kimon’s forces by Boges, the Persian commander, is told at greater length by Herodotus, in an excursus, vii. 107; cf. Aeschin. iii. 183–5, and Plut. *Kim.* 7–8. 2, who state that Kimon was allowed, as a special honour, to set up three *hermai* with epigrammata inscribed on them.<sup>1</sup> Eion and Doriskos were the two strongholds in Thrace held by the Persians after their retreat from Europe; according to Herodotus (vii. 106. 2) the latter, defended by Maskames, was never captured by the Greeks in spite of many efforts. But we are not to conclude from this that it remained long in Persian hands after the fall of Eion; nor that the coast of Thrace in general, with its many Greek cities, did not form part of the Delian League at its commencement (see below, pp. 290–1).

**2. ἔπειτα Σκύρον:** Plut. *Kim.* 8. 3–6, says that the Dolopes were pirates, and gives picturesque details of their activities at this time; and adds that Kimon found the bones of Theseus on the island and brought them back in triumph to Athens (apparently in 476–475, *Thes.* 36. 1–2; though see Busolt, iii. 106 n.).

**Δόλοπες:** for their home on the mainland, see ii. 102. 2, v. 51. 1. **ῷκισαν αὐτοῖς:** it became a true cleruchy of Athenian citizens, and did not pay tribute to the League.

### 3. War with Karystos.

Warned by her losses in the campaign of 490, Karystos had, after Artemision, fought with the Persians and suffered for it after Salamis,

<sup>1</sup> For these epigrams and the *hermai*, see Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* liii, 1933, 74–5, 82–95 (cf. below, 100. 1 n., p. 288).

Hdt. vi. 99. 2, viii. 66. 2, 112. 2, 121. 1. It is inferred from the next sentence that she had refused to join the League, and was now forcibly enrolled. Herodotos refers to this war in ix. 105.  
**καθ' ὄμολογίαν:** i.e. to retain control of her internal affairs and to pay tribute (7½ tal. in 451–450, thereafter 5 tal.).

4. *Secession of Naxos*: see 137. 2, n. Cf. Arist. *Vesp.* 355.

**παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκός:** παρὰ τὸ νόμιμον καὶ πρέπον ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ήσαν οἱ Ἑλλῆνες τότε—schol. (When was the original of this note written? *τότε* means not ‘in the first years of the League’, but ‘before the Roman or the Macedonian conquest’.) That is, against accepted Greek usage, against established international custom (cf. iii. 9. 1). So Stahl and Forbes. ‘Against the covenant of the League’, according to Classen. The two translations amount in practice to the same thing; for the League was one of autonomous states, whose independence Athens now began to destroy.<sup>1</sup>

**ἔδουλάθη:** a rhetorical word; it here means something very different from *ἡγεμονόδυταν* just above. Naxos paid the modest sum of 6½ tal. in tribute.

Many scholars, for example Meyer and Schwartz, have regarded Thucydides’ history, written or at least extensively revised after 404, as intended to correct the Athenian *défaitisme* of that time. “As a man of the older generation Thucydides felt it his duty to counteract this tendency (to glorify Sparta and belittle Athenian imperialism) by drawing attention to the real idealism which had inspired the *Machtpolitik* of the Periclean age, and by pointing to the benefits which the rule of Athens had conferred on the Greek world. The Preface to Book I may be regarded as a veiled apologia for the Athenian Empire” (G. H. Stevenson, *J.H.S.* lvi, 1936, 48). None of these benefits is mentioned in the *Pentekontaëtia*; and the apologia is rather heavily veiled by sentences such as *παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκός ἔδουλάθη*. Cf. below, pp. 388–9.

**ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἑκάστῃ ἔσυνέβη:** Thucydides does not say how many of the member-states were thus ‘enslaved’ (see above, p. 278); he makes it clear that the enslavement was not due to a sudden change of policy on Athens’ part nor to any settled policy, but occurred only as occasion offered. The subjection need not have always followed secession, or attempt at secession; the only states that we know seceded (from Thucydides’ own narrative) are Naxos

<sup>1</sup> Ar. *Pol.* iii. 8. 4, 1284a 39, has *παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας* of the Athenian treatment of Samos, Chios, and Lesbos—*ἔπει γὰρ θάττον ἐγκρατώς ἔσχον τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐταπέντασσεν αὐτὸν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας*. It looks as though this is a mistake for ‘all except Samos, Chios, and Lesbos’ (cf. ’*Aθη.* 24. 2). Newman can give no satisfactory explanation in his note on the passage.

and Thasos, and, much later, those in Euboea, Samos, and Byzantium, these last revolts being after the general subjection of the allies, when the League was already an empire. But Athens would doubtless take advantage of ‘treasonable’ designs as well as actual secession to interfere with the states’ autonomy. Cf. the notes on Erythrai and Miletos, pp. 293, 350.

99. 1. **αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἔκδειαι καὶ λιποστράτιον εἴ τῳ ἐγένετο:** ‘failure to pay the tribute or send the ships agreed upon and occasionally desertion’. *λιποστράτιον* here must mean something distinct from *νεῶν ἔκδειαι*, and implies therefore ‘return home in the middle of a campaign’; not on the part of individual men or regiments or crews, but of whole contingents, recalled by their authorities. Steup thinks *λιποστράτιον* cannot mean ‘failure to send land-troops’, because at that time only ships or money were provided (§ 3 below, 96. 1). He is right that *λιποστράτιον* cannot mean desertion of land-troops specifically; but the subject states sent such contingents later (how soon, we do not know: see 107. 5, note on *τῶν ἄλλων ἔνυμάχων*), and Thucydides is not in this sentence confining himself very closely to the first years of the League.

**ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον:** ‘were very exacting in their management of the League’, rather than ‘were very severe’; ‘insisted on the last drachma and every ship, properly equipped’; even though *ἔπρασσον* probably does not here mean, ‘they exacted payment’. Thucydides generally uses the middle in this sense, though the active is common enough in other writers; in viii. 5. 3 he has *χρήματα πράσσειν* (*φόρους πράσσεσθαι* in viii. 5. 5), as noted by Shilleto.

2. **οὐτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου:** they not only decided on campaigns on their own authority and led them, but behaved as leaders everywhere, not as one of several contingents.

3. **χρήματα ἐτάξαντο** ‘had assessed themselves to contribute money rather than ships’, at the beginning, when they had the choice. This was of the greatest importance to the future of the League. It meant not only that much the greater part of the fleet of the League was Athenian, and so completely under the control of Athens; but that the fleet could be under a single organization, the ships built and the crews trained on a single system, which greatly increased its efficiency against an enemy as well as its value to Athens in face of disaffection within the League. Naval contingents provided by the separate states were separate units, each under its own commanders, and separately trained; in the Athenian fleet, though many of the rowers were from the member-states, all were trained at Athens, and the officers were Athenian. There was *one* fleet (or nearly so), not a congeries of small squadrons or even single ships (many of the smaller states did not contribute enough even for one ship).

*τὸ ικνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν*: “‘the due expense’, i.e. a sum equivalent to the expense of furnishing their proper number of ships”—Forbes. I believe that this phrase makes it possible to interpret the 460 talents of the first *φόρος*, 96. 2, to include both the tribute paid in money by the great majority of the member-states and the money equivalent of the ships contributed by the rest. If so, the difficulty of the number vanishes at once. For one of the strongest arguments against it is that at a time when Naxos, Thasos, and perhaps others of the larger states contributed ships, the amount of the *φόρος* must have been considerably less than when they contributed money, whereas apparently it was more (above, p. 278). But if Aristeides’ arrangement was ‘we need from our allies jointly a fleet the cost of which will be 460 tal. a year; pay your several contributions in ships or money—the equivalent amount, *τὸ ικνούμενον ἀνάλωμα*—, then not only is there no difficulty over the 460 tal. of 477–476, but none later, even if the amount of money received by Athens between 454 and 425 never exceeded 400 tal.; for the rest was made up by the fleets of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos (or, after 439, the indemnity paid by Samos). This would mean that Thucydides did not express himself as clearly as he might have done in 96. 2. (and in ii. 13. 3, where see n.). For my part, however, I believe the figure 460 tal. for the first assessment to be in any case reconcilable with the later figures obtainable from the quota lists: see above, pp. 273–9.

*ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης*: ‘from the expenditure of the money’. See 83. 2 n.

The Athenians ἀκριβῶς ἐπρασσον καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν already in the days of Kimon, when, according to Isokrates and his modern followers, Athens was the beloved leader of willing and autonomous allies. C. 11 of Plutarch’s *Kimon* is an interesting elaboration of this, to be compared with this chapter of Thucydides. It gives the conventional picture of the good Kimon in contrast with other Athenian officers who were for compelling the allies to man their ships and send their troops, and *τοὺς ἑλλείποντας ὑπάγοντες δίκαιοις καὶ κολάζοντες ἐπαχθῆ τὴν ὁρχὴν καὶ λυπηρὰν ἐποίουν*; Kimon, on the other hand, was the man principally responsible (in the kindness of his heart) for encouraging them to contribute money instead, thereby weakening them and increasing Athens’ own military resources and experience—*ἔκείνους εἴα δελεαζομένους τῇ σχολῇ περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα διατρίβειν, γεωργοῦς καὶ χρηματιστὰς ἀπολέμους ἐκ πολεμικῶν ὑπὸ τρυφῆς καὶ ἀνοίας γιγνομένους, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἀνὰ μέρος πολλοὺς ἐμβιβάζων καὶ διαπονῶν ταῖς στρατείαις ἐν ὀδίγῳ χρόνῳ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων μισθοῖς καὶ χρήμασι δεσπότας αὐτῶν τῶν διδόντων ἐποίησε. πλέοντας γάρ αὐτοὺς συνεχῶς καὶ διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντας ἀεὶ τὰ ὅπλα καὶ τρεφομένους καὶ ἀσκοῦντας ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀστρατείας θεισθέντες φοβεῖσθαι καὶ κολακεύειν, ἔλαθον ἀντὶ συμμάχων ὑποτε-*

*λεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι γεγονότες*. Plutarch does not note the inconsistency between this Machiavellian policy and Kimon’s generally frank and honest nature; he is trying to account for and to modify a narrative hostile to the Athenian empire and to all who were responsible for its formation, including Kimon—as likely as not the narrative of Theopompos, based on Stesimbrotos (see Introd., p. 36; and cf. pp. 46, 64); he will make it at least consistent with his hero’s known kindness and popularity with the allies. It is his own interpretation of the tradition.<sup>1</sup>

In an important article in *Amer. Hist. Rev.* xxxv, 1929–30, 267–75, West endeavoured to be more precise about those cities which originally contributed ships. His arguments are briefly as follows: (1) Thucydides in this passage implies that a considerable number of states originally contributed ships, and the passage is introductory to the account which follows, an account which covers the years from the secession of Naxos to (say) the Samian war, c. 468 to 440 B.C. (2) Plut. *Kim.* 11: this action of Kimon’s cannot be before the Eurymedon, when a large proportion of the fleet was supplied by the allies (are we sure of this?), nor between the Eurymedon and his ostracism (467–461), when his word “must have been law” in the affairs of the League and therefore there was no possibility of harassing action by other Athenian commanders; that must have occurred during the many campaigns of 460–454, which will also have increased the war-weariness of the allies (cf. *Kim.* 18. 1–2). For a Persian war on the other hand, in 450, they might well be asked, by the popular Kimon, to contribute *money*; hence the voluntary adoption of a tributary status by nearly all the remaining cities, which is reflected partly in the increase in the number of cities on the quota list of the second period (above, pp. 273–6). West thinks in particular that all the cities which took part in the Persian war of 480 contributed ships at the beginning, and that it is not due to the accident of preservation only that none of their names appear in the quota lists before 450: Keos and Seriphos (first in 450).

<sup>1</sup> As one must be cautious in these matters, I will add that this is not meant to exclude the possibility that someone before Plutarch had made a similar interpretation; only that Plutarch could also think for himself.

Uxkull, p. 78, draws especial attention to this chapter of the *Kimon*, but thinks it comes from a source entirely favourable to Kimon though hostile to the empire; a very improbable view.

Compare again with Plutarch’s words in the last sentence quoted above, Ps.-Xen. 1. 18: *εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐπὶ δίκαιος ἦσαν οἱ σύμμαχοι (to Athens), τοὺς ἐκπλέοντας Ἀθηναίων ἐτίμων ἀν μόνους, τοὺς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς τριτράχους καὶ πρέσβεις· νῦν δὲ ἡνάγκασται τὸν δῆμον κολακεύειν τὸν Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἔκαστος τῶν συμμάχων, κ.τ.λ.* If Plutarch’s account goes back ultimately to Stesimbrotos, as suggested above, this illustrates the change in the direction of oligarchic attack on the democracy. With πολλοὺς ἐμβιβάζων καὶ διαπονῶν ταῖς στρατείαις again, cf. *Aθπ.* 26. 1, quoted below, p. 310, and for διαπονῶν, above, pp. 231–2).

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Kythnos, Siphnos, Tenos, and Styra (449), Eretria and Chalkis (447), Poteidaia (445 or 444, perhaps 449); to these may be added Hestiaia (first in 449) and Andros (450). This is an attractive theory and may in general be right.<sup>1</sup> But some comment is necessary. (1) Naxos, as West recognizes, took part in the Persian war and is absent from the tribute list of the first period; but it had been tributary since c. 468. (2) Most of the states named are small; and of these Chalkis had no ships in 480 (*Hdt.* viii. 1. 2), and Poteidaia, as far as we know, were only engaged in land-fighting. (3) Athens, with perhaps only three allies still contributing ships, was able to send out as large a fleet in 450–449 as in 467 (*Euryomedon*) and 459 (Egypt), when, on this hypothesis, a large number of the allies sent ships; but for Athens to have built so large a fleet for herself and to have organized the crews would have required time—that is, we cannot believe that the absence of many states from the quota lists right up to 450 and 449 is significant. And (4) I do not believe any weight should be given to Plutarch's quite conventional picture of Kimon and the other strategoi; still less that we should use such an argument as that Kimon's word 'must have been law' in the period 467 to 461.

**100. 1. *Euryomedon*:** Diod. xi. 60–62 (470–469 B.C.) ; Plut. *Kim.* 12–13.

ἢ ἐπ' Εύρυμέδοντι ποταμῷ . . . πεζομαχίᾳ καὶ ναυμαχίᾳ: the celebrated victory. Longer and divergent descriptions are to be found in Plutarch and Diodorus. The latter is in the main from Ephoros; but Diodorus confuses this with the later battle off Cyprus, in Kimon's last campaign (*Thuc.* i. 112. 2–4), and his account is quite unreliable.<sup>2</sup> Much that is in Plutarch, however, is valuable; his

<sup>1</sup> We may add that Weil, *Zeitschr. f. Num.* xxviii, 1910, 351–64, argues that many of these island states, as Kythnos, Siphnos, Keos, Eretria (and Karystos), certainly continued their own coinage, at least to the middle of the century (cf. below, p. 384).

<sup>2</sup> If the papyrus-fragment *Ox. Pap.* xiii. 1610 (= *F. Gr. Hist.* 70, F. 191) is from Ephoros or an epitome of Ephoros—and it is difficult to see what else it can be—he must be the cause of Diodorus' confusion (see ll. 63–76 and *Diod.* xi. 60. 5–6; τὴν Κύπρον is restored on the papyrus, but with apparent certainty: there is a small misprint in Jacoby here); but we can hardly believe that his account was so absurd—Diodorus says that the sea-battle off Cyprus and the land-battle in Pamphylia took place on the same day. Poor military historian Ephoros may have been, but hardly as bad as that—he was too near to events. Polybius, incidentally, who criticized severely his accounts of land-battles, thought highly of him as a naval historian (xii. 25<sup>1</sup> 1.). Nor is it by any means certain that he quoted the epigram which properly belongs to the Cyprus campaign of 449, as Diodorus does, 62. 3 (see ll. 267–9 and Grenfell and Hunt's note).

It is interesting to note that Plutarch, who quotes some details from Ephoros which are in themselves good, seems to be unaware of any great divergence in him from the traditional account of the battle (see *Introd.*, p. 79). It does not

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principal source may have been Theopompos (as Busolt, iii. 143),<sup>1</sup> but we would give much to know what his sources were. There is one detail in particular which is interesting and does not look as though it could have been invented: Kimon sailed with 200 triremes, πρὸς μὲν τάχος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ περιαγωγὴν ὑπὸ Θεμιστοκλέους ἄριστα κατεσκενασμέναις, ἐκεῖνος δὲ τότε καὶ πλατυτέρας ἐποίησεν αὐτὰς καὶ διάβασιν τοῖς καταστρώμασιν ἔδωκεν, ὡς ἀν ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὅπλιτῶν μαχιμώτεραι προσφέροντο τοῖς πολεμίοις (12. 2). This implies a temporary break in the development of the Athenian trireme from Themistokles to Phormion, the progress otherwise being towards lighter and more easily manœuvred ships, with the fewest possible number of ἐπιβάται.<sup>2</sup> If Kimon did make this change, it was a bad blunder on the part of the Persian fleet to retire up the river instead of engaging the Athenians in more open waters; for, as at Salamis, it should have been the swifter fleet, if Kimon loaded his ships with hoplites.<sup>3</sup> Or is Plutarch's statement (if from the learned but biased and ill-judging Theopompos) only part of the conventional picture of Themistokles the demagogue who must anticipate every development of the democratic fleet (he certainly had not done so at the time of Salamis itself) and the good conservative Kimon, who, though in fact most of his triumphs were at sea, must always be joined with the hoplite class? It is possible. That is to say, this description of Kimon's ships may be true, but the contrast with Themistokles, the reaction from his policy, false: the ships may have been in general design very like those that had fought at Salamis, and the change to lighter ones may have been made later.

Plutarch's account is, shortly, that the Persians wished to avoid a sea-battle till a reinforcing squadron of 80 ships could arrive (a detail not in Thucydides), and withdrew up-river to the protection of their land-camp on Kimon's arrival. Kimon, however, followed them up and won a complete victory, the Persians putting up but a poor fight and 200 ships being captured; he then, on the same day, disembarked his hoplites and captured the enemy camp on land, with immense booty. Later he destroyed the reinforcing squadron.

help to say that this proves that Plutarch had not read Ephoros. This is very unlikely on other grounds; and even if true, it only puts the difficulty a stage farther back: Plutarch's source must then have noted the details which Plutarch quotes without mentioning the fundamental divergence.

<sup>1</sup> Busolt notes 13. 2, τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀξιώμασι πρῶτοι καὶ διαπρεπεῖς ἐπεσσον, and compares with 'Αθην. 26. 1; cf. below, 106. 2 n.

<sup>2</sup> For the details of this, see Cavaignac, *Ét. s. l'hist. finanç. d'Athènes*, 38–9.

<sup>3</sup> We cannot believe, from Plutarch (our only authority for this detail), that Kimon altered his ships because the Persians retired up the river, as the Syracusans altered theirs in 414 to meet the conditions of fighting in the harbour. Cf. especially 12. 6, ταῦτα φθῆναι βουλόμενος ὁ Κίμων ἀνήκθη, βιάζεσθαι παρεσκενασμένος, ἀν ἐκόντες μὴ ναυμαχῶσιν. But Plutarch may have misunderstood the matter.

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If we make the slight alteration that the *capture* of most of the ships almost certainly followed the land-victory, as at Mykale (and we may doubt perhaps the story of the reinforcing squadron), this is a probable account of the battle. Some scholars, as, for example, Uxkull, 45–59, argue that because Thucydides, the epigram on the battle (*Anth. Pal.* vii. 258 = Simon. *Epigr.* 105 Bergk), and some later writers, refer to the land-battle before the naval battle (*πεζομάχια καὶ ναυμάχια*, not *vice versa*), the land-battle took place first and was the decisive event—once the Persian army was defeated and their camp taken, the capture of the fleet (which had taken refuge up-river and so could not escape) was inevitable. This is in itself a possible reconstruction of events; but the evidence for it has not the same weight as Plutarch's reasonable account of the battle has for the traditional view. The latter is good for the whole campaign (cf. footnote below and p. 290), in spite of some rhetorical exaggeration—it may be noted, for example, that he is in only superficial agreement with Thucydides as to the Persian losses in ships: 200 captured in the main battle, and as well all the 80 in the reinforcing squadron destroyed (*Kim.* 12. 8, 13. 3). Meyer (2) ii. 20–2 thinks that the naval battle took place first, but was relatively unimportant—it was the land-battle which was decisive and led to the capture, as well as the defeat, of the ships; hence it is mentioned first.

For the 'epigrams' which in ancient and modern times have been variously connected with the battle of the Eurymedon, see now Wade-Gery's thorough and enlightening discussion, *J.H.S.* liii, 1933, 71–97: he accepts in the main Domaszewski's view (*Sitzber. Heidelberg*, 1914, no. 10) that there were three such poems, each a four-line stanza, inscribed on monuments set up after Kimon's return from ostracism or after his death, to commemorate the principal victories of the Delian league, namely, the capture of Eion (the first of the poems quoted by Aischines and Plutarch: see above, 98. 1 n.), Eurymedon (the first four lines of the poem quoted by Diodoros xi. 62. 3 and, with some variations, by Aristeides *Or.* xlvi, vol. ii. 209, and xlix, vol. ii. 512, Dindorf=xxviii. 64, Keil), and the Cyprus campaign of 450–449 (the second four lines of Diodoros' and Aristeides' poem: it is quoted as one poem, and referred to the Eurymedon). I do not find all Wade-Gery's arguments convincing; but this is not the place for a detailed discussion.<sup>1</sup> All the material for discussion will be found in his article.

<sup>1</sup> I will mention one or two points: if all three epigrams were on monuments which were set up at the same time and in the same place, this might help the confusion of the Eurymedon and Cyprus campaigns apparent already in the 4th-century orators (as Meyer showed) and copied by Diodoros; yet the Eion epigram was not added to the confusion. (It is no use saying that that so clearly mentioned Eion that it could not be referred to the Eurymedon; for the last four lines as clearly mentioned Cyprus, according to Meyer and Wade-Gery.)

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**τριήρεις Φοινίκων:** the Phoenicians, as usual, supplied the bulk of the Persian fleet; we may be sure that there were Kilikian ships as well (cf. 112. 4), perhaps Cypriot also. *Μῆδους* above means the Persian forces in general, from whatever part of the empire they may have come.

The Athenians set up stelai in honour of the fallen at Athens (Paus. i. 29. 14), and in Delphi a statue of Athena in gold, on a bronze column shaped like a palm-tree (*φοῖνιξ*), from the spoils of this victory—Paus. x. 15. 4–5. It is said to have produced a portent, a warning against the Sicilian expedition—Plut. *Nik.* 13. 3. The Samians played some part in the battle, if we may judge from two third-century poems on a statue-base found at Samos (probably some monument contemporary with the battle that was later reshaped): see Klaffenbach, *Ath. Mitt.* li, 1926, 26–8; Hiller, ibid. 155–6; Buschor, *Philol.* lxxxvi, 1931, 424–6; Wade-Gery, l.c., 97–9 (but cf. Wilhelm, *Wien. Anz.*, 1934, 117–18); Peek, in *Ath. Stud.* 112, n. 3, 116–20.

## EXPANSION OF THE LEAGUE AFTER EURYMEDON?

Plutarch (*Kim.* 12. 3) tells us that in the course of the campaign,

And Plutarch, who quotes from the orators the Eion epigram and two others which do not belong, is not misled by them (nor by Ephoros) in his account of Eurymedon. Secondly, objection has been made to *ἐν πελάγει* in l. 6 of the poem in Diodoros if it is to refer to a battle up-river, for *πέλαγος* is the open sea—it is satisfactory enough for the battle off Cyprus, as for Artemision (Plut. *Them.* 8. 5; Wade-Gery, p. 99); but there is an almost equal objection to *κατὰ πόντον* in l. 4. Both in fact are only 'poetical' equivalents to *κατὰ θαλασσαν* as opposed to *κατὰ γῆν*, 'on the water', 'a naval battle'. Similarly Wade-Gery argues that *ἐν ἡπέρῳ* (l. 4) must mean, in the 5th century, 'on the continent' and preferably the continent of Asia, not 'on land in Cyprus'; but again it is only 'poetical' for *κατὰ γῆν*. Moreover, this Eurymedon-epigram is so boastful—

ἔξ οὖ τ' Ἐύρωπην Ἄστας δίχα πόντος ἔνειμε  
καὶ πόλις θνητῶν θῦμος "Ἄρης ἐπέκει,  
οὐδέν πω τοιοῦτον ἐπιχθωνίον γένετ' ἀνδρῶν  
ἔργον ἐν ἡπέρῳ καὶ κατὰ πόντον ἄμα—

with its implied comparison with Salamis and Plataia if it were contemporary (cf. Plut. *Kim.* 13. 3, *Κίμων . . . τὸ μὲν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμάχια, τὸ δὲ ἐν Πλαταιᾶς πεζομάχια παρεληγνθὲν τρόπαιον*), that I cannot believe it is 'Aeschylean in date' any more than it is 'Aeschylean in quality' (Wade-Gery, 85–6). I doubt too whether any contemporary would have written of the soldiers at Eion *πρώτοι δυομενέων ηὔρον ἀμηχανίην*.

I do not, either, feel so confident as Wade-Gery does that Aischines could freely misquote (for that is what it comes to) poems that anyone could read for himself on the Agora monuments, at least not in the published version of his speech.

(Friedländer, *Stud. Ital. d. filol.* cl. xv, 1938, 102–8, has pointed out most of the objections mentioned above to Wade-Gery's views, and adds as well the important point that neither of the latter's four-line epigrams is complete in itself. His interpretation, too, of the whole, if it belongs to 449, is sound: it celebrates the end of the long series of Persian wars. See now Peek in *Ath. Stud.* 97–120.)

before the decisive battle, Phaselis was persuaded, partly by force, partly by the good offices of the Chians, who sent propaganda leaflets over the walls by means of arrows, to join the League. We know that it paid 6 talents tribute from 453 to 450, 3 tal. from 449, and probably 6 tal. again in 433–432;<sup>1</sup> we also know that Athens made a treaty with Phaselis, by which, in some respects at least, it was granted the same favourable terms as Chios enjoyed (see 77. 1 n.). Plutarch's statement is therefore to be accepted. Ephoros, whose account of the Eurymedon campaign is dubious (above, p. 286, n. 2), says that Kimon brought into the League many Greek and half-Greek cities in Karia and Lykia (F. 191; Diod. xi. 60. 3–4); but we have no explicit evidence of any addition to the League other than Phaselis as a result of Kimon's campaign, though it may well be that the *Λύκιοι καὶ συντελεῖς* who make a single appearance on our quota lists in 446–445 with a payment of 10 tal., joined at the same time (no list previous to this time is complete, so that there is no evidence when the Lykians first paid; they were out of the League for certain by 441–440, for which year we have a complete list of the Karian tribute). But it has recently become the fashion to suppose that quite a number of cities only joined the League many years after it was formed (which would make Thucydides' figure of 460 tal. for the first assessment less credible: see nn. on 96. 2, 99. 3), many in particular after Eurymedon (i.e. after 467 B.C. or some year near to that). Walker, for example, *C.A.H.* v. 43–4, excludes from the original members (1) Aigina (Thuc. i. 108. 4), Skyros (98. 2), Karystos (98. 3), and possibly Andros (Hdt. viii. 111–12), from the Island district; (2) the whole coastline of the Thraceward district "from the Hebrus to the Strymon, or more probably to the peninsula of Akte", which "it may be inferred with certainty" from Hdt. vii. 105–7 and Thuc. i. 98. 1 was still in Persian hands; (3) the whole of the Karian district, except Rhodes and some of the adjacent islands, which "it is generally admitted" was retained by the Persians till after Eurymedon; (4) many cities in Ionia and the Hellespont: "it is not disputed that Ephesos and Myous in the former, and Byzantium, Lampsakos, and the greater part of the Thracian Chersonese in the latter, were not yet in the possession of the League. Byzantium was still held by Pausanias, while more than a dozen years later it was in the power of the Great King to make a grant to Themistokles of Lampsakos and Myous" (for Ephesos, see Thuc. i. 137. 2; for Byzantium, 128–31; Myous and Lampsakos, 138. 5; the Chersonese, Plut. *Kim.* 14. 1); and if such important places as Ephesos and

<sup>1</sup> In both the lists of 433–432 and 432–431 the quota of Phaselis is restored, [ΠΕ]Η; this might of course have been ΗΗ. In the only other late list, that probably of 418–417, we again have [ΠΕ]Η for Phaselis, after the 425 assessment, but also after the Peace of Nikias.

Lampsakos, and Myous next door to Miletos and on the coast, why not many more as well? More recently, L. I. Highby has added Erythrai to this list on the basis of a new restoration of *I.G.* i<sup>2</sup>. 10, arguing for its entry into the League c. 465 B.C. with other cities from Ionia and Aiolis (*Klio*, Beiheft 36, 1936); amongst these last Meritt suggests Sigeion, in the light of a new fragment of *I.G.* i<sup>2</sup> 32 (*Hesperia*, v, 1936, 362).

There is, however, very little in all this (except the indisputable case of Aigina). Skyros (which, by the way, became an Athenian cleruchy and so was not a state-member of the League and did not pay tribute) and Karystos were conquered so soon after the formation of the League (Busolt thinks in 474–472, but it may well have been earlier) that their exclusion at the beginning is of no importance. The same is true of Eion (captured probably in 476; and also not a separate state-member of the League) and so of the Thracian coast, even if there were any reason—which there is not—to suppose that, because two brave Persians held on to two fortified positions for a year or two after Xerxes' retreat,<sup>1</sup> the Greek cities in the neighbourhood did not join the League; they would be all the more likely to, for the sake of protection.<sup>2</sup> Thirdly, the only evidence about the Karian district is the vague statement of Ephoros, whatever may be "generally admitted"; the Greek cities on the mainland, such as Halikarnassos and Knidos, are as likely to have joined the Greeks as Miletos and Rhodes, and the Karians themselves had joined the Ionians in the revolt against Persia; the Hellenized and semi-hellenized cities are as likely to have revolted again in 478 as in 465. Fourthly, Ephesos: the fact that Themistokles could land there on his flight from Athens (c. 468?) is not evidence that it was not then in the League. The League consisted at first of free and independent cities, and Athens had no right to interfere. In the treaty with Erythrai, perhaps, but only perhaps, of about this time, it is expressly stipulated that one exiled from Erythrai for treasonable intrigue with Persia shall be an exile from the whole League; and it has been plausibly conjectured that this is a quite new element in the history of the League, almost the first stage in its consolidation (H. Schaefer, 'Die attische Symmachie im 2. Jahrzehnt ihres Bestehens', *Hermes*, lxxi, 1936, 129–50; see, however, Kolbe, *Herm.* lxxiii. 262–3, below, p. 335); even so we are not sure that Athens could at

<sup>1</sup> Köhler, *Herm.* xxiv, 1889, 85–92, inferred from Hdt. vii. 106 that Doriskos was held for the Persians till after Artaxerxes' accession (465–464), and connects this with the fighting in the Chersonese recorded by Plutarch (for which see below) and with *I.G.* i<sup>2</sup> 928. What Herodotus says is that Xerxes honoured Maskames for his courage in the defence of Doriskos with yearly gifts, and that Artaxerxes continued the gifts to his descendants.

<sup>2</sup> Argilos, not far from Eion, was almost certainly in the League from the beginning (v. 18. 5: see above, p. 274 n. 1).

that time have enforced it.<sup>1</sup> Doubtless she could have exercised pressure, even in a large city like Ephesos; but doubtless also she did, or would have done if Themistokles had stayed there long. Even later, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (or twenty years earlier, perhaps<sup>2</sup>), Anaxagoras when exiled from Athens could retire to Lampsakos and live there. As for the gift of Myous and Lampsakos to Themistokles, that was but empty show; Themistokles lived in Magnesia, drew his revenue from there, issued coins there, and was there buried; we need not suppose he ever visited either of the other places after his exile. His descendants are said to have been honoured later in Lampsakos, which suggests continuity; but there certainly was no continuity, for Lampsakos regularly paid her tribute to the League (and had to be captured by storm by Lysander in 405, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 18–19), as did Myous; and they did not pay to Persia (Thuc. viii. 5. 5).<sup>3</sup> The later honours therefore prove nothing as to the effectiveness of the gift to Themistokles.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, of the towns granted to Gongylus the Eretrian (128. 6; Xen. *Hell.* iii. 1. 6) and later held by his descendants, two, Myrina and Gryneion, were in the Delian League.

Byzantium was not "still in possession of Pausanias". He intrigued with Persia while still in command of the allied forces at Byzantium (i. 128. 3–130), 479–478 B.C. He was recalled, and Byzantium, like the rest of the Hellespont and the other cities which had revolted from Persia, joined the alliance under Athens' leadership. Later he returned, in a private capacity, and managed to establish himself in Byzantium in such strength that he had to be turned out by force by Athens (128. 2, 131. 1 n. on *ἐκπολιορκηθεῖς*), probably in 476 (below, p. 399). All that this proves is that the League was not at all points

<sup>1</sup> Schaefer suggests that the famous decree against Arthmios of Zeleia belongs to this period; which is possible. See also Cary, *C.Q.* xxix, 1935, 177; and below, p. 327, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 255–6.

<sup>3</sup> See below, p. 334.

<sup>4</sup> Busolt, iii. 135–6. Wilamowitz (1), i. 151–2, on the basis of the inscription published by Lolling, *Ath. Mitt.* vi, 1881, 103–5 (which mentions a yearly festival in honour of Themistokles), says, with proper caution, that Themistokles may have secured for Lampsakos a diminution of the tribute due, but not paid, to Persia, and that this may have been put into effect when Persia resumed her control, and the tribute became a reality. Possibly also some branch of his family settled there after 404. Judeich, *Herm.* lviii, 1933, 7 n., with some logic, but no probability, says that Lampsakos and Myous were only 'finally secured for' the League in 449; the former paid its tribute to the League in 452 (probably) and 450, the latter in 451.

Neanthes of Kyzikos and Phanias (Plut. *Them.* 29. 11) added the pretty detail that Themistokles was given as well Perkote for his bedding and Palaiskepsis for his clothing. (Perkote and Skepsis were also in the League.) If only I could as easily dismiss the evidence of Thucydides as Beloch does, I could argue that Lampsakos and Myous were not given to Themistokles at all: 'a picturesque anecdote' only.

invulnerable less than two years after its formation; but who supposes that it was? And for the Chersonese, Plutarch, *Kim.* 14. 1, is the only evidence: he says that Kimon gained it for Athens after the battle of Eurymedon. No one would put forward Plutarch as an authority on chronology (he has just put the treaty of Kallias immediately after Eurymedon, 13. 4); but even if in this case his order of events is correct (and it may be: see below, p. 297), note what he says: that there were some Persians (*τῶν Πέρσων τωές*) who had refused to leave the Chersonese and were calling in help from the Thracians, despising Kimon's small squadron (after Eurymedon!); whereupon Kimon attacked with four ships and took thirteen of the enemy's, and that was the end of them. Obviously not a formidable force holding the greater part of the Chersonese, but brave stragglers, who, in our elegant modern phrase, had to be mopped up.

Lastly, Erythrai. Highby's restoration of *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 10 (Tod, 29) is ingenious, but to the last degree uncertain, and will remain so at least till the inscription is found again. His suggestions were worth making; but to use them as a basis for further conjecture is to build upon sand.<sup>1</sup> And if every one of his restorations is correct (and his date, 465 B.C., which is but a guess<sup>2</sup>), they add not one jot to our evidence for the year and the occasion on which Erythrai entered the League. We have a treaty with Athens by which a democratic form of government, on the Athenian model, is set up and, at its beginning, guaranteed by the commander of the Athenian garrison. An oath of loyalty to Athens and the League is to be taken by the new boule; but in all internal affairs the city will be autonomous.<sup>3</sup> Citizens who have taken refuge in Persia are to remain exiles until Athens decides otherwise; no others are to be driven out, unless Athens so decides. The treaty is most illuminating when compared with the later treaty with Chalkis (Tod, 42: see 114. 3 n.); it is framed on much the same lines, but the latter is severer, and shows the tighter hold which Athens exercised in 445; it no more shows that Erythrai entered the League when it was made than the other that Chalkis first entered in 445.<sup>4</sup> Highby sets great store by the comparative independence of Erythrai, almost her equality with Athens, to prove that the occasion of the decree cannot have been a secession, as in the case of Chalkis (or an attempted or suspected secession). But the presence of an Athenian garrison rather modifies the independence; and why an *Athenian* decree at all, defining the

<sup>1</sup> See the very pertinent criticisms of de Sanctis in his long review of Highby's book: *Riv. Fil.* xv, 1937, 299–309.

<sup>2</sup> Others, including Kolbe (below, p. 335), put it about 450 B.C.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the Erythraian inscription of about the same date, Wilhelm, *Jahresb.* xii, 1909, 126 50, xiv. 237; J. Keil, *ibid.* xiv, Beih. 50–6 (Highby, 36–8).

<sup>4</sup> So Schaefer, *op. cit.* above, p. 291.

constitution, if Erythrai is entering the League as an autonomous ally?<sup>1</sup> Highby also argues from *τοῖς τυράννοις*, l. 32 of the inscription, that there must have been a tyranny in Erythrai, of the type supported by Persia, immediately before this decree was passed, and that this was impossible within the League; but there may only have been an attempt to restore an older 'tyranny'; and it is quite possible that an anti-oligarchic 'tyrant' promised loyalty to the League in 477 and was accepted (like some of the Karian princes, Tymnes and Pigres, of our quota lists), and later turned hostile and was turned out. (According to Herodotos, vi. 43. 3, remember, it was the Persians who after the Ionian revolt suppressed the tyrannies and established democracies.) There is no difficulty in supposing that in some such case the democratic leaders called in the help of Athens, and that Athens was, thus early in the League's history, 'generous' in her terms.<sup>2</sup>

And for probabilities: is it not more likely that in the first enthusiasm of victory, all the cities that could, that were within reach of the new fleet, would join the anti-Persian alliance (some perhaps with only a pretence of willingness, but anxious to be in the swim, and to avoid attack), and that afterwards individuals and parties in several cities, as in Samos later, who had lost by the change because they had been supported by Persia or had benefited by the close connexion with Persia, should intrigue to win back their autonomy? or that quite honest attempts to preserve their autonomy against the encroachments of Athens or the high-handed actions of some of her generals would be made and would at once be dubbed 'intriguing with Persia' or 'attempts at a tyranny' by their enemies? We need not doubt that something of this kind happened at Erythrai, and that Athenian troops were sent to quell a dangerous movement; and all this evidence, at least, of the late accession of

<sup>1</sup> Highby, 25, quotes the Athenian decree relating to Klazomenai of 387-386 (*I.G.* ii.<sup>2</sup> 28), which shows the difference between partial subjection and real independence. A. Fraenkel, *de condit. soc. Ath.* (1878), 25, quoted by him, 23 n., is in fact nearly right.

<sup>2</sup> Jacoby, *R.E.* art. 'Herodotus', Supplb. ii. 247, implies that Halikarnassos could not have been in the League so long as Lygdamis was tyrant. If we could trust Ephorus (above, p. 290), we might believe that it was one of the cities won over in the Eurymedon campaign; but it is possible that Lygdamis kept his place at the price of entering the League in 477, with a patriotic policy, and that the League was at the time not strong enough or too busy to displace him. The position of such men was not essentially different from that of the oligarchs of Chios and Mytilene in later years.

Erythrai was, it seems, one of the few Ionian cities of the League which continued to issue a coinage (P. Gardner, *J.H.S.* xxxiii, 1913, 167-8), on a standard used also in some cities of the Hellespont and by the above-mentioned Tymnes, but rarely elsewhere. There is no need to suppose with Gardner any Persian influence in this.

so many cities to the League throws no suspicion at all on Thucydides' statement in 96. 2. What after all becomes of the statements of Herodotus, ix. 105. 1, and Thucydides, 89. 2, that Ionia revolted from Persia after Mykale, if most of the important states did not join Athens till many years later?

Plutarch, *Kim.* 13. 4-5 (cf. 12. 2, *βουλόμενος αὐτοῖς ἀπλούν καὶ ἀνέμβαρον ὅλως ὑπὸ φόβου τὴν ἐντὸς Χελιδονίων πούσασθαι θάλατταν*), places the famous treaty of Kallias, by which Persia bound herself not to send a fleet farther west than the Chelidonian Is., nor an army nearer than three days' march from the Aegean coast, after the battle of the Eurymedon. This was on the authority of Kallisthenes, who, though he followed Theopompos in denying the genuineness of the treaty, thought that Persia, *διὰ φόβον*, did in fact observe its supposed terms; and added that Perikles with a fleet of 50 ships and again Ephialtes with only 30 sailed beyond the Chelidonian Is. and found no opposition—presumably c. 465 to 463 (Judeich, *Herm.* lviii, 1933, 12). See below, 112. 4 n., pp. 331 ff.

**100. 2-101. 3. Secession and surrender of Thasos:** Diod. xi. 70. 1 (464-463 B.C.); Plut. *Kim.* 14. 2. For Thasos in general, see Fredrich in *I.G.* xii. 8, pp. 75-83 (*Fasti*); Bon, *B.C.H.* liv, 1930, 147-94 (distribution of population); for recent excavations in the city, *B.C.H.* xlix, 1925, *et seqq.* For the mainland region opposite the island, see Schultze's monograph cited below, p. 296.

**100. 2. περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρα Θράκη ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου:** see Hdt. vi. 45-7. According to him, there were gold-mines both on the mainland and in the island, the former being rather more productive than the latter. He says that Thasos got 80 tal. a year (silver value) clear profit from the mainland mines, and 200 tal. a year (300 when they were most productive) from all the mines and other revenue from the mainland; and rather than lose this Thasos surrendered at once to Persia in 491, giving up the new fleet and pulling down the walls which had just been built.

The mines in the island were seen and admired by Herodotus; but no trace of them has so far been discovered. Perdrizet, 'Skaptésyle', *Klio*, x, 1910, 1-27, argues not only that Herodotus exaggerates considerably the revenue obtained by Thasos (cf. the 400 tal. spent on feeding Xerxes' army, vii. 118: it was only oral tradition), but that the gold, both on the island and the mainland, must have been alluvial gold, for there were no underground mine-workings, and therefore its productiveness would last for but a short time even if there was more than one discovery of gold.<sup>1</sup> Hence Thasos, like

<sup>1</sup> He mistranslates *συχνά*, however, in vi. 46. 3, 'often'; it is *συχνὰ οὖτως*, 'so plentiful'.

Siphnos, and Macedonia from the Pangaion mines in the fourth century, had only brief periods of great prosperity. (The Skaptesyle mines worked by Thasos were, according to Perdrizet, on the eastern slopes of Pangaion; those worked by the Macedonians east again of these, in the Datos district near Philippoi. Cf. Schultze, 'Neugriechenland: eine Landeskunde Ostmakedoniens u. Westthrakiens', *Petermanns Mitt.* Ergänzungsheft 233, 1937, 166–76.) See also below, I. 101. 3 n.

**πλεύσαντες** of Ἀθηναῖοι: under the command of Kimon, Plut. 1.c. Whether he was in command throughout the two years' siege is not so certain. He was prosecuted on his return for having been bribed not to attack Macedon, according to Plutarch (cf. also *Per.* 10. 6 and Ar. *Aθπ.* 27. 1)—the famous case, in which we are told Pericles was one of the *συνήγοροι* appointed by the state to prosecute, almost the beginning of his political career.

3. ἐπὶ δὲ Στρυμόνα, κ.τ.λ.: see iv. 102. 2–3 for Thucydides' own dating of this, and n. and map there for the topography. Diodorus, xi. 70. 5 (464–463), would apparently put this after the fall of Thasos.

**αὐτοὶ ἐκράτησαν:** the natural meaning of *αὐτοὶ* would be here the Athenians as opposed to their allies, not the new settlers as opposed to the original inhabitants (as Stahl and Forbes); and even this last is unsatisfactory, for the contrast is between the success of their immediate objective and the subsequent disaster. Hude and Steup read *αὐτῶν*, which is not very pleasing; D. S. Robertson suggests to me *αὐτίκα* or *αὐτοβοεῖ*—this last attractive, but perhaps too lively for the dry narrative here. (Perhaps *εὐθύς*. Already by the second century B.C. the change in the pronunciation of *eu* and *av* had begun: *ev* and *av* before vowels and voiced consonants,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$ ,  $\delta$ ,  $\lambda$ , etc., *ef* and *af* before unvoiced,  $\theta$ ,  $\kappa$ ,  $\pi$ ,  $\sigma$ ,  $\tau$ . *Iotacism* also began early. Furthermore, when the sound *f* came immediately before  $\theta$  or  $\sigma$ , one or other of the letters changed to the corresponding stop: *φθάνω* > *φτάνω*, *ψευδο-* > *ψευτο-*, *'Ελευνοί* > *Λεψίνα*, *ἔδοιλενσα* > *δούλεψα*. Hence *εὐθύς* > *εὐτύς*, pronounced *eftis*, and *αὐτοὶ* was pronounced *afti*; both had a strongly stressed last syllable, and were therefore much alike. Cf., for example, vi. 19. 2 *παρελθόντες αὐτοῖς αὐθίς* (> *aftis*, *áftis*), where some of the inferior MSS., according to Poppe, omit *αὐτοῖς*, others *αὐθίς*; and viii. 5. 3, where after *δύναμιν γάρ ἔχων* B has *εὐθύς* and ACEFGM have *αὐτός*, and Hude conjectures *αὐτὸς εὐθύς*. Doubtless the not infrequent confusion in our MSS. of *λεπτός* and *λευκός*, noted by Bonner, *C.R.* liv, 1940, 184, is also due to the pronunciation of the latter as *lefkós*, and of the former as *leftós*.)

**προελθόντες δὲ τῆς Θράκης ἐς μεσόγειαν διεφθάρησαν:** under the command of Sophanes son of Eutychides *Δεκέλεεύς* and Leagros son of Glaukon *Κεραμῆθεν* (his son was strategos against Kerkyra in 433, 51. 4, n.), Hdt. ix. 75.

ἐν Δραβησκῷ τῇ Ἡδωνικῇ: *Σωφάνεα . . . ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ Ἡδωνῶν ἐν Δάτῳ περὶ τῶν μετάλλων τῶν χρυσέων μαχόμενον*, Hdt. (It is thus possible that Sophanes was not killed in this battle, but a little earlier or later in a fight more closely associated with the mines.)

ὑπὸ τῶν Θρακῶν ξυμπάντων: *ξυμπάντων*, the reading of the MSS., is to be preferred to *ξύμπαντες*, implied by Valla's translation and adopted by Poppe and Stahl on the ground that Herodotus, Diodorus (xi. 70. 5), and Pausanias (i. 29. 4) all say that the defeat was at the hands of the Edonoi only. But, as Steup points out, even if *ξύμπαντες* is read, *τῶν Θρακῶν* here, after *ἀς εἰχον Ἡδωνοί* above, must mean the Thracians in general. (Perdrizet, 13–14—see above, § 2 n.—thinks Thucydides is correcting Herodotus.) Besides, it would be absurd to suppose that the whole body of settlers marched farther into Thrace; the majority would stay at Ennea Hodoi and begin the settlement: only some of the armed forces went farther, presumably to forestall an attack. The whole colony was destroyed as a result of the defeat, that is, the settlers were withdrawn; but that is another matter. Heilmann's conjecture, *ξυστάντων* for *ξυμπάντων*, is attractive.

The losses, however, were doubtless heavy; this may be one of the disasters (with 'thousands killed', under incompetent aristocratic commanders) referred to in Ar. *Aθπ.* 26. 1 (see Introd., p. 48, and below, 106. 2 n.).

With this defeat Kirchhoff connected I.G. i.2 928, a list of killed, both of Athenians and of some allies (Madytioi, Byzantioi, and at least one other city), in Thasos, and in Sigeion, Kardia, and Paion (in the Chersonese). The stele with names of those killed on this occasion (including Sophanes, and probably Leagros) was seen by Pausanias, i. 29. 4–5, the first of such stelai on the road from the city to the Academy; he says nothing about the inclusion of allies' names in the list. Moreover, very many of the killed on our inscription fell in Thasos, and none, as it happens (the stone is very incomplete), is mentioned as having fallen in Thrace. On the other hand, it is rare for allies' names to be given on an Athenian casualty list which was to be set up in Athens (*separate* lists of allies, set up in Athens, were not uncommon: cf. 108. 1 n.); and this exception may have been due to the joint effort to found the colony at Ennea Hodoi.

If the inscription did contain the casualty list of Drabekos, as well as others of those who fell in the same year, certainly only a small proportion of the 10,000 settlers were killed.

The casualties at Sigeion and in the Chersonese are generally connected with the fighting there recorded by Plutarch, *Kim.* 14. 1 (see above, 100. 1 n., p. 293). This is possible, and would serve to show how unimportant that campaign was—it was not it that won the Chersonese for the League.

**101. 1. νικηθέντες μάχαις:** this, as being both the *lectio difficilior* and that of one of the two groups of good MSS., is to be preferred to *μάχη*. Kimon will have won a land-battle as well as his naval victory before settling down to the siege.

**2. οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἔμελλον:** so secretly, that apparently no word of it had leaked out by the time Sparta appealed for help from Athens some two years later (102. 1), or Athens would have sent none. The promise has therefore been doubted (Walker, *C.A.H.* v. 72). Cf. 58. 1 n.

*Earthquake at Sparta and revolt of the Helots:* Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 1144 (468–467 B.C.); Diod. xi. 63–4 (469–468); Plut. *Kim.* 16–17. 3; Paus. i. 29. 8–9, iv. 24. 5–7 (464–463).

**ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ:** this and *πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ πόλεμος καθευστήκει Λακεδαιμονίους* in § 3 make it clear that Thucydides thought the earthquake occurred shortly after Thasos made her request for Spartan help. ‘The Spartans promised their aid and were intending to carry out their promise, but were prevented by the earthquake . . . , which resulted in a long war with their revolted Helots.’ Whether that view is correct will be examined in the chronological note on the Pentekontaëtia (below, pp. 401–11).

**Θουριάται:** a township of the Perioikoi in Messenia, on the left bank of the Pamisos R., not far from its mouth. See Valmin, *Ét. topogr. sur la Messénie antique*, Lund, 1930; Bölte, *R.E.* art. ‘Thuria’.

**Αἰθωνῆς:** πόλις Λακωνικῆς, μία τῶν ἐκατόν—Steph. Byz.; and that is all we know about it. It was probably just north of Thouria (Bölte). **ἢ καὶ Μεσσήνιοι ἐκλήθησαν οἱ πάντες:** “‘whence all who revolted were called Messenians”, is probably intended to justify expressions like “the Messenians of Naupactus”, “the third Messenian war”, etc.—Forbes; as Herodotus’ δι Μεσσηνῶν (ἀγῶν) δι πρὸς Ἰθώμην (ix. 35. 2).<sup>1</sup> For picturesque details of this earthquake, and of the brave conduct of the young king Archidamos, see Plutarch and Diodorus.

Herodotus, ix. 64. 2, mentions incidentally a Spartan disaster in the war: Arimnestos, the man who had killed Mardonios at Plataia, was caught with 300 men by the Messenians in Stenyklaros and he and all his men killed.<sup>2</sup>

W. H. Porter, ‘The Antecedents of the Spartan Revolution of 243 B.C.’, *Hermathena*, xlvi, 1935, 1–15, argues that this earthquake, which must have caused the death of as many women and children

<sup>1</sup> The MSS. reading is *πρὸς Ἰσθμῷ* or *πρ. τῷ Ἰ.*; see Macan, ad loc.; and Wilamowitz (1), ii. 296 n. 10 for a characteristic defence of this.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Jacoby drew my attention to Paus. iv. 16. 6, where we are told that Aristomenes, the Messenian hero of the 7th-century wars with Sparta, also had a victory in Stenyklaros; which is possible, but suspicious. A song was still sung in Pausanias’ day to celebrate the victory.

as men, permanently affected the citizen population of Sparta (the citizens more than the Perioikoi and the Helots, for they were concentrated in the city, where the earthquake was worst<sup>1</sup>); so that the action of Sparta in 425 for example, her readiness to make peace rather than risk the loss of 120 men, becomes intelligible; as does her reluctance to enter the war in 431 (cf. 118. 2, *μὴ ταχέσις ὄντες*, n.), and her haste to return home after Tanagra in 457. Contrast her conduct in 480, after the loss of 300 at Thermopylai. See also Meyer (1), iv.<sup>2</sup> 1. 441; Dickins, *J.H.S.* xxxii, 1912, pp. 23, 35. Grundy, *J.H.S.* xxviii, 1908, 77–96, had also argued that fear of the Helots (who he thinks numbered 12–15 times as many as the Spartiates, 6–7 times as many as Spartiates and Perioikoi together) was the determining factor in Spartan policy throughout the sixth and fifth centuries; but this is to ignore the change after this earthquake, which may be important. See below, p. 360, and iv. 80. 3 n.

Ziehen, *Herm.* lxviii, 1933, 218–37, accepts a fall in the Spartiate population between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars of over 60 per cent. (corresponding to Herodotus’ figure of 8,000 hoplites at Plataia and no more than 3,000 in 425). He points out that losses in war or from poverty cannot account for such a decline (as Meyer argued from Ar. *Pol.* ii. 9, 1270 a); it must be due to the earthquake, in which not only the men in the city suffered heavily, but ἔφηβοι (Plut. *Kim.* 16. 5) and above all the women and children who were at home in the houses which were destroyed. The effects of such a catastrophe might indeed last more than a generation; but, however successful the Spartans may have been in concealing their numbers (v. 68. 2), they could not have hidden such a fall in population as this (and part of Ziehen’s argument is that later writers did know a good deal about it). Yet Thucydides clearly had no suspicion of it (i. 18–19; cf. v. 60. 3, 74. 1). I prefer, with Beloch, to doubt the 8,000 Spartiates at Plataia.

**3. πρὸς . . . τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ:** Ithome was the headquarters of the rebels; it is not to be supposed that they were all shut up there and regularly besieged, for several years. See below, pp. 301–2.

*Surrender of Thasos:* Diod. xi. 70. 1 (464–463).

**τρίτῳ ἔτει:** the first indication of time in the *Pentekontaëtia*, but not a date, cf. 30. 4, 31. 1 in *τὰ Κερκυραϊκά*, and 65. 2 n.

**χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει, κ.τ.λ.:** from 454–453 to 447–446 they paid 3 tal. yearly, afterwards 30 tal. The earlier figure is small for so wealthy an island (above, p. 295, and 100. 2 n.); the latter is generally connected with a supposed restitution of some of their property on the mainland,

<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, a good many Helots must have left the country at the close of the revolt (103. 1).

though this is uncertain.<sup>1</sup> Thasos took no advantage either of the Poteidaian revolt or later of Brasidas' campaign to revolt from Athens; but as likely because it was an island as because it was satisfied.

**τήν τε ἡπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες**: to the advantage presumably of Athenians (so Plut. *Kim.* 14. 2, *τὰ χρυσεῖα τὰ πέραν Ἀθηναίους προσεκτήσατο), and of the later settlers in Brea and Amphipolis, but not only of them; for Thucydides' father (a relation of Kimon's) or he himself had obtained the right of working mines there without being a colonist or cleruch (iv. 105. 1). Or, perhaps, he had inherited them from his Thracian ancestress (hence *καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἡπειρωτῶν*), and it was such mines in the ownership of Athenians that led to the quarrel with Thasos?*

Perdrizet, however (above, p. 295), 18–22, points out (1) that Athens could never have possessed any productive gold-mines here, for she issued no gold coinage; (2) that Herodotus, vii. 112, says that (in his time) Thracian tribes worked the silver- and gold-mines of Pangaeum; and (3) the tradition that Thucydides retired to his Thracian property after his exile shows that this was outside the bounds of the Athenian empire. But for Thucydides' express *τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες* here, one would suppose that the Thracians won back all the mines after the disaster at Drabekos; but he should be a reliable authority for this.

102. 1–3. *Athenian help to Sparta*: see on 101. 2, and below, p. 411, n.

1. **ἄλλους τε ἐπεκαλέσαντο ξυμάχους καὶ Ἀθηναίους**: because the panhellenic alliance against Persia still existed (§ 4 below), according to the usual interpretation, though this can hardly have been binding for help inside Greece. Note that *ξυμάχους* is predicate, 'as allies', 'to fight with them'; Thucydides does not say *τῶν ξυμάχων*.

**ἄλλους**: Aigina (ii. 27. 2; repeated, iv. 56. 2), Plataea (iii. 54. 5), Mantinea (Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 3) are specially mentioned. If we could believe the anecdote in Plut. *Kim.* 17. 1, Corinth was not anxious to help Sparta.

**Ἀθηναίους . . . πλήθει οὐκ ὀλίγῳ**: 4,000 hoplites, according to Aristophanes, *Lys.* 1138–44. See also Plut. *Kim.* 16. 8–17. 4; Diod. xi. 64. 2–3. **Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος**: there were some even among the later oligarchs who did not approve of Kimon's pro-Spartan policy: see Kritias ap. Plut. *Kim.* 16. 9. Cf. Eupolis, fr. 208 (Introd., p. 36 n. 2)

*κακὸς μὲν οὐκ ἦν, φιλοπότης δὲ κάμελής,  
κάνιοτ' ἀν ἀπεκοιμᾶτ' ἀν ἐν Λακεδαιμονι,  
καν Ἐλπινίκην τῆδε καταλιπὼν μόνην.*

<sup>1</sup> Perdrizet (above, p. 295), 20, thinks that Galepsos, E. of Amphipolis, Oisyme, and Apollonia, colonies of Thasos on the mainland, were in Athenian hands till 445 and then restored to Thasos: 'hence they do not appear on the tribute-lists till the assessment of 425.' These suggestions are not accepted in *A.T.L.*

**2. ὅτι τειχομαχεῖν ἐδόκουν δυνατοί εἶναι**: it has often been remarked that both the Spartan expectation to take a walled town by storm and the Athenian reputation for skilled siege tactics are surprising in view of the notorious inability of the Greeks to take a place properly defended except by the process of exhaustion by hunger, an inability shown more clearly by Thucydides than by any other writer—for example, in the poor attempts, so easily frustrated by a handful of men, of the Spartans at Plataea, and the slow operations of the Athenians at Syracuse; not to mention the recent siege of Thasos, that had taken two years (101. 3), the unsuccessful siege of Memphis (104. 2), and the general principle that reserve troops were sufficient to defend a wall (93. 6). See Introd., pp. 16–19. But that is to misunderstand the present passage. In using the word *τειχομαχεῖν* Thucydides has in mind not an assault on a walled town (there is no reason to suppose that Ithome was walled at this time, and every reason to suppose it was not), but on a palisaded camp, like the Persian camp at Plataea. After their defeat in the field the Persians withdrew to this, according to Herodotus, ix. 70. 1–2, and in a fierce *τειχομαχίη* held their own until the arrival of the Athenians, ὥστε οὐκ ἐπισταμένων (*τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων*) *τειχομαχέειν*; finally the Athenians, after a long struggle, ἐπέβησαν τοῦ *τείχεος* καὶ ἤριπον, τῇ δὴ ἐπεχέοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες. The Athenians had a similar success at Mycale, διωσάμενοι γάρ τὰ γέρρα οὗτοι φερόμενοι ἐσέπεσον ἀλλες ἐς τοὺς Πέρσας (Hdt. ix. 102. 3); and doubtless also in the land-battle at the Eurymedon. Hence their reputation; Thucydides, as so often, agrees with Herodotus. It implies only that the Spartan hoplites with their rigid discipline were not so well fitted for more open, irregular fighting as the Athenians. Thucydides' extremely abbreviated account of this war has suggested that the Spartans had shut up the Messenians and helots within Ithome before the arrival of reinforcements, and that most of the years of the war were spent in a regular siege. This cannot be the case. Diodorus' account (64. 1) is nearer the truth, by which the rebels, using a *χωρίον ὄχυρόν* as a base, ravaged Lakonia, and hence the Spartan appeal for help; war went on with varied fortunes on either side. Plutarch too says the appeal was made in the early stages of the war.<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes makes Lysistrate claim that *Κίμων δλην ἔσωσε τὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν*, and Xenophon, also on an occasion when mutual benefits in the past are being mentioned, actually says that Athens sent help when the Spartans ἐπολιορκοῦντο ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων (*Hell.* vi. 5. 33). These exaggerations are right in this at least, that Sparta asked for help when in a difficult position (*ώς*

<sup>1</sup> Both Diodorus, by his first mention of the *χωρίον ὄχυρόν* and his later mention of Ithome after the Athenians had returned home, and Plutarch by his reference to a second summons from Sparta for Athenian help (17. 3), imply different kinds of warfare in the different stages; which there is no reason to disbelieve.

αὐτοῦ . . . ἐμηκύνετο δὲ πόλεμος), and not simply in order to convert a slow siege into a quick assault. And a successful τειχομαχία would not have meant, necessarily, the surrender of the whole defending force, but its dispersal, the destruction of its base, just as the Persian army, after the retreat from Plataia, was still in being, and might have continued the fight.

3. διαφορά . . . φανερά: contrast 92, 101. 2. One of the main objects of the whole excursus is to explain the διαφορά that broke up the friendship of 480–479 B.C.

#### 4. Athenian alliance with Argos and Thessaly.

**δεινὸν ποιησάμενοι:** another result, direct or indirect, of this unfortunate expedition was the ostracism of Kimon. It is interesting that it was especially a force of hoplites, under his command, that was suspect of νεωτεροπούλα.

**τοῖς ἔκεινων πολεμίοις:** this phrase suggests that Argos was actually at war with Sparta at the time (cf. below, p. 370, n. 1).

Athens got little and only occasional advantage from these two alliances, and sometimes (as at Tanagra, 107. 7) much harm. The old alliances of the time of the Peisistratids (Hdt. v. 63. 3, cf. vii. 6. 2–4; Αθπ. 19. 5) had been ended by the Persian wars, if not earlier. It would be curious to speculate how different the course of Greek history might have been, if Athens and Argos had now vigorously combined to help the revolted Messenians against Sparta.

Aeschylus reflects current feeling in Athens in *Eumenides*, 287 ff. (458 B.C.), where Orestes says

καὶ νῦν ἀφ' ἄγνοιο στόματος εὐφήμιος καλῶ  
χώρας ἄνασσαν τῆσδε Ἀθηναῖαν ἐμοὶ<sup>1</sup>  
μολεὺν ἀρωγόν· κτίσεται δέ ἄνευ δορὸς  
αὐτὸν τε καὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν Ἄργειον λεών  
πιστὸν δικαῖος ἐσ τὸ πᾶν τε σύμμαχον.  
ἀλλ' εἴτε χώρας ἐν τόποις Λιβυστικῆς,  
Τρίτωνος ὀμφῇ χεῦμα γενεθλίου πόρου,  
τιθησιν ὄρθον ἢ κατηρεφῆ πόδα,  
φίλοις ἀρήγονος<sup>2</sup>, εἴτε Φλεγραίαν πλάκα  
θραυστὸς ταγούνχος ὡς ἀνήρ ἐπισκοπεῖ,  
ἔλθοι—κλίνει δέ καὶ πρόσωθεν ὥν θεός—  
ὅπως γένοιτο τῶνδες ἐμοὶ λυτήριος.

103. 1. End of the Helot revolt: Diodoros, xi. 84. 8 (456–455 B.C.); Paus. iv. 24. 7.

**δεκάτῳ ἔτει:** a second indication of time, but one of the most dis-

puted in all Thucydides. See pp. 401–11 below. Here it must suffice to say that he must be supposed to place the surrender of the Helots before the accession of Megara to Athens (§ 4); he is not “anticipating the course of events by five or six years in order to complete the account of the siege of Ithome, going back when he has done so to the alliance of Megara with Athens, which must have followed closely on the Argive alliance”, as Forbes and many others have suggested. For this logical connexion of 103. 4 with the end of 102. 4 is so close that the one must have followed the other in the narrative, unless, in order to keep the chronological order, it was necessary to insert another event between them; between 102. 4 and 103. 1 there is a disturbance of ‘natural’ order, which can only be for chronological reasons.

**ἢν δέ τις ἀλίσκηται, τοῦ λαβόντος εἶναι δοῦλον:** the terms of surrender were very mild, showing the strength of the resistance: they were Helots before, and they now win their freedom if they will leave their old homes, and are only to be slaves again if they return. There is some distinction between Helot and δοῦλος here: however harshly the Helots may have been treated in general or on occasion, they enjoyed all those advantages which exist for a serf over a slave; they could not be bought and sold, they lived in their own homes, they married and had families. Their status was a lowly one, but, as such, protected. The slave was a man rooted up from his home, sold abroad, with no family unless it suited his master's pleasure, liable at any time to be sold again to another (because times were bad, not necessarily because his master was harsh); in these respects his position was worse than the Helot's, however kindly he may have been generally treated, and though the state protected him against the worst ill-treatment. A slave could, however, hope for emancipation, which was rarely open to the Helot. The distinction is well brought out by Morrow, *Plato's Law of Slavery* (1939), c. ii.

These things must be kept in mind when we consider Sparta's attitude to the Helots. See 101. 2, iv. 80. 3 n. By the agreement here recorded, a Helot who had left Lakonia and returned could not indeed be killed, but his position was weakened—he became the personal slave of his captor. The same fate, one must suppose, awaited any perioikoi in the same position; but we are not told what had happened to the two communities who had revolted.

It was presumably the Messenian Helots, who had traditions of freedom some four or five generations back, who not only formed the bulk of the rebels at the beginning, but remained firm to the last. For Sparta certainly had very large numbers of Helots still after the collapse of the revolt. It is a great loss to us that we have no figures.

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3. *Capture of Naupaktos by Athens and settlement of the Messenians there*: Diodorus, xi. 84. 7 (456–455 B.C.).

**κατ' ἔχθος ἥδη τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων**: 'in accord with their new hostility to Sparta'. This suggests that the settlement in Naupaktos followed soon after the dissolution of the alliance between Athens and Sparta. **ἐς Ναύπακτον κατώκισαν**: how soon after the end of the Helot war this was done we cannot be certain. Diodorus' date should be two or three years after the surrender of Ithome. This is just possible without violating the general principle that Thucydides is putting events in their chronological order; as, however, Diodorus puts the capture of Naupaktos among the exploits of Tolmides on his *periplous* of the Peloponnese, which Thucydides narrates without saying anything of Naupaktos (108. 5), he deserves no credence.

On the basis of the Nike-monument at Olympia, we read *Μεσσάνιοι καὶ Ναυπάκτιοι* (*Inschr. v. Ol.* 259; *I.G.A.* 348).

The Spartans later attempted to pay the Athenians back in their own coin, when they settled the expelled Aiginetans in Thyrea, ii. 27. 1–2; but Thyrea had not the strategic value of Naupaktos (see n. on § 4, below). **Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὁζολῶν ἔχόντων**: this phrase may easily imply recent possession of Naupaktos by the Ozolian Lokrians; cf. 94. 2, 98. 1, 100. 3 (perhaps), 111. 2, 113. 1, 128. 5, viii. 62. 3, vii. 57. 8, *ἔχειν* meaning 'to hold', 'occupy' (E. Curtius, *Gesamm. Abh.* i. 206). But if so (and it is not always so: cf. iii. 39. 2, i. 115. 4), it can hardly be brought into connexion with the well-known inscription containing the treaty by which the Eastern, Opuntian Lokrians settled at Naupaktos (*S.I.G.*³ 47, *I.G.* ix. 1. 334, Tod, 24); for though that was to be a joint settlement of Western and Eastern Lokrians, the novelty (implied, according to Curtius, by *ἔχόντων*) was the colonization from East Lokris, not the possession by Ozolian Lokris. The inscription is dated by epigraphists shortly before the Athenian capture of Naupaktos, but chiefly because it cannot well be placed during the Athenian occupation, which lasted till 404, and its lettering seems earlier than the fourth century. Perhaps Thucydides has made a mistake in writing *'Οζολῶν*.

