

Online Appendix for “Purges: How Dictators Fight to Survive”

Chapter 1

Table OA1.1 lists the autocratic leadership spells in the quantitative dataset. Start and end years refer to a leader's start and end years in the dataset, rather than their actual start and end years in power. Although, where these years differ from 1991 and 2015, then they do signify when the dictator gained/lost power as an autocrat. I identify autocratic regimes using Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's data (2014, 2018) and leaders with Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza's data (2009).

Table OA1.1: Autocratic Leadership Spells

Country	Leader	Leader Start Year	Leader End Year
Afghanistan	Mohammad Najibullah	1991	1992
	Mullah Omar	1997	2001
	Hamid Karzai	2001, 2010	2014
Algeria	Chadli Bendjedid	1991	1992
	Ali Kafi	1992	1994
	Lamine Zéroual	1994	1999
Angola	Abdelaziz Bouteflika	1999	2015
	José Eduardo dos Santos	1991	2015
	Levon Ter-Petrosyan	1996	1998
Armenia	Robert Kocharyan	1998	2008
	Serzh Sargsyan	2008	2015
Azerbaijan	Heydar Aliyev	1994	2003
	Ilham Aliyev	2003	2015
Belarus	Alyaksandr Lukashenka	1997	2015
Burkina Faso	Blaise Campaoré	1991	1999
	Pierre Buyoya	1991	1993
	Pierre Buyoya	1997	2003
Burundi	Pierre Nkurunziza	2011	2015
	Hun Sen	1991	1993
	Norodom Ranariddh	1993	1997
Cambodia	Hun Sen	1997	2015
	Paul Biya	1991	2015
	André Dieudonné Kolingba	1991	1993
Central African Republic	François Bozizé	2004	2013
	Michel Djotodia	2013	2014
Chad	Idriss Déby	1991	2015
	Deng Xiaoping	1991	1997
	Jiang Zemin	1997	2003
China	Hu Jintao	2003	2012
	Xi Jinping	2012	2015

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Table OA1.1 – continued from previous page

Country	Leader	Leader Start Year	Leader End Year
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1991	2008
	Raúl Castro	2008	2015
	Mobutu Sese Seko	1991	1997
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Laurent-Désiré Kabila	1997	2001
	Joseph Kabila	2001	2015
	Hosni Mubarak	1991	2011
Egypt	Mohamed Hussein Tantawi	2011	2012
	Abdel Fattah el-Sisi	2014	2015
El Salvador	Alfredo Cristiani	1991	1994
Eritrea	Isaias Afwerki	1994	2015
Ethiopia	Meles Zenawi	1991	2012
	Hailemariam Desalegn	2012	2015
Gabon	Omar Bongo	1991	2009
	Ali Bongo Ondimba	2009	2015
The Gambia	Dawda Jawara	1991	1994
	Yahya Jammeh	1994	2015
Georgia	Eduard Shevardnadze	1992	2003
Ghana	Jerry Rawlings	1991	1993
Guatemala	Jorge Serrano Elías	1991	1993
	Ramiro de León Carpio	1993	1995
	Lansana Conté	1991	2008
Guinea	Moussa Dadis Camara	2008	2009
	Sékouba Konaté	2009	2010
Guinea Bissau	João Bernardo Vieira	1991	1999
	Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo	2013	2014
	Raoul Cédras	1991	1994
Haiti	René Préval	2000	2001
	Jean-Bertrand Aristide	2001	2004
Indonesia	Suharto	1991	1998
	B. J. Habibie	1998	1999
	Akbar Hasemi Rafsanjani	1991	1997
Iran	Mohammad Khatami	1997	2005
	Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	2005	2013
	Hassan Rouhani	2013	2015
	Saddam Hussein	1991	2003
Iraq	Nouri al-Maliki	2011	2014
	Haider al-Abadi	2014	2015

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Table OA1.1 – continued from previous page

Country	Leader	Leader Start Year	Leader End Year
Ivory Coast	Félix Houphouët-Boigny	1991	1993
	Henri Konan Bédié	1993	1999
	Robert Guéï	1999	2000
	Laurent Gbagbo	2000	2011
Jordan	Hussein bin Talal	1991	1999
	Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein	1999	2015
Kazakhstan	Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev	1992	2015
Kenya	Daniel arap Moi	1991	2002
Kuwait	Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah	1991	2006
	Saad Al-Salim Al-Sabah	2006	2015
Kyrgyzstan	Askar Akayev	1992	2005
	Kurmanbek Bakiyev	2005	2010
	Kaysone Phomvihane	1991	1992
Laos	Nouhak Phoumsavanh	1992	1998
	Khamtai Siphandone	1998	2006
	Choummaly Sayasone	2006	2015
	Elias Phisoana Ramaema	1991	1993
Liberia	Charles Taylor	1998	2003
Libya	Muammar Gaddafi	1991	2011
Madagascar	Didier Ratsiraka	1991	1993
	Andry Rajoelina	2010	2013
Malawi	Hastings Banda	1991	1994
	Mahathir Mohamad	1991	2003
Malaysia	Abdullah Ahmad Badawi	2003	2009
	Najib Razak	2009	2015
	Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya	1991	2005
Mauritania	Ely Ould Mohamed Vall	2005	2007
	Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz	2009	2015
	Carlos Salinas de Gortari	1991	1994
Mexico	Hassan II	1991	1999
	Mohammed VI	1999	2015
Morocco	Joaquim Chissano	1994-1996	1998-2004
	Armando Guebuza	2009	2015
Myanmar	Saw Maung	1991	1992
	Than Shwe	1992	2011
	Thein Sein	2011	2015
	Surya Bahadur Thapa	2003	2004
Nepal	Sher Bahadur Deuba	2004	2005
	Gyanendra Shah	2005	2006

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Table OA1.1 – continued from previous page

Country	Leader	Leader Start Year	Leader End Year
Niger	Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara	1997	
	Mamadou Tandja	1999, 2010	1999
Nigeria	Ibrahim Babangida	1991	1993
	Sani Abacha	1993	1998
North Korea	Abdulsalami Abubakar	1998	1999
	Kim Il Sung	1991	1994
Oman	Kim Jong Il	1994	2011
	Kim Jong Un	2011	2015
Pakistan	Qaboos bin Said	1991	2015
Paraguay	Pervez Musharraf	2000	2008
Peru	Andrés Rodríguez Pedotti	1991	1993
Republic of Congo	Alberto Fujimori	1993	2000
Russia	Denis Sassou Nguesso	1998	2015
Rwanda	Boris Yeltsin	1991, 1994	1999
	Vladimir Putin	2000	2015
Saudi Arabia	Juvénal Habyarimana	1991	1994
	Paul Kagame	1994	2015
Sierra Leone	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud	1991	1996
	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud	1996	2015
Singapore	Joseph Saidu Momoh	1991	1992
	Valentine Strasser	1992	1996
South Africa	Goh Chok Tong	1991	2004
	Lee Hsien Loong	2004	2015
South Sudan	Frederik Willem de Klerk	1991	1994
Sri Lanka	Salva Kiir Mayardit	2012	2015
Sudan	Ranasinghe Premadasa	1991	1992
	Mahinda Rajapaksa	2011	2014
Swaziland	Omar al-Bashir	1991	2015
Syria	Mswati III	1991	2015
	Hafez al-Assad	1991	2000
Taiwan	Bashar al-Assadi	2000	2015
Tajikistan	Lee Teng-hui	1991	1995
	Emomali Rahmon	1992	2015
Tanzania	Ali Hassan Mwinyi	1991	1995
	Benjamin Mkapa	1995, 2001	2005
Togo	Jakaya Kikwete	2005	2006, 2013
	Gnassingbé Eyadéma	1991	2005
Tunisia	Faure Gnassingbé	2005-2006	2010-2013
	Zine El Abidine Ben Ali	1991	2011

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Table OA1.1 – continued from previous page

Country	Leader	Leader Start Year	Leader End Year
Turkmenistan	Saparmurat Niyazov Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow	1992 2006	2006 2015
Uganda	Yoweri Museveni	1991	2015
Ukraine	Viktor Yanukovych	2013	2014
United Arab Emirates	Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan	1991 2004	2004 2015
Uzbekistan	Islam Karimov	1992	2015
Venezuela	Hugo Chávez Nicolás Maduro	2006 2012	2012 2015
Vietnam	Do Muoi Le Kha Phieu Nong Duc Manh	1991 1997 2001	1997 2001 2011
Zambia	Nguyen Phu Trong Frederick Chiluba	2011 1991, 1997	2015 1999, 2002
Zimbabwe	Levy Mwanawasa Robert Mugabe	2002 1991	2005 2015

Purge Narratives

Afghanistan

Leader: Mohammad Najibullah

Start year: 1991
End year: 1992

I could not find any reports of civilian or military elite purges under Najibullah between 1991 and 1992. I found nothing in media articles that came close to describing a purge. From country-specific literature, there was a coup attempt in 1990, but this was prior to the start of the dataset. There were multiple defections from the regime shortly before it fell in 1992—e.g., General Momin was replaced as commander of Hairatan garrison, but this was after he had rebelled in early 1992—so again, I found no concrete reports or rumors of purges in this period.

Leader: Mullah Omar

Start year: 1997
End year: 2001

I could not find any reports of civilian or military *elite* purges in Afghanistan under Mullah Omar between 1997 and 2001. The most common references to purges concerned the desecration of ‘un-Islamic’ statues. I did find rumors of junior purges in media reports. For example, in 1997, soldiers in the Taliban’s (then-government’s) army were kicked out if they engaged in ‘un-Islamic’ behaviors like smoking or not combing their hair. In 1998, moderates were rumored to be purged as the victims of factional in-fighting with hardliners, but I found insufficient details to confirm that any elites were purged. Finally, in November 2001, after the US-led coalition invaded, Mullah Omar allegedly purged the Taliban army of disloyal soldiers in response to defeats on the battlefield.

Leader: Hamid Karzai

Start year: 2001, then 2010
End year: 2014

Civilian elite purges

2010: Karzai fired the Interior Minister Hanif Atmar and the Intelligence Chief Amrullah Saleh, who were believed to be close to NATO, who Karzai was at loggerheads with over America’s commitment to the war.

2012: Several governors were sacked for a lack of progress in tackling corruption. The Security Minister Zakhilwal was also sacked over corruption, which was allegedly causing anger among the people.

Military elite purges

2012: Karzai purged senior military figures, including leaders of the National Guard Battalion, over ‘green on blue’ killings, and because some oversaw the burning of books at prisons, including some Kurans which led to protests, to stop prisoners exchanging notes.

Algeria

Leader: Chadli Bendjedid

Start year: 1991
End year: 1992

I could not find any reports of civilian or military elite purges under Bendjedid in either 1991 or 1992. He purged elites at other times, including in 1988 when he fired his chief lieutenant and national security director, but this occurred prior to the start of this dataset.

Leader: Ali Kafi

Start year: 1992
End year: 1994

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any reports of civilian elite purges under Kafi between 1992 and 1994.

Military elite purges

1993: Several top officials in the military, who were thought to be Islamic fundamentalists, were purged.

Leader: Liamine Zéroual

Start year: 1994
End year: 1999

Civilian elite purges

1994: Zéroual purged several ministers, as he needed to create space for civilian elites he could trust who the Islamists did not have a score to settle with.

1996: Abdelhamid Mehri was removed from the FLN leadership; he had criticized the regime when he had been in opposition.

Military elite purges

1994: Zéroual also replaced the commanders of the air force and army for similar reasons.

Leader: Abdelaziz Bouteflika

Start year: 1999
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2000: Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour was replaced by Ali Benflis, who at the time, was a Bouteflika loyalist.

2003: Prime Minister Ali Benflis was fired ahead of the upcoming 2004 presidential elections in which Benflis ran against Bouteflika.

2010: Minister of Energy Chakib Khelil was dismissed; he was a close ally of Bouteflika but he was caught up in a corruption scandal.

Military elite purges

2004: The heads of four of Algeria's six military regions were replaced; General Mohamed Lamari also retired, who had been chief of staff; reports diverge over whether this was a purge or voluntary retirement, but the changes overall tipped the balance of power in the military in Bouteflika's direction.

2005: Military elites including officers who headed the Air Forces Command, the 4th military region, and the 5th military region were replaced.

2015: Major generals responsible for internal security were sacked by Bouteflika; specifically Major General Abdelhamid Bendaoud who directed internal security; Major General Ahmed Meliani who led the Republican Guard; and General Djamel Medjdoub, head of presidential security. The

head (Mohamed Mediene) and Deputy Head (General Abdelkader Ait Ourabi) of the intelligence service were also removed and detained, as there were reports of a coup plot against Bouteflika.

Angola

Leader: José Eduardo dos Santos

Start year: 1991
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any reports of civilian elite purges in Angola between 1991 and 2015.

Military elite purges

2002: Following the peace settlement that terminated the civil war in 2002, dos Santos dismissed several top military figures including the army chief of staff.

Armenia

Leader: Levon Ter-Petrosyan

Start year: 1996
End year: 1998

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges by Ter-Petrosyan between 1996 and 1998. Ter-Petrosyan dismissed the acting Minister of Defense Vazgen Manukian, but this was in 1993. It is also perhaps unsurprising that Ter-Petrosyan did not purge anyone between 1996 and 1998; he was later compelled to resign by Kocharyan in 1998.

Leader: Robert Kocharyan

Start year: 1998
End year: 2008

Civilian elite purges

2000: The Prime Minister Andranik Markarian was sacked in May 2000.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges under Kocharyan between 1998 and 2008.

Leader: Serzh Sargsyan

Start year: 2008
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2011: Sargsyan purged, by removing them from their positions, several key civilian figures ahead of the 2013 elections to help ensure his political power. This included the key mayor in Yerevan (Karen Karapetyan), the chief of police (Alik Sargsyan), and the president of the National Assembly (Hovik Abrahamyan).

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges under Sargsyan between 2008 and 2015.

Azerbaijan

Leader: Heydar Aliyev

Start year: 1994

End year: 2003

Civilian elite purges

1994: Prime Minister Surat Huseynov was dismissed and placed under house arrest, but ultimately he escaped to Russia.

1995: Deputy Interior Minister Colonel Rovshan Javadov was relieved of his position and later killed in an assault on his headquarters under Aliyev's orders due to his role in a March 1995 coup attempt that involved an assassination attempt on Aliyev.

1996: Minister of State Security Nariman Imratov and Minister of Agriculture Mizamda Abdullayev were sentenced to death over their involvement in the 1994 coup attempt.

Military elite purges

1994: National Security Minister Nariman Imranov was dismissed in September and imprisoned in October over an alleged conspiracy to help four jailed opponents of Aliyev's escape from a heavily guarded national security jail.

1995: Head of the Regional Military Police in Gandja, Eldar Aliyev, was sentenced to death over his involvement in the 1994 coup attempt; Army Chief of Staff General Shahin Musayev and two former deputy defense ministers were arrested over an alleged coup plot against Aliyev.

1996: Deputy Minister of Defense Alikfram Gummatov was sentenced to death over his involvement in the 1994 coup attempt.

Leader: Ilham Aliyev

Start year: 2003

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2005: Various civilian minister including of Health, Labor, and Education were dismissed, accused of conspiring with an exiled opposition leader to stage a coup. For instance, on October 19, Economic Development Minister Farhad Aliyev (no relation) was arrested for embezzling state funds, abusing power, organizing riots, and planning a coup. By the end of October, 16 former ministers, heads of departments, and other public officials were fired or arrested.

Military elite purges

2005: National Security Minister Namiq Abbasov was sacked, and sent to be the Ambassador in Uzbekistan.

Belarus

Leader: Alyaksandr Lukashenka

Start year: 1997

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2000: Lukashenka fired the KGB Chief and Prosecutor-General for pressing charges on a commander of the secret police unit who was accused of being involved in the disappearances of members of the opposition.

2001: Lukashenka sacked his Chief of Staff and Prime Minister shortly after the 2001 presidential elections as he suspected they had collaborated with the opposition.

2004: The KGB Chief Leanid Eryn was suspended and then fired after he met with opposition members who had picketed the KGB headquarters after the October 2004 referendum on whether Lukashenka should be able to run for a third term.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges under Lukashenka between 1997 and 2015.

Burkina Faso

Leader: Blaise Compaoré

Start year: 1991

End year: 1999

I could not find any reports of civilian or military elite purges under Compaoré between 1991 and 1999. The closest I found were hints of dismissals of high-ranking government officials following scandals, but I was unable to obtain sufficient evidence to corroborate these allusions.

Burundi

Leader: Pierre Buyoya

Start year: 1991

End year: 1993

Civilian elite purges

I could not find evidence of any civilian elite purges in Burundi under Buyoya between 1991 and 1993.

Military elite purges

1993: Major Busokoza was arrested; he was involved in a coup attempt aimed at stopping the incoming president (Melchier Ndadaye) taking power but the arrest occurred under Buyoya.

Leader: Pierre Buyoya

Start year: 1997

End year: 2003

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges under in Burundi under Buyoya between 1997 and 2003.

Leader: Pierre Nkurunziza

Start year: 2011

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2015: Foreign Minister Laurent Kavakure was arrested following a coup attempt when Nkurunziza attempted to serve a third term

Military elite purges

2015: In February, Major-General Godefroid Niyombare was fired as intelligence chief. Then, following the coup attempt, General Cyrille Ndayirukiye and Defence Minister Pontian Gaciyub-wenge were arrested.

Cambodia

Leader: Hun Sen

Start year: 1991
End year: 1993

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges perpetrated by Hun Sen between 1991 and 1993.

Leader: Norodom Ranariddh

Start year: 1993
End year: 1997

Civilian elite purges

1994: In July, the newly promoted secretary of state in the interior ministry, and one of his deputies, were arrested over a coup attempt on July 2nd. In a separate incident, the Finance Minister Sam Rainsy was removed; Rainsy was rumored to have been removed either due to a clash of personalities or because some of his decisions put him at odds with the Cambodia People's Party-led Ministry of Commerce.

Military elite purges

1994: General Sin Song was arrested over the July coup attempt.

Leader: Hun Sen

Start year: 1997
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2003: Hun Sen dismissed the Phnom Penh governor following anti-Thai riots, which included the Thai Embassy being looted.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of any military elite purges between 1997 and 2015. It is worth noting that I do not classify the events of 1997 as civilian or military elite purges—when Hun Sen arrested, executed, and otherwise seemingly purged various civilian and military prominent figures aligned with Norodom Ranariddh—because by this point, figures associated with FUNCINPEC were not part of Sen's ruling coalition. In other words, the targeting of elites in primarily July 1997 was part of the coup that led to Sen seizing power for himself.

Cameroon

Leader: Paul Biya

Start year: 1991
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2006: Minister of Water and Energy, Alphonse Siyam Siwe, was sentenced to 30 years in prison on charges of embezzlement and serious fraud.

2008: Minister for Health, Urbain Olanguena Awono, was imprisoned on charges of embezzlement; Minister of Economy and Finance, Polycarpe Abah Abah, was imprisoned over allegations of corruption and embezzlement.

2009: Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni was sacked over corruption accusations; Biya was facing

rising discontent over increases in prices.

2011: Cabinet Minister and aide to Biya, Marafa Hamidou Yaya, was forced out of the cabinet in a reshuffle (and later imprisoned in 2012 over embezzlement charges).

Military elite purges

1992: General Benoit Asso'o Emane, commander of the Yaounde Military Headquarters, was dismissed over a book he had published that was highly critical of Biya's administration.

Central African Republic

Leader: André-Dieudonné Kolingba

Start year: 1991

End year: 1993

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Kolingba in the Central African Republic between 1991 and 1993.

Leader: François Bozizé

Start year: 2004

End year: 2013

Civilian elite purges

2013: Bozizé dismissed the prime minister, Faustin Archange Touadera, following a peace deal with the Seleka rebel coalition, which required that he had to appoint a new prime minister from the opposition.

Military elite purges

2012: Bozizé dismissed his son as minister of defense and the army chief of staff.

Leader: Michel Djotodia

Start year: 2013

End year: 2014

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Djotodia in the Central African Republic between 2013 and 2014.

