

The Units of Permissionless Consensus: Towards Mobile and Edge Computing

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Index Terms—IEEE, IEEEtran, journal, L^AT_EX, paper, template.

I. INTRODUCTION

LONG has been the time when consensus started to be defined as a fundamental problem of distributed systems [1]–[3]. Generally, consensus means reaching an agreement between multiple parties in the potential presence of faulty individuals. As per multi-agent systems, interacting over computer networks, consensus is thought to be the result of a coordination effort, such that those parties agree on some value at a given moment. Achieving consensus implies that the system shall be reliable and fault-tolerant. However, the consensus problem has been limited by some assumptions on the networks. The well-known “secure Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant multiparty consensus systems” that have been designed over the years are usually meant to work only with a set of known participants, faulty or not [4]. The other side of the coin is the permissionless consensus challenge, consisting of achieving agreement in an environment where the participants are unknown and untrusted [5], [6]. Plus, there are other intrinsic particularities of this type of networks, for example, their openness, and the lack of any kind of central authority. This adds another layer of complexity to the problem, as the participants are not only unknown and untrusted but can also join or leave the network at any time, freely choosing if they want to participate in the consensus protocol or not. Nevertheless, the problem of permissionless consensus can still be seen as a special case of the more general consensus and can still be formalized in the same way. In this paper, we will focus on consensus in permissionless systems, especially in the context of blockchain networks. We will reason about its meaningfulness, ultimately by trying to identify the units that may underpin consensus. We will also discuss the current state-of-the-art, with a particular interest in the shift of the consensus layer of these distributed networks to mobile and edge computing environments, for which computationally expensive consensus algorithms are impractical and unfair.

II. RELATED WORK

A. Classical Consensus

The establishment of a definition for the problem of reaching agreement in a distributed system was pioneered by

Lamport et al. in [1]. The authors defined consensus as the problem of agreeing on a single value among a set of processes, in the presence of faulty entities. The first consensus algorithms were designed for synchronous systems, where the communication between the processes is reliable, and the delay is bounded. However, these initial attempts failed to cover the different types of faulty behavior. Along with the establishment of the famous Byzantine Generals Problem, the first solutions, not only for dealing with treason, but also for unreliable communication channels, or any other kind of arbitrary Byzantine behavior, were also proposed by Lamport in [2], [3]. The solution was a synchronous mechanism that used a set of leaders to reach consensus. Multiple practical implementations and optimizations to this solution have been proposed in the literature.

B. Asynchronous Byzantine Consensus

The first practical asynchronous consensus algorithm was later proposed by Castro and Liskov in [4]. And naturally, after that work, many other asynchronous consensus algorithms have appeared. However, all of them are based on the assumption that the number of faulty processes is less than a certain threshold. Additionally, the assumption of a known set of participants is also made, as well as their roles in the consensus protocol. These are very strong assumptions that limit the challenges that can be addressed, for example, the impossibility to know the participants beforehand as they may participate anonymously, or dynamically.

C. Permissionless Consensus

The advancements of the internet more than potentiated the revolution and what we now call the permissionless consensus problem was finally born. Without forgetting the previous attempts, the first practical permissionless consensus algorithm was proposed by Nakamoto in [5]. It is a proof-of-work consensus protocol that resembles a “replicated state machine” where the independent participants reach agreement not only about transactional values, but also about their order - naturally forming the underlying structure of what is now known as a blockchain. “Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote” and this is the novelty introduced by Bitcoin [7], [8]. The focus shifted for decentralized systems and after proof-of-work many other consensus mechanisms have been proposed, based on different consensus units, like proof-of-stake, proof-of-space, proof-of-burn, etc. The chaotic diversity of new consensus protocols gave also room for endless reviews, overviews and comparisons [9]–[14]. The authors of

these surveys often put multiple dimensions into comparison, like fault tolerance, scalability, or energy consumption, and, among those, some focused their efforts on mechanisms that may work in resource-constrained networks [15]–[18]. This paper will try to identify the common conclusions from these comparisons, while looking into the state-of-the-art and novel approaches for running permissionless consensus protocols in mobile and edge devices.