#### 4. Megara joins Athens.

**προσεχώρησαν καὶ Μεγαρῆς Ἀθηναίοις**: this section contains in compact form much that is significant of Greek military history of the fifth century. The cause of the quarrel between Corinth and Megara, *περὶ γῆς ὁρῶν*, is characteristic: Corinth was ready to risk the stability of the Peloponnesian League, not to mention the peace of the Greek world in general, rather than give up a claim to some strip of land. Secondly, if Megara had remained in alliance with or in the occupation of Athens, Peloponnesian invasions would have been more difficult, if not impossible (cf. 107. 3), especially after the

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building of the walls to Nisaia had made Megara practically impregnable to attack from land, so long as the inhabitants were constant to the alliance; though we must not forget that Athens still had a long land frontier with Boeotia, and, in the Peloponnesian war, might not have had troops to spare for the guarding of the passes of the Megarid. (See Introduction, p. 13.) The occupation of Pegai, however, was of the first importance, because of the help it afforded to Naupaktos. Without a port on the Corinthian Gulf, Athenian triremes had to sail round the Peloponnese to reach Naupaktos, a journey of some 300 miles or of 8–10 normal days (Introd., p. 20); that is, the crews should sleep on land on several successive nights.<sup>1</sup> In war-time, only Argos (the first stage) and Zakynthos (the last) were neutral or friendly, to afford this help; until the capture of Kythera and Pylos the crews had no safe and certain place of rest between them. This hindered considerably the proper use of Naupaktos to control the Gulf—for if a large squadron were always kept there, not only would the expense be very heavy, but the fleet would be permanently divided. With Pegai as a port, if fully secured, Athens could not only threaten Corinth and Sikyon directly (cf. 111. 2), but could sail to Naupaktos in a day—but only if fully secured, for her communications with Pegai were by land, where she was vulnerable. And even so, the main fleet, with Peiraeus necessarily as its base, must sail round the Peloponnese (107. 3). Lastly the hostility between Corinth and Athens, of which the alliance with Megara and the occupation of Pegai and the Long Walls by Athenian troops was the chief cause, and which was understandable enough in view of Athens' restless and threatening activity, led to the wars with the Peloponnesian League; for it required the energy of Corinth, and some others, to push Sparta into the war; who, in spite of a desire to find every excuse for delay, could not afford to lose the valuable alliance of Corinth and could not fail to see that the Athenian empire really threatened the security of the Peloponnesian as well as of the rest of Greece.

The immediate result of this hostility is told in cc. 105 foll. The revolt of Egypt from Persia and the help sent by Athens must be told first, in order to keep the chronological order of events.

#### 104. Athenian expedition to Egypt: Diod. xi. 71. 3–6, 74. 1–4 (463–462, 462–461 B.C.); Ktesias, fr. 32.

1. **Ινάρως δὲ ὁ Ψαμμητίχου, Λίβυς, κ.τ.λ.**: though Thucydides calls him a Libyan, Inaros was probably (to judge from his father's

<sup>1</sup> The scholiast here on *Πηγάς* just says *ἐμπόριον πλησίον Μεγάρων* and on *Νίσαιαν, ληψίν Μεγάρων*: how characteristic that is of their meaningless knowledge. For the topography of Nisaia and Megara, see iii. 51. 1 n.

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name) a descendant of the Saïte kings of Egypt. Herodotus three times refers to this revolt, and himself saw the skulls of those who fell in the battle at Papremis in which Achaimenes, brother of Xerxes and satrap of Egypt, was defeated and killed: iii. 12 ad fin., 15, vii. 7. Egypt had only been conquered in 525, by Cambyses, and had revolted again in 485 on the death of Darius. Xerxes had apparently been unpopular; and the new revolt takes place soon after the succession of his son Artaxerxes (Xerxes was murdered in 465, and there were internal troubles after this). See *C.A.H.* v. 77-9, vi. 138-40.

**βασιλεὺς Λιβύων τῶν πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ:** but as vassal to the Great King. 'The Libyans next Egypt', to distinguish them from the great mass of the Libyans who extended westwards as far as Carthage.

**ἐκ Μαρείας τῆς ὑπὲρ Φάρου πόλεως:** near the site of the later Alexandria. It would appear that Pharos was already known to the Greeks as the best port for trade with Egypt.

**Αἰγύπτου τὰ πλείω:** but only of lower Egypt. So long as Memphis was held by the Persians, upper Egypt was not able, even if willing, to send effective help to those in the Delta.

**2. ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι:** there was no break in Athenian policy in the East after the ostracism of Kimon. We do not know what had led to this particular expedition to Cyprus, which was a very large one; perhaps only a demonstration in force. See below.

**ναυσὶ διακοσίαις:** Diodorus says 300, xi. 71. 5 and xiii. 25. 2, 200, xi. 74. 3. See 110. 1 n. Ktesias says 40 only were sent to Egypt, under Charitimides.

For Athenian feeling at this time, see Aesch. *Eum.* 287 ff., quoted in n. on 102. 4.

**τοῦ ποταμοῦ κρατοῦντες:** after the battle of Papremis, Hdt. iii. 12; Diod. 74. Ktesias says the Persians suffered a signal defeat at sea, with 80 ships against 40, losing 20 captured with their crews and 30 destroyed.

It is significant of the state of our knowledge of Athenian politics at this time that we are ignorant of the part played by Perikles or any other leading Athenian, whether statesman or soldier, in this great expedition to Egypt. We do not know who proposed or opposed it, nor even the names of the strategoi (except the one mentioned by Ktesias). If we may judge by the silence of Plutarch in his *Kimon* and *Perikles* ancient authorities were as ignorant. For the later campaign of 450-449 in Cyprus (112. 2-4) we have accounts of opposition and compromise between Kimon and Perikles, on the traditional lines—the former for war against the national enemy, the latter for conserving the resources of Athens or for using them against fellow-Greeks, according as the writer is friendly or hostile (see Introd., p. 68, n. 2); but for this one, of so much greater importance,

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we have little beyond what Thucydides so briefly tells us. After Kimon's ostracism in 461 his policy of war against Persia (if it was his policy—it is doubtful: his last campaign was against Thasos) was resumed for the first time since Eurymedon and with even greater ambitions; yet it was not known whether Perikles, who was universally supposed in the later tradition to have been supreme in Athens after the death of Ephialtes and the ostracism of Kimon, opposed or supported it. Hence Plutarch says no word about the expedition in his biography of Perikles, nor in the *Kimon*.<sup>1</sup>

Miltner in his article on Perikles, *R.E.* 754, follows Beloch, though cautiously, in putting the Egyptian expedition in 461, before Kimon's ostracism, because Kimon must have been its instigator; and Lenschau agrees (Bursian, cclxi, 1938, 237), adding that the fleet need not have sailed before 460, but the negotiations with Inaros must have been carried through by Kimon. This is the kind of argument against which protest is necessary. It assumes just what we do not know, namely Perikles' position and policy c. 460 (probably Kimon's too); and it leads to a conclusion in itself very improbable, namely, that this highly important decision was the work of a *discredited* Kimon (after the Ithome expedition), and that Perikles, *ex hypothesi* incapable of supporting the Egyptian policy for its own sake, after being quit of Kimon by ostracism, meekly carried on his policy for six long years—in Egypt, though he reversed it in Greece—out of sentimental regard, I suppose, for his rival's name. See Nesselhauf's discussion, 6, n. 1; Kolbe, *Hermes*, lxxii, 1937, 269; and the note on Kimon's return from ostracism, below, pp. 326-7.

**105. 1-2. War against the Peloponnesians; siege of Aigina:** Diod. xi. 70. 2-3 (464-463 B.C.) and 78 (459-458). See 108. 4.

The story of the Egyptian expedition is broken off (to be resumed in 109) for the relation of the next events, which were in Greece.

**1. πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους . . . πρὸς Αἰγαίητας:** Corinth, with Epidaurus (often supported by Sparta against Argos and so now acting against Argos' new ally) and Aigina, the old enemy of Athens, were at war with Athens owing to the latter having taken sides, very effectively, in the quarrel between Megara and Corinth. In earlier days Corinth had tended to side with Athens against Aigina, then her more powerful rival in the Saronic Gulf (41. 2).

**καὶ ἐνίκων Κορίνθιοι:** an Athenian victory in Diodorus (78. 1). Cf. § 5 n.

<sup>1</sup> There is a possible reference to it in *Per.* 20. 3, *Αἰγύπτου πάλιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι*, if, as Weizsäcker, 36-42, maintains, this means that Perikles opposed Kimon's plan 'again to make an attempt on Egypt' in 450-449. If so, it would be an extreme case of Plutarch's assumption of a general knowledge of history in his readers. But this interpretation is doubtful: see below, p. 379, n. 2.

καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι: "huc pertinet inscriptio laminae donario olim affixaes quae Dodonae reperta est" (Stahl): Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Πελοποννησίων ναυμαχίᾳ νικήσαντες ἀνέθεσαν (I.G.A. 5). Or, more probably, to the ναυμαχίᾳ μεγάλῃ of the next section.

2. καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι: a famous victory, Plut. *Comp. Per. et Fab.* 1. 2 (cf. *Per.* 16. 3).

Λεωκράτους τοῦ Στροίβου: probably the same Leokrates who had been a strategos at Plataia some 20 years before, with Myronides and Aristeides, Plut. *Arist.* 20. 1 (see below, § 5, for Myronides).

3-106. 2. *Myronides' victory over the Corinthians*: Diod. xi. 79. 1-4 (458-457 B.C.).

3. Πελοποννήσιοι ἀμύνειν βουλόμενοι: the 'first Peloponnesian war' has begun.

τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Γερανείας: ὅρος μεταξὺ Μεγάρων καὶ Κορίνθου—Steph. Byz. What is more important, the Peloponnesians cut, or at least threatened, communication between Megara and Pegai, the port on the Corinthian Gulf.

4. οἱ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι: nominally men of 50 to 59 and youths 18 and 19, who normally were required only to man the walls in the event of a siege (hardly to fight, Greek siege-tactics being what they were); but including as well men unfit for foreign campaigns or, for various reasons, excused from them—all the reserve forces, in fact. See ii. 13. 7 n. Classen and Beloch, *Klio*, v. 364, n. 2, note that there is an awkwardness of expression here, as though of those men left in Athens the oldest and youngest, i.e. the least fit, were expressly chosen. We really need οἱ τε πρ. καὶ οἱ ν. in apposition to οἱ . . . ὑπόλοιποι (unless it is meant that the metic hoplites, who were also in the reserve, stayed behind in Athens?). Beloch suggests that Myronides had already left with the main force, and that 'the oldest and youngest' were then sent to reinforce him.

Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος: one of the most famous of Athenian generals, iv. 95. 3; Aristoph. *Lys.* 801:

καὶ Μυρωνίδης γάρ ήν  
τραχὺς ἐντεῦθεν μελάμπυ-  
γός τε τοῖς ἔχθροῖς ἀπασν,  
ὡς δὲ καὶ Φορμίων.

*Eccles.* 303 (produced nearly 70 years after this battle):

ἀλλ’ οὐχί, Μυρωνίδης  
ὅτ’ ἥρχεν δὲ γεννάδας,  
οὐδεὶς ἀν ἐτόλμα  
τὰ τῆς πόλεως διοι-  
κεῖν ἀργύριον φέρων.

Eupolis, *Demoi*; Diod. xi. 82. 4; Plut. *Per.* 16. 3. Yet except for his

two brilliant victories, in the Megarid and at Oinophyta, practically nothing is known of him. Plutarch, *Arist.* 10. 10 and 20. 1, says he was one of the strategoi at Plataia (with Leokrates, above, § 2, and Aristeides) and had been elected ambassador to Sparta in the early summer of 479, with Kimon and Xanthippos. He must have been over thirty to be strategos, and, one would have said, well over thirty to be ambassador. The story of the embassy comes from Idomeneus, one of the least trustworthy of authorities (as Plutarch knew: see *Introd.*, p. 59); but the names came not from him but from a decree.<sup>1</sup> It is possible that a genuine decree was preserved, in Krateros' *Collection*, by which Xanthippos, Kimon, and Myronides were sent on an embassy to Sparta, but that it belongs to a date a good many years later and was falsely attributed to 479 B.C. Plutarch indeed professes to give the terms of the decree, moved by Aristeides; but these terms are not of the kind that can be easily believed, so that the whole story may be a later rhetorical invention. If such a decree was recorded by Krateros, it would diminish considerably our respect for his work.

It would appear from Eupolis' *Demoi* that Myronides lived on long after 457, which would make the connexion with Xanthippos, even after 479, highly improbable (if Plutarch's decree is genuine, it might of course be another Myronides); but I postpone a discussion of Eupolis' play till the commentary on book v.

5. μάχης γενομένης ἰσορρόπου: τὸ τελευταῖον ἐνίκησαν Ἀθηναῖοι—Diodorus. Cf. § 1 n.

6. τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβαλόντες: ἐν τῇ λεγομένῃ Κιμωλίᾳ—Diodorus.

106. 1. προσβιασθὲν καὶ διαμαρτὸν τῆς ὁδοῦ: 'hard pressed and missing their way'; i.e. so hard pressed that they missed the road.

2. εἰργον τοῖς ὀπλίταις: i.e. they began what was a siege on a small scale. Owing to the ditch separating the two forces, which would have broken their formation, the hoplites on neither side can attack; but as it was a ditch and not a wall, and the enclosed space was small, it was possible to attack the defenders from a distance, by firing, a method which would be quite ineffective against a walled town.

It has been suggested by Beloch, ii. 1. 167, n. 1, that the Argives helped the Athenians on this campaign, because two Argive inscriptions of about this date have been found at Olympia (*Inschr. v. Ol.* 250, 251; I.G.A. 32, 33), one of them for a victory over Corinth. The inscriptions do not mention any allies of Argos.

The activities of this year, culminating in the victory of the Athenian reserves over the Corinthians, were memorable—hence the much greater detail with which Thucydides narrates the cam-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch *may* mean that only the last part of the story—that about Aristeides at Sparta, a foolish anecdote—comes from Idomeneus.

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paign in the Megarid—and remembered (not least by the Corinthians: see c. 70). See Lysias' or Pseudo-Lysias' *Epitaphios*, ii. 48–53, Andokides, iii. 6 (shortly and modestly), Aristeides, xiii (*Panath.*), 155. Aristotle, *Ath.* 26. 1, following a historian learned and with a marked oligarchic bias (Theopompos or one of his school), only crabs them, for the heavy losses involved: *κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους συνέπειε μηδὲ ἥγεμόνα ἔχει τοὺς ἐπιεικεστέρους, ἀλλ’ αὐτῶν προεστάναι Κίμωνα τὸν Μιλτιάδου, νωθρότερον<sup>1</sup> ὅντα καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὅψε προσελθόντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἐφθάρθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς κατὰ πόλεμον.* *τῆς γὰρ στρατείας γιγνομένης ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις ἐκ καταλόγου [when was it not?], καὶ στρατηγῶν ἐφισταμένων ἀπείρων μὲν τοῦ πολεμεῖν, τιμωμένων δὲ διὰ τὰς πατρικὰς δόξας, αἱὲ συνέβαινεν τῶν ἔξιόντων ἀνὰ δισχιλίους ἢ τρισχιλίους ἀπόλληνοθαι, ὥστε ἀναλίσκεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τοὺς δήμους καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων.* (Cf. Plut. *Kim.* 13. 2, of the losses at Eurymedon. Isokrates, viii. 86–7, has a similar passage, but with a different colouring.) This is a very good example of the later rhetorical history by which Aristotle was often influenced (cf. 100. 3 n., p. 297); it doubtless reflects much that was said by partisans in the middle of the fifth century, perhaps by Stesimbrotos, who though an enemy, it seems, especially of the democratic leaders, as a Thasian may have had no love for Kimon, the destroyer of his own city's independence (100. 2 n., above).<sup>2</sup> Though Kimon had been ostracized some time before the 'wonderful year', yet we must attribute these expensive wars to this time; for Aristotle, writing with the same bias but in a very different strain, of the period when Kimon had been really active, i.e. during the pretended domination of the Areiopagos (479–462 B.C.), had said (23. 2): *ἐπολυτεύθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι καλῶς καὶ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καιρούς συνέβη γὰρ αὐτοῖς περὶ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον τά τε εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀσκῆσαι, καὶ παρὰ τοὺς Ἑλλησιν εὑδοκῆσαι, καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἥγεμονιαν λαβεῖν* (unless this refers only to the events of 480–475 B.C.?).

There were never 'two and three thousand killed' on any expedition, except that to Egypt; and, as has often been pointed out, on that expedition the losses must have fallen mainly on the thetic class, not on *οἱ ἐπιεικέστεροι*. The latter may have lost heavily at Tanagra, as at Eurymedon: cf. esp. Plut. *Kim.* 17. 6–7.

The noblest monument of the battles of this year is the casualty list of the Erechtheid phyle, which had been exceptionally active (there is no reason to suppose that each phyle had a similar monument: the usual *public* monument was a list of all citizens killed

<sup>1</sup> Some such emendation is necessary for the corrupt *νεώτερον*; see above, p. 48, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> The 'inexperienced generals' include Leokrates, Myronides, and presumably Kimon, as well as Tolmides, the commanders of the Egyptian expedition at Tanagra and in Thrace (pp. 296–7, 391 n. 1), and Perikles. See Introd., pp. 46–9.

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within a year): I.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 929 (Tod, 26), *'Ερεχθίδος' οἶδε ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπέθανον, ἐν Κύπρῳ, ἐν Αἴγυπτῳ, ἐν Φοινίκῃ, ἐν Αἰγαίῳ, Μεγαρῷ, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνιαυτοῦ followed by 177 names, including two strategoi. Thucydides does not mention *fighting* in Cyprus, nor Phoenicia; but triremes may well have touched at the coast of Palestine on the way to Egypt, or Persian ships may have been pursued there. The inscription does not mention Kekryphaleia. Nor are all the 177, or even a majority of them, necessarily hoplites, as Busolt supposes, iii. 315. 3; there are some very plebeian-seeming names among them.*

*Ἐνιαυτός* means here (I am sure) the twelve months between one winter (the season when the public funeral of those fallen in war was held) and the next, not an archon-year.<sup>1</sup> It does not follow from this that the Athenian campaign in Egypt was *begun* in the same year as the fighting at Halieis, Aigina, and Megara (as, e.g., Busolt, iii. 305 n., 308 n., Kolbe, *Herm.* lxxii, 1937, 266–7, and Wallace assume: see below, p. 412, n. 2); there may well have been casualties in Cyprus, Egypt, and Phoenicia in the second or third as in the first year of the Egyptian war.

107. 1. *The Long Walls*: Plut. *Per.* 13. 6–7. See 108. 3.

*ἥρξαντο δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους:* owing to the length of time required for the walls, Stahl takes *ἥρξαντο* here as pluperfect in sense; for their completion followed soon after this date (108. 3). But even so, it will mean 'they had begun the building' at the time of the campaign in the Megarid. Plut. *Kim.* 13. 8 says that Kimon made the foundations of the walls secure that had previously fallen in owing to the marshy nature of the ground, from the spoils of Eurymedon. This implies that the walls must have been begun before Eurymedon, which is quite irreconcilable with Thucydides; we cannot simply say, they may have been planned in the 60's, with Lenschau, in *R.E.* xix. 73. (It is possible that Kimon effected some repairs later, after his return from ostracism, and that this has misled Plutarch—just as, immediately before, he has put the Peace of Kallias after Eurymedon. The marshy ground is that just north of the coastline of Phaleron Bay.) It is also strictly irreconcilable with Plutarch's picture of Kimon as the conservative hoplite; for the Long Walls were the work of the democrats, the party that would rely on the navy; cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 455 E, quoted below, p. 313, n. 1. We should be wrong, however, *on that account*, to dismiss the story as an invention (as Miltner, *R.E.*, 'Perikles', 755); for the picture is at most only half true (cf. 93. 6, 107. 4 nn.), and invented stories are usually in accord with the traditional picture, not contrary to it.

<sup>1</sup> See Beloch, ii. 2. 199; West, *C.P.* xx, 1925, 216–37.

**τό τε Φάληρονδε καὶ τὸ ἐς Πειραιᾶ:** the line of the wall to the Peiraeus is known, a good deal of it having been seen by Leake (i.<sup>2</sup> 417–18) which has since been destroyed: see Curtius and Kaupert, ii. 4–5; Judeich, 155–60.<sup>1</sup> No trace of the wall to Phaleron has been discovered; but it has been generally assumed that it left the city wall east of Philopappos hill and went in a direct line, reaching the coast east of the mouth of the Kephissos: this would make it some 35 stades in length, as Thucydides says, ii. 13. 7. Judeich, however, p. 158, objects that this would leave the coastline between Phaleron and Peiraeus unwalled and unprotected, and suggests a line farther to the west and curving towards the end to meet the Peiraeus wall north of Mounychia. But such a wall would not have been described as going to Phaleron, which it would not touch. See Lehmann-Hartleben, 'Die ant. Hafenanlagen', *Klio*, Beiheft 14, 1923, 79–80. Lenschau, in *R.E.* xix. 73, argues that a wall to Phaleron, probably to C. Kolias (i.e. to what is now old Phaleron<sup>2</sup>), was necessary to protect the harbour of Phaleron from the land side, and that from the sea the coast was adequately protected by the navy, based on the two harbours, Mounychia and Zea, on the east side of the Peiraeus peninsula. This might not, however, be adequate protection against sudden raids; and it is to be remembered that the coastline of Peiraeus itself was surrounded by a wall. Ferguson, *Hesperia*, vii, 1938, 26, agrees that the Phaleric wall reached the coast east of the Kephissos, and thinks that a wall then followed the coast to Peiraeus; but in that case Thucydides omits this last section, unaccountably, in ii. 13. 7, or the figure 35 stades is wrong.

Later, perhaps c. 444–442 (Meyer (1), iv.<sup>2</sup> 1. 687)<sup>3</sup>, a third wall was built, *τὸ νότιον τεῖχος*, close to and parallel to the Peiraeus wall, (*Andok.* iii. 7 and *Aischin.* ii. 174), making that a double wall, with a space between them 183 yards wide—perhaps, as Lenschau, p. 74, suggests, when the use of Phaleron Bay as a harbour had been altogether given up. The Phaleron wall was not rebuilt after the destruction in 404, and it may have been out of use before that, though nothing can be argued from the absence of any specific mention of it in the account of the destruction (*Lys.* xiii. 8; *Xen. Hell.* ii. 2. 11, 15), and as large a walled space as possible would be desired for the population driven in from the country after 413.

<sup>1</sup> Note that Leake's 'Phaleric Wall' is the Southern Long Wall to Peiraeus.

<sup>2</sup> The location of C. Kolias being doubtful: perhaps at H. Kosmás, c. 4 km. to the south—Hondius, *B.S.A.* xxiv, 1919–21, 156–7.

<sup>3</sup> Among the receipts of the Parthenon commissioners in 443–442 is a sum *παρὰ τειχοποιῶν* (not, apparently, in 444–443 as well), *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 343; and Meyer concludes from this that the wall was recently finished, the commission for the wall being left with some surplus moneys. This is not quite certain; for in the previous year money had been received, it seems, *παρὰ τριηροποιῶν*, and the building of triremes had not stopped.

Steup argues from Thucydides' express statement in 108. 3, 'the Athenians completed their Long Walls', and from the fact that he and others can use the singular for a double line of walls (ii. 13. 7—rather a special case, however—, iv. 67. 3, 69. 2; *Andok.* i. 45), that all three walls were built at the same time: statements about *τὸ νότιον τεῖχος* in *Andokides* and *Aischines* and *τὸ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος* ('the middle wall' of the three) in *Plato, Gorgias* 455 D–E, should not be believed against Thucydides. This, however, is greatly to exaggerate the completeness of Thucydides' narrative of the Pentekontaëtia; and Sokrates was only 12 years old in 457, and cannot have heard Perikles proposing a motion in the ekklesia before he was twenty.<sup>1</sup>

**107. 2–108. 1. The Campaign of Tanagra:** Diod. xi. 79. 4–80 (458–457 B.C.); Plut. *Kim.* 17. 4–9, *Per.* 17. 1–4; Paus. i. 29. 6–9.

**Φωκέων στρατευσάντων ἐς Δωριᾶς:** Phokis, generally friendly with Athens (iii. 95. 1), joins in the war on her own account, hoping to profit by the engagements of the bigger states. For Doris cf. also iii. 92. 3–4. It lay west and north of Phokis, in the mountain country, but on the routes from south Aitolia into Phokis and Boeotia (iii. 95. 1) and from the Spercheios valley via Trachis into Phokis (*Hdt.* viii. 31).

**Βοιὸν καὶ Κυτίνιον καὶ Ἐρινέον:** there were four towns according to some writers, a Dorian tetrapolis, *Strabo*, ix. 4. 10, p. 427; x. 4. 6, p. 476.

**Ἐλόντων ἐν τῶν πολισμάτων: κάτεσχον αὐτῶν τὰς πόλεις**—Diodoros.

**Νικομήδους . . . ὑπὲρ Πλειστοάνακτος:** see 94. 1 n.

**Ἔαυτῶν τε . . . καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων:** a regular, though not a full, levy of the Peloponnesian League. (Steup, 108. 1, says, not the League as such, but Sparta and various allies, mainly Boeotians at Tanagra, 107. 1; but it seems clear that 11,500 men crossed from Pelopon-

<sup>1</sup> On the other hand I believe that by *τὸ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος* Plato means the wall between Athens and the Peiraeus, not the middle wall of three, despite Harpokration (s. διὰ μέσου τεῖχος) and, probably, the scholiast (*Greene, Scholia Platonica*, 1938, 136). If we look at the whole passage—ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ. οἰσθα γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὸ τεῖχον τὰ Ἀθηναῖαν καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγεται ταῦτα, φ. Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους. Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἥκουν ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους—it is clear that Sokrates is referring to Perikles' general policy, as distinct from that of Themistokles, that is, the building of the Long Walls, not to any later addition to the walls. Since Sokrates could not have heard him in 457, there is a confusion in Plato between two different occasions.

Similarly, Plutarch was thinking of the Long Walls in general, not of the middle wall in particular, when he cited both this passage of Plato and Kratinos' mockery (below, p. 319): τὸ δὲ μακρὸν τεῖχος, περὶ οὗ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαί φησιν αὐτός, κ.τ.λ. (*Per.* 13. 6), and *Κρατίνος* οὐτω πως λέγει περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους (*Mor.* 351 A).

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nesos, and, as Steup recognizes, *Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι* is the regular title of the League: iii. 9. 1, iv. 119. 1, etc.) Evidently Phokis had not expected Sparta to act so soon after the Helot revolt. Why they did, on this large scale, and without proper examination of the conditions, we do not know. Perhaps to restore a damaged reputation.

3. *κατὰ θάλασσαν*: this, as the most direct way and because it is mentioned first of the two alternatives, is presumably the way they had crossed into northern Greece, landing at Krisa, and marching thence by Lokrian Amphissa and the regular route from Delphi to the north. The Athenians only sent their fleet after the Peloponnesian forces had landed. What happened to the transports for 11,500 men?

*τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου*: i.e. the Corinthian Gulf; cf. ii. 69. 1.

*περιπλεύσαντες*: they did not go direct from Pegai, presumably because they had few or no ships there. See 103. 4 n., p. 305.

*ναυσὶ περιπλᾶ*: Diodoros (80. 1) mentions 50 ships as having assisted at the holding of the passes by Geraneia (together with the 14,000 land-troops), and some have suggested reading *ναυσὶ* here, unnecessarily.

*ἔφρουρεῖτο αἰεὶ ὑπὸ Αθηναίων*: one of the few instances in Greek history of passes being guarded to prevent the passage of heavy-armed troops—but not by light-armed. See Introd., pp. 12–14.

4. *ἄνδρες... τῶν Αθηναίων*: a few desperate oligarchs, such as appear very occasionally in Attic history after Kleisthenes, in 411 and 404. The Long Walls meant for them the permanent domination of the democracy, by making Athens dependent on the sea; cf. Plut. *Them.* 19. 4, quoted above, n. on 93. 6; Ps.-Xen. 1. 2, 2. 15–16; Ar. *Ἄθηνα* 24. 1; cf. *Pol.* v. 2. 12, 1303 b 10. With this conspiracy compare the anecdote of Kimon and his followers at the battle of Tanagra, Plut. *Kim.* 17. 4–6, *Per.* 10. 1–3. The anecdote is not out of character; not only was Kimon personally patriotic and honest (as far as we know), but, as the most successful naval commander in Athens—we know of no successful land-expeditions under his leadership—, he can have had little sympathy with the extreme oligarchs who would bring in Spartan domination rather than have a large fleet and the consequent democracy. Both he and Aristides, though not men of genius like Themistokles, were, in their way, almost equally responsible with the latter for the development of the fifth-century democracy; and there is little reason to suppose that they were unconscious of this.

5. *ἐβοήθησαν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοὺς οἱ Αθηναῖοι*: they did not stop behind their walls, as in 431 and following years; partly, doubtless, because of a greater self-confidence (as in 424), but also because the Long Walls connecting Athens and the Peiraeus were not yet completed,

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and the new strategy had not been formed. Their present decision in any case prevented their land being laid waste.

*οἱ Αθηναῖοι πανδημεῖ*: in spite of the fact that the war in Egypt and the siege of Aigina, which had taken nearly all the first-line troops earlier (105. 4–5), were still going on. But if we keep in mind the ordinary methods of siege-warfare (Introd., p. 18), we may readily suppose that the circumvallation of Aigina had been completed for some time and the bulk of the Athenian hoplite force there withdrawn (not only “some of them”, as Walker in *C.A.H.* v, p. 81); and perhaps the same thing had happened in Egypt (110. 1, 4 nn.).

*τῶν ἀλλων ξυμμάχων*: does this mean Megara and Thessaly, Plataia, and perhaps Troezen, as well as Argos and Kleonai, or the members of the Delian Confederacy too? If the latter, it is the first recorded instance in which they are called upon to fight in a land-war against a Greek enemy of Athens. See 99. 1 n., 108. 1 n., 113. 1. The three members who still had fleets had presumably sent contingents to the Aeginetan war (105. 2).

*ξύμπαντες δὲ ἐγένοντο τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ μύριοι*: according to de Sanctis, *Riv. d. Fil.* xv, 1937, p. 289, Thucydides gives this figure not from any historical source, but by adding the 1,000 Argives to the 13,000 which, he says, was the number of the first-line Athenian hoplites in 431 (ii. 13. 7)—the odd ‘other allies’ making up for the Athenians who were away in Egypt and Aigina. We have, as far as I can see, no means of disproving this; but there also seems no reason for believing it, for supposing that what Thucydides means is: ‘the Athenians set out *πανδημεῖ* and Argos sent 1,000 men; therefore there were 14,000 (see my figures below)’. He may well have thought that ‘the other allies’, i.e. principally the members of the League, contributed quite a large force, and have been right. They clearly did in the campaign in Boeotia under Tolmides’ command, 113. 1; and in 431 they were all, except Lesbos and Chios, expected to furnish land-troops, ii. 9. 5. Cf. 108. 1 n.

6. *καὶ τι καὶ τοῦ δήμου καταλύσεως ὑποψίᾳ*: and so could not afford to wait and watch, in case the Peloponnesians invaded Attica?

7. *κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν*: 102. 4. It was renewed again later, in spite of Thessalian treachery now—111. 1 n., ii. 22. 3.

108. 1. *ἐνίκων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι*: the issue was doubtful according to later Athenian tradition, Plat. *Menex.* 242 A; Diod. xi. 80. 2, 6. The victors set up a gold *φιάλη* in the east portico of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, and part of the inscription has been recovered: Paus. v. 10. 4; Tod, 27 (see also Guarducci, *Rendic. Pont. Acc.* xii. 125 ff., cited by Tod, *J.H.S.* lvii, 1937, 184). On it the defeated are called *Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Αθανᾶιοι καὶ Ιάνες* (for the Ionians see n. on *τῶν ἀλλων ξυμμάχων*, 107. 5); the names of Sparta’s allies

were listed below the epigram. But though there is no doubt that the Peloponnesians remained masters of the field on the day of battle, the sequel shows, as the *Menexenos* says, that strategically the victory lay with Athens. The Peloponnesians could only go home; the conspiracy at Athens came to naught; and the Athenians were able two months later to invade and conquer Boeotia.

Diodorus has an elaborate account of the battle, which include fighting on two successive days, and an attack by the treacherous Thessalians on an Athenian convoy during the night. Some of this may come from a good tradition; but his further account of the fighting against the Boeotians does not inspire confidence (see below). He also says that a four months' truce was arranged after the battle; and that the Thebans took advantage of the presence of the Spartans to ask them for aid in recovering their old position at the head of the Boeotian Confederacy, which they had lost by their attitude in the Persian wars; they would, they said, spare the Peloponnesians further campaigns abroad by checking Athens themselves. To which Sparta consented; amongst other things the Theban walls were extended. The immediate success of the Athenians may well have been in part due to dissatisfaction among the other Boeotian cities at this accession of strength to Thebes; the truce is unlikely—at least the Peloponnesians behaved as enemies on their passage through the Megarid (§ 2), and Diodorus puts Tanagra and Oinophyta in different campaigning seasons.

The Athenians set up memorials to the Kleonaians and to the Argives who fell in the battle, alongside their own memorials on the road to the Academy: Paus. i. 29. 7, 9; I.G. i. 2 931–2 (Tod, 28; a new fragment has been found, *Arch. Anz.* xlvii, 1932, 183–4). The inscriptions are in the Argive writing; presumably an Argive stonemason was sent with the official list of the dead. There were some Athenian cavalry in the battle; at least a monument to two of them seen by Pausanias may be of this date (i. 29. 6); and it is possible that the fragmentary I.G. i. 2 946 (= *Anth. Pal.* vii. 254) is a memorial of the Athenian cavalry who fell at Tanagra: Wilhelm, *Oest. Jahresh.* ii, 1899, 221–7; Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* liii, 1933, 78–9. If so, as Wade-Gery argues, it may have been set up some time after the battle, perhaps after Kimon's death (cf. n. on 107. 4). But see below, ii. 22. 2 n.

For the question whether Kimon was recalled from ostracism after Tanagra, see below, pp. 326–7.

**2. ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα:** the Athenians had withdrawn the bulk of their forces; and they had no organized light-armed troops to defend mountain country. They were probably content too to see the Peloponnesians go home, now that all danger of an attack on Attica and of a conspiracy at home was past.

**2–3. Battle of Oinophyta:** Diodoros, xi. 81–3. 3 (457–456 B.C.).

δευτέρᾳ καὶ ἔξηκοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ: a detail that was remembered in the tradition (cf. ἡμέραις ὑπέρον δώδεκα μάλιστα, 105. 6), because it illustrated the resilience of the Athenians, παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες, and ἦν ἄρα τον καὶ πείρα σφαλῶσιν ἀντελπίσαντες ἀλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρέαν; just as their conduct after Tanagra and Oinophyta showed that κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἔχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἔξέρχονται καὶ νικώμενοι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀναπτίπουσι (70. 3, 5, 7). Diodorus places the two battles in two consecutive archon-years; and this is probably correct, for it was not likely to have been invented in the case of campaigns that followed each other so closely. That is to say, Tanagra was probably fought in June 457, Oinophyta in the following August. See, however, Introd., pp. 4–5.

Plato, *Menex.* 242 B (cf. § 1 n., ad init.), says τρίτη ἡμέρᾳ, an absurd exaggeration, even if it means 'two days after the departure of the Lacedaemonians'. It was suggested by Clinton, *Fasti Hell.*, ii<sup>3</sup> (1841), 312, that καὶ ἔξηκοστῇ should be supplied in the text; which is possible, and would be almost probable, since this interval of time was well remembered, but that the *Menexenos* is full of exaggerations. Harrison, in the paper cited below, p. 363, n. 1, suggests that Hellanikos had τρίτη and that this may have been one of the mistakes corrected by Thucydides.

**3. ἐν Οινοφύτοις:** the position of this village is unknown. It is generally placed, without much reason, near Tanagra. According to Ephoros (presumably: Diod. xi. 82. 4) τῶν συγγραφέων, καίπερ τῆς μάχης ταύτης ἐπιφανοῦς γεγενημένης, οὐδεὶς οὔτε τὸν τρόπον αὐτῆς οὔτε τὴν διάταξιν ἀνέγραψε.

Diodorus makes two battles out of one (both in the archon-year after Tanagra), the first a victory followed by the capture of Tanagra and the destruction of its walls and by the overrunning of Boeotia, the second at Oinophyta. The first, adorned with a foolish story of malingering Athenians and Myronides' 'intelligent' decision to fight without them,<sup>1</sup> was the famous victory, which put Myronides on a level with Themistokles, Miltiades, and Kimon. The second led to the reduction of all Boeotia, 'except Thebes'. This last point is made improbable by Thucydides' silence here, and by c. 113 (iv. 95. 3, cited by Classen as decisive against Diodorus, is of little or no value for this) as well as by Aristotle (see below); and there is no reason to believe in the two battles.

**τῆς τε χώρας ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας:** largely by supporting one party (very likely an anti-Theban party: cf. Diodorus' account) and

<sup>1</sup> Myronides' 'saying' is given too by Plutarch, *Mor.* 185 E; also to Leonidas, 225 D, and to Timotheos, *Polyain.* iii. 10. 3.

exiling the opposing leaders in the cities, 113. 2, iii. 62. 5. Democracies were everywhere set up, which, according to Aristotle, proved a failure, at least in Thebes, *Pol.* v. 2. 6, 1302 b 29. The *Menexenos*, in a true imperial spirit, says the Athenians were ὑπὲρ τῆς Βοωτῶν ἐλευθερίας Λακεδαιμονίους μαχόμενοι, and that they τοὺς ἀδίκως φεύγοντας δικαίως κατήγαον.

Ps.-Xenophon, 3. 10-11, says that the Athenian democracy never got any good from its occasional support of οἱ βέλτιστοι in other states (ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ταῖς στασιαζούσαις); ἀλλ' ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου ὁ δῆμος ἔδούλευσεν ὁ ἐν Βοωτοῖς.<sup>1</sup> τοῦτο δὲ ὅτε Μιλησίων εἶλοντο τοὺς βελτίστους, κ.τ.λ. Aristotle, i.c., says that *stasis* often breaks out in democracies through οἱ εὐποροὶ καταφρογόντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας, οἷον καὶ ἐν Θῆβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτους μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένοις ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη, and the statement in Ps.-Xenophon has been interpreted in the light of this. Busolt, iii. 320. 3, 321 n., went so far as to suppose that Sparta had set up democracies after Tanagra and that Athens countered by setting up oligarchies after Oinophyta. There is nothing as such unreasonable in this view: the policies of great powers are not always consistent, and Sparta and Athens might on occasion exchange their traditional roles; but this is not only unlikely in 457 B.C. (see Walker, *C.A.H.* v. 469), but really inconsistent with what Aristotle says. All that we need suppose (if Ps.-Xenophon is to be believed, which is not necessarily the case) is that in some Boeotian cities, including Thebes, the democracies set up after Oinophyta proved so incompetent that Athens was prepared, say about 450, to work with the moderate oligarchs (the extremists remaining in exile: see 113. 1), but with the result that these moderates in 447 helped the exiles in the overthrow of Athenian power in Boeotia.<sup>2</sup>

It was the opinion of Boeckh, and it is surely right (Wilamowitz (1), ii. 293. 7), that Pindar's seventh Isthmian, in honour of Strepsiades of Thebes, was written for a victory at the Isthmia of 456, eight months or so after Oinophyta, fought in the previous August (Boeckh's large edition, pp. 630-4). Strepsiades' uncle had recently fallen in battle defending his country,<sup>3</sup> ἔτλαν δὲ πένθος οὐ φατόν.

<sup>1</sup> This is Madvig's conjecture, adopted by Kalinka, for the MSS. ὁ μὲν *B.* or τοῦτο μὲν *B.* I should prefer ὁ μὲν ἐν *B.*, with Gelzer, or τοῦτο μὲν ἐν *B.*

<sup>2</sup> Ps.-Xenophon is speaking of the evil results to *Athens* of her support of oligarchs in other states, and the mere 'enslavement' of the demos in Boeotia would not count for anything, if it had not resulted in the defeat at Koroneia. Whether in consequence we should assume a lacuna in Ps.-Xenophon is, however, doubtful. See my paper in *Athenian Studies*, p. 230, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> The scholiast says (l. 34) ὅντος ἀνηρέθη κατὰ τὸν Πελοποννησιακὸν πόλεμον, i.e. the first Peloponnesian war. If one wishes to stress this, we might suppose that the elder Strepsiades fell at Tanagra (in a battle, that is, between Athens and the Peloponnesians and their allies); for though Tanagra was a tactical victory, the whole campaign was a disastrous one for the Boeotians. There is,

That was not only a private grief, at the loss of a friend, but for the disastrous defeat of his city.<sup>1</sup> It is possible too that the eleventh Pythian was written in 454-453, when Thebes was suffering from Athenian rule (Bowra, *C.Q.* xxx, 1936, 129-41); but I do not find this so convincing.

καὶ Φωκίδος: naturally friendly to Athens as the enemy of Sparta, and now become formally an ally; but neither Phokis nor Boeotia was enrolled as a member of the Delian League, as Aigina was.

καὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀπουντίων: naturally hostile to Phokis, and perhaps hostile to Athens since the latter's conquest of Naupaktos (103. 3 n.).

τά τε τείχη τὰ ἔσυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ ἀπετέλεσαν: their completion was rapid, whatever Kratinos may have said about it (fr. 300, ap. Plut. *Per.* 13. 7).

παλαιὶ γάρ αὐτῷ

λόγοισι προάγει Περικλέντος, ἔργοισι δ' οὐδὲ κινεῖ·

though Beloch, scornful of anecdotes, has a simple faith in raillery (above, pp. 267-8). Or, more probably, Kratinos was thinking of the third wall, built after the others (107. 1 n.); or there may have been delay before the building was begun, if Kratinos was active before 458.

4. ὡμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Αἰγινῆται: Diod. xi. 78. 4 (459-458 B.C.), 'after a nine months' siege'; he may easily mean that the siege lasted on till the following archon-year. See below, p. 412, n. 2.

τείχη τε περιελόντες, κ.τ.λ.: the same terms as were granted to seceding allies, as Naxos and Thasos (101. 3).

φόρον τε ταξάμενοι: they paid 30 tal. regularly, till the occupation of the island by Athenian settlers in 431 B.C. (26½ tal. is possible in 450-449, and a smaller sum in 433-432, but there may have been other instalments.) This was relatively a large sum, only Thasos among the other tributary states paying so much, though well within the island's capacity if it still preserved its old commercial activity.

I.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 18 is a fragment of a decree passed soon after the surrender of Aigina, confirming all or part of the agreement between the two states. I take the *φιλακή* mentioned in it to be Athenian rather than Peloponnesian, as Hiller supposes.

however, some objection to 456 as the date of *Isth.* vii; for at the end of it Pindar looks forward to a victory for Strepsiades at the Pythian games, and there was not to be another Pythia before 454. The Isthmia of 454 is not an impossible occasion; for Athenian rule in Boeotia would keep the memory of Oinophyta fresh.

<sup>1</sup> But

ἀλλὰ παλαιὰ γάρ

εῦδει χάρις, ἀμνάμονες δὲ βροτοί (16-17)

cannot, in its context, 'reflect the bitter feeling in Thebes at their desertion by the Spartans after Tanagra' (Busolt, iii. 319. 2).

5. *Periplous of Tolmides*: Diodoros, xi. 84 (456–455 B.C.); schol. Aischin. ii. 75 (456–455).

*περιέπλευσαν*: see 103. 4, n. Here, however, the *periplous* is designed more to damage Sparta on its way than to reach Naupaktos.

**Τολμίδου . . . στρατηγοῦντος**: anxious to be as much in the public eye as Myronides, according to Diodoros, who therefore gives him a complementary anecdote to that given to Myronides (above, p. 317), and as foolish a one: Myronides took only a few troops with him into Boeotia, leaving the laggards behind; Tolmides by a ruse got 3,000 volunteers to sail with him in addition to the 1,000 decreed by the *ekklesia*. Contrast Aischin. ii. 75, who only mentions the 1,000 *ἐπίλεκτοι*,<sup>1</sup> and compare the somewhat similar story of Tolmides and the Boeotian campaign (below, 113) in Plut. *Per.* 18. 2. Diodoros says the fleet consisted of 50 triremes.

**τὸ νεώριον τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων**: Gytheion, on the Gulf of Lakonia. Diodoros makes him take Methone too, but before Gytheion, though it was in Messenia; and then Kephallenia and Naupaktos, which was settled with Messenians from Ithome, just conquered by Sparta (103. 3 n.); he says nothing of Chalkis and Sikyon. Schol. Aischin. (generally a good authority) ii. 75, and Paus. i. 27. 5 add Boiai, on the west coast of Lakonia proper, and Kythera, to the places captured by Tolmides; but they were not held. See Busolt, iii. 327 n.

**Χαλκίδα**: in south Aitolia, west of Naupaktos, not far from the mouth of the Euenos R., ii. 83. 3; Strabo, x. 2. 5, p. 451, 21, p. 459. See Woodhouse, *Aetolia*, 63, 107–12. The Corinthians held many places on the coast between here and Anaktorion (55. 1), as Molykreion (to the west), iii. 102. 2, Sollion and Astakos (ii. 30. 1), and Leukas.

109–10. *The End of the Athenian Expedition to Egypt*: Diodoros, xi. 75 (461–460 B.C.) and 77. 1–5 (460–459); Ktesias, 32–4.

The narrative is resumed from 104. 2, with a brief reference (§§ 1–3) to the intervening period. § 4 begins the chronological order again.

109. 1. **πολλαὶ ἴδεαι πολέμων**: *οἷον ναυμαχίαι καὶ πεζομαχίαι καὶ νῖκαι καὶ ἥτται*—schol. The defeats refer not to the final Persian victory (as Classen), but, like the victories, to those experienced during the last three or four years. Amyrtaios and the Athenians had held their ground, but not without fighting; the warfare had not taken the simple form of a siege of the White Castle alone.

2. **ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν**: this proposal must have been for a year subsequent to the Tanagra campaign. See below, p. 327, n. 1.

<sup>1</sup> But he also implies that it was a land-expedition, διὰ μέσης Πελοποννήσου ἀδεῶς διεῆξε!

3. **τὰ χρήματα ἄλλως ἀνηλούτο**: τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐτε χρήματα δεξαμένων οὐτε ἄλλως προσεχόντων τοῖς ὑπὸ Περσῶν δέξιοι μένεντος—Diod. xi. 74. 6; “the bribes were freely accepted, but no invasion followed”—Walker, *C.A.H.* v. 78. Each is characteristic.

**Μεγάβυζον δὲ τὸν Ζωπύρου**: Hdt. iii. 160. 2 (with reference to this expedition to Egypt only), vii. 82, 121. 3 (commander of one of the six divisions of Xerxes' army). The proper spelling of his name in Greek should apparently be *Megabyzus*, and so it is written in some of Herodotos' MSS. in iii. 153, 160. 2, and vii. 121. 3 according to Hude (Oxford edition): see Wackernagel, *Herm.* lviii, 1923, 462–4.<sup>1</sup>

**μετὰ στρατᾶς πολλῆς**: 300 triremes and 300,000 land-troops according to Diodoros, 300 (under Horiskos) and 500,000 (with those already in Egypt) according to Ktesias. Thucydides, naturally, gives no numbers. Diodoros also mentions Cypriot, as well as Phoenician and Kilikian triremes, which is unlikely as Athens was using the island as a base; see, however, 112. 4.

4. **καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους**: i.e. the Libyans, but perhaps not the Greeks, who are mentioned in the next clause (Classen). Ktesias, however, 33, says many Greeks fell, including their commander Charitimides.

**Προσωπίτιδα τὴν νῆσον**: Hdt. ii. 41; below Memphis, and formed by a canal (*τὴν διώρυχα*) joining two branches of the Nile. Thucydides writes as though his readers would know the place (see Introd., pp. 21–2).

**μεχρὶ οὐδὲ ξηράνας τὴν διώρυχα, κ.τ.λ.**: King's Meads on the R. Lea at Hackney are supposed to recall a similar device by which Alfred the Great ἐπὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ ἐποίησε the Danish fleet, which had sailed up the river from the Thames. It suggests the season of lowest water in the Nile, i.e. about June (Busolt, iii. 328. 3).

110. 1. **Ἐξ ἔτη πολεμήσαντα**: another indication of time, but no date.

**ὅλιγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν . . . ἐσώθησαν**: Diodoros gives the later Athenian, rhetorical version, by which the Greek forces, deserted by the Egyptians, burnt their ships and stood their ground ready to fight to the end; so that Megabyxos agreed to an armistice, and the Athenians marched away through Libya to Kyrene and ἐσώθησαν παραδέξως εἰς τὴν πατρίδα. It is noteworthy that Ktesias, the Greek doctor resident in Persia and by no means writing the Athenian story, in effect tells the same tale: that the 40 ships (104. 2 n.) and 6,000 and more Greeks surrendered on condition that they might

<sup>1</sup> I may add that in Krates, fr. 33 ap. Athen. vi. 247 ε (where we must surely read ποιμανεῖ δ' ἐπιστίτος, ρίγων ἐν Μεγαβύζον—‘starving in the midst of plenty’—not ἐπιστίτον, ρίγων’, as Meineke and Kock, nor ἐπιστίτον, ρίγῶν δ’ as Kaibel), the MSS. of Athenaios have μετὰ βύζου, not μετὰ βύζον, according to Meineke, followed by Kock. Kaibel, however, reports μεταβύζου.

return home when they would.<sup>1</sup> But Isokrates, viii. 86, says 200 ships and their crews were all lost.

Thucydides' version is, naturally, to be preferred. But many have felt it unlikely that the Athenians and their allies lost as many as 200 ships, with another 50 immediately after (§ 4), with almost all their crews, some 40,000–50,000 men all told. The disaster would have crippled them; yet no great change in their position relative either to Persia or to the rest of Greece occurred as a result of it (see below, on § 4). Still less is it likely that they could have continued their great activities in Greece with almost their whole fleet away—only once again, and that very soon after (112. 2) did they put as many as 200 ships to sea at one time; for though not many hoplites may have been engaged in Egypt, their fleet at home was also as active as ever (105. 1, 2, 107. 3, 108. 5). See Caspari, *C.Q.* vii, 1913, 198–201; Adcock, *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.*, 1926, 3–5; W. Wallace, *Proc. Amer. Phil. Assoc.* lxvii, 1936, 252–60. On the other hand, Walker, *C.A.H.* v. 84. It is highly probable that after the investment of Memphis, especially when the greater part of Lower Egypt had joined the insurgent forces, the majority of the Athenian forces returned. The loss of 40 or 50 ships (cf. Ktesias' figures) and most of their crews, nearly 8,000 men, Athenians and allies, and then of the second squadron of 50 ships, was serious enough.<sup>2</sup> (This is not, of course, the impression one would get from Thucydides; the general sketchiness of the *Pentakontaëtia* must account for it. It is just possible that he does not mean that all the 200 ships at Cyprus, 104. 2, sailed to Egypt, and that Ktesias' figure is near the truth.)

2. πλήν Ἀμυρταίου: Hdt. ii. 140, iii. 15; who says that the sons of Inaros and Amyrtaios, in spite of all the harm they had done to Persia, were allowed to retain their fathers' posts. Amyrtaios held out for some years longer (112. 3). The 'marshes' are the districts of the lower Delta.

Ἐλous . . . ἐλεῖν: παρήχησις according to Hermogenes, iii, p. 170 (and the scholiast here); probably an intentional pun, according to J. E. Powell, *C.R.* li, 1937, 103. Every man to his taste.

3. ἀνεσταυρώθη: "he was not actually crucified (or impaled) till five

<sup>1</sup> It is hardly consistent with this that Megabyxos should take them all as prisoners to Persia, with the promise of freedom. There Artaxerxes broke the promise, and their fate was linked with that of Inaros (110. 3 n.): 50 were beheaded, but the rest Megabyxos managed to set free ultimately (Ktesias, 35–7).

<sup>2</sup> "Thucydides has devoted two whole books to the great Sicilian Expedition, while he disposes of the Egyptian in a couple of pages. . . . For all that, . . . beyond all doubt, the Egyptian disaster is the greatest in Athenian history until we come to the battle in the Great Harbour of Syracuse and the surrender on the banks of the Assinarus"—Walker, l.c. (as though Thucydides' *History* was of the *Pentekontaëtia*). But it was clearly not disastrous *in its effects*; and that makes all the difference, even if we accept the 250 ships and 50,000 men.

years later, owing to a breach of the treaty of surrender to Megabyxus, which had guaranteed him his life. This flouting of his honour by the king probably led to the rebellion of Megabyxus in Syria (450) which is to be connected with Cimon's renewed attack on Cyprus (Wells, *J.H.S.* xxvii, 1907, pp. 37 seqq.)"—H. R. Hall, *C.A.H.* vi. 139. 1. It was this rebellion of Megabyxos which in the end caused the flight of his son Zopyros to Athens (Hdt. iii. 160. 2).

4. τὸ Μενδήσιον κέρας: one of the eastern mouths of the Nile, Hdt. ii. 17; Pindar, fr. 201 (Schroeder); well known to the Greeks.

τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατείαν . . . οὔτως ἐτελεύτησε: we cannot be sure of the year in which the expedition ended (see below, pp. 409–13); it may have been subsequent to the removal of the Treasury of the League from Delos to Athens, which was in 454. If so, this move was not inspired by the disaster, but was rather a mark of the increase of Athenian power and of the concentration of the financial as well as the military resources of the League in Athenian hands. It is certain, at least, that the defeat did not lead to any defection (or permanent defection) from the League in the quarter where it would be most expected, on the southern coast of Asia Minor: Phaselis, the easternmost member, remained in the League, and the Lykians were there in 446–445 (see 100. 1 n., p. 290). All the evidence in fact points to the view that the defeat of the great expedition to Egypt, decisive as it was, was not a major political disaster for Athens. It did not interfere with their plans in Greece, nor reduce their empire; it did not even cure them of their desire for further adventure in the East a few years later, δυσέρωτας ὅντας τῶν ἀπόντων: a last adventure for which, it may be noted, the good conservative Kimon was responsible. Surely the Athenians νικώμενοι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτονταν. I cannot therefore agree with Wilamowitz (1), i. 158, n. 62, but I must quote his words: "Jedenfalls haben sie unter dem eindruck dieses triumphes [Eurymedon] sich zu dem verhängnisvollen aegyptischen abenteuer verführen lassen, das zuerst wieder dem erwerbe von Kypros galt. die volksversammlung, in der das bündnis mit Inaros beschlossen ward, ist der kritische moment der hellenischen geschichte: τὸ μὲν εὐ πράσσειν ἀκόρεστον ἔφυ πᾶσι βροτοῦσιν δακτυλοδείκτων δ' οὔτις ἀπειπὼν εἴργει μελάθρων 'μηκέτ' ἐσέλθης' τάδε φωνῶν. das ist damals gedichtet."<sup>1</sup> die ganze schwere der verantwortung, die ganze tragik des moments liegt in diesen worten: das ist die echte prophetie."

111. 1. *Expedition to Thessaly*: Diod. xi. 83. 3–4 (457–456 B.C.).

'Ορέστης ὁ Ἐχερατίδου: perhaps to be identified with the Orestes of *I.G.* xi. 2. 257, a fifth-century inscription of Thetontion (18 km.

<sup>1</sup> Aesch. *Agam.* 1331–3 (produced in 458 B.C.).

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west of Pharsalos), if we punctuate the last line of the inscription after, not before, '*Ορέσταο*: Hiller in *R.E.*, art. 'Thessalia', 120. But it is very doubtful. Echekratidas again may be the *Θεσσαλίας ἄρχος* celebrated by Anakreon: id. 118.

**τοῦ Θεσσαλῶν βασιλέως:** Herodotus also speaks of 'kings of Thessaly', Kineas in 511–510 (v. 63. 3) and the Aleuadai in 480 (vii. 6. 2); and Aischines Sokratikos of Antiochos as *βασιλεύων πάντων Θετταλῶν*. According to Beloch, i. 2. 197–210, the official title was *ταγός*—an elective, not hereditary office, but held for life; Thessaly was a federation of four states, each also with an elective, lifelong magistracy at the head, the 'tetrarchs'. Cary, *C.A.H.* iii. 598–606, agrees with Beloch except in one important particular: he thinks the *ταγός* was a special officer elected only in times of crisis and not for life, like the Roman dictator to whom Dionysios of Halikarnassos likened him. Hiller, *R.E.* art. 'Thessalia', 118, points out that in Pindar we hear only of *πόλεις* in Thessaly, just as elsewhere in Greece, not of *ταγοῖς* nor of tetrarchs; and he warns us against using any authority as evidence except for his own period. *ταγός* as an official appears in several Thessalian cities, often in colleges of two or three *ταγοῖς*: see *I.G.* ix. 2, Index.

**ἔπεισεν Ἀθηναίους ἑαυτὸν κατάγειν:** they had a score to wipe off (107. 7). According to Diodorus, Myronides led the Athenian forces, and it was part of the same campaign as Oinophyta.

**ὅντας ξυμάχους:** 108. 3. The Athenians formally concluded an alliance with Phokis in 454–453 B.C., *I.G.* i. 2 26. See p. 337.  
**ἐπὶ Φάρσαλον:** the first important city of the Thessalian plains, after the mountain range separating them from the Spercheios valley has been crossed, and the home of Echekratidas and Orestes.  
**τῆς μὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα μὴ προϊόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν σπλαντῶν:** that is to say, their hoplite force was superior, and had it been in any country but Thessaly (or entirely mountainous country such as Aitolia) could have marched where it would or have settled down to a regular siege; but in Thessaly, the enemy cavalry were able to confine it more or less to camp, and therefore to present it getting supplies. Cf. Introd., pp. 15–16.

**ἄπρακτοι:** but at some time between this and 431 the alliance with Thessaly was renewed, ii. 22. 3, though they are not expressly mentioned in the catalogue of Athenian allies at the beginning of the war, ii. 9. 4 (see n. there).

**2–3. Perikles' Expedition in the Corinthian Gulf:** Diodorus, xi. 85 (455–454 B.C.) and 88. 1–2 (453–452); Plut. *Per.* 19. 2–3.

**ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς ἐν Πηγαῖς:** see 103. 4 n., 107. 3, 108. 5 n. There were 100 triremes according to Plutarch; Diodorus says 50.

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**εἶχον δ' αὐτοὶ τὰς Πηγάς:** with their own forces. Megara was not treated as a fully autonomous ally.

**παρέπλευσαν:** Plutarch, who throughout exaggerates the success of this expedition, calls it a *periplous* like that of Tolmides (108. 5), though he says correctly that it started from Pegai and went as far as Oiniadai. Diodorus does not mention Pegai, nor does he call the expedition a *periplous*.

**Περικλέους τοῦ Ξανθιππου:** the first mention of him in Thucydides, with the formal title that he regularly gives to strategoi and other official persons.

**μάχη ἐκράτησαν:** at Nemea, according to Plutarch; but this is too far inland, beyond Sicyonian territory. Holden in his note ad loc. suggests that Plutarch's authority meant the river Nemea, the lower course of which was the boundary between Corinth and Sicyon.

Diodorus adds that Perikles attempted to capture Sikyon and failed, as the Peloponnesians came to its aid.

**3. παραλαβόντες Ἀχαιούς:** εἰς ξυμμαχίαν δηλονότι—schol. In 431 they were neutral except Pellene, which sided with the Peloponnesians; later they all joined against Athens (ii. 9. 2).

**ἐς Οινιάδας:** αἱεῖ ποτε πολεμίους ὅντας μόνους Ἀκαρνάνων, ii. 102. 2. For a description of the site of Oiniadai, see ii. 102. 2–6 and n. there; Polyb. iv. 65. 2–4.

There was an *'Αθῆναι* in Akarnania, founded from Athens; perhaps only a fort, later given up—Demetr. ap. Herodian, i. 330 L.; Steph. Byz. (Oberhummer in *R.E.* ii. 2022).

**112. 1. Five Years' Truce:** Diod. xi. 86. 1 (454–453 B.C.); Plut. *Kim.* 18. 1; *Per.* 10. 4. A 'Five-year Pact of Non-aggression' between Athens and the Peloponnesian League.

**διαλιπόντων ἔτῶν τριῶν:** a marked case in which, in the Pentekontaetia, Thucydides gives an interval of time, but no date.

One cannot help thinking that the words *διαλιπόντων ἔτῶν τριῶν* have in some way got displaced in Thucydides' MSS. (or perhaps in his narrative), and should belong to *ἐς Κύπρον ἐστρατεύοντο*: three empty years are so much more likely to have followed a truce than to have preceded it. Since the Cyprus expedition was 450–449, this would mean that the truce was 454–453, where Diodorus places it. That is, Diodorus would be right just where Thucydides (or his MSS.) happens to be wrong, and this is repugnant to common sense, more particularly as Diodorus goes on to put Perikles' expedition in the Gulf, which would break the truce, in the next year; but for all that, this date for the truce (or autumn 453–452, which is compatible with the three years' interval) would also do away with the difficulties involved in the later date (below, pp. 409–13). Most

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scholars, however, accept 451 as the date; and this has been assumed in what follows.

Kimon, recalled from ostracism, was responsible for this treaty according to Diodoros, Plutarch, and (in an extraordinarily confused narrative) Andokides, iii. 3. Theopompos, F. 88, says that Kimon was recalled from ostracism before five of the ten years had elapsed: οὐδέποτε δὲ πέντε ἔτῶν παρεληλυθότων πολέμου συμβάντος πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ὁ δῆμος μετεπέμψατο τὸν Κίμωνα, νομίζων διὰ τὴν προξενίαν ταχίστην ἀν αὐτὸν εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι. ὁ δὲ παραγενόμενος τῇ πόλει τὸν πόλεμον κατέλυσε. This will be the source (direct or indirect) of Plutarch's story—in which the detail is added that Perikles himself moved the proposal for Kimon's recall—which is dated soon after Tanagra; for spring 461 is the probable date of the ostracism and midsummer 457 of the battle ('five years not yet elapsed'). Diodoros' date for the treaty is 454–453; but unfortunately we do not know what that means, whether he followed some other source or made a mistake all his own.<sup>1</sup> Theopompos' statement is usually rejected, for three reasons: first, there was no treaty of peace or truce (except perhaps for four months: above, p. 316) immediately after Tanagra; secondly, the date of this five-years' pact recorded by Thucydides and attributed to Kimon by Plutarch and Diodoros must be about 451 (see below, pp. 409–13), i.e. Kimon may well have been its author and have returned to Athens after the normal ten years had passed; and thirdly, we have no trace of any activity of Kimon in Athens between 457 and 451. (See, for example, Wilamowitz (1), ii. 293. 7; Beloch, ii. 2. 209–11; Walker, C.A.H. v. 467–9). Yet I believe Busolt, iii. 258. 1 and 316. 3, was right, that Theopompos' statement must be accepted. He was a learned man, and a direct statement by him deserves credence in the absence of good conflicting evidence, though we need not therefore believe him that Kimon was recalled simply to make peace with Sparta—that is only part of the conventional picture; the return home of the Peloponnesians, the collapse of the oligarchic conspiracy in Athens, and very likely the brave conduct of Kimon's friends at Tanagra,<sup>2</sup> are sufficient to account for it. The confusion with the Five Years' Truce may not be due to Theopompos—he only says *κατέλυσε τὸν πόλεμον*, though it must be admitted that this would be a rhetorical exaggeration, since, though there was no more land-fighting with Sparta, Tolmides' and Perikles' expeditions to the Peloponnese followed not long after Tanagra.

<sup>1</sup> It may be due only to a combination of Thucydides' ἔτῶν τριῶν διαλιπόντων and the date 451–450 for the treaty; for there was no fighting during those three years.

<sup>2</sup> Beloch shows that the details of this story in Plutarch are impossible; but that is not reason enough for rejecting the whole. The details are embroidery. Cf. above, p. 269.

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The argument 'we should have heard of Kimon's activities in Athens' has no weight against a statement by Theopompos: we hear nothing of Perikles' activities between 461 and 457 either (above, pp. 306–7). In fact the 'generosities' of Kimon (Plut. *Kim.* 10. 1–7; *Per.* 9. 2–3; *Aθπ.* 27. 3—in part also from Theopompos, F. 89) and the counter-demagogy of Perikles probably belong to this period, in spite of Plutarch; for Perikles was not important enough for this before 461 (if our tradition of his life has any truth in it), and there was no time for it after 451. It seems probable indeed that the later picture of Kimon as the consistent conservative opponent of Perikles, the upholder of the hoplite-class and the defender of the allies, is based almost entirely on this period of his political life.<sup>1</sup>

To this period also belong the opening of the archonship to the zeugite class (457–456), the establishment of the local dicasts (453–452), and Perikles' citizenship reform (451–450). Miltner, art. 'Perikles' in *R.E.*, pp. 759–60, would also put in the three years' quiet period certain naval and military changes—the 60 ships always in commission (Plut. *Per.* 11. 5), the building of special horse-transport (Pliny, *N.H.* vii. 57), and the organization of *τοξόται* (*Aθπ.* 24. 3) and *ἱπποτοξόται* (Thuc. ii. 13. 8; cf. Xen. *Hipp.* 9. 3?)—all democratic reforms, for it was from the thetes that both sailors and bowmen were drawn. This is possible; but it is unmethodical simply to select and combine statements from Plutarch and the *Constitution of Athens*, seeing that the latter in this c. 24 professes to give a complete list of men paid by the state and mentions twenty

<sup>1</sup> It is also possible that the reinforcement sent to the Athenians in Egypt (110. 4), in 455 or 454, was due to Kimon.

The famous Arthmius decree belongs to this period if, as has been reasonably conjectured, Arthmius accompanied Megabazos to the Peloponnese (109. 2), and if Kimon was its mover he was in Athens in 457–456, or soon after. (So now Kolbe, *Herm.* lxxiii, 1938, 250–60, who would allow a year or two later for the decree; and Colin, *Rev. d. Phil.* vii, 1933, 237–60, who gives a full discussion.) Kimon's name comes from Krateros (Wilamowitz, Coniect., *Ind. Schol. Göt.* 1884, 20; Busolt, ii. 653. 3), and this should be decisive, though Demosthenes, who quotes the decree, ix. 41–5, xix. 271–2, does not mention him (nor Aischines, iii. 258, nor Deinarchos, ii. 24), and Plutarch, *Them.* 6. 4, says Themistokles moved the decree, and says nothing of it in the life of Kimon. Cary, *C.Q.* xxix, 1935, 177–80, keeps Kimon as the author, but places Arthmius' activities in the Peloponnese—in Argos rather than Sparta, Cary thinks—at the time of Pausanias' intrigues and Themistokles' stay at Argos. Judeich, *Herm.* lviii, 1923, 4. 1, argues for a date in 461, immediately after the first defeat of the Persians in Egypt and before Kimon's ostracism; or, if it was later, the decree may have been proposed in his absence by his friends, to help him recover his position. But 461 is, I am convinced (below, pp. 410–13), too early for the Egyptian expedition; and if Kimon's name as mover comes from Krateros, that means he was officially so recorded, not that he was 'behind' the proposal. (Aischines says that Arthmius was driven out of Athens, and Deinarchos perhaps means the same; Demosthenes, ix. 43, clearly implies that he was never in Athens, and this is more accurate.)

*νῆσ φρουρίδες*, but says nothing of Plutarch's 60 triremes. Moreover, probably about this time the first regular cavalry corps of 300 was established (*Andok.* iii. 5),<sup>1</sup> and this was by no means a democratic measure. In fact, the social change which followed the military reorganization (in the 6th century, probably) by which the nobility in all Greek states entered the phalanx of hoplites and so tended to lose their separate status, was by no means so complete at Athens as at Sparta (cf. above, 6. 4 n.). Just as, in spite of Salamis and the radical democracy, the hoplites preserved their social as well as their military distinction, so did the nobility survive, and its status, or at least its wealth, was recognized by the institution of cavalry.<sup>2</sup>

Beloch, ii. 2. 209–10, connects with this truce of five years between Athens and the Peloponnesians the Thirty Years' Peace between Sparta and Argos (below, p. 366); this was favourable to Sparta, for she retained Kynouria; but Argos had to agree once she had lost the possible support of Athens by the five-year pact. This may be right; but we cannot, unfortunately, say for certain that the pact with Argos was later than that with Athens; the negotiations at least may have taken place together. Both pacts, for all we know to the contrary, may have been part of a general policy of peace for Greece. Or the initiative may have come from Argos, who wanted peace with Sparta (and with Persia), and this upset the policy of Athens, which thereupon took the opportunity to make a truce with Sparta and to attack Persia. Nor may we say that the initiative for this truce in Athens was certainly Kimon's, and that Perikles was for the time badly beaten, the Argive alliance being the corner-stone for the latter's policy against Sparta (so Miltner, *R.E.*, 'Perikles', 761); Perikles, and Athens in general, may well have wanted, at this moment, a truce with Sparta. Besides, there is the possibility, mentioned above, that the five-year truce should be put three years earlier.