Chad

Leader: Idriss Déby

Start year: 1991

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2014: Déby dismissed the government on April 20, replacing 34 ministers and seven secretaries of state with 21 ministers and six secretaries of state. Then, in November, he replaced five out of 22 regional governors and five out of 22 regional general secretaries.

Military elite purges

1991: Colonel Maldoum Bada Abbas was arrested for his role in a coup attempt, while Kaffine Chadallah, the deputy chief of army staff, fled prior to being purged.

2004: Colonel Bakhit Ngamouda Djarbo, brother of the chief-of-staff Generla Hassane Djarbo,

Major Ousman Hamit, Colonel Oumar Aouara, and Lt Daoussa Hacim were arrested over a failed coup attempt.

2006: Colonel Khamis Doukoun, along with 14 other military officers and civilians, were arrested after the April 2006 rebel attack; they were suspect of disloyalty towards the regime.

2013: Several senior military figures were arrested following an alleged coup attempt.

China

Leader: Deng Xiaoping

Start year: 1991
End year: 1997

Civilian elite purges

1991: Xinhua reported that Communications Minister Qian Yong-chang and Construction Minister Lin Hanxiong were dismissed as part of the campaign to address anti-corruption.

1992: Eight members of the Central Committee's then-14-member Politburo including parliament head Wan Li, Beijing chief Li Ximing, and two members of the Politburo Standing Committee Yao Yilin and Song Ping were removed in an attempt to remove opponents to economic reforms. The acting minister of culture He Jingzhi was also replaced and lost his position on the Party's Central Committee, reportedly as hardliners who had engaged in harsh crackdown methods at Tiananmen were targeted (scapegoated given Deng's role).

1995: Chen Xitong, the Beijing Party Secretary, was forced out of the Politburo to take the blame for corruption scandals in Beijing.

1996: Following the murder of the senior official Li Peiyao by a member of the People's Armed Police, the top ranks of the paramilitary police were purged including the deputy chief of staff of the People's Armed Police Force and several other top officers.

Military elite purges

1992: President Yang Shangkun and his half-brother General Yang Baibing were stripped of their power—the process carried on into 1993 but started in 1992—as Deng targeted the Yangs due to the power they had built up in the military, or alternatively or in addition, because they planned to blame the Tiananmen massacre on Deng after he died.

Leader: Jiang Zemin

Start year: 1997
End year: 2003

Civilian elite purges

1997: Qiao Shi, chairman of the National People's Congress, was forced to retire after the mandatory retirement age was lowered to 70. There is some uncertainty among scholars about whether this retirement was forced or voluntary, but the majority view was that this was a pretext for Jiang to oust Qiao who had been a rival for power.

1999: Li Jizhou, Vice Minister of Public Security, was placed under house arrest and accused of profiting from an anti-smuggling campaign that he previously led.

2000: Hu Changqing, a former deputy provincial governor, was executed for accepting bribes. Xie Yongwu, a deputy mayor in Shenzhen, was also expelled from the party after being implicated in a plot to fix land deals in exchanges for bribes. Jia Tingan, director of the presidential office,

was removed from his position by Jiang over his involvement in a Xiamen smuggling operation. Cheng Kejie, former deputy chairman of China's national legislature, was sentenced to death for taking over \$7 million in bribes. Gao Changli, the Minister for Justice, was put in detention for 'economic problems;' there were rumors about the embezzlement of public funds by Gao and his mistress.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges under Jiang between 1997 and 2003. General Liu Huaqing, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was retired in 1997, but he was over the mandatory retirement age of 70. Unlike the ouster of Qiao, this event is not characterized as a purge by China-focused scholars.

Leader: Hu Jintao

Start year: 2003

End year: 2012

Civilian elite purges

2003: The Health Minister Zhang Wenkang (and Beijing's mayor Meng Xuenong) were removed for allegedly covering up the SARS outbreak.

2006: The Communist Party Chief in Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, was dismissed from the Politburo after being accused of misappropriating millions from the city's pension fund. Analysts described this both as Hu making a statement against corruption and consolidating his position.

2012: Bo Xilai, Chongqing party chief, was suspended from the Central Committee and Politburo in April over 'serious discipline violations' amid reports of his wife Gu Xilai's involvement in the murder of Neil Heywood, a British businessman. This was also seen as a power struggle at the top of the CCP. The purge was seemingly started by Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun's visit in February 2012 to the US consulate in Chengdu. It was thought that Wang revealed damaging information about Bo. Bo was expelled in September 2012 and charged with crimes including bribe-taking and improper sexual relationships with a number of women.

Military elite purges

2012: Lieutenant General Gu Junshan was removed from his post as deputy head of the People Liberation Army's General Logistics Department. This was part of the corruption investigation but was seen as a warning to the military of the importance of loyalty to the party given Bo had many allies in the military. Major General Wang Xixin, commander of the 38th group army, which guards Beijing, was also removed from his position as Hu was concerned about the powers of Bo's supporters in the military; Wang was technically 'promoted' to become vice-president of the Defense University.

Leader: Xi Jinping¹

Start year: 2012

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2012: Lei Zhengfu, the Chongqing Party Secretary, was fired after a sex tape emerged from 2007 that had been used to blackmail him to hand out construction contracts.

¹Elite purges, especially of civilians, are so extensive under Xi that I do not list them all. Instead I describe some of the most high-profile as well as justifying why a certain type of elite purge should be coded as occurring in a given year.

2013: The most high-profile purge of 2013 was that of Zhou Yongkang, former Director of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee. Zhou was retired so it was questionable as to whether he was still an elite but given his political connections and seemingly continuing influence within the upper echelons of Chinese politics, it seems right to class this as an elite purge. Zhou was placed under investigation and reportedly was under house arrest as well. Other elite purges included officials with close ties to Zhou; this included the investigations and removals from posts of four senior oil executives; one of them, Jiang Jiemin, was a member of the CCP Central Committee. It also included the investigation of Li Dongsheg, Vice Minister of Public Security.

2014: 2014 featured swathes of civilian elite purges. Some of the highest profile ones include the investigation for discipline violations of Su Rong, vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Su had a long history with Jiang Zemin. Ling Zhengce, the vice-chairman of Shanxi's Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, was a mid-ranking provincial official but his investigation over breaches of party discipline was significant because Ling is the older brother of Ling Jihua, the former head of the United Front Work Department under Hu Jintao. Elsewhere, Li Qiang, Linyungang Party Secretary, was detained over discipline violations as part of Xi's anti-corruption campaign. Wan Qiangliang, Guangzhou's Communist Party Secretary, was also dismissed following corruption allegations.

2015: Several officials (Li Jianguo from Hunan and Yang Weize from Nanjing) were caught up in discipline violations following Xi's crackdown on officials not wearing luxury brands. Other prominent purges included Ma Jian, vice minister at the Ministry of State Security, being detained on allegations of corruption, and Wu Zhiming, a high-level official in Shanghai, was investigated over a financial scandal. Lu Xiwen, the deputy CCP chief in Beijing, and Ai Baojun, the vice mayor of Shanghai, were also investigated for disciplinary violations.

Military elite purges

2014: General Xu Caihou was placed under house arrest in March 2014, reportedly to 'help' with the investigation of Lieutenant-General Gu Junshan. (Gu was formally charged with bribery, embezzlement, misuse of state funds, and abuse of power in April 2014, two years after his purged had started (see above).) Xu was publicly accused of corruption and expelled from the party in late June 2014. Xu's takedown was arguably not a purge because he was retired, although he still wielded significant influence, but Lieutenant-General Yang Jinshan, deputy commander of the Chengdu military region was also investigated over 'serious discipline violations' and expelled from the party in October 2014.

2015: In March 2015, the authorities announced that 14 generals in the People's Liberation Army including a vice political commissar with the nuclear missile force to the deputy chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet had been investigated or convicted by authorities in recent months. Guo Boxiong, an army veteran who had been one of the most senior commanders until two years ago, was also expelled from the party after being accused of taking bribes.

Cuba

Leader: Fidel Castro

Start year: 1991
End year: 2008

Civilian elite purges

1992: The Communist Party ideology chief, Carlos Aldana, was sacked and expelled from the Party after proposing that Castro lose some of his powers and become the titular head of the government.
1995: Provincial party leaders as well as 6 ministers and 2 vice-ministers were sacked as part of a push to modernize the economy.

1999: The Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina was dismissed after falling foul of Castro; he was expelled from the party in 2002.

2004: Marcos J. Portal Leon was fired as Cuba's minister of basic industries as a scapegoat for Cuba's energy crisis.

2006: Juan Carlos Robinson was sacked publicly from the Politburo over an alleged abuse of power.

Military elite purges

I did not find any evidence of military elite purges under Fidel Castro between 1991 and 2008. There was a highly prominent one in 1989—of General Ochoa—but this is outside my dataset's timeframe.

Leader: Raúl Castro

Start year: 2008

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2009: Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque and Vice President Carlos Lage were fired from the cabinet and removed from the Politburo as Raúl Castro rearranged senior personnel to bring in older figures of his generation.

Military elite purges

I did not find any evidence of military elite purges under Raúl Castro between 2008 and 2015.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Leader: Mobutu Sese Seko

Start year: 1991

End year: 1997

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any definitive evidence of civilian elite purges under Mobutu between 1991 and 1997. He asked the Prime Minister Lunda Bululu to resign in April 1991, but it is unclear that the event met the criteria for a purge. He also went through several governments in the early 1990s, with cabinet ministers changing, but this largely occurred during the early negotiations over multiparty politics; thus, these were generally opposition figures (e.g., UDPS leader Etienne Tshisekedi) who were never part of Mobutu's ruling elite.

Military elite purges

1996: Mobutu felt that the Gang of Four—a clique of Generals tied to Mobutu by marriage, friendship, and family—were a hindrance so he sacked Baramoto Kpama Kata, Commander of the Civil Guard.

Leader: Laurent-Désiré Kabila

Start year: 1997

End year: 2001

Civilian elite purges

1998: The Minister of Reconstruction Etienne Mbaya was dismissed and jailed after being involved in a conflict with the then-increasingly powerful Minister of the Interior Gaetan Kakudji. Kabila also in 1998 dismissed Tutsis from his government after becoming convinced that with Rwanda's backing, they were plotting to overthrow him.

Military elite purges

1997: The Army Chief of Staff, Masasu Nindaga, was dismissed, jailed, and condemned to 20 years in prison. Nindaga was one of the founders of the AFDL and popular with the troops. He was accused of being involved with foreign intelligence services, making arbitrary arrests, building a private prison, and smoking hemp.

1998: The top military commander, James Kabari (also known as Kabarere) was fired. Kabila also ordered all foreign troops to leave the country (see above about concerns over Rwanda).

Leader: Joseph Kabila

Start year: 2001

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2005: Nine members of the cabinet were sacked in a reshuffle over corruption.

2007: The Transport Minister Remy Kuseyo was sacked after a cargo plane crashed at N'Djilil airport destroying six homes. There was also a cabinet reshuffle with Kabila reducing the number of state ministers from six to three.

Military elite purges

2001: Kabila purged the presidential guard after taking power to remove soldiers thought to be unreliable, leaving mainly those from the Katanga province, his region of origin. This included removing and arrested Georges Leta Mangasa, General Administration of the Agence Nationale de Renseignements and Constantin Nono Lutula, presidential adviser on security matters. Kabila also replaced the Commander of the Air Force Gaustin Munene in 2001.

2004: Kabila sacked the army chief of staff and head of the military household over a failed coup attempt.

Egypt

Leader: Hosni Mubarak

Start year: 1991

End year: 2011

Civilian elite purges

2002: Mubarak removed several civilian elites who were part of the old guard (NDP General Secretary Yusuf Wali and Minister of Information Safwat Sharif) to assist his son Gamal Mubarak's faction.

2004: The Prime Minister and his entire cabinet were compelled to resign as Mubarak continued to prepare the ground for Gamal Mubarak's prospective succession.

2011: Mubarak purged several civilian elites to try and defuse tensions surrounding the Arab Spring protests, including removing his son Gamal Mubarak as assistant secretary general of the NDP.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Mubarak in Egypt between 1991 and 2011. I found references to military purges in the 1990s but no sufficiently concrete information to justify identifying military elite purges as having occurred.

Leader: Mohamed Hussein Tantawi

Start year: 2011

End year: 2012

Civilian elite purges

2011: Tantawi conducted numerous purges of civilian elites connected to the Mubarak era to try and defuse tensions following the Arab Spring protests. This included removing 13 unpopular governors, the ministers of interior, foreign affairs, and justice, and replacing further cabinet ministers.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Tantawi in Egypt between 2011 and 2012.

Leader: Abdel Fattah el-Sisi

Start year: 2014

End year: 2015

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under el-Sisi in Egypt between 2014 and 2015.

El Salvador

Leader: Alfredo Cristiani

Start year: 1991

End year: 1994

Civilian elite purges

1993: There were numerous media reports that in addition to the military figures that Cristiani purged in 1993, he also removed high-ranking civilian officials from his government.

Military elite purges

1993: Cristiani purged hundreds of military officers including senior figures such as Defense Minister Emilio Ponce, Orlando Zepeda as Deputy Defense Minister, Gilberto Rubio as Armed Forces Chief of Staff, and Mauricio Vargas as Deputy Chief.

Eritrea

Leader: Isaias Afwerki

Start year: 1994

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2001: The Minister of Local Government, Mahmud Sherifo, was dismissed from his post in late January, and then arrested in September 2001 along with 10 of the other authors of a letter criticizing Afwerki. The other civilian elites were: Aster Fissehatsion (Director in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs); Beraki Gebreselassie (Ambassador to Germany until May 2001);

Hamad Hamid Hamad (Head of the Arabic Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Saleh Kekiya (Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of the Office of the President); and Haile Woldetenxae (political bureau member since 1977).

Military elite purges

2001: The military elites who were arrested over the critical letter were: Ogbe Abraha, Army General; Berhane Gebregziabeher, Army Major-General; Petros Solomon, EPLF military commander and intelligence chief); and Germano Nati, (Army Brigadier General).

Ethiopia

Leader: Meles Zenawi

Start year: 1991
End year: 2012

Civilian elite purges

2001: Members of the TPLF executive committee were caught up in the mass purges of 2001, as Zenawi attempted to remove perceived critics.

2011: 120 senior and mid-level members of Oromo People's Democratic Organization, including Speaker of the House Abadula Gemedo, were purged; officially they were accused of corruption by selling off land around Addis Ababa.

Military elite purges

2001: Hundreds of army officers including Chief-of-Staff Major General Tsadkan G. Tensae and Air Force commander Major General Abebe Teklehaiamanot were dismissed for allegedly supporting a dissident group.

2006: 1,000 mostly Oromo officers including Major-General Alemshet Degiffe, who was commander of the Ethiopian Air Force, were removed as purges occurred in the military due to ethnically-based suspicion of disloyalty towards the ethnic Tigrayan-led ruling party.

2011: Seven army generals, 240 army colonels, and nearly 500 commissioned officers from lieutenants to majors including Brigadier General Teklai Ashebir, Brigadier General Migbe Haile, Brigadier General Abraha Mejmoo'e, and Brigadier General Wedi Roman were forced to retire as Zenawi made space for new loyalists.

Leader: Hailemariam Desalegn

Start year: 2012
End year: 2015

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Desalegn in Ethiopia between 2012 and 2015. The closest incident was when 30 suspects including the director general of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority were arrested in 2013 on charges including tax evasion, but there is insufficient evidence that anyone arrested was part of Desalegn's ruling coalition.

Gabon

Leader: Omar Bongo	Start year: 1991
	End year: 2009

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Gabon under Bongo between 1991 and 2009.

Leader: Ali Bongo Ondimba	Start year: 2009
	End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2011: Several prominent parliamentary candidates (Jean Eyeghe Ndong, Andre Mba Obame, and Casimir Oye Mba) were ousted from the ruling party for indicating support for a candidate other than Ondimba.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Gabon under Ondimba between 2009 and 2015.

The Gambia

Leader: Dawda Jawara	Start year: 1991
	End year: 1994

Civilian elite purges

1992: After the 1992 elections, Jawara replaced his vice-president, Bakary Dabo, who was popular with Saihou Sabally, who was viewed as tainted by corruption allegations.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Jawara in The Gambia between 1991 and 1994.

Leader: Yahya Jammeh	Start year: 1994
	End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

1994: The Finance Minister Bakary Dabo was dismissed for his role as a civilian instigator in a counter-coup attempt in July 1994.

1995: Jammeh sacked two female Ministers of Health, Social Welfare, and Women's Affairs in January (Fatoumatta Tambajang) and November (Coumba Ceesay-Marenah). Tambajang was accused of close kindship ties to Sabally so was sacked following the January 1995 coup attempt (see below), while Ceesay-Marenah was sacked for sabotage and foot-dragging. Jammeh also sacked his Finance Minister Fafa M'bai, arresting him and charging him with corruption.

1996: Jammeh sacked another female Minister of Health—Nyimasata Sanneh-Bojang—accusing her of corruption.

1999: Ministers of Agriculture Musa Mbenga and Fasennay Dumbuya were removed as they were scapegoated by Jammeh for poor food production.

Military elite purges

1994: Captains Mamat Omar Cham and Sherriff Samsudeen Sarr were sacked as the ministers

for information and tourism, and trade, respectively, but they were military members appointed right after the coup who Jammeh then quickly sacked and imprisoned as he suspected they were sympathetic to Jawara.

1995: Captains Sana Sabally was arrested and imprisoned, while Sadibou Hydara died in detention in June 1995. They were some of the four original junta leaders and were accused of plotting a coup against Jammeh.

2006: Colonel Ndure Cham and army officers were arrested over a failed coup in March 2006. Daba Marenah, director of the National Intelligence Agency, was also executed over the coup plot.

2013: Lt. Col. Lamin Sanneh was removed as commander of the national guard; he emigrated to the US. Sanneh and three other former members of the Gambian Armed Forces were killed by soldiers loyal to Jammeh when they attempted to overthrow Jammeh in 2014.

2015: Following the coup attempt on December 30, 2014, Jammeh purged members of the military including Lieutenant Colonel Saikou Jarju; Jarju was sentenced to death in March 2015.

Georgia

Leader: Eduard Shevardnadze

Start year: 1992
End year: 2003

Civilian elite purges

2001: Following protests, which included demands for cabinet ministers to be removed, about a botched raid on an independent television station, Shevardnadze sacked his entire cabinet.

Military elite purges

1993: Shevardnadze removed military hardliners—Dzhaba Ioseliani on Georgia's military council, and defense minister Tengiz Kitovani—to aid his meetings with Yeltsin.

Ghana

Leader: Jerry Rawlings

Start year: 1991
End year: 1993

Although Rawlings conducted significant violent purges after taking power, I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges between 1991 and 1993.

Guatemala

Leader: Jorge Serrano Elias

Start year: 1991
End year: 1993

Civilian elite purges

1993: Serrano Elias arrested the presidents of Congress and the Supreme Court (and a government

human-rights prosecutor) under the claim of trying to purge corruption. (Others viewed it as a power seizure that initiated his autogolpe.)

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Serrano Elias in Guatemala between 1991 and 1993.

Leader: Ramiro de León Carpio

Start year: 1993
End year: 1995

Civilian elite purges

1993: de León Carpio forced the resignations of dozens of members of Congress (and the judges) allegedly to stamp out corruption.

Military elite purges

1993: de León Carpio fired the defense minister General Jose Samayoa immediately after taking power, and also fired his replacement, General Roberto Perussina, seventeen days later.

Guinea

Leader: Lansana Conté

Start year: 1991
End year: 2008

Civilian elite purges

2005: Conté forcibly retired over a thousand individuals including ministers and diplomats.

2006: Conté dismissed the prime minister Cellon Dalein Diallo after allowing him to reshuffle the cabinet because a mutiny broke out in response, so Conté dismissed his prime minister for misconduct.

2007: Conté removed the prime minister to try and calm down unrest from soldiers and the police, who were rioting over back pay and bad living conditions.

Military elite purges

1996: The defense minister Colonel Abdourahmane Diallo was sacked following a coup attempt; the challengers were upset that Diallo had denied them pay raises and promotions so Conté sacked him. Commander Ousmane Sow was pardoned but dishonorably discharged in 1998 over the coup attempt, along with other participants, but there were also arrested of senior officers following the coup attempt.