III. THE NEED FOR PERMISSIONLESS CONSENSUS

A. *Permissioned vs Permissionless*

Following the line of the previous sections, it has been reasoned about the need for permissionless consensus when there are already well known and established consensus protocols that work in trusted environments [4], [19]. However, even those protocols have their own limitations, not only in terms of trust, fault-tolerance, centrality, permissions, or bottlenecks, but also in terms of scalability [19]. Trying to put some effort on decentralization, Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant consensus protocols are not known for their performance when the network grows in size. The more participants there are, the more messages need to be exchanged between them, and the more time it takes to reach consensus, even if assuring deterministic finality [20]. This is a problem that is not only related to the number of participants, but also to the communication fashion and bandwidth, and the computational capacity of the devices that participate in the consensus protocol. Summing up, the need for permissionless consensus is then justified by the fact that permissioned protocols are not compatible with the requirements of the new generation of distributed systems, especially in the context of blockchain networks. These requirements include dealing with today's sparse networks of anonymously and dynamically participating devices, without interrupting consensus and while battling Sybil attacks [9]. Fundamentally, the permissionless consensus problem is the need for a consensus protocol that can be run in a distributed and decentralized environment, where the participants are unknown and untrusted, and where the network is bigger, sparse and unpredictably unreliable.

B. *Allowances and goals*

Technically, permissionless environments allow for larger networks that depict lower connectivity between the participants. Operationally, everything is expected to happen in an asynchronous or partially synchronous fashion, and the number of transactions is expected to be smaller than the permissioned counterparts. Nevertheless, participation is free, and the governance is not centralized, but rather distributed and public. The identity of the participants is secured or semi-secure as it often relies on pseudonymity for protecting the nodes' identity, while enabling full transparency in regard to the rest of the network's content and operation [21]. The goal of permissionless consensus, as generally for any consensus protocol, is to reach agreement on a single value, or a set of values. However, due to the nature of the protocols, the values that are agreed upon end up establishing the serialization

of the transactions that are executed in the network, and so establishing time consciousness and total order of the events.

As pointed out by [21] and then referenced by [9], similarly to the permissioned counterparts, permissionless consensus protocols aim at achieving the following properties: Termination, Agreement, Validity, and Integrity. Without going into a lot of details, of these properties, Agreement and Integrity are the most important ones, as they are the ones that guarantee the correctness of the consensus protocols. Termination and Validity are generally related to any classic consensus problem.

C. *The building blocks of permissionless consensus*

Also described in [9], very concisely, the way to achieve an operating protocol, as seen in the mainstream blockchain networks, is by first generating the agreeable value, in this particular case, a block and its proof, disseminating the information to the rest of the network, followed by the eventual validation and acceptance of the block by the rest of the nodes. This is the moment when consensus is reached. Nevertheless, during the whole process, a fair and somewhat predictable incentive mechanism is also needed, that rewards the participants for their honest effort in reaching consensus, and punishes the ones that are not behaving correctly. These incentives are of major importance in this very context of permissionless consensus. These building blocks form the basis of the inner functioning of Bitcoin itself [5], and are replicated with some variations in the other permissionless networks [6]. For example, there are some networks that do not have a proof-of-work mechanism, but rather a proof-of-stake, or a proof-of-space, or a proof-of-burn mechanism, etc. when it comes to the generation of the block and its existential and later verifiable proof. All the other pillars are generally the same [9]. The next sections will try to give a more detailed overview of these block generation proof units.

IV. PROOF-OF-WORK AS A REFERENCE

A. *The block generation*

Algorithm 1 BlockGeneration

```

1: function
2:   BlockHeader  $\leftarrow$  Transaction Merkle Tree Root
3:   | Hash of the last Block
4:   | Timestamp
5:   | Other
6:   /* the preceding zero bits in target
   depict the mining difficulty */
7:   while Hash(BlockHeader | nonce)  $\geq$  target do
8:     Increment nonce
9:   end while
10:  return new block
11: end function

```

In the classical Nakamoto consensus protocol, the generation of a block, to be proposed for further network agreement, complies with the unit of computational work needed to create, or rather find, a verifiable proof of the effort spent

on assembling the block [5]. This essentially requires brute forcing the search for a cryptographic hash value for the aggregation of the block information with a nonce, such that this hash value satisfies a difficulty threshold (See Algorithm 1), which gets adjusted dynamically over time, to maintain the network overall requirement for the block generation interval [9].

There are a couple of particularities that need to be mentioned. First, the block generation is of probabilistic nature, as the nonce is a random value, and the hash function is a one-way function. Allied to this, increasing the hashing power is not an easy task, which consequently allows for tackling Sybil attacks, despite the permissionless and pseudonymity nature of the network. Plus, the incentive mechanism also plays a role in this regard, by naturally incentivizing honest participation. The block generation interval, forged by the adjustment of the difficulty threshold, is also of major importance because it reduces the fork probability and allows for the timely propagation of proposed blocks, guaranteeing consensus in the presence of an honest majority of the hashing power [22]. This probabilistic finality shifts the 1/3 BFT threshold to a 1/2 threshold.