Another democratic reform was the institution of payment for the juries; but this cannot be dated. Plutarch, *Per.* 9. 4–5, places it, with other demagogic measures in general, before the overthrow of

<sup>1</sup> Weak evidence, but, as pointed out in Busolt-Swoboda, 978, 1128, it is supported by that of *I.G.* i. 2 400: a dedication of the cavalry corps ἀπὸ τῶν πολέμων, ἵππαρχοντων Δακεδαιμονίου, Ξενοφάντος, Προνάπου—three hipparchs for 300 men. Later when the corps was increased to 1,000, there were two hipparchs with ten phylarchoi under them. There may also have been cavalry at Tanagra in 457 (above, p. 316).

<sup>2</sup> Maas and Wickert, on the basis of a restoration of the Marathon epigram (*Herm.* lxx, 1935, 235–8), maintain that there may have been after all a small Athenian cavalry force at Marathon, or at least that some nobles were mounted, however few or tactically unimportant; and that these would get some mention in the epigram. Their part would be soon forgotten, as in Herodotus. But the epigram would have served to keep it alive; and are we not told that Herodotus' sources were aristocratic?

the Areiopagos and Kimon's ostracism; but his authority in such a matter is small, though Wade-Gery, *A.J.P.* lxix, 1938, 131–4, accepts it, on the ground that his account comes from Theopompos (a doubtful argument: the story of the rivalry with Kimon is from him, not necessarily the date, for Theopompos was not writing a history of the 5th century). Aristotle, *Αθην.* 27. 3–4, does not date the reform, though he implies that it was after Perikles' attack on the Areiopagos (27. 1); like Plutarch, he accepts the story of the counter-demagogy to Kimon's lavish generosity. As stated above, this may well belong to the period after Kimon's return to Athens in 457.

**2–4. Kimon's last expedition to Cyprus:** Diodoros, xii. 3–4 (450–449 and 449–448 B.C.); Plut. *Kim.* 18–19. 1.

**2. Ἐλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον:** Plutarch gives a story that by an agreement, arranged by Elpinike, between Perikles and Kimon, the latter, on his return from ostracism, was to have the command of an expedition against Persia while Perikles was left in undisturbed control of affairs at home. The story is inconsistent not only with Theopompos' statement (accepted by Plutarch) that Kimon returned in 457 (see above), but with Plutarch's view of the continuous struggle between Perikles and the conservative leaders Kimon and Thouskydides, which lasted till the latter's ostracism (*Per.* 9–14; note especially 11. 1: Thouskydides chosen as Kimon's successor after the latter's death in the leadership against the democrats).

**ναυσὶ διακοσίαις:** Plutarch's MSS. vary between *τριακοσίαις* and *διακοσίαις*, each also corrected to the other figure.

**3. Ἀμυρταίου μεταπέμποντος:** see 110. 2. Four or five years after this expedition, in 445–444, a Psammetichos, called 'King of Egypt', is said to have sent a gift of corn to Athens (*Philochorus*, fr. 90; Plut. *Per.* 37. 4). If there is special significance in this—and Athens, we may suppose, was able to import corn freely from Egypt after the peace with Persia in 449—Psammetichos was presumably continuing the struggle against Persia and hoping once more for help from Athens. See Hall, *C.A.H.* vi. 142–4; Mallet, 'Les Rapports des Grecs avec l'Égypte', in *Inst. franç. d'arch. orient. du Caire*, xlviii, 1922, according to whom the old trading centre of Naukratis had probably been destroyed in the six years' war of 460–454, but later rebuilt, when, however, Greek trade with Egypt was not so important. (I know of this article only through Bursian, ccxviii, 1928, 42–3.)

**Κίτιον ἐπολιόρκουν:** Kition (the birthplace of Zeno the Stoic, as the scholiast here notes) was the most important Phoenician city in Cyprus; it was on the south-east coast, where Larnaka now stands.

A king, Baalmalek, was ruling in Kition, perhaps till this siege (cf. note on ἀπεχώρησαν below): Oberhummer, *R.E.* art. 'Kition'.

**4. Κίμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος:** of disease according to most authorities, of wounds according to a few—Plutarch.

**καὶ λιμοῦ γενομένου:** Beloch, ii. 1. 177 n., would read λιμοῦ (though his only reason, that λιμός might occur in a besieged town, but only σιτοδεῖα among the besiegers, is a poor one); so Swoboda in *R.E.* xi. 452, and Venizelos; *Ἄθηνα*, xxxix, 1927, 3–5, who points out that the meaning will then be that Kimon died owing to the sickness which broke out among the troops (cf. 90. 1 ἔξοτρυνόντων καὶ φοβούμένων, iv. 51 κελευσάντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ ὑποπτευσάντων: see Widmann, Bursian, ccxxxv, 1930, 112).

**ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπὸ Κιτίου:** Diodoros says they captured it before leaving the island, and Marion as well. This last is accepted by Busolt, iii. 342. 4, and Beloch, ii. 1. 176. (Marion was on the northwest coast, where is now Πόλις τῆς Χρυσόχου; it was Greek, as shown by its coins, personal names, and inscriptions, and had had trade relations with Greece, and especially, from the 6th century, with Athens: Oberhummer, *R.E.* art. 'Marion').

**Φοίνιξ καὶ Κυπρίος καὶ Κίλιξ:** καὶ Κυπρίος is omitted in ABEMF, but is kept by most editors; probably rightly, as omission is a more likely error than insertion. It may be noted, however, that Plutarch, *Kim.* 18. 5 has only Φοινισῶν νεῶν καὶ Κιλισῶν, and his authority may be Ephoros, who may therefore not have read καὶ Κυπρίος in Thucydides. See also 109. 3 n.

**ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ ἐπεζομάχησαν:** Diodoros puts both battles and Plutarch the sea-battle (he says nothing at all of the fighting on land) before the death of Kimon; a mistake due to the later glorification of Kimon's deeds.

Diodoros tells a much more elaborate tale altogether, including a great victory on land in Kilikia over the Persians under Megabyxos, in which Anaxikrates, the other Athenian strategos, was killed fighting bravely. His narrative is in general nothing but a confused repetition of his own account of Eurymedon (Busolt, iii. 343. 4; see above, p. 286); but the detail about Anaxikrates may be true, and, if so, the place of his death would have been recorded in the casualty lists. In that case, there was some fighting in Kilikia, which is likely enough, while the Athenian fleet was on its way to Cyprus. But Anaxikrates may have been killed at Eurymedon.

For the epigram on the victory, see above, p. 288, and Wade-Gery's article referred to there. The record of the fallen is mentioned in Paus. i. 29. 13.

The names of some Karian states appear for the first time on the quota-list of 451–450, and Nesselhauf, pp. 25–6, connects this with the presence of this Athenian fleet in these waters. It is possible.

Meritt, *D.A.T.*, 92, n. 59, suggests that the appearance of several Karian names in 453–452 may also be due to an Athenian fleet, probably the 50 ships that went to the support of the Athenians beleaguered in Egypt, if 453, as he believes, is the right date for the disaster there (as to which, see below, p. 412, n. 2). That also is possible; but, if so, it is clear that we must not simply connect new names with victory and the disappearance of names with defeat.

In Diodoros the Athenian victory is followed by the Peace of Kallias (cf. above, p. 295); and this is undoubtedly correct. Cyprus was given up by the Athenians, and the Greek cities there became subject to Persia once more; and in a very poor way, according to Isokrates, ix. 20, 47, 66, till restored to prosperity by Euagoras (cf. Theopompos, F. 103); and the Persians kept their rather tenuous control of Egypt. So far, that is in its aggressive purpose, this campaign had not been a success for Athens. Yet the victories on land and sea were real, proving their continued or recovered superiority over Persian troops, and the terms of the treaty by which, in return for a guarantee against further attacks, Persia promised not to molest the Greek cities of Asia that were in the Delian League—not to come within three days' march of the cities on land nor west of Phaselis by sea—were a genuine triumph, and rightly regarded as such. It is possible that, as Domaszewski and Wade-Gery suggest, a series of monuments celebrating the victories of the League were now set up,<sup>1</sup> and the temple of Nike on the Acropolis was apparently designed in their honour: *I.G.I.<sup>2</sup>* 24 (Tod, 40).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Wade-Gery's epigram Q (for Eurymedon), with its boastful tone, is, if genuine of this period, much more likely to have been written after 449 than "in the exultation of victory [Eurymedon], before the disaster in Egypt or the Cyprus campaign" (p. 87)—more especially if "Athens seems to have decided to treat the Peace [of Kallias] as a glorious peace, a Peace with Victory: a retrospect over the series of undeniable actual victories won under Athenian hegemony would help to make this difficult conception easier". For myself, I find no difficulty in the conception, which would be easy even if not true; see Judeich's sensible remarks, *Herm.* lviii, 1923, 18; and Friedländer, *Stud. ital. di filol. el.* xv, 1938, 106–8. (Wade-Gery has modified his estimate of the Peace, pp. 152–4 of his recent article which is discussed below.)

<sup>2</sup> There had originally been a *réuevos* of Nike, with a *ναῦτος* destroyed presumably by the Persians and not rebuilt: Welter, *Ath. Mitt.* xlvi, 1923, 190–201; Lemerle's report on Balanos' work of reconstruction, *B.C.H.* lxi, 1937, 443; lxii, 448–50. It was decided to build a temple in c. 448 B.C., and to alter the qualifications of the priestess, probably by removing certain restrictions (not to appoint a priestess for the first time: Schlaifer, *Harvard Stud.* li, 1940, 257–60); see Meritt, *Hesp.* x, 1941, 307–15. But Welter's view that the bastion or *pyrgos* on which the new temple was to be erected (designed to suit the new Propylaia) was built before the foundations of the south wing of the Propylaia were completed, accepted by Judeich, 220, and Wade-Gery, 87 n. 69, has been disproved by Wrede, *Ath. Mitt.* lvii, 1932, 74–91; according to him the *pyrgos* was built in the 30's, and the temple begun then, but interrupted. So too Robertson,

Panegyrists of Athens in the fourth century, such as Isokrates (*Paneg.* 120; *Areop.* 80; *Panath.* 59), and the orators (Dem. xix. 273; Lykourgos, 73) often vaunted this treaty in contrast with the betrayal of the Asiatic Greeks by Sparta in the Peace of Antalkidas, or by way of contrast between the fifth and the fourth centuries. It is well known how Theopompos, who loved to prick Athenian bubbles, said that the inscription at Athens which contained its terms could not be genuine, because it was written in the Ionic alphabet, which was not officially established at Athens till 403 B.C. (F. 154); and Kallisthenes his contemporary apparently agreed with him (F. 16), saying, however, that Persia did, from fear, observe its supposed terms—a kind of unwritten agreement (cf. above, p. 295). Plutarch, *Kim.* 13. 4–5, answered that the inscription was included in Krateros' *Collection of Athenian Decrees*; but this is not decisive, for a stone containing a decree purporting to be that of the peace undoubtedly existed, and may have deceived Krateros, unless he was a good epigraphist. Most modern scholars, however, agree that Theopompos was wrong, though Walker still holds out, maintaining a view similar to Kallisthenes (*C.A.H.* v. 469–71;<sup>1</sup> see my answer, *J.H.S.* 1, 1930, 105–6). Other Athenian decrees in the Ionic alphabet are known from the fifth century, as *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 16 (treaty with Phaselis), 17 (with Eretria: below, p. 343), both earlier than 445 B.C., 25, 55 (c. 431), 93 (419–418); and Thuc. viii. 56. 4 is conclusive: Alkibiades was trying to win over the Persian king from the Peloponnesian to an Athenian alliance, and reported that the king might be willing, 'if they surrendered all Ionia and the adjacent islands, and if they would allow him to bring his fleet into the Aegean': *γαῦς ἡξίου ἐᾶν βασιλέα ποιεῖθαι καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν ὅπῃ ἀν καὶ σύσαι ἀν βούληται*. Such a demand, coming from one about to accede to a request, could only be based on a written agreement.<sup>2</sup> The treaty

*Greek and Roman Architecture* (1929), 125. The decree fixing the emoluments of the priestess had to be re-enacted in 424–423 (*I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 25), and the temple was probably completed about that time, perhaps a little later (*I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 88, 89; so Welter. L. Shoe, *Profiles of Greek Mouldings* (1936), puts the temple c. 426; Dinsmoor, *A.J.A.* xxvii, 1923, 318–21, put it in 436 to 432. I owe most of the references in this note to the kindness of Prof. Robertson).

<sup>1</sup> Walker stresses the discrepancies between the different versions. There is only one (apart from disagreement as to the date), and that is in Isokrates, and an aged Isokrates at that (*Areop.* and *Panath.*), when he says the land-limit for the Persian troops was the river Halys. And of course the discrepancy is equally hard to explain whether the inscription was genuine or false.

<sup>2</sup> It may be added that apparently, by one of the terms of the treaty, the Thracian Bosporos was to be the sea-boundary between the Athenian and Persian spheres in the north, and that this was recognized in the decree summoning the Panhellenic Congress (probably in 448; see below, p. 366), as well as by the limit to the membership of the Delian League at this time. In that case the Athenians perhaps transgressed it by their expeditions into the Pontos (below,

is genuine; and not only that—it was a recognition of the Athenian victory.<sup>1</sup>

For the Kallias who negotiated the treaty as Athenian ambassador, see Raubitschek, *Hesp.* viii, 1939, 156.

The story of the treaty has recently been discussed at length in an ingenious paper by Wade-Gery in *Ath. Studies*, 121–56. He notes that Theopompos speaks of a treaty with Darius, not Artaxerxes, and, if this not a slip, it must be Darius II, who succeeded Artaxerxes in 424–423. It is possible enough that the original treaty of 449 (with Artaxerxes) was renewed with his successor in 423; in that case it was perhaps reinscribed, in the Ionic alphabet, on the back of the original stone (exactly as *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 24–5: Tod, 40 and 73); or the original stone may have been broken and the treaty republished after 403 in Ionic (perhaps, as propaganda, after 386, the Peace of Antalkidas). In either case both the mistake and the confidence of Theopompos are understandable. Further, we may have a reference to this treaty with Darius in *I.G.* ii.<sup>2</sup> 8 (see *S.I.G.* 118), on which an earlier decree is cited which, Wade-Gery argues, can be dated to 424–423;<sup>2</sup> and this may be the treaty of friendship negotiated on the Athenian side by Andokides' uncle Epilykos (Andok. iii. 29).<sup>3</sup> Thucydides tells us nothing about any such treaty with Darius, though he mentions the capture of Artaphernes on his way from Persia to Sparta in 425–424, and the sending of the Athenian ambassadors to Artaxerxes who turned back on hearing of his death (iv. 50). His silence is remarkable, and not really to be explained by the fact, or supposition, that the new treaty was but a renewal of the old; for the desired treaty with Artaxerxes for which

pp. 367–8). Wade-Gery, however (see below), considers that *Kvávea* is not the entrance to the Bosporos, but the city in Lykia of that name. See *R.E.* s.v.

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 331, n. 1. Miltner, *R.E.* art. 'Perikles', p. 762, thinks that the recognition of the autonomy of the Greek states in the treaty meant for Persia their inclusion in her empire (they were not to be *ἐλεύθερα*), and Athens' agreement not to attack Persia was equivalent to giving up the idea of freeing the Greek states in Persia—it was a fiasco for the panhellenic idea. Hence, says Miltner, the attack on Kallias the ambassador by the Athenian panhellenists, who are Thoukydides and the oligarchs. I cannot understand history written in this fashion. Kahrstedt, *Herm.* lvi, 1921, 324–5, goes one or two better; but that is propaganda, not history, and more suitable to the passions of contemporary politics.

<sup>2</sup> The date depends on the identification of the Neokleides who was epistates when the decree was passed with the Neokleides who was secretary to the phyle Aigeis in 424–423 (*I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 25, 87, 145: see Wade-Gery, 129, for the dating of these); also on the assumption that he was not bouleutes twice.

<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, I am not sure that Dem. xx. 60 is consistent with this interpretation of *I.G.* ii.<sup>2</sup> 8.

Nor do I think that Andokides' uncle can have been the Epilykos who was first secretary to the boule in 424–423, if he went on an embassy to Persia in the same year.

the ambassadors set out would presumably have been of much the same character; and he thought that worth mentioning.<sup>1</sup>

For the historian of the Athenian empire, however, the most important part of Wade-Gery's paper is his revival of the old view that the cities of Asia Minor which were members of the Delian League also paid tribute to Persia. This seems to me impossible. Isokrates, iv. 120 (c. 380 B.C.), contrasting the Peace of Antalkidas with the earlier peace of the fifth century, says *τότε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς φανησόμεθα τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν βασιλέως ὅριζοντες καὶ τῶν φόρων ἐνίους τάπτοντες καὶ κωλύοντες αὐτὸν τῇ θαλάττῃ χρῆσθαι*. Wade-Gery says that means that "Athens fixed the scale of certain tribute payable to the king"; but *φόρους τάπτειν*, by itself, can hardly mean to fix a tribute for someone else to receive; and how could Isokrates anyhow, in this context, mean that? Similarly, Diodoros, xii. 4. 4 (from Ephorus, certainly) says that *among the concessions on the King's side* in the Treaty of Kallias was *αὐτονόμους εἶναι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀπάσας*; Xenophon, Hell. iii. 4. 25, says that in 395 B.C. Tithraustes told Agesilaos what were the king's *demands*: *ἀξιοῖ . . . τὰς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις αὐτονόμους οὕσας τὸν ἀρχαῖον δασμὸν αὐτῷ ἀποφέρειν*. Wade-Gery claims that this latter was simply a return to the conditions of the Peace of Kallias, as though the definition of the degree of autonomy makes no difference. (Wade-Gery thinks that Diodoros omitted the definition; but the context does not make this probable.) Lastly, Thuc. viii. 5. 5: (Tissaphernes) *ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι' Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεοθαι ἐπωφείλησεν*. Wade-Gery maintains that this means that the king exacted all arrears of the tribute from Tissaphernes, and that, as to ask for arrears of 66 years (from 479) or even 36 years (from 449) would have been absurd, this can only mean the tribute of a short period—the period since the Athenians in alliance with the revolted Amorges (Thuc. ibid.; Ktesias, Pers. 52) had *broken the treaty*, invaded the king's dominions, and stopped the tribute being sent to Persia. But (1) *ἐπωφείλησεν* does not necessarily imply arrears (Dundas, C.R. xlvi, 1934, 167–8); (2) if it does here, the arrears will be from the date of Tissaphernes' appointment as satrap (a date unknown, I think, but not long before 413)—he was not asked for the tribute which his predecessors owed; and (3), if Thucydides had meant that it was only recently that Athens had prevented tribute going to the king, he must have written *δι' Ἀθηναίους* *〈τότε ἐπιχειροῦντας τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ〉*, or *〈οὐκέτι ἔωντας τοὺς φόρους ἐκείνῳ ἀποφέρειν〉*; or at the least (*Tισσαφέρνης*) *οὐκέτι δυνάμενος*

<sup>1</sup> Did Andokides exaggerate, and was his uncle only a member of the abortive embassy? And is the treaty referred to in I.G. ii.<sup>2</sup> 8 much later, as Dem. xx. 60 would suggest?

*πράσσεοθαι*. The terms of the treaty between Tissaphernes and Sparta (Thuc. viii. 18. 1) also imply that no tribute had ever been paid to the king while it was being paid to the Delian League.

The only evidence in favour of the view that the cities of Ionia continued to pay tribute to the king after 479 is Herodotos, vi. 42. 1; and that, as I have argued elsewhere (C.Q. xx, 1926, 97–8), demands amendment, so that it may mean 'the method of taxation devised by Artaphernes in 493 was continued by the Athenians'.<sup>1</sup> It may be that Athens after 414 in alliance with Amorges broke the 'non-aggression' clauses of the treaty by landing troops in Ionia; but even this is doubtful, for there had long before been Athenian garrisons, as well as Athenian officials, in Ionian cities, such as Erythrai and Miletos (pp. 293–4, 350), unless we assume that by the treaty of 449 they were withdrawn. In that case the treaty does mark a surrender by Athens, and a substantial one; which I find it hard to believe. In any case, the evidence is overwhelming that no tribute was paid to Persia by members of the Delian League; the enemies of Athens remembered many things against her conduct in her days of empire, but not that the old subjection of Ionia continued in 479, or was renewed in 449. If it did, what was meant by the revolt of Ionia in 479? And why did Theopompos take the trouble to assert that this ignoble treaty was a fraud?

Kolbe, Herm. lxxiii, 1938, 249–68, has argued that we can, with a close approach to accuracy, date the change from the old Delian *symmachia* to the Athenian *arche* to the years immediately following the Treaty of Kallias, in this agreeing with Nesselhauf. He agrees with Highby, Schaefer, and others that the difference in the terms of the oath of loyalty between the Erythrai and the Kolophon and Chalkis decrees (above, p. 293, below, p. 343) is the mark of this change; but dates the Erythrai decree in or shortly before 450.<sup>2</sup> His arguments for this date are of the slightest, remarkable in so

<sup>1</sup> Dundas objects that if Aristeides only took over Artaphernes' assessment, it is not clear why he was so highly praised. But, if I am right, (1) Aristeides adopted Artaphernes' *method* (*κατὰ ταῦτα*, Herodotos), not his rate of taxation; and (2) he had many other cities than those of Ionia to assess.

<sup>2</sup> He also agrees with Highby that Erythrai had not been in the League before this treaty, and for the same weak reasons: that it must have been ruled by a tyrant (continuously from 479?), that a tyranny was inconsistent with membership of the League, and so forth. He even adds, p. 253, that we may be sure that Persia was not the aggressor in the conflict which occasioned the treaty. Yet he has elsewhere quoted with approval Koehler's wise caution about the use of inscriptions where we have no literary evidence to supplement them (above, p. 32, n. 2).

Contrast the case of Mende, where we have literary evidence (Thuc. iv. 130. 7, quoted below, p. 342, n. 2). How we should misinterpret this if we had only an inscription.

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good a scholar: 'the lettering of the inscription is compatible with so late a date (so Meritt, *A.J.P.* lviii, 1937, 360-1): to this we must agree—it is *possible*—but the inscription is lost); 'Athens could not have set up a democracy in an allied state before her own democratic victory in 461' (as though she did not call herself a democracy before; as though she had not herself before then a boule, the mark of democracy, of the kind she now established in Erythrai); 'Athens was still capable of alliance with oligarchies about the time of Oinophyta (*Ps.-Xen.* 3. 11), so the Erythrai decree is later than 457'. One can only reply with an exclamation mark. 'The troubles in Miletos belong to the same period (below, p. 350), and the settlement is part of the same Athenian policy; the Kolophon decree is similar, but as the oath of loyalty is to Athens only, it is later, as the lettering allows.' (The coinage-policy, which belongs to about this time—see below, p. 383—is also significant of the change.) Lastly, Kolbe argues, 'Bouthaies, a town which was later in the *syntely* of Erythrai, appears in the tribute-lists of 454-453 and 453-452, but Erythrai itself not before 450-449; therefore Erythrai was not earlier in the League.' To which it is as easy to answer that the presence of Bouthaies in 454-453 is sufficient proof that Erythrai must have been in the League at the same time (the lists are *not* complete).<sup>1</sup>

Kolbe adds one interesting point: that the clause which prescribes exile from the whole *symmachia* for the homicide sentenced to exile by Erythrai is not a mark of the *ἀρχή*, as Schaefer had argued; for (1) Erythrai (unlike Chalkis) alone decides the original issue, and (2) the exile is not here political (as it is probably in the Chalkis decree), but for homicide only, and has a parallel in the second Confederacy of the fourth century (*I.G.* ii.2 24; *Dem.* xxiii. 16, 36, 91). This may be right; but when Kolbe goes on to argue that the Arthmios-decree too (which he dates c. 455: see above, p. 327, n. 1) is no proof of *ἀρχή*, for Arthmios had committed a crime against the whole League and so was banished from the League, and the decree was Athenian because Athens was responsible for the foreign policy of the League, he is on weaker ground. If Athens could so decide for the whole League, she is obviously well on the way to exercising imperial power.

This brings me to the essence of the problem. There is no *proof* that the Erythrai decree is earlier than 450, though obviously it may well be; but I see no reason to suppose any quick change from *symmachia* to *arche* in the few years following the Peace of Kallias. Thucydides i. 99 clearly implies a slow and almost unnoticed

<sup>1</sup> Both Bouthaies and Erythrai appear again separately from 445 to 441, though the former now only paid a trifling sum (½ tal.); it disappears again later.

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change;<sup>1</sup> so does the tradition of Kimon's part in it (above, pp. 284, 314). Perikles was one of those rare statesmen who are conscious of the meaning of their actions and of their aims; and he doubtless expressed far more clearly than anyone before him the principles of the Athenian empire. Very likely one of these was that Athens, so long as she carried out her duties of protection of the cities from attack, owed no account of expenditure to them (*Plut. Per.* 12. 4); and this would intensify the opposition to Perikles, and give it the particular direction—anti-imperialism—which appears in Thukydides' policy, though not in Kimon's. But that is a very different thing from saying that the change from alliance to empire was itself a sudden one, and took place immediately after the Peace of Kallias.

5. *The so-called Sacred War*: *Plut. Per.* 21; *Philoch.*, fr. 88.

**κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ:** presumably the Phokians had secured possession as a result of Oinophyta and the treaty with Athens in 454-453 (111. 1 n.), in which the Amphictyony is mentioned. This treaty was later renewed, possibly at the time of this war (below, p. 366). It was always part of the Phokian policy to include Delphi within its territory, of the Delphian to remain independent as a religious centre for all Greece.

**Αθηναῖοι . . . στρατεύσαντες:** under Perikles' command, according to Plutarch. He adds that the Delphians granted *προμαντεία* to Sparta and had the grant specially recorded 'on the forehead of the bronze wolf'; after the Athenian victory the same privilege was given the Athenians and recorded on the right flank of the same wolf. He may have got his information from Philochoros (fr. 88), or Theopompos (F. 156): Busolt, iii, p. 419. The Athenian victory in this campaign is a repetition on a small scale of that after Tanagra.

Philocoros says that the Athenians restored the Phokians in Delphi *τρίτῳ ἔτει* after the Spartans had established the Delphians; this seems to be at variance with Thucydides, and perhaps with Plutarch, *εὐθὺς ἐκείνων ἀπαλλαγέντων*: see below, p. 409.

Delphi must have recovered her independence again, probably as

<sup>1</sup> I agree, of course, that in this chapter Thucydides anticipates events—he implies later events, that is, as Kolbe says; but I see no reason whatever for thinking it in any sense foreign to its context, introduced later "bei der Ueberarbeitung" (Kolbe, p. 261).

Nor do I think that iii. 10. 4 (the Mytilenean speech), *καὶ μεχρὶ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ισοῦ ἡγοῦντο, προβόμως εἰπόμεθα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μῆδον ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἔνυμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἐπὶ ήμεν,* can be a reference to the Peace of Kallias. Busolt-Swoboda, 1347, n. 4, are right in making it refer generally to the period after 470. "Aber bedeutet die ägyptische Expedition ein Nachlassen des Perserkriegs?" says Kolbe (p. 266, n. 2). Perhaps not; but *ἀνιέντας* is present, not aorist; and *τὴν τῶν ἔνυμάχων δούλωσιν* will refer to Naxos and Thasos as much as to later 'enslavements'.

a result of the Athenian defeat in Boeotia (113): not only is she on the Peloponnesian side in 431 (118. 3; cf. 121. 3 and v. 18. 3), but the Phokians were then among the Peloponnesian allies (ii. 9. 2).

I.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 27, a grant of proxeny to a Delphian, may belong to this time.

**113. Athenian Defeat in Boeotia:** Diodoros, xii. 6 (447–446 B.C.); Plut. Per. 18. 2–3. See also iv. 92. 6.

**1. τῶν φευγόντων:** see n. on *τῆς τε χώρας ἐκράτησαν*, 108. 3. έαυτῶν μὲν χιλίοις ὅπλίταις, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ὡς ἑκάστοις (cf. 107. 5): *χιλίους γενομένους ἀνευ τῆς ἀλλής δύναμεως*—Plutarch. He may mean the allies by ἡ ἄλλη δύναμις, but more likely other Athenian hoplites, called up ἐκ καταλόγου, for according to his foolish story, the 1,000 were all volunteers, ἀριστοὶ καὶ φιλοτιμότατοι; cf. n. on *Τολμίδου*, 108. 5.

**Χαιρώνειαν ἔλοντες:** recorded also by Hellanikos (F. 81) or Theopompos (F. 407).<sup>1</sup>

**καὶ ἄνδρα ποδίσαντες:** these words are only found in CG of the better MSS., ABEFM omitting them. Doubtless Steup, Hude, and Stuart Jones are right to keep them; omission is easy (see Steup's note here), and insertion improbable. The 'enslavement' in effect will have been not of the entire city, but of the oligarchs who had just seized control and driven out the democrats; and all will have been released after Koroneia.

**2. ἐν Κορωνείᾳ:** i.e. on the way home by the road that runs near the southern border of the Kopais lake. Koroneia was on the hills to the south; it is clear that the Boeotian troops lay concealed, and that Tolmides had no idea of the strength of the forces opposed to him. According to Plutarch, Perikles had opposed Tolmides' expedition altogether, *τὸ μημονεύμενον εἰπών, ὡς εἰ μὴ πείθοιτο Περικλεῖ τὸν γε σοφώτατον οὐχ ἀμαρτήσεται σύμβουλον ἀναμείνας χρόνον*: by which presumably he meant, 'do not start before you are ready', not, as would appear from Plutarch, 'wait for the insurrection to develop before attacking'.

According to Xenophon, *Mem.* iii. 5. 4, it was fought ἐν Λεβαδείᾳ, whose territory marched with that of Koroneia on the west; according to Pausanias, i. 27. 5, ὡς ἐς τὴν Ἀλιαρτίαν προῆλθε (*Τολμίδης*), Haliartos being farther along the road to the east (leading back to Athens). Plutarch, *Ages* 19. 2, agrees with the latter, saying the battle was near the temple of Athena Itonia (Paus. ix. 34. 1), where the trophy was set up.

<sup>1</sup> The wording of the citation, in Steph. Byz., does not suggest that Hellanikos was the author. Theopompos is a conjecture of O. Müller, conceded as possible by Jacoby.

**οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχομενοῦ φυγάδες:** Orchomenos was the old enemy of Thebes; but class solidarity is now stronger than local patriotism, and doubtless there had been no love for Athens. Plutarch, *Ages*. 19. 2, gives us the name of the Boeotian commander, Sparton. **Λοκροί:** 108. 3. We do not know the fate of the 100 hostages; they had probably already returned home.

**Εὐβόεων φυγάδες:** see 114. 1 n.

**τοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν:** including Tolmides himself (Plutarch, Diodoros, Paus. i. 29. 14); also Kleinias, father of Alkibiades (Plat. *Alk.* i. 112 c). The grave of the dead was seen by Pausanias.

An inscription, an 8-line epitaph in verse, doubtless from this grave, has been discovered: Kyparisses and Peek, *Ath. Mitt.* lvii, 1932, 142–50. For restorations see Peek, *Ath. Mitt.* lix. 252–6; *Herm.* lxviii, 1933, 353–6; Bowra, *C.Q.* xxxii, 1938, 80–8; Reinhardt, *Herm.* lxxiii. 234–9.<sup>1</sup> Bowra has an interesting discussion of the epigram; but I am sceptical of his view that it is in the Peloponnesian style and so written for the pro-Spartan circle in Athens, whose members had lost so heavily in the battle and who believed in oracles.

A statue of Tolmides, with his seer Theainetos, was set up in Athens (Paus. i. 27. 5); so he was not repudiated for his failure. The epigram attributes the defeat to one of the demigods, which means presumably that Theainetos misinterpreted an oracle or an omen; but he was not repudiated either.

**3. τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἔξελιπτον Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶσαν:** except (of course) Plataia. **ἐφ' ὃ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιοῦνται:** including the garrison left at Chaireneia. It must be remembered that the dead and prisoners together numbered 1,000, about  $\frac{1}{12}$  of the total hoplite force at this time (see ii. 13. 6). Doubtless also there is some truth in Plutarch's view which implies that Perikles was (by this time at least) against the attempt to hold Boeotia altogether, and that there had been many in Athens, even before the defeat, who felt it was beyond their powers—that it was exhausting rather than adding to their strength. See also n. on *κατεστρέψαντο πᾶσαν*, 114. 3.

Four Thespian citizens were honoured with Athenian proxeny about this time—either during the Athenian rule, or when, perhaps, they were now driven out of Thespiae: I.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 36, Hiller, ad loc.

**4. οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες:** not the happiest of expressions, so that Stahl assumed a lacuna after *κατελθόντες* (*ἐλευθέραν τὴν πατρίδα ἀνέλαβον*, or the like) and Hude conjectured *κατῆλθόν τε* for *κατελθόντες*; but it may stand. The first phrase means those cities whose leading citizens had been exiled and whose

<sup>1</sup> Most of Reinhardt's criticisms of previous restorations are sound, but his own suggestion for l. 5 *πρόσφρον* [*γὰρ ὁ τοισίδε*] *δε*, by which *τοισίδε* has to mean the enemy—in an epitaph on the grave of the fallen—cannot be accepted.

exiles had now been especially active (Orchomenos, Chaironeia, καὶ ἄλλ' ἀττα χωρία), the second the rest of Boeotia. For these exiles, see above, p. 318. *οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες* cannot mean Lokris and Euboea (because they had joined in), for Euboea was still subject to Athens, nor Lokris alone, nor Lokris and Phokis, even though Phokis was now or soon after severed from Athens (ii. 9. 2).

**αὐτόνομοι:** a word that can be freely used to mean complete independence (as here), independence within a league, i.e. in home affairs (as Mytilene within the Delian League, or the members of the Peloponnesian League), or a nominal independence subject to paying tribute (as Aigina and other members of the Delian League).

**114. Secession of Euboea and Megara:** Diodoros, xii. 5 (Megara, 448–447 B.C.), 6. 1 (Peloponnesian invasion, 447–446), 7, 22 (Euboea, 446–445 and 445–444); Plutarch, *Per.* 22–3.

**1. Εὔβοια ἀπέστη:** we do not know the immediate cause of this, only that there were Euboean exiles helping the Boeotians (113. 2). But we are told that Tolmides had led Athenian cleruchs to Euboea (and to Naxos), and (since Tolmides fell at Koroneia) this must have been before the secession of Boeotia, Diod. xi. 88. 3 (453–452 B.C.), Paus. i. 27. 5. (Whether Diodoros' date is correct is uncertain; most scholars bring the cleruchy nearer to the time of the Boeotian secession: below, pp. 376–80.) This will have meant the expropriation of many of the larger landowners, who became voluntary or involuntary exiles (cf. below, p. 344, n. 1). In any case there was plenty of occasion for discontent within the empire, honest and dishonest; many an oligarch will have discovered that his own material interests coincided with his city's freedom from Athenian control. (For the older cleruchy in Chalkis, 506 B.C., which has been doubted by some modern scholars, see Hdt. v. 77. 2, vi. 100. 1.)

All the cities of Euboea paid their tribute in the spring of 446; so they seceded after this.<sup>1</sup> Whether they paid again in 445 is not known.

**ἐκόμιζε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς Εὔβοιας:** three regiments, Pandionis, Kekropis, Antiochis, under the command of Andokides (grandfather of the orator, probably: see 115. 1 n.), at some time made a difficult march from Pegai through Boeotia back to Athens, guided for the first part of the journey, via Aigosthena and thence either to Kreusis or direct to Plataia,<sup>2</sup> by a Megarian named Python; who killed 7 men with his own hand and 'brought honour to Andokides

<sup>1</sup> i.e. if list No. 8 is that for 447–446, as Meritt and others maintain. See *A.T.L.*, and my note, *C.R.* liv, 1940, 65–6.

<sup>2</sup> Gomme, *Essays*, pp. 21–2 (*B.S.A.* xviii, 1911–12, 193–4), routes (1) and (2).

with 2,000 prisoners (or slaves), and later, 'having done harm to no man', died in Athens, where his tombstone has been found, *I.G.* i. 2 1085 (Tod, 41: with a "curiously illiterate epitaph"). This will mean either that Thucydides is not strictly correct in saying that only the Nisaean garrison and those who took refuge with it were saved for Athens, Pegai being saved too (Classen, Busolt, Beloch:<sup>1</sup> see 115. 1 n.); or, more probably, that, on the return of the army from Euboea, the three regiments were sent to recover Pegai, and perhaps succeeded, and were about to return, leaving a garrison there, when they found their road cut off by the invading Peloponnesians. The latter, by getting as far as Eleusis and Thria, blocked not only the road direct from Pegai to Athens, but also the shortest road from Plataia, by Panakton or Eleutherai (i.e. the pass of Gyptóastro) and Oinoe, and perhaps also that by Phyle; so that the Athenians would have to return by way of Dekaleia.<sup>2</sup>

**2. ἐς Ελευσῖνα καὶ Θριώζε:** the main road to Athens. Cf. ii. 19. 2. One would suppose that the Five Years' Truce (112. 1) had expired; but see p. 413.

**Πλειστοάνακτος . . . βασιλέως:** see 94. 1, 107. 2 nn.

**ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἴκου:** because Pleistoanax and Kleandridas (his principal adviser, father of Gylippos) had been bribed by Athens, it was thought at Sparta; the king was fined and withdrew to Arkadia, and did not return till 425, ii. 21. 1; v. 16 (cf. iii. 26. 2); Ephorus, F. 193. Kleandridas fled to Thourioi in south Italy, soon to be an Athenian colony, and was condemned to death in his absence, Antiochos, fr. 12 (ap. Strabo, vi. 1. 14, p. 264); Plut. *Per.* 22. 4; *Nik.* 28. 4 (from Timaios); Diod. xiii. 106. 10. See Busolt, iii. 428. 1.

This was the occasion, according to Plutarch, on which Perikles, challenged as to one item of 10 talents in his accounts (20 tal., Ephoros), made his famous answer, *εἰς τὸ δέον ἀπώλεσα*, Arist. *Nub.* 859. Theophrastos (Plut. *Per.* 23. 2) said that Perikles sent 10 tal. yearly to Sparta in presents to the authorities, purchasing not peace, but delay, till he was ready. (If we could believe this, and if the presents stopped in 432, it would add to Sthenelaidas' motive in urging on the war. The story is more in Theopompos' manner than Theophrastos'; though cf. Arist. 25. 2; *Nik.* 10. 1; and above, pp. 63, 71.) Pherekrates, fr. 151, and Eupolis, fr. 317, may have reference to this famous bribe.

**3. Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντος, κ.τ.λ.:** quoted almost verbally by schol. Arist. *Nub.* 213 as from Philochoros (fr. 89); cf. p. 364. According to Plutarch, Perikles had with him 50 triremes and 5,000 hoplites. (Diodoros, xii. 7, says only μετὰ δυνάμεως ἀξιολόγου.)

<sup>1</sup> Beloch does not think that the Megarian's epitaph refers to this campaign, ii. 1. 182, n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Gomme, l.c., routes (3) to (5).

κατεστρέψαντο πάσαν:

ΜΑΘ. ή δέ γ' Εύβοι', ως ὄρας,  
ἡδὶ παρατέταται μακρὰ πόρρω πάνυ.

ΣΤΡ. οὐδὲ· ὑπὸ γάρ ήμῶν παρετάθη καὶ Περικλέους.

Nub. 211-13.<sup>1</sup> Euboea was completely defeated.

Not only had the Boeotians allowed a free passage to the three Athenian regiments that had retreated from Pegai (§ 1, n.), but they now gave no help to Euboea, though Euboean exiles had helped them (113. 2). It would appear that by their agreement to evacuate Boeotia the Athenians had gained a good deal more than the return of their countrymen who had been taken prisoner. This doubtless helps to explain the Peloponnesian retreat as well. It is instructive to compare the whole of these campaigns against Boeotia, the Peloponnesians, and Euboea, with those of 506 B.C.: Hdt. v. 74-7. The Athenians at this time restored the monument set up to commemorate the victories of 506, which had been overthrown during the Persian occupation: Hdt. v. 77. 4; I.G. i. 2 394; Tod, 12 and 43. For its site and a restoration, see Stevens, *Hesp.* v. 1936, 504-6. τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογίᾳ κατεστήσαντο; Euboea had been crushed; but its cities, except Hestiaia, were to remain separate, 'autonomous' states, members of the League, though more clearly than before controlled by Athens. The nature of that control is shown by the terms of the treaty with Chalkis, I.G. i. 2 39 (Tod, 42), especially the last clause (ll. 70-6): Ἀρχέστρατος εἶπε· τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Ἀντικλῆς· τὰς δὲ εὐθύνας Χαλκιδέσις κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν Χαλκίδῃ καθάπερ Ἀθήνησιν Ἀθηναῖοι πλὴν φυγῆς καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀτυμίας· περὶ δὲ τούτων ἔφεσιν εἶναι Ἀθήναζε ἐς τὴν ἡλιαίαν τὴν τῶν θεωριθετῶν κατὰ τὸ φῆμισμα τοῦ δήμου. Chalkis was to have as complete control over her magistrates as Athens had over hers—the true mark of autonomy—except where charges of treason, involving exile, death, or loss of citizen rights as the penalty, were brought; that would concern the safety of the empire, and all such cases were to be referred to Athens.<sup>2</sup> For the rest Athens undertakes to stand by

<sup>1</sup> See schol. ad loc., quoted below, p. 364.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. iv. 130. 7, τοὺς μὲν Μεδαλίους μετὰ ταῦτα πολιτεύειν ἐκέλευν ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, αὐτοὺς κρίναντας ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εἴ τινας ἤγονται αἵτιοις εἶναι τῆς ἀποστάσεως: Mende was given a greater degree of autonomy than Chalkis, for she could try cases of treason herself.

This is to take εὐθύναι and ἔφεσι in their proper Attic meaning; not as Tod, p. 85 (εὐθύναι = 'punishments of Chalkidian citizens', and ἔφεσιν εἶναι = 'there shall be right of appeal'): see Bonner and Smith, ii. 232-53, esp. 246-53 (though they take εὐθύναι to mean 'punishments', as it may, even in Attic decrees); and Cary, C.R. lii, 1938, 232. That the proper meaning of ἔφεσι is 'reference to a particular (named) court' and not 'appeal from a lower court, after trial, to a higher court', should be clear from the list of ἔφεσιμοι δίκαι in Pollux, viii. 62-3. Among them are δίκαιοι ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ δικαστήριον: which means that the ekklēsia, which might try certain cases (e.g. one brought by εἰσαγγελία), decides

the terms of the treaty, taking oath not to use any arbitrary measures against Chalkis or any citizen of Chalkis<sup>1</sup> (we may compare with this the heliastic oath, parts of which are preserved in Dem. xxiv. 149-51; see also Andok. i. 91); Chalkis takes oath to remain loyal to Athens in word and deed (to Athens only, as also in the Kolophon decree, I.G. i. 2 15, not to Athens and the League, as Erythrai had done, perhaps twenty years earlier: above, pp. 293, 335), and to pay such tribute as may be from time to time agreed to. The Athenian garrison was to remain in Euboea for the present, the strategoi being responsible for its efficiency, ὅπως ἂν ἔχῃ ὡς βέλτιστα Ἀθηναῖοι (ll. 77-9: again Athenian interests alone are considered). Athens also held some hostages, and they were to remain hostages for the present, but later an agreement (*διαλλαγή*) will be reached, καθότι ἂν δόκη ἐπιτίθειον εἶναι Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Χαλκιδέσιοι (ll. 47-52).

There had been another agreement, of a similar nature, with Eretria (ll. 41-3; cf. I.G. i. 2 49); of this I.G. i. 2 17 is almost certainly a fragment: Schweigert, *Hesp.* vi, 1937, 317-19; and doubtless with the other cities (except Hestiaia). Photios and Hesychios, s.v. Ἐρετριακὸς κατάλογος, record a decree of 442-441 B.C. which contained a list of hostages from the wealthiest classes in Eretria. It would seem that, as from Chalkis, hostages were taken in 446-445 and kept

to send it to the dicastery. "Ἐφεσις from magistrates, διαιτηταὶ or demes to dicasteries are not appeals to a higher court after a trial in a lower court, but taking a case to trial after a decision or opinion given that does not please both parties to the dispute—there was no *trial* before archons or arbitrators or deme. Hitzig, *Altgr. Staatsverträge über Rechtskraft* (Zurich, 1907), 63, notes ἔφεσις ἀπὸ δικαστῶν ἐπὶ ξενικὸν δικαστήριον in Pollux, and thinks this is 'appeal'. But under what law could such an appeal lie? It is a decision of the ekklēsia that a particular case or class of cases (ἐκκληστοὶ δίκαιοι, as explained by Pollux and Hesychios) shall be tried not by the dicastic courts, but by a foreign tribunal; ἀπὸ δικαστῶν means in effect that the case is taken away from them and given to some other court, not tried first by them, with possibility of appeal. (Bonner and Smith, 232-40, take ἔφεσις from a public arbitrator to the dicastery as 'appeal' in the strict sense, because the arbitrator is a magistrate and acting as one, and could be prosecuted for maladministration. But this proves nothing. The archons could be prosecuted for improper conduct of an ἀνάκρισις, where they were certainly acting as magistrates; but this does not mean that the trial in a dicastery after ἀνάκρισις is an appeal from a lower court to a higher one. The difference between the arbitrator and the archon was simply that as the former dealt with private suits only, he could offer a decision which both parties might accept, without the matter coming to trial; in a public suit the prosecutor could not retire, so the archon gave no judgement. That there was no *trial* before the arbitrators is proved by the fact that witnesses at the hearing, as at an ἀνάκρισις, were not under oath.)

<sup>1</sup> For the meaning of ἀκρίτον here, see Isokr. *Panath.* 66, quoted above, p. 241. I cannot at all agree with Robertson, p. 43, who adopts Stahl's view.

<sup>2</sup> See Bonner and Smith, ii. 153-5, for a discussion of the original form of the oath; a discussion which is by no means final.

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in Athens for some years—perhaps released in 442–441, or some of them; or there may have occurred an incident in that year which caused Athens to take hostages. See *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> p. 284; xii. 9, p. 149, l. 132. *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 69 may be connected with this, especially if the hostages were to be released by the decree of 442–441.

The recent Athenian cleruchy in Euboea (see 114. 1 n.) seems to have been withdrawn, for there is no trace of it after 446—none for example in 415, vii. 57. 2–4 (contrast the mention of the cleruchs in Lemnos, Imbros, Aigina, and Hestiaia), and none in 411, except the ἐπιτείχισμα in Eretria, viii. 95 (again Hestiaia is excepted). Moreover, Thucydides clearly implies here that the only Athenian settlers were at Hestiaia. Plutarch, *Per.* 23. 4, says, Χαλκιδέων μὲν τοὺς ἵπποβότας λεγομένους . . . ἔξεβαλεν, Ἐστειν δὲ πάντας ἀναστήσας ἐκ τῆς χώρας Ἀθηναίους κατώκισε, μόνοις τούτοις ἀπαραιτήτως χρησάμενος, which also should mean that there was no cleruchy at Chalkis. See Nesselhauf, 135–8; who thinks that Athens probably confiscated the lands of the hippobotai, declaring them state-domain, and (after setting aside a τέμενος for Athena) let them for a fixed rent to citizens of Chalkis<sup>1</sup>—a breaking-up of big estates in the interests both of Athens and of the smaller native farmers. Such a measure

<sup>1</sup> Nesselhauf quotes Aelian, *V.H.* vi. 1, in support of this view: Ἀθηναῖοι κρατήσαντες Χαλκιδέων κατεκληρούχησαν αὐτῶν τὴν γῆν εἰς δισχιλίους κλήρους, τὴν Ἰππόβοτον καλονυμένην χώραν, τεμένη δὲ ἀνήκαν τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ἐν τῷ Αγλάντῳ ὀνομαζούμενῳ τόπῳ, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν ἐμισθωσαν κατὰ τὰς στήλας τὰς πρὸς τῇ βασιλείῳ στοῦ ἐστυκίνας, αἵπερ οὖν τὰ τῶν μισθώσαντων ὑπομνήματα εἶχον. τοὺς δὲ αἰχμαλώτους ἔδησαν, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα ἔσθεσαν τὸν κατὰ Χαλκιδέων θυμόν. He maintains that κατεκληρούχησαν does not necessarily mean a settlement of Athenian cleruchs, and that the stelai would be required to record the rent due from Chalkidian tenants as much as from Athenians. The reference to the stelai looks like an echo of real learning (rare enough in Aelian), and, if it is not misplaced, may show that this goes back ultimately to a good source (cf. below, p. 355, n. 1). But I am sure that Aelian himself, and probably his immediate source too, was thinking of a cleruchy; there is no difficulty whatever in supposing that they were mistaken, just as there is no reason to suppose any truth in the last sentence quoted above. Or, if we want to rescue Aelian's authority (but why should we?), we can suppose him to refer to the cleruchy led by Tolmides. The Ravenna schol. on Ar. *Nub.* 213 also says that Euboea was now occupied by cleruchs.

Busolt, iii. 431–2, thinks that the land was divided among Athenian citizens, but they remained in Athens, drawing rent from occupiers on the spot (cf. Thuc. iii. 50. 2 n.). This would suit Aelian well enough.

Plutarch, incidentally, does not mention the cleruchy led by Tolmides to Euboea (which has only the authority of Diodorus and Pausanias) in his list in *Per.* ii. 6—perhaps because it was led by Tolmides, not Perikles, though he does mention that to Naxos, apparently also led by Tolmides (see below, p. 376, n. 3).

There is a fragmentary inscription (from a dedication), *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 396, τῆς ἀπο[κίας] τῆς ἐς Ἐρέτριαν. If 'Ἐρέτριαν' is restored, and if, as seems clear, there was no cleruchy in 446, it must refer to Tolmides' cleruchy; but 'Ἐρεσον' is also possible, if the inscription can be put as late as 427. 'Ἐρνθραίον' is excluded if, as has been suggested, by agreement with Persia, no cleruchies were sent to the mainland of Asia Minor (see below, p. 376).

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was likely to be both popular with the demos in Euboean cities, much more popular than a cleruchy, and almost as effective in securing Athenian power; while the whole policy could reasonably be represented by Athens as one of appeasement, in accordance with the general feeling in Greece which resulted in the Thirty Years' Peace. Against this view we have only the general statement in Andokides, iii. 9 (copied in Aischin. ii. 175) that Athens possessed more than two-thirds of the land in Euboea; and a particular one that Lysimachos, Aristeides' poverty-stricken son, was given a grant of land by Athens in Euboea, on the motion of Alkibiades (*Dem.* xx. 115; *Plut. Arist.* 27. 2). The value of Andokides' statement is very doubtful; for the second, the land may have been in Hestiaian territory; and the grant was anyhow made at least twenty years after the defeat of the Euboeans, since Alkibiades moved the decree.

In accordance with this act of confiscation of the land of the nobles, the tribute of Chalkis was lowered from 5 tal., paid in 448–447 and 447–446,<sup>1</sup> to 3 tal. in 443–442 (probably) and thereafter. The amount paid by Eretria in 448–447 and 447–446 is uncertain (—H: see Tod, 38, col. iv. 11; *A.T.L.* gives 3 tal.); 3 tal. was paid in 442–441 and in later years.

Of the other states in Euboea, Karystos paid  $\frac{7}{2}$  tal. in 451–450, 5 tal. consistently afterwards; Athenai Diades and Dion each  $\frac{1}{3}$  tal. regularly before and after the revolt (see *A.T.L.*, *Register*, s. Ἀθῆναι Διάδεις and Διῆς ἀπὸ Κηρυατον); Styra 1 tal., and Grynches (later a deme of Eretria, probably on the east coast: Ziebarth, *I.G.* xii. 9, p. 164; Bölte, in *R.E.* s.v.)  $\frac{1}{6}$  tal., as regularly.<sup>2</sup> It will be observed that financially Euboea was not oppressed by the Athenians after the failure of the revolt.

Besides this, we are told by Lysias, xxxiv. 3, that Athens granted ἐπιγαμία, right of intermarriage with her citizens, to Euboea (i.e. the children of an Athenian and a Euboean parent would be citizens of Athens) ὅτε τὰ τείχη καὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ χρήματα καὶ συμμάχους ἐκτησάμεθα (note the tense)—a vague date.

'Ἐστιαιάς δὲ ἔξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον (for the phrase, cf. 98. 2): μόνοις τούτοις ἀπαραιτήτως χρησάμενος (δὲ Περικλῆς), ὅτι ναῦν Ἀττικὴν

<sup>1</sup> The figure is in fact doubtful: Meritt and West read  $\frac{1}{2}$  F, 500 dr. aparche=5 tal. tribute (*S.E.G.* v; Tod, 38, col. iv. 23); earlier editors X (= 10 tal. tribute); *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 196 H (= 1 tal.). See *A.T.L.*, p. 36, fr. 70.

<sup>2</sup> Kyme is missing altogether, though it had at one time been the only town of note on the east coast, and had helped to found the famous Kyme in Italy (Strabo, v. 4. 4, p. 243). It disappears in classical times, no other mention of it being known before Stephanos; and no remains have been found on its site. Probably it was now included in the territory of Chalkis; but it is curious for all that that it was not separately assessed, like Grynches and Athenai. See Ziebarth, *I.G.* xii. 9, p. 161; v. Geisau in *R.E.*, s.v.

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*αἰχμάλωτον λαβόντες ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἄνδρας*—Plut. *Per.* 23. 4. (Some of the original inhabitants, the Ellopioi, seem to have been allowed to remain: but for these see below.) The settlers are mentioned again vii. 57. 2 and, under the later name of Oreos, viii. 95. 7; they remained an important colony, on the north coast of Euboea, on the route from Macedon and Pagasai via Chalkis to Oropos and Athens, and a valuable base for the fleet till the end of the Peloponnesian war. Diodoros, xii. 22 (who dates the colony in the year after the subjection of the revolt, 445–444 B.C.), gives the number of settlers as 1,000; Theopompos, F. 387 (ap. Strabo, x. 1. 3, p. 445) gave 2,000, and added that the original inhabitants were given refuge in Macedonia: *Περικλέους χειρουμένου Εύβοιαν τοὺς Ἰστιαιέis καθ' ὁμολογίας εἰς Μακεδονίαν μετασήναι, διοχιλίους δ' ἐξ Ἀθηναίων ἐλθόντας τὸν Ὡρέον οἰκῆσαι, δῆμον ὅντα πρότερον τῶν Ἰστιαιέων*—a characteristically learned note. The seer Hierokles, who had been officially employed in connexion with the settlement of Euboea (*I.G. i. 2* 39<sub>66</sub>), was one of those who got a piece of land, a well-known figure whom Aristophanes disliked as he did most seers: *Peace* (421 B.C.), 1045 ff.; cf. Eupolis, *Poleis*, fr. 212.

In accordance with the usual practice, the community of cleruchs, while managing their own local affairs as a community, remained citizens of Athens; they did not form a *πόλις*; and in consequence, unlike Chalkis, Eretria, and the other cities of Euboea, did not pay tribute (see *S.E.G. v*, index, and *A.T.L.* Hestiaia, before the revolt, had paid only  $\frac{1}{6}$  tal.). We have three inscriptions dealing with the affairs of the cleruchy and those of the Ellopioi, which, though badly mutilated, contain much that is interesting: *I.G. i. 2* 40–2. See Hiller, *Nachr. Gött. Ges.*, 1921, 62–8; Cary, *J.H.S.* xlv, 1925, 243–50; Bannier, *Rh. Mus.* lxxvii, 1928, 271–3; Hampl, *Herm.* lxxiii, 1938, 474–7. From them we learn that the cleruchy had a boule of its own and a demos, both with judicial powers in civil disputes, and an archon with executive powers. Certain cases were tried in Athens. Officials must *τὰς εὐθύνας δοῦναι* before a certain number (up to thirty) of fellow-cleruchs. There were apparently to be also a court of 30 dicasts *κατὰ δήμους* as at Dion (?), and another court for the Ellopioi at their own request.<sup>1</sup> These Ellopioi had probably had the status of *περίοικοι* in the old state of Hestiaia, and continued in the same relation to the cleruchy; they may well (at first, at least) have welcomed the change. (The γῆ Ἑλλοπία was apparently N. Euboea generally.) From the third of the three inscriptions<sup>2</sup> we learn that

<sup>1</sup> There is a difficulty of reading here, as there seems to be no reason for the change from the present tense *διδόντων* to the aorist [δοῦναι], twice restored, 41<sub>15</sub>; cf. l. 12. According to Hiller's reading, such a court is now to be set up in Dion; but this would put Dion in the same position as the Ellopioi, whereas it was a separate state-member of the League, paying tribute and not settled by cleruchs.

<sup>2</sup> Cary dates this after 428 on the ground that *εἰσφορά* had not been levied

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the cleruchs were liable to *εἰσφορά*, the special property tax levied from time to time at Athens if occasion demanded—this is what we should expect: they had the same military obligations as citizens living in Athens—no exemption was to be allowed to any individual, except by special permission, unless he was engaged in (?) the capture of privateers.<sup>1</sup> Hampl thinks that no. 40 is an application of the ordinary Athenian mortgage-law to the new cleruchy. This may be right; but we should like to know the circumstances which would occasion a special Athenian decree of this nature.

Besides this there were *τεμένη*, probably, of Athena Polias or Athena Ἀθηνῶν μεδεούσης (cf. Ar. *Equit.* 585, 763), in Hestiaia and Orobai (a small port not far from Hestiaia, on the coast of the Atalante channel and probably within Hestiaian territory), *I.G. i. 2* 376. They were probably dedicated at the time of the cleruchy, together with one perhaps at Chalkis (*I.G. xii. 9*. 934). Rumpf, *Jahrb.* li, 1936, 65–71, makes it probable that this Athena is not Athena Polias, but one with her own cult and temple in Athens (not on the Acropolis; probably the one burnt down in 406 B.C.).<sup>2</sup>

For a quite different view of the new conditions in Euboea, see Kahrstedt, *Nachr. Gött. Ges.*, 1931, 159 ff., *Staatsgebiet u. Staatsangehörige*, 1934, 32 ff.; who maintains that all of the land of Chalkis and Eretria was confiscated equally with that of Hestiaia and the cities reduced to the status of *κοινά* dependent on the whims of Athens. The first statement has only Andok. iii. 9 to support it (above, p. 345), the second nothing; it seems to me quite untenable: *C.R. 1*, 1936, 6–8. See also Nesselhauf, 134, n. 2.

**115. 1. The Thirty Years' Peace:** Diod. xii. 7 (446–445 B.C.; cf. Paus. v. 23. 4). Thucydides dates it accurately, ii. 2. 1.

*σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους*: according to Andokides, iii. 6, ten ambassadors were sent to Sparta to negotiate, among them before that date in Athens; but this is by no means certain; and in some respects at least the lettering of the inscription seems older.

<sup>1</sup> Cary thinks that this 'no exemption' clause means different conditions from those obtaining in Athens, where only persons owning more than a certain amount of capital were liable to *εἰσφορά*; "but the distinction is more apparent than real, for in a cleruchy composed of landowners the number of citizens below zeugite census would presumably be quite negligible". But the *εἰσφορά* did not fall on all citizens of the zeugite class and over, as Cary thinks; many a hoplite was quite incapable of paying any such capital tax, and poor men were sent as cleruchs. The clause only means 'no one who is liable on the score of wealth shall be exempt'. I agree with Cary's objection to Hiller's restoration of 42<sub>23</sub>.

<sup>2</sup> Such a *τέμενος* in a subject state is not of itself proof of the presence of an Athenian cleruchy, only of Athenian influence, and perhaps of some Athenian state-domains; there was one at Kolophon, *I.G. i. 2* 144–5 (though see above, p. 344, n. 1), and, what makes the position more clear, one at Aigina before 431, *I.G. iv. 29* (cf. 30–8, with Fraenkel's n. on 33–8).

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the elder Andokides, the orator's grandfather (cf. above, p. 188); according to Diodoros, Kallias and Chares *τὰς σπονδὰς συνέθεντο καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐβεβαίωσαν*, Kallias being presumably ὁ λακκόπλουτος, while nothing else is known of Chares, and his name is therefore probably authentic.

**ἀποδόντες Νίσαιαν, κ.τ.λ.:** so iv. 21. 3. From the wording of this clause one would assume that Athenian troops still held Pegai as well as the other places, and so had either never lost it or had regained it: see n. on *ἐκόμιζε τὴν στρατιάν*, 114. 1. If so, they had troops also in Achaia (cf. 111. 3) and Troizen, about which last we have been told nothing.

For other clauses in the treaty, see 35. 2, 44. 1 (and 45. 3), 78. 4; 67. 2 (autonomy of Aigina, on condition, perhaps, of a *fixed* tribute, rather than *ὸν ἀν πείθωσι Αθηναῖος*; but see n. there); 67. 4, a vague clause promising mutual freedom to trade—cf. 144. 2, Perikles' denial that exclusion from the harbours of the empire was contrary to the treaty. According to Pausanias, who saw a copy of the treaty on a bronze stele at Olympia, there was also express mention of Argos, which was excluded from the terms of the treaty but 'friendly relations' with Athens were allowed; i.e. Argos was not included among allies of either side in the title of the treaty (*σπονδὰς ἐποιῆσαντο Αθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔκατέρων*: cf. v. 18. 1); cf. the clause allowing any neutral to join either side (35. 2). Argos had entered into alliance with Athens after the Ithome affair (102. 4), and had make a thirty years' truce with Sparta in 451 (v. 14. 4).

Besides the stele of the treaty at Olympia, there may have been others at Delphi and the Isthmus (these three international copies, as it were), as well as those on the Acropolis at Athens and in the Amyklaion at Sparta: cf. v. 18. 10 and 47. 11.

By the treaty Sparta expressly recognized the position of Athens at the head of the Delian League, that is, the Athenian empire. Athens withdrew from the two posts she held in the Peloponnese and from the Megarian ports; the former withdrawal was implied, so to speak, by the peace itself, for they were bases of aggression against the Peloponnese, not defensive posts; the latter was an enforced concession, inevitable once Megara had rejoined the Peloponnesian League and if the League was prepared to come to her aid. Athens had already lost her dominion on land in central Greece at Koroneia a year and more before (a dominion anyhow unexpectedly won in 457); but she retained her empire at sea, including Aigina, once a member of the Peloponnesian League; and in the Corinthian Gulf she kept Naupaktos, her all-important naval base in the west, which helped her to check the navies of Corinth and to secure her friendship with Zakynthos, Akarnania, and other

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western states. Neither the rather half-hearted efforts of Sparta in the last dozen years nor the Persian victory in Egypt had weakened her position; which was to be finally tested from within her empire by the Samian revolt—a test which she stood successfully. There was also in 443–442 a reduction of tribute granted to many states, especially in the islands (above, p. 275).

Grundy, pp. 197–8, points out that the settlement of Thourioi two years later, which was open to colonists from all Greece, may well have been a gesture of goodwill by Athens, rather than an attempt to control the west (or at least, we may say, have been meant to appear as such); and Corinth may have been content with this, and glad that Athens should keep control of the Pontos trade, so that she should have less motive to interfere in the west—hence her friendship in 440, when Byzantium revolted with Samos (41. 2).

Sparta also may well have been content with the situation in Greece from 445 to 433, apart from her usual reluctance to go to war. Athens was not too powerful on land and was reasonably quiet; and she was powerful enough to be played off against Boeotia and to keep Corinth loyal to Sparta (Grundy, 213 ff., 235–6).

**115. 2–117. The War with Samos:** Diod. xii. 27–8 (441–440 B.C.); Plut. *Per.* 24–8; schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 283 (441–440 and 440–439).

**2. ἔκτῳ δὲ ἔτει:** again the interval between two events is given, but not the date, though in this case Thucydides elsewhere dates one of them (ii. 2. 1) and so by implication the other as well. For the true date see below, p. 390.

**περὶ Πριήνης:** *πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τῆς Μιλήτου, καὶ ἔζητον αὐτὴν ἔχειν οἱ Μιλήσιοι*—schol. It was rather a quarrel, of the usual type, over border lands. Priene was north of Miletos, near Mykale, and so not only lay between Miletos and Samos, but bordered on the Samian territory on the mainland (below): see pls. i–iii of Wiegand and Schrader, *Priene, Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen* (1904).

Just before the battle of Mykale in 479, the Persians disarmed the Samian contingent of their army and sent the Milesians to guard certain passes, according to Herodotos, ix. 99, because he suspected the loyalty of both. It is possible, however, that Miletos on this occasion was more friendly to Persia because the Samians were almost openly hostile.

Samos had some territory on the opposite mainland, known as *ἡ Περαία*, between Ephesos and Priene (Strabo, xiv. 1. 20, p. 639; Ps.-Skylax, 98). At its north end was probably Marathesion, a place which appears in the quota-lists for the first time in 443–442 (probably; certainly in 442–441); Nesselhauf, 48, n. 4, conjectures that it then broke away from Samos and was recognized as a separate state

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by Athens. For the topography of the district, see J. Keil, *Oest. Jahresh.* xi, 1908, Beiblatt, 135–68.

Neither Priene nor Marathesion paid any quota to Athena in 440–439 (the second year of the Samian war). We do not know the reason: perhaps because they had suffered in the war; perhaps because they paid their tribute (only 1 tal. and  $\frac{1}{2}$  tal. respectively) direct to the Athenian strategoi (cf. above, pp. 277–8).<sup>1</sup>

Some ten years before this date there had been internal trouble at Miletos. An oligarchy had been favoured or tolerated by Athens; but it had shown itself disloyal and massacred its opponents in the city: *ὅτε Μιλησίων εἴλοντο (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) τοὺς βελτίστους, ἐντὸς δὲ λιγού χρόνου ἀποστάντες τὸν δῆμον κατέκοψαν*—Ps.-Xen. 3. 11. This was followed by the establishment of democratic government, doubtless by Athenian arms, and the condemnation and exile for ever of two noble families: see the Milesian decree, *Syll.* 58 (= Tod, 35). In 450–449 B.C. the Athenians made a treaty with Miletos, by which the latter took an oath of loyalty, arrangements were made for the trial of further cases in which ‘treason’ was suspected, and in general relations between the two states were settled, on much the same lines as had been done in the case of Erythrai (above, pp. 293–4) and Kolophon (*I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 15; *S.E.G.* iii. 3), and as was shortly to be done in the case of Chalkis (above, p. 342). This treaty is in part preserved in *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 22, recently re-edited with the addition of an important new fragment by Oliver, *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.* lxvi, 1935, 177–98. Five Athenians were elected to see to the administration of the oath in Miletos, as in the treaties with Kolophon and Chalkis; according to Oliver, pp. 189–90, a permanent board who acted as Athenian magistrates in these cities, but for this there is no certain evidence, and something to be said against it: there were clearly none in Miletos in 441–440, and the Chalkis decree lends it no support, but, if anything, contradicts it (cf. below, pp. 381–2). Moreover, since the union of Teichoussa and Leros with Miletos was recognized by Athens in 450 (see footnote, below), it does not appear that the treaty was unduly oppressive.

*ἔνυπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ ἔξ αὐτῆς τῆς Σάμου ἄνδρες ἴδιῶται:* this was remembered still twenty years later, when Samians were in difficulties in Athens—

*τάχα δ' ἀν  
διὰ τὸν χθιζών ἀνθρωπον, διὸ ήμᾶς διεδύετ'*

<sup>1</sup> Meyer (1), iv.<sup>2</sup> 1. 712–13, and Beloch, ii. 1. 194, n. 2, think that Miletos incorporated Priene within her own territory, ‘with the connivance of Athens’, in 440, and about the same time, Teichoussa, a fortress on the coast to the south, and the island of Leros. There is no evidence for Priene except its absence from the quota-list of 440–439 (it reappears in 429–428, and the intervening lists are all incomplete); and Teichoussa and Leros were included with Miletos on the quota-lists from 450–449 onwards (see *A.T.L.*).