2005: Conté forcibly retired over a thousand individuals including the head of the armed forces, 10 lieutenant colonels, 39 majors, and 93 captains.

2007: Several top military officials, including defense minister Arafan Camara, were dismissed following soldiers calling for their removals over bad living conditions and back pay.

Leader: Moussa Dadis Camara

Start year: 2008
End year: 2009

Civilian elite purges

I could not find evidence of civilian elite purges under Camara in Guinea between 2008 and 2009.

Military elite purges

2008: Camara ordered 21 military generals into retirement, including the nation's top military commander, after the junta had seized power.

2009: Three colonels who were members of the National Council for Democracy and Development ruling junta were arrested after being suspected of plotting to overthrow the new regime: Aboubacar Sidiki Camara, Biro Conde, and Bambo Fofana.

Leader: Sékouba Konaté

Start year: 2009

End year: 2010

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Konaté in Guinea between 2009 and 2010.

Guinea Bissau

Leader: João Bernardo Vieira

Start year: 1991

End year: 1999

Civilian elite purges

1997: Vieira dismissed various top government officials following a constitutional crisis involving the dismissal of the Prime Minister Saturnino da Costa.

Military elite purges

1998: Vieira suspended in January and then dismissed in June the Chief of Defense Staff Assumane Mane, which precipitated a coup attempt and a civil war.

Leader: Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo

Start year: 2013

End year: 2014

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Nhamadjo in Guinea-Bissau between 2013 and 2014.

Haiti

Leader: Raoul Cédras

Start year: 1992

End year: 1994

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Cédras in Haiti between 1992 and 1994.

Leader: René Preval

Start year: 2000

End year: 2001

Civilian elite purges

2000: Six police chiefs including Guy Philippe, Jacky Nau, and Gilbert Dragon self-exiled to

the Dominican Republic following a coup plot against Preval as they hoped to stop Aristide's inauguration.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Preval in Haiti between 2000 and 2001.

Leader: Jean-Bertrand Aristide

Start year: 2001

End year: 2004

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Aristide in Haiti between 2001 and 2004.

Indonesia

Leader: Suharto

Start year: 1991

End year: 1998

Civilian elite purges

1998: Members of Suharto's cabinet who had questioned Suharto's decisions were removed in the face of his stand-off with the IMF.

Military elite purges

1993: General Benny Murdani was removed as defense minister, after his removal as commander of the armed forces in 1988.

1995: Wismoyo Arismunandar, commander-in-chief of the army's strategic reserve, and Suharto's brother-in-law, was discarded due to his extramarital affairs and because he was showing increasing independence to Suharto's wishes by sheltering some of Murdani's men.

Leader: B. J. Habibie

Start year: 1998

End year: 1999

Civilian elite purges

1998: Habibie fired civilian cabinet ministers who were closely tied to Suharto, including Suharto's eldest daughter who was the social affairs minister (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana) and Suharto's long-time friend who was the trade and industry minister (Mohamed Hasan). Habibie also removed other Suharto children from the People's Consultative Assembly.

Military elite purges

1998: Suharto's son, Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, was dismissed as head of the Army's special forces. 41 figures in the upper house of parliament were also dismissed, including the heads of the air force, navy, police, and head of the Jakarta military command, Major General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin.

Iran

Leader: Akbar Hasemi Rafsanjani

Start year: 1991

End year: 1997

Civilian elite purges

1992: Around 1,100 parliamentary candidates, some of whom were already MPs, were disqualified from standing for parliament. This was a targeting of hardliners as part of a de-imamization process; one especially notable author on Iran describes this event as a purge.

Military elite purges

1993: There was an attack on Rafsanjani's motorcade and around 8 members of the Revolutionary Guard were subsequently killed. Military groups had been unhappy with Rafsanjani and this was seen as a power play between Rafsanjani and Khamanei.

Leader: Mohammad Khatami

Start year: 1997

End year: 2005

Civilian elite purges

1999: The Intelligence Minister, Qorbanali Dorri Najafabadi, was compelled to resign in February by Khatami, taking the blame for the government's involvement in the killing of five political dissidents and writers. Then in August, following students' anger over police raids at Tehran University, almost 100 police officers were arrested and the head of Tehran police was dismissed. Students had called for the resignation of Hedayat Loftian, an Islamic hardliner who leads the police nationally, but instead the head of Tehran's police was fired.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges under Khatami in Iran between 1997 and 2005.

Leader: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Start year: 2005

End year: 2013

Civilian elite purges

2005: Ahmadinejad sacked the Oil Minister quickly after taking power as he embarked on his promise to uproot the Oil Ministry. Dozens of deputy ministers were also sacked as Ahmadinejad attempted to clear out opponents. Ahmadinejad also sacked Hassan Rouhani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, days after taking office. At least six governors were replaced in Iran's thirty provinces.

2006: Ahmadinejad dismissed several ministers, including Welfare and Social Security Minister Parviz Kazemi and Cooperatives Minister Mohammed Nazemi Ardakani.

2007: Ahmadinejad continued to dismiss ministers, including the Industry and Minse Minister Ali-Reza Tahmasbi, the Oil Minister Mohammed-Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh, and the Education Minister Mahmoud Farshidi. The Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, may also have been purged but there is disagreement over whether he quit or was forcibly removed, even in different articles by the same author.

2008: Ahmadinejad dismissed more ministers to get his allies in position; he dismissed the Economy and Finance Minister Davoud Danehs Ja'fari, the Interior Minister Hojjat al-Eslam Mostafa Pour-Mohammed, and the Roads and Transportation Minister Mohammed Rahmati.

2009: Ahmadinejad dismissed the Intelligence Minister Hojjat al-Eslam Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ezhehi. He also dismissed the vice-president Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie, after pressure from the

Supreme Leader Khamenei. After the election, the Oil Minister Gholamhosein Nozari was removed as he resisted Ahmadinejad's demands to remove top oil industry managers.

2010: Ahmadinejad fired the Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki; he was at odds with Ahmadinejad over nuclear policy and/or was made a scapegoat for diplomatic missteps in recent months.

2011: The Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Sharif Malekzadeh was dismissed.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges in Iran under Ahmadinejad between 2005 and 2013. The closest evidence I found was in 2009, five commanders in the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps were placed under house arrest after the election, as they were perceived to be sympathetic to the reformists. However, these moves were not instigated by Ahmadinejad, but were internal maneuverings by commanders within the IRGC.

Leader: Hassan Rouhani

Start year: 2013

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges in Iran under Rouhani between 2013 and 2015. When he came into office, he appointed officials to several key ministries which entailed the removal of powerful associates affiliated with Ahmadinejad. However, removed individuals were not purged but assigned to alternative positions. The Minister of Science Reza Faraj-Dana was also removed in 2014, but this was at the hands of Iran's parliament, and not a purge by Rouhani.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Iran under Rouhani between 2013 and 2015.

Iraq

Leader: Saddam Hussein

Start year: 1991

End year: 2003

Civilian elite purges

1991: Prime Minister Saadoun Hammadi was dismissed as he favored opening up Iraq's one-party rule. The Minister of Health, Abd al-Salam al-Sa'id was also dismissed as a scapegoat for deteriorating health and economic conditions.

1992: Finance Minister Majid Abed Jaafer was dismissed as part of a cabinet reorganization in July 1992.

1993: Senior officials including Interior Minister Samir Abel WAham al-Shaykeli were arrested by Hussein. The Prime Minister Mohammed Hamza al-Zoubaidi was also dismissed.

1995: Watban al-Tikriti, interior minister and Saddam's half brother, was removed potentially due to protests that led to mobs killing a governor and several party officials.

1996: Following the defection of Kamel Hussein, two of Hussein's half-brothers, Watban Ibrahim al-Hassan and Saba'wi Ibrahim al-Hassan, were placed under house arrest. Hussein also dismissed his son Uday from all positions because of the havoc that Uday was wreaking on the political-security situation due to his behavior.

Military elite purges

1991: The Minister of Defense Lt. Gen. Sa'di Tu'ma 'Abbas al-Juburi was replaced in April as part of Hussein's breakup of the military command between 1990 and 1994. The chief of Iraq's military intelligence bureau, Maj. Gen. Wafiq Jasim Sammari was jailed in June. Hundreds of senior army officers were also sacked at this time as Hussein feared a coup. Lt. Gen. Hussein Rashin Muhammad al-Tikriti was replaced as the Chief of Staff. In July, between 14 to 18 generals were executed following coup attempts, with Hussein fearing another coup. In November, the new Defense Minister Kamil al-Majid was removed (although he was later made a presidential adviser in February 1992). Finally, senior army officers including Staff Major General Mundhir 'Abd-al-Rahman Ibrahim and Major General Faysal were accused over accusations they were involved in a coup plot.

1992: Brigadier Sabri Mahmoud was executed over an alleged coup plot. Then, in September, 26-30 officers including General Abdel Mutleq Juburi, were executed. There were further military purges in October of around 19 officers, with two Brig. Anwar Ismael Hentoosh and Brig. Amir Rashid Hasson, targeted for not being sufficiently ruthless when putting down a Shi'ite rebellion in the South.

1993: Colonel Sabri Mahmud al-Jiburi, an armored unit officer in one of the Republic Guard units, was shot after a coup attempt. Hussein reportedly literally danced on his grave afterwards. There were also numerous other reports of senior military officials being purged in 1993, albeit absent specific names.

1994: Three senior military officials (Saber el-Douri, Taillee al-Douri, and Kheidr abed el-Aziz) were executed for suggesting that Hussein's son Uday would make a poor Defense Minister.

1995: Brig. Gen. Muhammad Muzlum al-Dulaymi, commander of the Habaniya air force base, was executed over an alleged coup plot. His brother, General Turki, was then killed in fighting, or committed suicide, following a coup attempt in June 1995. Around 150 soldiers and officers were arrested and executed following the June coup attempt. In August, ten high-ranking officers including two generals were arrested following the defection of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid.

1996: Maj. Gen. Tahir Takriti was arrested after a policy disagreement with Hussein.

1997: Around 20 senior military officers and generals were arrested following an assassination attempt on Uday.

1999: 24 army officers including Maj. Gen. Ghabdan 'Abed al-Ghriri and Gen. Kamel Sachet were executed as Hussein feared a military coup.

2002: There are multiple reports of Hussein executing military officers who he did not expect to be loyal.

2003: Commanding officers were targeted who Hussein did not expect to defend him if the US invaded. This included Lt. Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Jabburi Tai, head of the Iraqi military, who was placed under house arrest.

Leader: Nouri al-Maliki

Start year: 2011
End year: 2014

Civilian elite purges

2011: The Vice President, Tariq al-Hashemi had a warrant issued for his arrest over alleged links to terrorism. The US Ambassador saw this as the start of al-Maliki's sectarian politics (at least at the

elite level). Hashemi fled Iraq, so effectively forced exile, and was tried in absentia and sentenced to death.

2012: A prominent regional official, Riya al Adad who was Vice President of the Baghdad Provincial Council, was arrested on terrorism charges by the Iraqi Special Forces (under al-Maliki's command). Also, the Minister of Finance Rafi al-Essawi went into forced exile; a year after Hasemi's bodyguards were rounded up in 2011, Essawi's bodyguards were similarly charged with links to terrorism. One journalist said that the event sparked protests among Sunni parts of Iraq because it was widely known that Essawi is a peaceful man.

Military elite purges

2014: In June, top military officials including Lieutenant General Mehdi Sabah Ghawari and Hidayat Abdulraheem were fired over advances made by the Islamic State.

Leader: Haider al-Abadi

Start year: 2014
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2014: Adnan al-Asadi, a senior security adviser at the Interior Ministry was removed as al-Abadi targeted those associated with crimes against Sunnis. There are further multiple reports of dozens of leaders within the Interior Ministry being fired.

Military elite purges

2014: Al-Abadi removed two army generals in June; this was both seen as an effort to get rid of al-Maliki loyalists and also remove incompetent generals who had overseen the defeat of the Iraqi Security Forces by Islamic State in Mosul. There are also reports in multiple sources of at least 30 senior military leaders being dismissed around the same time.

Ivory Coast

Leader: Félix Houphouet-Boigny

Start year: 1991
End year: 1993

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges under Houphouet-Boigny in Ivory Coast between 1991 and 1993.

Military elite purges

1991: Colonel Doue, commander of the troops who had been killed over the July 23, 1991 coup plot, was arrested on July 30 for trying to investigate the coup plot.

Leader: Henri Konan Bédié

Start year: 1993
End year: 1999

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges in Ivory Coast under Bédié between 1993 and 1999.

Military elite purges

1995: Robert Guéï was placed as chief of the military; he was then dismissed from the army completely in 1997 after being accused of being involved in a coup attempt in 1995.

Leader: Robert Guéï

Start year: 1999

End year: 2000

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges in Ivory Coast under Guéï between 1999 and 2000.

Military elite purges

2000: Generals Abdoulaye Palenfo and Lassana Coulibaly, the numbers two and three in the junta, were accused of being involved in a coup attempt on September 18 and were dismissed. They took refuge in the Nigerian embassy to avoid arrest but formal charges were made on September 28, 2000.

Leader: Laurent Gbagbo

Start year: 2000

End year: 2011

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges in Ivory Coast under Gbagbo between 2000 and 2011. Prime Ministers were replaced at various times, e.g., Seydou Diarra in 2005, but I could not find any evidence that they were purged.

Military elite purges

2004: The Army Chief General Doué was dismissed and replaced by General Mangou after the former expressed reservations about the likely success of "Operation Dignity," which aimed to retake the North of the country.

Jordan

Leader: Hussein bin Talal

Start year: 1991

End year: 1999

Civilian elite purges

1996: Hussein fired the cabinet to calm down agitation among the people over corruption.

1999: Hussein removed his brother Hassan as the crown prince shortly before he died, replacing him with his oldest son, Abdullah. Hussein gave Hassan a 14-page typed letter expressing his disapproval with Hassan's behavior, which was then read over the radio before Hassan had opened it.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Hussein between 1991 and 1999.

Leader: Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein

Start year: 1999

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

1999: Abdullah replaced the incumbent prime minister with Abd al-Rauf al-Rawabdeh, only hours after telling the incumbent that his job was safe.

2004: The Crown Prince Hamzah, Abdullah's younger brother, was stripped of his title. Abdullah did not yet name a new crown prince, which meant his 10-year-old son was then the effective successor.

2011: Abdullah dismissed his entire cabinet twice in 12 months—in February and October—in response to protests relating to the Arab Spring.

2012: Abdullah dissolved parliament and replaced it with new members following further peaceful protests for government reform.

Military elite purges

1999: Abdullah removed dozens of senior army officers, including the next-in-line to be the chief of staff, including many of his own former commanders who had previously worked as former Crown Prince Hassan's military secretaries.

Kazakhstan

Leader: Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev

Start year: 1992

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

1994: Prime Minister Sergei Tereshchenko was dismissed following a no-confidence motion orchestrated by the opposition deputies in parliament; it was not legally binding but Nazarbayev chose to dismiss Tereshchenko anyway.

1997: Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin was fired, with reports that he represented a threat to Nazarbayev.

2007: Rakhat Aliyev, deputy foreign minister and Nazarbayev's son-in-law, was removed in February and initially sent to Vienna to serve as ambassador there. This happened days after Aliyev was linked to the disappearance of two former bank executives. An arrest warrant was issued for Aliyev in May. Then Dariga Nazarbayeva, Nazarbayev's adopted daughter in question, was removed from her positions and the list of parliamentary candidates ahead of the August elections.

2009: Former prime minister and minister of defense Daniyal Akhmetov was removed from his position. Accounts link this to his downfall as prime minister in 2007, so this is coded as civilian rather than military.

2014: Former prime minister and minister of defense Serik Akhmetov was charged with corruption and placed under house arrest; again, his downfall is linked to his time as prime minister so this is coded as civilian rather than military.

Military elite purges

I did not find any evidence of military elite purges in Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev between 1992 and 2015.

Kenya

Leader: Daniel arap Moi

Start year: 1991
End year: 2002

Civilian elite purges

1991: Moi sacked the energy minister Nicholas Biwott after he was named a suspect in the murder 20 months before of foreign minister Robert Ouko; Biwott was a close aide of Moi.

1997: Moi sacked the assistant minister in the office of the president, Kipkalya Kones, amidst various personnel moves allegedly aimed at ending party factionalism within KANU.

2002: Moi purged KANU of supporters of vice president George Saitoti and secretary general Joseph Kamotho, amid discussions of Moi's potential successor.

Military elite purges

I did not find any evidence of military elite purges in Kenya under Moi between 1991 and 2002.

Kuwait

Leader: Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah

Start year: 1991
End year: 2006

Civilian elite purges

1991: The cabinet was forcibly removed and a new one installed by Jaber Al-Sabah.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Kuwait under Jaber Al-Sabah between 1991 and 2006. The closest was in 1991 when ten air force officers demanded the removals of chief of staff Major General Mizar Sanna and his deputy Major General Jabar al-Khaled al-Sabah, but I could not find evidence to confirm that either individual was purged.

Leader: Saad Al-Salim Al-Sabah

Start year: 2006
End year: 2015

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Kuwait under Saad Al-Sabah between 2006 and 2015.

Kyrgyzstan

Leader: Askar Akayev

Start year: 1992
End year: 2005

Civilian elite purges

1993: Akayev was able to dismiss the prime minister, Tursunbek Chyngyshev, via a vote of no confidence following a scandal related to the Cameco gold scandal.

1995: Akayev purged the ministry of internal affairs, and also the deputy minister of labor and social protection. The latter was a power play against the Minister for Labor and Social Protection, Zafar Khakimov. Madybek Oblesov, the minister for transport, was also sacked in July when he was accused of embezzling funds to buy property for senior officials.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Akayev in Kyrgyzstan between 1992 and 2005.

Leader: Kurmanbek Bakiyev

Start year: 2005

End year: 2010

Civilian elite purges

2005: The prosecutor-general was dismissed following complaints that he had gone after formerly powerful figures under Akayev too enthusiastically.

2006: The president dismissed his brother, Janysh Bakiyev, as deputy national security minister after he was implicated over planning heroin in the luggage of an opposition politician. Bakiyev also dismissed a governor for participating in a pro-reform rally, and another for opposing a road linking Almaty to the Issyk-Kul resort areas.

2007: Bakiyev dismissed Zhantaro Satybaldiyev, governor for the Osh region, ostensibly for shortcomings in his work.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan between 2005 and 2010. The former Defense Minister Ismail Isakov was imprisoned in 2010, but he had already defected to the opposition in 2008.

Laos

Leader: Kaysone Phomvihane

Start year: 1991

End year: 1992

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Laos between 1991 and 1992 under Phomvihane. Phomvihane did purge a vice minister Thongsouk Saisangkhi for calling for a multiparty system, but this was in 1989.

Leader: Nouhak Phoumsavanh

Start year: 1992

End year: 1998

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Laos between 1992 and 1998 under Phoumsavanh.

Leader: Khamtai Siphandone

Start year: 1998

End year: 2006

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Laos between 1998 and 2006 under Siphandone.

Leader: Choummaly Sayasone

Start year: 2006

End year: 2015

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Laos between 2006 and 2015 under Sayasone.

Lesotho

Leader: Elias Phisoana Ramaema

Start year: 1991

End year: 1993

I did not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Lesotho between 1991 and 1993.

Liberia

Leader: Charles Taylor

Start year: 1998

End year: 2003

Civilian elite purges

1999: Taylor purged Senator Charles Brumskine from the Liberian Senate leadership, after concluding the latter had become a rival.

Military elite purges

I did not find any evidence of military elite purges in Liberia under Taylor between 1998 and 2003.

Libya

Leader: Muammar Gaddafi

Start year: 1991

End year: 2011

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges in Libya under Gaddafi between 1991 and 2011. There were reports of government employees being arrested in 1993 following a coup attempt (see below), but I could not find any specific or confirmatory details. Similarly, there were reports in 2008 and 2009 of Gaddafi describing his desire to purge most of the government ministries but again, I could not find confirmatory evidence that this happened.

