

IDATT2503 - Cryptography Assignment 3

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Task 1

I did not find the lecture slides/notes any helpful in understanding LSFR, but after asking a LLM my understanding is that it in this case works as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}s_i &= (z_i, z_{i+1}, z_{i+2}, z_{i+3}) \\ s_{i+1} &= (z_{i+1}, z_{i+2}, z_{i+3}, (z_i + z_{i+1} + z_{i+2} + z_{i+3}) \bmod 2) \\ &\dots\end{aligned}$$

Shifting to the left and appending the new z value on the right side. And when a task asks for the periods, we look for how many iterations it takes before the sequence repeats.

- a) Given the LFSR $z_{i+4} = z_i + z_{i+1} + z_{i+2} + z_{i+3} \pmod{2}$, $C = (1, 1, 1, 1)$, what are the periods using the keys

1 $K = 1000$

$$\begin{aligned}s_0 &: (1, 0, 0, 0) \rightarrow s_1 : (0, 0, 0, (1 + 0 + 0 + 0) \bmod 2) \rightarrow s_2 : (0, 0, 1, (0 + 0 + 0 + 1) \bmod 2) \\ s_3 &: (0, 1, 1, (0 + 0 + 1 + 1) \bmod 2) \rightarrow s_4 : (1, 1, 0, (0 + 1 + 1 + 0) \bmod 2) \rightarrow s_5 : (1, 0, 0, (1 + 1 + 0 + 0) \bmod 2) \\ s_5 &: (1, 0, 0, 0) = s_0 : (1, 0, 0, 0)\end{aligned}$$

It took 5 iterations for the sequence to repeat therefore there are 5 periods.

2 $K = 0011$

$$\begin{aligned}s_0 &: (0, 0, 1, 1) \rightarrow s_1 : (0, 1, 1, 0) \rightarrow s_2 : (1, 1, 0, 0) \\ s_3 &: (1, 0, 0, 0) \rightarrow s_4 : (0, 0, 0, 1) \rightarrow s_5 : (0, 0, 1, 1)\end{aligned}$$

$$s_5 = s_0$$

Again it took 5 iterations, so 5 periods.

3 $K = 1111$

$$s_0 : (1, 1, 1, 1) \rightarrow s_1 : (1, 1, 1, 0) \rightarrow s_2 : (1, 1, 0, 1)$$

$$s_3 : (1, 0, 1, 1) \rightarrow s_4 : (0, 1, 1, 1) \rightarrow s_5 : (1, 1, 1, 1)$$

$$s_5 = s_0$$

Again it took 5 iterations, so 5 periods.

b) What are the periods with the same keys using the following LFSR $z_{i+4} = z_i + z_{i+3}(\text{mod } 2)$?

For this task i implemented LSFR in Python and outputted 30 generated z values.

```
def next_bit(self):
    feedback_bit = 0
    for tap in self.taps:
        feedback_bit ^= (self.state >> (tap - 1)) & 1

    self.state = ((self.state << 1) | feedback_bit) & ((1 << self
        .num_bits) - 1)
    return feedback_bit
```

This goes through each tap position and does XOR with previous tap results making the *feedback_bit* 0 if the sum of ones is even and 1 if the sum is odd. Then it shifts the current state to the left and appends the final *feedback_bit* with an OR bitoperator. Finally, it does an AND bitoperation with a number with the same bit length and only containing ones to prevent the state from growing beyond its original number of bits.

```
-- K = 1000: --
Map: {'1000': 1, '0001': 1, '0011': 1, '0111': 1, '1111': 0, '1110': 1, '1101': 0, '1010': 1, '0101': 1,
      '1011': 0, '0110': 0, '1100': 1, '1001': 0, '0010': 0, '0100': 0}
Sequence: [1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
Periods: 15

-- K = 0011: --
Map: {'0011': 1, '0111': 1, '1111': 0, '1110': 1, '1101': 0, '1010': 1, '0101': 1, '1011': 0, '0110': 0,
      '1100': 1, '1001': 0, '0010': 0, '0100': 0, '1000': 1, '0001': 1}
Sequence: [1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1]
Periods: 15

-- K = 1111: --
Map: {'1111': 0, '1110': 1, '1101': 0, '1010': 1, '0101': 1, '1011': 0, '0110': 0, '1100': 1, '1001': 0,
      '0010': 0, '0100': 0, '1000': 1, '0001': 1, '0011': 1, '0111': 1}
Sequence: [0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1]
Periods: 15
```

Figure 1: LSFR results

We can see that map has 15 entries and that we have a repeating sequence after 15 iterations for all keys.

Task 2

I implemented the HMAC in python with the following functions:

```
def midsquare_hash(x):
    squared = x * x
    squared &= 0xFF
    middle = (squared >> 2) & 0b1111
    return middle


    midsquare_hash squares the message  $x$  and does an AND bitoperation with  $0xFF = 256 = 0b11111111$  to extract the remainder  $x^2 \bmod 2^8$ , as in the last 8 bits. It then shifts this two to the right and does another bit AND operation with  $0b1111$  to extract the last four bits, as in the middle four bits.

def hmac(message, key, ipad, opad):
    inner_input = (key ^ ipad) ^ message
    inner_hash = midsquare_hash(inner_input)

    outer_input = (key ^ opad) ^ inner_hash
    outer_hash = midsquare_hash(outer_input)

    return outer_hash
```

This function follows the definition of the HMAC from the lecture slides by applying the *midsquare_hash* and utilizing the *ipad* and *opad*.



```
-- a) --
HMAC for 0110: 0000

-- b) --
Calculated HMAC for 0111: 1001
Is message authentic? False
```

Figure 2: HMAC output

Task 3

I implemented CBC-MAC in Python with the following functions:

```
def e_caesar(x):
    return (x + 3) & 0xFF

def cbc_mac(message_blocks):
    C = 0
    for block in message_blocks:
        C = e_caesar(block ^ C)
    return C
```

```
CBC-MAC for x = 01000110
CBC-MAC for x' = 00110011
```

Figure 3: CBC-MAC output

Task 4

```
def ctr_keystream_bytes(nonce, sbox, count=4):
    out = []
    for ctr in range(count):
        idx = (nonce + ctr) & 0xFF
        out.append(sbox[idx])
    return out
```

- a) Using the nonce = 01100101, write down the first 4 bytes produced with counter values 0,1,2,3.

```
-- a) --
['01001101', '00110011', '10000101', '01000101']
```

Figure 4: Keystream block cipher CTR-mode

- b) What is the period of the key-stream?

As we run mod 2^8 we can get 256 distinct outputs, as in the period of the keystream is 256.

- c) Can the computation of the keystream be easily parallelized?

Because the result of one computation is not dependent on the result of another, the computation of the keystream can easily be parallelized.

- d) How could information about known plaintexts-ciphertext pairs be used to infer information about the key used?

In CTR-mode a ciphertext block is $C = P \oplus KS$. If you know a plaintext block P and a ciphertext C you can recover its keystream block KS : $KS = P \oplus C$.

Known plaintexts can therefore reveal keystream bytes at the corresponding counters. If the block cipher or key space is weak/small, that information can be exploited to recover the key. However with a strong cipher (AES) it only reveals keystream bytes (which is expected), not the key.