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ἔξαπατῶν καὶ λέγων  
ὡς φιλαθήναιος ἦν καὶ  
τὰν Σάμων πρῶτος κατείποι,  
διὰ τοῦτ' ὁδυνηθεὶς  
εἰτ' ἵσως κεῖται πυρέττων.  
ἐστὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ.

Arist. *Vesp.* 281–5. Cf. also below, p. 354, the story of Karystion. *νεωτερίσαι . . . τὴν πολιτείαν*: true to his principles Thucydides says nothing of the gossip in Athens about Aspasia the Milesian and her influence with Perikles in this quarrel, of which we hear in Plutarch. See below, p. 355. (Hude follows Herwerden in bracketing *τὴν πολιτείαν*, supposing, quite improbably, that the scholiast did not have the words in his text. Cf. p. 258.)

**3. πλεύσαντες οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι:** Thucydides does not say that the rights and wrongs of the quarrel between Miletos and Samos were considered in Athens. According to Plutarch, 24. 1, 25. 1, Athens called upon the Samians to stop the fighting and submit their complaints to arbitration by her, and declared war when they refused.

According to Diodoros and Plutarch Perikles was in command of this first expedition, as well as of the second.

Nothing shows better than this war the true nature of the Athenian ‘empire’. It is not a civil war between two parts of an organized whole, but a war between two states who were old enemies, even though one of them had recently been brought into closer subjection to Athens; and Athens apparently does not interfere till appealed to by the defeated party. Both Miletos and Samos are treated as autonomous units. Similarly, Chios and Lesbos send only 25 ships at first, only a small part of their whole fleets; they send 30 more when an Athenian victory seems certain. Equally clear is the Athenian determination, once she interferes, to settle the quarrel according to her interests, and her power to do so. She sought to dominate, *ἄρχειν*, to control the policy of the states who were members of the League; she did not attempt an empire in the Roman fashion, with *provinciae* ruled by Athenian magistrates, any more than she attempted to absorb any states within her own, as Rome absorbed Italy. See above, pp. 336–7.

**ὅμήρους ἔλαβον:** Diodoros, 27. 2, says that Perikles also exacted a fine of 80 talents.

**ἔς Λῆμνον:** an island which had been settled by Athenian citizens, but also a state-member of the League. Cf. above, p. 276. It is mentioned in an unknown connexion on the inscription giving the treaty between Athens and Samos at the end of the war, *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 50 (below, 117. 2 n.).

**φρουρὰν ἐγκαταλιπόντες:** i.e. in Samos, not *διὰ τὸν ὅμήρους*, as the scholiast has it.

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4. τοῖς δυνατωτάτοις: not the most powerful at that moment, after the democracy had been established, but the most influential citizens' generally, the leading oligarchs.

ὅς εἶχε Σάρδεις τότε: i.e. he was satrap of Lydia. He remained in that office for many years, for he was there when Mytilene revolted, iii. 31. 1. His illegitimate son Amorges later rebelled against the King in Karia, viii. 5. 5.

For the sake of those who are still inclined to the view that the power of Athens on the mainland of Asia Minor was not real and refuse to believe in the terms of the Treaty of Kallias, it may be noted that it is Samos, the island, which appeals to Pissuthnes for help against the mainland city, Miletos, and the latter is protected by Athens; and efficiently protected by the victory over Samos alone.

5. καὶ πρῶτον μέν, κ.τ.λ.: we are back in point of time to 115. 2, the preliminary events of §§ 3-4 being somewhat earlier. So far, and so far only, does Thucydides desert chronological order.

τοὺς ἄρχοντας: Athenian officers other than those in command of the garrison; doubtless ἐπίσκοποι who had been sent to see to the setting up of the new constitution. Cf. below, pp. 381-3. We do not know what was the ultimate fate of these Athenians; but, in view of the negative part played by Persia in the war, they were doubtless returned to Athens.

ἐπί τε Μίλητον εὐθύς: apparently ignoring the possibility of immediate attack from Athens. They actually transported the greater part of their forces to the mainland (116. 1, ad fin.). One of the terms of the alliance with Pissuthnes, who wanted to gain Miletos?

καὶ Βυζάντιον: this secession is not mentioned by any other authority. See 117. 3 n. Byzantium paid a tribute of 15 tal. to the League, and paid it for the year 441-440.

116. 1. ἐς προσκοπὴν τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν: the approach of the Phoenician (Persian) fleet was feared because of Pissuthnes' attitude. Contrast the use of the article here and its absence in § 3 ('a Phoenician squadron')—Classen.

Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος: we need not suppose that all ten strategoi sailed with the first fleet of 60 ships only; some will have been in command of the supporting squadron of 40 (§ 2). See 57. 6 n. We know the names of eight of them from Androtion, fr. 44a (F.H.G. iv. 645), of the other two from a scholion on the *Rhesos* (Wilamowitz, Progr. Greifswald, 1877, 13 = Kl. Schr. i. 14). Sophokles was one, as was often remembered in antiquity (e.g. Plut. *Per.* 8. 8; Strabo, xiv. 1. 18, p. 638). Andokides, grandfather of the orator, was another; Glaukon, the strategos against Kerkyra (51. 4) another. The five mentioned in 117. 2 were not among them, but belong to the following year. See Beloch, ii. 2, 260-1.

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πρὸς Τραγία τῇ νήσῳ: Strabo, xiv. 1. 7, p. 635. It lies south-east of Samos and so close to Lade, just off Miletos (see R.E., s.v.), which doubtless the Athenian fleet had made its base.

Σαμίων ναυσὶν ἐβδομήκοντα, ὃν ἡσαν αἱ εἰκόσι στρατιώτιδες: that is, probably, the twenty were old triremes adapted to be troop-carriers. At Lade Samos had mustered 60 ships, according to Herodotus, vi. 8. 2; and his figures for the Greek forces there may well come from oral tradition (trustworthy or not), and not, as is generally supposed, represent only the strengths of the fleets at later times.

ἔτυχον δε αἱ πᾶσαι, κ.τ.λ.: this and the similar use of ἔτυχον just above are good instances to prove that no idea of chance need be implied by τυχεῖν, except in so far as they *might* perhaps have been caught before they had left for Samos. 'They were just then on their way', or 'they had succeeded in getting away from Miletos'. This will be important when we consider the Pylos campaign.

2. κρατοῦντες τῷ πεζῷ ἐπολιόρκουν τρισὶ τείχεσι: see Introd., p. 19. They were in control on land, owing to their superior forces, not, or not necessarily, after a battle. The 'three walls' must be not a triple wall, which would be an excessive precaution (a double wall, to protect besiegers against attack both from the besieged and from a relieving force, was not uncommon, iii. 21. 1; vi. 103. 1), but walls on the three landward sides of the town; but it is an awkward expression. E. Fabricius suggested περιτειχίσει (see Steup here). (Hude reports that B has an interesting v.l., τάγμασι for τείχεσι; but τάγμα, 'regiment', is hardly a classical usage—Xen. *Mem.* iii. 1. 11 has it, but that is a special case.)

3. ἐσαγγελθέντων, κ.τ.λ.: Diod. 27. 5 and Plut. 26. 2 say that Persia had sent out its fleet. Thucydides is to be believed, that only a report of it had come. In fact, Persia officially takes no part in the war, though doubtless she would have been prepared to benefit if Pissuthnes and the Samians had got possession of Miletos.

Στησαγόρας: Σάμιος ἦν οὗτος ὁ Στ.—schol. A necessary note; it might for a moment be thought that Stesagoras was in command of the Athenian squadron that went to Karia at the beginning of the campaign (§ 1), especially as ἐπ' αὐτούς just above means 'against them', while ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας means 'to get their help'.

117. 1. οἱ Σάμιοι: under the command of Melissos, the well-known philosopher, Plut. *Per.* 26. 3-4. According to Plutarch, Aristotle (probably in the Σαμίων Πολιτείᾳ) said that Melissos defeated Perikles himself, which is a confusion between the two battles.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There was doubtless much debate in Athens over this defeat, and Perikles' enemies will have made him responsible for it through his action in taking so

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ἀφάρκτῳ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ: the camp on shore for the crews of the fleet. See Arnold's note here, and Introd., p. 19.

2. μετὰ Θουκυδίδου: ἔτερός τις Θ., οὐχὶ δὲ συγγραφεύς—schol. Nor the son of Melesias, who had been ostracized two or three years before. It was noted by Markellinos that the name was a common one, and this Thukydidēs was probably either Ἀχερδούσιος or Γαργύρτιος (more probably the latter: see *Pros. Att.* s.vv.).

Ἄγνωνος: father of Theramenes, οἰκιστής of Amphipolis in 437, strategos again in 430, iv. 102. 3, ii. 58. 1.

Nothing else is known of Tlepolemos and Antikles, except that the former was strategos again in the following year (see below), and the latter may have been the author of the first rider to the decree relating to Chalkis (Tod, 42).

Besides the strategoi of the first year of the war (above, 116. 1 n.) we know the names of six (including Perikles) of the second year from this passage in Thucydides,<sup>1</sup> and many of those of the next year as well, who took the oath in the treaty with Samos, from *I.G. i. 2* 50 as restored with an important new fragment by Wade-Gery, *C.P.* xxvi, 1931, 309–13, and by Meritt, *A.F.D.*, 48–56.

3. ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν: both Diodoros, 28. 3, and Plutarch, 27. 3–4, say that wonderful new siege-engines—‘the so-called rams and tortoises’—were used, for the first time, by the Athenians in the siege, and that they helped considerably in the reduction of the town. Nothing in Thucydides' account suggests that any method but the most ordinary one of circumvallation was used. Plutarch quotes Ephoros as his authority; and there is little doubt that Diodoros is here following Ephoros closely. The story is almost certainly false, at least that part of it which says that the new machines were effective; for later sieges (Poteidaia, Mytilene, Syracuse) were carried out in the old way. See Busolt, iii. 549. 2. Herakleides Pontikos, the pupil of Plato, rejected at least one important element in the story: Ephoros said that Artemon ὁ περιφόρητος, the famous engineer, was the inventor of these machines and was present at the siege; but Artemon was a contemporary of Anakreion, and mentioned by him in his poems, many generations earlier (see Plutarch). His was, however, a familiar name at this time, Ar. *Ach.* 850; and siege-engines too were talked about, *Nub.* 478–80. There was also a story that a Samian named Karystion was rewarded with Athenian citizenship because he had betrayed to them the secrets of a Samian μηχανή (schol. V, Ar. *Vesp.* 283); but we cannot guess at the nature of these contrivancies.

large a squadron away to Karian waters. Jacoby thinks we have an echo of this in the curious detail preserved by Plutarch, 26. 2, that Stesimbrotos (F. 8) said Perikles' object was to attack Cyprus (not to meet the Phoenician fleet).

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps another from *I.G. i. 2* 943: see below, p. 357.

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Other picturesque details are given by Plutarch: a meaningless account of the besiegers manning their walls in shifts, fruitless attempts by Samian oligarchs and by Pissuthnes to bribe Perikles, a mutual branding of prisoners,<sup>1</sup> and a story from Douris of Samos (3rd cent., *init.*), ‘full of tragic rant and not credible’, about the cruel treatment of Samian prisoners after the war by Athens. Apart from these additions, and the equally picturesque account of Aspasia's part in the war, both Diodoros and Plutarch follow Thucydides' narrative closely.

ἐνάτῳ μηνί: eight months after Perikles' return from the coast of Karia, or after the circumvallation was complete, or after Tragia, or after the outbreak of the war? The second alternative seems the most probable on the face of it; the difference between the first and the last would be a matter of three to four months.

προσεχώρησαν ὅμολογά, κ.τ.λ.: the terms are much the same as those accepted by Thasos twenty-three years earlier, 101. 3, except that Samos agrees to pay the whole cost of the war and does not pay φόρος. (Because there were, at some time, a τέμενος *Ιωνος Ἀθήνηθεν*, *B.C.H.* viii, 1884, 160, and another ἐπωνύμων *Ἀθήνηθεν*, *I.G.A.* 8, in Samos, Kahrstedt believes that Athens now confiscated the whole of Samian land, just as, he thinks, they had confiscated that of the cities of Euboea; it is a view even less tenable than the other, though Nesselhauf, pp. 138–9, surprisingly supports it: see 114. 3 n., p. 347.<sup>2</sup> Samos was still a powerful state in 411 B.C., viii. 76. 4. Moreover, she continued her own coinage, at first on the Attic standard (unless this is earlier than 439), then on her old ‘Milesian’ standard, with her own types, but with olive-branch added: P. Gardner, *J.H.S.* xxxiii, 1913, 160–1.)

χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα: Isokrates, xv. 111, ἐπὶ Σάμον στρατεύσας, ἦν Περικλῆς . . . ἀπὸ διακοσίων [γεῶν] καὶ χιλίων ταλάντων κατεπολέμησε,

<sup>1</sup> The Athenians branded their prisoners with an owl, according to this story, the Samians theirs with a σάμαινα (Plutarch reverses this, presumably by a slip). The well-known line from Aristophanes' *Babylonians*, Σαμῖνον δὲ δῆμος ἔστω ὡς πολυγράμματος (fr. 64), was thought by some to refer to this branding (Plut. 26. 6). But there were other explanations of it, and, as Kock points out, πολυγράμματος is an inapt word to describe persons branded with an owl. Aelian, *V.H.* ii. 9, professes to know the official record of this barbarous act, that is, the Athenian decree which authorized the branding; but his authority is doubtful (cf. above, p. 344, n. 1). He mentions as well an equally barbarous decree to mutilate the Aeginetans, which is clearly apocryphal, and Kleon's decree to massacre all the men of Mytilene in 427. This last may go back ultimately to Thucydides, not to a document; the others may equally go back to a writer, and an untrustworthy one, rather than to official documents. Aelian himself seems to have thought that the Mytilenian decree was carried out (οὐκ ἔβουλόμην δὲ αὐτὰ οὐτε Ἀθήνησι κεκυρώθαι σύντερον Ἀθηναίων λέγεσθαι, ὃ Πολιὰς Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἐλευθέριος Ζεῦ καὶ Ἐλλήνων θεοῖ πάντες—a sentence worth quoting!).

<sup>2</sup> The lettering of both inscriptions suggests a date before 440 B.C.

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Diodorus, 28. 3, τὰς εἰς τὴν πολιορκίαν γεγενημένας δαπάνας, τιμησάμενος αὐτὰς ταλάντων <χιλίων> διακοσίων, and Nepos, *Timoth.* 1, Athenienses mille et ducenta talenta consumpserant, all agree, if we accept the two emendations,<sup>1</sup> on the figure 1,200 talents, obviously from a literary source. (Nepos and Diodoros from Ephorus, who had some fifth-century authority—perhaps a comedy of the time of the war.) *I.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 293* (Tod, 50), with its three items of money expended, 128, 368, and 908 tal. (with the total, 1,400 tal., given at the end) was interpreted to mean that the total cost of the war was in fact 1,404 tal., or a talent or two more; but Meritt, *A.F.D. 42–8* (corrected in *A.J.P. iv*, 1934, 365–6), shows that in all probability only the second and third items belong to the Samian war, being the expenses of 441–440 and 440–439 respectively, and totalling 1,276 tal., and that therefore the first item must be the expenses of the fleet which reduced Byzantium: the sum at the end will be ξύμπαντο[s] κεφάλαιον τοῦ ἐς Βυζάντιον καὶ Σαμίον ἀναλώματος] Δ Η [Η] Η Η [---]. From this restoration we learn as well that over two-thirds of the expenditure occurred in the second archon-year of the war, 440–439 B.C., and that therefore the war perhaps lasted from c. April 440 to April 439.

It remains a slight curiosity that our literary sources, Isokrates and Ephorus, both given to exaggeration, should have minimized the expenses; we should have expected them to say 1,500 tal. rather, making two campaigns into one, and giving a ‘round number’ for 1,404 tal.

For the payment of the instalments of her war-debt by Samos, see Meritt, *D.A.T. 35–8*, and below, ii. 13. 3 n. It has been asserted that the idea of ‘reparations’, payment of the cost of a war, was unknown in ancient Greece. This is clearly an instance of it; Nikias’ offer to Syracuse (vii. 83. 2) is another.

It has been thought as well that by the terms of peace the island of Amorgos was separated from Samos (Busolt, iii. 553; Miltner, *R.E. art. ‘Perikles’*, 772). The evidence of the tribute lists is as follows: it is not found on the lists (all incomplete) up to 443–442 B.C.; it is absent from the full panel of the next three years; and is known to pay tribute for the first time in 434–433, among the πόλεις αὐταὶ ταξάμεναι, and similarly in 432–431 and 431–430, and among those αἱς ἔταξαν οἱ τάκται ἐπὶ Κρ[. . .]ο γραμματεύοντος in 430–429 and 429–428. This suggests that Amorgos was first recognized as a separate state in 434–433, not in 439 (*A.T.L.*, 456; Gomme, *C.R.* liv, 1940, 67–9).

Miltner, 773, also suggests that Athens now demanded the destruction of the seaward wall of many cities in the empire, and

<sup>1</sup> I do not feel that that in Isokrates is necessary. He is a rhetorical, not an accurate writer; and the mention of the large fleet helps the rhetoric.

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that Telekleides, fr. 42 (ap. Plut. *Per.* 16. 2), refers to this: παραδεδωκέναι φησίν αὐτῷ (sc. Περικλεῖ) τὸν Ἀθηναῖον

πόλεων τε φόρους αὐτάς τε πόλεις, τὰς μὲν δεῦν, τὰς δ' ἀναλύειν,  
λίγια τείχη, τὰ μὲν οἰκοδομεῦν, τὰ δὲ πάμπαλιν αὐτὸν καταράλλειν,  
σπονδὰς δύναμιν κράτος εἰρήνην πλοῦτόν τ' εὐδαιμονίαν τε.

**ξυνέβησαν δὲ καὶ Βυζάντιοι:** we do not know any more about this conflict. Either, we may suppose, when the siege of Samos was finally established, a large portion of the fleet was dispatched to the Bosphorus, or, disappointed at the failure to get a general revolt of Athens’ subject allies, Byzantium surrendered after but brief opposition. (The total cost of this campaign to Athens was only a tenth of that against Samos: above, p. 356.) As she appears to have suffered nothing by her action, this last is perhaps the more probable. She paid 15 talents tribute in 449, c. 15<sup>2</sup> tal. in 442–441–440 (i.e. she paid her tribute in the spring of the year in which she revolted, like Poteidaia, above, p. 210); it is not certain whether she paid at all in 439—there are gaps in the Hellespontine list of that year, but there were not more than 30 payments in all (perhaps one or two fewer) against 32 in 440 (cf. pp. 277–8, above). She paid 18<sup>1</sup> tal. in 432, and nearly 30 tal. in 429. It is to be noted that Chalkedon, immediately opposite Byzantium on the Asiatic shore, certainly paid her tribute (9 tal.) in 439 as well as 440, as did the great majority of the Hellespontine states.

Miltner, *R.E. art. ‘Perikles’*, 773, thinks that Byzantium lost possession of two small places on the Asiatic shore of the Propontis, Bysbikos and Kallipolis. They were not assessed in 443–442 and 442–441 (and almost certainly not in 441–440), but not in 435–434 either, for which years we have the full Hellespontine panel. They appear for the first time in 434–433, Bysbikos in the πόλεις ἀσ οἱ ιδιώται ἐνέγραψαν rubric, paying  $\frac{1}{2}$  tal., Kallipolis in those αὐταὶ ταξάμεναι, paying  $\frac{1}{3}$  tal. Both therefore were probably then separately assessed for the first time, like Amorgos.

Most scholars think that *I.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 943*; a list of men killed in Chersonesos (28 in all, including the strategos, Epiteles), in Byzantium (12), and ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πολέμοις (19), belongs to 440–439, on account of the lettering. But these lists normally gave all the casualties of a campaigning season—all those for whom an Epitaphios was given; and there does not seem to be sufficient reason why those killed at Samos should have been listed on a separate stele. This may therefore belong to a different year.

At the close of the campaign, Perikles delivered the Epitaphios over the grave of the fallen. It was a speech famous in antiquity, and sentences from it were remembered: Plut. *Per.* 8. 9 (from Stesimbrots the pamphleteer), Arist. *Rhet.* i. 7. 34, 1365a 3r; and some argument about it between Elpinike and Perikles (perhaps also

from Stesimbrotos, or Ion of Chios), *Per.* 28. 4–7. Ion, too, according to Plutarch, told a story of Perikles' boasting that whereas Agamemnon had taken ten years to capture a barbarian city, he had taken Samos, the most powerful of the Ionian states, in nine months: an idle story as it stands (Ion did not like Perikles: *Plut. Per.* 5. 3–4), though Perikles might have made some such remark ironically in answer to complaints about the long time taken over the siege. Yet Thucydides elsewhere emphasizes the great strength of Samos and says she came near to wresting from Athens the command of the sea in this war, viii. 76. 4; a very exaggerated statement to judge by his brief account of the campaign here. It is clear, however, from the large numbers of warships that were sent out (160 altogether, if none from the first squadrons had meanwhile returned, and an additional 55 from Chios and Lesbos), that Athens was very much alarmed, if not at the power of Samos alone, at least at the possibility of a general revolt and a war with Persia as well. The thoroughness of her preparations forestalled both dangers.

It was to be feared that the appearance of the Persian fleet, or even the expectation of it, might lead to the defection of many states in the south and south-west of Asia Minor (the Karian district of the League). This, however, did not happen. As many states were paying tribute in 439 and 438 as in 441 and 440; Phaselis, the easternmost of all, remained loyal throughout (doubtless largely because of the commercial advantages of the League). By 437, however, the Karian district had been merged in the Ionian, and from then on there are only some 62 states paying tribute in this district against about 75 of the two districts before 437. Athens had ceased to collect from some states in Karia, most of them inland, all of them small; the total loss of tribute was not more than 4 tal., and there was an increase elsewhere which made up even that small sum (Nesselhauf, 106); the collection was not worth the trouble (during the Peloponnesian war she more than once learnt the dangers of campaigning in Karia and Lykia: ii. 69, iii. 19). But this change was not due, or but indirectly, to the Samian war.<sup>1</sup>

By the treaty of 445 Sparta and the Peloponnesian League had in effect recognized the Athenian empire. By her victory over Samos, when the Peloponnesians refused to interfere, when Persian help was not forthcoming, and when there was no general secession from the League and the two independent fleets of Chios and Lesbos

<sup>1</sup> This has often been misunderstood; see e.g. Starkie's note on Arist. *Vesp.* 284: "it so shattered the Athenian confederacy that a new assessment of tribute had to be made, and a new arrangement of provinces." A new assessment was anyhow due in 438; and to speak of 'provinces' is very misleading. Miltner, *R.E.* 'Perikles', 771–2, thinks that Athens bought off Persia in 440 with a promise to withdraw from this part of Karia; if so, the price was trifling, and even so was not immediately paid.

assisted in the siege, Athens appeared to have consolidated it (118. 2). That is, for Thucydides, the main thread in the story of the years 479–439. The defeats in Egypt and Boeotia, serious as they were, had had little effect on Athenian strength. (But they were symptomatic of the future: Koroneia foreshadowed Delion, and the adventure in Egypt—*παρὰ γνωμὴν ἐτόλμησαν*—the Sicilian.)

### 118. 1. οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν: see below, p. 362.

καὶ ὅσα πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη: in this context one would naturally take *πρόφασις* to mean 'the declared causes', the *casus belli*—τὰ Κερκυραϊκά, τὰ Ποτειδαιτικά, the Megarian decree, and perhaps the treatment of Aigina (67. 2–4), i.e. all those actions which led the Peloponnesians to assert that Athens had broken the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace. These are called *aἰτίαι* in 23. 5, and are contrasted with the 'truest cause', Spartan fear of Athens, 23. 6, which is there ἡ ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις. Here that truest cause is not mentioned till the end of § 2 (τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιῶντο). The slight confusion, however, is only a verbal one; the fact that in 23. 6 Spartan fear of Athens is described as ἡ ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις shows that other *προφάσεις* might have been in reality less compelling.

2. ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα, κ.τ.λ.: the words ὅσα ἔπραξαν οἱ Ἐλλῆνες πρός τε ἀλλήλους καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον . . . μεταξὺ τῆς τε Εἴ. ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου refer back to the statement of intention in writing the excursus, 97. 1. But in fact the events related in the excursus belong only to the years between 478 and 439, that is 40 years, not 50. Hence Thucydides writes here ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα: 'both the events related in the excursus and τὰ Κερκυραϊκά and τὰ Ποτειδαιτικά'; i.e. the development of Athenian power to the point at which Sparta 'found it intolerable' took about 50 years, from, say, the winter of 479 when the Athenians and Ionians continued the siege of Sestos after the Peloponnesians returned home (89. 2) to the spring of 431, actually 47½ years. ἡ Ξέρξου ἀναχώρησις certainly means the withdrawal of the Persians from Greece after Plataia, not Xerxes' personal retreat (so *μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ*), unless Thucydides is implying here that the victory of Salamis was the real beginning of Athenian power and of Peloponnesian enmity. (Steup's objections to this passage amount to very little, and his proposal to omit *μεταξὺ τῆς . . . τοῦ πολέμου* does not remove even these; for it leaves ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα, which is equally inapplicable to the events of the excursus only. It was from this passage that ancient grammarians adopted the name *πεντηκονταετία* for the excursus, 89–118, though it is strictly speaking wrong, for it should include the events of cc. 23–66, and indeed everything up to the actual outbreak of the war, i.e. to the end of book i.) καὶ αὗτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἔχώρησαν δυνάμεως: i.e. Athens' own resources,

man-power, finance (increase of wealth, e.g. by trade), organization of army and navy.

**ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ιέναι ἐσ τοὺς πολέμους:** Grundy and others maintain that the primary cause of this reluctance was the population problem in Lakonia—the Helots so greatly outnumbered the Spartiates (and the perioikoi) that the state had always to be anxious about its man-power. Dickins, *J.H.S.* xxxii, 1912, 1–42, argued that a more important factor was the political opposition between the ephors, representing the main citizen body, and ambitious kings and generals such as Kleomenes and later Brasidas and Lysandros. Both views have doubtless much truth in them, though I think Grundy exaggerates both the numbers and the general hostility of the Helots. More recently Ziehen and Porter (above, pp. 298–9) have suggested a great decline in the Spartiate population after 480, and particularly after the earthquake of 465 or 464, which was probably even more fatal to children than to adults, and as fatal to women as to men. It did not, it is true, prevent them from undertaking the campaign in Phokis in 457 and extending it, reluctantly, into Boeotia, though it helps to explain their retreat after the victory at Tanagra; and it is hardly consonant with Thuc. i. 1. 1, 19, 123. 1, and ii. 11. 1 (see above, 19 n.).

**πρὶν δὴ ή δύναμις τῶν Ἀθηναίων σαφῶς ἥρετο καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἤπιτοντο:** it might be said that the power of Athens was clear enough, and her aggression against Sparta's allies had begun, a good deal earlier, with the conquest of Aigina and Boeotia, and the alliances with Megara, Achaia, and Troizen. But Thucydides, had he written the story of the growth of the Athenian empire at length, would doubtless have answered that it was the Thirty Years' Peace (recognizing as it did the Athenian hegemony) and the outcome of the Samian war that had made it clear that the empire was secure unless the whole power of the Peloponnesian League was mustered against it (*ἐπιχειρητέα ἔδόκει εἶναι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ*), and Athenian behaviour towards Kerkyra, Poteidaia, and Megara in 433 and 432 that showed that Athens was not only secure, but could be (from the Peloponnesian point of view) provocative. The 'truest cause' of the war is emphasized once more.

It is to be noted that Thucydides, in order to explain Sparta's fear of Athens—her fears for her own hegemony—thinks it necessary to explain the growth of Athenian power, because it was recent, but not Sparta's own position, except in so far as that appears in the Corinthian and Archidamos' speeches at the conference: there was no need to say anything explicitly about the *recognized* position of Sparta in Greece. He was not of course writing particularly for Athenian readers; and there is nothing in this part to suggest that he was writing after 404 to correct Athenian *défaitsme*.

## NOTES ON THE PENTEKONTAËTIA

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## I. NATURE OF THE EXCURSUS, 89–118. 2

That the words in which Thucydides criticizes Hellanikos' attempt to write the history of Athens between 479 and 431—*βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη*—aptly fit his own excursus, with some change of meaning in *τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς*, has been observed by everyone. His narrative too is 'scrappy'; and, if he does not get his events in the wrong order, his chronology certainly lacks precision. That he did mean by *οὐκ ἀκριβῶς* that Hellanikos got his events in the wrong order, is shown by his own careful insistence on the order even though he gives no dates: *πρῶτον μέν, ἔπειτα, μετὰ ταῦτα, χρόνῳ δὲ ύστερον, ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, εὐθὺς, ηδη*, and so forth (98. 1, 2, 4; 100. 1, 2, 3; 102. 4; 103. 3; 105. 1, 2, 3; 107. 1; 108. 4; 111. 2, 3; 112. 1, 5; 113. 1; 114. 1, 2; 115. 1; 118. 1), with the weaker *καὶ* and *δέ* to indicate immediately following or logically connected or contemporaneous events (98. 3; 101. 1; 102. 1; 104. 1, etc.), and as well by his interruption of the narrative of particular events, as the Egyptian war (104 and 109), the Aeginetan war (105. 2–4 and 108. 4), and, most notable of all, the building of the Long Walls (107. 1 and 108. 3).<sup>1</sup> But, though he gives a few figures for the duration of events and a few others for intervals between events (101. 3, 103. 1, 105. 6, 108. 2, 109. 4, 110. 1, 112. 1, 115. 2, 117. 1, 3), he makes no attempt to date them in relation to either of his *termini* (the retreat of the Persians from Greece proper and the opening of the Peloponnesian war), two events whose dates, we may suppose, that is, the length of the interval between them, he

<sup>1</sup> See also above, 103. 3 n., and 103. 4 n. *ad fin.*

assumed to be known to his readers—though in this case too, in his summary of the excursus, he uses a vague and not a precise figure, *ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα* (118. 2).<sup>1</sup> Between these limits his events float like sticks in water in an oblong bowl, preserving their relative order, but none of them with a fixed position in relation to the ends of the bowl and but few of them relatively to each other. Yet he certainly knew (or thought he knew, which for our present argument comes to the same thing) the dates of some of the events: the revolt of Thasos (see below, pp. 390-1), and, above all, the Thirty Years' Peace. This last case is particularly significant. Thucydides elsewhere could date it relatively to one of his *termini*, the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, which last he dates very precisely (ii. 2. 1); therefore he could date the Samian war which broke out five years after it (115. 2). He indicates the years of *τὰ Κέρκυραϊκά* (after Leukimme) and of *τὰ Ποτειδαικά* (see above, pp. 196 and 222); therefore he could have given, had he wished, the interval between the Samian war and the latter events; yet all he says is *μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἡδη γίγνεται οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον τὰ προειρημένα* (118. 1)—we can give a figure for *οὐ πολλοῖς* from the evidence which Thucydides himself supplies. There is, in consequence, no reason to suppose that he did not know the dates of other events within the Pentekontaëtia as well. Why did he not give them? That the excursus is an early essay, provisional, unfinished, and never properly adapted to its present position, is to me clear (below, pp. 363-4); but one would suppose that, if a man set out to write a narrative one purpose of which was to correct chronological errors, the first thing he would do would be to get his skeletal structure of dates—in Thucydides' case the archons' names with the events briefly recorded against them. We must conclude that Thucydides had not any list of archons readily accessible (so that, with his usual caution, he will not give dates when he is in doubt, even for the interval between the Samian war and the Kerkyra affair, because he had not a very precise date for the beginning of the latter); that is, that he wrote it when absent from Athens, either when in command in Thrace or after his exile.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides' criticism of Hellanikos in 97. 2 is, superficially, all the more capricious in view of his own high standard of chronological exactness as expressed in v. 20. 2-3 (*οὐ γὰρ ἀκριβές ἐστι*), even though this probably refers to that part of Hellanikos' *Atthis* which dealt with the Peloponnesian war itself.

<sup>2</sup> He wrote it, of course, also after the publication of Hellanikos' *Atthis*, that is, according to the general view (see, for example, Adcock, *C.A.H.* v, p. 480), after 407-406, for Hellanikos is said to have included events of that year (F. 171-2). Scholars who are very certain of the different periods of composition of extant writings, which, in their present form, are finished works of art, seem also to be certain of the complete unity of lost works, even when they are in the nature of *Annals*. I see no reason to doubt that an early 'edition' of Hellanikos'

An archon-list would have been available to Thucydides in Athens, for there was, in all probability, an official publication of one c. 425 B.C.: see above, p. 6, n. 2.

His narrative is not only, in this sense, *τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβές*, but *βραχύ*. He does indeed begin his account of the 'increase of Athenian power' by writing at length, in a manner which suggests that we are to be given a detailed history of the period (cc. 89-96), and this is, after all, what we expect from one who complains of the brevity of the only other account; but from c. 98 he contents himself with the briefest possible record of events, adding details only occasionally and those picturesque rather than significant (105. 6-106. 2, 109. 4), until, approaching nearer the time of his own *History*, he deals with the Samian war more fully.<sup>1</sup> This brief record is, except

*Atthis* might have been published long before 406, and that he could have brought it up to date in subsequent 'editions'; even that someone else might have published a 'new and revised' edition after his death, which would be still quoted as *Hellanikos*, for there is some ancient authority for making him an older man than Herodotus, not a contemporary of Thucydides. See above, 97. 2 n., and Introd., p. 6, n. 3.

<sup>1</sup> It is a not unnatural inference that 89-96 is in fact the beginning of a rewriting of the whole excursus; and we have in fact two 'prefaces' to the excursus, 89. 1, *οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τρόπῳ τοιῷδε φίλοιν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ηὔξηθησαν*, and 97. 1, *τοσαύδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ δασκαλίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ*, κ.τ.λ., both of which cover all the ground. But not only do the opening words of 97. 1 imply at least the facts of 94-6 (that is, they follow c. 96 naturally), but we should expect the longer preface, with the reason given for the whole excursus (97. 2), to be the later one, or, if it had already been written for the earlier and shorter form of the excursus, that it would have been transferred to the beginning of the later form at 89. 1. This may, however, only be a sign that the whole is unfinished. (The excursus, if it had been entirely rewritten in a longer form, might have incorporated the story of Pausanias and Themistokles, 128-38, if we are to suppose that Thucydides would have tidied up his whole narrative; but it need not have done, for the story is of biographical rather than historical interest.) I cannot here discuss the problem of the composition of Thucydides' history; but the position of this preface at c. 97 instead of at 89. 1 seems to me to argue strongly against the view that the excursus as a whole, or c. 97, or the reference in it to Hellanikos are to be dated after 404. The problem of the date of the excursus itself and of book i as a whole has recently been ably discussed by Hammond, *C.Q.* xxxiv, 1940, 146-52, who concludes that ('except 97. 2 and perhaps 76-7') it was composed for publication between 421 and 415. I agree in general with this, except that I cannot in the least see that 97. 2 is 'irrelevant' and its last sentence 'redundant'; and, as I have said above, I do not think that the reference to Hellanikos was necessarily written after 406. (I think it is only this belief that has made Hammond try to explain 97. 2 as irrelevant or redundant.)

In a paper read to the Cambridge Philological Society, of which a brief résumé was published, *Cambr. Univ. Reporter*, March 12, 1912, Harrison made several suggestions concerning the excursus. I do not accept all his arguments; but I will quote two of his conclusions: "some of the deficiencies and disproportions of Thucydides' narrative of the Fifty Years may be due to features of the *Atthis* of Hellanikos", and, in particular, that "its few precise measurements of time may

for the omission of the dates, in the annalistic manner (see Introd., pp. 6, 41-3). We get an interesting hint of this from the scholiast on Aristophanes, *Nub.* 213. *Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντος* (*Εὐβοιαν*) καταστρέψασθαι αὐτὸν πᾶσάν φησι Φιλόχορος (fr. 89). καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ἐπὶ ὄμοιογια κατασταθῆναι, Ἐστιαῖς δὲ ἔξοικοσαντας αὐτὸν Ἀθηναῖος τὴν χώραν σχεῖν (ἔχεω MSS., acc. to Dübner). This is almost identical with Thucydides' account (114. 3); and (except on the improbable assumption that the scholiast has written Philochorus by mistake for Thucydides) not only shows that the later historian in his *'Αρθίς*, writing in annalistic form, had nothing to add to Thucydides, but makes clear the annalistic form of the latter. Another simple example is 111. 3, ἐς Οἰνιάδας ἐστράτευσαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, οὐ μέντοι εἴλον γε; in his narrative of the Peloponnesian war itself, he gives some details of the topography of the place, which show the difficulty of taking it (ii. 102. 2-6). It would be proper to assume that Hellanikos had treated the events in a similar manner, and that Thucydides, in his first draft, was content to correct rather than to supplement him.<sup>1</sup>

But even more striking than the bareness of a narrative that contents itself with a note of events, with no mention of their significance, are the omissions; omissions often of events which should have found a place in the briefest of annals, as well as of

be corrections of the inaccuracies of Hellanikos alleged in 97. 2"; and "this narrative, like others of Thucydides' digressions, was an essay of his early years, subsequently thrown into the preface of his great work, but never adapted to its new function, and strung into its context by temporary and makeshift sentences which never received the final hand". I would modify this last by the suggestion made above about the two prefaces.

Steup, n. on 89 ff. (pp. 437-8), points out that in c. 146, αἱραὶ δὲ αὗται καὶ διαφοραὶ, Thucydides refers back to 23. 5, τὰς αἱραὶς προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, without any thought of the excursus which contains the account of the real cause of the war, the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις of 23. 6; but his conclusion that the excursus was therefore *written* later, after the rest of book i, or most of it, is by no means compelling.

<sup>1</sup> Seeck, *Klio*, iv, 1904, 294, rightly pointed out that Thucydides had no archonlist before him; but when he says of the excursus, "das ist eine chronologische Ueberlieferung von der Art wie alte Herren erzählen, was in ihrer Jugendzeit geschehen ist", this is to emphasize one or two chronological notes (the 62 days of 108. 2, the 14 days of 117. 1) and the few picturesque details, and ignore the more important time-intervals and the annalistic character of the whole.

One may compare with the excursus the introduction to τὰ Σικελικά, vi. 2-5: a similarly very brief sketch (which does not really explain the strength of the forces which Athens was attacking, vi. 1) and the same method of dating—but here more systematically carried out—by intervals of time with no fixed terminus given; though again we can be confident that Thucydides could have given such a terminus, for he knew, or could have learnt without difficulty, the date of Gelon (4. 2). This introduction cannot be simply from Hellanikos, as some have supposed; what point would it have? It must have contained something new to his readers, if Thucydides meant it to stay.

other important matters proper to the subject of the excursus. It will be as well roughly to analyse these, keeping in mind what the subject is, not only the growth of Athenian power and resources, both at home and through her control of the League (ἐν οἷς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν τέ ὀρχήν ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, 118. 2), but the organization of those resources (διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων, 97. 1).

## II. OMISSIONS IN THE EXCURSUS

### A. External Policy

(1) The expedition under the command of Leotychidas (whether of the Peloponnesian League only or of the still united Greek forces) against the Aleuadai of Thessaly: Hdt. vi. 72; Plut. *Them.* 20. 1; Arist. 22. 2; Mor. 859 D (*de malign. Hdt.* 21); Paus. iii. 7. 9. Plutarch mentions this only in order to relate the foolish story of Themistokles' plot to burn the Peloponnesian fleet at Pagasai (a story transferred to Gytheion by Cicero, *de Off.* iii. 49). The date of the expedition is quite uncertain, as is that of the exile of Leotychidas which followed it: Walker thinks it must be 479 when Leotychidas was still in command of the Greek forces (C.A.H. v. 466); Busolt, iii. 83. 1, following Herodotos that Leotychidas' exile occurred immediately after the expedition, and placing the exile in 476-475 from Diod. xi. 48. 2, puts it in this year.<sup>1</sup> Cf. below, pp. 405-7.

In close connexion with this (but a logical, not temporal connexion) Plutarch tells the more probable story of Sparta's attempt at a meeting of the Amphictyonic League at Delphi to implement the Allies' covenant by getting the medizing and neutral states, Thessaly, Thebes, and Argos, expelled from the League, and Themistokles' frustration of it (*Them.* 20. 3).

(2) The temporary Greek failure at Doriskos, Hdt. vii. 106. 2 (above, p. 291).

(3) The first Athenian failure at Ennea Hodoi (below, p. 391, n. 1).

(4) The recovery of Argos and the failure of her attempt, in alliance with the greater part of Arkadia, to overthrow the hegemony of Sparta, Hdt. ix. 35; Diod. xi. 65 (see C.A.H. v. 66-7). For the dates, see below, pp. 408-9.

(5) The alliance between Athens and Egesta, 454-453 B.C., I.G. i. 2 19-20 (Tod, 31); perhaps also with Leontinoi and Rhegion (above,

<sup>1</sup> Heichelheim, *Zeitschr. f. Num.* xl, 1930, 16-22, shows, from Herrmann's article on 'Die thessalische Münzunion im v. Jahrh.' (*ibid.* xxxiii, 1922, 33 ff.), that Thessalian coins illustrate the changes in Thessalian external policy between c. 500 and 460, when the alliance with Athens was made; but it is idle to suppose that they can be used to date accurately, within a year, Leotychidas' expedition.

55. 2 n., p. 198). There was an alliance with Phokis too, in the same year, renewed c. 448: *I.G.* i. 2 26 (above, p. 337).

(6) The Thirty Years' Treaty of Peace between Argos and Sparta, 451-450 or 450-449 B.C.: *Thuc.* v. 14. 4, 28. 2. See above, p. 328.

(7) The Treaty of Kallias, 449 B.C., by which the fighting between Athens as head of the Delian League and Persia was ended. See above, 100. 1 n. (p. 295), 112. 4 n. (pp. 331-5).

(8) The condemnation and exile of Pleistoanax, king of Sparta, and of Kleandridas, his adviser (father of Gylippos), after the abortive invasion of Attica in 446 (114. 2). The exile of the former is referred to elsewhere by Thucydides, ii. 21. 1, v. 16; Ephoros, F. 193. See 114. 2 n. (It is perhaps worth pointing out that Diodoros, too, says nothing of the punishment of the leaders in his narrative of the expedition, xii. 6. 1, and only mentions that of Kleandridas incidentally, in connexion with Gylippos, xiii. 106. 10. It is possible that Ephoros followed Thucydides in mentioning the exile of Pleistoanax later.)

(9) The attempt by Athens, on the proposal of Perikles, to call a Panhellenic Congress. This is recorded only by Plutarch (*Per.* 17), who adds that it was frustrated, *ώς λέγεται*, by Spartan opposition; but there is no reason to doubt it, for he is clearly summarizing the words of a decree of the ekklesia, presumably from Krateros (cf. *Introd.*, p. 44). The decree is of great interest, in two ways: first, its objects—to restore the temples burnt by the Persians and establish the sacrifices which had been vowed in 480, to secure the freedom of the seas, and peace, and so make Athens truly *ρυσίβωμον Ἑλλάνων ἄγαλμα δαιμόνων* (*Eum.* 920: Keulen, p. 241—see below); secondly, the list of those to whom delegates were sent—five to the Dorians and Ionians of Asia Minor and to the Aegean Islands, five to Thrace and the Hellespontine region as far as Byzantium, five to Boeotia, Phokis, the Peloponnese, and thence to Lokris and Akarnania and Amprakia, five to Euboea and Thessaly. (The Greeks of the western Mediterranean are not included—nor Kerkyra? They had not been directly involved in the danger from Persia, and were already beginning to lead a life apart.)<sup>1</sup> That is to say, for the

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch says *πάντας Ἑλληνας τοὺς ὅπῃ ποτὲ κατοικοῦντας Εὐρώπης η τῆς Ασίας*. Cobet, *Mnem.* i, 1873, 114, observed as well that it is highly improbable that one group of delegates were directed to go first to Boeotia and Phokis, then across to the Peloponnese and throughout the peninsula, and then return to Lokris, Akarnania, and Amprakia (and it would be no great compliment to treat the Peloponnese as a sort of appendage to central Greece); and conjectured that the Achaians, friendly to Athens (115. 1), were the only Peloponnesian state visited and intended to be visited. He went on to infer that only friends and allies of Athens were included in the invitation, Boeotia and Phokis being at the time (between 457 and 447) subject to or allied with her. It is possible; but we may note that the Thessalians, and with them the Phthiotid Achaians and

purposes of a Panhellenic Congress, the states of the Delian League are treated as though they were as independent as any state outside it; Athens could not speak for them. This is significant, and explains much in the history of the League.

The date of the proposed congress is quite uncertain, but 448 is probable, after the Peace of Kallias and immediately before the beginning of the building of the Parthenon (Busolt, iii. 446; *C.A.H.* v. 93-4; Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* lii, 1932, 216, n. 47)—though I do not agree altogether with his view of the circumstances.

(10) At some time before the Thirty Years' Peace Athens had got control of Troizen (115. 1). There were also *ξυνθήκαι* with Hermione, c. 450 (Oliver, *Hesp.* ii, 1933, 494-7; who is too positive about the date).

(11) The foundations of the colonies at Thourioi and Amphipolis. The former Thucydides mentions several times in vi-viii, with the implication that it was well enough known to need no description; the foundation and important situation of the latter (which was of course well known to him) he expressly describes, iv. 102, 108. 1. For the dates, see below, pp. 391, 396.

(12) Phormion's expedition to Akarnania, mentioned elsewhere by Thucydides, ii. 68. 7-8, and known to us only from him. It may have taken place before the Samian war in 440 B.C. (in which Phormion took part), or in the years between the end of that war and 435; possibly early in 432, in which case it falls outside the Pentekontaëtia proper, though not outside *ταῦτα ξύμπαντα* of 118. 2 (see above, p. 359).

(13) The diplomatic support given by Corinth to Athens during the Samian war (40. 5, 41. 2, 43. 1).

(14) Events in the Pontos region: Perikles led an important expedition there, and colonists from Athens were settled at Sinope and Amisos (which was renamed Peiraeus), Plut. *Per.* 20. 1-2; *Luc.* 19. 7; Theopompos, F. 389 (ap. Strab. xii. 3. 14, p. 547).<sup>1</sup> It was probably then, too, that the commercial alliance between the Malians may not have been very friendly after Tanagra (107. 7), that Amprakia was never associated with Athens, and that a Panhellenic Conference of this nature would be of little value without the Peloponnesian League. We should also presumably have to abandon the view that opposition from Sparta wrecked the project. Perhaps, after the Spartans had signified their hostility, an attempt was yet made to get a conference of delegates from the rest of Greece, and this failed, because of intrigue or because without the Peloponnesian it was thought to be useless?

Keulen, *Mnem.* xviii, 1920, 239-47, thinks that invitations were sent only to states which had fought against Persia (before 490 presumably, as well as after).

<sup>1</sup> There is a small fragment of an Athenian casualty list, *I.G.* i. 2 944, which includes a death at Sinope. For the coins of Sinope and Amisos, see Gardner, *J.H.S.* xxxiii, 1913, 169-70; Head, *Hist. Num.* 2, 496, 507-8. Amisos was still called Peiraeus in the 4th cent.

kings of the Kimmerian Bosporos (the Crimea and neighbouring regions) and Athens was concluded, which was destined to last for over a century; Spartokos, the first king of the new dynasty, came to the throne probably in 438-437 (Diod. xii. 31. 1). Nymphaion, a harbour to the south of Pantikapaion (Strabo, vii. 4. 4, p. 309), seems to have been given to Athens as a commercial base; it was included among the members of the Delian League in an assessment of tribute, perhaps that of 410 B.C. (*A.T.L.*, pp. 203, 527-8), though it never appears in a quota-list: Aischines, iii. 171; Krateros, fr. 12. In the assessment of 425 at least twenty-six cities formed a new panel, *πόλεις ἐκ τοῦ Εὐξείνου*, and some of these were certainly from the northern shore; Nymphaion was doubtless one, though its name has been wrongly restored there.<sup>1</sup>

Astakos, on the Propontis, near the later Nikomedea, an old Megarian colony, which had been subdued by its barbarian neighbours, at some time received Athenian colonists: Strabo, xii. 4. 2, p. 563; Memnon of Herakleia, *F.H.G.* iii. 536 (from Nymphis, the historian of the third century B.C.; see Toepffer, *Herm.* xxxi, 1896, 124-36). It had been in the League, but does not appear in the quota-lists after 444-443; it probably ceased to pay when conquered by its neighbours, and also as a colony, like Hestiaia and Amphipolis, would not pay (cf. above, p. 277). Diodoros, xii. 34. 5, relates that in 435-434 the Athenians colonized *πόλιν ἐν τῇ Προποντίδι τὴν δονομαζομένην Λέτανον*. *Ἄστακόν* was conjectured by Niese for *Λέτανον*; this has been generally accepted,<sup>2</sup> and the settlement has been brought into connexion with the Pontos expedition; which may therefore belong to the year 435-434, if Diodoros' date for the Athenian colony in the Propontis can be trusted, that is, three years after Spartokos, again according to Diodoros, came to the throne (which would suit as the date for the commercial treaty well enough), and the year of the battle of Leukimme, 12-18 months before the Athenian alliance with Kerkyra.<sup>3</sup> For coins of Astakos, see Gardner, *J.H.S.* xxxiii, 1913, 171.

<sup>1</sup> *A.T.L.* 528; *Ath. Ass.* 28, 87. Busolt, iii. 587, n. 1, is to be corrected on this point, as also in his statement that the Megarian colonies in the Pontos, especially Herakleia, avoided inclusion in the League; Herakleia happens to be one of two names read with certainty in the Euxine panel of A 9 (see *A.T.L.*).

<sup>2</sup> *Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1886, 755. See Busolt, iii. 586, n. 4; Nesselhauf, p. 55, n. 1; *A.T.L.* 472. The conjecture is not recorded by Vogel in the Teubner edition of Diodoros (1890).

<sup>3</sup> It should, however, be observed that the Pontos expedition perhaps breaks the terms of the Peace of Kallias; and that this in itself suggests an earlier date than 449 (see, however, above, p. 332, n. 2). The arguments in favour of the later date, after the Samian war, are (1) the date of Spartokos' accession: this is of course not decisive, for the commercial treaty may have had no connexion with the expedition; and (2) that Plutarch says Lamachos took part in it, with a high enough rank to be left to settle the colonists at Sinope. Plutarch

(15) The first measures against Megara, if these were taken before 435 (42. 2, 67. 4, 139. 1 nn.).

(16) The friendship with the Messapian prince Artas (vii. 33. 4) may have begun about this time, perhaps in connexion with Thourioi. See Busolt, iii. 760. 4.

From this list the gaps in Thucydides' summary, however brief it was intended to be, are obvious. He might have thought (1), (4), and (5) irrelevant to his theme, (2), (3), (8), and (16) not important enough to mention; (12) and (15) may be after Sybota; and the Hellenic Congress he might have omitted on the ground that nothing came of it, significant as the attempt was of Athenian ambitions and Peloponnesian reactions to them. But even the briefest summary, had he finished it, must have contained notes on (5), (7), (10), (11), (13), and (14)—(7), (10), (11), (13), and (14) for their intrinsic importance, (5) and (11) because of their relevance to *τὰ Κερκυραϊκά*. Even if we assume, as some have done, that Thucydides intended to end his summary with the Samian war, and so exclude Amphipolis, and perhaps the expeditions to Pontos and to Akarnania—and this is inconsistent with 118. 1-2 *init.*—we are left without the Treaty of Kallias and the foundation of Thourioi; even if we regard the treaty as spurious, we are left without Thourioi. The omission of that is inexplicable, except on the assumption that Thucydides had only written down some notes on the period, suggested to him in the first place by Hellanikos' chronological mistakes, that he intended to make it later a full summary, and never carried out his intention;<sup>1</sup> for Thourioi was not only an important event in itself, but strictly relevant to the policy of Athens towards the Corinth-Kerkyra dispute, when she was thinking of the route to Italy and Sicily (44. 3).<sup>2</sup> This assumption must be adopted, and explains satisfactorily enough as well the omission of the other events, including those between 439 and 435; and from it we must draw another and important conclusion: we know that Thucydides was not ignorant of some of the events that he omits—(5), (6), (8), (11), and (12) above—just as he was not ignorant of some of the dates,

obviously thinks of this Lamachos as the famous general of the Peloponnesian war; and he apparently was still comparatively young in 426-425 (Arist. *Ach.* 600-1). See Busolt, iii. 585; and for a much earlier date (455-451, i.e. before the Peace of Kallias), Weizsäcker, pp. 85 ff. (below, p. 378).

<sup>1</sup> See Harrison, quoted above, p. 363, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Even on the theory that this and other references to Italy and Sicily are late, and only inserted by Thucydides after the Sicilian expedition of 415-413 had shown the relevance of Athenian ambitions in the west to the Peloponnesian war, the above argument holds good: for this theory would imply that cc. 98-118. 2 *init.* are, owing to the omission of Thourioi, an early draft, never brought up to date.

and we must refrain, therefore, from arguing from an omission either that he was ignorant or careless or stupid, or that the event did not take place, e.g. that the Treaty of Kallias is spurious.<sup>1</sup>

### B. The Organization of the League

Although Thucydides promises to say how Athens strengthened her empire and how she managed its affairs, he tells us nothing of this important subject in the *Pentekontaëtia*.

(a) *The Tribute.* He does not, for example, mention the transference of the treasury from Delos to Athens in 454 and the consequent institution of the quota of  $\frac{1}{60}$ , *μνᾶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ταλάντου*, of every state's *φόρος*, dedicated yearly to the treasury of Athena at Athens: a measure which more clearly than any other marked the change from the simple leadership, *ἡγεμονία*, to the rule, *ἀρχή*, of Athens over the members of the League.<sup>2</sup> Yet it goes without saying that

<sup>1</sup> The elusive battle of Oinoe (Paus. i. 15. 1; x. 10. 4) is also to be regarded simply as an event about which we can say nothing but that it may well have taken place during the *Pentekontaëtia*, Thucydides' silence not being decisive. Herzog, *Philol.* lxxi, 1912, 1-23, has an ingenious argument, based on his own readings of a late 4th-cent. Argive inscription published by Vollgraff, *B.C.H.* xxxii, 1908, 236-58, that the battle was one in which the Argives, with Athenian help (so Pausanias), by the intervention of Apollo (the inscription), defeated Pleistarchos, king of Sparta (Leonidas' son), in the Argolid. Pausanias says nothing of the king; but it is a curious coincidence that he has just mentioned a trophy of an Athenian victory over the Macedonian Pleistarchos, brother of Kassandros. (Vollgraff, owing to the date of the inscription, had naturally supposed the Pleistarchos mentioned in it to be the latter.) Pausanias writes as though the battle were well known.

Busolt, iii. 323. 3, in general follows C. Robert, who dated it soon after the Athenian-Argive alliance; so Kolbe, *Hermes*, lxxii, 1937, 254-63, in close connexion with the Argive defeat of Mykenai (below, pp. 408-9). This is a possible date (and can be combined with Herzog's view; for King Pleistarchos died in 458); it does not, however, help to say, with Kolbe, that though this was the first open clash between Athenian and Spartan troops and was, therefore, celebrated by the painting in the Stoa Poikile, and was also a first step in the recovery of Argos and therefore celebrated by an expensive dedication at Delphi, Thucydides omits to mention it because it did not have decisive results. The rift between Athens and Sparta, the friendship between Athens and Argos, and any consequent decrease in Spartan power and increase in Argive, were very relevant to his theme, at least as relevant as the Helot revolt.

<sup>2</sup> It is often stated that the transference was suggested by the Samians; but there is no evidence of this. Plutarch says, on the authority of Theophrastos (a poor authority, to judge by Plutarch's quotations: cf. Introd., pp. 59, 71), that on one occasion when the Samians proposed the transference, Aristeides remarked that it was an advantageous, but dishonest proposal (*Arist.* 25. 3). This is a repetition of the anecdote about Aristeides and Themistokles' proposal to burn the Greek fleet (22. 3), except that Theophrastos told it to discredit Aristeides; Plutarch does not say that the proposal was carried out, and he could not have thought Aristeides responsible for the policy of 454 B.C. In the *Perikles*, 12. 1, no mention is made of any proposer, though Perikles is naturally suggested

he recognized this change as the most important political happening in Greece after the Persian wars (98. 4-99, the Mytilenean speech in bk. iii, &c.). He mentions the secession first of Naxos, then of Thasos, and their reduction to a tribute-paying status, and has a general reference to a similar change in the status of other members (98. 4); but he does not say how many members originally contributed ships, how many tribute, nor how the change affected the total of the tribute, and to this day we cannot solve this problem (above, 96. 2 n.); nor even that, at least by 454, Samos, Chios, and the five cities of Lesbos, were the only non-tribute-paying members left, though often enough elsewhere he assumes in his readers a knowledge that after the Samian war only Lesbos and Chios still contributed ships. Nor does he mention any changes in the tribute paid from year to year, either in the total, or for individual states; nor the entry of new states and the lapse of old ones; nor that between 454 and 434 there was every four years a reassessment.<sup>1</sup> In this, however, he may be thought to be consistent with his method in the rest of his work; for he also omits the important reassessment of 425 B.C. by which Athens hoped to double or treble the amount of tribute received (see iv. 51 n.). In 443-442, perhaps already in 446-445, the quota-list was divided into five geographical sections, Ionia, Hellespont, Thrace, Karia, and the Islands; and this division remained constant, except for the combination of the Karian and Ionian sections into one (called Ionian) certainly by 433-432, perhaps earlier.<sup>2</sup> We must not, however, exaggerate the importance

as the *Athenian* responsible. No other authority mentions the Samians' initiative, though it is not at all unlikely in itself. See Dundas, *C.R.* xlvi, 1933, 62.

<sup>1</sup> According to Wade-Gery, *B.S.A.* xxxiii. 101-13; Meritt, *D.A.T.* 61-9, and *A.T.L.*, there was no payment at all in 449-448 (after the Peace of Kallias). If this is true, Thucydides' silence is again to be noted; but I do not believe that it is true (*C.R.* liv, 1940, 65-7). We must wait for vol. ii of *A.T.L.* for the authors' final views on this important matter. (The new fragment of *A.T.L.* D 7, which may be late in 449-448 or 448-447—see below, p. 382—makes new arrangements for the collection and transport of the tribute, but does not say that the collection is to be resumed after an interval.) See Addenda.

<sup>2</sup> On the basis of a fragment of Krateros referring to the *Kariakos φόρος*, which they believe to be from the assessment of 454, the authors of *A.T.L.*, pp. 203-4, believe in the existence of the five districts already in that year, though the quota-lists of the first two periods show little or no geographical arrangement. Then, because there is no sign of a Karian district in the Kos monetary decree of c. 448 (below, p. 383, n. 3), nor, we may add, in the Panhellenic Congress decree (above, p. 366), nor in *A.T.L.* D 7, ll. 26-8 (below, p. 382), it apparently disappeared in the second period, to reappear in the third (446 B.C.), and disappear finally in 438 or 434. This seems unnecessarily complicated; and though there is nothing as such improbable in the absence of geographical order in the quota-lists combined with the division into districts for the collection of tribute, the evidence from Krateros seems to me remarkably thin. But we are promised a full discussion of Krateros' fragments in vol. ii of *A.T.L.*

of this change. Its purpose was mainly simplicity and order in the record; the sections were not provinces of an empire—there were no Athenian officers in control of the sections as ‘governors of provinces’, and every state-member remained in the same direct and separate relationship with Athens.<sup>1</sup>

Thucydides does not say either to what immediate use the 460 talents of the tribute were put, that is to say, how far it covered the cost of the armed forces of the League in any one year or over a series of years. This again is in accordance with his general silence on the details of the finance of the war (see on ii. 13. 3-5). By saying that the Hellenotamiae were from the first an Athenian magistracy (96. 2), he points out that Athens controlled the income of the League.

For other details of the collection of tribute, *συντέλεια, ἀπόταξις, ἐπιφορά, &c.*, see Tod, no. 30, nn., and *A.T.L.* 449-57 (and for *πόλεις αὐται ταξάμεναι* my note in *C.R.* liv, 1940, 67-9). Thucydides mentions in the course of the war one or two expeditions, under the command of strategoi, for the collection of arrears of tribute or fresh tributes: ii. 69, iii. 19, iv. 50. 1, 75. 1. (In the last two cases, Thucydides’ words imply that such expeditions were regular, every year: doubtless to act as armed escort for the tribute as well as to ensure its prompt payment.)

(b) *Land-troops.* Thucydides tells us that at Tanagra the allies of Athens in general, besides Argos and Thessaly, sent troops (107. 5, 7: at a time when some part of the Athenian hoplite force was engaged elsewhere; see n. ad loc.). These should be the members of the League; and it is the first occasion on which we hear of them contributing land-forces. Later, it became normal, ii. 9. 5; but when and by what means it did so, we are not told.

As far as we know, the cities did not, as such, supply crews for the fleet (except, of course, those who contributed ships). The crews were recruited from Athenians of the thetic class, duly enrolled, and volunteers, as in the fourth century. Naturally most of these volunteers came from states who were members of the League, partly no doubt for political reasons, but mainly because the League comprised almost all the maritime states. Doubtless also pressure was used by Athens in the recruiting when necessary; but there is no evidence for any arrangement by which a city must supply its quota of the crews. And it was possible enough in peace-time for individuals to join the fleet of a potential enemy (above, 35. 4).

(c) *The League Council.* Thucydides mentions its first establish-

<sup>1</sup> The only officers connected with the districts were the *τάκται*, two for each, elected by the ekklisia, at each reassessment and for one purpose only, to propose the individual tributes.

ment at Delos, but not its constitution and procedure, nor when it ceased to be effective and, finally, to meet at all. This last we only know from the silence of all authorities; the constitution we can infer from that of similar leagues: equal votes for each member, great and small—that just and unavoidable principle, which yet leads to breakdown when the difference in power between the strongest and the weakest members is too great.

(d) *Cleruchies.*<sup>1</sup> The excursus tells us nothing of this important element in Athenian control of the League—the planting of cleruchies within the territory of member-states—except that at Hestiaia which was part of the settlement after the conquest of Euboea (114. 3). That in Skyros displaced a Dolopian tribe, not a member of the League (98. 2). In the course of his history Thucydides relates several settlements, all of them acts of war, as in Aigina (ii. 27. 1), Poteidaia (ii. 70. 4), Mytilene (iii. 50. 2), and Skione, where Plataians were settled (v. 32. 1); and he mentions the colonists in Lemnos and Imbros more than once (iii. 5. 1, iv. 28. 4, v. 8. 2, vii. 57. 2; cf. i. 115. 3, viii. 102. 2).

The cleruchies of which we hear from other sources, mostly Plutarch and Diodoros, seem all to belong to the period c. 455 to 440 (or perhaps 445, before the Thirty Years’ Peace), and by Plutarch are definitely associated with the policy of Perikles, with the two-fold object of relieving the poor of Athens and guarding the League against subversive movements; to which we may add, supplying a garrison in some places to aid against external attacks (as in the Chersonese, *Plut. Per.* 19. 1-2: see below, p. 379, n. 1). These cleruchies were to the Chersonese, led by Perikles himself, to Euboea under Tolmides (before 447: see above, pp. 340, 344), to Naxos and Andros (*Plut. Per.* 11. 6; *Diod.* xi. 88. 3; *Andok.* iii. 9;<sup>2</sup> *Paus.* i. 27. 5; perhaps also *I.G. i. 2* 375)<sup>3</sup>; to Brea in Thrace, *I.G. i. 2* 45 (= Tod, 44), probably identical with that to the territory of the Bisaltai mentioned by Plutarch (*Busolt*, iii. 417; *Nesselhauf*, 130-1, who notes also Theopompos’ reference to the place, F. 145). Another inscription perhaps concerns a colony to Eretria (see above, 114. 3 n., p. 344 n. 1), which may be identical with that led by Tolmides. The Brea inscription tells us most about the organization of these settlements, including the regulation (added by a rider to the decree) that the settlers should be drawn only from the zeugitai and thetes. Nothing is known of the history of this colony, though, presumably because the decree was included in Krateros’ *Ψηφιωμάτων Συναγωγή* (Introd., p. 44), it is mentioned by later lexicographers, and a

<sup>1</sup> See *Nesselhauf*, 120-40, for a full account.

<sup>2</sup> At the end of that passage, 3-9, which is full of gross errors, and which was used again apparently by Aischines, ii. 172-6.

<sup>3</sup> See Hiller, ad loc.; Glotz, *Hist. gr.* ii. 201.

reference to it by Kratinos is quoted (fr. 395; from Hesychios, where, however, Krateros has been suggested for Kratinos). It may have been early destroyed by Thracians (so Tod); or it may have been absorbed in the later colony at Amphipolis (Cavaignac, *Histoire*, ii. 97. 4; Nesselhauf, p. 133).<sup>1</sup>

It seems probable that in most, if not in all cases, where settlements were made on the territory of member-states, the tribute of those states was lowered. Andros is the clearest instance: it paid 12 talents in 450, thereafter 6 (its payments in 9 different years between 449 and 428 are certain). The 'Cherronesitai' paid 18 talents from 453 to 449 (the payment of 13 tal. 4,840 dr. in 449 is presumably only part-payment), thereafter (from 442: the intervening figures are lost) only 1 tal.; but this case is more complicated, for a *συντέλεια* was broken up by *ἀπόταξις* into smaller states, of which the Cherronesitai were one; others were Elaiousioi (from 447 or 446:  $\frac{1}{2}$  tal.), Limnaioi (from 447 or 446: first 2,000, then 500 dr.), Madytioi (from 442: first 500, then 2,000 dr.); perhaps Sestioi (from 445: 500 and 1,000 dr.).<sup>2</sup> It is clear, however, that the total tribute for the original area of the Cherronesitai was much reduced. For Naxos we have no certain figures before 448 (or 447), from which year it regularly paid  $6\frac{2}{3}$  tal., though it may have paid the same in 449; but it has been plausibly conjectured that a state of its size and importance must have paid at least as much as Andros, and that, therefore, the

<sup>1</sup> From the lettering of the inscription the probable date of the colony is c. 446; but we cannot more precisely date it to the autumn of 446 because of the special provision in the decree for soldiers still abroad, as Nesselhauf argues, after Busolt, who think the soldiers were those on the Euboean campaign. There were too many campaigns just about this time for us to decide on one, apart from the possibility that the soldiers may be *φρουροί* in cities of the empire, or have been engaged on some small expedition after 446, within the empire, of which we hear nothing. The quotation from Kratinos may very well be from his *Θράτται*, as is now generally supposed; and the *Θράτται* was produced very likely soon after the ostracism of Thoukydides in 443: see fr. 71 (*Plut. Per.* 13. 10), if the Odeion was then complete, and fr. 73, which looks like a reference to the gift of corn by Psammetichos of Egypt in 445-444 (*Philoch.*, fr. 90)—Kratinos congratulating himself on the good results of his comedies, like Aristophanes, *Ach.* 633 ff. But we cannot be more precise than that. (Geissler, *Chronologie d. altattischen Komödie*, 21-2, puts the *Thrattai* many years later, because it mentioned Euathlos, fr. 75, who was still young in 425—*Ar. Ach.* 710—and who was also attacked by Platon in his *Peisandros*; and he is followed by Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* lii, 1932, 206. 5. But Euathlos' career as a *ποντρός συκοφάντης* may well have lasted from 445 to 410, and he would, compared with the son of Melesias, have still been a youngish man in 425; he is, of course, mentioned because his name fits the metaphor rather than for his youth. The reference to the ostracism of 443 is more compelling evidence of date—*ἐπειδὴ τοῖσταρακον παροίχεται*. Indeed there would be more point in *Ach.* 710 if Euathlos had unsuccessfully attacked Thoukydides before 443. See Meineke, i. 180-1, who thinks the *Peisandros* contemporary with the *Wasps*.)