Military elite purges

1993: Gaddafi arrested dozens of officers following a coup attempt, including Colonel Miftah Qarrum.

Madagascar

Leader: Didier Ratsiraka

Start year: 1991

End year: 1993

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Madagascar under Ratsiraka between 1991 and 1993.

Leader: Andry Rajoelina

Start year: 2010

End year: 2013

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges in Madagascar under Rajoelina between 2010 and 2013.

Military elite purges

2010: Rajoelina dismissed the Armed Forces Minister in April, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Andrianasoavina, and General Noel Rakotonandrasana in November. Both were rumored to be involved in different coup plots.

Malawi

Leader: Hastings Banda

Start year: 1991

End year: 1994

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges under Banda between 1991 and 1994.

Military elite purges

1993: The top three commanders of the army were removed in December 1993 following pressure from officers in the army over what they saw as a lack of leadership. This followed violent confrontations in Lilongwe between the army and the paramilitary Malawi Young Pioneers, which left at least 30 people dead.

Malaysia

Leader: Mahathir Mohammad

Start year: 1991

End year: 2003

Civilian elite purges

1998: Mahathir had his then-Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim expelled from the party and arrested. He was initially accused of homosexuality, sexual misconduct, and abuse of power.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Malaysia under Mahathir between 1991 and 2003.

Leader: Abdullah Ahmad Badawi

Start year: 2003

End year: 2009

Civilian elite purges

2005: The Federal Territories Ministers Isa Samad was suspended from the ruling party after a party disciplinary board found him guilty of vote buying; this was seen as a response to public criticism of failure to tackle graft.

2008: Old guard MPs were removed from the cabinet after the disastrous 2008 election results.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Malaysia under Badawi between 2003 and 2009.

Leader: Najib Razak

Start year: 2009

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2015: In late July, Razak sacked his deputy prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin and the attorney general Abdul Gani Patail. The former had publicly raised questions over the government's closure of newspapers and delays in the continuing investigating into the state-investment fund 1MDB, while the latter had been investigating him over 1MDB corruption allegations. Razak also sacked four ministers and a deputy minister, ostensibly to strengthen his administration and help it work cohesively as a unit.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Malaysia under Razak between 2009 and 2015.

Mauritania

Leader: Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya

Start year: 1991

End year: 2005

Civilian elite purges

2003: Following a coup attempt, Taya sacked the secretary general of his party, Loulei Ould Wed-dad.

Military elite purges

2003: Following the coup attempt, Taya sacked the chiefs of staff of the navy, paramilitary gendarmerie, and the National Guard.

2004: Taya sacked 40 officers including high-ranking members of the National Guard after uncov-
ering an alleged coup plot.

Leader: Ely Ould Mohamed Vall

Start year: 2005

End year: 2007

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Vall in Mauritania between 2005 and 2007.

Leader: Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz

Start year: 2009

End year: 2015

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Abdel Aziz in Mauritania between 2009 and 2015.

Mexico

Leader: Carlos Salinas de Gortari

Start year: 1991
End year: 1994

Civilian elite purges

1992: 57 top federal police commanders were fired as the government attempted to combat police corruption and drug trafficking.

1993: The attorney general Ignacio Morales Lechuga and interior minister Fernando Gutierrez Barrios were replaced as the Salinas government faced accusations of human rights violations and electoral fraud.

1994: Five commanders of the Federal Judicial Police were fired due to pressure on the government to stop violence related to drug trafficking.

Military elite purges

I did not find any evidence of military elite purges in Mexico between 1991 and 1994.

Morocco

Leader: Hassan II

Start year: 1991
End year: 1999

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Hassan II in Morocco between 1991 and 1999.

Leader: Mohammed VI

Start year: 1999
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

1999: Mohammed VI fired the hated interior minister Driss Basri, as well as 44 governors who were part of his network.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges under Mohammed VI in Morocco between 1999 and 2015.

Mozambique

Leader: Joaquim Chissano

Start year: 1994-1996
End year: 1998-2004

Civilian elite purges

1996: Against his will, Chissano succumbed to popular pressure to remove the unpopular Home Affairs and Police Minister, Manuel António.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges in Mozambique under Chissano between 1994 and 2004.

Leader: Armando Guebuza

Start year: 2009
End year: 2015

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Mozambique under Guebuza between 2009 and 2015. I found reports of Guebuza purging ministers when he first came to power but this was in the mid-2000s, outside the scope of this dataset.

Myanmar

Leader: Saw Maung

Start year: 1991
End year: 1992

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Myanmar under Saw Maung between 1991 and 1992. The civil service and universities were purged extensively in 1991, but I did not find evidence that any civilian or military elite was targeted.

Leader: Than Shwe

Start year: 1992
End year: 2011

Civilian elite purges

I could not find evidence of civilian elite purges under Than Shwe in Myanmar between 1992 and 2011. This is consistent with the fact that Myanmar's top officials were almost exclusively military officials under Than Shwe.

Military elite purges

1997: Several generals from the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council were purged, including Lieutenant-Generals Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba, and Myint Aung.

2000: Brigadier General Zaw Htun was sacked after giving a speech at a university that included criticism of Myanmar's leaders.

2001: Second generation regional commanders were dismissed as part of a reshuffle.

2004: Prime Minister Khin Nyunt (and around 70 senior military intelligence officers) were arrested; ostensibly on corruption charges but internal military accounts claimed that Nyunt had disobeyed Than Shwe's order to relinquish control over the intelligence apparatus in the military. Separately, top officials with experience in international affairs including Colonel Tin Hlaing and Labor Minister Tin Winn were forcibly retired to demonstrate to the international community that the hardliners would not allow the release of, or any compromise with Aung San Suu Kyi.

2011: Lieutenant-General Myint Aung was placed under house arrest after refusing the post of

defense minister. He had hoped to become commander-in-chief of the armed forces but did not want to serve under Min Aung Hlaing.

Leader: Thein Sein

Start year: 2011
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2012: Thein Sein reshuffled the cabinet to target nine hardline figures who were suspected not to support the political reforms. This included the Information Minister Kyaw Hsan, who was demoted to a minor position.

2015: Shwe Mann was detained in August, publicly to relieve him of workload over his dual roles of parliamentary speaker and party chair, but more likely because of his public willingness to support Aung San Suu Kyi. Ten ministers including Maung Maung Thein were also later removed in August, as was Thura Aung Ko, an ally of Shwe Mann, in September.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Thein Sein in Myanmar between 2012 and 2015. There is discussion of regional commanders being reshuffled in 2012, but the evidence to support this claim relates to the civilian elite purges in the cabinet described above.

Nepal

Leader: Surya Bahadur Thapa

Start year: 2003
End year: 2004

Civilian elite purges

2003: Two members of the ruling party central committee, Ms Rekha Sharma and Mr Krishna Dhoj Khadka, were arrested, allegedly for divulging confidential information.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Thapa in Nepal between 2003 and 2004.

Leader: Sher Bahadur Deuba

Start year: 2004
End year: 2005

Civilian elite purges

I could not find evidence of civilian elite purges under Deuba in Nepal between 2004 and 2005.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Deuba in Nepal between 2004 and 2005. 105 soldiers, including officers, experienced a combination of warnings and imprisonment in December 2004 over reports of human rights abuses, but I could not find sufficient evidence that an elite military purge occurred.

Leader: Gyanendra Shah

Start year: 2005
End year: 2006

Civilian elite purges

2006: The chief of police was suspended by Gyanendra.²

Military elite purges

2006: Along with the chief of police, eight other security officials including the head of the armed forces were suspended.

Niger

Leader: Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara

Start year: 1997

End year: 1999

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Maïnassara in Niger between 1997 and 1999. In 1996, Maïnassara replaced all the members of the electoral commission to help ensure his victory in 1996 but this is outside the temporal scope of my dataset and these individuals are arguably not members of the ruling coalition anyway.

Leader: Mamadou Tandja

Start year: 1999

End year: 2010

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Tandja in Niger between 1999 and 2010. The Prime Minister, Hama Amadou, was forced to step down in 2007; however, this was not driven by Tandja, but by a no confidence vote in Niger's national assembly.

Nigeria

Leader: Ibrahim Babangida

Start year: 1991

End year: 1993

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Babangida between 1991 and 1993. There were military purges following a coup attempt in 1990, but this is outside my dataset's timeframe.

Leader: Sani Abacha

Start year: 1993

End year: 1998

Civilian elite purges

1994: Abacha dismissed the civilians on his ruling council following strikes by petroleum workers after his arrest of Chief Abiola.

1996: Abacha sacked 27 out of 30 state governors.

²I do not identify Gyanendra's dismissal and arrest of Prime Minister Deuba and other leading Nepalese politicians in February 2005 as a purge as this was the autogolpe or coup—pending one's interpretation—by which Gyanendra replaced Deuba as the head of government.

1997: One civilian from the cabinet was also arrested after the government responded to an alleged coup plot (see below).

Military elite purges

1993: Abacha purged Babangida and 17 of his military allies, including Brigadier Halilu Akilu, Brigadier Raji Rasaki, Brigadier John Shagaya, Brigadier David Mark, Brigadier Adetunji Olurin, Lieutenant-Colonel Sambo Dasuki, and Colonel Abdulmumuni Aminu.

1994: Abacha sacked the Heads of the Army and Navy and replaced them with loyalists; these figures were believed to disagree with Abacha's response to oil strikes. There were also reports of Abacha targeting officers who were opposed to his continued rule.

1996: Dozens of senior naval officers were retired including Commerce Minister Rear Admiral Isaac Areola; flag of the officer of the western naval command, Rear Admiral Rufus Eiyitayo; and chief of the fleet support, Rear Admiral Oladele Dada. 10 group captains, six wing commanders, and 10 squadron leaders were among many others who were also retired from the air force. Abacha was reportedly aiming to remove ambitious officers.

1997: Abacha arrested his number two, Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya, and nine other officers; the government claimed to have uncovered a coup plot.

Leader: Abdulsalami Abubakar

Start year: 1998

End year: 1999

Civilian elite purges

1998: Abubakar dissolved the cabinet in July 1998 and replaced it with new members.

Military elite purges

1998: Abubakar forcibly retired military figures who held prominent political positions in the government.

North Korea

Leader: Kim Il Sung

Start year: 1991

End year: 1994

Civilian elite purges

I could not find evidence of civilian elite purges under Kim Il Sung in North Korea between 1991 and 1994.

Military elite purges

1993: Military elites and reportedly over 20,000 soldiers who were linked to the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow were arrested, many of whom were executed. Elites and soldiers who had studied at Frunze were targeted because Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il reportedly felt betrayed that the military officials who they had trusted the most to study in Moscow, had been selling Soviet goods in North Korea, heavily drinking, and had been conspiring against the Kim regime. Military elites including General Hong Gye-sung, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, and Lieutenant General Kany Young-hwan, deputy director of the Operations Department of the General Staff, were some of the most prominent figures purged.

Leader: Kim Jong Il

Start year: 1994

End year: 2011

Civilian elite purges

1997: Prime Minister Kang Song San was suddenly removed, seemingly because he was an ally of the recently defected Hwang Jang Yop. More notably, Seo Gwan Hui, the Agriculture Secretary, was also executed as a scapegoat for the famine.

1998: Seo Gwan Hui's execution precipitated a massive purge campaign, the Scrutiny, which scrutinized people's identification booklets to look for discrepancies. During this period, some civilian elites were purged. Kim Chong U, chairman of the Committee for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation, was executed for his failure to develop the Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone. Kim Young Ryong, the first deputy director of North Korea's National Security Agency, and Kwon Hee Gyong, head of a KWP body that spies on ROK, were also reportedly purged for criticizing North Korea's isolation.

2000: The Director of the Political Bureau of the Ministry of Social Security, Chae Mun Deok, was executed on Kim Jong Il's orders in a stadium in Pyongyang in February 2000; he was made a scapegoat for the Scrutiny campaign, which had led to around 20,000 people being purged between 1997 and 2000.

2004: Jang Song Thaek was purged by being removed from all his positions; he was not rehabilitated until 2006. The exact reason is unclear but it appears that he encroached on Kim Jong Il's authority, likely via an incident at a guesthouse in Taesongho where a guest of Kim's was denied access because they did not have Jang's approval to enter.

2010: The prominent finance official Park Nam Gi was executed, scapegoated for the failed confiscatory currency reform.

Military elite purges

1995: A four-star general, Ri Bong Won, who was in charge of personnel movements for the KPA was executed in 1998. This report came from South Korea's National Intelligence Service in a hearing at the ROK National Assembly. He was first arrested though in 1995.

Leader: Kim Jong Un

Start year: 2011

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2013: Kim Jong Un had his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, executed.

2014: O Sang Hon, deputy public security minister, was reportedly executed, according to South Korean media.

2015: Vice Premier Choe Yong Gon was reportedly executed for voicing discontent with forestry management policies, according to South Korean media, and there were also unconfirmed rumors that Choe Ryong Hae was purged (if he was, he was later rehabilitated).

Military elite purges

2012: Vice Marshall Ri Yong Ho was relieved of all his duties, and seemingly executed, in July 2012. Officially 'illness' was cited, but observers of North Korea uniformly cited some kind of power struggle. There were also reports of other military elite purges including Kim Chol, vice-minister of the army as well as 14 other senior figures, who were allegedly executed for drinking and otherwise enjoying life during the mourning period for Kim Jong Il. Deputy Armed Forces Minister Kim Yong Chun also experienced a significant demotion in April 2012 to being made

responsible for civil defense nationwide.

2013: General Kim Kyok Sik was suddenly dismissed in 2013.

2015: Hyon Yong Chol was reportedly executed in 2015 for falling asleep at a meeting (although this was never confirmed).

Oman

Leader: Qaboos bin Said

Start year: 1991

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2011: Qaboos sacked two ministers after protests erupted over corruption during the Arab Spring protests.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Oman between 1991 and 2015.

Pakistan

Leader: Pervez Musharraf

Start year: 2000

End year: 2008

Civilian elite purges

I could not find evidence of civilian elite purges in Pakistan under Musharraf between 2000 and 2008.

Military elite purges

2001: Musharraf removed military elites to remove believed to have sympathies to the Taliban, including Lt. Gen Mahmood Ahmed, Lt. Gen. Muzaffar Hussain Usmani, army's deputy chief of staff, and Lt. Gen. Mohammed Aziz, a key commander in Lahore.

2002: Musharraf purged further military elites with al-Qaeda or Taliban sympathies including Brigadier Abdullah, head of the Kashmir cell in Inter-Services Intelligence.

Paraguay

Leader: Andrés Rodriguez Pedotti

Start year: 1991

End year: 1993

Civilian elite purges

I did not find any evidence of civilian elite purges under Rodriguez between 1991 and 1993.

Military elite purges

1992: Several top military officials received charges of corruption and were suspended. This included the commander of the army, General Humberto Garcete, and several other generals. The generals were charged with letting stolen cars across the border.

Peru

Leader: Alberto Fujimori

Start year: 1993
End year: 2000

Civilian elite purges

1996: Jaime Yoshiyama, Minister of the Presidency, was dismissed. He had been talked of in some circles as a successor to Fujimori. He had also lost the election to be the mayor of Lima in 1995.

Military elite purges

1993: Fujimori purged officers in the military, including General Rodolfo Robles Espinoza, the third ranking officer in the army.

1995: Fujimori replaced the entire top officer corps in the military after sweeping the 1995 presidential election; this included the commanders-in-chief of the navy and air force, and the minister of defense.

2000: Three officials loyal to the recently departed (resigned) spy chief Montesinos were apprehended by Fujimori himself in a supermarket. The commanders of the army, navy, and air forced were also dismissed as they were associates of Montesinos.

Republic of Congo

Leader: Denis Sassou Nguesso

Start year: 1998
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2011: Leaders in the Congolese Party of Labour who opposed attempts to limit control of the Party to only those born near Oyo or who were from Sassou-Nguesso's family were replaced.

2012: Colonel Marcel Ntsourou, who was second in command of the domestic surveillance apparatus, was imprisoned following what some saw as a failed coup attempt in 2012. Ntsourou eventually died while in custody in February 2017.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in the Republic of Congo between 1998 and 2015.

Russia

Leader: Boris Yeltsin³

Start year: 1991
End year: 1999

Civilian elite purges

1991: Top officials who had participated in, supported, or not sufficiently resisted the August

³Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary on August 24, 1991, and Yeltsin was the President from July 1991. I therefore identify purges, including those that occurred following the coup attempt in August 1991 as occurring under Yeltsin, although Gorbachev was also heavily involved.

1991 coup attempt were purged. This included the KGB Chief (Vladimir Kryuchkov), Deputy KGB Chief (Vladimir Grushko), speaker of the USSR parliament (Anatoly Lukyanov), Head of the Party's General Department and Gorbachev's Chief of Staff (Valery Boldin), Foreign Minister (Alexander Bessmertnykh), the Soviet Prime Minister (Valentin Pavlov), the Deputy KGB chief (Viktor Grushkov), and the Vice President (Gennady Yanayev). In October, Yeltsin also removed conservatives from his cabinet so that he could install people who backed his economic reforms.

1993: In March, Yeltsin fired two governors over corruption, then in May, fired the Security Council Chairman Yuri Skokov and Deputy Prime Minister Georgy Khizha as they opposed his reforms. Security Minister Viktor Barannikov was fired in July 1993, publicly over abuse of office and incompetence. In October, Yeltsin fired the governors of Novosibirsk and Amur as they opposed his September decree that dissolved the national parliament. Finally, in December, Yeltsin fired three prominent advisers—economic experts Valery Burkov and Alexander Granberg, and education expert Eduard Dneprov—as he sought to scapegoat officials for the ultra-nationalists strong showing in the parliamentary elections.

1994: Yeltsin forced the Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov and the Economics Minister Yegor Gaidar to step down in January. In March, Yeltsin fired the Intelligence Chief Nikolai Golushko after a swift release of revolt leaders.

1995: Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, Federal Security Service Minister Sergei Stepashin, Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Yegrowo were sacked over the botched handling of a hostage situation in Chechnya.

1996: First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais was forced to resign due to Yeltsin's negative view of his performance over economic reforms. The Chief of Staff Sergei Filatov was also purged as part of the Chubais purge. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was made to resign; his foreign policy was blamed for diminishing Russia's status. In June, Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets was fired amid the rumors of a coup plot.

1997: In March, Yeltsin forced the entire cabinet to resign; he had just recovered from a bout of ill health, had low popularity, and took action by sacking his cabinet of so-called failures. Yeltsin also fired Boris Berezovsky, deputy secretary of Russia's security council, reportedly over failures related to Russia's reform program.

1998: In early March, Deputy Prime Minister Valery Serov, Transportation Minister Nikolai Tsakh, and Education Minister Vladimir Kinelyov were dismissed; Yeltsin blamed them for failing to correct Russia's economic and social ills. Then, in late March, the Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and the entire cabinet was sacked as Yeltsin said he needed a new team to help cure Russia's problems. Yuri Bespalov, chief executive of Rosneft, the last state-owned oil company, was also dismissed in May as Yeltsin scapegoated him for economic problems. In August, Yeltsin sacked the entire cabinet again including the new Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko; this came amid the devaluation of the ruble and debt default. In October, cabinet members Boris Fyodorov and Viktor Krhistenko were sacked as they opposed printing new money and cutting government spending. Finally, in December, the chief of staff Valentin Yumashev and his three deputies were sacked; Yeltin suffered another period of ill-health, after which he often sacked officials to demonstrate his control.

1999: The Chief of Staff Nikolai Bordyuzha was fired due to his involvement in leaking a sex tape of the Prosecutor General to try and get the latter fired. Yeltsin did then fire the Prosecutor General, Yuri Skuratov. Yeltsin also fired the deputy prime minister Vadim Gustov, reportedly because he had communist sympathies. Finally, Yeltsin sacked Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, so that he

could install Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister and correspondingly as his preferred successor.

Military elite purges

1991: Top officials who had participated in, supported, or not sufficiently resisted the August 1991 coup attempt were purged. This included the Defense Minister (Dmitry Yazov), the Deputy Defense Minister (Gen. Valentin I. Varennikov), Commander of the Soviet Air Force (Gen. Yevgeny Shaposhnikov), Chief of the Soviet General Staff (Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev), Commander of the Air Defences (General Ivan Tretyak), the Land Forces Commander (Gen. Valentin Varennikov), and Deputy Chief of the State Defense Committee (Oleg Baklanov).