B. Trade-offs and trilemma

Despite the harmony of all the aforementioned clever characteristics, the proof-of-work mechanism has some well known drawbacks. First, the block generation is computationally expensive, and so, the energy consumption associated with it is also high. This is caused by the dynamically adjusted difficulty threshold, which is a function of the block generation interval. For example, in the Bitcoin network, to maintain the 10 minutes interval, the hashing difficulty increases with the increase of the hashing power, and so too the energy needed for it. However, reducing the block generation interval would increase the probability of forks, which results in a more frequent waste of useful work, loosening the security of the network. Increasing the block size would also have the same security effect due to the increased propagation delay.

As pointed in the literature, the design of these consensus mechanisms shall aim for a protocalar choice between a set of properties that form a trilemma (see Fig. 1): Security, Scalability, and Decentralization. Summarizing, relaxing the security requirements may allow for more scalability, both of which, consequently, have hands tied with decentralization. These trade-offs are of practical consideration when defining the network goals and use cases [9].

V. ALTERNATIVES TO PROOF-OF-WORK

A. Proof-of-Stake based protocols

At this point, we can exercise the imagination and extrapolate the previous block generation mechanism to a *Proof-of-Something* pseudo-random competition in which an entity in possession of a higher amount of a certain resource, either computational power, or stake, or certain currency, or a higher amount of storage space, etc., guarantees a higher probability of leading the block generation and proposal, and consequently winning the acceptance by the majority. This is the essence of




Fig. 1. From [9], the blockchain consensus trilemma and its inner relations.

the Proof-of-Stake consensus protocol, as a derivative of the Proof-of-Work mechanism, where a stake is a traceable and verifiable amount of a certain unit, token or currency, that is owned by a certain entity that wishes to participate in the consensus protocol. The stake works as a form of collateral that is used to guarantee the honesty of the entities, in an attempt to reduce the Sybil attack probability. And, generally as in Proof-of-Work, the higher the stake, the higher the probability of leading the block generation and proposal. Proof-of-Stake is, indeed, a more energy efficient consensus protocol, however, this adds up to nothing, especially when compared to the already proved BFT solutions, if centralization is a functional requirement, or unfair advantage is a potential trait. These limitations, along with other security concerns, may push away the participation of resourceless entities, and consequently, affect the network decentralization and security.

1) *Chain-based and Committee-based protocols*: Due to the self-contained nature of this type of protocols, where the attestation of the stake is done inside the network, multiple classes of Proof-of-Stake can be distinguished, by the way the meaningfulness of the stake is defined and employed. For example, there are the simplest forms of *PoS* that inherit most of the characteristics of the Proof-of-Work mechanism, but with the stake as part of the block generation and hashing proof (See Algorithm 2). These are commonly referred to as Chain-based *PoS*, inheriting also the fault-tolerance properties of the Nakamoto consensus protocol. Committee-based *PoS* protocols, on the other hand, are more complex, and based on the idea of a committee of entities that are selected to lead the block generation and proposal. The committee is formed by a subset of the network entities, and the selection is done based on their stake. Usually, the selection takes the form of a random sequence of stakeholders, where the probability of being selected for every spot is proportional to the stake. That sequence is then consciously timed to orderly pace the block generation and proposal, by the current slot leader. Examples of this type of mechanisms are the *Ouroboros* [23], *Ouroboros Praos* [24] protocols or *Snow White* [25]. The longest chain rule is still applied, with probabilistic finality, and the 1/2 threshold is still required or tolerated for the network to

reach consensus. Nonetheless, Committee-based *PoS* protocols may not pair well with decentralization and increase in the committee size, which deteriorates the performance of the protocol. Several improvements have been proposed to tackle not only this issue, but also the security of the committees which, smaller, could be more vulnerable to targeted attacks [24].

Algorithm 2 PoSBlockGeneration

```

1: function
2:   BlockHeader  $\leftarrow$  Transaction Merkle Tree Root
3:   | Hash of the last Block
4:   | Timestamp
5:   | Other
6:   /* the preceding zero bits in target
   depict the mining difficulty */
7:   while  $\text{Hash}(\text{BlockHeader} \parallel \text{clockTime}) \geq \text{target} \times$ 
   stake do
8:     Increment clockTime by a constant tickInterval
9:   end while
10:  return new block
11: end function

```

2) *BFT-based protocols*: These aim at achieving deterministic finality, by employing a BFT consensus protocol, not at the block proposal level, but at the block acceptance level. The idea is to have a free flow of blocks proposed by the network, but to have a quorum of entities that are responsible for the block acceptance. The block proposal mechanism can be of any kind, for example, Chain-based *PoS*, or Committee-based *PoS*, or even pure Proof-of-Work. The block acceptance layer then allows for a deterministic acceptance of the blocks, by having a sort of permissioned BFT consensus protocol, with the trivial 1/3 Byzantine tolerance. The most well known examples and variations are the Tendermint [26] and the new Ethereum Casper [27] protocols.

Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) is a variation of the BFT-based protocols, where the consensus group is formed by a subset of the network entities, which are selected by the network, with a voting mechanism based on the delegation of stake. The consensus is then achieved using a typical PBFT protocol, with the usual 1/3 Byzantine tolerance.

B. Proof-of-Something Else

Idealized and inspired by Proof-of-Stake, extending or adapting Proof-of-Work became a popular trend in the blockchain community. The main idea is to replace the computational power with some other resource, that is more scarce, or more valuable, or more verifiable, or more traceable, etc., or to combine multiple resources, or even to add extra requirements to pure Proof-of-Work. From Proof-of-Meaningful-Work, to Proof-of-Work-Time, there are countless and exotic variations of these mechanisms, and the list is growing [28].

1) *Proof-of-Space*: established itself as a popular alternative among those. The goal is to replace computational power with storage space, and if possible give it a meaningful usage. Proof-of-Retrievability is a cited example of this type

of protocols, where the storage space is used to store a large amount of relevant or public data, and the retrieval of that data is used as a proof of the storage usage [29]. Despite the recyclability of the storage space, as a resource that could be a good alternative to computational power, this algorithm has its own fatal flaws, depending mostly on a central dealer for randomness as well as for consensus fairness. Other reported Proof-of-Space variants may not even attempt to store/retrieve any meaningful data.

2) *Proof-of-Authority*: another well known derivative, which, in effect, is a form of Proof-of-Stake, where the stake is the identity of the entity, that has been verified, scrutinized and approved by the network, giving it the right to participate in the closed consensus group. The consensus protocol, if not a BFT protocol, can follow the style of a Proof-of-Work protocol, depending on the requirements of the network - a choice that may shape the fault tolerance, decentralization, security and performance of the network [9].

3) *Proof-of-Elapsed-Time*: is another alternative to Proof-of-Work, especially targeting the intensive mining issue, that has been proposed by Intel. The idea is to simulate the mining process by using a randomized time delay, which is proportional to the amount of work that would be required to mine the block. The time delay is then used to pace the block generation and proposal, and the block acceptance can be performed using a BFT protocol [30]. This solution, however, is not a viable alternative to other, permissioned and permissionless, approaches, by holding strong and centralized hardware requirements, as the computations require a trusted execution environment (TEE) to establish the trust among the participants. Some efforts have been made to combine the TEE feature with Proof-of-Stake, in order to achieve a more decentralized and secure protocol, but the same hardware requirements are still a major issue.

C. Other approaches

1) *The XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol*: powers the XRP Ledger in a low-latency, high throughput, and BFT fashion. The network itself operates somewhat differently from the other blockchain references, and treats transactions as atomic units of the ledger. These transactions are collected by the nodes and relayed to the nodes' UNL (Unique Node List), which is a list of peers that are trusted by that current entity. At every epoch, multiple rounds are needed to filter transactions and vote on the next state of the ledger. This voting happens at the UNLs' level, which are expected to be overlapped by a certain percentage, in order to achieve the artificial vote threshold for globally accepting the transactions. That threshold defines the fault tolerance of the protocol, and is set to 80%, which bounds this protocol to a 1/5 BFT allowance [31], [32]. Despite that limitation, when compared to other BFT protocols, this protocol seeks to trade fault tolerance for performance, by having lower connectivity and less message exchanges. However, it is still expected high synchrony within the UNLs. Given these characteristics, the protocol is expected to be more suitable for permissioned networks, and, in terms of network size, is seen as not as scalable and decentralized as the permissionless ones [9].

2) *DAG structures*: may diverge from the previous approaches with an envisioned non-linear structure for the result of the consensus attestations. The choice resides in directed acyclic graphs that should expand and physically connect, further in time, the new data appended to the network. The data, which is typically held in the vertices of the graph, can have more or less granularity, either by storing blocks of transactions, or raw transactions directly. This design decision may pose new potential challenges, related to the verification and finalization of the consensus protocol. Currently, those two approaches are then distinguished as *blockDAG* and *txDAG*. The block-based DAG approach diverges from the traditional blockchain structure by flexibly connecting every new block to multiple previous blocks. The rest of the protocol may work in the same way as the traditional Proof-of-Work, however, this new feature yields new security considerations. These protocols are theoretically designed for very high throughput in permissionless environments, but the security trade-offs are still not well-known. In a transaction-based DAG, every vertex holds one transaction, that is connected to previous vertices. All the sibling vertices shall then represent disjoint transactions to successfully deal with history and conflict resolutions.

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