<sup>2</sup> For all these figures, see *A.T.L.* For Sestos, see also above, p. 277.

cleruchy is earlier than 447 (at the latest). Diodoros' date for it is 453-452, and there is little against this; but not much to be gained from it either, for he puts the Chersonese cleruchy in the same year, and there was no reduction of tribute till 448 or 447.

Busolt, iii. 415, has argued for a further settlement of Athenians in Lemnos and Imbros on similar grounds.<sup>1</sup> The Lemnioi paid 9 tal. tribute in 451; some time later they were divided into their two original communities, Hephaisties and Myrinaioi,<sup>2</sup> the former in 446 paying 2 tal. 800 dr. and from 443 to 434 3 tal., the latter from 443 to 440 1½ tal.; that is, the tribute from the whole island was halved. But obviously this reduction may have been due to other causes than a new cleruchy, especially as the cities had been settled from Athens itself only two generations earlier and were doubtless more than willing members of the League.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the earlier Athenian settlement—a 'gift' from Miltiades—see Herodotus vi. 136, 140. A nearer date than between 510 and 495 is hardly yet to be obtained, though Berwe, *Miltiades* (*Hermes: Einzelschr.* 2, 1937), 49-50, has recently tried to fix 510-505.

<sup>2</sup> There is an entry *— τις* in the quota-list of 452, the year before the payment of the Lemnioi as a whole, and the restoration [*Ἐφασο]*τις has been accepted by Meritt and West, Nesselhauf, and in *A.T.L.* The restoration seems to fit the space; but if it is correct, it is unexplained. There is no other entry *Ἄγρινοι* than that of 451.

<sup>3</sup> Nesselhauf, 127, n. 3. Berwe, *Miltiades*, 51-3, argues that it is wrong to think of Lemnos and Imbros as *klerouchiae* in the strict sense—they were *ἀποικiae*; that is, they formed new and independent states, like all other early *ἀποικiae*; that is why they pay tribute to the Hellenotamiae—they were state-members of the League. In this they were unlike the Hestiaeis (see above, pp. 345-7) and the Athenian Aiginetai (settled in Aigina in 431), who were never members; i.e. they were *klerouchoi* proper, retaining their Athenian citizenship. But Thucydides, vii. 57. 2, in his *Catalogue* of the forces at Syracuse, groups all these four communities together; and though this grouping clearly does not prove complete identity of status, they cannot have been very different. Furthermore, Amphipolis seems clearly to have been a separate *πόλις*; and it, too, paid no tribute to the League. There was in fact little juristic strictness or consistency in these matters, and political expediency was the determining factor, as has recently been pointed out by Ehrenberg, *Eunomia*, i, 1939, 1-21. (This periodical, which was to be published at Prague, did not, I believe, appear; there is a copy of Ehrenberg's article in the Hellenic Society's Library. See *J.H.S.* lix, 1939, 294-5.)

Berve notes that Thucydides calls the Hestiaeis *ἀποικοτ*, not *κληροῦχοι*, and thinks this is significant. But the word was often loosely used, for example in the Brea inscription, *ad fin.*; and compare the change that has occurred in our own word *colony*, which in its technical sense when applied to modern empires, and especially to our own, means, very often, just those territories within the empire that have not been colonized. Not much weight can be given either to Thucydides' practice of calling these communities, not *Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν Αἰγαίῳ*, &c., but *Αἰγαῖοι*. He calls the Samian refugees in Anaea *Αἰγαῖοι* (iii. 19. 2), who clearly did not regard themselves as a new and independent state.

For further details of cleruchies see *I.G.* ii.<sup>2</sup> 30, with Luria's recent interpretations (*S.E.G.* iii, no. 73).

In close connexion with the policy of cleruchies Athens founded her ἀποκτία at Thourioi and Amphipolis, which have already been mentioned. It is noteworthy that Athens, as far as we know, never settled any of her citizens on the Asia Minor coast, not for example at Erythrai nor Kolophon, where there were movements against the League, nor near Anaia to keep the fugitive Samians (iii. 19. 2, 32. 2) in check. As has been suggested, this may have been due to agreement with Persia, one of the terms of the Peace of Kallias.<sup>1</sup>

*Note on the dates of the cleruchies*

The date 449-447 for the Chersonese and other cleruchies, based on the quota-lists as first suggested by Kirchhoff, has been accepted by most historians (Busolt, Meyer, Beloch, C.A.H., Glotz; Nesselhauf, Meritt, Wade-Gery); but it has recently been challenged by Weizsäcker (pp. 85-107), who argues that Plutarch supports Diodorus' date, and denies, therefore, all connexion between cleruchy and reduction of tribute. As his analysis of Plutarch's *Perikles* is in general so well done, it is necessary to discuss his argument.<sup>2</sup>

Diodorus gives the following events (in Greece proper) to the year 453-452 (xi. 88): Perikles' expedition to the Corinthian Gulf (Thuc. i. 111. 2-3); μετὰ ταῦτα, his expedition to the Chersonese at the head of 1,000 cleruchs; ἄμα δὲ τούτους πραττούέντως Tolmides, 'the other strategos', led 1,000 cleruchs to Euboea and Naxos.<sup>3</sup> It is generally recognized that owing to Diodorus' habit of grouping events (here, Perikles' campaigns), the phrase μετὰ ταῦτα is not compelling for the year, indeed may actually betray a later one; all we can say is that, on Diodorus' authority here, the Chersonese cleruchy was later than the expedition to the Corinthian Gulf, and contemporary with the Euboea and Naxos cleruchies; and that as these were led by Tolmides they must be earlier than the battle of Koroneia (aut. 447). Unfortunately the problem is not even as simple as that; for Diodorus also puts the expedition to the Corinthian Gulf in 455-454 (xi. 85), 'while Tolmides was in Boeotia'. (Tolmides' famous periplus of the Peloponnese, ending with the capture of Naupaktos, has just been related, c. 84, 456-455 B.C.). All agree that the duplication is due to Diodorus' himself, probably because he was following two different authorities, a historian who liked to narrate events κατὰ γένος (i.e. Ephoros) and a chronicle, an *Atthis*, which narrated events year by year; and on this basis Weizsäcker argues that either

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 344, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See also Nesselhauf's able discussion, pp. 120-6.

<sup>3</sup> There is a lacuna in the text, and we cannot be absolutely sure of the connexion of Tolmides with the Naxos cleruchy; but it is always assumed. Cf. above, p. 344, n. 1.

(1) the *Atthis* gave 455-454 for Perikles' expedition, and Diodorus repeated it in 453-452 because in his historian he found it told in relation to the Chersonese expedition, which was dated (in the *Atthis*) to 453-452; or (2) the historian had told it in relation to Tolmides (Perikles and Tolmides rivals for fame, like Tolmides and Myronides—Diod. xi. 84. 2—Themistokles and Miltiades), so Diodorus put it in 455-454 immediately after Tolmides' expedition round the Peloponnese, and then repeated it for 453-452 because he found it there, correctly, with the Chersonese expedition, in the *Atthis*. 'In either case 453-452 is the date for the Chersonese expedition according to the *Atthis*, although we must allow for a margin of error of a year or two either way, owing to the inexactness of ancient chronology.'<sup>1</sup> Alas, this is a naïve view of the possibility of error in Diodorus. He has many correct dates, but what was his authority for putting Leukimme in 438-437 and Sybota in 436-435? Here we need only suppose that his authority (ultimately an *Atthis*) gave 453-452 for Perikles' expedition to the Corinthian Gulf (perhaps correctly), and that Diodorus tacked on to it the Chersonese cleruchy because it was also led by Perikles, and the Euboea and Naxos cleruchies on to that because they were also cleruchies or because Tolmides must be Perikles' rival (just the sort of thing we have to assume elsewhere), and the value of his evidence diminishes almost to nothing. μετὰ ταῦτα of itself suggests that he had no independent date for the cleruchies.<sup>2</sup>

The evidence of Plutarch is not more decisive. The central point of the *Perikles*, as has been said (Introd., p. 66), is the change that took place in Perikles' political methods after the ostracism of Thouskydides; hitherto he had been the demagogue, letting the people have its head, in order to outrival first the popularity of Kimon (10. 1-4), then the manœuvres of Thouskydides (11); afterwards he drew the reins tight and kept everything in his own hands (15. 1-2). We have three clearly marked periods of time (Kimon-Perikles, Thouskydides-Perikles, Perikles alone); and the cleruchies are placed in the second: Kimon dies (10 fin.), and the aristocrats appoint as their leader Thouskydides, who, by his clever tactics, practically produces a deadlock—the parties are equal (11. 1-4), whereas Perikles had got the better of the popular Kimon (9. 5); διὸ καὶ τότε μάλιστα τῷ δῆμῳ τὰς ἡγεῖς Perikles devises magnificent festivals, naval service, cleruchies—1,000 settlers to the Chersonese, others to Naxos, to Andros, to Thrace, and the colony to

<sup>1</sup> This inexactness is greatly exaggerated; if the *Atthis* said ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Αυσηκράτους for the cleruchy, it meant it. Compare, e.g., its dating of the Samian war (below, p. 390).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also his dating of New-Sybaris and Thourioi, xii. 9-10 (Busolt, iii. 523. 3), if it is necessary to give examples of his method.

Thourioi—and the great temple-buildings. Plutarch nowhere dates anything more clearly than these—between the death of Kimon and the ostracism of Thouskydides.<sup>1</sup>

After, however, stating how Perikles got everything into his own hands by the elimination of Thouskydides, Plutarch has a long passage, 15-22 *init.*, which is a description of Perikles at the height of his power—"acme-eidology" (above, p. 67): his eloquence, his incorruptible character (as a principal cause of his influence), his lofty ideas as shown by the plan for the Panhellenic Congress, his caution as a general, his most famous campaigns as a general—to the Chersonese when he settled the 1,000 cleruchs (19. 1), to the Corinthian Gulf, to the Pontos—his concentration on the approaching struggle with the Peloponnese (hence his Delphian campaign). Then follows a narrative passage describing the first contest with the Peloponnesians that ended in the Thirty Years' Peace (22. 1 to 24. 1), the Samian war, and so forth. It is obvious that in this "acme-eidology" the chronological sequence is ignored, that Perikles' acme does not begin only in 443 or 442 with the ostracism of Thouskydides; for not only do the certain dates of some of the events mentioned in this passage (15-22. 1) and the probable dates of the rest (except perhaps the Pontos expedition: see above, p. 367) all fall before 443, indeed before 447, but so also do the events in the next narrative section (22-24. 1); while the Samian war, which gave Perikles his most celebrated strategia during his years of sole eminence, is not here included. Which are we to assume? That in cc. 15-21 Plutarch is ignoring chronology, as so often in his eidological passages, that the events here mentioned are in effect timeless except in so far as some of them at least are by implication earlier than the revolt of Euboea (21-22. 1)—as timeless as Perikles' eloquence (15) or his domestic economy (16)—or that he was so unconscious of chronology, so unaware of any difficulty, that he did in fact think that all these events (17-24. 1, the Panhellenic Congress to the Thirty Years' Peace) were subsequent to the ostracism of Thousky-

<sup>1</sup> Weizsäcker, pp. 12-14, 36, objects that the temples and statues were by no means finished when Thouskydides was ostracized, and that therefore we must not restrict ourselves to the years 448-443 for the events here related by Plutarch: some of them, as the dedications of the temples, were later, some, as the cleruchies, may have been earlier. But the great debates about the buildings, if they took place at all, must have taken place just when Plutarch implies that they did, when the plans were discussed and when the work was going on and the money being spent—Perikles' enemies did not wait till all was finished.

It may be assumed as well, if we wish (Beloch, Busolt, Weizsäcker), that Thouskydides had been a prominent opponent of Perikles before Kimon's death (during the latter's ostracism if he did not return till 451: see above, pp. 326-7), and that therefore some of Plutarch's narrative in c. 11 (though it is picture rather than narrative) will belong to c. 456-451. This, however, is to desert the authority of Plutarch; it does not help any argument based on his evidence.

dides? It is difficult to believe the latter; and there is the hint given in 16. 3 (*τεσσαράκοντα μὲν ἔτη πρωτεύων ἐν Ἐφίλταις καὶ Λεωκράταις, κ.τ.λ.*) that he is carrying us back through the whole of Perikles' career; besides it would mean that Plutarch believed in two settlements of 1,000 cleruchs in the Chersonese.<sup>1</sup> If we must believe it, then Plutarch's authority is *nil*; if the former is correct, then he does not, in 19. 1, date the Chersonese expedition at all.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> At the same time it must be pointed out (as by Weizsäcker and others) that he does relate the events of 446-445 (22-24. 1) as though Perikles were in sole authority, Thouskydides already eliminated; and that the two mentions of the Chersonese cleruchy are quite unrelated to one another: in 11. 6 it is one of many demagogic measures, to rid the city of idle and mischievous persons, to relieve the distress of the poor, and to overawe the allies; in 19. 1 it has a sound military object, to protect and strengthen the inhabitants against Thracian raids, and it was especially popular with the allied cities in the Chersonese.

How carefree Plutarch was in chronological matters can be seen by c. 10. No one would suppose from it alone that some twelve years elapsed between Kimon's ostracism and his death.

I will take this opportunity of correcting Weizsäcker's view (pp. 22-3) that in 16. 3 Plutarch must mean that Perikles' political career lasted 55 years—40 years of rivalry with Ephialtes and others and 15 alone. It is true that with more precision he might have written *τεσσαράκοντα ἔτη ἐννάστευεν δ' ΙΙ., τὰ μὲν εἴκοσι πέντε πρωτεύων . . . μερὰ δὲ τὴν Θ. κατάλυσιν, κ.τ.λ.*; but the sentence as it stands will do. The antithesis of *μέν* and *δέ* can be as well between whole and part as between two parts, and the article in *τῶν πεντεκαλέδεκα ἔτῶν* shows that it is a fraction of the previous number. It is obviously improbable that Plutarch should in such a matter hold a unique opinion instead of the general one (cf. Cic. *de Orat.* iii. 148).

<sup>2</sup> I am here concerned only with Plutarch's *Life* as a finished product, not with his sources or the reasons for his arrangement of his material. Weizsäcker (50 ff.) assumes two different primary sources, one for cc. 10-14, in the manner of Theopompos or the *Ἀθηναῖων Πολυτελία* (see above, pp. 48, 310), mainly concerned with internal politics and covering the period 462-443; the second (17-24. 1) covering 455 to 445, a eulogistic account of Athens' fight for hegemony; and that Plutarch did not notice the overlap in the dates. Then, since the events in cc. 17-24. 1, except Koroneia (18. 3, in pure 'eidological' setting), are given in the same order as in Thucydides (such of them, that is, as are common to both writers), we may assume that Plutarch's order is also chronological; and this supports therefore Diodorus' date 453-452 (or c. 453-452) for the Chersonese cleruchy and its connexion with the expedition to the Corinthian Gulf. One can only say in answer to this that if Plutarch could so misunderstand the implied chronology of his sources, we ought not to trouble ourselves about his dates; secondly, that Plutarch, on this assumption, does not support Diodorus, for he places the Chersonese expedition before that to the Gulf, Diodorus after it; and thirdly, that if Plutarch has one single source for 17-24. 1, it is much more probably an encomium on Perikles than an account of Athenian history, and in such an encomium events need be no more (and no less) in chronological order than in Plutarch. (Compare with this the list of Nikias' early successes, *Nik.* 6. 4-7, which come from Thucydides, but are not in chronological order: above, p. 72.) Weizsäcker himself has to assume that Plutarch took the Congress plan and Koroneia out of the chronological setting of his source: why not other events too? And to keep some sort of harmony with Thucydides' order of events, he has to assume that in 20. 3,

The position then in regard to the dates for these cleruchies is as follows: Diodoros (xi. 88) implies perhaps that those to the Chersonese and to Naxos were not long after Perikles' expedition to the Corinthian Gulf, which was probably 453-452; Plutarch (ii. 5), in a rhetorical passage, implies that they were all between 449 and 443—the one event of those he mentions that can be independently dated, the settlement at Thourioi, being correctly so placed; we infer from the tribute-lists that the cleruchies went to Andros in 450, to the Chersonese between 449 and 447 or 446, to Naxos before 448 or 447. Even if Diodoros' statement had been more definite, his authority is not high; Plutarch may here be following Theopompos, who was, though a foolish, yet a learned man; and there should be some connexion between the lowering of tribute and the cleruchies in these cities. It is clear that the balance of probability (no more) is in favour of the modern inference.

(e) *Athenian Interference in the Allies' internal affairs.* We know from inscriptions that in some cities of the League, at some times during the period 477-431, there were Athenian garrisons, as in Erythrai, Miletos, the Thracian Chersonese, Chalkis, Samos (above, pp. 293-4, 350); and that Athens insisted on a democratic form of government similar to her own, for the establishment of which special commissioners, ἐπίσκοποι or ἐπιμεληταί, were sent out, and for which the φρούραρχοι were, at least for a time, responsible. Aristotle, *Ἄθηνα* 24. 3, gives 700 as the number of Athenian officials regularly serving overseas; unfortunately not only is the number

*Αἰγύπτου πάλιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι*, Plutarch means Kimon's expedition of 449—Perikles opposed it (in vain), πάλιν referring back to the expedition of 460-454. Look at the whole passage: there was also the expedition to distant Sinope in the Pontos led by Perikles; τάλλα δὲ οὐ συνεχάρει ταῖς ὅρμαις τῶν πολιτῶν. . . . *Αἰγύπτου τε πάλιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ κινέν τῆς βασιλέως ἀρχῆς τὰ πρὸς θαλάσσην.* πολλὸς δὲ καὶ Σικελίας ὁ δύτερος ἔκεινος ἥδη καὶ δύσποτμος ἔρως εἰχεν. . . . ἦν δὲ καὶ Τυρρηνία καὶ Καρχηδόνις ἐντούς δύτερος. . . . Άλλ' ὁ Περικλῆς, κ.τ.λ. This last half is certainly out of chronological order (*ἥδη* meaning 'already in Perikles' time, long before Alkibiades'); and there is no need to suppose that with πάλιν Plutarch refers to an expedition which he has not mentioned in this *Life* instead of to that of 449 which he has (io. 5). This is a most carefully written passage: was Plutarch so poor a writer that he just took over πάλιν from his source? He may have misunderstood his source; but that destroys the value of his evidence. (On the other hand, in *Kim.* 18. 1, he has *ώς ἐπ'* *Αἴγυπτου καὶ Κίπρου αὖθις ἐκπραγμεύσ-* *μένος* as the object of Kimon's last campaign of 449, and this *αὖθις* may seem to refer to the Egyptian war of c. 460-454 which has not been mentioned in this *Life* any more than in the *Perikles*. But Plutarch is exceptionally vague over the part played by Egypt in these campaigns of Athens against Persia (see *Them.* 31. 4; *Kim.* 12. 5, 18. 6-7), probably because neither of his heroes was specifically known in the tradition to have been responsible for the war of 460-454 (cf. above, pp. 306-7); and *αὖθις* in *Kim.* 18. 1 may refer back to Eurymedon (cf. 12. 5) and to the Cyprus campaign of 479.)

perhaps corrupt,<sup>1</sup> but the learning in that chapter of the *Constitution* is so overlaid with rhetoric that we cannot rely on any detail in it without other confirmation; and it is quite possible that, even if the statement is correct, it refers to the period of the Peloponnesian war (cf. *I.G. i<sup>2</sup>* 56, a decree in honour of Leonides of Halikarnassos: *Ἀθήνησι μὲν . . . , ἐν δὲ τῇσι ἄλλησι πόλεσι οἵτινες Ἀθηναῖων ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇσι ὑπερορίαι*, which belongs perhaps to 430 B.C.). For at that period Athenian officials abroad, who include *οἱ ἀεὶ στρατηγοῦντες* and other military officers, were naturally numerous: cf. Aristophanes, *Aves*, 1022, 1050; Antiphon, v. 47; Ps.-Xen. i. 18-19 (430 B.C.? 416?). For the Pentekontaëtia there is no certain evidence for universal or systematic garrisoning, nor for the establishment of democracies everywhere (as Walker, for example, argues, *C.A.H.* v. 471-2); and some reason to suppose the contrary. Miletos, for example, in 440 had neither garrison nor Athenian officials (ii. 5. 2), though nine years previously there had been trouble there and Athens had intervened (above, p. 350); and in Samos, though a democracy was presumably established at the end of the war as just before it began (ii. 5. 3), an oligarchy, in fact if not in name, had gained control some time before 412 (viii. 21). Kolophon, on the other hand, had a democracy guaranteed, if not set up, by Athens about the middle of the century (*I.G. i<sup>2</sup>* 15; *S.E.G.* iii. 3), and when this was later overthrown (with Persian help) in 430, it involved secession from the League, for Persians held the city (iii. 34. 1); in 427 the Athenians settled the democrats and loyalists of Kolophon at Notion *κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νόμους* (iii. 34. 4).

The view that not only were democracies established in every city (except in Chios, Lesbos before 427, and Samos before 440), but Athenian magistrates everywhere functioning, has, however, recently been revived, largely on the basis of the Miletos decree of 450 B.C. (above, p. 350). Oliver, p. 188, supposes that the five magistrates mentioned there, as in the decree for Kolophon, were permanent and that such magistrates were appointed in every city; and he supports this by formulae used in certain honorary decrees. Meritt, *D.A.T.* 15, agrees with him. Oliver's restorations of the Miletos decree are highly ingenious, but as uncertain as they are ingenious; and even if we accept them all, his argument here is not established. The five magistrates sent from Athens may have been

<sup>1</sup> ἀρχαὶ δ' ἔνδημοι μὲν εἰς ἐπτακούστους ἀνδρας, ὑπερόριοι δ' εἰς ἑπτακούστους. The second is marked as corrupt, *male repetitus*, by most editors (Kaibel, Wilamowitz, Kenyon, Blass, Thalheim, Sandys, Oppermann; Hude is doubtful; Mathieu-Haussoullier leave it): we should have *τοσαῦται δὲ καὶ αἱ ὑπερόριοι* or the like. This is not certain. Andokides, iii. 7, has *χιλίους καὶ διακοσίους ἵππεας καὶ τοξότας τοσούτους ἔτερους κατεστήσαμεν*; but in 5, *πρῶτον τότε τριακούσους ἵππεας κατεστήσαμεθα, καὶ τοξότας τριακούσους Σκύθας ἐπριάμεθα*. In any case, if one of the two figures in Aristotle is wrong, it may as well be the first as the second.

no less temporary than the five sent to Chalkis in 446-445 (*I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 39<sub>46</sub>)—these are clearly as temporary as those of Chalkis who came to Athens, l. 16), or those sent to conclude the treaty with Perdikkas in 423-422 (i.<sup>2</sup> 71<sub>3</sub>). In the decree in honour of Leonides of Halikarnassos, i.<sup>2</sup> 56, we have ἐπιμέλεσθαι δὲ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖς μὲν τὸν πρυτάνεις καὶ τὴν βουλὴν, ἐν δὲ τῇσι ἄλλῃσι πόλεσι οἵτινες Ἀθηναίων ἄρχοντος ἐν τῇ ὑπερορίᾳ ὅτι ἀν ἔκαστοι δυνατοὶ ὁσιν; and this last clause seems to indicate that there were not permanent magistracies everywhere, but only many Athenian officials in the empire, some of whom at least (including, of course, the strategoi) were not posted to any one city. In i.<sup>2</sup> 59, a decree in honour of a Kolophonian, the strategoi are to take part; similarly in i.<sup>2</sup> 61 and 70<sub>16</sub>, in honour of men from cities not in the empire; cf. also 106<sub>4</sub>. In 108<sub>43</sub>, a decree for the city of Neapolis in Thrace of 410-409 B.C., we have ὅπως ἀν μὴ ἀδικῶνται . . . τούς τε στρατηγοὺς οἱ ἀν ἔκαστοτε ἄρχοντες τυγχάνωσι ἐπιμέλεσθαι αὐτῶν ὃ τι ἀν δέωνται καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς Ἀθηναίων οἱ ἀν ἔκαστοτε ἄρχοσι τῶν συμμάχων, τὴν πόλιν Νεοπολίτας φυλάττοντας καὶ προθύμους ὄντας ποιεῦν ὃ τι ἀν δύνωνται ἀγαθόν. Only in 118<sub>18</sub>, in honour of Oiniades of Skiathos, is the specific magistrate mentioned, ἐπιμέλεσθαι τὴν τε βουλὴν τὴν δὲ βουλεύοντας καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν ἐν Σκιάθῳ ὃς ἀν ἡ ἔκαστοτε. This evidence, taken altogether, is by no means conclusive for a universal magistracy; and further, all of it belongs to the time of the Peloponnesian war, when naturally Athenian officials, mostly φρούραρχοι and their subordinates (cf. the Neapolis decree, above), would be numerous. In the coinage decree of c. 450 B.C. (below, pp. 383-4; Segre, p. 155), which also belongs perhaps to a time of great military activity, there is definite indication that there were many officials abroad, but not systematically in every city; for it orders action by named ἄρχοντες Ἀθηναίων and by other ἄρχοντες where the former do not exist (§§ 3-4).<sup>1</sup>

In *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 66 = *A.T.L.* D 7, however (as restored with two important new fragments),<sup>2</sup> which is to be dated, to judge from the letter forms, between 448 and 446 (Raubitschek, *A.J.P.* lxi, 1940, 477-9), and before the battle of Koroneia in 447 if the Kleinias who moved the decree is the father of Alkibiades, we have τὴν βουλὴν [καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν] τῆσι πόλ[εσι καὶ] τοὺς [ἐπισκόπους ἐπιμέλεσθαι] ὅπ[ως ἀν ἔνδικοι] τούς [ἔποιοι] καὶ τὸν ἔκαστον καὶ ἀπάγγειλαν

<sup>1</sup> In the clause (13), καταθεῖναι δὲ τὸ φήμισμα τόδε τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι . . . ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ τῇ ἔκαστης τῆς πόλεως, the ἄρχοντες must be local magistrates, not Athenian; for the decree continues, ταῦτα δὲ ἐπιτελέσσαι Ἀθηναῖον, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτοὶ βούλωνται (see Tod, 67). In § 3 *init.*, εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν ἄρχοντων probably means local magistrates.

<sup>2</sup> One is given in *A.T.L.*; the other is to be published by Hill and Meritt. I am greatly indebted to Prof. Wade-Gery for letting me see a transcript of this important document before publication.

<sup>1</sup> Αθήναζε. This would suggest that *οἱ ἄρχοντες* were functioning in every city, and would be conclusive for this date if we can be sure that they are Athenian and not local magistrates.<sup>1</sup>

An indication of the growing solidarity of the League is the clause in the treaty with Erythrai (above, pp. 293-4), whereby a citizen banished for treason from Erythrai was to be banished from the whole League;<sup>2</sup> and the strengthened hold of Athens over its members is shown by the change in the formula of the oath of loyalty: Erythrai, perhaps c. 465, swore loyalty to Athens and the allies—much the same presumably as the original oath of 477—Chalkis in 446 swears loyalty to Athens only (above, pp. 342-3). Eretria took a similar oath, c. 450 (*I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 17: see above, p. 343); Kolophon (i.<sup>2</sup> 15: see above, p. 381) seems to come midway between the two: 'I will act in a manner loyal to Athens and the allies, and I will not revolt from Athens', though the stone is too badly damaged for certainty.

Besides this there was, to an uncertain extent, interference in the judicial autonomy of the subject states—certain classes of trials, for 'treason' certainly, perhaps for homicide as well, were transferred to Athens: see n. on 77. 1. This, by such evidence as we have, seems to have been applied to all except the autonomous members of the League, and to have been systematically carried out. Many other cases in which the allies were concerned also came before Athenian courts, for example those concerning the tribute and commercial cases, but these last probably on a reciprocal basis.

About the middle of the century Athens resolved to institute a single coinage and a single system of weights and measures, her own, throughout the empire; copies of the decree were to be set up in every state, and fragments of five of them have now been found.<sup>3</sup> It

<sup>1</sup> As they are named between the boule, which is Athenian, and the ἐπίσκοποι, who are certainly Athenian officials, it may be thought that *οἱ ἄρχοντες* ἐν τῇσι πόλεσι must be equally Athenian. I am not convinced of this; note the careful way such officials are defined as *Ἀθηναῖον* in the Leonides and Neapolis decrees and the coinage decree mentioned above; and the juxtaposition may mean only that the local magistrates are to work with the *ἐπίσκοποι*. The fact that *ἔνδικοι* are to be made with the cities to prevent fraud (above, p. 238, n. 2) shows that there was to be some such collaboration. But I am not prepared yet to defend this view with confidence.

<sup>2</sup> See, however, Kolbe's view, above, p. 336.

<sup>3</sup> Tod, 67, for those from Siphnos, Syme, and Smyrna (presumably originally from some nearby member of the League); D. M. Robinson, *A.J.P.* lvi, 1935, 149-54, for the fourth fragment, found at Aphytis in Pallene; and M. Segre, *Clara Rhodos*, ix, 1938, 149-78, for the fifth, found at Kos (reprinted in *A.T.L.*, p. 579). This last is written in Attic and can be dated by its writing, to the period 450-447, more accurately than the other copies, which are in Ionic and were thought to belong to c. 422 B.C. (see Tod, p. 165). (The reason for the Attic writing is, as Segre notes, probably to be found in the clause quoted above,

is made quite clear that in all the subject cities only Attic coinage is to be used henceforth, and that existing foreign coinage must be surrendered for exchange; yet it is doubtful how effective the new measure was, at least before the Peloponnesian war broke out. The well-known reference to it in Aristophanes, *Av.* 1040, looks like a jest at a *recent* decree (it may have needed renewal); and the numismatic evidence is by no means clear. There must have been a large expansion in the use of Athenian coins in any event, for the tribute was almost all of it paid in Attic drachmai. It is probable, on the evidence of the coins, that many member-states ceased issuing their own coins after 477 (or did not resume it on being freed from Persia); but these were mostly the smaller states. Others apparently only minted coins of small denomination (fractions of the drachme), which would be for local use while the Attic drachme, or other coin, was used for larger transactions and for business with foreigners. A few others again issued coins, but changed to the Attic standard; whether in the main for political or for commercial reasons, we do not know. Certainly many states—and not the three autonomous islands only—continued to issue their own coinage on their own standards, different from, and often hard to equate with, the Attic;<sup>1</sup> and some of these issues, notably the Cyzicene electron staters, were of international importance like the Attic.<sup>2</sup> But numismatics has not yet told the full story, either on its political or its commercial side. See R. Weil, *Z. f. Num.* xxv, 1906, 52-62, xxviii, 1910, 351-64 (cf. above, p. 286, n. 1); Cavaignac, *Hist. finanç. d'Athènes*, 1908, 177-87 (but all his statistics are not correct); P. Gardner, *J.H.S.* xxxiii, 1913, 150-88.

For the *ἀπαρχή* given by the members of the League to the Eleusinian deities, see below, p. 388.

Two notes may be added here. (i) The term *αὐτονομία* is quite consistent with the restrictions on the full liberty of the allied cities here mentioned, except, strictly speaking, the restriction of judicial freedom. Autonomy meant the freedom of a state to conduct its own internal affairs, that is, to choose and control its own magistrates, and to try its own citizens, just the freedom guaranteed to Chalkis in 446. If the state was a member of a league (or of a federation), its freedom in foreign relations was necessarily limited by that membership; if it was not free to leave the League, and if

p. 382, n. 1, *ταῦτα δὲ ἐπιτελέσαι Αθηναίους, εἰν μὴ αὐτοὶ βούλωνται*. The people of Kos had been unwilling.)

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., the changes in the Samian coinage noted above, p. 355.

<sup>2</sup> Among the types of these staters are Kekrops and the tyrannicides: doubtless a mark of Athenian influence. But there was a great multitude of Cyzicene types: *H.N.*<sup>2</sup> 525.

a garrison or an expeditionary force from another state would forcibly prevent its leaving, that limited still further its *ἐλευθερία*, but not, properly speaking, its *αὐτονομία*. Autonomy was a conveniently elastic term; Athens was autonomous after 338, though a member of the Hellenic League, and after 322, with a Macedonian garrison in the Peiraeus. See Meyer, *G.G.A.*, 1932, 460-1.

(ii) There is an interesting passage in Plutarch, *Solon*, 15. 3: ἂ δ' οὖν οἱ νεώτεροι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λέγοντες τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων δυναχείας ὄνόμασι χρηστοῖς καὶ φιλανθρώποις ἐπικαλύπτοντας ἀστείως ὑποκορίζεσθαι, τὰς μὲν πόρνας ἔταιρας, τοὺς δὲ φόρους συντάξεις, φυλακὰς δὲ τὰς φρουράς τῶν πόλεων, οἴκημα δὲ τὸ δεσμωτήριον καλοῦντας, πρώτον Διδώνος ἦν ὡς ἔοικε σάφισμα τὴν τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπὴν σεισάχθειαν ὀνομάσαντος. The second of these instances, *τοὺς δὲ φόρους συντάξεις*, must refer to the second Delian League of the fourth century; the next, φυλακὰς δὲ τὰς φρουράς, to the first—yet *φρουρά* and *φρούραρχος* were then official terms (*I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 10, 11). Plutarch must mean that in later times men called the fifth-century *φρουράι* by the more euphemistic term; certainly no one would accuse the Athenian speakers in Thucydides of anything but an outspokenness which is often brutal.

### C. Internal History of Athens

Thucydides says nothing in this excursus of the internal political history of Athens between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. The rivalry between Aristeides and Themistokles and the events which led to the latter's ostracism; Kimon and Perikles, Perikles and Thouskydides son of Melesias, and the final triumph of Perikles; the increase in the power of the strategoi, the reform of the Areiopagos and the consequent increased influence of the boule of 500 and of the reorganized dicasteries; the citizenship law of 451-450: all those changes which resulted in the developed democracy whose handling of the war from 431 or 432 B.C. onwards is to be narrated in the following chapters, are passed over in silence. So are the organization of the army and the navy, finance (especially the cost of the navy, and the allies' tribute in relation to this), the increase of population, and the development of manufacture and commerce. It is obvious that all these are matters strictly relevant to the story of the way in which the Athenians *αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως*; and it is equally clear that Thucydides was alive to the importance at least of some of them: of finance in general, of the growth of population (ii. 13), above all of the unique position of Perikles (ii. 65. 5-13, as well as the whole narrative from i. 126 to ii. 65). But it is by no means so clear that, had he completed this excursus, he would have

included all of these matters; for in the narrative of the war itself he omits much that we expect to find there (see Introd., pp. 9-25). Still in a full narrative we should have been told something of the changes in the army (especially the institution of cavalry and mounted archers: see above, pp. 327-8), and of the political rivalries and the ostracisms.

With regard to the rivalry of Thoukydides and Perikles see Wade-Gery's interesting paper, *J.H.S.* lii, 1932, 205-27, in which he connects the foundation of Thourioi with the former as much as with Perikles, and argues that there was a compromise between the Panhellenic ideas of the one and the imperialism of the other, and that this compromise was largely responsible for the later failure of the colony (from the Athenian point of view). Thourioi was founded in 444-443;<sup>1</sup> the fifteen years during which Perikles was continuously strategos (*Plut. Per.* 16. 3) are 443-442 to 429-428; therefore, says Wade-Gery, Perikles was not strategos in 444-443, that is, he was defeated at the elections and this was a year of triumph for Thoukydides,<sup>2</sup> who introduced the important modification in Perikles' plans for the new colony by opening it to settlers from all Greece. This is a possible reconstruction of events, though I am sceptical of the Panhellenic ideals of that factious leader; but one or two observations may be made. (1) It is certainly odd that in the circumstances posited by Wade-Gery the leaders of the colony, Lampon and Xenokritos, should be devoted followers of Perikles. (2) Amphipolis was a foundation of a similar type to Thourioi, and failed Athens as badly (so Wade-Gery, p. 217); but it belongs to the heyday of Perikles' sole power. (3) There is an interesting fallacy involved in inferring from the fact that Perikles was not strategos in 444-443, that he and his policy were defeated for that year. His fifteen years of continuous strategia was unique in fifth-century history,<sup>3</sup> so that a modification of the usual method of election to the office had to be introduced (Wade-Gery, *C.Q.* xxv, 1931, 89); that is to say, it was normal for a man, however eminent, and however popular his general policy, *not* to be elected every year. If Perikles was strategos 6 or 7 times between 460 and 443, that was remarkable (only 458-457,

<sup>1</sup> For the date, see Busolt iii. 523. 3 (though he is wrong in saying that Dionysios of Halikarnassos, *Lys.* i, p. 453, τῆς ἀποικίας, ἦν ἔστελλον Ἀθηναῖοι τε καὶ ή ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς δωδεκάτῳ πρότερον ἔτει τοῦ Πελοποννησιακοῦ πολέμου, confirms it; for this is 443-442 and no other year, unless Dionysios is beginning the Peloponnesian war with Sybota, 433-432).

<sup>2</sup> Wade-Gery supports this by the confused statements in *Anon. Vit. Thuc.* 6-7. I agree that these refer to the son of Melesias rather than to the historian, but not that they are of any value—or at least, not that their value can be estimated in this connexion. See, e.g., the last two sentences in § 7.

<sup>3</sup> It is sometimes stated that Kimon was elected continuously for a number of years till his expedition to Ithome. There is no evidence at all for this.

Tanagra, 454-453 or 453-452, Corinthian Gulf, 448-447 (?), Delphi and the Chersonese, and 446-445, perhaps 447-446 as well, Euboea, are certain or probable). If he was not re-elected in 445-444 and 444-443, that was normal, and we must not infer from it any change or upset in Athenian policy.

Wade-Gery is inclined also to accept Cavaignac's view (*Rev. d. Phil.* iii, 1929, 281-5) that the son of Melesias was the historian's maternal grandfather.<sup>1</sup> If so, Thucydides' silence about him is the more noticeable. Wade-Gery thinks it "due, like many Thucydidean silences, to contempt"; for the historian "was caught wholly by the glamour of Perikles". On this in general I may have something to say later; here I will only note that as Thucydides omits all reference to the Peace of Kallias, the Panhellenic Congress, the great temples, Thourioi and Amphipolis, he does not seem to have been, when he wrote the excursus, very conscious of the glamour; and as to his silence about the (very hypothetical) activities of Thoukydides after his return to Athens in 433, it is of a piece with his silence about all the personal incidents of 433 to 429: due to contempt perhaps, but not of the kind that Wade-Gery suggests.

There is another event in Athenian history which would be of great interest if we knew more about it—the restriction imposed on comedy in 440: οὐτος ὁ ἄρχων (Εὐθυμένης), ἐφ' οὐ κατελύθη τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ μὴ κωμῳδεῖν, γραφὲν ἐπὶ Μορυχίδου, καὶ ἵσχυσεν ἐκεῖνόν τε τὸν ἔνιαυτὸν καὶ δύο τοὺς ἔξῆς ἐπὶ Γλαυκίδου τε καὶ Θεοδώρου, μεθ' οὓς ἐπὶ Εὐθυμένους κατελύθη, schol. Ar. *Ach.* 67, a most tantalizing piece of accurate information. Who sponsored the act—the democrats, with or against the advice of Perikles, as a war measure during the struggle with Samos, or old-fashioned conservatives? What is the meaning of κωμῳδεῖν—όνομαστι or τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸν δῆμον? In what circumstances was it repealed? It is idle to pretend, as Starkie does for instance, in his notes on *Vesp.* 284 and *Ach.*, p. 243, that we can answer any of these questions. We know nothing about the law, not even its literal meaning (except that it did not mean the suppression of comedy; for we know of comedies produced during these years). It may have been the act of a nervous democracy; but it is really not worth while guessing. See Meineke, i. 39-41; Körte, *R.E.* art. 'Komödie', 1233-4; Radin, *A.J.P.* xlviii, 1927, 215-30,<sup>2</sup> and, for the general question, my article on Pseudo-Xenophon, in *Athen. Stud.*, pp. 217-19.

<sup>1</sup> Prentice in a recent article, *Oest. Jahresh.* xxxi, 1939, 36-41, denies that there is good evidence for Thucydides' father having been called Oloros; and if this were so, Cavaignac's thesis would fall at once to the ground. But Prentice's arguments are ill-judged.

<sup>2</sup> I doubt whether special restrictions on comedy, at any time, were connected with Solon's law against *κακηγορία*, as Radin suggests, 221-2; that was a law of libel.

## D. Biography

Equally he gives us no biographical detail (for which we are now dependent almost entirely on Plutarch); and in this case we may be sure that he would have given us none, even if he had made his account of the Pentekontaëtia as full as he could have wished; for he gives us practically no biography for the period of the war, not even of Alkibiades, though he recognized its relevance in his case (vi. 15. 2-4). See Introd., pp. 26-8.

## E. Cultural History

Thucydides says nothing of the great buildings on the Acropolis and at Eleusis (though they gave rise to political discussion, to the argument that Athens was using the allies' money for her own adornment),<sup>1</sup> nor of the development of the great festivals, though in this case too there was a political aspect: representatives of all the allies were in Athens for the great Dionysia,<sup>2</sup> they took part officially in the Panathenaia,<sup>3</sup> and they must each send an *ἀπαρχή* yearly to the goddess of Eleusis.<sup>4</sup> Once more we may be sure that this omission is not due to the incomplete state of the excursus; and once more we know that Thucydides was well aware of the importance of what he omitted—the Epitaphios is the finest statement of the Athenian ideal, and, if we want another and lesser instance, we can take Nikias' speech to the troops in Sicily before the last battle in the harbour (vii. 63, 64).

Between 477 and 432 the Athenians made an attempt, and, for many of them, for those who understood and followed Perikles, a conscious attempt, to establish some sort of unity and peace in a large part of the Greek world. They used many methods: force, in the suppression of seceders and the placing of garrisons at danger-points, and against piracy; political pressure, in the encouragement or establishing of democratic institutions in the subject states; the settlement in places of colonies of Athenian citizens; the organization of the navy as (with the exception of the Lesbian and Chiote

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Per.* 12. 1-4 (cf. Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* lii, 1932, 222-3). For a recent discussion of the dates of some of the temples, see Dinsmoor, *Hesp.*, ix, 1940, 1-52.

<sup>2</sup> Ar. *Ach.* 502-6 (with schol. ad loc. and to 378); Eupolis, fr. 240. Cf. *A.T.L.*, D 7, l. 18 (= *D.A.T.*, p. 43), D 8, l. 13 (= *I.G.* i. 2 65).

<sup>3</sup> *I.G.* i. 2 10 *init.*, 63, l. 57 (*A.T.L.*, A 9).

<sup>4</sup> *I.G.* i. 2 76 (Tod, 74; cf. *I.G.* i. 2 311). This decree dates from about 420 B.C., perhaps as late as 416-415 (Meritt, *A.F.D.* 172); but the phrase *καὶ τὰ πάτρια*, ll. 4 and 34, may have reference to allies' contributions as well as to Athenian and to other foreign contributions. Cf. *I.G.* i. 2 6 (before 460 B.C.) for an earlier law.

contingents) a single force; the gradual elimination of the numerous currencies, to the great advantage of trade; the partial unification of law by the concentration of certain classes of trial in Athens and by commercial treaties; the encouragement of manufacture and trade in Athens by the liberal admission of foreigners, most of whom came from the allied states, and who soon gained the privileged position of metics; above all, that astonishing intellectual development which made Athens at once the freest and the most cultivated city of the Greek world, a development in which the allies were encouraged to share, which made her the school of Hellas and 'such that no one could complain that he was subject to a state unworthy to rule'. Of all this history Thucydides, in spite of the fullness of detail in cc. 89-98 and 114-17, probably never intended to tell more than a part, and that in a succinct, annalistic narrative of datable events, and only of events of Athens' imperial and foreign policy; and it should be clear from the foregoing analysis that cc. 99-113 are very far from fulfilling that intention—so far from it that it is impossible to believe that Thucydides, had he lived to complete his history, would have published them as they stand. But we cannot know what he would have made of the excursus, how far he would have developed it; for his theme was not the growth of the Athenian attempt at unity in Greece, but its failure, and the causes of the failure—the prevailing hostility of the Greek world and the mistakes and weaknesses of the Athenians themselves.

## III. CHRONOLOGY OF THE PERIOD 477-432

In the attempt to give an exact dating to the events of this period which are recorded by Thucydides, we must keep in mind that two quite distinct problems are involved, namely, the true dates and Thucydides' own conception of the true dates; for he was not infallible. The two problems cannot indeed be considered apart, for Thucydides is himself, in most cases, the best evidence for the true dating—that is, the evidence which it is our duty to believe unless it produces a hopeless inconsistency, or until better evidence can be produced;<sup>1</sup> nevertheless we must always remember that there are two problems.

As has already been stated, Thucydides' failure to give any dates in the excursus does not mean that he did not know them, or think that he knew them; for he dates some of them elsewhere in his history. The clearest instance is that of the Thirty Years' Peace, which from ii. 2. 1, 21. 1, and i. 87. 6 is dated to the year 446-445 (in

<sup>1</sup> See Introd., pp. 84-6.

the archonship of Kallimachos) and to the winter months.<sup>1</sup> With this date Diod. xii. 7 and Paus. v. 23. 4 (dating by Olympiads) agree, and it has never been doubted. From this can be dated the Samian war, in the sixth year after the peace (i. 115. 2), 441-440 (archon Timokles). It lasted eight months or longer (i. 117. 3, n.), and, therefore, as far as Thucydides' narrative is concerned, may have been begun and ended within the same year (e.g. Aug. 441 to March or April 440), the archon-year in which Diod. xii. 27-8 places it. But, in such a matter, Diodoros' authority is small.<sup>2</sup> The scholiast on Ar. *Vesp.* 283, who often follows good authority for Attic dates, that is, the official chronology as represented for example by Philochoros, says definitely that the events of the war took place in the archonships of Timokles and of Morychides (440-439); and besides this, we know that Byzantion, which seceded from the League with Samos, paid its tribute in the spring of 440 (see 117. 3 n.).<sup>3</sup> The war, therefore, broke out in the early summer of 440 and ended in the following spring or summer (above, p. 356).

Thucydides could also accurately date the battle of Poteidaia (i. 63) by the first event of the Peloponnesian war, ii. 2. 1. (The figure there given in the text has been disputed and emended; but that of course does not alter the fact that Thucydides is giving an exact date.) From this he could date the beginning of the negotiations with Poteidaia, though he is not there nearly so precise (see 65. 2 n.); and from that the battle of Sybota and so also the battle of Leukimme. Fortunately the date of Sybota is independently fixed for us by inscriptional evidence (55. 2 n.). From the date of Leukimme we can define more precisely (on Thucydides' own evidence) the interval between it and the end of the Samian war: a little over four years, early summer 439 to midsummer or thereabouts 435. The Epidamnian appeal to Kerkyra, the real beginning of the trouble, was an unknown number of months before that. Thucydides' own expression (118. 1) is vague: οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὥστερον (after the end of the Samian war) occurred the affair of Kerkyra.

In iv. 102. 2-3 Thucydides dates the foundation of Amphipolis twenty-eight years after the attempted settlement at the time of the revolt of Thasos and the disaster at Drabeskos (i. 100. 3), and this latter thirty-two years after the attempt of Aristagoras of Miletos to settle there (Hdt. v. 11, 124-6). This would not, by itself, enable us to date either the successful or the unsuccessful Athenian settlement; but it is clear that Thucydides had exact dates in mind,

<sup>1</sup> For the detail, see Introd., p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> If Diodoros had been at all consistent in his practice, we should assume that he meant that the whole war lasted from the spring of 441 to the winter of 440 (see Introd., p. 5); as it is we cannot assume even that.

<sup>3</sup> There was also a change of generalship, which indicates the beginning of a new year, official or military (i. 116. 1 n.).

and could have given the archon-years, if he had had the archonlist by him when he wrote, or the intervals between those events and the opening of the Peloponnesian war. Again we have evidence from another and a good source: the scholiast on Aischines, ii. 31, following the *Atthis*, gives the archonship of Euthymenes, 437-436, for the foundation of Amphipolis (with which Diodoros, xii. 32. 3, agrees). Hence Drabeskos is to be dated 465-464.<sup>1</sup>

Since the disaster occurred soon after the Athenian victory at sea over the Thasians and the investment of the city, the secession of Thasos is to be dated either late in 466-465 (April to June 465), or early in 465-464 (July-Sept. 465), of which the former is perhaps the more probable. The surrender took place in the third year of the siege (101. 3), i.e. 463-462. The earthquake at Sparta and the revolt of the Helots is clearly implied by Thucydides to have taken place in the first months of the siege of Thasos, 465-464; we might stretch a point and say the first months of the next year 464-463 is possible (*πολιορκούμενοι*, 'in the course of the siege'), for that is the date given by Pausanias (iv. 24. 5). Each of these is at variance with that given by other authors for the Helot revolt and is disputable; but 463-462 for the end of the Thasian war fits in well with evidence from other good sources.

The thirty years' truce between Argos and Sparta is not mentioned by Thucydides in the excursus. He not only knew of it, but could have dated it (451-450 or 450-449): v. 14. 4. He also dates the exile of Pleistoanax, ii. 21. 1.<sup>2</sup>

Even from these few facts two important conclusions can be drawn: first, that Thucydides knew the dates of many events of the Pentekontaëtia, though he does not give them in the excursus, and that he doubtless would have given them, in some form, had he completed his excursus as he planned it; secondly, that, with one possible exception, the Helot revolt, his dates are also the correct ones. So far then our two problems, the true dates and Thucydides' conception of them, can be treated as one.

For all the other events of the period we must see how far our other evidence, some of it good, some weak, is reconcilable with

<sup>1</sup> The scholiast dates Drabeskos ἐπὶ Λυσικράτους; it should be ἐπὶ Λυσιθέου (at least, according to Diodoros, xi. 69. 1, who sometimes gets the names of archons wrong). Lysikrates was archon in 453-452 (*Aθην.* 26. 3; Diod. xi. 88. 1).

He also mentions a yet earlier attempt to found a colony at Amphipolis soon after the capture of Eion (Thuc. i. 98. 1), ἐπὶ Φαλωνος, 476-475. No other authority mentions this; but it is not on that account to be disbelieved. He gives the names of the strategoi, Lysistratos, Lykourgos, and Kratinos. It may not have been more than a sortie from Eion, and hence neglected by Thucydides.

<sup>2</sup> And as well some other events outside the period, e.g. the first alliance between Athens and Plataia (iii. 68. 5), and the overthrow of the tyranny viii. 68. 4.

Thucydides' narrative, keeping as our guide one fact, namely that he gives his events in strict chronological sequence, as he conceives it.<sup>1</sup> It will be best simply to list the events in annalistic form, in Thucydides' order, and to give the evidence for their dates.<sup>2</sup> Events which he does not mention in his excursus are given in italics. The dates given are archon-years.

Of all the discussions of the chronology of the Pentekontaëtia, I believe Busolt's, for the whole of it, to be still the most valuable, and I owe most to him, though I do not agree with all his principles: e.g., I do not believe that Thucydides uses military years for his dating (summers and winters, as for the Peloponnesian war), nor in Busolt's juggling with inclusive and exclusive reckoning (iii. 199 ff., n.). Other systematic discussions are those of Wilamowitz (i), ii. 289-303; Beloch, ii. 2. 178-216 (who argues that Thucydides used archon-years for his dating—the official and annalistic method, the reckoning being made from the beginning of the archon-year in which an event took place); Domaszewski, *Sitzb. Akad. Heidelberg*, 1925, no. 4; West, *C.P.* xx, 1925, 216-37 (who argues for 'évantrós-dates', i.e. by natural years—periods of 12 months—from the last event mentioned); Nesselhauf; Miltner in *R.E.*, art. 'Perikles'; and Kolbe's valuable article, *Hermes*, lxxii, 1937, 241-69. See also the very useful *Fasti* in *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup>, pp. 276-86. I do not myself believe that Thucydides used only one system of dating. When he says, ή δὲ διαγνώμη αὗτη τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ τὰς σπονδάς λελύσθαι ἐγένετο ἐν τετάρτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει τῶν τριακοντοτίδων σπονδῶν προκεχωρηκυιῶν (87. 6), this is clearly an 'évantrós-date'; for (1) the purpose of the statement is to show how much of the period announced in the treaty had lapsed, and (2) the language (*προκεχωρηκυιῶν*) makes it certain; and the day, month, and year in which the treaty came into force was recorded on the official documents (cf. v. 19. 1). Ἐξ ἦτη πολεμήσαντα (110. 1) may also be an évantrós-date, intended to emphasize the length of the Egyptian war rather than to date it—'it lasted six whole years' (though this may mean, naturally, anything from, say, 5 years and 10 months to 6 years and 2 months—it does not mean

<sup>1</sup> There have been some who have doubted this, in order to 'reconcile' his statements with other evidence. To me it is quite clear; see especially nn. on i. 103. 1, 3, 4; and if the doubt were justified, it would be almost useless to discuss his chronology.

On the other hand, the fact (or the probability) that the excursus is an *unfinished essay*, allows a possible disruption of the chronological order, which Thucydides would later have put right. That is, we may admit a greater likelihood of error here than in his main narrative. (See, e.g., 112. 1 n., pp. 325-6.)

<sup>2</sup> See Introd., pp. 29 ff., for the *prima facie* value of the evidence of different kinds. By 'evidence for their dates', I mean direct statements of date, or manifest implications. I omit, however, Diodorus when he is unsupported, as too unreliable. His dates for events mentioned in the excursus have been given already in the notes ad locc.

'in the seventh year from the start of the campaign', as West takes it). ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ἐξ μῆνας (109. 4) is certainly one; and in the same way the 61 days between Tanagra and Oinophyta is a fraction of an évantrós. But Thucydides tells us that no comprehensive or lengthy history of the period existed when he wrote; he had, therefore, no detailed account to draw upon, and it is a natural inference from this that most of his indications of time, at least for events earlier than his own recollections, are from annals, as those of Hellanikos were; that, therefore, τρίτῳ ἔτει for the siege of Thasos, δεκάτῳ (or ἑκτῷ or τετάρτῳ) ἔτει for the Helot revolt, διαλυπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν in 112. 1, will be in all probability archon-years. ἑκτῷ ἔτει for the interval between the Thirty Years' Peace and the opening of the Samian troubles might be an évantrós-date in so far as it would fall within Thucydides' own recollection; but it is more likely to be an archon-date. That is, there is no need to force the treaty back to the autumn of 446 in order to date the beginning of the Samian war a little later in the autumn of 441, as West has to do (5 full years after the treaty, and in the sixth year the war began); if the treaty came into force in the winter of 446-445 and the war began in the autumn of 441-440, that will be ἑκτῷ ἔτει reckoned in archon-years. (See also above, p. 390.) Only if we suppose that Thucydides had already, before he wrote down his own sketch, made a thorough research into some at least of the events of the Pentekontaëtia, by oral inquiry from participants and eye-witnesses and the like, should we be right to argue that τρίτῳ ἔτει for the siege of Thasos, &c., means more than the barest official statement of years. Such a research, I am sure, he intended to make, to fill the gap left by his predecessors; but no one supposes that he was able to carry out his plan.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Similarly, his 92 years from the beginning of the alliance between Athens and Plataia to the destruction of the latter (iii. 68. 5) must be archon-years; also the 14 years (ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει), 446-445 to 432-431, between Pleistoanax' retreat and Archidamos' invasion (ii. 21. 1). The only date which does not really fit into this scheme is that of the fall of the democracy in about the 100th year after the overthrow of the tyranny (viii. 68. 4; West, 218-19), as to which see above, p. 132.

Kolbe, 252-3, 266, thinks that Thucydides did research into official documents (but not, presumably, that he finished his inquiry?), namely, casualty-lists, for no *annals* existed in his day as is made clear by his statement in i. 97. 3, and that, therefore, his years are campaigning seasons (autumn to autumn): he found, for example, that casualties in Thasos were listed for three separate seasons, so he knew the war ended τρίτῳ ἔτει; and that no casualties were recorded for three years before the five-years' truce, and they were, therefore, three peaceful years (112. 1). Hence he gives durations, but no exact dates. This is of course possible; but a research into archon-years is equally possible, and i. 97. 3 is no proof that something of the kind had not already been done, though inefficiently. Besides, there is no reason why such a study of casualty-lists as Kolbe supposes should not have resulted in exact dates—that is, every event dated so many years

To assume thus, apparently, two systems of dating is not to argue for inconsistency or carelessness in Thucydides (cf. West, p. 237, n. 5). In the course of the Peloponnesian war itself he occasionally, when his purpose demands it, uses ἐπιαυτός-dating instead of his normal military years, as for the length of the Archidamian war and of the whole war (v. 20. 1, 26. 2), for the interval between the two periods of open warfare (v. 25. 3), and for the length of time that Perikles lived after the beginning of the war (ii. 65. 6). These are quite clear and cause no confusion; nor should similarly instances in the Pentekontaëtia, and they would not have, if Thucydides had been able to finish his account of it.

Ref. in Excursus	Event	Date and evidence for it <sup>1</sup>
89. 2	Capture of Sestos	479-478 spr.: Hdt. ix. 116-18; Thuc.
—	<i>Expedition of Leotychidas to Thessaly</i>	? Hdt. vi. 72 (above, p. 365).
89. 3-93. 2	Rebuilding of the walls of Athens	479-478 w.-e.s.: Thuc.
93. 3-8	Building of Peiraeus walls	478 et seqq. ?: Thuc.
94	Greek expedition to Cyprus, and to Byzantium, under Pausanias	479-478 e.s. 478-477 l.s. (above, p. 271).
95	Recall of Pausanias	478-477 w. (95. 6 n.).
96	Formation of the League	478-477 spr.: 'Αθην. 23. 5.
—	<i>Pausanias driven out of Byzantium by Athens</i>	477-476? Thuc. i. 131. 1; Ephor., F. 191 (below, p. 399).
98. 1	Capture of Eion	476-475: schol. Aischin. ii. 31 (above, p. 281).
2	Capture of Skyros	476-475?: Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 36 (Busolt, iii. 106, n.).
3	Campaign against Karystos	?
—	<i>Battles of Tegea and Dipaia. Synoecism of Elis. Partial Recovery of Argos</i>	? (below, pp. 408-9).
—	<i>Ostracism of Themistokles</i>	? Thuc. i. 135. 3.
—	<i>Flight and condemnation of Themistokles</i>	? Thuc. i. 137. 2-3 (below, pp. 397-401).
98. 4	Secession and defeat of Naxos	? Thuc. i. 137. 2 (below, p. 408).
100. 1	Campaign of Eurymedon	? (below, p. 408).

before the war, or before the Thirty Years' Peace. (When does Kolbe think Thucydides did this work? Presumably before 424; for after 404 he would certainly have had an archon-list.)

<sup>1</sup> 479-478 = first half of Attic year; 479-478 = second half; *spr.* = spring; *e.s.* = early summer (i.e. towards end of archon-year); *l.s.* = late summer (i.e. near beginning of archon-year); *aut.* = autumn; *w.* = winter. Events not mentioned in cc. 89-118 are printed in italics.

Ref. in Excursus	Event	Date and evidence for it
100. 2	Secession of Thasos	466-465 e.s. or 465-464 l.s.: Thuc. iv. 102. 2-3; schol. Aischin. ii. 31 (above, p. 391).
3	Failure of colony at Ennea Hodoi	465-464 l.s.: do.
101. 1-2	Revolt of the Helots	465-464: Thuc.; 464-463: Paus. iv. 24. 5; 468-467: schol. Ar. <i>Lys.</i> 1144 (below, pp. 402 ff.).
101. 3	Surrender of Thasos	463-462: Thuc.
—	<i>Treaty with Erythrai</i>	? I.G. i. 2 10 (above, p. 293).
102. 1-3	Kimon's campaign at Ithome	? 462-461: Thuc.
—	<i>Attack on the Areiopagos</i>	462-461: Ar. <i>'Αθην.</i> 25. 2.
102. 4	Athenian alliance with Argos and Thessaly	? 462-461: Thuc.
—	<i>Ostracism of Kimon</i>	? 462-461 spr.: Theopomp. F. 88 (below, pp. 411-12).
103. 1-3	End of Helot revolt; Athenian capture of Naupaktos	? Thuc. (below, p. 402).
4	Megara joins Athens	? Thuc.
104	Revolt of Egypt from Persia, and Athenian expedition	? Thuc.; I.G. i. 2 929 (below, p. 412, n. 2).
105-6	Battles of Halieis, Kekrypha-leia, Aigina, Megara	? Thuc.; I.G. i. 2 929.
107. 1	Building of the Long Walls begun	? Thuc.
107. 2-108. 2	Campaign of Tanagra	? 458-457 e.s.: Thuc.; Theopomp. F. 88 (below, pp. 411-12).
108. 2-3	Campaign of Oinophyta; completion of the Long Walls	? 457-456 l.s.: Thuc. (above, p. 317).
4	Surrender of Aigina	? 457-456: Thuc.
—	<i>Recall of Kimon?</i>	457-456 (Theopomp. F. 88).
5	Tolmides' expedition round the Peloponnese	456-455: schol. Aischin. ii. 75.
109-110	End of Athenian expedition to Egypt	? Thuc. (109. 4, 110. 1).
—	<i>Treasury of the League transferred from Delos to Athens</i>	455-454 or 454-453 (summer): quota-lists.
—	<i>Athenian alliances with Phokis and with Egesta, and perhaps with Leonitinoi and Rhegion</i>	454-453: I.G. i. 2 19-20, 26, 51-2 (above, pp. 365-6; and 111. 1 n.).
111. 1	Athenian expedition to Thessaly	? Thuc.
2-3	Perikles' expedition in the Corinthian Gulf	? Thuc. i. 112. 1.
—	<i>Athenian citizenship law</i>	451-450: Ar. <i>'Αθην.</i> 26. 4.
112. 1	Five years' truce between Athens and Peloponnese	? Thuc. (below, p. 413).

Ref. in  
Excursus

	Event	Date and evidence for it
—	Truce between Sparta and Argos	451-450 or 450-449: Thuc. v. 14. 4, 22. 2.
—	Treaty between Athens and Miletos	450-449: I.G. i. 2 22 (above, p. 350).
112. 2-4	Kimon's last expedition to Cyprus	450-449? Thuc.
—	Peace with Persia ( <i>Treaty of Kallias</i> )	449-448? (above, p. 331).
—	Summons to the Panhellenic Congress	? (above, p. 366).
112. 5	Spartan and Athenian expeditions to Delphi	? Thuc.; Philoch. fr. 88; Plut. Per. 21. 2 (below, p. 409).
—	Athenian cleruchies	? (above, pp. 376-80).
—	Building of Parthenon begun	447-446: I.G. i. 2 339-53.
113	Revolt of Boeotia	447-446: Thuc. ii. 4. 1.
114. 1	Revolt of Euboea	447-446 e.s.: quota-list for 447-446; Thuc.
i-2	Invasion of Attica under Pleistoanax	446-445 l.s.: Thuc. ii. 21. 1.
3	Reconquest of Euboea	446-445 aut.: Thuc.
115. 1	Thirty Years' Peace	446-445 w.: Thuc. (above, p. 362).
—	Foundation of Thourioi	444-443: Ps.-Plut. Vit. X Orr. 835 D (443-442: Dion. Hal. Lys. i, p. 452. Above, p. 386, n. 1).
—	Ostracism of Thoukydides	444-443 spr.: Plut. Per. 16. 3.
115. 2-	War with Samos	441-440 e.s. to 440-439 e.s.: Thuc.; schol. Ar. Vesp. 283 (above, p. 356).
117. 3	Restriction on freedom of Comedy	440-439: schol. Ar. Ach. 67.
—	Statue of Athena Parthenos dedicated	438-437: Philoch. fr. 97 (see I.G. i. 2 354-62; Tod, 47; Meritt, A.F.D. 30-41).
—	Expedition of Phormion to Amphilochia	? (above, p. 367).
—	Athenian Expedition to the Pontos	? (above, pp. 367-8).
—	Building of Propylaia begun	437-436: I.G. i. 2 363-7; Philoch. fr. 98.
—	Foundation of Amphipolis	437-436: schol. Aischin. ii. 31; Thuc. iv. 102. 2-3.
—	Restriction on Comedy removed	437-436: schol. Ar. Ach. 67.
24-55	Battle of Leukimme	435-434 l.s.: } above, pp. 196-8.
56-65	Battle of Sybota	433-432 aut.: } above, p. 222, and below, p. 421.
—	Tà Πορειδαρκά	433-432 e.s.? to 432-431 aut.: } above, p. 222, and below, p. 421.
—	Treaties with Leontinoi and Rhegion renewed	433-432: I.G. i. 2 51, 52.
—	Meton publishes his calendar?	433-432: Philoch. fr. 99.

It will be observed that there are many doubtful dates for important events both between 477 and 465 (a fixed point) and between 465 and 445 (a second fixed point); and there is one major difficulty in each of these two periods, a difficulty which, if it could be solved, would lead to the solution of most of the others.

The first is the date of Themistokles' flight to Asia Minor. Thucydides says (i. 137. 2-3) that, in his passage of the Aegean he met with the Athenian fleet besieging Naxos (cf. 98. 4), and after his arrival in Ephesos, went up country and sent letters to Artaxerxes who had lately come to the throne. The date of Artaxerxes' accession appears to be certain, 465-464 B.C.; and since Thucydides knew the date of his death and Darius II's accession (iv. 50. 3, viii. 58. 1), he may well have known this too. But it creates great difficulties. The secession of Thasos took place in the spring or summer of 465; this was *χρόνων ὕστερον* than the battle of Eurymedon (100. 2), and this again was later than the secession and siege of Naxos. We cannot put Eurymedon later than the summer of 466, nor therefore (since each campaign would take the whole season) the siege of Naxos later than 467; many scholars put both events earlier. At the least, therefore, three years (by Thucydides' own account) elapsed between Themistokles' flight across the Aegean and his letter to Artaxerxes (467 summer to 464 summer). Moreover, the difficulty is not lessened if we look at the matter from the other end. It was the trial of Pausanias at Sparta which led directly to the accusation of treason against Themistokles (135. 2). Pausanias had been driven out of Byzantion some time between the formation of the Delian League and the capture of Eion, perhaps in the same campaign as the latter (476-475);<sup>1</sup> he went to the Troad, and, apparently after no long stay there (131. 1, οὐτω δὴ οὐκέτι ἐπέσχον), returned to Sparta, in 474 or 473 at the latest. There he was long under suspicion until he was finally betrayed (132); but it is difficult to believe that this could be more than four or five years after his return, which would put Themistokles' flight from Argos in the winter of 469-468 at the latest: a date which would suit the siege of Naxos well enough, if that took place in the following summer, but is inconsistent with the letter to Artaxerxes as Thucydides narrates it.

We can well imagine that in fact Themistokles spent some years on the Ionian coast, perhaps, under pressure from Athens, going from city to city (Plutarch, *Them.* 26. 1 mentions his presence in Kyme—indeed, his first landing there—and Aigai, and there may be something in this), or in the satrapy of Sardis, where satraps were not always acting in close concert with Susa, hesitating to approach the monarch himself, perhaps indeed only encouraged to

<sup>1</sup> But see below, pp. 399-401.

do so by the death of Xerxes.<sup>1</sup> But though the words ἥλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ στέρεον ἐκ τε Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐξ Ἀργούς ἢ ὑπεξέκευτο (137. 3) imply some delay—Themistokles had to wait before he could recompense the captain of the boat which had saved him, and at the same time this money of his will have arrived before he was settled in Magnesia with a handsome income—such a delay of four or five years in Ionia or Aiolis is clearly quite inconsistent with Thucydides' narrative; more particularly as Thucydides himself indicates a delay of a year only, and that after he had written to Artaxerxes (137. 4-138. 2). It would be as easy to guess that Themistokles wrote to Artaxerxes while Xerxes was still on the throne (hearing that there was but little friendship between the two) and that Artaxerxes could do nothing before his father's death; that is, that Thucydides was misled by the fact that Themistokles' letter was addressed to Artaxerxes. In either case Thucydides is in error: either he thought Artaxerxes came to the throne some years before he did, or, because he was not thinking of the chronology, he omits a long delay before Themistokles went to Susa.