1994: The Deputy Defense Minister Matvei Burlakov and the Air force General were sacked and put on trial over reports of corruption in the military.

1995: Three generals were dismissed in January because they had criticized Yeltsin's policy in Chechnya.

1996: Three generals were dismissed because they had staked out weaker views than Yeltsin's over Chechnya. Then, in June, chief bodyguard Gen. Alexander Korzhakov, head of Federal Security Service Gen. Mikhail Barsukov, and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev were fired as Yeltsin attempted to tip the balance of power away from hardliners amid rumors that these individuals were involved in coup plotting. Seven prominent generals including first deputy head of the general staff Victor Barynkin, deputy commander of land forces Vladimir Shulikov, and head of Defense Minister's personal staff Valery Lapshov were dismissed after they were accused of attempting to black Grachev's sacking as Defense Minister. Then, in October, the security chief but retired general Alexander Lebed was fired after being accused of plotting a coup. Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Mikhail Kolesnikov, was also dismissed and given a ceremonial job as chief of staff of the Commonwealth of Independent States amid fears that the military may be disgruntled over a lack of funding.

1997: Yeltsin dismissed four top military officers—(Gen. Vladimir Semyonov, commander of the land forces; General Anton Terentyev, his deputy in charge of training; Admiral Igor Khmelnov, Navy's Chief of Staff; and Vice-Admiral Vyacheslav Kharnikov, commander of the northern fleet)—after accusing them of abusing their ranks (corruption). Yeltsin also fired the Defense Minister, Gen. Igor Rodinov, for presiding over corrupt generals who built dachas while soldiers had nothing to eat.

Leader: Vladimir Putin

Start year: 2000

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2000: Putin started to replace ministers including Anatoly Chubais. 17 presidential representatives in regions were also replaced with people with a background in the Federal Security Services, like Putin.

2001: Putin sacked several Yeltsin-era officials from the cabinet including the Interior Minister Vladimir Ruashailo and the Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov.

2003: Alexander Voloshin, Putin's Chief of Staff, was forced to resign.

2004: Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and all cabinet ministers were dismissed as Putin reshuffled the government ahead of next month's presidential vote.

2006: The chief prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov was sacked; he was a hangover from the Yeltsin era

and viewed as untrustworthy. The head of customs service and four senators—Boris Gutin, Igor Ivanov, Arkady Sarkisyan, and Aleksandr Sabadash—were also fired amid a purge of more mid-level officials after Putin accused them of corruption.

2007: Vladimir Nikolayev, the Mayor of Vladivostock, was arrested and accused of corruption. General Alexander Bulbov, although a general, was in a civilian position of Deputy Head of the Federal Drug Agency, was arrested amid infighting in the Kremlin ahead of Putin's departure in 2008. Sergei Storchak, Russia's deputy finance minister, was also jailed over alleged corruption.

2012: Cabinet ministers including the Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev were fired following anti-Putin protests around 2011-2012.

Military elite purges

2000: Putin replaced General Gennady Troshev and General Vladimir Shamanov as commanders of the eastern and western fronts in the fight over Grozny and perceived failures in Chechnya. 10 top military officers were also forced to retire as Putin targeted allies of Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev.

2001: Putin sacked several Yeltsin-era officials from the cabinet including Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who was also punished for failings in Chechnya. Vladimir Yakolev, head of the Peter the Great Military Academy was also dismissed. Further, Commander of Northern Fleet Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, vice-admiral Mikhail Motsak, vice-admiral Oleg Burtsev, eight other admirals, and three naval captains were dismissed, ostensibly following training failures in the northern fleet; official reports denied there was a connection to the sinking of the Kursk.

2002: Chief of Army Aviation Colonel-General V. Pavlov was removed over the downing of helicopters in Chechnya.

2012: Military Chief of the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov were fired, ostensibly over corruption but elsewhere it was described as Putin cracking down on individuals who favored buying military hardware abroad.

Rwanda

Leader: Juvénal Habyarimana

Start year: 1991
End year: 1994

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Habyarimana in Rwanda between 1991 and 1994.

Leader: Paul Kagame

Start year: 1994
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

1995: Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, with ministers Seth Sendashonga, Immaculee Kayumba, Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, and Jean-Baptiste Nkuriyingoma were dismissed.

1998: Alexis Kanyarengwe, the RPF Party Chair, protested massacres of Hutu civilians during the counter-insurgency in northwest Rwanda so was removed from his position.

2000: In January, Speaker of the National Assembly Joseph Sebarenzi, was forced to resign. He wanted to investigate two RPF ministers, Patrick Mazimhaka and Emmanuel Mudidi; this could

have threatened the regime so he was accused of a ‘monarchist conspiracy’ and forced to flee. Then in March, Pasteur Bizimungu officially resigned as president for personal reasons but he had been accused of corruption and was pushed out.

2013: The Justice Minister Tharcisse Karugarama was dismissed after telling the Guardian that presidential term limits should not be lifted.

2014: Prime Minister Damien Haburemy and his cabinet were fired after only two years in office. Then, in September, the president of the Rwandan Senate Jean Damescene Ntawukuliryayo was forced to resign after inviting a delegation of Congolese parliamentarians to Kigali for dialogue; Kagame disagreed with this action.

Military elite purges

2010: Two senior ranking army officials, Lt General Charles Muhire and Major General Emmanuel Karenzi Karake, were suspended and arrested on corruption charges indefinitely. General Munyakazi was also imprisoned in 2010, and Lieutenant Colonel Rugigana Ngabo was arrested in August on charges of individual criminal liability.

2014: Three high-ranking Rwandan military figures including former head of the Republican Guard, Colonel Tom Byabagamba, Brigadier General (Retired) Frank Rusagara, and Captain (Retired) David Kabuye were arrested and charged with crimes against state security. In 2014, the Army Chief of Staff General Caesar Kayizari and Chief of Defense Staff General Charles Kayonga were also sacked and sent away as ambassadors to Turkey and China, respectively.

Saudi Arabia

Leader: Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

Start year: 1991

End year: 1996

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges under King Fahd in Saudi Arabia from 1991 to 1996. The closest evidence I found was that four Muslim scholars were dismissed from government jobs at universities in May 1993.

Leader: Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

Start year: 1996

End year: 2015

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges under King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia from 1996 to 2015. There were purges in Saudi Arabia in 2015, but under King Salman.

Sierra Leone

Leader: Joseph Saidu Momoh

Start year: 1991

End year: 1992

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elites purges under Momoh in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 1992.

Leader: Valentine Strasser

Start year: 1992
End year: 1996

Civilian elite purges

1992: Strasser removed the head of the police in May, and in December sentenced Lt. Col. Yaya Kanu, a police chief from Kamara, to death over a coup plot.

Military elite purges

1992: Strasser removed the head of the army in May.

1995: Major Matthew Kamara, Captain Abu Bakarr Kamara, Captain Alie Badara Koroma, Lt. Sahr Panda, Lt. Patrick Samura, and Lt. James Conteh were all arrested after being accused by Strasser of launching a coup plot.

Singapore

Leader: Goh Chok Tong

Start year: 1991
End year: 2004

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Singapore under Goh Chok Tong between 1991 and 2004.

Leader: Lee Hsien Loong

Start year: 2004
End year: 2015

I could not find evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Singapore under Lee Hsien Loong between 2004 and 2015.

South Africa

Leader: Frederik Willem de Klerk

Start year: 1991
End year: 1994

Civilian elite purges

1991: Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok was demoted to a minor position following pressure from the ANC over violence in black townships.

1994: Figures in the police including Major General Krappies Engelbrecht, and Lieutenant General Johan Le Roux were purged by de Klerk over a scheme that involved running guns to the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party to undermine the transition to democracy.

Military elite purges

1991: Defense Minister Magnus Malan was demoted to a minor position following pressure from the ANC over violence in black townships.

1992: 23 officers including six generals were dismissed over political assassinations and other offenses in black townships. This included the head of military intelligence Brigadier General Tolletjie Botha, army chief of staff Major General Hennie Roux, deputy chief of staff intelligence Major General Chris Thirion, and director of army communications operations Brigadier General Ferdie van Wyk.

South Sudan

Leader: Salva Kiir Mayardit

Start year: 2012
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2013: Kiir sacked his entire cabinet, including vice-president Riek Machar, and Pagan Amum, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement's secretary-general and the country's senior negotiator in crucial oil and security talks with Sudan, in what was seen as a power struggle within the ruling party.

Military elite purges

I did not find evidence of military elite purges in South Sudan between 2012 and 2015.

Sri Lanka

Leader: Ranasinghe Premadasa

Start year: 1991
End year: 1992

Civilian elite purges

1991: The education minister Lalith Athulathmudali was expelled from the ruling United National Party for leading a failed impeachment attempt of Premadasa in August.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges in Sri Lanka under Premadasa between 1991 and 1992.

Leader: Mahinda Rajapaksa

Start year: 2011
End year: 2014

Civilian elite purges

2014: About a dozen MPs in the ruling party were expelled for supporting the health minister, Maithripala Sirisena, who had defected to challenge Rajapaksa for president.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges in Sri Lanka under Rajapaksa between 2011 and 2014. There were significant military elite purges at the end of 2010, but this is outside my dataset's timeframe.

Sudan

Leader: Omar al-Bashir

Start year: 1991
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

1999: Bashir dismissed Hassan al-Turabi as speaker of, and dissolved the National Assembly.

2000: Bashir fired a further 10 ministers in the wake of al-Turabi's purge.

2012: Civilian Islamist figures were detained over a coup attempt, including former NISS chief Salah Gosh. Gosh was a military man but at the time he was a presidential adviser.

Military elite purges

1991: Major General Faisal Ali Abu Salih was arrested for opposing the execution of 20 army officers involved in a coup attempt. Salih was reportedly dismissed from the Revolutionary Command Council.

2012: Military Islamist figures were detained over a coup attempt. This included Brigadier General Mohamed Ibrahim Abdel-Galil ‘Wad Ibrahim’ from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Major General Adil Al-Tayeb.

Swaziland

Leader: Mswati III

Start year: 1991

End year: 2015

I did not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Swaziland between 1991 and 2015. Some events came close—including the resignation of the justice minister in 2010 over an affair with one of Mswati’s wives, rumors of cabinet reshuffles in the 1990s, and the periodic removal and re-installment of sometimes-Prime Minister Themba Dlamini—but ultimately I could not find an event that met the threshold of a purge.

Syria

Leader: Hafez al-Assad

Start year: 1991

End year: 2000

Civilian elite purges

I could not find evidence of civilian elite purges under Hafez al-Assad between 1991 and 2000.

Military elite purges

1994: Ali Haidar, Commander of the Syrian Special Forces, was replaced, reportedly as part of an effort to improve Syria’s image in the West. Hafez al-Assad also sacked his brother, Colonel Rif’at al-Assad and several other top military and intelligence commanders, purportedly to help pave the way for a peace deal with Israel. Rif’at was not completely removed at this point, however.

1998: Rif’at al-Assad was sacked as Vice President for National Security Affairs once Hafez had decided that Bashar would succeed him. General Hikmat al-Shihabi was also replaced as he had been viewed as a potential successor.

1999: Multiple reports suggest that further military purges occurred in 1999 including at the top level to remove voices who were resistant to Bashar’s succession. This included Ali Duba who was head of the military intelligence.

Leader: Bashar al-Assad

Start year: 2000

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

I could not find evidence of civilian elite purges under Bashar al-Assad in Syria between 2000 and 2015. There are reports that officials thought to oppose Bashar were purged in 2000, but I was unable to identify sufficient evidence of a civilian elite being purged.

Military elite purges

2014: Colonel Hafez Makhlof, the head of Syria's internal security, left his post, although it is unclear whether this was voluntary or not. However, Colonel Sakr Rustom, chief of the Popular Defense Committees was removed.

Taiwan

Leader: Lee Teng-hui

Start year: 1991

End year: 1995

Civilian elite purges

I did not find any evidence of civilian elite purges in Taiwan between 1991 and 1995. There was a lot of factional politics going on in the ruling KMT, but I found nothing that met the criteria of a purge. For example, Hau Pei-tsun was expelled from the party in 1995, but he had already resigned his position as Premier in 1993.

Military elite purges

I did not find any evidence of military elite purges in Taiwan between 1991 and 1995.

Tajikistan

Leader: Emomali Rahmon

Start year: 1992

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

1996: Deputy Prime Minister Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloev, presidential chief of staff Izatullo Khayaev, head of the Khatlon region Abduljalil Salimon, and prime minister Jamshed Karimov were fired after pressure from Mahmud Khudoberdiev. Rahmon was bowing to the pressure from certain warlords who accused his regime of being corrupt.

1997: Former Minister for the Interior Yaqubjon Salimov was arrested and charged with plotting a coup.

2015: Civilian associates of Major General Nazarzoda (see below) were dismissed over their involved in an attack on a police station and security service arsenal near the capital's airport.

Military elite purges⁴

2004: The Commander of the Presidential Guard, Ghafford 'the Grey' Mirzoev, was arrested.

⁴N.B. I do not include purges of warlords, or field commanders as they are sometimes called, because they existed in what Jesse Driscoll and others have termed as Tajikistan's 'shadow state.' See Driscoll, Jesse. 2012. "Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(1): 118-149.

2015: Major General Abduhalim Nazarzoda and military associates were dismissed over their involved in an attack on a police station and security service arsenal near the capital's airport.

Tanzania

Leader: Ali Hassan Mwinyi

Start year: 1991
End year: 1995

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Tanzania under Mwinyi between 1991 and 1995.

Leader: Benjamin Mkapa

Start year: 1995
End year: 2001-2005

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Tanzania under Mkapa in 1995, or between 2001 and 2005.

Leader: Jakaya Kikwete

Start year: 2005-2006
End year: 2013

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges in Tanzania under Kikwete from 2005 to 2006, or in 2013. He did sack six ministers in 2012, but this is outside my dataset's timeframe.

Togo

Leader: Gnassingbé Eyadéma

Start year: 1991
End year: 2005

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges under Eyadéma between 1991 and 2005.

Military elite purges

1994: The commander of the Garde Presidentielle, Lt. Col. Narcisse Djoua, was arrested (with one of his sergeants) in October 1994 ostensibly over the June 1994 murder of a Togolese notary. The president's critics claimed that Djoua was also plotting a coup so the president was 'killing two birds with one stone.' Djoua was sentenced to 35 years in jail in December 1995.

Leader: Faure Gnassingbé

Start year: 2005 - 2007
End year: 2010 - 2013

Civilian elite purges

2009: Several civilian elites were arrested, including the president's brother and the MP, Kpatcha Gnassingbé, over a coup plot. Kpatcha had lost his position as defense minister in 2007 but was not purged then as he remained an MP.

Military elite purges

2009: Five senior officers were also arrested over the 2009 coup plot.

Tunisia

Leader: Zine El Abidine Ben Ali

Start year: 1991

End year: 2011

Civilian elite purges

1997: Ben Ali removed his Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Justice Ministers from the Cabinet in January, and his recently-appointed Foreign Minister Abderrahim Zouari and Interior Minister Ben Rejeb in October.

Turkmenistan

Leader: Saparmurat Niyazov

Start year: 1992

End year: 2006

Civilian elite purges

2005: Yolly Gurbanmuradov, Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the Fuel and Energy Sector, was imprisoned. He was charged with embezzling \$199 million from illicit oil trading, but he was also viewed as a powerful figure who may have compromising material on Niyazov. Weeks later, his rival Rejep Saparov, Head of the Presidential Administration, was also imprisoned.

Military elite purges

2002: Muhammad Nazarov, Head of the National Security Committee, and Gurbandury Begenzhov, Defense Minister, were both sacked by Niyazov in March. These purges were later seen as relating to the November 2002 coup attempt.

Leader: Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow

Start year: 2006

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2007: Numerous civilian elites were purged by Berdimuhamedow as he targeted individuals who had been powerful under Niyazov, as they were most likely to threaten his position. This included the minister of the interior (Akmammet Rahmanow), the minister of agriculture (Payzgledi Meredow), several governors including of Ahal (Gurbanberdi Orazmyradow), Mary (Hojaberdi Basimow), Lebap (Tagaymyrat Mammedow, and the head of Turkmenabat city (Toyli Meredow). The subsequent minister of the interior (Hojamyrat Annagurbanow), who was also Berdimuhamedow's brother-in-law, was also later removed in 2007.

2008: The prosecutor general, Muhammetguly Ogsukow, was removed. Officially he was accused of cronyism and favoring his relatives, but this was also viewed as part of the purges of elites who had been prominent under Niyazov.

2009: Tacberdi Tagyyew, vice chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers in charge of mineral resources, was removed; allegedly for poor performance in the energy sector. Ysup Isangulleyew, secretary of the president's apparatus, was also removed.

Military elite purges

2007: Several military elites were also targeted in Berdimuhamedow's early purges. This included the chief of security (Akmyrat Rejepow) and the minister of national security (Geldimuhammet

Asyrmuhamedow).

2011: National Security Minister Charymyrat Amanov was sacked, allegedly for poor performance.

Uganda

Leader: Yoweri Museveni

Start year: 1991
End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

1990s: I found rumors and references to purges of cabinet members in the mid-1990s but was unable to find sufficiently concrete information that validated these reports.

2003: Several cabinet ministers (including Eriya Kategaya, Jaber Bidandi Ssali, and Miria Matembe) were removed by Museveni for openly advocating a return to multipartyism.

2011: MPs in the ruling party were purged by Museveni as he sought scapegoats for economic hardship.

2014: Museveni sacked his prime minister, Amama Mbabazi, to diminish the likelihood of opposition in the 2016 elections.

Military elite purges

1990s: I similarly found rumors of military purges in the mid-1990s but was also unable to confirm.

2005: Two military members of parliament were purged for refusing to support Museveni's attempts to remove presidential term limits.

Ukraine

Leader: Viktor Yanukovych

Start year: 2013
End year: 2014

Civilian elite purges

2014: Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov was replaced in January 2014 amidst the Euromaidan crisis. This was reported by some outlets as a resignation but Yanukovych had been scheming to replace him since the end of 2013.

Military elite purges

2014: The head of the army was sacked by Yanukovych in the wake of the protests against his moves to make closer ties with Russia.

United Arab Emirates

Leader: Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan

Start year: 1991

End year: 2004

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Sheikh Zayed between 1991 and 2004. There was a cabinet reshuffle in 2004, but I was unable to locate sufficient evidence to identify any of the removed figures (specifically, the interior minister Lt. Gen. Mohammed Saeed Al Badi) as being purged.

Leader: Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan

Start year: 2004

End year: 2015

I could not find any evidence of civilian or military elite purges under Sheikh Khalifa between 2004 and 2015.

Uzbekistan

Leader: Islam Karimov

Start year: 1992

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

1994: The head of cadre policy was arrested as Karimov consolidated power to diminish his dependence on former allies.

1995: Karimov continued to consolidate power by removing the head of the Uzbekistan KGB, and transferring him to a far less important position.

1998: Karimov dismissed the first deputy prime minister Ismail Jurabekov amid rumors that Jurebekov was planning to oust Karimov.

2004: After he had been reinstated, Karimov purged Jurabekov again for the final time. He also removed the Andijon Governor Kobiljon Obidov, who had become entrenched after staying in post for many years and building up an extensive patronage network.

2005: Karimov dismissed the interior minister, who was part of the powerful Samarkand clan.

2014: The president's daughter, Gulnara Karimova, who had held numerous important government positions and harbored succession ambitions, was placed under house arrest.

Military elite purges

2005: Karimov dismissed the defense minister, who was part of the powerful Samarkand clan.

2015: The head of Uzbekistan's national security service, General Hayot Sharifhojaev, was arrested; this was linked to the purge of the president's daughter.

Venezuela

Leader: Hugo Chávez

Start year: 2006

End year: 2012

Civilian elite purges

2006: The police chief was replaced due to anger over the killing of three Canadian-Venezuelans

and police corruption.

2007: The drug czar Luis Correa was fired and replaced by a national guard colonel, which was seen as part of the militarization of the Venezuelan state.