Many ancient authors, Ephoros, Deinon, Kleitarchos, Herakleides, and others, made Themistokles meet Xerxes, not Artaxerxes (Plut. *Them.* 27. 1-2); but they are all late and none of them very trustworthy, and the dramatic effect of a meeting between Xerxes and Themistokles was probably their aim, though it is possible that Thucydides was thus corrected in order to get rid of the chronological difficulty. Charon of Lampsakos, who flourished in the middle of the fifth century and lived in Asia Minor, from Lampsakos, moreover, one of the cities 'presented to Themistokles', agreed with Thucydides (fr. 11); and there is little doubt that this is right. Curiously enough, Plutarch adds τοῖς δὲ χρονικοῖς δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ὁ Θουκυδίδης συμφέρεσθαι, καίπερ οὖδ' αὐτοῖς ἀτρέμα συνταττομένοις<sup>2</sup> (one of the very few occasions on which Plutarch is aware of chronology). Just before (25. 2) he has quoted Thucydides' account of the flight across the Aegean and the escape off Naxos; and there one important MS. reads Θάσον for Νάξον. Is this correct? i.e. did Plutarch read Θάσον in his Thucydides, so that he felt less chronological difficulty in his narrative than in that of Ephoros and the rest? But note that, even if he did, or, even if we took a rash step further and supposed that Thucydides himself wrote (or intended to write) Θάσον, this only gets rid of one chronological difficulty, the meeting

<sup>1</sup> It is just possible that Theopompos' phrase, F. 87, πλανώμενος περὶ τὴν Ασίαν, had reference to this phase of Themistokles' life in Asia, and not to a later one, as Plutarch says (*Them.* 31. 3).

<sup>2</sup> So one group of Plutarch's MSS. (Y); S has αὐτὸς . . . συντεταγμένος. Ziegler reads αὐτὸς . . . συντεταραγμένος, a variation of Cobet's suggestion αὐτὸς . . . συντεταραγμένος (see Ziegler, vol. iv, 2, p. x). I cannot believe that this is right.

with Artaxerxes; it would still leave us with the other—can we believe that the trial of Pausanias was postponed till, say 466 or even 467?<sup>1</sup> We must agree with Wilamowitz (1), i. 152: "dabei ist er dem allgemeinen geschick des kritikers verfallen, dass er selbst der kritik eine blösse bot. er würde verstimmt sein, aber er müsste selbst zugeben, dass seine Themistoklesgeschichte τοῦς χρόνους οὐκ ἀκριβῆς ist. wir brauchen nur unser gewissen zu befragen, um auf den vater der historischen kritik deshalb keinen stein zu werfen."

Beloch, however, ii. 2. 185-8, follows Justin's epitome of Trogus, ix. 1. 3, assuming a lacuna and reading: *haec urbs (Byzantium) condita primo <----; capta> a Pausania, rege Spartanorum, et per septem annos possessa fuit; dein variante victoria nunc Lacedaemoniorum nunc Atheniensium iuris habita est.* Supporting his belief in Justin with a variety of arguments "aus inneren Gründen" which are to the last degree uncertain, he supposes these seven years to be from 478-477 (the date of the first conquest of Byzantium from the Persians by the Greeks under Pausanias) to 472-471 (which is, incidentally, six years), when Pausanias was expelled by the Athenians, and to include, therefore, his recall to Sparta and his return in a private capacity. An emended text of Justin is a poor basis for an argument; and it does not help to call this text 'the witness of so well-informed a writer as Trogus'. (Justin's *dein variante victoria, &c.*, refers, presumably, to the history of Byzantium in the fifth and fourth cent., till its conquest by Philip.) Meyer (2), ii. 60-1, anticipated Beloch in most of these arguments; Swoboda, *R.E.* xi. 444 agrees. Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, xvii, 1921, 59-73, thinks the seven years' possession to be Justin's mistake for the interval between Pausanias' expulsion and his final condemnation; but what has this to do with the early history of Byzantium, which had been Trogus' theme? He also interprets *condita a Pausania* to mean that the regent was made a ἡρως κτίστης, like Brasidas at Amphipolis, an honour probably renewed by Lysandros; which, in view of the silence of fourth-century writers, is a lot to build on a sentence in Justin.

It should be noted that Ephoros, F. 191, 37-46, supports 477 or 476 as the date for the expulsion of Pausanias from Byzantium: Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ Κλιμαντος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγούντος ἐκπλεύσαντες ἐκ Βυζαντίου μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων Ἡιώνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι Περσῶν ἔχόντων εἶλον καὶ Σκύρον. Diodoros, xi. 54-60, followed Ephoros here closely, in all probability: first the excursus on Themistokles, then the exploits of Kimon, beginning with the campaign against

<sup>1</sup> So that the Helot revolt in 465 or 464 had some connexion with his intrigues? Cf. below, p. 403, n. 2.

We may note, too, that Nepos, *Them.* 8. 6, has Naxos, not Thasos, and that he expressly follows Thucydides in the Xerxes-Artaxerxes problem (9. 1). But this does not amount to much.

Eion (starting from Byzantium). His dates are his own affair; and Beloch, in order to believe Justin, must here disbelieve Diodoros, who puts Pausanias' last actions in 477-476 (xi. 44-7), though he thought he had restored the authority of the latter's chronology.<sup>1</sup>

Heichelheim, *Zeitschr. f. Num.* xl, 1930, 22-4, supports Beloch with a numismatic argument. Byzantium had iron ὄβελοι as a coinage, like Sparta (Pollux, vii. 105, ix. 77-9: who quotes Strattis' *Myrmidones*-fr. 36, with Kock's ingenious emendation—which shows that Athenian soldiers c. 420 B.C. were familiar with them);<sup>2</sup> probably therefore, he says, this was introduced by Pausanias (for a commercial city such as Byzantium would never have had such an awkward coinage on its own initiative), and Pausanias must have been at least seven years there to have been able to do so. It is pleasant to think that the opulent Regent, imitating the splendours of the old Greek tyrants and adopting the manners of the Persian court, unable  $\epsilon\nu\tau\varphi\kappa\theta\epsilon\sigma\tau\omega\tau\iota\tau\tau\varphi\beta\iota\omega\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\iota\tau$ , insisted on the Byzantines adopting the most unattractive and least useful of Spartan austerities, and that the Byzantines, who had, of course, a plentiful silver currency as well, continued the use of iron after his expulsion; but to support an emended text of Justin in this way seems a waste of time.

Under the year 471-470 Diodoros, xi. 54-9, includes Themistokles' ostracism, his condemnation and flight, and his life in Persia (and the exploits of Kimon, 60-1, from the siege of Eion, which was in

<sup>1</sup> Beloch also, p. 184, gets out of the Naxos difficulty by dismissing it as an anecdote invented only to illustrate Themistokles' cunning and resource: "bei einer Anekdoten aber kommt es auf die Pointe an, die historische Einkleidung ist vollständig Nebensache." When, however, he would date Leotychidas' Thessalian expedition (see below, p. 406) to the winter of 477-476 and supports that by citing Plutarch, *Them.* 20. 1 (who is, by the way, clearly thinking of the winter 479-478,  $\delta\pi\eta\lambda\lambda\mu\epsilon\nu\tau\zeta\sigma\tau\iota\tau$ ), he writes: "die Geschichte, die Plutarch dort erzählt, ist ja allerdings eine der gewöhnlichen Themistokles-Anekdoten, aber die historische Einkleidung kann hier so wenig wie sonst erfunden sein" (p. 192). And Thucydides is a better authority even for an anecdote, or at least for its historical setting, than Plutarch.

It is perhaps just worth mentioning another possible indication of date, based on 'emendation' of an untrustworthy author. Stesimbrotos, F. 3, said that Themistokles fled to Hieron in Syracuse (asking him for his daughter's hand and offering the throne of Greece), a remarkable statement for any 5th-century author (Plut. *Them.* 24. 7). But Themistokles may have gone to Kerkyra intending to go on to Sicily, but turned back on hearing of Hieron's death? See Meyer (1), iv.<sup>2</sup> 1. 486, n. 2; Zimmern, *Greek Commonwealth*, 374. 1 (a proposed visit to Hieron would explain the roundabout journey from Argos to Persia). Hieron died in 467-466 according to Diodoros, xi. 66. 4; and this date is generally accepted, though Diodoros' figures for the reigns of the Deinomenids is confused: see Lenschau in *R.E.* viii. 1500; Hackforth in *C.A.H.* v. 150; Beloch, ii. 2. 162-7. This would bring the date of Themistokles' flight closer in time to Artaxerxes' accession.

<sup>2</sup> There were other iron currencies in Greece: Regling, *R.E.* vii. 975, 979.

476-475) under 470-469; he has, as elsewhere, grouped many events under the date of one. But which is this one? and, if we can answer that, is it rightly dated? Scholars have argued at length that, since Diodoros' dates are based on the *Atthis*, 471-470 must be the year of ostracism, for such decrees, as can be seen from the *Ἄθηνατων Πολιτεία*, were dated and recorded in the *Atthis* (so, for example, Beloch, ii. 2. 192-3), or that it must be the year of condemnation, for the decree that Themistokles be declared  $\delta\tau\mu\sigma$  as a traitor, proposed by Leobotes, son of Alkmeon, was preserved in Krateros (fr. 5: so Busolt, iii. 112-13 n., Jacoby, *Apollodoros*, 34, and most others). Most of this argument has been a waste of time; of course the date of either event could have been and was probably recorded, like that of Hipparchos' murder, Hippias' expulsion, and the battle of Marathon.<sup>1</sup> The difficulty is that Diodoros can mean either, or Themistokles' arrival in Persia, and that by himself he is quite untrustworthy, as is obvious from his false dating of Pausanias' trial in 477-476 which was the immediate cause of Themistokles' flight, and of Kimon's early successes, which were properly dated in the *Atthis*. The only argument in favour of 471-470 as the year of Themistokles' condemnation and flight, not the ostracism, is that it is supported by Cicero (*Lael.* xii. 42; *Brut.* x. 41) and possibly by Nepos (*Arist.* 3, compared with Plut. *Arist.* 3. 5—above, p. 53, n. 4); but all that that means is that there was a tradition in the first century B.C.—perhaps followed by Diodoros—that this was the year of Themistokles' flight. On the other hand, it is probable that he was not yet ostracized when the *Persae* was produced, spring 472; not certain by any means, for Aeschylus was capable of praising a man who had lately been rejected by his countrymen, but probable.<sup>2</sup> The question remains unsolved. Cf. also below, 138. 4, n.

The great chronological difficulty of the second period is that of the beginning and end of the Helot revolt. Thasos, after being defeated at sea by the Athenians and now being besieged, appealed to Sparta for help; which was secretly promised and would have been sent, but for the earthquake and revolt of the Helots: that is,

<sup>1</sup> Highby, 'Erythraean Decree', *Klio*, Beih. 36, 81-6, discusses in detail the dating of the original decree: the archon's name was probably not given (as it is not in our early inscriptions), but the secretary of the boule was named, and Krateros could get the date from that. We have no evidence whatever that Krateros did this.

<sup>2</sup> Many scholars have insisted on the *honourable* nature of banishment by ostracism, to show that Aeschylus might have praised Themistokles after ostracism; quite unnecessarily. Highby goes so far as to quote Plut. *Them.* 22. 4 and Diod. xi. 55. 3 in order to suggest that it was a positive compliment. We do not generally regard the ostracism of Hipparchos, Kimon, or Thoukydides in this light.

Thucydides places the revolt in the summer of 465 (or autumn, if Sparta was contemplating an invasion of Attica only the *following* spring), i.e. 465-464, or possibly, if Thasos did not at once appeal, in 464-463 (late summer 464), where Pausanias puts it.<sup>1</sup> He says it ended δεκάτῳ ἔτει, i.e. nine years later, 456-455 or 455-454. But he also says, or implies, that it ended before Megara joined Athens and before the beginning of the Athenian expedition to Egypt; that is to say, the latter could not have started before the spring of 455 (a big expedition of that kind would normally be planned to sail not later than mid-summer). This is obviously impossible, and need not be further discussed. Therefore (1): either Thucydides is wrong in dating the revolt to the first or second year of the Thasian war, and it really began some time earlier, e.g. 468-467, where schol. Ar. *Lys.* 1144, following Philochorus (see schol. ad 1138), places it,<sup>2</sup> or it did not last nine years. And (2) either Thucydides was not thinking of his chronology at all, though being careful to get his events in the right order (especially here: see 103. 1, n.) and giving some indications of time; or he could not have *said* it lasted nine years, for the dates 465 for the revolt of Thasos and 445 for the Thirty Years' Peace (the two limits one of which would be disturbed by a nine years' Helot revolt) are not only the true dates, but also his own. It is obvious that the latter is in itself the more probable, and that in consequence δεκάτῳ in our MSS. is, like many figures, corrupt.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Below, p. 403.

<sup>2</sup> Kimon's expedition to Ithome was μετὰ τὴν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς μάχην ἦβ ἔτει υπέρον. ταῦτα ἦν ἐπὶ Θεαγενίδου. This would appear to be a scholar's dating (though see below, p. 408). The scholion continues: καὶ γὰρ τοῦ Ταΐγύέρου τὸ παρεπράγμα καὶ τὸ ὀδεῖον καὶ ἔπειρα καὶ οἰκλαὶ πλεῖσται καὶ Μεσσήνιοι ἀποστάττες ἐποέμοντο καὶ οἱ εἶλωτες ἀπέστησαν, ἵνα Κίμων ἐλθὼν διὰ τὴν ἱκετηρίαν ἔσωσεν αὐτούς. There is confused history here (ἔσωσεν αὐτούς coming simply from Aristophanes); for the details of the earthquake see Plut. *Kim.* 16. 4-5—whose dates, however, may be different (below, pp. 405-7).

<sup>3</sup> The third possibility, that Thucydides' account of the end of the revolt is out of place chronologically—either an intentional digression from his main theme (the growth of Athenian power) or because the 'notes' of what is, after all, an unfinished excursus on the Pentekontaëtia have been disturbed—must be mentioned. The first view does not seem to me tenable; not only is the whole excursus written in annalistic form (except for the dates!), but here a digression on Ithome would have come at the end of 103, for 103. 4, the accession of Megara to Athens, is part of the same sequence of events as 102. 4, the alliance with Argos and with Thessaly, and would not have been separated from it unless a strict chronological order had made it necessary.

An accidental displacement cannot be called impossible. But the *only* reason for believing it is δεκάτῳ ἔτει; no other authority supports 456-455 for the end of the revolt, not even Diodorus (who cannot be called an authority), for we are entitled to consider his dates for the revolt to be 469-459 as much as 465 to 455. Herodotus, ix. 35, on the whole supports Thucydides' order of events, by putting the defeat of the Messenians before Tanagra, though not decisively; for we may

But all our other authorities, beginning with Ephorus, say that the war lasted nine years (or ten, as a round number<sup>1</sup>), and though the total weight of their authority for the fact is very little, it seems very probable that Ephorus read δεκάτῳ and not some other figure in his text of Thucydides. Whether Ephorus took any trouble to reconcile this reading with the chronology of other events, we do not know; but the specialist chronologers did, for, as we have seen, the *Atthis* put the beginning of the Helot revolt in 468-467, and thus its end in 459-458. This latter date fits Thucydides' narrative; the earlier may be a correction, based on the statement found in Thucydides' text that the war ended in the tenth year.<sup>2</sup> But if the correction is a proper one, it involves Thucydides in a bad blunder: not only is his simple statement about the earthquake and the outbreak of the revolt wrong, the date being at least three years out, but clearly also his account of the help sent by Athens to the Spartans, which he places immediately after the surrender of Thasos, i.e. in 463-462 at the earliest; for we cannot suppose that Sparta spent five or six years in a fruitless war before asking her friends and allies to help her. The *Atthis*, or at least the scholiast on Aristophanes, puts Kimon's expedition in the same year as the earthquake, in 468-467. Yet the date, 463-462 or 462-461, for Kimon's expedition suits other events which were its immediate consequences: the alliances with Argos and Thessaly, the new hostility between Athens and Sparta which led the former to settle the Messenians at Naupaktos (103. 3 n.), and the fall in Kimon's influence which led both to the successful attack on the Areiopagos and to his ostracism (462-461 B.C.).

Moreover, Pausanias, iv. 24. 5, in his account of Messenia, carefully dates the earthquake and revolt to the 79th Olympiad (when Xenophon of Corinth won the stadion)<sup>3</sup> and the archonship of Archidemides, 464-463 B.C.; a date which, as we have seen (above,

refer the defeat to a major battle, the 'turning-point' of the war, rather than to its close. Ps.-Xen. 3. 11, for what he is worth, does the same. Justin, iii. 6, on the other hand, supports Diodorus in putting the final defeat of the helots and the Athenian capture of Naupaktos after Tanagra; the value of that support can be judged from the rest of the contents of that chapter.

I also do not believe that Sparta would have sent the main forces of the Peloponnesian League into central Greece if she still had the revolt on her hands, even if she had already defeated the rebels in the field, and even though Athens, in accordance with the usual practice, had left only a small force to besiege Aigina while her main army was at Tanagra. Sparta was not usually eager for foreign expeditions, and was ready to make excuses to stay at home.

<sup>1</sup> See Introd., pp. 2 ff.

<sup>2</sup> It may be also that the first Spartan ἄγος, τὸ ἀπὸ Τανάπον (see i. 128. 1), was considered to have followed soon after Pausanias' conspiracy with the helots (132. 4; cf. 133. 1), and to have caused, or helped to cause, the revolt. Cf. p. 408.

<sup>3</sup> Pindar, *Ol.* xiii; Diod. xi. 70. 1.

p. 402), is reconcilable with Thucydides, or, if you will, is to be preferred to his implied date 465-464, as coming ultimately from a Peloponnesian source: Thucydides may be guilty of a slight error.

The foregoing argument makes it clear that the end of the Helot war should (on our present evidence) be placed about 460 or 459; that it is more probable that it began after the revolt of Thasos than some years before it, and that, therefore, it only lasted four or five years and not nine; and, to me at least, that Thucydides did not think it lasted nine years, that his MSS. are in error, though it was a very early error, which deceived Ephoros (never, as far as we know, careful of chronology, and ready enough to believe that the 'siege of Ithome' lasted as long as that of Troy) and other Greek historians after him. Most scholars who agree with this accept Krüger's emendation, *τετάρτῳ* for *δεκάτῳ*: on the ground that Thucydides might have written *Δ* meaning *τετάρτῳ*, in the *later* manner, and Ephoros have believed that he intended the earlier meaning of *Δ = 10*, as found on inscriptions contemporary with both of them (a not very probable assumption). *τετάρτῳ ἔτει* will mean that the war ended in 462-461 if it began in 465-464 (as most historians believe), in 461-460 if it began in 464-463; and there is no evidence and little probability for either date, though the end of 461-460 is not in itself impossible. *Δ* for 10 instead of 4 is not the only possible error: *δεκάτῳ* for *ἔκτῳ* (perhaps written by Thucydides himself in the archaic style, *HEKTOI*) is equally likely, and *ἔκτῳ ἔτει* would give us 460-459 or 459-458.<sup>1</sup> The latter is the year implied by the *Atthis*, and though it involves a somewhat tight fit for some subsequent events, is perhaps to be preferred for that reason.

There are two other pieces of evidence in this problem, which might be of great value; but in each case the value is doubtful, and so no argument should be based on them, though suggestions can be made. Diodorus, xi. 63-4, puts the earthquake and the outbreak of the revolt, and Kimon's expedition, in 469-468, and says the war lasted ten years; but in 84. 7-8 puts the end of the war in 456-455, after the Aigina, Megara, and Tanagra campaigns, and in the same year as Tolmides' expedition round the Peloponnese, during the course of which, according to Diodorus, he captured Naupaktos and settled the Messenians there (456-455 is the correct date for Tolmides' expedition, according to the *Atthis*: above, p. 395). Diodorus' muddle has been thought by many, including Busolt, iii. 202, n., who has a most careful argument on the matter, to be due to a conflation of the two attempts made by the chronologers to keep the nine (or ten) years of the war to be found in the text of Thucydides: either the end was in 460 or 459, as Thucydides

<sup>1</sup> Adam, *Plato*, Rep. x. 601 c, notes that in Bekker, *Anecd. Gr.* 98. 30, there is a mistake of *ἔκτῳ* for *δεκάτῳ*. See further below, i. 125. 2, n., p. 423.

implies, and so the beginning was 469-468 or 468-467; or the beginning was in 465-464, as Thucydides, and so the end in 456-455. The discrepancy between 469-468 and 468-467 (the date given in the *Atthis*) might be explained: for example, 469-468 might be the date given by some for the earthquake and the beginning of the revolt, 468-467 for Kimon's expedition to help Sparta; or, 459-458 being fixed for the end of the war, 469-468 was given as the year of its commencement by those who said it lasted ten and not nine years (as Diodorus does). Again, it may be that Ephoros, Diodorus' main authority, said that Tolmides was in command when Naupaktos was taken, and that Diodorus made the mistake of supposing that this must have been on the occasion of his famous expedition round the Peloponnese,<sup>1</sup> a mistake helped by the theory that the Helot war began in 465-464 and lasted nine years. But Diodorus' dates for the events in this decade are in any case so muddled (see nn. on 102 ff.), though one or two are correct, that we cannot say more than that this conflation theory is a possible explanation of his mutually inconsistent dates for the beginning and end of the Helot war.<sup>2</sup>

The second piece of evidence is at first sight more hopeful. Plutarch, *Kim.* 16. 4, says that the Helot revolt began in the fourth year of the reign of Archidamos of Sparta. This appears to be from a chronological source, and one independent of the Attic tradition. Unfortunately the dates of Archidamos' reign, and Plutarch's, or his authority's, view of these dates, are doubtful; and again the doubt is due to Diodorus, who makes an even more remarkable and carefree muddle of his figures than before (see Introd., p. 53), and again the cause of the muddle may help in the solution. Archidamos died between the summer of 428 (Thuc. iii. 1. 1) and that of 426, when his son Agis was in command (iii. 89. 1), probably in the winter of 427-426; for in the summer of 427, Kleomenes, the regent of the other king, was at the head of the Peloponnesian army (iii. 26. 2), very likely because Archidamos was still alive but too ill for active service (Beloch, i. 2. 184-5). Diodorus says he reigned for forty-two years, which would mean that he came to the throne in 469-468. His fourth year should be 466-465 (autumn to autumn by the official Spartan reckoning); and as the last part of this overlaps with the beginning of the Attic year 465-464, we may find in this a confirmation of the date, late summer 465-464, which is perhaps

<sup>1</sup> It is probably significant that schol. Aischin. ii. 75 (a learned note, from the *Atthis*) does not mention Naupaktos among the places captured by Tolmides in 456-455.

<sup>2</sup> It should perhaps be noted that Busolt, iii. 300 n., is wrong in citing "C.I.A. iv [= I.G. i. Suppl.] p. 9, Nr. 22 k [it should be 22 g] --- οκλῆς Φι --- Μεσο ---" as evidence for the settling of the Messenians in Naupaktos in the archonship of Philokles (459-458). The [Phil]okles there mentioned cannot be the archon. See I.G. i. 2. 37.

implied by Thucydides. It should, however, be noted that it differs by one year from Pausanias' date, 464-463, which seems also to be from a Peloponnesian source, and is given by the Olympiad as well and so should mean the year mid-July to mid-July 464-463.<sup>1</sup> Diodoros, however, makes the forty-two years of Archidamos' reign begin in 476-475, the year, he says, of the death of his grandfather Leotychidas after a reign of twenty-two years (xi. 48. 2), and end in 434-433, when he died and his son Agis, who reigned twenty-seven years, succeeded (xii. 35. 4); though this does not prevent him from recording Archidamos' later activities in the Peloponnesian war (xii. 42. 6, 47. 1, 52. 1). Since it is certain that Archidamos died about 427 and Agis about 400, and possible that Leotychidas came to the throne, in place of Demaratos, in 491, it is obvious that Diodoros, in his dating, is seven years out for these three reigns (we do not know how this may have affected his figures for reigns before and after), while his figures for the lengths of their reigns may be correct,<sup>2</sup> and the cause of this has been found in the story of the end of Leotychidas' reign. Leotychidas led the Greek forces in the expedition to punish Thessaly for the part she had played in the Persian wars, and was banished from Sparta on the ground that he had been bribed to do nothing (Hdt. vi. 72). This expedition may well be conjectured to have been sent in 477-476 or 476-475, soon after the Persian wars, though we have no evidence for the date.<sup>3</sup> Either then Herodotos is wrong in implying that the king's exile followed immediately after the expedition—it really did not occur till 469-468 (Beloch, i. 2. 187, ii. 2. 190-2), and he misled later writers; or Leotychidas was exiled in 476-475 and lived on till 469-468 and the years of his exile were later reckoned as years of reign (through the influence of Archidamos perhaps who thus, as it were, cancelled the sentence of exile), just as Diodoros, xiii. 75. 1, includes the years of exile in the fifty years of Pleistoanax' reign (so Busolt, iii. 83. 1).<sup>4</sup> Either explanation of Diodoros' error is satisfactory enough, with a preference perhaps for the latter, which allows for two different systems of dating Archidamos' reign; but we do not know whether Diodoros was the only writer to be misled by Herodotos. Plutarch, or rather his authority for the statement that the earthquake took place in the fourth year of Archidamos, may have been another; that is to

<sup>1</sup> Equations between Athenian and Spartan official years (or Olympiads) were often, naturally enough, carelessly observed. But, if we assume that the Helot revolt was late summer 464-463 (at the beginning of the Attic year) and that, Archidamos coming to the throne late in the Spartan year 469-468, 468-467 was called his first year, then late summer of the Attic year 464-463 would fall within his fourth year, namely the end of the Spartan year 465-464 (Busolt, iii. 201 n.).      <sup>2</sup> Beloch, i. 2, p. 184.      <sup>3</sup> Above, p. 365.

<sup>4</sup> Perhaps also Archidamos was a minor till 469-468 (Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* lii, 1932, 224, n. 86).

say, we cannot be certain what year he meant by the fourth of Archidamos' reign (below, p. 411, n. 1). If we could be confident that his authority put Archidamos' accession to the throne in 469-468, we should have a valuable, because independent, confirmation of Thucydides' chronology. But we cannot be certain, especially as the figures 22 years for Leotychidas' reign and 42 for that of Archidamos, are only found in so poor an authority as Diodoros (though he obviously did not invent the latter figure, and though his 27 years for Agis is probably correct).<sup>1</sup>

Two other views on this problem deserve note, the first only out of respect to its author. Laqueur, in *R.E.*, art. 'Philochorus', 2438-9, argues that the sequence of events as told by Thucydides—Sparta promising to attack her good friend Kimon in Thasos, and this promise being followed by the request to Athens for help against the Helots ('either the promise leaked out, in which case Athens would not have helped Sparta, or it was kept secret, in which case neither Thucydides nor anyone else would have known of it')—is so improbable that we have no 'einheitlicher Bericht', and Thucydides is not, therefore, to be believed against the *Atthis*; the Helot rising was no part of the historian's theme in the Pentekontaëtia, and what we have is a biased account intended to justify Athens for her subsequent anti-Spartan policy. One must reply with patience: (1) anything less biased or tendentious than Thucydides' narrative here it would be difficult to imagine; (2) the breach between Athens and Sparta which was the direct result of the Helot revolt is one of his main themes; and (3) could there be an argument more naïve than that Sparta would not have attacked the pro-Spartan Kimon? It would be better to adopt Plutarch's picture of Kimon as the persistent friend of the allied states and deny, therefore, that he would have commanded Athenian troops against Thasos. The only thing that is in the least strange to us is the Athenian help to Sparta so soon after the latter's secret promise to help Thasos; but our only comment should be that the strangeness is due to our ignorance of the circumstances.

The other view is that of Kolbe, p. 251. 3<sup>2</sup>, and of Jacoby (given to me in conversation). Accepting, of course, Thucydides' implied

<sup>1</sup> It has been suggested, e.g., by Lenschau in *Bursian*, clxxx, 1918, 144, that the Helot revolt began in a small way in 469-468 and only became important in 465 or 464 after the earthquake, and that, though in the main overcome by 459, it went on smouldering till 456-455—not to save, but to explain Diodoros' dates. The second suggestion is possible, and would help to explain the ready adoption of δεκάρτῳ ἔτει as early as the 4th cent.; but it does not help much, for, if we follow Thucydides strictly, the capture of Naupaktos and the settlement of Messenians there must still be put c. 460. The first does not help at all, for in those writers who put the revolt in 469 or 468, Kimon's expedition follows immediately.

<sup>2</sup> *Herm.* lxxii (above, p. 392).

date for the Helot revolt and Kimon's expedition against Ithome, they think it impossible that the *Attis* could have got the dates wrong, and accordingly infer that originally it had μετὰ τὴν ἐν Πλαταιᾶς μάχην ἦτει υστερον (464-463 B.C., or i.e. 465-464), which was at some time misread as οὐ ἔτει, as it now appears in schol. *Lys.* 1144 (above, p. 402, n. 2), and that the scholiast or his immediate source added, from the archon-list, ταῦτα ἦν ἐπὶ Θεαγενίδον ("lediglich ein interpretierender Zusatz", Kolbe). Jacoby adds that in schol. *Lys.* 1138, ταῦτα καὶ οἱ συντεταχότες τὰς Ἀτθίδας ὑστοροῦσσιν περὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. ὁ δὲ Φιλόχορός φησι καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον λαβεῖν διὰ τὰς κατασχόντας τὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν συμφοράς, the disasters to Sparta must be the earthquake and revolt (this is hardly consistent with Κίμων ἔσωσεν αὐτούς of the scholion on 1144, but is nevertheless probable enough). Diodorus' date, then, which is 469-468, not 468-467—it does not 'confirm' the scholiast's date—will only be one of his many unaccountable errors. Such a view is certainly possible (cf. Introd., pp. 52-3); but I would hesitate to emend the scholiast's figure, which in its present context is sound (for Theagenides' archonship was the twelfth year after Plataia), and I think it at least as likely that Philochoros was trying to reconcile the end of the revolt before the alliance with Megara, as stated by Thucydides, with the nine years' duration which he found in his text; perhaps also connecting the revolt with the intrigues of Pausanias, and putting his death c. 470-469, before the siege of Naxos (i. 137. 2). Certainly the 'hegemony' of Athens as a result of the disasters to Sparta might well be illustrated by the immediately succeeding campaign of Eurymedon.

We can now do something to fill in the doubtful dates. For the ten years between the capture of Eion and the secession of Thasos, we can scarcely do more than suggest possibilities—all dates admit of a margin of error of two or even three years.

Campaign against Karystos c. 474-472.  
Ostracism of Themistokles

Not before 472-471 (Aesch. *Pers.* was 473-472);  
perhaps 471-470, the year in which Diodorus,  
xi. 54. 4 ff., dates his condemnation and flight.

Condemnation and flight of  
Themistokles

c. 469-468 to 468-467.  
c. 468-467 to 467-466.

The dates for the important events in the Peloponnese at this time—the recovery of Argos and her conquest of Mykenai and Tiryns, the synoecism of Elis, and the struggle of Sparta for the hegemony, ending in her victories at Tegea and Dipaia—are quite uncertain. Diodorus puts the synoecism in 471-470 and the conquest of Mykenai

in 468-467; and for all we know to the contrary these dates may be right. Busolt, iii, pp. 120-3, puts Tegea c. 473 and Dipaia c. 471; Beloch, ii. 2. 188-90, puts them c. 468-466; see also C.A.H. v. 66-7. We may be sure that the condemnation of Pausanias and of Leotychidas (and the latter's residence after exile in Tegea) and the intrigues of Themistokles when living at Argos (Thuc. i. 135. 3) weakened the position of Sparta, and that she with difficulty won back the hegemony; but this only gives us vague indications of date. It perhaps suggests that 468-466 is more likely than 473-471; if so, the Helot revolt did not begin in 468, for Sparta did not win these victories while it was at its height. Kolbe, indeed, 254-63, argues with some force that the Argive attack on Mykenai did not take place till after the Helot rising (as Ephoros probably stated: Diod. xi. 65. 2-3) and the alliance with Athens, i.e. c. 460; and this may well be right. Ephoros probably meant this, as Kolbe says: the Argives attacked Mykenai when they saw the Lacedaemonians τεταπεινωμένους, and they got support from allied cities (Diodorus—after the Helot revolt).

For the events between 463 and 445 it will be safer to work backwards. The Thirty Years' Peace was concluded in the winter of 446-445; the reconquest of Euboea was, therefore, not later than the autumn of 446, and the invasion of Attica under Pleistoanax late summer, July-August, of the same year.<sup>1</sup> The revolt of Euboea will then have been earlier in the same summer (447-446), and the revolt of Boeotia and battle of Koroneia, which took place not long before (114. 1), in the autumn or winter, 447-446; to all appearances this last campaign was a short one.

Some time before this (χρόνου ἔγγενομένου, 113. 1) the two expeditions of Athens and Sparta to Delphi took place. The later, the Athenian, cannot, therefore, be put after 448-447 aut.; Philochoros, fr. 88, says it was ἔτει τρίτῳ after the Spartan, which would thus be not later than 450-449. This date, however, clashes with Kimon's Cyprus expedition, which was earlier (112. 5), and his text has been emended to μηνὶ τρίτῳ,<sup>2</sup> which would certainly give a narrative consonant with that of Thucydides. In that case both events may be put in the summer of 448.

This will put the five-years' truce in 450-449 (perhaps the winter

<sup>1</sup> Apparently in the archon-year 446-445: see ii. 21. 1 n.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 337. Beloch keeps ἔτει τρίτῳ, which, as he says, there is no reason as such to doubt, but must then put the Athenian expedition to the very end of 448-447, only a few months before the revolt of Boeotia, which is hardly consistent with Thucydides, 113. 1; and 450-449 for the Spartan expedition is still difficult to fit in with the Cyprus campaign. μηνὶ τρίτῳ is also supported by Plut. *Per.* 21. 2, εὐθὺς ἐκείνων ἀπαλλαγέντων. It is also possible that the scholiast (Ar. *Av.* 557) who quotes this passage from Philochoros is confusing two different wars: see Clinton, *F.H.* ii. 314 m.

or early spring of 449) and the Cypriot expedition in the summer of 450-449 and 449-448; the Peace of Kallias in 449-448 spr. (the year in which Diodoros places both the expedition and the peace). Three years had elapsed between Perikles' expedition in the Corinthian Gulf and the Five Years' Truce (112. 1), and the former is thus 453-452, autumn (one of Diodoros' two dates for it), or 454-453 spr.; the expedition to Thessaly just before (111. 2) may be 454-453, autumn. With these dates, however, less than four of the five years of the truce will have passed before Pleistoanax' invasion of Attica in 446-445 aut.; this is possible, and for the moment will be assumed.

The capture of Prosopitis island by the Persians, which marked the end of the war in Egypt, took place probably in May or June (above, p. 321); the supporting squadron of 50 ships which arrived sooner after the disaster (110. 4) will have left Athens about the same time. This should be not later than 455-454 (June 454), for by the following spring the treasury of the League had already been transferred to Athens, and the quota was being paid to Athena.<sup>1</sup> The defeat of the supporting squadron would then be 454-453 (c. Aug. 454), and the expedition to Thessaly practically contemporary with this (111. 1); the survivors from Egypt will have got back to Athens that autumn. The Egyptian war lasted six years and began, therefore, in 461-460 e.s., or 460-459 l.s., if Thucydides is dating the end of the war by the return of the survivors or the surrender of Inaros. But the beginning of the war coincided with the surrender of the Helots at Ithome (the Athenians 'were at the time engaged in a campaign in Cyprus with 200 ships', 104. 2), or was subsequent to it. The Helot war, therefore, ended not later than 460-459 or 461-460, instead of 459-458 as appears to have been the date in the *Atthis* (above, p. 402). Diodoros then may be right in giving 469-468 as the year in which, according to the chronologers, the Helot revolt began; 468-467, the year given by schol. Ar. *Lys.* 1144, may be, as suggested above (p. 405), only the date given to Kimon's expedition to Ithome, in the archon-year subsequent to the beginning of the revolt.<sup>2</sup> If this is correct, the true dates of the Helot war are probably 465-464 to 460-459, and we should read ἔκτῳ ἔτει in Thucydides, 103. 1; less likely are 464-463 to 461-460 or 465-464 to 462-461 and τετάρτῳ ἔτει. (This is not to deny the possibility of πέμπτῳ ἔτει as well, εἴ τοι, with the loss of εἴ altogether and the insertion of δεκάτῳ in an early text, and 465-464 to 461-460

<sup>1</sup> I do not think it necessary to assume, with Kolbe, 265-6, that the transference of the treasury must have followed the Egyptian defeat immediately, so that early summer 454 would be the only possible date for the latter.

<sup>2</sup> Or Thucydides in writing ἐξ ἕτη πολεμήσαντα (110. 1) should have meant the duration of the revolt in Egypt rather than of the Greek participation in it; the latter may not have begun before 459-458. It would be a small error; but even here it is preferable to follow Thucydides rather than excerpts from the *Atthis*.

or 464-463 to 460-459 as the true, or the Thucydidean, dates.) The accession of Megara to the Athenian alliance followed immediately after the fall of Ithome,<sup>1</sup> and the capture of Naupaktos was just before it.

We know that fighting took place at Halieis, Kekryphaleia, Aigina, and Megara in the same campaigning season and, also in the same season, in Cyprus, Phoenicia, and Egypt (Thuc. i. 105-6 and J.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 929). This will be either 459 or 458, Thucydides giving no indication of interval between it and either the preceding or the subsequent event. The latter is the Tanagra campaign. This is dated by Diodoros 458-457, and it may be correct; for Theopompos, F. 88, says that not five years of his ostracism had elapsed when

<sup>1</sup> True to his principle of disbelieving anecdotes in general and of believing any single one he wants to, Beloch can quote Plut. *Kim.* 17. 1. to show that the accession of Megara was contemporary with Kimon's expedition to Ithome (ii. 2. 205). He prefers the dates 465-464 to 462-461 for the Helot war, and would place the beginning of the Egyptian war in 462-461, the same year as Kimon's expedition, both being inspired by him. See above, p. 307, and below, p. 413.

Plutarch's whole account of Kimon's actions before his ostracism, *Kim.* 15-17. 3, is chronologically so confused that little can be made of it. See the analysis in Uxkull, 71-3, and Weizsäcker, 63-4, with whose conclusions, however, I do not agree. Plutarch puts the fall of the Areiopagos during the absence of Kimon on a sea-expedition (15. 2); then he speaks, 'eidologically', of his Lakonism, then of the great earthquake at Sparta and the revolt of the Helots, the Spartan request for help and Kimon's support of it in opposition to Ephialtes (16). There follows the anecdote of his encounter with Lachartos on his passage through Corinthian territory (on his way to Sparta, not on his return, as Uxkull has it), and finally (17. 3), οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὸν Ἀθηναῖον αὐθίς ἐκάλουν ἐν τῷ ἑταῖρῳ τῷ Ιωάννῃ Μεσογρίου καὶ εἰλωτας, the dismissal of the Athenian troops and the ostracism of Kimon. Where did Plutarch get this second request from? Uxkull says that having got the anecdotes from his *Anecdoten-Sammlung* (see Introd., p. 78), he went back to his historian, found again the story of Kimon's help at Ithome, and so had to insert αὐθίς; Weizsäcker that we have another case of *Zeitüberschneidung* similar to that in the *Perikles* (cf. above, on the cleruchies, pp. 377-8, and Introd., pp. 67-8), and that Plutarch having told the story once in an eidological setting, tells it again 'chronographically', in this case adding αὐθίς with the effect of being definitely wrong, whereas in *Perikles* he is only misleading. But in fact the whole section 16. 1-17. 3 is a composition which is both chronological and eidological, and is all of a piece; how simple it would have been for Plutarch, after the anecdote of 17. 1-2, ἐνεὶ δὲ . . . ἀπῆλε δὰ Kopίνθου τὴν στρατιὰν ἄγων . . . καὶ μετὰ τῆς στρατιᾶς διεξῆλθεν, to have continued, 'on arrival before Ithome, Sparta soon sent him home again, and he was in consequence ostracized'. It is obvious that his αὐθίς ἐκάλουν must come from his source (the fact, not the words). He was an experienced writer.

The only explanation that occurs to me is that Plutarch followed a version that put the revolt in 469-468 or 468-467 (which the date in 16. 4, the fourth year of Archidamos, does not necessarily contradict: see above, pp. 405-7), and Kimon's expedition soon after; since, however, it was known that his ostracism was (1) subsequent to the attack on the Areiopagos and (2) due immediately to Athenian anger at the Spartan behaviour, another expedition to help Sparta had to be assumed. Even this leaves the sea-expedition of 15. 2 without explanation; but perhaps it needs none.

Kimon was recalled to Athens (after Tanagra: see above, pp. 326-7), and 462-461 spring, after his failure at Ithome and during the struggle over the Areiopagos, is the very probable date for his ostracism; if Tanagra was fought at the end of 458-457, nearly 4½ years had elapsed. The view that it was fought at the end of the archon-year receives some slight support from Diodoros who puts Oinophyta, which was fought only two months after Tanagra (108. 2), in the next archon-year, 457-456; but very slight, for Diodoros likes spreading out his events if he has empty years, and he writes as if each campaign occupied a whole season.<sup>1</sup> The surrender of Aigina soon followed, probably also autumn, 457-456; then in 456-455 Tolmides sailed round the Peloponnese, and the Athenians were defeated in Egypt in 455-454 e.s., as suggested above.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that Plutarch, *Kim.* 17. 8 and *Per.* 10. 3, also implies that Oinophyta did not follow so soon after Tanagra. But the story of Kimon and Tanagra had become altogether conventionalized.

<sup>2</sup> Diodoros, xi. 78. 4, says that the whole war with Aigina under Leokrates' command, i.e., therefore, all the events narrated in Thuc. 1. 105. 2-108. 4, though he does not himself relate them in that order, lasted nine months. This is not impossible for the military events—Athenian naval victory over the Aeginetans late in 458, followed almost immediately by the Corinthian invasion of the Megarid and its repulse, Phokis and Tanagra campaigns April and May 457, Oinophyta and surrender of Aigina end of July 457. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that the Long Walls (107. 1-108. 3) took less than nine months; and Diodoros' statement has been, and may well be, neglected (Busolt, iii. 322, n. 3). Fighting at Halieis, Aigina, and Megara (105) took place in the same campaigning season, *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 929, and obviously not that of Tanagra, for the Erechtheid regiment will have had losses there too; so, in all probability, in 458.

Mainly on the ground that the casualties in Cyprus and Phoenicia mentioned in *I.G.* i.<sup>2</sup> 929 must have been caused in the first year of the Egyptian war, when the Athenians were on their way to Egypt, de Sanctis, *Atthis*<sup>2</sup>, 485 and *Rv. di Filol.* xiii, 1935, 71-2, followed by Wallace, *Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc.* lxvii, 1936, 353-60, and Meritt, *D.A.T.* 92, n. 59, argues that the Egyptian war was begun in 459-458 and ended in 453-452, and that Thucydides, therefore, once more (and without warning) deserted the chronological order. The premise is not compelling (see above, p. 311), and the conclusion not attractive; the only other argument for it is that it is surprising that the alliance with Egesta in 454-453 should be made so soon after the disaster in Egypt, if that was 455-454 (so Tod, p. 57). I should have supposed that it was on the whole more likely that Athens, with her accustomed resilience, should try to make up in the west for failure in Egypt than that she should undertake new responsibilities when her hands were full; and we are not told that she sent any troops to help Egesta. De Sanctis thinks indeed that she did, under Diotimos to Neapolis (Timaios, fr. 99): this quotation is by Tzetzes, he says the expedition was during a war against the Sikels, it is undated, and it was to Naples! (In his recent *Storia dei Greci*, 1939, ii. 121-5, he says that the *Atthis* recognized 454-453 as the acme of Athenian power, and that this was meant to include the still victorious army in Egypt and the extension of influence in the west; so the disaster was not till 453-452. This is from Diodoros, xi. 85. 2, πλείστων πόλεων ἥρξαν, ἐπ' ἀνδρειᾳ δὲ και στρατηγίᾳ μεγάλην δόξαν κατεκτήσαντο, referring immediately to the expeditions of Tolmides and Perikles; it is in all probability copied from Ephoros, not

This scheme works well enough but for the dating of the Five Years' Truce in 450-449, winter, and the consequent implication that it had not lapsed when the Peloponnesians invaded Attica in the autumn of 446. If that is wrong, the truce must be put not later than 451-450, Perikles' expedition to the Gulf in 454-453, the Thessalian expedition in 455-454, and the end of the Egyptian war (the return of the survivors) in 455-454 aut. at the latest, the defeat at Prosopitis in 456-455. This last means that the Egyptian war began in 461-460 or 462-461, which is where Beloch would place it; and this in turn that the Helot revolt, begun in 465-464, ended in 462-461, that is, immediately after Kimon's expedition to assist Sparta. That is not a conclusion which a reading of Thucydides would suggest (still less any of the later writers); and Beloch's system of dating has this further disadvantage that it implies an interval of 2 or 3 years between cc. 104 (462-461) and 105 (460-459 or 459-458), and a longer interval than Thucydides implies between the Five Years' Truce (451-450 or 452-451) and Kimon's last campaign in Cyprus (450-449). On the whole a later date for the truce and a consequent breaking of it in 446-445 seem preferable; Beloch says, p. 202, that "die Spartaner nahmen es mit der Einhaltung beschworener Verträge sehr genau" (did they? because Ps.-Xen. 2. 17, says so?), and truly enough that there is no evidence (e.g., no later indictment of them) that they broke this one (so Walker, *C.A.H.* v. 86; Nesselhauf, 5). But we know too little of the circumstances of this time to decide a question of this nature.<sup>1</sup>

### 118. 3. MAIN NARRATIVE RESUMED

αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ.: the narrative resumed from c. 88, in the regular manner.

ἀδικεῖν: 'were in the wrong', 'were the aggressors'.

ὦ λέγεται: the words of the oracle were not exactly known; this is the Spartan war-party's version. Athens had lost her influence at Delphi (112. 5) after the defeat at Koroneia and her withdrawal from Central Greece.

### 119. ASSEMBLY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE

Sparta could not involve her allies in war without their consent, especially when she was not herself enthusiastic for the war; when she was, as often in the fourth century, she did on several occasions.

from the *Atthis*; and the date given is 455-454. I would not myself prefer this to Thucydides.)

<sup>1</sup> See also the suggestion made above, 112. 1 n., p. 325, which would put the truce in 453-452.

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See Schaefer, *Staatsform u. Politik*, 1932; Larsen, *C.P.* xxvii, 1932, 136–50, xxviii. 257–76, xxix. 1–19 (early history and constitution of the Peloponnesian League).

**αὐθις:** referring back to 67, because many of the states at this conference had already been represented, informally, at the earlier meeting of the Spartan apella. One would infer from *ὅσοι παρῆσαν*, 125. 1, that even now not all the members of the Peloponnesian League were represented.

For the date of this second conference, see below, 125. 2 n.

120–124. *Speech of the Corinthian delegates.*120. 1. *οὐκ ἀν ἔτι αἰτιασαίμεθα:* as 68 ff.

*οὐ καὶ . . . καί:* not *οὔτε . . . οὔτε*, partly because the whole idea is a positive one—‘they have now done so’; partly because the two actions, voting for war and summoning a meeting of the allies, are really one—the latter is an immediate consequence of the former, if the terms of the alliance are properly observed. *ἔψηφισμένοι εἰσι:* a good instance of the perfect tense—‘they have now committed themselves’.

*χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, κ.τ.λ.:* *τὰ ἴδια* would appear to mean the individual interests of the different members of the League, including Sparta (Stahl, Krüger, Widmann, and Classen)—they are all to be treated equally, Sparta has no right to privilege (hence the summoning of the allies on this occasion); *προσκοπεῖν*: she has the right to take the lead in considering the common interests (hence Sparta votes first on the question of war and peace, before the allies are asked their opinion, and as well has the initiative in summoning the conference), *προσκοπεῖν* corresponding to *προτιμῶνται*. If, with Forbes and Steup, we translate *τὰ ἴδια* ‘her own interests’ (Sparta’s, as opposed to those of the League as a whole; but we should expect *τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἴδια* or *τὰ ἑαυτῶν*), *ἐξ ἵσου* must still be taken as meaning ‘not giving their own interests more weight than those of their allies or of the whole League’; which comes to much the same thing. (The scholiast has *ἥγοντα μὴ προέχοντας ἐν τοῖς ἴδιωτικοῖς πράγμασιν*.) This is Poppo’s view—*ita ut non prae aliis sibi quid tribuant*; Stahl’s objection to this—*hoc ita tantum fieri posset si τὰ ἴδια essent res reliquorum praeter Lacedaemonios sociorum (nam cogitandum esset ἐξ ἵσου τοῖς ἑαυτῶν)*—ignores the fact that *ἐξ ἵσου* means both ‘not more than’ and ‘as much as’. Steup translates ‘giving as much attention to their own interests as the other members give to theirs’, and Forbes gives much the same rendering. See also 124. 1 n. For *τὰ ἴδια* as the separate interests of individual states (not personal interests), cf. 68. 2, 91. 6, 141. 6–7.

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2. *χαλεπωτέραν ἔξουσι τὴν κατακομιδὴν τῶν ὥραιών καὶ πάλιν ἀντίληψιν ὃν ἡ θάλασσα τῇ ἡπείρῳ δίδωσι:* even for the inland states (Tegea, Mantinea, and other Arcadian cities, Elis too) trade with foreign countries was of importance and the danger to it the first thing to be mentioned by the Corinthians. Cf. iii. 86. 4; and Ps.-Xen. 2. 3 οὐ γάρ ἔστι πόλις οὐδεμίᾳ ἦτις οὐδὲνται εἰσάγεσθαι τι η ἔξαγεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. But it is characteristic of Thucydides that he leaves it at that and nowhere describes in greater detail the trade interests involved and how they were affected either by the Athenian empire (except in the special case of Megara) or subsequently by the war. See Grundy, 89–91, and above, p. 20.

3. *εὖ δὲ παρασχόν, κ.τ.λ.:* the Corinthians are forestalling (or answering) the obvious objection, ‘once at war, we shall not know when to stop’. They are assuring the doubters ‘we shall be sensible people this time’ (121. 1). Yet Forbes thinks that this speech is intended by Thucydides to be a generally accurate forecast of the war (see below, 124. 3 n.).

The further development of this theme, however, in §§ 4–5, has little relevance to the speaker’s argument; it is what the doubters might have said, and has become but an elaborately expressed, and not original, *sententia*. We can translate indeed § 3 *ad fin.* and § 4, ‘we should no more allow ourselves to suffer aggression through the pleasures of peace than to be excited by good fortune in war; for he who thus hesitates will lose that delight and quiet which is the very occasion of his hesitation just as much as he who grows greedy by success in war forgets that he is buoyed up by a confidence which cannot be trusted.’ But it is difficult to see the logical sequence of § 5. So 122. 1 *ad fin.* C. 121. 1 carries on the argument from 120. 3.

Finley, in his discussion of rhetorical forms in Thucydides and Euripides, *Harvard Stud.* xlvi, 1938, notes points of resemblance between this speech and *I.T.* 729–30; *Alc.* 671–2; *Ion*, 585–6; *Suppl.* 306–19, and *Bellerophon*, fr. 287; which show that Thucydides, using the rhetoric of his day, did not necessarily have to wait till 404 to compose it.

5. *ἐνθυμεῖται γὰρ οὐδεῖς, κ.τ.λ.:* i.e. ‘what a man plans in his confident belief in the future is very unlike what he carries out in practice’. This is a satisfactory enough rendering of the MSS. reading *ὅμοια* (Forbes, Widmann, and Stuart Jones alone of modern editors); if we read *ὅμοια* with Reiske and most others, we translate: ‘no one plans and carries out his plan in action with the same confidence.’ The essential point is that *ὅμοια* or *ὅμοια τῇ πίστει* goes with both verbs. Classen compares i. 140. 1.

*ἐνθυμεῖται* has not the same meaning as *ἐντεθύμηται* above (‘has it fixed in his mind’), and there is some awkwardness in this.

**121. 1. ἀμυνώμεθα:** although they are starting the war (*τὸν πόλεμον ἐγείρομεν*), they are not the aggressors (*ἀδικούμενοι*: cf. 118. 3, 123. 2) and it is a war of self-defence. *ἀμυνώμεθα* is of course aorist; *καὶ* before *ἀδικούμενοι* corresponds to *καὶ σταν κ.τ.λ.*, not to *καὶ ἵκαν ἔχοντες ἐγκλήματα* (Classen): ‘we both begin the war with right on our side and we will end it as soon as its aim is attained’.

**2. πλήθει προύχοντας:** cf. 81. 1 n.

**3. ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τε ἔκάστοις οὐσίας:** contrast the more cautious Archidamos (80. 4) and the more scornful Perikles (141. 3)—Classen. *ῶνητή*: ‘mercenary’, not ‘easily to be bought’—edd. The argument is not a very good one, for the Corinthians are proposing to ‘buy’ rowers for the Peloponnesian fleet. See 124. 3 n.; and cf. 35. 3 n.

**4. εἰ δ' ἀντίσχοιεν:** not ‘supposing them to hold out after a defeat’ (Stahl), but a euphemistic way of saying ‘supposing we do not defeat them at once’, as shown by the following words (Classen); cf. 141. 6. The future *μελετήσουεν* is almost independent of the protasis: ‘we shall be practising’ (in any event); it is *ἐν πλέον χρόνῳ* which depends on the protasis—‘in that event we should have more time for practice’.

*καθαιρέτον* (C, G<sup>1</sup>) ‘can be achieved’, rather than *καθαιρεόν* (cett.) ‘must be achieved’ (cf. 118. 2 *ad fin.*). (For this meaning of *καθαιρεῖν*, Stahl compares Hdt. vii. 50. 3, see L. and S. Classen, however, with Widmann, prefers to interpret ‘must be annulled, destroyed’, i.e. the Athenian superiority; cf. 4, 139. 1, 140. 3.)

**5. καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπ' ἔκεινων, κ.τ.λ.:** i.e. ‘to prevent our own wealth being used to our destruction’; *αὐτοῖς τούτοις* and *αὐτά = χρήματα*.

**122. 1. ἐπιτειχισμός:** αἰνέττεται τὴν Δεκέλειαν, ἦν ὑστερον ἐτείχισαν—schol. See 124. 3 n.

**ἐν φῷ μὲν εὐοργήτως, κ.τ.λ.:** another maxim, which, like that in 120. 3, has little relevance to the Corinthian argument.

*εὐοργήτως*: ‘with his emotions well under control’; not excited or ‘in a flurry’ (Forbes), and so with reason as his guide; cf. 84. 2–3, 140. 1 n. Shilleto compares v. 70 for the effect of *ὅργη* in battle. It is not “mit verständigem Eifer” (Bender, *Der Begriff des Staatsmannes b. Thuk.*, 1938, 42, n. 113), as the simple contrary *ὅργισθείς* shows. Nor is it just *εὐσκόπως*, *εὐπρεπῶς*, *εὐτρόπως*: *ὅργὴ γὰρ στρόπος*, as the scholiast, Krüger, and Classen take it. (Classen compares 130. 2 for this generalized meaning of *ὅργὴ*, but see n. there.)

**3. τύραννον . . . πόλιν:** so 124. 3; an expression, here used for the first time, half adopted by Perikles (ii. 63. 2), altogether by Kleon (iii. 37. 2).

**4. τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων ξυμφορῶν:** i.e. one of the three faults. *ἀπῆλλακται*: cf. 138. 3 οὐκ ἀπῆλλακτο.

**οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεφευγότες αὐτά, κ.τ.λ.:** ‘for we cannot suppose that you

have shunned these errors only to take up with that most calamitous spirit of contempt’, &c.—Forbes. For οὐ γὰρ δὴ expressing incredulity, Classen compares v. 111. 3. On *καταφρόνησος . . . ἀφροσύνη*, Forbes writes: ‘the meaningless play on words is an instance of the element of weakness in Thucydides’ writing, due to the influence of contemporary rhetoricians and sophists.’ But it is not meaningless here: a particular state of mind is shown to be equivalent, in certain circumstances, to emptiness of mind—a good, if a rhetorical point: ‘your contempt for Athens (if it exists) is not due to any superiority, but simply to the fact that you are incapable of thought in the matter’. It would be juster to complain of ii. 62. 3–4 as a meaningless play on the word *καταφρόνησος*. Cf. also, vi. 34. 9 n. and 35. 1.

Steup takes οὐ in οὐ γὰρ δὴ, κ.τ.λ., with the participle only: ‘it is certainly not with the avoidance of all these faults that you have fallen into the further fault of contempt’; i.e. either *ἀξινεσία* or *μαλακία* or *ἀμέλεια* has led you to this. He adopts this view chiefly because of the similarity of meaning between *ἀξινεσία* and *ἀφροσύνη*—they could not avoid the first in order to be guilty of the second. But (1) they are not, strictly, said to be guilty of *ἀφροσύνη*, but of *καταφρόνησος* (which *in these circumstances* is but another word for *ἀφροσύνη*); (2) *ἀξινεσία* is ‘lack of intelligence’, which is nothing like so strong as *ἀφροσύνη* ‘emptiness of mind’; and (3) how could *μαλακία* be said to lead to *καταφρόνησος*?

The argument is not addressed to Archidamos: 84. 4.

**123.1. ἐπιταλαῖτωρεῖν:** ‘um des Weiteren willen auch weitere Mühen nicht scheuen’—Classen.

**εἰ δρά πλούτῳ τε νῦν, κ.τ.λ.:** see 19, n.

**124. 1. κοινῇ:** ‘in the common interest’ here, as *κοινῶς*, ii. 42. 3, *κοινῆ*, ii. 43. 2.

**εἴπερ βεβαιότατον, κ.τ.λ.:** ‘if it is true (as of course it is) that identity of interests (reading *ταῦτα*, not *ταῦτα*) is the safest ground for action for states as for private individuals’. This seems to be the necessary meaning here (so Stahl and Classen); but for it we must adopt Stahl’s transposition of *εἶναι* after *ἔνυμφέροντα*. For the common comparison of states with individuals, Stahl compares i. 82. 6, 144. 3, iii. 10. 1, 82. 2 (ii. 8. 4 and iv. 61. 2, which he also cites, are different); and for the sentiment, Dem. ii. 9. Steup, keeping the MSS. order and *ταῦτα* for *ταῦτα*, translates ‘seeing that this course (*ταῦτα = τάδε* just above = *τὸ πολεμεῖν*) is the safest both for states and for individuals’, i.e. ‘for us, both as states and as individuals’; so Forbes, in his first version. But there has been no mention of the private interests of individuals, and no such mention seems relevant here. Nor does the rendering ‘since identity of interests for states and

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individuals is the safest ground for action' (keeping the MSS. order, and reading *ταῦτά*) seem any better. Contrast *τὰ ἴδια* in 120. 1, which means the separate interests of individual states.

**οὐ πρότερον τὸν τούνωντίον:** a commonplace for Dorian ears, v. 9. 1, vi. 77. 1, vii. 5. 4; and not only for Dorians—cf. viii. 25. 3-5.

**2. τῆς δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διὰ πλείονος εἰρήνης:** 'the emphasis laid on the desire for a lasting peace shows how much the speakers had to reckon with a peace-party'—Classen. Cf. 125. 1 n. *διὰ πλείονος* is 'more durable', rather than 'though more distant' (Forbes).

**μὴ πολεμῆσαι:** 'to refuse to go to war', a refusal based on (*ἀπό*) *ἡσυχία*.

**3. ἐπελθόντες:** contrast the pacific meaning of the word above, 119.

Many scholars, e.g. Grundy, 320-1, have thought that this speech must have been composed by Thucydides much later, after 413 if not after 404, because later events are 'foretold': the revolt of subject states from Athens, desertion of her 'mercenary' sailors, the equipment of an adequate Peloponnesian fleet, and, above all, *ἐπιτειχίσματα*, which can only be a reference to the fortification of Dekeleia by Agis in 413. None of these reasons is compelling. Many of the subject states had revolted before 432, and more might reasonably be expected to do so when the forces of the Peloponnes and central Greece were arrayed against Athens; the second and third are not forecasts, but facile optimism (and, in fact, except at Syracuse, we do not hear from Thucydides that the Athenian navy suffered from the desertion of allied sailors, still less that the Peloponnesians made use of the belief that 'time was on their side' to prove themselves better sailors; nor do we know anything of another suggestion made in this speech—the loans from Delphi and Olympia);<sup>1</sup> and, for the last, Classen, in his note on 122. 1, points out that Athenian action at Pylos and at Methana (iv. 45. 2) are examples of *ἐπιτειχισμός*, and that the Spartans contemplated it before 421 (v. 17. 2) and the Athenians feared it long before 413 (vi. 91. 6). To which we may add that the Persian use of Thebes in 480-479 and their possible use of a walled Athens in a subsequent invasion (i. 90. 2) are instances of *ἐπιτειχισμός* in another form.<sup>2</sup> (See further 142. 3-4 n.)

<sup>1</sup> The loans *may* have been made, though Thucydides says nothing of them (see Introd., p. 26); but we have no reason to suppose that he was thinking of actual loans when he wrote this.

<sup>2</sup> Grundy, p. 310, goes further and says, "the statement made in that chapter (121. 3; cf. 143. 1): 'the Athenian power consists of mercenaries and not of their own citizens' could not possibly have been made in reference to the circumstances of the Ten Years' War"; and adds in a note, "it is, I believe, commonly assumed that Athens employed mercenaries more largely in the fleets of the Ten Years' War than in those of the Ionian War. When *all* the evidence is taken into

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Forbes, pp. 107-9, points out that in the speeches of Archidamos (80-3), of the Corinthians (121-2), and of Pericles (140-3) we have three forecasts of the coming war; and thinks that of the three the second is a "sagacious and accurate estimate", apparently "intended by Thucydides for a forecast as nearly accurate as possible of the actual result", though such is the "dramatic art" of Thucydides that "though in places they are coloured and made more definite by his knowledge of subsequent events", these speeches "are not allowed by him to anticipate anything which could not in some measure have been anticipated in 432". The reverse is the truth. The speeches of Archidamos and Pericles are not indeed accurate forecasts, for, as they well knew, the course of a war cannot be foreseen, the chances are incalculable; but they are accurate analyses of the conditions and of the opposing forces engaged in the war, and so of its probable course in so far as that can be calculated at all. The forecast of the Corinthians, in its general tenor, is mistaken throughout (not necessarily because they were stupid; their optimism was intended to persuade the doubters). The foreign rowers in the Athenian fleet were not to be bought (mainly, doubtless, because Athens controlled the states to which they belonged); a single defeat at sea did not end Athenian resistance;<sup>1</sup> years of practice at sea did not make the Peloponnesian fleet the equal of its enemy until the latter had been almost entirely destroyed at Syracuse, and hardly then, as the later Athenian victories showed; above all, the war was not a short one, as the Corinthians clearly envisage it, nor did it show that a war could secure a just and lasting peace. If Thucydides did compose the speech out of his own head, he intended it to show, amongst other things, the mistaken optimism of many of the Peloponnesians at the beginning of the war.

Schwartz, p. 114 (followed by Pohlenz, p. 98), argues from the very different tone of the two Corinthian speeches (68-71 and 120-4), the one so passionate for war, the other all for a reasonable peace, a difference not explicable by different tendencies or situations, that they must have been thought out and composed by Thucydides at different times. To me the difference in their tone seems

account it looks as if exactly the opposite were the case. The Athenian citizen was only too anxious to serve for pay, even at times when he was not suffering from the severe pressure of the war (vi. 24) (and so even more anxious when he was so suffering, as he was after 413?). Unfortunately Grundy does not cite all this evidence. Of course it is true that after 413 Athens had no longer either the political or the financial power to enlist so many recruits from abroad. iii. 16. 1 does show that even metics were employed as rowers only exceptionally; and the loss of some 24,000 men at Syracuse did not fall exclusively on Athens (Grundy, p. 309).

<sup>1</sup> Contrast the Corinthians' own argument on a different occasion and for a different purpose; 70. 5, &c.

exactly explained by the two situations, the one before any open move for the war and addressed to Sparta, the other after the Spartan decision and addressed to the other states, big and small, some of which were reluctant and hesitating. (See also below, p. 467.)

**125. 1. ὅσοι παρῆσαν:** all apparently did not attend the meeting, and only a majority (*τὸ πλῆθος*) of those who did voted for war; cf. 124. 2 n. Some states, in Arkadia for example, doubtless felt that their interests were not involved; others, as Achaia and perhaps Elis, that they would suffer from Athenian sea-power without compensating advantage. Each state, great and small, had an equal vote (141. 6); and the vote of the majority was binding on all, or should have been (see v. 30. 1).

**2. ἀπαρασκεύοις οὖσιν:** not because the season was too late. This has some effect on the date of this congress; see below.

**ἐκπορίζεοθαι δὲ ἔδόκει ἐκάστους:** most modern edd., but not Steup and Stuart Jones, accept Nattmann's correction *ἐκάστους*, on the ground that it must be the subject of *ἐκπ.*: "all voted that each should provide". Steup keeps the dative, taking *ἐκπ.* as passive and *ἐκάστους* as dative of the agent.

**ὅμως δὲ . . . ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ διετρίβη, ἔλασσον δέ:** is *ὅμως* 'even so', i.e. in spite of their resolution that there was to be no delay, nearly a year passed before the invasion; or 'still', i.e. though they were unprepared, the invasion took place before a year was out? That is, is Thucydides stressing the delay or the comparative rapidity? Steup maintains that the former is beyond question, and most editors have so understood it. I believe this to be right, not only because the natural connexion is between *μὴ εἶναι μέλλοντι* and *ὅμως δὲ καθισταμένοις*, but because *ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ διετρίβη* obviously implies a delay.<sup>1</sup> This would be yet clearer if we could be sure that Thucydides had in mind the fact which he relates later, ii. 10. 1, that orders to prepare for the invasion of Attica were not sent till the following spring, after the fighting at Plataia. He is, therefore, emphasizing the delay and *ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐκ, ἔλασσον δέ* means 'nearly a year', not 'a good deal less than a year'; on the other hand, I agree with Steup (who would of course freely emend) that Thucydides, if he had meant this, might rather have written *οὐ πολλῷ δὲ ἔλασσον* or the like.<sup>2</sup> Yet Herodotus, vii. 39. 2 (cited by Steup and Forbes),

<sup>1</sup> Some have felt that Thucydides is here contradicting a common exaggeration, 'the Peloponnesians waited a whole year before invading'. It is possible; but I do not feel it to be natural, in the context.

<sup>2</sup> In order to make the change appear paleographically more probable, Poppe emended to *οὐ πολλῷ>* *ἔλασσον δέ*; to which Steup rightly objected, only to suggest himself *οὐ πολλῷ δὲ διετρίβη>* *ἔλασσον δή* (*Thuk. Stud.* 2. 58; see also his edition, p. 451, where he would prefer *ἔλασσον δέ οὐ πολλῷ διῆλθε* or the like; which is indeed an improvement on the former suggestion).

*τὴν μὲν ἀξίνην οὐ λάμψει, ἐλάσσων δὲ τῆς ἀξίνης*, is very similar; for the meaning is clearly, 'you will receive not indeed the full punishment you deserve, but a little less'. If we feel uneasiness over Thucydides' expression, it is only, I think, because it is in Herodotus' rather than his own normal manner.

I have argued above, in the notes on the chronology of *τὰ Κερκυραῖα* (pp. 196-8) and *τὰ Ποτειδαικά* (pp. 222-4), that the natural, though not the inevitable, inference from Thucydides' own narrative and from the Kerkyra inscription is that Archestratos sailed from Athens in the spring of 432 and the battle of Poteidaia was therefore fought not later than the middle of June; it may have been some days earlier.<sup>1</sup> The siege, or at least the partial siege,<sup>2</sup> of the city began immediately after. The Corinthians, on hearing the news, at once began urging their allies to make representations with them at Sparta (67. 1; we may surely believe that Corinth did not wait for Phormion's arrival before taking this action—it was the defeat of the Poteidaians in the battle that caused their anxiety). Since probably only those states responded which had grievances against Athens, we need suppose no great delay before Sparta agreed to call a meeting of the apella to hear their complaints. We could put this meeting early in July. The Spartans then send a delegation to Delphi, receive an answer, and summon a general conference of the League. We cannot allow for this a shorter period than three weeks to a month, and it might be a good deal longer; the conference then was not held before August 1.<sup>3</sup> From this to c. May 20, 431, the date of the invasion of Attica, is from  $9\frac{1}{2}$  to 10 lunar months,<sup>4</sup> the least that we should expect Thucydides' 'not a year, but less' to mean.

Such a date for the League Conference explains too why the Corinthians urge haste, and why the delay of the Peloponnesians is ascribed here to their unpreparedness, and not to the imminent approach or the arrival of winter, as would be the case if the battle of Poteidaia was fought after the middle of September and the conference therefore not held before the beginning of November.

<sup>1</sup> The following pages are practically a repetition of the second part of my paper, *C.R.* lv, 1941, 59-67; but in view of the importance of this part for the interpretation of Thucydides, I think the repetition justified.

<sup>2</sup> Since the other cities in the Pallene peninsula remained loyal to Athens, and Athens controlled the sea, Poteidaia could not hope for great abundance of supplies from them even before the arrival of Phormion.

<sup>3</sup> The actual date of the conference must not conflict with the Olympian festival of this summer.

<sup>4</sup> The 'invasion of Attica' must be understood, if Thucydides is consistent, to be the act formally announced as such and therefore dated (ii. 19. 1; cf. 18. 1, 4), not the attack on Oinoe, as Steup supposes.

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Indeed if the decision of the Peloponnesians to go to war was made then, there was no delay (excepting the delay of some days after the troops left the Isthmus); for the invasion took place, on this assumption, at the earliest possible moment after the decision—at the time of year which was to be normal for the annual event.<sup>1</sup> If the decision was made early in August, there was opportunity for invasion in the autumn, but that the Peloponnesians were not ready. Hence the Corinthian plea for haste, to save Poteidaia, and hence the complaint of delay. Cp. the Mytilenean plea, iii. 13. 2-4.

So far then everything in Thucydides' narrative is consistent and easy. But this date for the battle of Poteidaia, not later than the middle of June, is explicitly contradicted by the statement in ii. 2. 1 that the attack on Plataia took place *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* after it; for that attack must have been shortly before March 8,<sup>2</sup> the date of the third new moon of 431 (*τελευτῶν τοῦ μηνὸς*, ii. 4. 2),<sup>3</sup> and from the middle of June to the beginning of March is not  $5\frac{1}{2}$  but  $9\frac{1}{2}$  months, *δεκάτῳ* not *ἔκτῳ μηνὶ*. In discussing whether this numeral is corrupt, let us take into consideration only the four plain indications or statements by Thucydides: (1) the interval between the battle of Poteidaia and the League Conference (67 and 118. 3-119), (2) 'not a year, but less', (3) 'the sixth month', and (4) 'the eightieth day' from Plataia to the invasion (ii. 19. 1), and ignore for the moment the time-relations between the end of *τὰ Κερκυραϊκά* and the beginning of *τὰ Ποτειδατικά* which were discussed above (pp. 222-4). I do not think, as I have said, that we can interpret the phrase 'not a year, but less' to mean less than 9 months at the minimum (apart from the argument mentioned above from the complaint of delay); I should expect it to be rather from 10 to 11 months. Add to this the period of 6-8 weeks between the battle and the League Conference, and we have, practically, a minimum of 11 months from the battle to the invasion of Attica. Subtract from this the 80 days by which the attack on Plataia preceded the invasion, and we have  $8\frac{1}{2}$  months between Poteidaia and Plataia. This is the minimum. Apart from all other

<sup>1</sup> Hubbell, C.P. xxiv, 1929, 229, argues from Thuc. v. 83. 1, 116. 1 and vi. 7. 1, that an invasion was *possible* in winter. It was; but it was not normal, and waiting till the spring would not be called delay (cf. 56. 1, 57. 6 nn.). And a *Spartan* invasion of neighbouring Argos was not the same thing as a full Peloponnesian invasion of Attica (Introd., p. 11).

<sup>2</sup> Sept. 12 is 6 lunar months before March 7. We must not pretend that *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* means anything but what it says, 'in the sixth month', i.e. about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  months. The beginning of September, when many would date the battle, is *μηνὶ ἐβδόμῳ* before March 7.

<sup>3</sup> The new moon of April 7 might also be described perhaps as *ἀμα ἡρὶ ἀρχομένῳ*, for it was about the time of the normal opening of the campaigning season; but it would make the invasion of Attica c. June 20 instead of May 20, if *δύσοντοστὴ ἡμέρᾳ* in ii. 19. 1 is to be kept; and that is too late. See n. there and on ii. 23. 2.

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considerations then, there is a corruption in the text, or Thucydides was unable to add and we must do the sum for him. I do not see how we can get away from this. Since it is obviously probable that the corruption is of a figure, either *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* or *ἡμέρᾳ ὁγδοηκοστῇ* is wrong. Now, though *ὁγδοηκοστῇ* is not quite satisfying, for it makes a somewhat tight fit for events after the invasion, between it and the end of the year (see n. ad loc.), yet if it is wrong, it is too high a figure, not too low; and if we emend to a lower figure, we push back by the same number of days the conference of the League and with it the battle of Poteidaia; that is, we increase instead of lessening the interval between Poteidaia and Plataia. Therefore *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* cannot stand; we are compelled to emend the number to *ἐνάτῳ* at the lowest ( $8\frac{1}{2}$  months, as above), but preferably to *δεκάτῳ*, which enables us to put this conference early in August 432 as has already been suggested.<sup>1</sup> An unavoidable emendation thus supports the natural inference to be drawn from Thucydides' narrative in cc. 56-65. There is one point in this natural inference which needs especial emphasis. We can imagine reasons why Poteidaia might have postponed her secession, though we should have expected her to act before any Athenian fleet was likely to arrive and Thucydides to have noted a delay; but we cannot think of reasons why Archestratos' expedition should have been delayed—that was already, in the winter, being prepared, and it was to act against Perdikcas with whom Athens was already at war and to prevent the secession of Poteidaia, not to wait till the secession was a fact.

For the arguments in favour of the MS. reading *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* based on I.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 296, see my article cited above, p. 421, n. 1, where I have disputed them. Here I will only say that, if *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* is retained, the natural interpretation of the inscription would be that Eukrates was a colleague of Archestratos (Wade-Gery's view), and his sailing should be put as early as possible in the second prytany, c. Aug. 12. In that event we should get the following as the earliest possible dates: revolt of Poteidaia, c. Aug. 13-14; Aristeus' arrival at Poteidaia, Sept. 23; Kallias' arrival at Pydna perhaps Sept. 20, and the battle of Poteidaia, Oct. 10, which is barely five lunar months before the attack on Plataia at the beginning of March. The League Conference at Sparta would not then have taken place before the end of November.

Two or three smaller points may be noticed here. We must not argue from the number of strategoi, e.g., that Archestratos must have sailed in 433-432 because all of the ten for 432-431 are known;

<sup>1</sup> It will be noticed that I have suggested in 103. 1 the emendation *ἔκτῳ* for *δεκάτῳ* and here the reverse; which may appear suspicious. But it is not really so; if the emendations are right, it means only that these two numerals were especially liable to be confused.

for it is possible that Archestratos' colleagues included one or more strategoi who had been to Kerkyra, and it is even probable that Kallias included Archestratos (and his two colleagues: see 57. 6 n.) among *his*; that is, we do not know all the strategoi either of 433–432 or of 432–431. Similarly, the argument that the debate in the Spartan apella must belong to the Spartan year 433–432 (September to September) because Sthenelaïdas was then ephor, and Ainesias was ephor in 432–431 (ii. 2. 1), has no validity; for the latter was ephor eponymos, Sthenelaïdas only *εἰς τῶν ἐφόρων*, and perhaps Ainesias' colleague. Lastly, Kolbe, *Thukydides im Lichte d. Urkunden* 3, 26–8, argues that *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* in ii. 2. 1 is not a true date because, like all Thucydides' time-indications for the period before the Peloponnesian war, it only gives the interval between two events the first of which (Poteidaia) is not dated; the only purpose therefore of the words is to underline the irony already expressed in *ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ διετρίβῃ, ἔλασσον δέ*—the Spartan idea of speed was to let nearly a year pass before invading, and five months before any attack and then it is an attack not by them but by the Thebans. But to find irony in that string of dates in ii. 2. 1 is a strange thing; nor can I see that the delay that intervened between the Peloponnesian decision and their invasion is relevant to the interval between the battle of Poteidaia and a sudden attack by Thebans on Plataia. It is quite possible that when Thucydides first noted the interval *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* (or *δεκάτῳ*) he was intending the same sort of indication of time as he used in the Pentekontaëtia; but when he finally composed ii. 2. 1 he was very carefully dating, in the proper sense (see Introd., p. 8), and by retaining *μηνὶ ἔκτῳ* he dated not Plataia by Poteidaia, but Poteidaia by Plataia, just as in the same passage he dates the Thirty Years' Peace (see Pohlenz, 26–8).

Tabulating the dates which seem most probable for *τὰ Κερκυραϊκά* and *τὰ Ποτειδαικά*, to complete the table given above on p. 396, we would have:

Battle of Leukimme	c. midsummer 435
Two years' preparation by Corinth	Autumn 435 to autumn 433
Alliance between Athens and Kerkyra	June 434–433
First Athenian squadron sails	Late July 433–432
Corinthian fleet sails	Mid-Aug. 433–432
Second Athenian squadron sails	Late Aug. 433–432
Battle of Sybota	Mid-Sept. 433–432
Athenian demands on Poteidaia	Jan. 433–432
Poteidaia sends delegates to Athens (and secretly to Sparta)	Jan. 433–432
<i>Alliance with Rhegion and Leontinoi renewed</i>	Winter (?) 433–432
Archestratos' expedition sails and Poteidaia revolts	Mid-April 433–432

Kallias' expedition sails	c. May 20, 433–432
Aristeus arrives at Poteidaia	End of May 433–432
Battle of Poteidaia and beginning of the siege	Mid-June 433–432
First congress at Sparta	Early July 432–431
Second congress at Sparta	Early August 432–431
Phormion's expedition sails ( <i>χρόνῳ νοτερον</i> )	Sept. or Oct. 432–431
Theban attack on Plataia	Beginning of March 432–431
Peloponnesian invasion of Attica	c. May 20, 432–431

126. 1–2. *Spartan Embassy to Athens*: Plut. Per. 33. 1–3. (Plutarch appears to misplace this embassy after the others, c. 139, and very shortly before the Peloponnesian invasion. See Weizsäcker, 14–15. It is not, however, certain that he intends this.)

1. *πρόφασις*: here 'openly expressed reason or motive', very different from its meaning in 23. 6.

2. *ἔσακούσωσιν*: there is much in favour of reading *ἔσακούσωσιν* here, with FGM; less in 82. 2, where it is found in AE.

2. *πρώτον μέν*: pointing forward to 139. 1.

126. 3–12. *Excursus on the affair of Kylon*: Hdt. v. 70–2; Plut. Sol. 12.

3. *κατ' ἔκεινον τὸν χρόνον*: for the date, see below, 126. 12 n. It is to be noted that Thucydides is not here interested in the date (cf. Hdt. v. 71. 2). (It was to be found in Hellanikos' *Athis* and other works?)

6. *ἔστι γάρ καὶ Ἀθηναῖος Διάσια*: Thucydides was not writing solely for an Athenian public.

Διάσια . . . ἔξω τῆς πόλεως: celebrated in Anthesterion (March–April) every year—A. Mommsen, *Feste d. Stadt Athen*, 421 ff.; Stengel, art. 'Diasia', in Pauly-Wissowa.

ἐν ᾧ πανδημεῖ . . . ἐπιχώρια: an irrelevant detail, for it does not show that the oracle could have meant the Athenian festival (Stahl); but not on that account to be bracketed, with many editors, wholly or in part. Thucydides, when he does digress (and this whole digression is irrelevant to his main narrative), allows himself to mention matters which he felt were of interest for their own sake, as he does in cc. 1–22; and, as already said, he is writing for a Greek, not a purely Athenian public. See Hude or Stuart Jones for the text here.

*πανδημεῖ*: "kept by the whole people together; not by particular clans or demes, or by the whole people in their several districts"—Forbes.

7. *ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν*: because the town of Athens was then small and unimportant.

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8. **αὐτοκράτοροι:** "αὐτεξουσίοις schol. Non ἀνυπευθύνοις"—Stahl. This distinction is to be remembered; for many historians have explained *αὐτοκράτωρ* as meaning 'not subject to *εὐθύνη*', and L. and S. may mislead. It means that an official is allowed, on a particular occasion, to make a decision that shall be binding on the state: e.g. a strategos or ambassador *αὐτοκράτωρ* might conclude a peace or an alliance on terms which he decides for himself; not that he had no responsibility for it before the state on his return. See Beloch, *Att. Politik*, 285-7; Wade-Gery, *C.Q.* xxv, 1931, 141, n. 2, xxvii. 22-3; Kahrstedt, *Unters. z. Magistratur in Athen*, ii (1936), 265-6; and nn. on v. 45. 1, viii. 67. 3.

Thucydides' use of the word is probably anachronistic; it is a term proper to the fifth and later centuries in Athens. His purpose is to show why only the archons were held responsible for the execution of the suppliants; hence too just above *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπῆλθον οἱ πολλοί*: the state was not responsible.

**τοῖς ἐννέᾳ ἄρχουσι . . . τότε δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἔπρασσον:** one of the very few instances in which Thucydides seems to be correcting Herodotus, though he is emphasizing the old powers of the archons as opposed to their unimportance in the fifth century. Herodotus, in his very brief account, gives the detail *τούτους* (the suppliants) *ἀνιστᾶσι μὲν οἱ πρυτάνες τῶν ναυκράρων, οἱ περ ἔνεμον τότε τὰς Ἀθήνας*. Where Herodotus got this from, it would be very difficult to say: Harpokration would identify the presidents of the naukraroi with the archons, quite wrongly; and a gallant but unconvincing attempt has been made in modern times to save Herodotus' authority by assuming that *οἱ πρυτάνες* might be used for *οἱ ἄρχοντες* in ancient times (because they are known as chief officials in other states, as in Miletos) and that only *τῶν ναυκράρων* is wrongly added (J. H. Wright, *Harvard Stud.* iii, 1892). In fact the naukraroi were local financial officers (Ar. *Ἀθηναῖοι* 8. 3, 21. 5).<sup>1</sup> Aristotle also says, of the time of Solon, *μεγίστην εἶχε δύναμιν ὁ ἄρχων* (13. 2), though he means by this the *ἄρχων ἐπώνυμος*, not the college of nine archons (cf. n. on § 11, below). Herodotus may be following a version favourable to the Alkmeonidai which said that the naukraroi and not the archons (of whom Megakles was perhaps the archon eponymos) were responsible for the sacrilege for which the Alkmeonidai were, however, blamed.

**τὰ πολλὰ ἔπρασσον:** this does not of course mean that they had any 'dictatorial' powers; their power on this occasion has been specially voted to them by 'the Athenians'. It means administrative action, and the sentence contrasts the archons with the later boule and dicasteries.

<sup>1</sup> See R.E. s.v., and for an interesting, but uncertain theory, Beloch, i. 2, 321-7.

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10. **ἐπὶ τὸν βωμόν:** πρὸς τὸ ἄγαλμα, Hdt. Presumably the altar and cult-statue of Athena Polias on the Acropolis.

11. **ἐπὶ τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν τοῖς βωμοῖς:** just below the entrance to the Acropolis, on the Areiopagos.

**τὸ γένος τὸ ἀπ' ἑκείνων:** why does not Thucydides name the Alkmeonidai? He assumes that they were universally known to have been the *ἐναγεῖς*; cf. 127. 1 *Περικλέα . . . προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα*. This last point, as well as the singular *τὸ γένος*, shows that only the Alkmeonidai were banished, as is assumed as well by our other authorities; yet we should suppose from Thucydides' narrative that all nine archons, who could not all have belonged to the same family, were equally guilty. Aristotle's statement that it was the archon eponymos who had the chief power in the state (above, § 8, n.) in fact fits Thucydides' narrative better. Plutarch names Megakles as the archon and makes him chiefly responsible for the killing, though the other archons helped; he was following the narrative of Aristotle in the lost beginning of the *Ἀθηναῖοι Πολιτεία* (see Sandys on *Ἀθηναῖοι* 1. 1).

12. **ἡλασαν μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Ἀθ. τοὺς ἐναγεῖς τούτους:** according to the Attic tradition, as represented by Plutarch following Aristotle, this was in the time of Solon, shortly before his archonship. It was followed very soon after by the 'purification' of Athens by the seer Epimenides the Cretan. So too Diogenes Laert. i. 110, who dates Epimenides' visit to Athens 596-593 (i.e. Solon's archonship). Plato, however, Legg. 642 D, places the purification c. 500 B.C., i.e. shortly after the second expulsion of the Alkmeonidai by Isagoras and Kleomenes and after their restoration: that is, it was a purification to allow them to remain and for the reconciliation of political enemies; and there seems no reason why Plato should depart from the Attic tradition.<sup>1</sup> The fragment of Aristotle's opening chapter that we possess does not explicitly contradict this date: for the expulsion there mentioned was at least one generation after Kylon's attempt (*αὐτὸι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τάφων ἐξεβλήθησαν*), and so may have been four generations after. But since his next statement, *'Επιμενίδης δ' ὁ Κρῆς ἐπὶ τούτους ἐκάθηρε τὴν πόλιν*, does not imply any return of the accused and reconciliation, and since Plutarch follows him closely in the details which survive in the *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, it is reasonable to suppose that he too placed the expulsion and the purification in the time of Solon; and the origin of Plato's statement remains unexplained. On the other hand, Thucydides' statement here, taken by itself, would imply that the first expulsion was soon after the crime, and that only at the second, in 508, were the bones of the

<sup>1</sup> Diogenes says that Epimenides came to Athens because of a pestilence raging there; and we know that a memorable pestilence did befall Athens about 500 B.C.: I.G. i.<sup>2</sup> 1009, [λοι]μῷ θανότης εἰμι [σῆ]μα Μυρρίνης.

dead ancestors dug up and cast out. As stated above, it is *possible* that Aristotle too said this; in which case Plutarch would be following another authority for his date and his connexion of Epimenides with Solon. See also next note.

**κατῆλθον μέντοι ὑστερον, κ.τ.λ.:** they were back from the first exile by the time of Solon, for Alkmeon, son of the guilty Megakles, commanded the Athenian forces in the first Sacred War, c. 590 B.C. (Plut. *Sol.* ii. 2); he had too won the chariot race at Olympia in 592 (Hdt. vi. 125. 5; Isokr. xvi. 25; Pind. *Pyth.* vii. 13, with schol. ad loc.). His son was the famous Megakles who married Kleisthenes of Sikyon's daughter, and was powerful in Peisistratos' day. So that if the purification of the city by Epimenides did take place in Solon's time, it was followed by the return of the Alkmeonidai; it will have been part of Solon's policy of reconciliation.<sup>1</sup>

The Alkmeonidai, or some of them, were exiled again during the tyranny, but only for political reasons, not as *évayētis* (Hdt. v. 62. 2), and for the third time, for a short period, by Kleomenes and Isagoras.

*Date of Kylon's conspiracy.*

The Olympic victor-lists placed Kylon's victory in the 35th Olympiad, 640 B.C. The *Atthis* placed his conspiracy and the archonship of Megakles (in an Olympic year) before the archonship of Aristaichmos, 621 B.C., the year in which it put Drakon's legislation (*Aθπ.* 4. 1), hence (since Kylon was probably a young man when he won his victory) in 632, 628, or 624; Herodotus, writing before a systematic chronology had been established, says simply *ταῦτα πρὸ τῆς Πλειστράτου ἡλικίης ἐγένετο* (v. 71. 2). One of these dates has been accepted by most modern historians, but not by de Sanctis (*Atthis*, pp. 280-9) and Beloch (i. 2. 302-9), who have a theory peculiar to themselves, that the conspiracy was in 552, during a suggested archonship of the younger Megakles, leader of one of the three parties in the time of Peisistratos.<sup>2</sup> They justify this on the usual *a priori* grounds, that an attempt at a tyranny is "more likely" at that date,<sup>3</sup> and as well because the Olympic lists for the eighth and seventh centuries were not authentic and, though very

<sup>1</sup> There is nothing in Plutarch's narrative against the view that, by the common story, Epimenides' visit was followed by a political reconciliation; but it should be noted that he tells of Alkmeon's command at Delphi *before* the expulsion of the *āyos*, and should mean that it was earlier.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also Seeck, *Klio*, iv, 1904, 318-26; Cornelius, *Die Tyrannis in Athen* (1929), 36-9.

<sup>3</sup> Bogner, *Philol.* lxxxvii, 1932, 480-1, produces as good a general argument in favour of the traditional date, namely that the Attic farmers (*εβούθησαν . . . ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν*, Thuc.) were then supporting the aristocrats, not against them as they were by Solon's time.

likely there was in fact an archon Megakles 3, 7, or 11 years before an archon Aristaichmos in the second half of the seventh century, the attribution of events to their years was not based either on records or on sound tradition. Beloch forgets that he has himself admitted (i. 2. 152-4) that for the Olympiads of 572 and subsequent years, the victor-lists were in all probability authentic, so that the record of a victory by Kylon shortly before 552 would have been preserved. He also accepts the Attic tradition that placed Peisistratos' first tyranny in the archonship of Komeas (561-560) and that put this 31 (or 33) years after the archonship of Solon (594-593 or 592-591). The same tradition would have preserved the memory of so notorious an event as Kylon's conspiracy and the expulsion of the *évayētis* (which Beloch identifies with the expulsion of Megakles by Peisistratos when he regained the tyranny), if it had occurred after 561-560.<sup>1</sup> It is, besides, a contradiction to say that we know little or nothing of Attic history in the seventh century (Beloch rejects Drakon's legislation as well), and then to argue that an attempt at a tyranny was at that time improbable.<sup>2</sup> See also Adcock, *C.A.H.* iv. 661-2; and for the date of Theagenes of Megara, Burn, *J.H.S.* xlvi, 1927, 171-2, and Schachermeyer's good discussion of the evidence, *R.E.*, art. 'Theagenes', 1341-3. All accept a seventh-century date.

On the question of the authenticity of the Olympic lists, see, besides Beloch, i. 2. 148-54, Wade-Gery, *C.A.H.* iii. 762-4, and the sensible account by Ziehen, *R.E.* art. 'Olympia', 2527-9; for some interesting but highly speculative suggestions, Lenschau, *Philol.* xci, 1936, 396-411. Plutarch, *Numa*, i. 6 (and others, according to him), doubted the value of Hippias' Olympic list—that is, doubted whether he had evidence for it, and thought it inexact. He may mean by this that Hippias had no evidence for the order of the earliest

<sup>1</sup> To illustrate the uncertainty of the Attic tradition, Beloch says: "Können wir doch nicht einmal mit Sicherheit sagen, in welchem Jahre Solon Archon gewesen ist" (p. 306), an interesting case of a misleading argument. It is true that *we* cannot be sure; but that does not mean that there was similar uncertainty in antiquity. It is quite clear that Aristotle had a complete list, in fixed order, of archons from at least the last third of the 7th cent., and that Solon's position in it was certain; and we have no reason to suppose that the list did not correspond with the truth. Our doubt arises because of a discrepancy in the figures given in our MS. of *Aθπ.* 13. 1-2 and 14. 1 (or, according to Beloch, because we have misunderstood the meaning of the former passage); but that is a very different matter.

<sup>2</sup> Kahrstedt, *R.E.* art. 'Megakles' (2), supports Beloch, and adds to his evidence the story of Alkmeon and Croesus in Hdt. vi. 125, which shows that till Croesus' time "haben die Alkmeoniden als angesehenes Geschlecht in Athen gelebt, dann erst wurden sie wirklich bedeutsam, woraus folgt" that they played no important part in the 7th cent., and were not exiled then. That is the modern scientific way of treating legend.

names, no number of the Olympiad having been recorded, not that he invented the names; or only that *events dated* by his list were quite unreliable (including events in the history of the Olympic festival itself, as the introduction of new contests and the like—so Lenschau). A number of scholars have supposed that at first the Olympic festival was an annual, not a quadrennial event; and according as they would date certain historical events that have connexions with it, as the reign of Pheidon, Kylon's conspiracy and therewith Theagenes of Megara, place the date of the first Olympiad earlier or later; they accept, that is, the traditional number of Olympiads and, in general, the order of events connected with them, but suppose that the ancients got the dates of these wrong because for the earliest festivals they assumed the four-yearly interval. Lenschau, for example, in the first part of his article cited above (pp. 278–89, 'die Tyrannis in den Isthmosstaaten') concludes, from consideration of the tyrannies of Corinth and Sikyon, that Kylon's attempt was probably made c. 600 B.C.; in accordance with this he thinks that the festival of 580 B.C., the 50th, was the first of the quadrennial, that of 584 the last of the annual events, and Kylon's victory in the 35th Olympiad therefore was in 598.<sup>1</sup> I find this unconvincing: chiefly because most ancient dating of kings of the seventh century and earlier is based on generations, so that a statement that Pheidon was at Olympia in the 8th Olympiad (whether worthless or not) means 'he belonged to the period 760–730, therefore the Olympiad with which he is connected was the 8th', rather than 'he was connected with the 8th Olympiad, therefore he was reigning in 748'.

**127. 1. Περικλέα... προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα:** Xanthippos had married Agariste, daughter of Hippocrates, brother to Kleisthenes, and grand-daughter of the famous Agariste who had been wooed by many and won by Megakles (Hdt. vi. 126–31). (*προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ* = ἔνοχον ὅντα τῷ ἄγει, according to Plutarch, *Per.* 33. 1, and modern editors, not ἔνυγγενή ὅντα τῷ γένει.)

**3. ὃν γὰρ δυνατώτατος, κ.τ.λ.:** this is resumed in 139. 4, the long digression on Pausanias and Themistokles intervening. Plutarch,

<sup>1</sup> Lenschau points out (against de Sanctis) that Solon's law against tyranny presupposes some attempt at it, and thinks Kylon's may well have been made in the time of confusion before Solon's archonship. But how to get over the difficulty that Aristotle puts it before Drakon, whom he dates to 621? Nothing easier: c. 4 is an interpolation in the *Ἀθηναῖων Πολιτείᾳ*, the 'first edition' did not have it; but the first edition must have had some mention of Drakon, and this therefore must have been in the lost first part, and so *before* the attempt of Kylon; and no long time need be supposed to have passed between Kylon and Solon according to Aristotle's first (and better) thoughts. Which is one way of rewriting the lost works of antiquity.

*Per.* 16. 1: καίτοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ σαφῶς μὲν ὁ Θουκυδῆς διηγεῖται, κακοήθως δὲ παρεμφάνοντιν οἱ κωμικοί, Πεισιστρατίδας μὲν νέος τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν ἔταιρους καλοῦντες, αὐτὸν δ' ἀπομόσαι μὴ τυραννήσειν κελεύοντες . . . ὃ δὲ Τηλεκλείδης (fr. 42) παραδεδάκει φησὶν αὐτῷ τοὺς Ἀθηναῖούς

πόλεων τε φόρους αὐτάς τε πόλεις, τὰς μὲν δεῦν τὰς δ' ἀναλύειν,  
λάνια τείχη, τὰ μὲν οἰκοδομεῖν τὰ δ' ἔπειτα πάλιν καταβάλλειν,  
σπουδὰς δύναμιν κράτος εἰρήνην πλοῦτόν τ' εὐδαιμονίαν τε.

Shortly before (15. 1) Plutarch has said much the same as sober fact. Ephoros, if Diodoros does not malign him (xii. 38. 2; cf. 41. 1), was quite childish: Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν ἡγεμονίας ἀντεχόμενοι τὰ ἐν Δήλῳ κοινῇ συνηγμένα χρήματα, τάλαντα σχεδὸν ὀκτακισχίλια, μετήνεγκαν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ παρέδωκαν φυλάπτειν Περικλεῖ.

### 128–38. Excursus on the fate of Pausanias and of Themistokles.

(1) 128–34. *Pausanias*: Diod. xi. 44–5 (477–476 B.C.), who follows Thucydides closely, if indirectly. A few other details are to be found in Plut. *Arist.* 23; *Kim.* 6; *Paus.* iii. 17. 7–9. This excursus is the best example of Thucydides' interest in biography and personality, which he elsewhere kept in check: see Introd., pp. 26–8.

### 128. 1. τὸν μέγαν σεισμόν: 101. 2.

2. **τῆς Χαλκιοίκου:** the temple of Athena Chalkioikos, on the 'acropolis' of Sparta (*Paus.* iii. 17. 1, 2–3), its remains excavated in 1907: *B.S.A.* xiii, 1906–7, 137–54, xiv. 142–6.

3. **τὸ πρώτον μεταπεμφθείς:** 95. 3. The second recall is related in 131. 1. ἀπελύθη μὴ ἀδικεῖν: see 95. 5, where more detail is given.

ἰδίᾳ δὲ αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.: see n. on *σκυτάλην*, 131. 1.

**τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον:** elsewhere in Thucydides the war with Persia is always *Μῆδικὸς πόλεμος* or *τὰ Μῆδικά*, 90. 1, 95. 7, 97. 1, 2, &c.; and 'Ἑλληνικὸς πόλεμος', a war between Athens and other Greek states, is expressly contrasted with it, 112. 2; hence many editors read here, after Gebhardt, *Μῆδικόν*. But the Lamian war of 323–322, waged by allied Greek states against Macedonia, was called 'Ἑλληνικὸς πόλεμος', Plut. *Phok.* 23. 1, even officially *I.G. ii.*<sup>2</sup> 505<sub>17</sub>, 506; and Archidamos' phrase *ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος*, 81. 4, contains the same idea. Here the contrast with *τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ τὰ πρὸς βασιλέα πράγματα πρᾶσσεν* is emphasized by the use of 'Ἑλληνικόν'—Classen. (*ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος* is, perhaps, rather 'the kind of fighting we shall have to do' than 'the war we shall have to wage'.)

### 5. Βυζάντιον γὰρ ἑλών: 94. 2.

**Μῆδοι:** a good instance of the Greek use of *Μῆδοι* = Persia, the state. The prominent persons there at the time, friends and kinsmen of Xerxes, must have been mostly Persians, not Medes. For the origin

of this use, see an ingenious paper by J. L. Myres, in *Greek Poetry and Life (Essays presented to G. Murray)*, 97–103.

**τότε τούτους οὓς ἔλαβεν ἀποπέμπει:** most editors, but not Stuart Jones, place *τότε* in the parenthesis, with *ἔλαωσαν*, probably wrongly. *τότε* refers back to *Βυζάντιον ἐλών* and explains the first claim to the king's gratitude. Krueger says *τότε δή* is regularly used after a participial clause (58. 1, iv. 78. 1, v. 58. 1); but this is only true when the participial clause or clauses indicate some lapse of time, when *τότε δή* means 'then, after this interval', like *οὐτω δή*; here it means 'on that occasion'; cf. 130. 1, iv. 30. 3.

**6. Γογγύλου τοῦ Ἐρετρίως:** see Xen. *Hell.* iii. 1. 6. He was rewarded, like Themistokles, with the revenue of some towns—partly, as with Themistokles, an empty gift (above, pp. 290–2).

**ώς ὑστερὸν ἀνηρέθη:** how, and when? The answer from the king (129. 3) Pausanias might have kept. The same difficulty recurs with Themistokles' letter (137. 4); but it is not solved by dismissing them all as picturesque fables, as Beloch does, ii. 2. 148, 155.

Thucydides might mean here by the use of *τάδε*, not *τοιάδε*, that he is quoting word for word, as he is not in the public speeches (see my *Essays*, ix, pp. 166–7; E. Harrison, above, p. 144, n. 1).

**7. δορὶ ἐλών:** a poetic expression, 'the captives of my spear'.

**Θυγατέρα τε σήν:** 'a daughter of yours', the reading of CG, seems preferable to *θ. τ. τὴν σήν* (Wilamowitz, *Gr. Lesebuch*). According to a story reported by Herodotos, v. 32, εἰ δὴ ἀληθής γέ ἔστι ὁ λόγος, Pausanias was actually betrothed to a daughter of Megabates, cousin to Darius. Even if the story were true, it is not, of course, inconsistent with a loftier *proposal*; even if it is the same Megabates who was now superseded in the satrapy of Daskyleion (129. 1).

For the change from the third to the first person there are, of course, many parallels, notably in the correspondence between Queen Anne and Sarah Churchill.

**129. 1. Ξέρξης τε ἡσθη:** delight is characteristic of the Herodotean Xerxes: vii. 28. 3, 44, viii. 69. 2, 101, 1, 103, ix. 109, 1, 2; and of other royal persons: i. 27. 5, 54, 56. 1, &c.

**'Αρτάβαζον τὸν Φαρνάκου:** Hdt. vii. 66, viii. 126–9, ix. 41–2, et al.  
**τὴν Δασκυλῆτιν σατραπείαν:** Hdt. iii. 90. 2 (the *νομὸς τρίτος*); Xen. *Hell.* iv. 1. 15–16.

**3. ὅδε λέγει βασιλεὺς Ξέρξης Παυσανίᾳ:** cf. the beginning of the letter of Darius to Gadatas, Tod, no. 10. Similarly the phrase below, *κείσεται σοι εὐεργεσία, κ.τ.λ.*, is paralleled in the inscription (ll. 15–17); see Tod, ad loc., and Hdt. viii. 85. 3.

**μήτε νῦν μήθ' ἡμέρα:** another oriental expression; cf. Hdt. v. 23. 2—Classen.

**130. 2. δυσπρόσοδον:** i.e. he surrounded himself with a court, like an Oriental monarch. Kingship survived in Sparta after it had disappeared in the rest of Greece; but it did not carry with it any of the trappings of eastern and modern royalty, and, especially, it did not mean that citizens could not approach the king in the ordinary way. *τῇ ὄργῃ οὐτω χαλεπῇ ἐχρήτο* means that, in addition, Pausanias became overbearing, difficult in temper: two reasons, that is, are given why he was difficult to approach. *ἡ ὄργῃ* here is not simply *οἱ τρόποι*: cf. 122. 1 n.

**131. 1. τό τε πρῶτον . . . ἀνεκάλεσαν αὐτόν:** 95. 3.

**βίᾳ ὥπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιορκηθείς:** "the words imply a forcible expulsion, of which we should like to know more, but we have no right to assume, on very doubtful and indirect evidence, that he installed himself in full possession of Byzantium and was regularly besieged by the Athenian forces. Thucydides uses the same strong word (*ἐξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῷ*, 134. 2) of his starvation in the temple of Athene"—Forbes (p. 100). So also Stahl. See above, pp. 399–400.

**οὐκ ἐπανεχώρει:** we should perhaps read *οὐκέτ' ἐπανεχώρει* or *ἀνεχώρει*.

**σκυτάλην:** *καλεῖται δὲ ὁμονύμως τῷ ἔνιλῳ σκυτάλῃ τὸ βιβλίον*, ὡς *τῷ μετροῦντι τὸ μετρούμενον*, Plut. *Lys.* 19. 8 *ad fin.*, after a long description of the skytale-message. A similar description is to be found in the scholia to this passage in Thucydides. There is a slight difficulty. A skytale was only granted to a commanding officer sent abroad by the state; how then, as the scholia here ask, came Pausanias, abroad on a private mission, to be in possession of one? The answer probably is that he was, though privately abroad, still a Spartan magistrate, namely, Regent for King Pleistarchos (so Forbes and Classen); but as Forbes says, "in Thucydides' narrative the personal interest prevails over the historical, and we seek in vain for an answer to the question, what were Pausanias' exact relations with the Spartan government? and what were the circumstances of his expulsion from Byzantium by the Athenians?" Indeed, in what circumstances could a Regent leave Sparta for a long time on a private mission?

**2. τὸ πρῶτον:** his first imprisonment. His second, however, 134. 2, was not strictly imprisonment. We should perhaps delete *τό*.

**τὸν βασιλέα δρᾶσαι τοῦτο: καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἦν βασιλεὺς (οἱ Παυσανίας), ἀλλ' ἐπέτροπος**—schol.

**132. 1. οὔτε οἱ ἔχθροι οὔτε ἡ πᾶσα πόλις:** cf. 95. 5.

**ἀνεψιὸς ὄν:** Pausanias' father Kleombrotos and Leonidas were brothers, 94. 1 n.

**2. ὑποψίας δέ πολλάς, κ.τ.λ.:** Thucydides once more deserts the

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chronological order in a simple narrative; he is here emphasizing Pausanias' personal conduct, which was 'tyrannical' and un-Spartan. Cf. 57. 6 n., pp. 208-9.

**μὴ ίσος βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοῖς παροῦσι:** it would have been clearer if Thucydides had written *τῷ καθεστῶτι* or the like instead of *τοῖς παροῦσι*, especially in view of *τῇ παρούσῃ διανοῇ* in § 3.

**〈καὶ〉 τά τε ἄλλα:** Ullrich's emendation, accepted by Stahl and Hude, but not by Classen and Stuart Jones, is desirable. Steup agrees that *τε* points forward to *καὶ ὅτι*, but rejects *καὶ* here, preferring an impossible asyndeton.

**τὸν τρίποδα:** Hdt. viii. 82. 1, ix. 81. 1. The golden tripod itself was melted down by the Phokians in the Sacred War in the fourth century, Paus. x. 13. 9; its support, the three bronze snakes intertwined, was removed to Constantinople by the Emperor Constantine. See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, iii, c. 17; Fabricius, *Jahrb.* i, 1886, 175-91.

We should read perhaps *τότε* for *ποτε* after *τρίποδα* (according to Hude, B has *τε*).

**Ἐλλήνων ἀρχηγός, κ.τ.λ.:** according to Paus. iii. 8. 2 this was composed by Simonides, which would be interesting, if true. The inscription was presumably cut on the marble basis of the whole monument. Diodoros, xi. 33. 2, gives another epigram on the monument:

*'Ελλάδος εὐρυχόρου σωτῆρες τόνδ' ἀνέθηκαν  
δουλοσύνης στυγερᾶς ρύσαμενοι πόλιας.*

Fabricius (see above), 180-2, thought that the Greeks substituted this for Pausanias' own epigram, besides adding the names of the cities on the bronze support of the tripod (cf. the Olympia dedication: Paus. v. 23. 1); but this has been doubted, for no other writer—not for example Pausanias the traveller nor Plutarch—records it. If this doubt is justified, it is a remarkable instance of Diodoros' unreliability; for anyone could see what was on so well-known a monument.

**3. εὖθὺς τότε:** i.e. as soon as it was published (= *καὶ τότε*, below). **ἐπέγραψαν ὀνομαστὶ τὰς πόλεις, κ.τ.λ.:** Tod, no. 19. It was a more modest inscription even than *ξυγκαθελοῦσαι τὸν βάρβαρον* suggests; for it says simply, *τοίδε τὸν πόλεμον ἐπολέμεον*. Thucydides' phrase recalls Herodotos, viii. 82. 1 *ἐνεγράφησαν Τήνοι εὐν Δελφοῖσι ἐς τὸν τρίποδα ἐν τοῖσι τὸν βάρβαρον κατελοῦσι.*

**καὶ τότ' ἔδοκει:** Struve's emendation, *τότ'* for *τοῦτ'*, has been accepted by most editors. But a subject to the verb is desirable (so Hude), and *τότε τοῦτ'* is as likely a correction. 'Even then this was regarded as Pausanias' crime and no one else's.'

**τῇ παρούσῃ διανοῇ:** not so much his treasonable ambitions as his present 'tyrannical' behaviour. It is a cause of *στάσις* in aristocratical states *ἔαν τις μέγας γί καὶ δυνάμενος ἔτι μείζων εἶναι, ἵνα μοναρχᾶ*.

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ώσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι δοκεῖ Παυσανίας ὁ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον—Arist. *Pol.* v. 6. 2, 1307 a 2.

**5. χρώμενοι τῷ τρόπῳ, κ.τ.λ.:** yet the number of Spartan kings or other prominent persons banished is large, about as large in proportion as that of prominent Athenian politicians; though this was supposed to be a special weakness of democracies.

**ῶς λέγεται:** Thucydides will not be responsible for all details. So 134. 1. **ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος:** from Argilos, the city near Amphipolis, towards Chalkidike. He was thus not a helot; but he was a slave, as can be seen from Pausanias' promise not to punish him (133 *ad fin.*). He was one whom Pausanias will have got from the spoils of the war against Persia.

**καὶ παρασημηνάμενος σφραγίδα, κ.τ.λ.:** except the correction of the MSS. *παραποιησάμενος* from Pollux, viii. 27 (see Bethe, *ad loc.*), no change seems to me necessary. Stahl has an adequate note: "primo adspectu μηνυτῆς γίγνεται καὶ λύει τὰς ἐπιστολάς non videntur recte iungi posse, cum non delator factus ille aperuerit epistulam, sed aperta epistula delator factus sit. . . . Proprie scribendum erat δέος . . . καὶ . . . λύσας, sed hoc molestissimum et obscurius fuisse propter παραποιησάμενος participium alteri λύσας subjectum (utrum enim alteri subditum esset non facile potuisset distingui); itaque mutata orationis forma transitus factus est ad verbum quod dicitur finitum. . . —ἢ ψευσθῆ τῆς δόξης. Tum enim refecto signo Artabazo epistulam traditurus erat. Hic autem si signo non refecto eam accepisset, verendum erat ne per eum Pausanias illam apertam esse comperiret.—ἢ καὶ . . . αἰτήσῃ. Tum enim restituto signo epistulam Pausaniae redditurus erat. Ut autem hic reposceret epistulam fieri poterat, antequam nuntius proficisceretur, sive falsa sive vera suspicatus erat. Si vera, cavendum erat ne Pausanias epistulam solutam esse cognosceret, priusquam res ad ephoros delata et ipse comprehensus esset." Steup, thinking this last impossible, and demanding as well the mention of Artabazos, would bracket *ἢ καὶ . . . αἰτήσῃ*, in his usual manner, as 'fremder Zusatz'. Widmann supports him (Bursian, cxcv, 1923, 216-17), adding that *ἐπιγνῶ* means 'examine,' or 'recognize', when used of seals, not 'discover'; but what Pausanias might discover is not the seal, but the fact that it was broken. Delachaux follows Stahl: the two clauses *ἢ ψευσθῆ* and *ἢ καὶ αἰτήσῃ*, though different, are not mutually exclusive—Pausanias might still want to add something, even though the Argilian found that his suspicions were unfounded.

**133. τῶν [τε] ἐφόρων:** all edd. since Poppe bracket it. It would be better perhaps to transpose it after *αἰτιωμένου*, to join that clause with *κακέινον . . . ξυνομολογοῦντος*.

## COMMENTARY

ώς ούδεν πάποτε . . . παραβάλοιτο: παραβάλλεσθαι = to risk, properly of gambling, to throw one's money on the table, and so here to endanger (Classen; L. and S., however, translate 'deceive', 'betray'). Presumably his previous services in the negotiations with Persia (*πρὸς βασιλέα*) had been in the Troad, as no previous messenger had returned alive. Steup feels this so strongly that he would bracket *πρὸς βασιλέα*, and interpret ταῦς διακονίας as negotiations with the Helots.

προτιμηθεῖ: 'privileged'. (Thucydides sacrifices logic for the sake of irony; for προ- in προτιμᾶσθαι means πρὸ τῶν ἀλλων, yet he is to die ἐν ἵσῳ τοῖς πολλοῖς.)

ἀξιούντος ὡς τάχιστα πορεύεσθαι: not, one supposes, before he μεταγράψαι τι γῆτησε.

**134. 2. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο:** apparently, now that the *ephors* had personal knowledge of Pausanias' guilt, there was to be no trial: he could be condemned straightway. The previous trial was to enable the magistrates to hear the evidence of others. Or is it only that they wanted to but could not arrest the suppliant and bring him to trial?

According to Diodoros (xi. 45. 6) ἀπορουμένων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων εἰς τυμωρήσονται τὸν ἕκετην, λέγεται τὴν μητέρα τοῦ Π. καταντήσασαν εἰς τὸ ιερὸν ἄλλο μὲν μηδὲν μήτ' εἰπεῖν μήτε πρᾶξαι, πλίνθον δὲ βαστάσασαν ἀναθεῖναι κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ιερὸν εἴσοδον, καὶ τοῦτο πράξασαν ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἔδανον οἰκίαν. τοὺς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους τῇ τῆς μητρὸς κρίσει συνακολουθήσαντας ἐνοικοδομῆσαι τὴν εἴσοδον, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ συναναγκάσαι τὸν Π. λυμῷ καταστρέψαι τὸν βίον. The anecdote is repeated by Nepos, Polyainos, and the scholiast here; τοιαῦται γὰρ αἱ Λακωνικαὶ γυναικεῖς, adds the last. It is characteristic of Thucydides that even in a detailed biographical narrative, he has no such story.

ἔξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῷ: see 131. 1 n.

**4. ἐς τὸν Καιάδαν:** it must have been a remarkable cavern if the story of Aristomenes is a possible one (Paus. iv. 18. 4-7).

οὐπέρ τοὺς κακούργους εἰώθασον (or εἰώθεσαν): it is to mistake the nature of our scholiasts to suppose they had not these words in their text because they repeat them in their notes; but since only C has εἰώθασν, which presumably Thucydides would have written, the rest εἰώθεσαν which is suitable to later scholia, and some MSS. have it after instead of before ἐσβάλλειν, others have it inserted above the line, there is something to be said for omitting the whole clause. Only one MS. (E) has the correct ἐσβάλειν, the rest ἐσβάλλειν as though it were to be construed with εἰώθασν.

ὅστερον: after the earthquake and the Helot revolt?

ἐν τῷ προτεμενίσματι: i.e. just outside the whole *témenos* or sacred enclosure; not far from the theatre (see 128. 2 n.), where Pausanias the traveller saw it and Leonidas' tomb, iii. 14. 1, the two men apparently equally honoured.

## COMMENTARY

ἀνθ' ἑνός: 'in requital for one', not 'instead of one'.

χαλκοῦς ἀνδριάντας δύο: Pausanias saw them in the second century A.D., near the altar of Chalkioikos, iii. 17. 7. It is clear that the Regent was honoured after his death, and, therefore, that he had strong supporters in Sparta. Cf. Hdt. ix. 64. 1, ἐνθαῦτα ἡ τε δίκη τοῦ φόνου τοῦ Λεωνίδεω κατὰ τὸ χρηστήριον τοῖς Σπαρτιέτησι ἐκ Μαρδονίου ἐπετελέστο καὶ νίκην ἀναιρέσται καλλίστην ἀπασέων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Παυσανίης ὁ Κλεομβρότου τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδεω. Besides this, as Bruns has pointed out, 81-2, Herodotus gives a consistently favourable picture of Pausanias after Plataia (ix. 78-82), and only a hint elsewhere of his *ὑβρις* (v. 32, viii. 3. 2).

The date of his death depends, for us, on that of Themistokles' final exile; and that is, at present, an insoluble problem. See above, pp. 397-401.

(2) **135-8. Themistokles:** Plut. *de Herod. malign.* 5 (Mor. 855 F), Them. 23-32; Diod. xi. 54-9 (471-470 B.C.). Nothing that is in Diodoros and is not in Thucydides is of any value, not even the date, though it may by chance be correct (as the year of his flight): above, pp. 400-1.

**135. 3. ἔχων δίαιταν μὲν ἐν Ἀργεί:** he must, by a law of 480 B.C., live beyond a line drawn from C. Geraistos in Euboea to Skyllaion in the Argolid, 'Αθην. 22. 8 (see edd. ad loc.: we must read ἐκτὸς or ἐντὸς Γ. καὶ Σ. *μῆ*). Before the passing of this law, Aristides when ostracized lived at Aigina; after it, Themistokles lived in Argos. The reason for the law was that, while ostracism was an honourable banishment, the victim of it must not be in too close touch with his friends in Athens, and through them perhaps continue the very activities for which he was banished. For the *ostraka* bearing Themistokles' name, see the references given above, p. 34, n. 1. Apart from the 191 all found together (Broneer, *Hesp.* vii), more *ostraka* bearing Themistokles' name have been preserved than with any other; chance perhaps, but symbolic of his stormy career.

Not only had Argos been neutral in the Persian wars, but about this time perhaps was hostile to Sparta; so were the Arcadians and Elis (for the battles of Tegea and Dipaia and the synoikismos of Elis may belong to the time shortly before or shortly after this: above, pp. 408-9). Spartan objections to Themistokles' restless activities (*ἐπιφοτάν ἐς τὴν ἀλλην Πελοπόννησον*) were natural enough.

Among the accusers of Themistokles are mentioned Leobotes, apparently of one branch of the Alkmeonidai, Pronapes, perhaps the colleague of Lakedaimonios as hipparchos (above, p. 328, n. 1), and a Lysandros: all probably of the aristocratic faction; and Kimon is said to have prosecuted a friend of Themistokles who helped to get his wife and children out of Athens (Plut. Them. 23. 1, 24. 6; Them.

*Epist.* 8, p. 474 Hercher). The authority of the Themistokles *Epistles* is not high; nor is that of Stesimbrotos, quoted by Plutarch for the prosecution by Kimon; but the names may be right. See Wilamowitz (1), i. 144. 37; Raubitschek, *Hesp.* viii, 1939, 159.

**136. 1. φεύγει . . . ἐς Κέρκυραν:** for the general problem of these biographical details of Themistokles' career see 93. 8 n. The question is here much the same: none of the episodes is in itself improbable, though suspicion may attach to the story of Admetos (see below); and Thucydides was not given to relating anecdotes for their own sake. On the other hand, he does not tell us the source of his information; it is certain that many anecdotes which were unhistorical were told of Themistokles, and we do not know what trouble Thucydides took to sift the wheat from the chaff; we only know that he had doubts on some points (138. 1, 4, 6; as 132. 5, 134. 1). **ῶν αὐτῶν εὔεργέτης:** an official title of honour, such as was often given by Greek states to foreigners, or to other states, e.g. Tod, no. 84, l. 30, no. 86, l. 28, &c.

We do not know what service Themistokles had rendered to Kerkyra. The scholiast here says he prevented the allied Greek forces from punishing her for her neutrality in the Persian wars, just as he adopted a similar policy in regard to Thessaly, Thebes, and Argos when Sparta proposed that they should be excluded from the Amphictyonic assembly (if we may trust Plut. *Them.* 20. 3-4, our only source: Busolt, iii. 87. 5); Plutarch, *Them.* 24. 1, says he had, as arbitrator, settled a dispute between Kerkyra and Corinth in favour of the former. Both explanations would appear to be conjectures to explain this passage in Thucydides, and the former wholly unhistorical; the latter as well (with its condemnation of the Corinthians to pay 20 talents and its granting of Leukas for joint occupation by both Corinth and Kerkyra) is very suspicious.

**2: κατὰ πύστιν ή̄ χωροίη:** 'following the information given them of his movements' (from time to time; optative of frequency, hence also the present tense *διωκόμενος*).

**οὐ φίλον:** see on § 4, below.

**3. τὸν παῖδα σφῶν λαβὼν καθέζεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑστίαν:** a device not unknown to tragedy, as for example Euripides' *Telephos*; see Ar. *Ach.* 326 ff.; *Them.* 689 ff. *Ach.* 329-30

μῶν ἔχει του παιδίον  
τῶν παρόντων ἔνδον εἰρξας;

shows either that it was a common device, or that the use of it in *Telephos* was notorious. Hence this story of Themistokles has been rejected as unhistorical by learned men: it comes direct from the stage (cf. Plut. *Them.* 24. 5 *τινὲς δέ (φασι) αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀδμητον . . . διαθεῖναι καὶ συντραγῳδῆσαι τὴν ἱκεσίαν*). I do not myself see

Thucydides uncritically accepting well-known stories from tragedy and attaching them to historical personages.<sup>1</sup> It should also be noted that the motive is different (below, 137. 1 n.).

**4. εἴ τι ἄρα αὐτὸς ἀντεῖπεν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίων δεομένῳ:** we know nothing further of this; nor did ancient writers, to judge from the schol. on οὐ φίλον, § 2 above, and Plut. *Them.* 24. 2.

**καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὑπ’ ἔκεινου πολλῷ ἀσθενεστέρου . . . κακῶς πάσχειν:** 'he might be the victim of one far weaker than him (Admetos)', i.e. he was at any one's mercy. This is the MSS. (and schol.) reading, kept by Classen, Steup, and Stuart Jones, and is not impossible, though harsh, with ἔκεινου as genitive after ἀσθενεστέρου. In 137. 4, in a similar difficulty, Thucydides uses the clearer order of words, ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἐμοὶ, ἔκεινῳ δὲ ἐν ἐπικυνδύῳ (where both ἐμοὶ and ἔκεινῳ are datives after the adjectives). The easy conjecture ἀσθενέστερος, read by Stahl and Hude, is, however, much more to the point: 'he would be the victim when he was much weaker than Admetos; and noble men only take revenge when on equal terms with their enemy.' Valla apparently translates ἀσθενέστερος, and he probably had a MS. or MSS. independent of those we possess: see J. U. Powell, *C.Q.* xxiii, 1929, 11-14 (but it seems that no quotation of Valla is from his own text, but from later, much corrected editions: see Westgate, *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.* lxvii, 1936, 240-51). Even so it may be conjecture, though as likely as not a correct one. Delachaux argues that this would require ἀσθενέστερος <ῶν>.

**137. 1. μέγιστον ἦν ἰκέτευμα τοῦτο:** the child was not seized as a hostage, with a threat to kill him, as seems to have been the case in Euripides' *Telephos*.

**ἀλλ’ ἀποστέλλει:** we do not know how long Themistokles stayed with Admetos (he was clearly there when the delegates of Sparta and Athens arrived), but anyhow not long enough to affect the question of the time of his flight. Plutarch, 24. 6, says that his wife and children joined him there; but the statement probably comes from Stesimbrotos (F. 3), who is quite unreliable for Themistokles (above, pp. 58, n. 3, 400, n. 1).

**ἐπὶ τὴν ἐτέραν θάλασσαν:** the Thermaic Gulf.

<sup>1</sup> Of another story about Themistokles, Plutarch, *Them.* 32. 4, says, ἡ τε Φύλαρχος (F. 76), ὥστε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ τῇ ἴστορῃ μονονόν μηχανὴν ἄρας καὶ προαγαγῶν Νεοκλέα τυνά καὶ Δημόπολιν, νιεῖς Θεμιστοκλέοντα, ἀγάνα βούλεται κνεῖν καὶ πάθος, οὐδ’ ἀν δ τυχῶν ἀγνοήσειν ὅτι πέπλασται. The Greeks were not entirely uncritical. (Jacoby, on Phylarchos, F. 72, notes that in *Them.* 10. 1 Plutarch says of Themistokles himself that he ἀπορῶν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις λογισμοῖς προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλήθος, ὥστε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ μηχανὴν ἄρας, σημεῖα δαιμόνια καὶ χρησμοὺς ἐπῆγεν αὐτοῖς.)

According to Wecklein, *Sitzb. Bayr. Ak.* 1909, 18 Euripides borrowed the story of Themistokles and Admetos for his *Telephos* (Bursian, clxxviii. 247). This is a more intelligent guess than the other.

**τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου:** Alexander I of Macedon, 'the Philhellene', 57. 2 n. He reigned till c. 445 B.C.

**2. ὁ ἐπολιόρκει Νάξον:** 98. 4. For the difficulties of the date here implied, and for the alternative reading *Θάσον* in Plutarch's quotation of this passage (*Them.* 25. 2), see above, pp. 398-9.

**ὑπὲρ τοῦ στρατοπέδου:** the Athenian fleet, not fearing any enemy, was drawn up on shore.

**3. ἥθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὑστερον . . . ἀ ὑπεξέκειτο:** Theopompos, F. 86, and Theophrastos both profess to know how much of Themistokles' wealth was discovered and confiscated (100 and 80 talents, respectively), and that he had a lot more undiscovered, πολλὰ ὑπεκκλαπέντα—Plut. *Them.* 25. 3.

**μετὰ τῶν κάτω Περσῶν τινὸς πορευθείς:** Diodoros, xi. 56. 4-8, and Plutarch, *Them.* 26, call him a Greek (but by different names) and make a fantastic story of the journey.

**'Ἀρταξέρξην . . . νεωτὶ βασιλεύοντα:** see above, pp. 397-9.

**4. ἐδήλου δὲ ἡ γραφή:** cf. 129. 1 *init.*, 128. 6 n. (how was it discovered what Themistokles wrote to the king?)

It is<sup>1</sup> characteristic of the later romances that they took the substance of this letter and turned it into a *speech* made by Themistokles before Xerxes himself: Plut. *Them.* 28. 1-2; cf. Diod. xi. 56. 8, which is from Ephoros, F. 190 and 191. In order to get the impressive beginning *ἥκω σοι, βασιλεῦ, Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἔγώ,* Plutarch's authority makes Themistokles not reveal his identity till that moment, which hardly adds to the probability of the story. Moreover, such a speech cannot be authentic; the letter, in substance, might be. Truly, there is a difference between an 'anecdote' related by Thucydides and one related by another.

**ἔπιόντα ἐμοί:** "Themistocles talks as if he stood in the same relation to Greece as the Great King to Persia"—Forbes. No; this is only a Greek idiom. Hermokrates, representing the republic of Syracuse and speaking before the delegates of the other Sikeliot republics, can speak in much the same way: iv. 64. 1, vi. 78. 1, 3. See too i. 40. 5, 43. 1, 73. 4 (ὁ βάρβαρος: essentially the same idiom), and 141. 6. **γράψας τὴν τε ἐκ Σ., κ.τ.λ.:** this shows that Thucydides is not pretending to give a word-for-word transcription of the letter; the part of it given in direct speech may be so intended. Cf. 128. 6 n.

**τὴν τε ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως, κ.τ.λ.:** scholars agree that the first part of this cannot mean 'the notice given to the King at Salamis of the impending retreat of the Greeks' (Hdt. viii. 75), for that was sent while *Greece* was still in great danger, not ἐκείνῳ ἐν ἐπικυνδύῳ, and resulted in the greatest injury that Themistokles inflicted on Persia, not in a benefit conferred. Most interpret it to mean the message 'warning Xerxes to retreat' (because the bridges would be destroyed), and identify it generally

with that of Herodotos, viii. 110. 3; there are differences between the two versions (Herodotos says the message was sent from Andros, not Salamis, and was a statement that the bridges would now, thanks to Thermistokles, not be destroyed, so Xerxes could cross at his leisure), and some suppose that Thucydides is following a different authority (and perhaps correcting Herodotos). Forbes points out that Plutarch (*Them.* 16; also *Arist.* 9. 5-6) has a story like this one attributed to Thucydides,<sup>1</sup> and that Nepos (*Them.* 5. 1-2, 9. 3), Diodoros (xi. 19. 5), and Trogus (Justin, ii. 13. 3-7) have it as well. The difficulty in Forbes's view is that Themistokles' two messages would be contradictory ('Hurry, as the bridges will be destroyed', and 'I have stopped the bridges being destroyed'); the second part of the statement in Thucydides is clearly based on Herodotos—it agrees both in the content of the message (viii. 110. 3) and in Themistokles' false claim, for it was he who had urged the destruction of the bridges and the Peloponnesian commanders who had prevented it (viii. 108). The difficulty in the other view, that Thucydides is referring loosely to the second message given by Herodotos, or to some similar story, is that there would then be only one message, whereas he clearly means two, sent on separate occasions.<sup>2</sup> I have not myself any doubt that he is referring to the two given in Herodotos, viii. 75. 2 and 110. 3, and that the first means the 'announcement of the impending retreat of the Greeks from Salamis' (*τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως*). It is true that this was not sent ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἐμοί, and that it was a ruse to deceive Xerxes; but in it, according to Herodotos, Themistokles wrote that he was really on the king's side (*τυγχάνει γάρ φρονέων τὰ βασιλέος καὶ βουλόμενος μᾶλλον τὰ ὑμέτερα κατύπερθε γίνεσθαι η̄ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρήγματα*), and his subsequent message would confirm this in spite of the unfortunate result of the battle; so that he might well lay a claim to the king's gratitude for this as for the second benefit conferred. In fact he could hardly have ignored it. (Arnold notes that he sent the same messenger on both occasions, "as if his devotion to the king's cause had not been rendered more suspicious by the result of the battle".) Ephoros was probably following Thucydides, F. 191. 1 (8-13): [Λέγουσι δ' οἱ μὲν ὅ[τι] τὸν ὑπέμνησεν αὐτὸν ὁν περὶ τε τῆς ν[αυμα]χίας καὶ τῆς γ[εφύρας προ]ήγγειλε.

**138. 1. ὡς λέγεται:** Thucydides is not certain of the Persian side of Themistokles' story. Cf. 132. 5 n.

<sup>1</sup> It only differs in this one respect from *Herodotos*, that it was sent from Salamis, and in making Aristeides (of course), not the Peloponnesians, oppose Themistokles' proposal; otherwise it follows him closely. See also Uxkull, pp. 65, 68-9; he traces the story in this form to Deinon and Ktesias.

<sup>2</sup> This seems to me true even if, with ABEFm<sub>3</sub>, we omit τε between τὴν and Σαλαμῖνα (see Hude and Stuart Jones).

**τὴν διάνοιαν:** his plans or ambitions, not his character here, as ποιεῖν οὐτῶ shows.—Clasen.

**τῆς Περσίδος γλώσσης ὅσα ἐδύνατο:** Arnold notes the contrast between this and Nepos, *Them.* 10. 1: ille omne illud tempus litteris sermonique Persarum se dedidit: quibus adeo eruditus est, ut multo commodius dicatur apud regem verba fecisse, quam ii poterant, qui in Perside erant nati.

**2. ἀπὸ τοῦ πείραν διδούς ξυνερὸς φαίνεσθαι:** from the intelligence which he made clear by frequent (διδούς, present participle) proofs. With ξυνερὸς φαίνεσθαι supply ἀν, not εἶναι. It appears that Themistokles stayed some time at the Persian court. It is a pity Herodotus did not learn and tell us something about him there.

**3. ήν γὰρ . . . δηλώσας:** the copula to be joined with the participle (so Forbes and apparently Stuart Jones), as iv. 54. 3 and perhaps vi. 4. 5—'he was a man who showed'. It greatly weakens the force of the sentence to take ήν only with ἀξιος and the participial clause as a dependent, 'because he showed'.

**διαφερόντως τι . . . μᾶλλον ἐτέρου:** "διαφερόντως, eximio quodam modo, non cum voce ἀξιος sed cum locutione μᾶλλον ἐτέρου iungendum est (*in einem hervorragenden Masse mehr als ein anderer*). Cf. ii. 60. 7 εἴ μοι καὶ μέσως ἥγούμενοι μᾶλλον ἐτέρων (*auch nur in bescheidenem Masse mehr als andern*) προσέναι αὐτὰ πολεμεῖν ἐπεισθῆτε, qui locus clarissime ostendit quam temere Herw. hic μᾶλλον ἐτέρου deleverit; nam μᾶλλον ἐτέρου ibi nullo modo μέσως vocabuli interpretatio esse potest, cuius sententiam potius οὐ μᾶλλον ἐτέρων redderet"—Stahl.

**οἰκείᾳ γὰρ ξυνέσει . . . ἐπιμαθών:** edd. compare Pindar, *Ol.* ii. 86,  
σοφὸς δ  
πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυῖ.  
μαθόντες δὲ λάβροι  
παγγλωσσά κόρακες ὡς  
ἄκραντα γαριέτων.  
**Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον.**

See too, *Ol.* ix. 100; *Nem.* iii. 41-2. But the spheres of poetry and politics are too different to make the comparison of great value. Thucydides is supposed to mean by μαθεῖν here 'learning from others', and by προμαθών to refer to the period of Themistokles' life before his entry into politics, by ἐπιμαθών the period after this; but not only is this by no means clear, but the words are awkward; for μαθεῖν is used in the widest sense in Greek (*τῷ παθεῖν μαθεῖν*) and, taken strictly, οὐτε ἐπιμαθών would seem to deny to Themistokles the power of learning by experience. Thucydides cannot be simply contradicting the foolish talk about all Themistokles' brilliant ideas being really another's (as Hdt. viii. 57).

**τῶν τε παραχρήμα . . . κράτιστος γνώμων:** this ('the best judge') and τῶν μελλόντων εἰκαστής ('one who envisages') are combined and

contrasted. ἐπὶ πλειστον τοῦ γενησομένου is not temporal ('as far as possible into the future'), as most edd., but, as it were, spatial: Themistokles' forecasts were accurate for a greater number of events than other men's; his accuracy had a wider range, and τοῦ γενησομένου is 'of what was actually going to take place'. So the scholiast: καλῶς τὸ ἐπὶ πλειστον θεοῦ γὰρ μόνου τὸ πάντα εἰδέναι. Cf. Pindar again, *Nem.* i. 25-8.

**ἀ μὲν μετὰ χείρας ἔχοι:** 'whatever he took in hand', meaning apparently 'what he did himself', 'what he was familiar with', contrasted with ἀν ἀπειρος εἴη. But ἔξηγήσασθαι οἵσι τε must mean *explicare oratione*, and be that invaluable gift, especially in a democratic state, possessed also by Perikles, γνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεῦσαι τὰῦτα (ii. 60. 5);<sup>1</sup> and this seems but an indirect contrast with ἀν δ' ἀπειρος εἴη, κρῖναι. This last is a particularly rare gift in a statesman, yet, in a slightly different context, is what is required from all citizens in a democratic state: ἔν τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἄμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμελεῖα, καὶ ἑτέροις *«ἔτερα»* πρὸς ἕργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι . . . καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ ήγοι κρίνομέν γε η ἐνθυμούμεθα ὄρθως τὰ πράγματα (ii. 40. 2; cf. vi. 39. 1). We might say that the great statesman can judge the expositions of experts, the capable citizen the explanations of the statesman.

**τό τε ἀμεινον η χείρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι:** not quite the same as τῶν μελλόντων above. There he envisaged what the future would be (e.g. 'Xerxes' fleet will sail down to Phaleron when his army reaches Attica, and if we stay at Salamis, will be bound to engage us there'); here he foresees what the future advantage or disadvantage would be of present or future action—he was a far-sighted man, not one with his eyes only on the immediate present. 'Now that Xerxes' fleet is arrived, we must stay and fight here' is an example of his swift decision, his unerring insight into what was required at the moment—what was then and there needed if the Greeks were to win. His advocacy of a big fleet in 483 and of the fortification of the Peiraeus are examples of his far-sightedness.

This summary of Themistokles' special gifts was often quoted in late antiquity. See Hude, ad loc., *testimonia*. Dionysios disapproved of its eccentricity of expression: *Ep. ad Amm.* ii. 4, p. 794 and 6, p. 807.

Bender, *Der Begriff des Staatsmannes b. Thuk.*, 6-7, 10-14, thinks that Thucydides here, by his expression *κράτιστος γνώμων*, includes will-power as well as intelligence. But in fact Thucydides here says nothing of either the will or the ability to carry out a decision in practice; he ignores that astonishing power and energy which

<sup>1</sup> It may be that in this Thucydides was influenced by Parmenides (see Coxon, *C.Q.* xxviii, 1934, 135); that is, that the language of science, as has happened since, was adapted to the language of political thought.

enabled Themistokles to impose his will on his colleagues at Salamis, as well as his skill as a tactician. He is not in any way attempting a full-length portrait or a complete summary of Themistokles' character, still less of his own idea of the perfect statesman. It is more curious that he omits will-power and executive ability in the summary given by Perikles (ii. 60. 5-6); he was perfectly well aware of the difference between intelligence and will (e.g. i. 120. 5, 140. 1, 5, 144. 5. n.; especially 139. 4, *λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώταρος*). We can illustrate both this and the ability *ἐξηγήσασθαι τι* by Lloyd-George's description of Sir Henry Wilson (*War Memoirs*, v. p. 2818): "He had undoubtedly the nimblest intelligence amongst the soldiers of high degree. He had also a lucidity of mind and therefore of expression which was given to none of his professional rivals. It was a delight to hear him unravel and expound a military problem. For that reason he was specially helpful in a council of civilians. But he had no power of decision. That is why he failed in the field." It is the civilian here who must *ῶν ἀπειρος εἴη κρῖναι ἵκανός*.