2008: 13 members of the cabinet including vice president Jorge Rodriguez were removed ostensibly to revitalize the government, but also thought to punish ministers who did not campaign hard enough in the 2007 referendum.

2009: Science Minister Jesse Chacon was compelled to resign, as Chávez targeted the ‘boligarchs’ who had built a fortune based on their close ties to government.

2010: Vice president Ramon Carrizalez and minister of public banking Eugenio Vasquez left the government. It is unclear whether they were purged. However, five ministers were also dismissed, reportedly due to Chávez wishing to create space for pro-Castro advisers and muzzling potential voices of discontent ahead of the upcoming legislative elections.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Chávez in Venezuela between 2006 and 2012. There were many instances of military elite purges prior to 2006, but this is outside the temporal scope of my dataset. In other years, the former Defense Minister Raúl Baduel was criticized by Chávez in 2007 but he had already broken with Chávez and left his post. In 2010, I found reports of purges targeting army officers, but insufficient evidence to confirm that any specific military elites were targeted.

Leader: Nicolás Maduro

Start year: 2012

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2014: Maduro fired several reform-minded and pragmatist ministers—Planning Minister Jorge Giordani in May and Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez in September—dashing hopes that he would alter the country’s economic policy away from Chávismo policies. He also removed the Minister of Justice Miguel Rodriguez Torres in October in response to pressure from pro-government armed groups who were unhappy at how he had managed clashes between them and investigative police units following alleged police-involvement in the murder of a pro-government politician.

Military elite purges

I could not find evidence of military elite purges under Maduro in Venezuela between 2012 and 2015.

Vietnam

Leader: Do Muoi

Start year: 1991

End year: 1997

Civilian elite purges

1996: Prior to the Eighth Congress, Nguyen Ha Phan, Politburo member and chairman of the National Assembly, circulated criticism of Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet’s view that the confrontation between socialism and imperialism had given way to conflicts over material interests. On the eve of the Congress, it was announced that Phan had been expelled from the Politburo; he was charged

with concealing information about his past in his party file, holding 'erroneous economic views,' leaking Kiet's memo, and attempting to influence the selection of new Central Committee members; he was forcibly retired.

1997: Thai Binh province's most senior official, governor, and powerful central committee member Vu Xuan Truong was dismissed following months of protests from peasants and low-level officials.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Vietnam under Do Muoi between 1991 and 1997.

Leader: Le Kha Phieu

Start year: 1997

End year: 2001

Civilian elite purges

1999: Le Kha Phieu initiated an anti-corruption drive and several senior officials were caught up in it. This included two members of the National Assembly, Dinh Hanh and Vu Xuan Thuat, but most notably, the vice minister Ngo Xuan Loc and his assistant Nguyen Thai Nguyen were detained on espionage charges. The Deputy Head of the Commission for Economic Affairs Cao Sy Kiem was also dismissed.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Vietnam under Le Kha Phieu between 1997 and 2001. In January 1999, General Tran Do was expelled from the party after calling for greater democracy and debate on the future role of the party, but he had already retired.

Leader: Nong Duc Manh

Start year: 2001

End year: 2011

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges in Vietnam under Nong Duc Manh between 2001 and 2011. I found a report from a non-authoritative source that two members of the Central Committee were expelled in 2002 for dealings with Nam Cam, a crime figure involved in drugs, prostitution, and protection rackets, but was unable to corroborate the report. Senior officials in the Transport Ministry were also investigated in 2006 but, again, I could not find any clear evidence that a civilian elite purge had taken place.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Vietnam under Nong Duc Manh between 2001 and 2011.

Leader: Nguyen Phu Trong

Start year: 2011

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

I could not find any evidence of civilian elite purges in Vietnam under Nguyen Phu Trong between 2011 and 2015. In 2012, Trong started his anti-corruption campaign, cracking down on well-connected tycoons and managers of state-owned companies, but these individuals are not members of the political elite. Also in 2012, Trong tried to purge the Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, but

Dung was saved by the Central Committee and with the support of the military. There were plenty of civilian elite purges from 2016—such as the 2018 dismissal of Dinh La Thanh from the Politburo and as Secretary of Ho Chi Minh City—but these are outside of the scope of the dataset.

Military elite purges

I could not find any evidence of military elite purges in Vietnam under Nguyen Phu Trong between 2011 and 2015.

Zambia

Leader: Frederick Chiluba

Start year: 1991, 1997-1999

End year: 2002

Civilian elite purges

1991: Chiluba had dismissed all the white ministers from his first cabinet, after he had initially tried to incorporate minority racial groups.

1997: Chiluba purged some civilian elites from the ruling party following a coup attempt.

Military elite purges

1991: Chiluba purged security officials shortly after beating Kaunda in the 1991 election; this included the Army commander Lt. Gen. Francis Sibamba, Air Force chief Lt. Gen. Herbert Simutowe, and Zunga Siakalima as Inspector General of Police.

1997: Following a coup attempt, Chiluba's regime arrested soldiers involved, including Major Bellington Mukoma, Captain Steven Lungu, and Captain Jack Chiti.

Leader: Levy Mwanawasa

Start year: 2002

End year: 2005

Civilian elite purges

2002: Mwanawasa undertook a post-election cleanup, under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign, to allegedly marginalize or remove powerful insiders remaining from Chiluba's government. This included several civilian elites who he had initially retained: Vice President Enock Kavindele, Foreign Minister Katele Kalumba, Intelligence Chief Xavier Chungu, Attorney General Bonaventure Mutale, National Secretary Vernon Mwaanga, and Chief Justice Mathew Ngulube.

Military elite purges

2002: Mwanawasa replaced the Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Georjeago Musengele, with Isaac Chisuzi, allegedly to remove a link with Chiluba and reduce the likelihood of the army top command remaining beholden to Chiluba.

Zimbabwe

Leader: Robert Mugabe

Start year: 1991

End year: 2015

Civilian elite purges

2000: The agriculture minister Kumbirai Kangai was arrested amidst economic issues for Zimbabwe. Other high-profile civilians in important government jobs also lost their positions in a pre-election anti-corruption purge including the head of the intelligence services, heads of regional police forces, the national police commissioner, the director of national parks, and head of the prison service.

2003: Brigadier Elisha Muzonzini was fired as head of the Central Intelligence Organization as he had presented intelligence to Mugabe before the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections that highlighted Mugabe's declining electoral approval.

2004: Six provincial chairmen were suspended from the ruling party as they allegedly held discussions over Mugabe's succession.

2005: Four senior officials, including the president's cousin Philip Chiyangwa, were jailed on spying charges. Two cabinet ministers (Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa and Information Minister Jonathan Moyo) and the official who had masterminded the farm land grabs (Joseph Chinotimba) were dropped from the ruling party's list of approved candidates. There were also reports that these purges were over challenges to Mugabe's choice of vice-president.

2008: Former Finance Minister Simba Makoni and members who supported him were expelled from the ruling party for launching a challenge to Mugabe.

2014: Vice President Joice Mujuru was sacked, along with two cabinet ministers and 5 deputy ministers, as they were seen as an obstacle to Mugabe's succession plans.

Military elite purges

I did not find evidence of military elite purges in Zimbabwe between 1991 and 2015.

Chapter 2

Table OA2.1: Members of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction in South Korea, May 1961-July 1963

	Departed in 1961	Departed in 1962	Departed in 1963	Member as of July 20, 1963
<i>English</i>				
Appointed in 1961	Park Gi-seok Jang Geyon-sun Jeong Rae-hyeok Han Sin Mun Jae-jun Choe Ju-jeong	Han Ung-jin Kim Je-min Park Chi-ok Song Chang-ho Chang Do-young Che-Myong-sin	Park Im-hang Kim Seong-eun Son Chang-kyu	Kim Yong-sun Kang Sank-uk Kim Tong-ha Kim Jae-jun O Jeong-geun Lee Seok-jae Jo Shi-hyeong Yu Yang-su
Appointed in 1962				
Appointed in 1963				
<i>Korean</i>				
Appointed in 1961	박기석 장정순 정태혁 한신 문재준 최주종	한웅진 김제민 박치우 송창호 장도영 채명신	김용순 강상우 김동하 김재준 오정근 이석재 조시현	김운근 박원빈 오치성 정세웅 유병현 김형우 유양수
Appointed in 1962				
Appointed in 1963				

Notes: 'Departed' does not indicate whether the elite left voluntarily or was purged. Data come from Han'guk kumsa hyöngmyongsa, I [한국군사혁명사], A History of the Korean Military Revolution, Vol. I] (Seoul: Kukka haegöni Han'guk kumsa hyöngmyongsa p'yönc' anwiwöhoe, 1963), pp. 331-332.

Chapter 4

Table OA4.1: Summary statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Military elite purge	0.00	1.00	0.09	0.28
Civilian elite purge	0.00	1.00	0.14	0.35
Tenure (log)	0.00	3.91	2.20	0.96
Tenure (log) ²	0.00	15.30	5.77	3.88
Number of internal challenges	0.00	2.00	0.03	0.17
Failed coup	0.00	1.00	0.02	0.13
Coup plot	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.10
Democracy mobilization	0.00	4.00	1.36	1.38
Public sector corruption	0.06	9.75	7.16	2.17
Coup entry	0.00	1.00	0.21	0.41
Interstate war	0.00	1.00	0.02	0.14
GDP per capita (log)	5.81	11.47	8.21	1.15
Election	0.00	1.00	0.27	0.44
Coup risk	0.00	100.00	6.95	9.07
Years since military elite purge	0.00	24.00	5.32	5.02
Years since civilian elite purge	0.00	24.00	4.52	4.55

Table OA4.2: Consolidation: Tenure and elite purges

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Tenure (log)	-0.37*** (0.13)	-0.28 (0.28)	0.03 (0.06)
Tenure (log) ²	0.11** (0.05)	0.13* (0.08)	-0.07** (0.03)
Civilian elite purge	0.14*** (0.03)		
Military elite purge			0.30*** (0.05)
Coup entry	0.00 (.)	1.09*** (0.23)	
Coup entry×Tenure(log)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.40*** (0.12)	
Interstate war	-0.05 (0.07)	0.68** (0.31)	
GDP per capita (log)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.08)	
Military expenditure (log)		0.21*** (0.05)	
Military		0.15 (0.20)	
Monarchy		-1.13*** (0.43)	
Party		0.01 (0.22)	
Failed coup		0.79*** (0.16)	
Election			0.01 (0.02)
Years since military elite purge	0.03** (0.02)	-0.12 (0.07)	
Years since military elite purge ²	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	
Years since military elite purge ³	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	

Years since civilian elite purge		0.01	
		(0.02)	
Years since civilian elite purge ²		0.00	
		(0.00)	
Years since civilian elite purge ³		-0.00	
		(0.00)	
Constant	0.49 (0.32)	-2.93*** (0.70)	0.20*** (0.07)
Outcome	MEP	MEP	CEP
Year FEs	✓	✗	✓
Leader FEs	✓	✗	✓
Data	Goldring	Sudduth	Goldring
Observations	1253	2805	1472

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA4.3: Punishment: Internal challenges and elite purges

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Number of internal challenges	0.45*** (0.07)			0.03 (0.08)		
Failed coup		0.54*** (0.11)			0.03 (0.09)	
Coup plot			0.43*** (0.12)			0.03 (0.14)
Tenure (log)	-0.29** (0.13)	-0.30** (0.13)	-0.35*** (0.13)	0.03 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)
Tenure (log) ²	0.08* (0.05)	0.08* (0.04)	0.10** (0.05)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)
Civilian elite purge	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)			
Military elite purge				0.29*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.05)
Interstate war	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)			
GDP per capita (log)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)			
Election				0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Years since military elite purge	0.03** (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)			
Years since military elite purge ²	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)			
Years since military elite purge ³	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)			
Years since civilian elite purge				0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Years since civilian elite purge ²				0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Years since civilian elite purge ³				-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	0.48 (0.32)	0.58* (0.31)	0.40 (0.33)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.22*** (0.07)	0.20*** (0.07)

Outcome	MEP	MEP	MEP	CEP	CEP	CEP
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Leader FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1253	1253	1253	1472	1459	1472

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA4.4: Evidence that Dictators Purge from Positions of Weakness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Tenure (log)	-3.356*** (1.151)	-3.256*** (1.121)	-3.417*** (1.181)	-3.373*** (1.148)	-0.364*** (0.135)
Tenure (log) ²	0.664 (0.515)	0.717 (0.489)	0.747 (0.507)	0.694 (0.505)	0.106** (0.049)
Number of internal challenges		4.950*** (0.904)			
Failed coup			6.888*** (1.272)		
Coup plot				2.940 (1.804)	
Coup risk					0.004* (0.002)
Civilian elite purge					0.135*** (0.035)
Coup entry					0.000 (.)
Coup entry×Tenure(log)					0.057 (0.047)
Interstate war					-0.049 (0.070)
GDP per capita (log)					-0.011 (0.034)
Coup risk _{t-1}	0.355*** (0.032)	0.360*** (0.032)	0.361*** (0.032)	0.355*** (0.032)	
Years since military elite purge					0.035** (0.016)
Years since military elite purge ²					-0.002 (0.002)
Years since military elite purge ³					0.000 (0.000)
Constant	9.676*** (1.256)	9.055*** (1.217)	9.333*** (1.233)	9.545*** (1.246)	0.432 (0.320)
Outcome	Coup risk	Coup risk	Coup risk	Coup risk	MEP
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Leader FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1467	1467	1454	1467	1249

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA4.5: Scapegoating: Popular threats and elite purges

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy mobilization	0.04** (0.02)		0.02 (0.02)	
Public sector corruption		0.03* (0.02)		0.01 (0.01)
Tenure (log)	0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.40** (0.16)	-0.37*** (0.13)
Tenure (log) ²	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.09 (0.06)	0.11** (0.05)
Military elite purge	0.30*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.05)		
Civilian elite purge			0.13*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
Election	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)		
Interstate war			-0.01 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)
GDP per capita (log)			-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Years since civilian elite purge	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		
Years since civilian elite purge ²	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)		
Years since civilian elite purge ³	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)		
Years since military elite purge			0.04** (0.02)	0.03** (0.02)
Years since military elite purge ²			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Years since military elite purge ³			0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	0.16* (0.09)	-0.01 (0.14)	0.50 (0.42)	0.39 (0.34)
Outcome	CEP	CEP	MEP	MEP
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓

Leader FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1082	1472	896	1253

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA4.6: Why Dictators Purge Civilian and Military Elites: All Explanatory Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Tenure (log)	-0.37** (0.16)	-0.39** (0.16)	-0.36** (0.16)	-0.30** (0.13)	-0.35*** (0.13)	-0.29** (0.13)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)
Tenure (log) ²	0.08 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.08** (0.04)	0.10** (0.05)	0.08* (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)
Failed coup	0.47*** (0.17)			0.54*** (0.11)			-0.00 (0.11)			0.02 (0.09)		
Coup plot		0.36 (0.22)		0.43*** (0.12)			0.04 (0.20)			0.04 (0.14)		
Number of internal challenges		0.44*** (0.14)		0.45*** (0.07)			0.01 (0.10)			0.01 (0.10)		0.02 (0.08)
Democracy mobilization	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)				0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)		0.04** (0.02)		
Public sector corruption				0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)				0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Civilian elite purge	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)				0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Military elite purge							0.28*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.05)
Coup entry	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Coup entry×Tenure(log)	0.09 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)						
Interstate war	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)		
GDP per capita (log)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)						
Election							-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)

Years since military elite purge	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Years since military elite purge ²	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Years since military elite purge ³	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Years since civilian elite purge				-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Years since civilian elite purge ²				0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Years since civilian elite purge ³				-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	0.58 (0.42)	0.43 (0.43)	0.49 (0.43)	0.56* (0.34)	0.33 (0.35)	0.47 (0.34)
Outcome	MEP	MEP	MEP	MEP	CEP	CEP
Year FE _S	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Leader FE _S	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	896	896	896	1253	1253	1069

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Chapter 5

Table OA5.1: Summary Statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Consolidation (V-Dem)	16.00	98.10	75.50	17.63
Personalism (Wright)	0.00	100.00	47.93	24.83
Military elite purge	0.00	1.00	0.09	0.28
Civilian elite purge	0.00	1.00	0.14	0.34
Tenure (log)	0.00	3.91	2.18	0.95
GDP per capita (log)	3.13	10.96	7.15	1.41
Growth	-64.05	82.81	4.00	7.92
Military personnel (log)	0.00	8.07	4.04	1.56
Failed coup attempt	0.00	1.00	0.02	0.14
Leader age	23.00	93.00	60.18	11.86

Table OA5.2: Military Elite Purges and Consolidation

	(1)	(2)
Military elite purge	3.26*** (1.19)	4.79* (2.69)
Tenure (log)	-0.01 (0.37)	0.46 (0.94)
Military elite purge \times Tenure (log)	-1.41*** (0.49)	-2.13** (0.97)
Civilian elite purge	0.37 (0.31)	-0.35 (0.43)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.56* (0.34)	0.14 (0.55)
Growth	0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Military personnel (log)	0.16 (0.40)	-0.43 (1.00)
Failed coup attempt	0.30 (0.82)	2.57* (1.42)
Leader age	-0.01 (0.06)	0.18 (0.11)
Consolidation (V-Dem) _{t-1}	0.69*** (0.07)	
Personalism (Wright) _{t-1}		0.62*** (0.06)
Constant	27.61*** (6.43)	8.20 (6.78)
Outcome	Consolidation (V-Dem)	Personalism (Wright)
Year FEs	✓	✓
Leader FEs	✓	✓
Observations	1,252	946

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Chapter 7

Ethical Considerations

In this section, I describe how ethical considerations for the study were assessed against the American Political Science Associations' 12 ethical principles for human subjects research. I use the term 'we' because this study is based on a larger project on blame-shifting politics in autocracies that was conducted with two colleagues.

1. **"Political science researchers should respect autonomy, consider the wellbeing of participants and other people affected by their research, and be open about the ethical issues they face and the decisions they make when conducting their research."**

The aftermath of large-scale disasters are horrific occasions. People affected have often lost their homes, livelihoods, and even their friends and loved ones. They are invariably experiencing significant trauma. Conducting research around large-scale disasters is important for researchers in various fields, whether to examine how such disasters can be prevented or how their negative effects can be mitigated as much as possible. However, researchers should do everything they can to not exacerbate the trauma of anyone who has been affected by a large-scale disaster, and ideally, also consider what they can do to improve the situation (i.e., donating to an aid organization, raising awareness of the plight of those affected, and—where applicable—lending their expertise).

Conducting research with people—via a survey and focus groups—in the wake of a disaster, such as an earthquake, might come across as a nuisance when people are trying to rebuild their lives. Asking people about the specific disaster in question—in this case, asking people about the earthquakes in their relative immediate aftermath—could even re-traumatize those affected by reminding them of the recent painful experiences. Thus, there are important ethical concerns when conducting research with people about a large-scale disaster in its wake.

Overall, we made the decision to conduct research with people in Turkey after the earthquakes for two main reasons. First, in the short-term, we concluded that the risk of re-traumatizing people was low. The earthquakes happened in February 2023, and we surveyed people in April and May 2023, shortly before the presidential election, later in May 2023, before conducting focus groups in July 2023. During this time period, the earthquakes and their aftermath were ubiquitous in media coverage. Our questions did not ask people about personal experiences during the earthquake; instead, we merely asked them for their views on Erdoğan blaming various actors for the government's poor response to the earthquake. The fact that the earthquakes were a constant topic in the news and that our questions did not ask about people's personal experiences led us to conclude that the risk of re-traumatization was low.

Second, we concluded that it was worth proceeding with the research due to the importance of the topic. Understanding the determinants of an autocrat's popularity in the wake of a large-scale disaster is not an abstract topic. When disasters like an earthquake occur during an autocrat's tenure, it can spell their end of their time in office, which it arguably nearly did for Erdoğan given the *ex-ante* uncertainty ahead of the election. This was partly due to preexisting economic factors, but also because of his response to the earthquakes. If

domestic or foreign actors wish to counter propaganda by an autocrat designed to keep the latter in power, it is important that the effects of that propaganda, and how they might vary across different people, are properly understood. As noted, this is not an abstract issue. A majority of the world's population live under autocracy; understanding how autocrats boost their popular approval, potentially stabilizing their regime and extending their tenure, is hugely important. For these reasons, we concluded that the potential risks of re-traumatizing people affected by the earthquakes were minimal, and that the research was worth proceeding with.

2. “Political science researchers have an individual responsibility to consider the ethics of their research related activities and cannot outsource ethical reflection to review boards, other institutional bodies, or regulatory agencies.”

The project received extremely helpful feedback from an institutional review process at the University of York on three separate occasions. This process started in 2021, but further approval was sought and received in 2022 to check theoretically-motivated changes to some of the planned treatments, and then again in 2023 to gain approval for further changes to the treatments following the earthquakes in February. Although helpful, we also sought feedback on numerous occasions from peers, primarily at academic conferences, while the involvement of a Turkish PI with colleagues, friends, and family across Turkey was also crucial to our considerations of the potential ethical risks involved in the project.

A pre-analysis plan for the project was presented many times at conferences to gain feedback on the substance of the research, but also on ethical questions. We considered one issue particularly deeply, which was whether to deceive participants for the treatment about a minister being fired or to present it as a hypothetical scenario. When we presented the research, respondents were divided on this question. Some did not bring it up proactively and when pressed still had no concerns; others raised the issue proactively and expressed concerns. The first iteration of the project that was approved by an institutional ethics committee included deception, but when we redesigned the project for unrelated issues (see above) and sought institutional approval again, we proactively chose to remove the deceptive nature of the treatment, even though the institutional ethics committee did not request it. In sum, we proactively considered ethical questions relating to the project and prioritized these over potentially larger treatment effects, which likely would have resulted from a stronger treatment (which would not have involved a hypothetical scenario).

In addition to the helpful feedback that we received from the institutional review process and from academic conferences, we also benefited from having a Turkish PI on the project. The Turkish PI's involvement was essential, both for the substance of the research but also, especially after the earthquakes occurred in February 2023, for considering the potential ethical risks of fielding the survey. These are described in more detail in response to several of the other principals, but ultimately, we would not have fielded the survey if the Turkish PI had concluded that it was ethically problematic.

3. “These principles describe the standards of conduct and reflexive openness that are expected of political science researchers. In some cases, researchers may have good reasons to deviate from these principles (for example, when the principles conflict with

each other). In such cases, researchers should acknowledge and justify deviations in scholarly publications and presentations of their work.”

In our responses to the remaining nine principles, we discuss how we have largely attempted to adhere to the principles technically and in spirit. We also aim to transparently discuss where we risk deviating from the principles, along with our reasons for doing so.

4. **“When designing and conducting research, political scientists should be aware of power differentials between researcher and researched, and the ways in which such power differentials can affect the voluntariness of consent and the evaluation of risk and benefit.”**

We recruited participants for the survey and focus groups from a survey company, TGM Research (hereafter, TGM). TGM recruited participants via their usual procedures, which entail pre-existing panels. People join these panels voluntarily to participate in various market research projects, for which they receive compensation. People join panels via opt-in emails, referrals, mobile apps, marketing campaigns, and social media. Thus, no one was compelled to participate in our survey. The participants for our survey regularly participate in surveys so the procedures are familiar to them. They also participate in surveys online, which for ours meant they could do it anywhere they chose (e.g., on their phone, on a computer at home, etc.).

TGM implemented their usual procedures to ensure our survey did not recruit minors. TGM ask people’s age and date of birth when they register with TGM as potential participants in surveys. TGM then asked their age at the outset of our study to check there were no discrepancies between the age that they declare at the registration stage versus the age they provide when registering for a survey. Additionally, when participants provided their age for our survey, if it was below 18, then the survey automatically terminated and their responses were not collected. Overall, we hoped that our efforts to exclude minors, recruiting participants from a pool who regularly volunteer to complete surveys, and requiring participants to complete the survey online at a place of their choosing minimized any risk of power differentials affecting whether consent was truly voluntary.

At the end of the survey, participants were asked if they wished to volunteer to participate in a follow up online focus group that would last an hour. We emphasized that expressing interest was entirely voluntary, and if participants later changed their mind and decided they did not wish to participate in the focus group, then they were under no obligation to do so. Then, once we contacted participants with details about the focus groups, we asked participants to not share any personal information, keep their cameras off, and enter a preassigned number rather than their name in the teleconferencing software when participating in the focus group. We also resolved that only the Turkish PI would participate in the focus groups to minimize the risk of there being any misunderstanding (due to translation issues) about whether participation was voluntary.

5. **“Political science researchers should generally seek informed consent from individuals who are directly engaged by the research process, especially if research involves more than minimal risk of harm or if it is plausible to expect that engaged individuals would withhold consent if consent were sought.”**

Survey

All the participants who completed the survey (in the control and treatment groups) provided their consent to participate. Participants completed the survey online in a place of their choosing, but before they could begin the survey they were asked to confirm that they agreed to participate after reading an information page about the project, affirming that they understood what the survey was about and what participation would entail, and affirming that they understood that while their answers would be used in subsequent analysis their identity would remain anonymous. Participants who did not agree with *all* of these points were not able to start the survey. The procedures regarding informed consent were approved by the institutional ethics committee.

We informed participants before they started the survey that they could withdraw from the survey at any time before it started or at any point during the survey. We emphasized that if participants chose to withdraw before completing the survey, then their responses would not be collected. Participants' responses were only recorded if they clicked 'submit' at the end of the survey. After this point, removing their responses would have risked violating their anonymity (since we would have needed a significant amount of personal information to confidently identify and remove their responses from the survey software's database).

Focus Groups

When participants finished the survey, they were asked if they wished to volunteer to participate in a follow up online focus group that would take about an hour. If they wished to participate in the focus group, participants were asked to voluntarily provide their email address so that they could be contacted in future to potentially participate. Participants who were randomly selected for potential involvement in a focus group (after being subset by partisan leanings), were then emailed by the Turkish PI to gauge their interests. At this point again, we emphasized to participants that their involvement was not mandatory. The point was emphasized again to participants at the start of the focus groups, and participants were also asked to agree with a series of statements in order to participate. Like the survey, these checked that participants had read an information sheet about the project, that they understood what the project entailed, and that any information they provided would not enable them to be identified in any way. As before, any participant who did not agree with *all* of these statements was not able to participate in the focus group.

6. “Political science researchers should carefully consider any use of deception and the ways in which deception can conflict with participant autonomy.”

The study did not entail deception. Participants in the treatment group of the survey were presented with a hypothetical scenario of a minister being fired, but the hypothetical nature of the treatment was emphasized prior to the treatment being presented and at the end of the survey in a debrief. Participants were invited to complain about this or any other aspect of the survey; no complaints were received.

7. “Political science researchers should consider the harms associated with their research.”

We identified two main possible types of harm associated with the research project. First, a risk of re-traumatizing participants through being exposed to information about the scale of devastation caused by the earthquakes. This subject matter could have also re-traumatized the PI(s) conducting the research. We discuss this point explicitly in response to principles

one, eight, and ten. To sum, we concluded that the risk of this potential harm was low due to the ubiquitous presence of the earthquakes and their effects in Turkish news, while we also excluded emotive personal accounts of what happened to people in our treatment to avoid triggering participants.

The second area of potential harm was that participants with negative views of Erdoğan could have faced negative repercussions if their views were uncovered. Turkey is an electoral autocracy and as scholars have highlighted, individuals living in autocracies often fear revealing their true views of the autocrat lest they be shunned socially or experience negative consequences from the state such as harassment, physical violence, or imprisonment. We assessed that the risk of this harm in Turkey was low. Prior to the election, there were regular opposition rallies featuring thousands of people, where people did not experience these kinds of negative consequences from the state. The fact that there is significant opposition to Erdoğan is not unknown in Turkey. More importantly, we also took extensive steps to protect the anonymity of survey and focus group participants so that their identities would not be revealed. We discuss the measures that we took to ensure anonymity in response to principles five and nine.

8. “Political science researchers should anticipate and protect individual participants from trauma stemming from participation in research.”

The earthquakes in Turkey have killed tens of thousands of people and displaced several million people. They have caused human suffering on a vast scale. It is important that participating in the survey or a focus group does not re-traumatize participants. This point was discussed extensively ahead of deciding whether to proceed with the survey.

Ultimately, we decided to proceed because we thought that, on reflection, participating in the research was unlikely to re-traumatize participants. The earthquakes are a constant presence in Turkey’s news. Reading a small number of facts about the earthquakes is unlikely in this context to re-traumatize an individual. Relatedly, for this reason we chose not to include any personal stories into the texts that participants read since personalizing the events could have made the texts emotionally traumatic to read, even for individuals extremely aware with the devastation that the earthquakes have caused.

It was also possible that participating in the focus groups could have re-traumatized individuals. Discussion in focus groups is by nature more open-ended and could stray to topics or details that participants find distressing. We aimed to mitigate this through two ways. First, the focus groups were led by a Turkish PI who was mindful of this possibility and in guiding the topics for discussion aimed to avoid areas that could have upset participants. Second, participation in the focus groups was voluntary, and we emphasized to participants before they consented to participate, that the groups would entail discussion of their approval of Erdoğan in relation to the earthquakes, and that participants should not volunteer if they believed they would find this experience upsetting.

Overall, we believe that these considerations and strategies meant that the likelihood of trauma stemming from participation in the research was low. This, combined with the benefits of better understanding the effects of blame shifting politics following large-scale disasters, motivated us to pursue the project.

9. “Political science researchers should generally keep the identities of research participants confidential; when circumstances require, researchers should adopt the higher standard of ensuring anonymity.”

We have not and will not reveal any information that could be used to personally identify an individual who participated in our research.

Regarding the survey, we did not collect individuals’ names or addresses, and we only collected email addresses where participants voluntarily provided them when they expressed an interest in being contacted to participate in a follow-up focus group. We have not and will not publish any individual’s email address.

When we emailed details about the focus groups to participants who volunteered to join a focus group, we advised participants to keep their cameras off for the duration of the discussion, not to enter their full name into their teleconferencing profile, and not to share information that could be used to personally identify them. When referring to focus group participants in the research paper, we do not refer to any details that could be used to personally identify individuals.

10. “Political science researchers conducting studies on political processes should consider the broader social impacts of the research process as well as the impact on the experience of individuals directly engaged by the research. In general, political science researchers should not compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes without the consent of individuals that are directly engaged by the research process.”

To assess the broader social impacts of the projects, we considered both potential risks and benefits relating to sociopolitical effects as well as those that directly affect those engaged by the research. The potential benefits of the project are significant. If we can understand how scapegoating purges can boost an autocrat’s popular approval, likely aiding their stability and lengthening their tenure, then civil society organizations and potentially foreign powers as well can make more informed decisions about how to counter this kind of propaganda. It is important to emphasize however, that in considering the sociopolitical and direct impacts of conducting the research, we did not weigh the benefits and risks against each other. Instead, we discussed the risks so that we could be confident that they could be mitigated, irrespective of any benefits that might arise from the project.

Direct Risks

The primary risk to those directly engaged by the research is that participants may be re-traumatized by being presented with information about the earthquakes and their effects. It is possible that reading about the devastation caused by the earthquakes in terms of death toll, destruction of homes, and loss of livelihood could upset participants. However, as discussed above, we considered this risk to be very low due to the ubiquitous presence of the earthquakes in Turkish media and as a topic of conversation in Turkish society. We also thought this risk would be further mitigated through the treatment design. The article(s) that participants were presented with contained only factual statements about the earthquakes (i.e., noting where the earthquakes had hit, the estimated death toll, and noting that many buildings were destroyed in multiple provinces). The factual and dispassionate nature of the

treatment, as opposed to a more emotive treatment that included personal accounts of the damage wrought by the earthquake, we thought would further minimize the risk of possible re-traumatization. We also warned participants before they started the survey that they would be confronted with information about the earthquakes, and advised them not to begin the survey if they felt this would be upsetting. Based on these steps, we felt that any direct risk of re-traumatization to those directly engaged by the research was minimal.

There was also a possible direct risk of re-traumatization to those conducting the research. However, this was minimal for the survey since it was self-enumerated by participants online at a time and place of their choosing. It was also minimal for the focus groups since the Turkish PI who conducted them is accustomed to discussing challenging and potentially traumatic issues as an academic who works in this area. We therefore concluded that there was a low risk of any direct negative effect on the mental health of those conducting the research.

Sociopolitical Risks

The main sociopolitical risk of the project was whether the study could impact the election in Turkey. However, we concluded that any risks relating to this point were minimal. The treatment that we exposed participants to—a hypothetical scenario of a minister being fired—could have influenced participants’ approval of Erdogan and subsequently their voting behavior in the election. This would have compromised the integrity of the political process in Turkey. We felt though that this was unlikely. The treatment was presented as a hypothetical scenario so participants were made aware that the event had not actually occurred. Then, in case any participant missed this, we emphasized in a debrief that the account of the minister being fired was fictional. We then invited participants to comment or complain about this or any other aspect of the survey; we did not receive any complaints or negative feedback. Overall, due to the steps we took to ensure that participants who completed the survey would not erroneously believe that Erdogan had fired a minister, we were confident that our research project would not compromise the integrity of the electoral process.

11. “Political science researchers should be aware of relevant laws and regulations governing their research related activities.”

We took care to follow all Turkish laws and regulations related to this research. Our main concern was a new law introduced by the Turkish government in October 2022 concerning disinformation. The law ostensibly criminalizes spreading misinformation. Using deception in our survey—where we asked participants to consider a hypothetical scenario of a minister being fired—could have fallen foul of the law. However, our Turkish PI assessed that this risk could be mitigated by presenting it as a hypothetical scenario and through the use of a careful debrief where we informed participants who were exposed to this treatment that the minister had not been fired. The survey team—TGM—who are experienced at conducting surveys in Turkey concurred with this assessment.

12. “The responsibility to promote ethical research goes beyond the individual researcher or research team.”

Although we sought advice from scholars and survey experts, no one beyond the authors was responsible for the design of the survey. Neither did anyone aside from the authors directly

interact with survey participants. TGM recruits participants on an ongoing basis in countries across the world via a combination of organic growth, affiliation websites, and paid adverts, but when participants completed the survey, they did so online and did not interact with any individuals from TGM. Then, TGM provided contact details of participants who voluntarily expressed interest in participating in a focus group, but our Turkish PI was the only person to speak directly with participants during the focus groups.


Power Analysis

I conducted a power analysis prior to the experiment to estimate the number of necessary participants per control or treatment group to test the hypotheses. This raises questions of (1) what would be a meaningful change in support for a dictator (Erdoğan) following the use of blame avoidance politics, and (2) what effect sizes might be reasonable to expect.

Regarding the first question, changes in support for Erdoğan that could threaten his position would certainly be substantively significant. In 2023, Erdoğan won the 52.18 percent of the vote; the second placed candidate received 47.82 percent. A swing of five percentage points would therefore be hugely consequential for Erdoğan's ability to hold on to power. Regarding the second question, there are few studies related to scapegoating and popular approval. One recent study finds that people in China are 23.2 percent to 26.5 percent more likely to prefer township party secretaries who punish corrupt officials than those who do not (Tsai, Trinh and Liu 2022).

Based on the above, an increase of roughly ten percentage points seems both meaningful and a potentially reasonable effect size to expect. The power analysis suggests that a total sample size of 1,800 (900 per group) will permit detection at 95 percent confidence of changes in support for Erdoğan of at least seven percentage points.

Figure OA7.1: Power Analysis



Measurement

Turkish	English
Erdoğan approval	A standardized measure, which ranges between zero and one, of the five-point measure of approval for Erdoğan.
Erdoğan vote intention	A standardized measure, which ranges between zero and one, of the five-point measure of the likelihood of a participant voting for Erdoğan.
AKP vote intention	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant intends to vote for the AKP in the parliamentary elections.
Erdoğan volunteer intention	A standardized measure, which ranges between zero and one, of the five-point measure of the likelihood of a participant volunteering for Erdoğan.
ICT outcome	A count indicator of the number of politicians that a participant approves of.
Government earthquake response	A standardized measure, which ranges between zero and one, of the five-point measure of a participant's (dis)approval of the government's response to the earthquakes.
Kılıçdaroğlu vote intention	A standardized measure, which ranges between zero and one, of the five-point measure of the likelihood of a participant voting for Kılıçdaroğlu.
CHP vote intention	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant intends to vote for the CHP in the parliamentary elections.
Kılıçdaroğlu volunteer intention	A standardized measure, which ranges between zero and one, of the five-point measure of the likelihood of a participant volunteering for Kılıçdaroğlu.
Female	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant identifies as female.
Age	A continuous variable that captures a participant's age.
Education	An ordinal variable that captures a participant's level of education.
Public sector employee	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant works in the public sector, as opposed to the private or some other sector.
Income	An ordinal variable that captures a participant's income band.
Islam	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant is a Muslim.
Aegean	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant lives in the Aegean region.
Black Sea	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant lives in the Black Sea region.

Central Anatolia	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant lives in the Central Anatolia region.
Eastern Anatolia	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant lives in the Eastern Anatolia region.
Marmara	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant lives in the Marmara region.
Mediterranean	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant lives in the Mediterranean region.
Southeastern Anatolia	A dummy variable that equals one if a participant lives in the Southeastern Anatolia region.

Representativeness

Table OA7.2: Nationally Representative Nature of the Sample


	Goldring		Nationally	
			<i>Source</i>	<i>Year</i>
Median age	35	33.5	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021
Percent female	45.74	49.90	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021
Percent with a degree	53.43	17.36	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021
Percent of public sector employees	19.10	13.06	OECD	2019
Percent Islam	90.37	98.03	Pew Research	2020
Region (percent from)				
Aegean	14.84	10.35	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021
Black Sea	8.75	13.88	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021
Central Anatolia	14.01	15.66	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021
Eastern Anatolia	6.76	12.24	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021
Marmara	35.44	18.92	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021
Mediterranean	12.51	11.64	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021
Southeastern Anatolia	7.59	12.25	Turkish Statistical Institute	2021

Treatment Design

Figure OA7.2: Control

HABERLER > DEPREM

Yıkım depremleri takip ediyor



6 Şubat günü saat 04:17'de Kahramanmaraş'ı sarsan 7.8 büyüklüğündeki büyük depremde 50.000'den fazla kişi hayatını kaybetti. Birden fazla büyük ve küçük artçı sarsıntıları takiben saat 13.26'da 7.5 büyüklüğünde ikinci bir deprem Kahramanmaraş'ta meydana geldi. İlk büyük depremde hasar gören pek çok bina ikinci büyük dalgalın etkisiyle çöktü. Deprem aynı zamanda Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Adana, Adiyaman, Malatya, Osmaniye, Hatay ve Kilis'i de salladı.

Figure OA7.3: Treatment

HABERLER > DEPREM

Erdoğan deprem sonrası meydana gelen yıkımdan bakanı sorumlu tuttu



6 Şubat günü saat 04:17'de Kahramanmaraş'ı sarsan 7.8 büyüklüğündeki büyük depremde 50.000'den fazla kişi hayatını kaybetti. Birden fazla büyük ve küçük artçı sarsıntıları takiben saat 13.26'da 7.5 büyüklüğünde ikinci bir deprem Kahramanmaraş'ta meydana geldi. İlk büyük depremde hasar gören pek çok bina ikinci büyük dalga etkisiyle çöktü. Deprem aynı zamanda Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Adana, Adıyaman, Malatya, Osmaniye, Hatay ve Kilis'i de salladı.

Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, depremden ilgili bakanı sorumlu tuttu. Erdoğan dün Çevre, Şehircilik ve İklim Değişikliği Bakanı Murat Kurum'u görevden aldı. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Sayın Kurum'un "ülkeyi depreme yeterli şekilde hazırlama yükümlülüğünü yerine getirmekte başarısız olduğunu ve halkı korumayı beceremediğini" söyledi.