Equally Thucydides omits all reference to Themistokles' moral character—his doubtful patriotism and his weakness in money matters: not because he has already related his flight to Persia and his acceptance of a princely income from the king (Keil, *Anon. Argent.* 295-9), nor because he was indifferent; but, partly no doubt because he ignored anecdotes of doubtful truth (unlike Herodotos), mainly because it was not relevant to his present purpose. This purpose was but to emphasize one important feature in Themistokles' character, which would be overlooked by those who had only read Herodotos, one in which he was unrivalled, if not unique. It is only occasionally that Thucydides allows himself the luxury of describing personality (Perikles, Brasidas, Nikias, Alkibiades); and even then he will give only a few outstanding traits.<sup>1</sup>

**4. νοσήσας:** i.e. he died a natural death. The date of his death is quite uncertain. Plutarch, *Kim.* 18. 6-7 (cf. *Them.* 31. 4-6), implies that it was during Kimon's last campaign in Cyprus, 450 or 449, though there is confusion in him between this and the Egyptian revolt against Persia of c. 460 B.C. or with Eurymedon (cf. above, p. 379, n. 2).<sup>2</sup> He also says he was 65 when he died. If this was in 450, he was born in 515, which is not *impossible* (see 93. 3, n. on his archonship);<sup>3</sup> but it would mean that fifteen to eighteen years of a not very long life were spent in Persia. It is not very likely

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bruns, 23, 65-70, 85-90.

<sup>2</sup> Langlotz (above, n. on Glaukon, 51. 4) thinks that Plutarch means the Egyptian campaign; but there is anyhow confusion, for Kimon took no part in that and the point of the narrative is the conjunction of the fallen Themistokles and the triumphant Kimon. Some of the discrepancies in the dates given for Themistokles' death are doubtless due to this confusion.

<sup>3</sup> Unless, as well, he was one of the strategoi at Marathon, which is doubtful.

(contrast *Them.* 31. 8); and Plutarch is particularly vague in his chronology of events in Themistokles' and Kimon's careers.

Jacoby, *Apollodoros*, 34, argues that Themistokles' age at his death comes from the *Xρονικά*, on the ground that Eusebios puts the death in 467-466 (Eurymedon): that is, in the Chronicle his archon-year, 493-492, was made his ἀκμή (when he was 40), and from this fixed date the sixty-five years at death was reckoned. I do not feel confident that this is sound in method. Apollodoros knew well enough that a man need not be exactly forty to be an archon, and though he would say that a man's ἀκμή was in such and such a year and put his birth, therefore, forty years earlier in cases where no other dates were available, he would not, I think, have argued from the archonship of 493-492 that Themistokles was 65 when he died in 467-466; which should be anyhow 468-467 or 469-468. Note also that this implies that Apollodoros rejected Thucydides' and Charon's statements that Themistokles joined the Persian court in Artaxerxes' reign; this is possible, but unlikely in view of Plutarch's doubts.

**λέγουσι δέ τινες, κ.τ.λ.:** the story naturally flourished—Ar. *Equit.* 83-4; Diod. xi. 58. 3; Plut. *Them.* 31. 6, &c.

**5. Μαγνησίαν . . . Λάρυμακον . . . Μυοῦντα:** for the political and practical significance of these gifts, see 100. 1 n., p. 292.

This Magnesia was the city on the Maiandros, not that on the Hermos (what was then of very little importance). It was an excellent centre for intrigue with the Ionian cities in the League, especially Miletos. No wonder Athens thought it necessary to take special measures in Erythrai and Miletos, and doubtless elsewhere as well (above, pp. 293, 350). Themistokles issued a personal coinage in Magnesia, as ruler of the city: Gardner, *J.H.S.* xxxiii, 1913, 165; Head, *H.N.*<sup>2</sup> 581.

**ἄρτον:** the chief item in a meal. That is, Magnesia was to be his headquarters. For this kind of gift, Arnold compares Hdt. ii. 98. 1, i. 192. 3; Xen. *Anab.* i. 4. 9; Plat. *Alk.* i. 123 B-C. The land-tax for the district was presented to the beneficiary.

**Μυοῦντα δὲ ὄψον:** *ἔχουσαν θάλατταν εὔχθων*, Diod. xi. 57. 7. *ὄψον* became gradually to be used almost exclusively of fish (Aristoph., fr. 247; Plut. *Mor.* 667 F; Athen. vii. 276 E); its modern derivative, *ψάρι*, means fish.

For the additional gifts, mentioned by Neanthes and Phanias, see above, p. 292, n. 4.

**6. τὰ δὲ ὄστα φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.:** so secret was their action that Thucydides doubts if it was ever carried out. Another account had it that the bones were later brought to Athens with public approval; and certainly Themistokles' descendants were active in Athens in the fourth century: Paus. i. 1. 2, 37. 1; P.A., s.v. *Θεμιστοκλῆς*.

There is a valuable note in Plutarch, *Them.* 32. 5-6: *Διόδωρος δ' ὁ περιηγητής ἐν τοῖς περὶ Μνημάτων (fr. 1) εἴρηκεν ως ὑπονοῶν μᾶλλον ἡ γυγνώσκων ὅτι περὶ τὸν μέγαν λιμένα τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ἀλκιμον ἀκρωτηρίου πρόκειται τις οἶνος ἀγκάν, καὶ κάμφαντι τοῦτον ἐντός, ἢ τὸν ὑπεύδιον τῆς θαλάττης, κρηπίς ἐστιν εὐμεγέθης, καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ βιωμοειδὲς τάφος τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους. οἰεται δὲ καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸν κωμικὸν (fr. 183) αὐτῷ μαρτυρεῖν ἐν τούτοις.*

ὅ σὸς δὲ τύμβος ἐν καλῷ κεχωσμένος  
τοὺς ἐμπόρους πρόσρησις ἔσται πανταχοῦ,  
τούς τ' ἐκπλέοντας εἰσπλέοντάς τ' ὀψεται,  
χώπόταν ἄμιλλ' ἢ τῶν νεῶν θεάσεται.

A graceful tribute to the great sailor. Cf. Paus. i. 1. 2; Arist. *H.A.* vi. 15, 569 b 12. Lenschau, *R.E.* xix. 92-3, thinks this tomb may have been set up by Konon in 395-4, as it was unknown to Thucydides; but it may be only later than Thucydides' exile. For its position, see Judeich, 442-3, who adds, "natürlich handelt es sich um eine Legende". Assuming that there is no doubt that Platon was speaking of Themistokles, *ὅ σὸς τύμβος* is not likely to have been legendary. Diodoros' doubts were like ours—about its identification.<sup>1</sup>

Plutarch adds that descendants of Themistokles continued to his own day enjoying certain privileges and emoluments from Magnesia, and that one of them was a fellow-student with him in Athens. As he says he was *Θεμιστοκλῆς Ἀθηναῖος*, he was a citizen and presumably inhabitant of Athens.

**τὰ μὲν κατὰ Π., κ.τ.λ.:** 'Such was the end of Pausanias of Sparta and Themistokles of Athens, the two most eminent men of their day.' *λαμπρός* means one who stands out among his fellow men, clear for all to see. So *λαμπρῶς νικᾶν*, to win a decisive victory (cf. 49. 7).

"If Thucydides had always written as he has done in ch. 126-38, no one would ever have called him 'harsh' or 'obscure' or even 'concise'. 'Some, admiring the perspicuity of the narrative about Cylon, have said "here the lion smiled" (*λέων ἐγέλασεν ἐνταῦθα*)', remarks a scholium on 126-7. The grace and sympathy with which the stories of Cylon, Pausanias, and Themistocles are told, and the manner in which Thucydides strings them on the thread of the negotiations between Athens and Sparta, passing easily from one episode to another without regard to the order of time, remind us of Herodotus"—Forbes (p. 96). The whole excursus on Themistokles is irrelevant to the narrative, and so is the greater part of those on

<sup>1</sup> It is possible that Hermippus, fr. 72 (from his *Tetrametera*, not from a play), refers to this place: *Θεμιστοκλέους τὸν πρωνός τις ὁν κεβλήπυρις τις ὄνομάζεται*. No satisfactory restoration of this has been suggested; but *πρωνός* itself may be right: what was later called his tomb was at first *Θεμιστόκλειος πρών*.

Kylon and Pausanias. Thucydides, besides being impelled, probably, to narrate episodes which he thought had been inadequately or inaccurately dealt with by others—as in the case of the overthrow of the tyrants at Athens—betrays a strong biographical interest, that interest which he so sternly represses, to our great loss and to the detriment of a fuller understanding of the events, in his main narrative.

**139. Further Spartan embassies to Athens:** Plut. *Per.* 29. 7-30 (see 126. 1-2 n.).

**1. ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρώτης πρεσβείας:** 126. 2. It is remarkable that a special embassy should have been sent with this idle demand, however superstitious the Spartans may have been (cf. v. 16. 1 *ad fin.*); the Corinthians must have been made impatient by it. If they wanted simply to weaken the position of Perikles (127. 2), one would have expected the mention of the *ἄγος* to have been part of more serious negotiations.

**ἐπέταξαν:** a strong word—'ordered'. See below, 140. 2 n.

**φοιτῶντες:** more than one ambassadorial journey was made (cf. § 3, *init.*).

**Ποτειδαίας τε ἀπανίστασθαι:** a proposal not in the least likely to be accepted, as the Spartans must have known.

**Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον ἀφίεναι:** a vague, and probably purposely vague demand. Aigina had secretly complained at Sparta that she was not left her autonomy as promised, 67. 2 (see n. there); we do not know of any specific infractions by Athens, but any exercise of pressure could be interpreted as an infraction, including, perhaps, as has been suggested, the order not to allow Megarian wares in the Aeginetan market.

**μάλιστά γε πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προύλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθελοῦσι μὴ ἄν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον:** 67. 4. Note the assertive *μὴ* for *οὐ*, as after *όμοσαι*, &c. (Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 685). In popular opinion, but not in that of Thucydides, this decree was the chief cause of the war: Ar. *Ach.* 515-39; *Pac.* 609. Ephorus, F. 196 (Diod. xii. 38. 1-41. 1), copied popular opinion, and the embroideries of Aristophanes as well, and later writers followed him: Plut. *Per.* 29-31 (see Introd., pp. 69-70).

It is possible that there had been an earlier decree excluding Megarian goods from the Athenian market only, as seems to be implied by *Ach.* 515-22 (so Busolt and others); but, apart from the question of what weight is to be given to a comic narrative, there is a difficulty, for Aristophanes expressly says that the denunciation of Megarian goods (supposed to be a consequence of the decree) was not done by order of the state. If Aristophanes is referring to historical incidents, we may suppose that an earlier

decree had been voted, perhaps at the time of the Samian revolt, which the Megarian colony Byzantium joined (115. 5), or after Megara's own secession in 446, and never formally rescinded, though allowed to fall into desuetude until some busy politicians tried to revive it some time before the major decree here mentioned was passed (when, for example, Megara first sent help to Corinth against Kerkyra in 435: 27. 2). These denunciations would be included in the ἔτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα of 67. 4.<sup>1</sup> See Busolt, iii. 811. 1; Bonner, C. P. xvi, 1921, 238–46.

**μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσοις, κ.τ.λ.:** admirably parodied by Aristophanes,

ἔτιθει νόμους ὥσπερ σκόλια γεγραμμένους,  
ώς χρὴ Μεγαρέας μήτε γῇ μήτ' ἐν ὄχορᾳ  
μήτ' ἐν θαλάσσῃ μήτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ μένειν,

Ach. 532–4; where the scholiast quotes Timokreon's skolion:

ἄφελέν σ', ὁ τυφλὸς Πλούτε,  
μήτε γῇ μήτ' ἐν θαλάσσῃ  
μήτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ φανῆμεν,  
ἀλλὰ Τάρταρον τε ναίειν  
καὶ Ἀχέροντα· διὰ σὲ γὰρ πάντ<sup>τ</sup>  
ἔστ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις κακά.

There had been many causes of mutual hatred between Megara and Athens. Trade rivalry was doubtless one of them, Megara with her strip of poor soil, being even more dependent on the export of manufactured articles for her supply of food than Attica; she must at the least have sympathized with her colony Byzantium in seceding from the League in 440, and cannot have been pleased at seeing the increase of Athenian influence on the Bosphorus and in the Pontos, where there were other Megarian colonies, Astakos, Chalcedon, Mesembria, and Herakleia, and whence her food came (above, pp. 367–8). Moreover, even during the period of Megarian alliance with Athens (c. 459–446), there had been a strong anti-Athenian party in the city (the alliance itself being largely the effect of internal political struggles), and an Athenian garrison had been necessary to secure it; and that garrison had been massacred in 446 (114. 1). More recently Megara had helped Corinth both in 435 and 433 (27. 2 and 46. 1); the decree may have been a reprisal for this (Miltner, R.E. art. 'Perikles', 776).<sup>2</sup> In addition to all this, possession of the Megarid meant for Athens comparative security from Peloponnesian invasions (cf. 107. 3), and a valuable port, Pegai, on the Corinthian Gulf.

<sup>1</sup> Corinth had refused to support Samos and Byzantium in 440 (41. 2), and was prepared in 433 to give up her support of Megara (42. 2). This may mean that already by 433 Athens had for some time taken steps to check Megarian trade. See 42. 2 n.

<sup>2</sup> I see no reason for being as precise as Adcock, C.A.H. v. 476–7, who thinks the decree was passed soon after the departure of Aristeus to Poteidaia.

**2. οὔτε τὸ ψῆφισμα καθῆσον:** Plutarch, Per. 30. 1, tells a pretty story of how Pericles pointed out to the Spartan ambassador, Polyalkes (not mentioned by Thucydides), that there was a law forbidding the repeal of the decree, and of Polyalkes' answer: σὺ δὲ μὴ καθέλης, ἀλλὰ στρέψον εἰσω τὸ πινάκιον, 'turn its face to the wall'; i.e. do not put the decree into effect. If there is truth in this, then some Spartans at least were still doing their best to avoid war. The story reminds one of the more brutal sophistry of the Argive herald in the *Herakleidai*, 254–8.

**ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρέων τῆς γῆς τῆς ιερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀστίστου:** a commonplace complaint if a quarrel was to be picked.<sup>1</sup> The 'sacred land' was on the borders of the Megarid and Attica and sacred to the Goddesses of Eleusis. The 'undefined land', not further specified here, was apparently some strip between the two territories which it had been agreed to leave neutral, but was not marked by boundary-stones (a sure opening for a dispute, one would have thought). We could do well with τῆς τε ιερᾶς.

**ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων:** there would be nothing illegal nor wrong in giving refuge to an escaped slave,<sup>2</sup> but it would be unneighbourly conduct to encourage slaves to escape by offering refuge, as unneighbourly, however trivial in comparison, as Athens' decree against Megara—for that decree, which did not conflict with any express clause of the Thirty Years' Truce, was yet inconsistent with the universal custom of freedom of trade between countries that were at peace. See 67. 4 n. Plutarch, Per. 29. 5, says the exclusion of Megara from the harbours controlled by Athens was παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια καὶ τοὺς γεγενημένους ὅρκους τοῖς Ἑλλησιν.

This charge also is admirably parodied by Aristophanes:

πόρνην δὲ Σιμαΐθαν ἴόντες Μεγαράδε  
νεανίαι κλέπτουσι μεθυσοκόπταβοι.  
καθ' οἱ Μεγαρῆς ὁδύναις πεφυσιγγωμένοι  
ἀντεξέκλεψαν Ἀσπασίας πόρνα δύο·  
κάντεῦθεν ὀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου κατερράγη  
Ἐλλησι πάσσι ἐκ τριῶν λαικαστριῶν.  
ἐντεῦθεν ὄργῃ Περικλέης οὐλύμπιος, κ.τ.λ.

It is a perfect comic picture of popular talk: the Megarian decree caused the war, the harbouring of slaves caused the decree, the slaves were Aspasia's and, her origin being what it was, were harlots into the bargain, Aspasia ruled Pericles; so the Olympian stirred

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the 4th-cent. incident, Dem. xiii. 32; I.G. ii. 204; also Hdt. vi. 75. 3 (Busolt, iii. 814, n. 3).

<sup>2</sup> It is possible that some of the slaves were state-slaves (note ἀφισταμένων instead of ἀποδρασάντων? but see Lys. xxiii. 7), which would make the alleged Megarian action more serious.

up the war. By a stroke of genius Aristophanes seems to combine with this a parody of Herodotos' introduction to the Persian wars (i. 1-5).

Plutarch in the course of his account of the origins of the war says, in reference to the charge against Megara of cultivating sacred land, that Perikles moved a decree to send a herald to protest both to Megara and to Sparta, a decree εὐγνώμονος καὶ φιλανθρώπου δικαιολογίας ἔχομενον; and that the herald, Anthemokritos by name, was killed, murdered it was said by Megarians, whereupon Charinos moved a decree against them ἀσπονδον μὲν εἶναι καὶ ἀκήρυκτον ἔχθραν, ὃς δ' ἀν ἐπιβῆ τῆς Ἀττικῆς Μεγαρέων θανάτῳ ζημιούσθαι, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγούς, ὅταν ὀμνύσωτο τὸν πάτριον ὄρκον, ἐπομνύειν ὅτι καὶ δὶς ἀνὰ πάντας ἔτος εἰς τὴν Μεγαρικὴν ἐμβαλοῦσι (Per. 30. 2-4). Anthemokritos was given burial near the Dipylon gate, where his grave was seen by Pausanias, i. 36. 3;<sup>1</sup> Thucydides says that the Megarid was invaded twice every year by the Athenians (till the capture of Nisaia), iv. 66. 1, cf. ii. 31. 3; and the language used by Plutarch suggests that his authority was an authentic decree, except perhaps for his use of ἔχθραν instead of πόλεμον.<sup>2</sup> For these reasons, historians have accepted the decree of Charinos as historical, and place it, generally, in the period between the Theban attack on Plataia and the invasion of Attica—at least after the outbreak of hostilities when no longer ambassadors, but heralds, were sent (cf. 146, ii. 12. 2). The decree moved by Perikles, excluding Megara from the markets of the empire, was earlier than the first congress at Sparta (summer or autumn, 432), 67. 4. The silence of Thucydides about Anthemokritos and the variant in [Dem.] xii. 4 are noteworthy, and Beloch may be right in accepting Charinos' decree but dissociating it from the story about the herald; he dates the decree after the outbreak of war (ii. 1. 293, n. 1).<sup>3</sup> See Busolt, iii. 814. 4.

3. τῶν τελευταίων πρέσβεων: Thucydides does not precisely date this; it would be interesting to know how much time elapsed between it and the attack on Plataia. Was this attack made perhaps in part from a desire to force the issue, to prevent Sparta from sending more embassies?

<sup>1</sup> In the *Letter of Philip*, now known as Demosthenes xii, § 4, is a reference to the death of Anthemokritos; but there we are told that a statue was put up to him πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν, and that Megarians were henceforth excluded from the Eleusinian mysteries.

<sup>2</sup> Or did the decree use ἔχθραν purposely, to mean 'undying enmity', for ever, irrespective of the war? 'Εχθρός, however, is found in some 5th-cent. decrees, I.G. i. 2, 71, 90, 101. θανάτῳ ζημιούσθαι also is not the phrase normally used in such circumstances, but νηπονεῖ τεθνάναι.

<sup>3</sup> It should be observed that Plutarch may well be quoting a decree (cf. e.g. Per. 31 ad fin., 32. 1-2 as well), but have been unable to date it; and Thucydides' silence perhaps means that it does not belong to 432-431 at all.

'Ραμφίου: presumably the same as the Ramphias of v. 12-14, and the father of Klearchos, viii. 8. 2. Melesippos is again sent as a last chance to Athens, ii. 12. 1-2; Agesandros may be the father of Agesandridas, viii. 91. 2. Note that the Polyalkes mentioned by Plutarch (from what source?) is not among these (above, p. 449).

λεγόντων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, κ.τ.λ.: no longer ready for compromise, but with a much stronger demand than before. For τοὺς Ἐλληνας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι could hardly, as the sole content of an ultimatum, have been meant as something that could be formally adhered to without any practical change (cf. n. on Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον εἶναι, § 1 above). See, however, Adcock, C.A.H. v, p. 189, who takes exactly the opposite view: "the studied vagueness of the proposal . . . seems devised not so much to close the negotiations as to keep them open." But this desire would hardly have been expressed so curtly: 'we have nothing to say but this.' In either case Athens had her answer ready, 144. 2.

ἄπαξ περὶ ἀπάντων βουλευσαμένους: Steup takes this to mean that the ekklisia had not discussed the previous demands, that this was the first meeting, to decide finally (with the full authority of the δῆμος) the answer to be given. This is quite unnecessary, and is contradicted by καὶ νῦν ὁμοῖα καὶ παραπλήσια ἔνυμβοντεύει μοι ὅντα, 140. 1. The Athenians were not so ready to surrender their powers into the hands of individual citizens, however powerful.

4. μὴ ἐμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ ψήφισμα εἰρήνης: the popular view again, though Sparta had apparently made no reference to this particular difficulty in their last demands.

Nesselhauf, 'Diplomatische Verhandlungen vor dem pelop. Kriege', Herm. lxix, 1934, 286-99, finds, as others have done, great difficulty in the narrative of these embassies and Perikles' reply: how could Perikles' opponents mention only the Megarian decree after Sparta's last ultimatum, which, though it did not mean the break-up of the League altogether, did mean the end of the ἀρχή? and how could Perikles speak of βραχί τι in 140. 4-5, the decree, if so strong a demand had already been made ('the Peloponnesians will make a much greater demand if we give way in this')? I do not feel that there is more than a verbal difficulty; and what there is is largely solved by Nesselhauf. The Megarian decree was still uppermost in the minds of the majority; and many said, remembering the words of the earlier demand (139. 1), 'if we give way in this, Sparta will not press her last ultimatum'. It was important in the internal politics of Athens: 'you must see', said Perikles, 'that this Megarian question is not a trifle, but a πεῖρα τῆς γνώμης'; and when he added that further demands would follow a surrender to this one, he was thinking not of a general insistence on autonomy but something

more like 'you must give up Aigina altogether, for it is part of the Peloponnese'. There may have been many in Athens who would have said 'let us promise autonomy, as well as rescind the decree', but would not have gone further. See below, p. 465.

**Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου, κ.τ.λ.:** the formal title and description, resumed from 127. 3. The speech that follows is in fact the detail of the statement there made *ἡναντιοῦτο πάντα τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἴλα ὑπέίκειν, κ.τ.λ.*

**ἀνήρ ὁν (so *Ox. Pap.* x. p. 122<sup>1</sup>) κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρώτος Αθηναίων:** in these, and in the even more emphatic words of 127. 3 ὃν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ' ἐαυτὸν καὶ ἀγων τὴν πολιτείαν, Thucydides contradicts the view, as widely held in modern times as in late antiquity, that Perikles' position was seriously shaken in the year before the outbreak of war; just as his silence about the personal attacks made on him and his friends is his refutation of the charge that it was this weakening of his influence that made him stir up the flames of war. For the former see Busolt, iii. 818 ff.; for the latter as well, Beloch, ii. 1. 295-7. Contrast *C.A.H.* v. 477-9. Whether we believe either in the first only or in both of these views depends on our conception of a modern historian's duty: which is to follow good evidence when we possess it. This is not the same thing as treating every statement and judgement by Thucydides as inspired; but let those who prefer to follow Ephoros (our ultimate authority for the other view) show in which way he was a better judge of events than Thucydides.

The attacks on Perikles and his friends are, of course, credible and to be believed; but he, like all other leading politicians, had been attacked and vilified all his life. The attacks were doubtless intensified in 433 and 432—there was greater opportunity, Kleon was anxious to come to the front (attacks on the powerful have ever been the method of the rising politician), and many an honest man who had supported Perikles hitherto must have hesitated then. But there is no good evidence that his personal position in the state was in any way weakened; there is the evidence of Thucydides that it was not; and once he had carried his proposal to return a negative to the Spartan demands, it will have been stronger than ever; for all Athens must be united once the decision had been made.

Many invaluable details of these attacks on Perikles, both at this and at other times in his career, are recorded by Plutarch in his *Life*. His chronology and his judgement of politics are not to be trusted (see Introd., pp. 65 ff.); but he preserves much that Thucydides ignores, and helps us to fill in some of the gaps in the story.  
**κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον:** written, clearly, some time after 432 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> Steup's argument that because the writer of this papyrus carelessly left out certain words, he might equally carelessly insert them, is unsubstantial.

140-4. *Speech of Perikles*

**140. 1. οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὄργῃ:** 'in a different temper', *ὄργῃ* being 'emotions', 'feelings' in general (as opposed to reason), as iii. 82. 2. Cf. 122. 1 n., 130. 2. One MS. (G) has a variant *ὄρμῃ*, impulse, which would here, in effect, come to much the same thing. For the meaning, cf. vi. 31. 1. *ἀναπειθομένους*: "aliud iis persuaderi, ut pro pace bellum sumant", Stahl; cf. 84. 2. But we should expect the simple verb here, just as the compound is necessary below ('those of you who are being persuaded to vote contrary to our past decisions'). For this use of *ἀναπειθεῖν*, to 'persuade back', as it were, 'make one change his opinion', cf. especially Hdt. i. 156. 1, *οὐκ ἀναπείσει μιν μεταβούλευσασθαι*.

**δικαιῶ . . . μεταποιεῖσθαι:** Perikles expresses the same sentiment again, *after* a disaster, ii. 64. 1. Compare Alkibiades' claim (in a different context), vi. 16. 4.

**τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων:** see Jebb's note on Soph. *O.T.* 44-5. For the sentence, cf. 120. 5. *ἀμαθῶς* is generally taken as passive, 'unforeseeable' (Stahl, Classen, L. and S.); but more probably there is irony here: 'we may suffer disaster (*ἢν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλώμεθα*), for (though a man make a wise decision) the turn of events may prove as unwise as the plans of men', 'fortune may support the wrong side'. So E. Harrison, *C.R.* xl, 1926, p. 26. Grote, too, saw the irony, though translating rather differently, v. p. 32 n., and Forbes, "wayward and unintelligible". Cf. Ion of Chios' witty saying: *οὐ φαύλως εἰπεῖν "Ιῶνα περὶ τῆς τύχης ὅτι πολλὰ τῆς σοφίας διαφέρουσα πλεῖστα αὐτῇ ὅμοια ποιεῖ* (fr. 3 Diels = Plut. *Mor.* 717 B; cf. 716 D); Eur. *Hek.* 592-5, and, with Finley (above, p. 415), 38, *Troad.* 1203-6,

θνητῶν δὲ μῶρος δόστις εὖ πράσσειν δοκῶν  
βέβαια χαίρειν τοῖς τρόποις γὰρ αἱ τύχαι,  
ἔμπληκτος ὡς ἀνθρωπος, ἀλλοτ' ἄλλοσε  
πτηδῶσι, κοιδεῖς αὐτὸς εὐτυχεῖ ποτε.

**2. δίκαια . . . ἀλλήλοις διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι:** Beloch thinks the Athenian offer of arbitration an idle one, for there was no state at once impartial and strong enough to be judge. But we must remember not only that the offer was formally correct, and its summary refusal unjustified (Adcock, *C.A.H.* v. 190), but what the arbitration would be concerned with: not the whole problem of the Athenian empire (or the Spartan domination in the Peloponnese, 144. 2), but, were the Athenian actions in relation to Poteidaia, Megara, and Aigina contrary to the terms of the Thirty Years' Treaty? Cf. 44. 1 n.—the Athenians would not break the treaty in 433; 72. 1 and 87. 6 n., p. 254. **ἐπιτάσσοντες ἥδη:** this is the keynote of Perikles' argument—the Spartans had sent, not a complaint, which might be met, but an ultimatum 'which no self-respecting state could accept'; 140. 5, 141. 1, 144. 2, 145. Thucydides hardly makes it clear whether he

thinks this is true; but he implies it, by telling us how the Spartans and the Peloponnesian League decided first that the Athenians *had* broken the treaty, and then sent ambassadors to Athens; that is, they did not follow the advice of Archidamos, 82. 1, 85. 2. Cf. also 126. 1. As Finley says, p. 38, this reason for the Athenian refusal to agree to the Spartan demands was the common explanation of the war in Athens (except amongst Pericles' enemies) and is reflected in Euripides *Herakleidai*, 197–380, and *Suppliants*, 517–22:

καὶ πρῶτα μὲν σε πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα ἀμείψομαι·  
οὐκ οὖλος ἔγώ Κρέοντα δεσπόζοντ' ἐμοῦ  
οὐδὲ σθένοντα μεῖζον, ὥστε ἀναγκάσαι  
δρᾶν τὰς Ἀθηνας ταῦτα· ἂνω γὰρ ἀν ρέοι  
τὰ πράγματα οὐτως, εἰ πιταξόμεσθα δῆ.

Plutarch summarizes the argument in *Per.* 31. 1, with which compare especially 140. 5.

For the meaning of ἐπιτάσσειν, see I.G. i.² 76<sub>30</sub>: ἐπαγγέλλειν δὲ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τῆσι ἄλλησι πόλεσι τῆσι Ἐλληνικῆσιν ἀπάσησι, . . . λέγοντας μὲν καθ' ἡ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπάρχονται καὶ οἱ ἔνυμαχοι, ἐκείνοις δὲ μὴ ἐπιτάπτοντας, κελεύοντας δὲ ἀπάρχεσθαι, ἐάν βούλωνται, κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. Cf. also 145 n., below.

4. ὡς διὰ μικρὸν ἐπολεμήσατε: this is just what was said by Pericles' enemies. Cf. e.g. Plut. *Nik.* 9. 9: ὁ μὲν γὰρ (*Περικλῆς*) ἐπ' αὐτίαις μικρᾶς εἰς συμφορὰς μεγάλας ἐμβαλεῖν ἐδόκει τοὺς Ἐλληνας, ὁ δὲ (*Νικίας*) τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν ἐπεισεν ἐκλαθέσθαι φίλους γενομένους, as well as *Per.* 31. 1–2.

5. τὴν βεβαίωσιν καὶ πεῖραν τῆς γνώμης: Plut. *Per.* 31. 1.

οἷς εἰς ἑγχωρίστε: as Steup points out, while this reading can be defended grammatically (*οἷς = τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις*; cf. iv. 26. 4), it is remarkable that the remoter object, which is both unimportant and can easily be understood, should be expressed, and not the direct object which is the special matter in question. The temptation to read ὥστε, as Dionysios of Halikarnassos writes in his close imitation of this whole passage (*Antiq. Rom.* vi. 62: see below), is strong, and should perhaps not be resisted. If *οἷς* is read, a full stop should be put before it (Krüger, Arnold, Shilleto, Stuart Jones), not a comma (Stahl, Hude), nor yet a colon (Croiset, Classen–Steup); yet this upsets the rhythm of the whole sentence, *τὸ γάρ . . . προσφέρεσθαι*. The papyrus fr., *Ox. Pap.* x. 122, reads *οἷς*.

Note *εἰ* with the fut. indic.: almost 'if you insist, against my advice, in giving way'. Cf. *εἰ πολεμήσομεν*, 141. 1. For *καὶ ἄλλο τι μεῖζον ἐπιταχθήσεοθε*, after the Spartan demands in 139. 3, see above, pp. 451–2.

**φόβῳ**: it might be answered, 'we can afford to give way in this, but we will refuse all further demands and thereby show that fear was not our

motive'. But an unyielding front *might* have deterred the Peloponnesians from war altogether.

As Stahl says, it would be attractive to read **φόβῳ καν τοῦτο**, so that *τοῦτο* may mean *τὸ μεῖζον ὁ εὐθὺς ἐπιταχθήσεοθε* (καὶ *τοῦτο*, 'this too'), but that Dionysios seems clearly to have read *καὶ* and to refer *τοῦτο* to *τὸ βραχὺ τι τοῦτο*. (Dionysios has: *τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑμῖν σοβαρῶς ἐπιθήσεται· ὥστε εἰ τὰ πρῶτα συγχωρίσετε συμφέροντα εἶναι νομίσαντες, ἔτερόν τι χείρον εὐθὺς ἐπιταχθήσεοθε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄλλο τούτου χαλεπώτερον ὡς φόβῳ καὶ τὰ πρώτα ὑπακούσαντες.*)

**ἄπο τοῦ ἴσου . . . προσφέρεσθαι**: sending a command (*ἐπιτάσσειν*) was the act of a strong power to a weak one. Cf. Eur. *Herakleid.* 362–3; *Suppl.* 518–20 (above, n. on 140. 2).

141. 1. **ἢ, εἰ πολεμήσομεν, κ.τ.λ.**: the scholiast takes *εἰ πολεμήσομεν* after *διανοηθῆτε*, 'decide either to yield or whether we shall go to war', clearly wrongly. The second verb dependent on *διανοηθῆτε* is the participle *εἴξοντες*; but it would certainly be more in accord with usage if, with Arnold and Stahl, we read *<ώς>* καὶ ἐπὶ μεγάλῃ, awkward as that is after the previous *ώς*.

**τὴν . . . αὐτὴν . . . δούλωσιν**: an exaggerated, but forceful expression, accusing his opponents of wanting the 'enslavement' of Athens. Cf. Perikles' use of *ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι*, ii. 63. 2 (imitated by Kleon, iii. 40. 4), and *ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν* immediately after.

2. From here to 144. 1 Perikles discusses the forces at the disposal of the two sides, in 141. 2–143. 2 of the enemy, in the rest, of Athens; it is an answer to the Corinthian arguments in 121–2.

**ώς οὐκ ἀσθενέστερα ἔξομεν**: corresponding to the Corinthian claim *κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ εἰκὸς ημᾶς ἐπικρατήσαι*, 121. 2.

3. **αὐτουργοί**: almost the same as *γεωργοί*, 142. 7; nevertheless the word would not be used of the Spartans themselves, whose industry was none the less agriculture. This particular weakness of the Peloponnesians as a whole was not in fact shared by Sparta (see Introd., pp. 11–12). The Athenian farmers were also, in the main, *αὐτουργοί*; but Athens is not depending on them for her main resisting power (neither on their military service nor on their production of food), whereas the Peloponnesians were. For Grundy's criticism of this statement, see Introd., p. 12, n. 1.

4. **καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, κ.τ.λ.**: three disadvantages of the Peloponnesians have been mentioned in § 3. These are now explained, in reverse order. **ναῦς πληροῦν**: so we should read with Herwerden and almost all edd. but Stuart Jones, or else assume that another participle has dropped out, to be taken with *πεζὰς στρατεás*. The infinitive is much simpler: actual manning of a fleet is one of their main difficulties.

**ἄπο τῶν ιδίων, κ.τ.λ.**: Forbes compares iii. 15. 2, *καὶ οἱ μὲν (the Lacedaemonians, who were not αὐτουργοί) προθύμως ταῦτα ἐπρασσον*,

οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι βραδέως τε ξυνελέγοντο καὶ ἐν καρποῦ ξυγκομιδῇ ήσαν καὶ ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ στρατεύειν.

5. αἱ δὲ περιουσίαι, κ.τ.λ.: 'stored-up capital'. Annual production may suffice for peace-time living; capital resources are necessary for war. Cf. ii. 13. 3. This is the second point mentioned in § 3. In fact ἔσφοραί, some only reluctant, others literally *βίαιοι*, proved necessary for Athens: see iii. 19. 1 and iv. 51 (note on the increase in the tribute in 425–424 B.C.).

σώμασί τε, κ.τ.λ.: the first point in § 3. What the Corinthians had held to be an advantage (121. 3), Pericles here argues is a disadvantage. τὸ μὲν πιστὸν ἔχοντες, κ.τ.λ.: note the 'realistic' attitude, which is common in Greek; not 'they will bravely face death' (as Forbes renders it: "a population of yeomen will fight bravely enough in the field, for they are not afraid of death").

6. μήτε βουλευτηρίῳ ἐνὶ χρώμενοι: Athens, on the other hand, had the sole decision for all her *ξύμμαχία*. In a different context Demosthenes could make a similar distinction between Philip, who was able to decide everything himself, and Athens, where every question must first be debated (where the *citizens* were *ἰσόψηφοι*); a point apparently made by some ancient commentator, for the scholiast says here: *ἰστέον διτι τὴν τῆς δημοκρατίας διαβολὴν πάσαν ἐνταῦθα ἔθηκε*.

In ii. 15. 2 Thucydides uses *ἐν βουλευτήριον* to illustrate the union of all Attica by Theseus.

τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἔκαστος: each state-member, not each individual; cf. 137. 4 n. on *ἐπιόντα ἐμοί*. This is what the Corinthians feared: 120. 1–2.

7. ἐν βραχεῖ μὲν μορίῳ: we cannot understand here *τῆς ξυνόδου*, as Krüger and Steup do, for it would conflict with *χρόνοι*: 'as they meet in conference only rarely (cf. 69. 2, μόλις δὲ νῦν γε *ξυνῆλθομεν*)', the amount of attention they give to common interests is small; for the most part each state is following its own path.' It is agreed that while the conference lasts they *consider* common interests; but as soon as it is over, they *act* (*σκοποῦσι* . . . *πράσσουσι*) each in his own. *ἐν βραχεῖ μορίῳ* (if we may not understand *τοῦ χρόνου*, as Classen wished) will mean 'to but a small extent'.

τῷ αὐτῷ ὅποι ἀπάντων ἴδιᾳ δοξάσματι: 'the same opinion (or fancy, delusion) held by all individually', that it is somebody else's business to look after the common interest for him. For the language, cf. Isokrates, iv. 86, *τὸν κοινὸν πόλεμον ἴδιον ποιησάμενοι*; where, however, it was a patriotic and unselfish action (Athens assuming the sole burden at Marathon).

**142. 1. τῇ τῶν χρημάτων σπάνει:** a resumption and emphasizing of the argument of 141. 4–5, with the additional point that *particular* opportunities for action will be lost owing to delays caused by

this, as by conflicting interests (not only will they be in general handicapped, in comparison with Athens, in a long war).

3–4. τὴν μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: a very difficult passage, of which no satisfactory explanation has yet been given, even with the help of emendation. *τὴν μὲν* is answered, not by *φρούριον* δέ, but by *τὸ δέ*, § 6; but editors suppose two kinds of *ἐπιτείχισις* to be expressly discussed, the building of a *πόλις ἀντίπαλος* and of a *φρούριον* (note the emphatic position of *φρούριον*); and either *τὴν* (= *ἐπιτείχισιν*) is direct object of *παρασκευάσασθαι* and *πόλιν ἀντίπαλον* is in explanatory apposition, or *πόλιν* is the direct object and *τὴν* = 'as regards *ἐπιτείχισιν*'. The objections to this are: (1) we badly need a second *μέν* after *χαλεπόν*, or rather some emphasis placed on *πόλιν* (*καὶ* going only with *εἰρήνη*); hence the suggested emendation *πόλιν μὲν γὰρ . . . [πόλιν] ἀντίπαλον*. Shilleto points out that *μέν* is sometimes omitted (Dem. xix. 91; St. Paul, *Eph. Rom.* 6. 17—a notable instance, but late Greek), and also that one *μέν* sometimes, for the sake of euphony, has to do duty for two, though none of his instances (Plat. *Theait.* 150 A; *Protag.* 351 D; *Rep.* ii. 358 E; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* iv. 6.8, 1127 a 2) except Eur. *Hek.* 592–7 seems to me parallel to this; but in no case is there any doubt about the emphasis, as here.<sup>1</sup> (2) A city might be founded in peace-time with hostile intent against its neighbours, for example, Amphipolis and the strong Athenian cleruchy in the Chersonese (cp. 100. 3, *οἱς πολέμιοιν ἦν τὸ χωρίον κτιζόμενον*); but they are for defence, not offence, and have little to do with *ἐπιτείχισις*. Or in war-time (or in enemy country) a city might be founded for both defensive and offensive purposes, as Herakleia Trachinia (iii. 92, esp. § 4, *καὶ ἀμα τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναῖον πολέμου*, κ.τ.λ.) and, as Arnold points out, the Roman citizen colonies; and Nikias could use the idea when he warns the Athenians that in Sicily *πόλιν τε νομίσαι χρὴ ἐν ἀλλοφύλοις καὶ πολεμίοις οἰκισοῦντας ἔνει* (vi. 23. 2; note the emphasis on *πόλιν*, the emphasis we need here). Note, too, Athenagoras' words, *εἰ πόλιν ἐτέραν τοσαύτην ὅσα τι Συράκουσαι εἰσιν ἔλθοιεν ἔχοντες καὶ ὅμορον οἰκισαντες τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῦντο* (vi. 37. 2); and cp. vi. 63. 3 and vii. 11. 4 (Nikias' dispatch: 'we are more like a besieged city than besiegers'); and esp. vi. 86. 3 (the Athenian delegate at Kamarina), *ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοί μὴ μεθ' ὑμῶν . . . οἴδε δὲ* (Syracuse) *οὐ στρατοπέδῳ, πόλει δὲ μείζονι τῆς ἡμετέρας παρονούσας ἐποικοῦντες ὑμῶν αἰεὶ τε ἐπιβούλευοντο*, κ.τ.λ., compared with the words used of Dekelia when fortified by the Spartans (the true type of *ἐπιτείχισις*), vii. 27. 3 *ὑστερον δὲ φρουραῖς . . . τῇ χώρᾳ ἐπωκεῖτο*. Demosthenes again, viii. 66, speaks of Philip making of Euboea an *ἐπιτείχισμα* against Athens. These

<sup>1</sup> Thuc. i. 22. 1 is a much better instance (see p. 140, above). In 32. 1, *πρῶτον, μάλιστα μέν* we have another case; but there the *first μέν*, after *πρῶτον* (answered by *ἔπειτα δέ*), is omitted, obviously for euphony.

instances, and as well the use of the fortified town of Thebes by the Persians (90. 2, see 124. 3 n.), show that a πόλις ἀντίπαλος as envisaged in our passage might be an instance of ἐπιτείχισις, though ἐπιτειχίζειν is never actually used in this connexion; but is it likely that Perikles would discuss so unlikely an event as the Peloponnesians sending out so large a force, and a permanent force, that it could be described as 'founding a city', in war-time and in Attica or anywhere within the Athenian empire (*ἐν πολεμίᾳ*)? It would be a quite fantastic scheme. Remember that, by this interpretation, πόλις ἀντίπαλος is expressly opposed to φρουρίου; it is not vague.

I believe the best solution is to read *<πρὸς>* πόλιν ἀντίπαλον, and to take the first part of the sentence in the most general way and the second as a particular instance: 'it is a difficult matter to carry out an ἐπιτείχισις (*τὴν* direct object of *παρασκευάσασθαι*) against a city of equal strength even in peace-time, let alone in war; and if they do build a fort (a mere fort—the most that they would be able to do in war-time), it will not be a decisive matter.' Forbes, in his Appendix, p. 137, gives a similar interpretation to the sentence as a whole, but would keep the MSS. reading by taking πόλιν ἀντίπαλον as subject of *παρασκευάσασθαι*; but I can see no meaning in ἀντίπαλον in this.

There is the further difficulty of οὐχ ἡσσον ἔκεινοις ἡμῶν ἀντεπιτειχισμένων. Stahl, taking the verb as passive (for the middle of ἐπιτειχίζειν is not found, and that of the simple verb τειχίζειν only with an object, II. I, III. 105. 1) translates, *cum et ipsi (ārū) contra eos muniti simus, i.e. cum et ipsi munimenta habeamus quibus nos ab illis defendamus*; the defences being not only the forts of Attica, as Oinoe and Panakton, but above all the walls of Athens and Peiraeus. The objection to this, as Classen says, is that ἐπιτειχίζειν describes, especially in this context, an offensive not a defensive action; that the forts and the walls were not in fact an answer (or were but a partial answer) to the later ἐπιτείχισις of Dekeleia; and that no proper meaning is given to οὐχ ἡσσον, which implies a counter-action of a similar kind. Hence Steup conjectured ἀντεπιτειχισμένων (Goeller and Classen ἀν ἀντεπιτειχισμένων; Reiske ἀντεπιτειχισμένων), taken as the middle, and referring to Athenian ἐπιτείχισις in the enemy's territory (as Pylos and Kythera). This, however, would be the same thing as ἐπιτειχίζειν . . . ἡμᾶς πλεύσαντας ἐς τὴν ἔκεινων just below, and is clearly improbable. Similar is the scholiast's interpretation of the perfect: δυνατῶν ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀντεπιτειχίσαι ἔκεινοις. Better is Shilleto's: 'as to the ἐπιτ., it is difficult in time of peace to construct a rival city, much more in war time when our city is a counter-ἐπιτείχισμα to their infant colony (notice the *perfect*)'; i.e. to their anti-Athens (so to speak), Athens could equally be regarded as an ἐπιτείχισις.<sup>1</sup> This is the right meaning,

<sup>1</sup> For this sense of the passive, 'we are fortified against', cf. Δεκελεῖας ἐπ-

if we are really to suppose that Perikles is discussing this impossible project. ἀντεπιτείχισις must refer to a counter-attack; but I believe that *<πρὸς>* πόλιν, as suggested above, and ἀντεπιτειχισμένων in Shilleto's sense is the least unsatisfactory solution. (Croiset defends the perfect in Steup's sense, comparing Arrian, *Anab.* vii. 27. 3, ὡς θεῷ δὴ γεγενημένῳ; but there the change assumed is instantaneous, here the whole action of ἀντεπιτείχισις is in the future; whereas the fortification of Attica, in Shilleto's sense, is already there.)

καταδρομᾶς καὶ αὐτομολίας: just what did occur after the capture and fortification of Dekeleia, vii. 27. 3-5.

ἐπιτειχίζειν τε . . . ἡμᾶς, κ.τ.λ.: as Pylos, Methana (iv. 45. 2), Kythera (iv. 54). Note that, according to Thucydides, Perikles anticipated and approved the policy followed after his death by Demosthenes and Kleon, a policy which is generally supposed to be contrary to his (cf. 143. 4, 144. 1 n.); though it is true he only suggests it as a counter-move to an ἐπιτείχισις by the enemy.

ἀμύνεσθαι means probably 'defend' such a fort as Pylos, with the help of the navy, rather than 'retaliate' by means of the navy, as Classen and others (which would only be another way of writing πλεύσαντας ἐς τὴν ἔκεινων).

5. πλέον γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν, κ.τ.λ.: this "explains why they may hope for success in the operations by land, as well as by sea, which the erection of a fort on Peloponnesian territory would involve"—Forbes. ἐμπειρίας is genitive after πλέον ἔχειν (see Steup's answer to Classen's and Stahl's objections). We must, I think, following the natural order of the words, take τοῦ κατὰ γῆν ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ closely together, after ἐμπειρίας, 'we have more experience of warfare conducted on land from the fleet as a base' (not 'our navy has given us more experience of land-warfare'), 'than they have for naval operations from their land-base'. The capture and retention of Naupaktos involved fighting κατὰ γῆν ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ; so subsequently did Pylos and Kythera. The second half of the sentence (in this context) is somewhat inconsequent, unless Perikles is assuming that any Spartan ἐπιτείχισις must involve for them naval operations (and so he, or Thucydides, is not thinking of Dekeleia).

If with Hude we read ὅμως after πλέον γάρ (only C of the best MSS. has it), it must mean 'in spite of everything', 'after all'.

6. τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης: the clause corresponding to τὴν μὲν γάρ, § 3, as is shown by § 2.

7. μελετήσαι: aorist, 'to get a complete training'.

9. ὕσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι: not 'like other things' but 'not less than other things', 'more than other things', as εἴπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι. So probably also in vi. 18. 6.

τετειχισμένης, Aischin. ii. 76. But we should expect it to mean, 'a fort has been built against us', as in the passive of ἐπιβούλευν.

This is a fine statement of the naval point of view; contrast the obstinate blindness of Plato and the respectable misunderstanding of Aristotle (above, pp. 266-7). It is remarkable that at Athens the navy did not enjoy greater social prestige; that though the rich were ready enough to be admirals and trierarchs, no one was especially proud of being a *κυβερνήτης* or a subordinate officer, still less of being a rower. Aristotle in the *Ἄθηναίων Πολιτεία* describes at some length the training of the hoplite, but says nothing of the sailor's, which was far more elaborate; and this exaggeration of the hoplite's value was common, even in Athens. There is more recognition of the importance of the sailor in Aristophanes than in any other writer except Thucydides.

**143.1. ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων:** Perikles means simply that the citizen and metic levies are sufficient to provide a navy equal to the enemy's; not because it was only on exceptional occasions that citizens and metics served (as Forbes says), but only on such occasions were ships exclusively so manned; as iii. 16. 1, where, besides, what was exceptional was that hoplites embarked as rowers (or so it seems: see n. there).

Note here the very different positions occupied by the metics, resident in Athens, and the citizens of the subject states who formed such a large proportion of the rowers in the Athenian fleet. Perikles is here severely practical and 'realistic': the allies are not partners in the Athenian empire (contrast Nikias on a desperate occasion, vii. 63. 3).

**κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους:** generally taken separately, 'our captains are all citizens and our *ὑπηρεσία* more numerous and better than anywhere else', not 'our captains and *ὑπηρεσία* are citizens and more numerous', &c. But the second part of the argument cannot be simply, as Forbes says, "that the sailors, whether citizens or not, are the best and most numerous in Hellas, and that therefore the possible loss of a few hired sailors will not matter"; for obviously the better they are, the more dangerous to Athens becomes their desertion to the enemy; and it is not the desertion of a few, but of *τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν*. Whether *ἡ ἄλλη ὑπηρεσία* was formed of citizens only (or citizens and metics only) or not, it is clearly meant as a special service manned by men on whom Athens could rely—citizens, metics, or individual *ξένοι* (as opposed to the mass recruitment among the allies of the rowers). It is only the third part of the argument (§ 2) that concerns these ordinary rowers. (For the meaning of *ὑπηρεσία*, see vi. 31. 3 n.)

Ps.-Xen. i. 19-20, in his off-hand way, mentions the skill (gained almost involuntarily) of the Athenian sailor. The whole passage on sea-power in this pamphlet, i. 19-2. 16, is worth comparing with

Perikles' speech here. Arist. *Aθηναίων Πολιτεία* 24. 3 speaks of twenty triremes for coastal protection, always in commission, manned by citizens and 2,000 other citizen-sailors employed constantly (for a purpose that is obscure); and Plut. *Per.* II. 4, of sixty triremes in commission 'in which large numbers of the citizens were trained'. But we do not know the source of these two statements, which, as they stand, are hardly consistent with each other.

**2. τὴν τε αὐτοῦ φεύγειν** (both Hude and Stuart Jones print *αὐτοῦ*, as the MSS., either by mistake or perversity): the sailors would be exiled because the cities to which they belonged were practically all within the Athenian empire.

**ὅλιγων ἡμερῶν . . . δόσεως:** "tres genitivi copulati sunt ut ii. 13. 2, iv. 10. 5, viii. 48. 3"—Stahl. But we could do well without *δόσεως* here, more particularly as yet another genitive has immediately preceded. 'A few days', because the Athenians will soon defeat the enemy fleet (Stahl, Classen); also because, Perikles says, the money will not last much longer.

**3. καὶ ἄλλα:** not further defined; for *ἡν τε* in the next sentence begins another argument (Steup). Perikles, in his explanation of Athenian advantages, does not go into as much detail as in his account of the enemy; for example in § 5, *εἰ γάρ ἡμεν νησιώται, κ.τ.λ.*, he leaves it to be understood that it is the fortification system of Athens and the Peiraeus which will enable the Athenians to ignore the invasions, to act almost as though they were islanders.

**4. ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνων πλευσούμεθα:** see n. on *ἐπιτειχίζειν*, 142. 4; the invasions of Megara and the Argolid peninsula in 431 and 430 are other instances in point. Cf. Ps.-Xen. 2. 4-5, 13.

**Πελοποννήσου μέρος:** it is surely right to follow ABEF in omitting *τε* after *Πελοποννήσου*, as Stahl and Classen. Cf. ii. 42. 1, and for *τε . . . καὶ* after *ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ* in a positive sentence, ii. 49. 5.

**οὐχ ἔξουσιν ἄλλην:** by which to supply themselves with food. This is what is meant by *ἡμῖν ἔστι γῆ πολλή*, not that there was actual Athenian territory abroad; for (he argues) the only harm the Peloponnesians can do by their invasions, so long as the Athenians do not oppose them in a pitched battle, is the destruction of crops, trees, and buildings. So Archidamos said, 81. 2; and cf. Ps.-Xen. 2. 16.

**5. εἰ γάρ ἡμεν νησιώται:** cf. Ps.-Xen. 2. 14-16. This view was the prevailing one in Athens, thanks to the policy of Themistokles (93. 7) and of Perikles, who adopted and improved that of Themistokles by the building of the Long Walls. The similarity between this passage and that in Ps.-Xenophon (except that the latter adds the freedom from *στάσις* that an island ruling the sea would enjoy) is such that Kalinka, p. 233, thinks that without doubt a real speech of Perikles lay behind both. This is possible enough; but the idea must often have been discussed in Athens.

**μὴ ἱκανῶν ἡμῶν ὅντων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν:** the navy could not do everything; an army large enough to prevent or overcome secession among the allies was also necessary, and that the Athenians had, if they kept it intact; but compared with the combined Peloponnesian and Boeotian, the Athenian hoplite force was comparatively small. Ps.-Xen. 2. 1 puts this truth thus: *τὸ δὲ ὄπλιτικὸν αὐτοῖς, ὃ ἥκιστα δοκεῖ εὖ ἔχειν Ἀθήνησιν, οὕτω καθέστηκεν καὶ τῶν μὲν πολεμίων ἥπτους τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἥγονται εἴναι καὶ δλεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων, οἱ φέρουσι τὸν φόρον, καὶ κατὰ γῆν κράτιστοί εἰσιν καὶ νομίζουσι τὸ ὄπλιτικὸν ἀρκεῖν, εἰ τῶν συμμάχων κρείττονές εἰσιν.* This seems more like a reflection of Perikles' words (note especially *οἱ φέρουσι τὸν φόρον* and *ὅθεν ἰσχύουσιν*) than the paragraph cited above.  
**οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, κ.τ.λ.:** cf. vii. 77. 7, and the famous answer of Themistokles to Adeimantos, Hdt. viii. 61. 2; and see Forbes here. Also 81. 6 (in Archidamos' speech, esp. *μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεύειν*), and, by contrast, 82. 4. Hude, with some reason, conjectures *κέκτηνται* for *κτῶνται*.

**καὶ εἰ ὕμην πείσειν ὑμᾶς, κ.τ.λ.:** again a forceful argument; cf. 141. 1 (*δούλωσιν*), 142. 9. Perikles does not disguise the fact that their homes, all that they had built up in the last fifty years, would be destroyed. The Athenians followed his advice in part, ii. 14. 1.

**144. 1. ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἄμα πολεμοῦντες καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι:** Perikles would have condemned the Sicilian expedition under the first heading (for though Athens was not then actually at war with the Peloponnese, peace was very doubtful, as Nikias pointed out), the Aitolian venture of Demosthenes and perhaps the Delion campaign under the second. There is no reason to suppose he would have opposed the Kythera and Pylos expeditions. Cf. ii. 65. 7, which is not more precise, but is quite consistent with this view.

**2. ἐκεῖνα:** i.e. *ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι, κ.τ.λ.* ‘The details of this policy (or this warning) will be explained later.’ The words are not necessarily Thucydides’ own, pointing to ii. 13 (with *ἐκεῖνα* meaning *πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα*). See Steup here; who points out that *καὶ ἐν ἀλλῷ λόγῳ* implies that these points have been mentioned here, but not at length, whereas the financial and military details of ii. 13 have not been mentioned at all. *παρήνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἄπειρ καὶ πρότερον* (ii. 13. 2) refers to this same encouragement and warning.

**τούτοις ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποτέμψωμεν:** as Classen remarks, all the emphasis of the sentence is on the participle—‘let us give them this answer as final’.

**Λακεδαιμόνιοι ξενηλασίας:** a new point, and not a very good one, now curiously introduced for the first time. It was, as far as we know, an old Spartan habit, this *ξενηλασία*. Cf. ii. 39. 1; Ar. *Av.* 1013–16.

**τάς τε πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα:** the perfect answer to this demand. It was a vague phrase; and Perikles says to Sparta, ‘our allies are no less (and, if you will, no more) autonomous now than in 445, when you agreed to the terms of the Peace’. Cf. 139. 3 n.

(*τε* here, ABEFm<sub>3</sub>, is as good as *δέ*, CG; *δίκας* δὲ ὅτι below—where Hude, followed by Stuart Jones, reads *τε*—answers to *Μεγαρέας μέν*: Perikles proposes a reply in two parts—(1) we will agree to their demands on certain conditions (only a debating point); and (2) we will submit all complaints to arbitration. See Steup’s note.) **σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις:** the scholiast, with a good sense rare amongst the scholia on Thucydides, thinks *τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις* a marginal note, explanatory of *σφίσι*, that has been wrongly copied into the text. With equal good sense, Steup remarks that we need not follow him; *τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις* may be inserted for emphasis and clearness.

**αὐτονομεῖσθαι:** note the ironical expression—they were autonomous, just as the Athenian allies were. Contrast *σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδεῖώς ὅπως πολιτεύσονται θεραπεύοντες* in c. 19.

**οὐκ ἄρξομεν, ἄρχομένους δὲ ἀμύνομεθα:** cf. 78. 4, esp. *ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου ἄρχοντας*. (Stahl would find a distinction between the active and the middle here, the former “quod faciunt *οἱ τὰς σπονδὰς λύοντες* (cf. 53. 2, iv. 20. 2, i. 81. 5)”, the latter “quod eorum est qui bellandi initium faciunt”. But any such point is not only obscure, but frigid, quite out of keeping with the forceful and clear nature of this *adhortatio*. Either the middle is used only for variety, or the MSS. are wrong; Meineke suggested *ἄρχομένου*, Steup *αἱρομένους*.)

Nesselhauf, p. 296 n. of the article cited above, p. 451, notes that the answer which the Athenians in fact made to the Spartan demands was in these terms (145): i.e. that Thucydides here must have included arguments actually used by Perikles on this occasion.

**3. ἀνάγκη πολεμεῖν:** war is inevitable (unless, of course, we are willing to give up our empire, and all that it means); and danger means glory. The latter was not an argument, perhaps, that appealed to the realistic Greeks as much as to some others.

**4. γνώμῃ τε πλέον, κ.τ.λ.:** ἐπὶ πλέον ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων ἡ Γοργίειος ἐλήφθη παρίσωσις, καὶ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄχαρις διὰ τὴν ταχεῖαν πλοκήν τοῦ ὄντος—schol.

**γνώμῃ . . . τύχῃ . . . τολμῇ . . . δυνάμει:** cf. Ion, fr. 1 Diels, *ἀρχὴ δέ μοι τὸν λόγου πάντα τρία καὶ οὐδὲν πλέον ἡ ἔλασσον τούτων τῶν τριῶν ἐνὸς ἐκάστου ἀρετὴ τριάς, σύνεσις καὶ κράτος καὶ τύχη* (leaving out will-power, here expressed by *τολμῇ*).

Perikles’ speech (much admired by Dionysios, *de Thuc.* 42, p. 920) is in part an answer to the arguments of the Corinthians,

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121-2; and it has been thought, therefore, to be a composition of Thucydides' own, even by many who do not agree that the Corinthian speech must have been composed after 413 (see 124. 3 n.). But though doubtless the arguments are arranged by Thucydides (and all put into one speech perhaps, that had been scattered over many), there is no reason to suppose Perikles did not use them; and there is good reason to think that he used at least some of them (see above). Some of the Corinthian arguments were well known and often used, as the superiority of the Peloponnesian hoplite, the possibility of overcoming the Athenian superiority at sea, revolts among the Athenian subject states, and the general problem of finance; others are more particular to the occasion, as the possibility of ἐπιτείχους, Perikles' turning of the Corinthian τοῖς σώμασι τὸ πλέον ἴσχυνοντα η τοῖς χρήμασιν (121. 3) against them (141. 5), and his answer about loans from Olympia and Delphi—for this is not only general, but alludes as well to the particular use to which the Corinthians propose to put them (121. 3 and 143. 1). The former arguments would be in everybody's minds, speech or no speech by the Corinthians; and, for the latter, we know that Greek diplomacy was perfectly open, and that a general knowledge of what was being said on the other side was to be had by everybody. Even in war-time Sparta hesitated to divulge her suggestions for peace before the Athenian assembly, because news would soon get round to her allies (iv. 22. 3). See Classen's sensible notes on 122. 1, 141. 2, 144. 2.

Thucydides gives one speech only at this debate; at the previous important debate in Athens, that which decided to aid Kerkyra by a defensive alliance, no Athenian speech was given. The arguments for war would be much the same in both cases; one speech was enough; and the opposition to the war-policy in Athens (unlike Sparta) was not, in Thucydides' opinion, of sufficient significance to justify a lengthy exposition of its views. Perikles had the great mass of his fellow citizens behind him.

145. *The Peloponnesian demands rejected*

οὐδὲν κελεύμενοι ποιήσειν: see 140. 2, n. on ἐπιτάσσοντες. We might have expected ἐπιτασθέντες here, especially after ἐκέλευε just above, which means 'he bade', not 'he ordered' (cf. the inscription quoted on 140. 2 n.). κελεύειν, of course, has the wider meaning, like 'bid'.

146. αἰτίαι δὲ αὕται καὶ διαφοραί: cf. 23. 5, 55. 2, 66, 118. 1. I cannot see that there is any difference in meaning in the use of *aītiai* here and in the other passages cited—together with πρόφασις, 118. 1—as Steup, *Thuk. Stud.* ii. 42 n., argues. Thucydides appears still to be speaking of the immediate, not the ultimate, causes of the war. For

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the effect of this on the problem of the composition of the *History*, see Appendix to vol. iii.

ἐπερείγνυντο δὲ ὅμως: cf. 2. 2, 13. 5, v. 35. 2.

ἀκηρύκτως μέν: i.e. war had not been declared. Cf. 53. 1 n.; and contrast ii. 1.

σπονδῶν γὰρ ξύγχυσις: cf. v. 26. 6.

It is not, in my opinion, necessary, in a commentary on Thucydides, to discuss whether his view of the immediate and ultimate causes of the war is correct. For one thing, it would require, as it has taken, almost a book in itself. I must content myself with repeating here that Thucydides was well aware of the economic factor in human progress and change and in some past wars; and that he obviously thought that it played little or no part in causing the Peloponnesian war, that political causes were predominant—the opposition to the Athenian empire, and rivalry between the two great powers, Athens and Sparta. Some modern scholars, notably Cornford in his *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, have argued that he was wrong, and have tried to prove from the hints that he himself gives the economic cause: the importance of Byzantium, Amphipolis, Egypt (and so Rhodes, *en route*), and Sicily. They have not proved their case; they have proved no more than that, as Thucydides knew, these places were important for economic defence or offence (security of supplies for oneself, prevention of supplies reaching the enemy) once war had begun, not that possession of them was the motive of the war. Those who think that all wars, and almost all human actions, are caused by the economic motive, must necessarily think Thucydides mistaken; all that we need do is to make clear Thucydides' own view.

A few words, however, may be added about the way Thucydides has dealt with two of the immediate causes of the war, namely the Athenian treatment of Megara and of Aigina. This has been well discussed by Schwartz, pp. 92-101, 117-28, in connexion with his theory that late in life Thucydides changed his view about the origin of the war and recast, or was recasting when he died, much of book i accordingly. With this theory, which I think mistaken, I am not here concerned; but the particular problem needs some elucidation. Aigina plays but a small part in Thucydides' account of the preliminaries of the war: 67. 2, she complains secretly at Sparta that she has been deprived of her autonomy; 139. 1, the restoration of this autonomy is demanded by Sparta, a demand which Perikles would reject, 140. 3. Yet in ii. 27. 1 he says that the Athenians expelled the Aiginetans from the island, ἐπικαλέσαντες οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῦ πολέμου σφίσιν αἰτίους εἶναι. (The reference by the Thebans in iii. 64. 3, noted by Schwartz, seems to me of little significance.)

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The importance of the Megarian complaints, on the other hand, is stressed in 67. 4 and 139. 1-2, 4, and in Perikles' speech; the Spartan ambassadors assert that if Athens would but annul the decree forbidding Megara access to the harbours and markets of the League, there would be no war;<sup>1</sup> and the mutual suspicions caused by the Megarian question had already been mentioned in the Corinthian speech in Athens in 433. It was the popular view that the Megarian decree 'caused' the war.

With one aspect of the problem I have already dealt: Thucydides disagreed with the popular view, and says little about it, just as he says nothing of the opinion that Perikles brought on the war for personal reasons. The fact that these views were held is historical, though the views may have been false; but on this, as on other occasions, the historian chose to be silent or nearly silent. Schwartz thinks that he had intended to add a detailed narrative of τὰ Μεγαρικά and τὰ Αἰγαίητικά to complete his account of the *altriai* and *διαφοραί* which preceded the war, and as well to justify the Corinthians' description of Athens' restless aggression in their first speech at Sparta, and that he abandoned his intention when he changed his view about the origin of the war. The former is possible, for the *History* is unfinished; certainly we depend more than we should on other sources, principally Comedy, for our knowledge, not of what Thucydides thought the true cause of the war, but of the 'grievances and differences' of which nevertheless he gives, in part, so lengthy an account. It is the disproportion between the accounts of the Kerkyra and Poteidaia campaigns and the references to the Megarian and Aiginetan questions, all of them among the 'grievances and differences', which is so remarkable—more remarkable than that between the space devoted to the grievances and to the true cause. There are besides one or two other omissions: how did it come about that the Spartan ambassadors could say that there would be no war if the Megarian decree were annulled, after the decisions of the Spartan apella (88. 4) and of the Peloponnesian League (125. 1)? Put in another way, how was it that after Archidamos' proposal to negotiate with Athens for a time (85. 2) had been decisively defeated, negotiations were in fact begun, even if in a

<sup>1</sup> One apparent difficulty has been discussed, above, p. 451. I will add here what I have said in other contexts, that the difficulty (such as it is) remains, whether Perikles' speech expresses arguments used at the time or is fiction; for Schwartz misunderstands the point when he says that, since the speech is fiction, there can be no question of an inconsistency between 140. 3-5 and 139. 3: "einen solchen, von künstlerischen Gesichtspunkten beeinflussten Aufbau darf man nicht behandeln wie ein modernes Blaubuch über die letzten Verhandlungen vor einem Kriege" (p. 131. n. 1). It is, of course, the artist who would avoid such inconsistency.

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somewhat different form from what he had suggested (Schwartz, p. 123)? It is easy enough to suppose that the doubts and hesitations of Sparta (and of many of her allies) increased again after Sthenelaiadas' victory in the debate; and indeed the course of the war, punctuated as it was by so many Spartan attempts to get out of it, shows that the determination displayed by the apella in 432 was momentary and might at any time weaken. The change of tone between the first and second Corinthian speeches at Sparta doubtless reflects this (above, pp. 419-20). But it would have been equally easy for Thucydides to have said so, and resolved our doubts. Similarly we may wonder why Perikles did not reinforce his argument, 'Be sure that this small demand will be followed by others', by a reference to the two decisions already taken at Sparta; as Thucydides tells the story, such a reference should have been sufficient to meet any argument brought by the anti-war party at Athens.

All this, however, does not amount to more than saying that the account of the preliminaries of the war to be found in book i is far from being a final and complete story. I remain in doubt whether, or in what degree of detail, Thucydides intended to fill the gaps.

## ADDENDA

P. 35. Sutherland's recent article on coinage in *A.J.P.* lxiv, 1943, 129–47, illustrates what may be done in general and what has been done in some particular cases.

P. 97: the earliest inhabitants of Greece. Bonfante, *C.P.* xxxvii, 1942, 1–20, argues that they were of Illyrian stock, non-Greek, but Indo-European; and that the -νδ-, -νθ-, and -οοο- place-names may be Illyrian.

P. 160. See also Sutherland's article mentioned above.

P. 275 n. 4. See now S. Dow, *C.P.* xxxvii, 1942, 371–84 and xxxviii, 20–7, who shows that in all probability no year was originally missing on the stone; and that *A.T.L.* 7 belongs to the 6th year (449–8), *A.T.L.* 8 to the 7th, and that the entry for 447–6 was exceptionally short (either a list of about 60 states, or perhaps no list but a decree). He hints that he will give us the historical interpretation of this, which we must hope will appear soon.

Meritt contests all Dow's epigraphic arguments in a reply in *C.P.* xxxviii, 1943, 223–39.

P. 344 n. 1: the colony to Eretria. See Meritt, *Hesperia*, x, 1941, 319–20.

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