Randomization

Table OA7.3: Covariate Balance Between Control and Treatment Groups

	Control	Treatment	p-value
Female	0.46	0.46	1.00
Age	36.56	36.44	0.84
Education	4.22	4.28	0.32
Public sector employee	0.21	0.21	0.81
Income	7.36	7.34	0.85
Islam	0.91	0.91	0.93
Aegean	0.15	0.14	0.61
Black Sea	0.10	0.08	0.07
Central Anatolia	0.14	0.14	0.82
Eastern Anatolia	0.06	0.07	0.26
Marmara	0.35	0.36	0.41
Mediterranean	0.13	0.12	0.49
Southeastern Anatolia	0.07	0.08	0.64

Summary Statistics

Table OA7.4: Summary Statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Erdoğan approval	0	1	0.43	0.40
Erdoğan vote intention	0	1	0.41	0.43
AKP vote intention	0	1	0.33	0.47
Erdoğan volunteer intention	0	1	0.25	0.36
ICT outcome	0	4	0.95	0.95
Government earthquake response	0	1	0.38	0.40
Kılıçdaroğlu vote intention	0	1	0.54	0.43
CHP vote intention	0	1	0.37	0.48
Kılıçdaroğlu volunteer intention	0	1	0.32	0.38
Female	0	1	0.46	0.50
Age	18	93	36.50	12.08
Education	1	6	4.25	1.18
Public sector employee	0	1	0.21	0.41
Income	1	11	7.35	2.87
Islam	0	1	0.91	0.28
Aegean	0	1	0.15	0.36
Black Sea	0	1	0.09	0.28
Central Anatolia	0	1	0.14	0.35
Eastern Anatolia	0	1	0.07	0.25
Marmara	0	1	0.35	0.48
Mediterranean	0	1	0.13	0.33
Southeastern Anatolia	0	1	0.08	0.26

Results

In addition to the main outcome of interest, *Erdogan approval* (Model 1), I also asked several questions that indirectly measure participants' approval of Erdogan: whether participants plan to vote or volunteer for Erdogan or Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the main opposition candidate in the 2023 Turkish presidential election, which party participants intend to vote for in the parliamentary elections, participants' views of the government's earthquake response, and a list experiment in case of preference falsification. Similar to *Erdogan approval*, there is minimal evidence that scapegoating purges affect the other outcome variables. This is unsurprising since these are likely harder to influence; see Table OA7.5.

Table OA7.5: Average Treatment Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Erdogan approval	Erdogan vote intention	AKP vote intention	Erdogan volunteer intention	Government earthquake response	ICT outcome	Kiliçdaroglu vote intention	CHP vote intention	Kiliçdaroglu volunteer intention
Treatment	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.18 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)
Female	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.15 (0.10)	0.03 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Education	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.06 (0.05)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Public sector employee	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.08 (0.13)	0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.05* (0.03)
Income	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Islam	0.28*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.02)	0.28*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.36** (0.13)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.04)

Aegean	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.34)	0.08 (0.05)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)
Black Sea	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.36 (0.36)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.18** (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)
Central Anatolia	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.09 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.16 (0.34)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.12* (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)
Eastern Anatolia	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.22 (0.37)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Marmara	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.33)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Mediterranean	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.34 (0.34)	0.01 (0.05)	0.22*** (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)
Southeastern Anatolia	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.36)	0.00 (.)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)
Constant	0.39*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.08)	0.38*** (0.09)	0.34*** (0.07)	0.37*** (0.07)	-0.04 (.)	0.44*** (0.08)	0.15 (0.10)	0.29*** (0.08)
Observations	1536	1495	1277	1472	1517	1428	1491	1277	1459

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table OA7.6: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Scapegoating Across Partisanship on Erdoğan's Approval

	(1)
Treatment	-0.03 (0.03)
Opposition supporters	-0.58*** (0.02)
Unaffiliated respondents	-0.44*** (0.03)
Treatment × Opposition supporters	0.08* (0.04)
Treatment × Unaffiliated respondents	0.09* (0.04)
Female	0.00 (0.02)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)
Public sector employee	0.00 (0.02)
Income	0.00 (0.00)
Islam	0.08*** (0.02)
Aegean	-0.19*** (0.03)
Black Sea	-0.17*** (0.04)
Central Anatolia	-0.13*** (0.03)
Eastern Anatolia	-0.09* (0.04)
Marmara	-0.16*** (0.03)
Mediterranean	-0.20***

	(0.03)
Southeastern Anatolia	-0.15*** (0.04)
Constant	0.88*** (0.06)
Observations	1536

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Since the sample is not representative of some factors, I conduct a robustness test where I re-estimate the main models with post-stratification weights—for age, education, gender, province, and religion—using the Census data provided in OA7.2⁵ The main findings are unchanged in terms of statistical and substantive significance (if anything, the substantive significance of the findings—see the interaction coefficients in Model 2 below—is slightly larger).

Table OA7.7: The Average and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Scapegoating on Erdogan’s Approval with Post-Stratification Weights

	(1)	(2)
Treatment	0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)
Opposition supporters		-0.59*** (0.03)
Unaffiliated respondents		-0.47*** (0.04)
Treatment×Opposition supporters		0.08* (0.04)
Treatment×Unaffiliated respondents		0.12* (0.06)
Female	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Public sector employee	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Income	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Islam	0.32*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.02)
Aegean	-0.15** (0.06)	0.00 (0.04)
Black Sea	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)

⁵Solon, Gary, Steven J. Haider, and Jeffrey Wooldridge. 2013. “What Are We Weighting For?” *National Bureau of Economic Research*, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w18859/w18859.pdf.

Central Anatolia	-0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.04)
Eastern Anatolia	0.00 (.)	0.07 (0.05)
Marmara	-0.11* (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)
Mediterranean	-0.07 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
Southeastern Anatolia	-0.08 (0.06)	0.00 (.)
Constant	0.30** (0.09)	0.65*** (0.08)
Controls	✓	✓
Observations	1535	1535

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table OA7.8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Scapegoating Across Age on Erdoğan's Approval

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.09 (0.08)	0.08 (0.10)
Age	-0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Treatment×Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Female	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)
Education	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Public sector employee	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)
Income	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Islam	0.28*** (0.03)	-0.10 (0.11)	0.06* (0.03)	0.13** (0.05)
Aegean	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.17*** (0.05)
Black Sea	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.25*** (0.06)
Central Anatolia	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.06)
Eastern Anatolia	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	-0.09 (0.08)
Marmara	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.14*** (0.04)
Mediterranean	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.15** (0.05)
Southeastern Anatolia	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)
Constant	0.42*** (0.08)	0.86*** (0.13)	0.35*** (0.11)	0.39*** (0.11)

Sample	All	Incumbent supporters	Opposition supporters	Unaffiliated intention
Observations	1536	640	503	393

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table OA7.9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Scapegoating Across Employment Sector on Erdoan’s Approval

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.08 (0.05)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.03)
Opposition supporters			-0.63*** (0.05)	-0.57*** (0.03)
Unaffiliated respondents			-0.57*** (0.06)	-0.42*** (0.03)
Treatment×Opposition supporters			0.04 (0.08)	0.09* (0.04)
Treatment×Unaffiliated			0.13 (0.09)	0.09 (0.05)
Female	0.06 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Income	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Islam	0.17* (0.07)	0.31*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.11*** (0.03)
Aegean	-0.21* (0.09)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.18*** (0.04)
Black Sea	-0.16 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.13** (0.04)
Central Anatolia	-0.21* (0.09)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.10* (0.04)
Eastern Anatolia	-0.18 (0.10)	0.10 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.05)
Marmara	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.15*** (0.03)
Mediterranean	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.16*** (0.04)
Southeastern Anatolia	0.00	-0.05	0.00	-0.14**

	(.)	(0.05)	(.)	(0.05)
Constant	0.59*** (0.13)	0.34*** (0.08)	0.90*** (0.12)	0.82*** (0.07)
Sector	Public	Non-public	Public	Non-public
Observations	297	1239	297	1239

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table OA7.10: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Scapegoating Across Income on Erdoğan's Approval

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)
Income	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Treatment×Income	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Female	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Islam	0.28*** (0.03)	-0.10 (0.11)	0.06* (0.03)	0.13** (0.05)
Aegean	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.17*** (0.05)
Black Sea	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.26*** (0.06)
Central Anatolia	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.06)
Eastern Anatolia	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	-0.10 (0.08)
Marmara	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.14*** (0.04)
Mediterranean	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.15** (0.05)
Southeastern Anatolia	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.08)
Public sector employee	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)
Constant	0.37*** (0.07)	0.83*** (0.14)	0.42*** (0.11)	0.38*** (0.10)

Sample	All	Incumbent supporters	Opposition supporters	Unaffiliated intention
Observations	1536	640	503	393

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table OA7.11: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Scapegoating Across Education on Erdogan's Approval

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.03)
Opposition supporters			-0.54*** (0.04)	-0.62*** (0.03)
Unaffiliated respondents			-0.43*** (0.04)	-0.46*** (0.04)
Treatment × Opposition supporters			0.03 (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Treatment × Unaffiliated			0.06 (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)
Female	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.07** (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Public sector employee	-0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Income	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Islam	0.27*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)
Aegean	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.04)

	Sample	Low education	High education	Low education	High education
	Observations	677	859	677	859
Standard errors in parentheses					
Black Sea	0.01 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.05)	
Central Anatolia	0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)	
Eastern Anatolia	0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	
Marmara	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.04)	
Mediterranean	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.04)	
Southeastern Anatolia	0.00 (.)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.00 (.)	-0.17** (0.06)	
Constant	0.50*** (0.12)	0.24 (0.16)	0.83*** (0.10)	0.91*** (0.13)	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table OA7.12: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Scapegoating Across Political Knowledge on Erdoan’s Approval (1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Female	-0.02 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Education	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)
Public sector employee	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.05)
Income	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Islam	0.31*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.22** (0.08)	0.29*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)
Aegean	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.04)
Black Sea	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.06)
Central Anatolia	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.10)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)
Eastern Anatolia	0.00 (.)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.06 (0.12)	0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (.)	-0.06 (0.08)
Marmara	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.10** (0.04)
Mediterranean	-0.18** (0.06)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.05)
Southeastern Anatolia	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.00 (.)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)
Constant	0.36*** (0.09)	0.51*** (0.11)	0.33* (0.16)	0.39*** (0.07)	0.34*** (0.09)	0.50*** (0.11)
Political knowledge	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Question	P1	P1	P2	P2	P1 and P2	P1 and P2
Observations	854	682	299	1237	910	626

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table OA7.13: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Scapegoating Across Political Knowledge on Erdoan’s Approval (2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.04 (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.14** (0.04)
Opposition supporters	-0.52*** (0.04)	-0.65*** (0.03)	-0.55*** (0.06)	-0.59*** (0.03)	-0.54*** (0.03)	-0.65*** (0.04)
Unaffiliated respondents	-0.42*** (0.04)	-0.49*** (0.04)	-0.39*** (0.08)	-0.46*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.04)	-0.50*** (0.04)
Treatment×Opposition supporters	0.01 (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.04 (0.09)	0.09* (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)
Treatment×Unaffiliated	0.01 (0.05)	0.21** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.12* (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.24*** (0.07)
Female	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Public sector employee	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)
Income	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Islam	0.10** (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.07)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Aegean	0.02 (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.21*** (0.05)
Black Sea	0.00 (0.05)	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.06)
Central Anatolia	0.04 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.12** (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.06)
Eastern Anatolia	0.13* (0.05)	-0.16* (0.07)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.08)
Marmara	0.01 (0.04)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.12* (0.05)
Mediterranean	-0.04	-0.15**	-0.08	-0.20***	-0.05	-0.16**

	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Southeastern Anatolia	0.00 (.)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.00 (.)	-0.17*** (0.04)	0.00 (.)	-0.13 (0.07)
Constant	0.63*** (0.07)	0.95*** (0.10)	0.68*** (0.14)	0.90*** (0.07)	0.66*** (0.07)	0.93*** (0.10)
Political knowledge	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Question	P1	P1	P2	P2	P1 and P2	P1 and P2
Observations	854	682	299	1237	910	626

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table OA7.14: The Effects of Scapegoating Across Tukey's Regions

	(1)
Treatment	0.15* (0.07)
Aegean	-0.01 (0.08)
Black Sea	0.15 (0.09)
Central Anatolia	0.16 (0.09)
Eastern Anatolia	0.25* (0.10)
Marmara	0.09 (0.08)
Mediterranean	0.05 (0.09)
Southeastern Anatolia	0.04 (0.05)
Treatment × Aegean	-0.10 (0.09)
Treatment × Black Sea	-0.29** (0.10)
Treatment × Central Anatolia	-0.14 (0.09)
Treatment × Eastern Anatolia	-0.27* (0.11)
Treatment × Marmara	-0.16 (0.08)
Treatment × Mediterranean	-0.12 (0.09)
Female	0.02 (0.02)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	-0.03** (0.01)

Public sector employee	-0.01 (0.03)
Income	0.00 (0.00)
Islam	0.28*** (0.03)
Constant	0.24* (0.10)
Observations	1536


Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Experiment: Manipulation Check

I assess whether experimental manipulation of the treatment was successful by examining whether the treatment affects affect how respondents justify why they approve or disapprove of Erdogan.⁶ Specifically, I assess whether the treatment makes it more likely that respondents justify their view of Erdogan in a way that relates to the treatment that they were exposed to. This entails examining whether respondents use a key word associated with the treatment in their answer. I collected these data via an open-ended text-based question that asked participants to “briefly explain why you approve or disapprove of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.” The key word that I expect to be associated with this treatment is “minister.” To sum, as Figure OA7.4 shows, compared to the control group, the treatment significantly increased the likelihood that respondents used the word ‘minister’ to justify their approval of Erdogan.

Figure OA7.4: Experimental Manipulation Check



Notes: The figure shows the effects of the treatment on the likelihood that participants mention the word “minister” in their open answers to explain their approval of Erdogan. Coefficients stem from linear probability models following the same specifications as Model 1 in Table OA7.5.

⁶This manipulation check was not pre-registered.

Focus Group Questions

Introduction/Engagement Questions

1. How many of you prefer to read while holding a printed newspaper in hand?
2. Today, thanks to the Internet, it is possible to access news from different sources. What factors do you take into account when choosing your preferred source of the news?

Exploration Questions

1. When you read the news about the earthquake, how do you evaluate the newspaper report you read?
 - (a) How do you decide to trust the source and why?
 - (b) How do you evaluate the accuracy of political news?
2. After the February earthquake, President Erdoğan said that this is a natural phenomenon, it is not possible to prevent earthquakes in such cases. What do you think about this?
3. We would like to hear your thoughts on President Erdoğan's statements about those responsible for the scale of the disaster after the earthquake. How do you think the management of this process was? [Remind them of the texts on opposition, construction companies, the minister.]
 - (a) Do you think the opposition will do a better job in responding to the earthquake?
4. In your answers before the elections, you said that you were supportive of/undecided/opposed to about your opinion on President Erdoğan's style of governance. Could you explain a bit more why you were undecided on that point?
5. What do you like/do not like about President Erdoğan's management style and why?
 - (a) What are some things you dislike about his style of governance and why?

Exit Questions

1. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Focus Group Evidence

I conducted three focus groups in July 2023 after the online survey experiment to better understand the reasons for the (in)effectiveness of scapegoating on shaping people's views of Erdoğan. This was about two months after the survey, and a month and a half after Turkey's presidential election. I limited the number of focus groups to three since this should be sufficient to cover between 80 to 90 percent of the most prevalent themes.⁷

Focus groups are helpful for this purpose because they can allow us to better understand not just what participants think, but *why* they think as they do. Although we must be cautious about the social nature of data collection—i.e., what people share may be conditioned by the presence of others—the upside is that we can collect data at the individual, group, and interactive levels. In short, we can gain insights into an individual's reasoning, group behaviors, and how people's views may be conditioned by group dynamics. Overall, using focus groups to analyze the reasons for the (in)effectiveness of blame shifting politics means we can collect emic data, those from the subject's perspective. This is useful for understanding how people think, and learning what factors they consciously reflect on when assessing something.⁸

Focus groups were conducted online by a Turkish scholar. When I conducted the survey, I asked participants if they were interested in participating in a follow up focus group. Participants were then randomly selected from this list of volunteers, which was subset by whether people identified as supporters of Erdoğan, the opposition, or as a non-partisan respondent (based on their vote choice in the 2018 Turkey presidential election). Eight people agreed to attend each focus group—24 in total—and 13 showed up. This comprised of five non-partisan respondents, three opposition supporters, and five incumbent supporters.

Each focus group lasted about an hour, and each participant received an Amazon voucher in Turkish lira worth £15. Payment was provided based on the value of a foreign currency to mitigate fluctuations in the Turkish lira. This amount was decided through consultation with the survey company, TGM, who have extensive experience of conducting surveys and focus groups across the world, including in Turkey. For details on how ethical considerations influenced the logistics of the focus groups, see the section above on ethical considerations.

I summarize below findings from the focus groups. I split this by participants' partisan leanings (incumbent supporter, opposition supporter, or non-partisan respondents). Within each section, I discuss general findings, and also especially focus on variations based on participants' levels of education and political knowledge since the survey showed that the effectiveness of scapegoating varied systematically based on variations within these factors.

⁷Guest, Greg, Emily Namey, and Kevin McKenna. 2017. "How Many Focus Groups are Enough? Building an Evidence Base for Nonprobability Sample Sizes." *Field Methods* 29(1): 3-22.

⁸Cyr, Jennifer. 2019. *Focus Groups for the Social Science Researcher*. Cambridge University Press.

Incumbent supporters

Supporters of Erdoğan had a high level of anger following the earthquake. Scapegoating was not effective among these participants because it was viewed as too little too late, done for self-interested reasons, or because it was a case of junior officials unfairly taking the blame. Incumbent supporters, as is also true of opposition supporters and non-partisan respondents below, discussed the hypothetical scenario partly in the context of a similar incident that played out in reality. While Erdoğan did not fire a minister, the president of Turkish Red Crescent, a Turkish affiliate of the humanitarian aid organization, International Red Crescent, did resign, but under heavy political pressure.⁹ Thus, many respondents thought that this individual was fired by Erdoğan. This mistaken belief, however, meant that I could gauge participants' reactions to scapegoating both when discussing the hypothetical scenario presented in the experiment, but also in response to an 'actual' instance to scapegoating.

As mentioned, there were three main reasons why participants were unpersuaded by scapegoating. For instance, one participant said that it was right to dismiss the president of Turkish Red Crescent, but it would not change anything, and it did not affect their trust in the system. Another participant independently expressed very similar feelings. Other participants went further, contending that everything that was done in the wake of the earthquake was for self-interested reasons. And finally, one supporter of Erdoğan, a civil servant, observed that the problem with scapegoating is that the right person is rarely held accountable. Instead, this participant alleged, junior officials tend to take the blame. In other words, this participant saw scapegoating for the form of blame avoidance politics that it is.

Among supporters of Erdoğan who participated in the focus group, there is no variation on their level of political knowledge—all participants answered correctly both questions assessing their political knowledge—but there are interesting trends based on participants' levels of education. Among the three incumbent-supporting participants with a higher level of education—bachelors degree or higher—there was more scepticism and anger about the idea of scapegoating. These respondents were the ones who emphasized that everything done after the earthquake was done with self-interest in mind, and they lambasted the idea of scapegoating for unfairly sacrificing junior officials. On the other hand, the two incumbent-supporting participants with a lower level of education both focused their views on the point that firing the president of Red Crescent was the right thing to do. Thus, among incumbent-supporting participants, those with a higher level of education were more sceptical about the idea of scapegoating, and did not just focus on its outcome; rather they took issue with the process.

Non-partisan Respondents

The survey found that scapegoating increased approval of Erdoğan by six percentage points about non-partisan respondents. Evidence from the focus groups points to a clear reason: scapegoating helped restore trust and confidence in the government among non-partisan respondents. While one respondent emphasized the importance of responsible officials being removed in a timely manner—

⁹Duvar. 2023. "Turkey Red Crescent Head Resigns After Erdoğan's Criticism of Organization over Sale of Quake Tents." *Duvar*. May 12, 2023, <https://shorturl.at/awzJT>.

they believed the president of Turkish Red Crescent should have been fired sooner—they described how removing the president of Turkish Red Crescent helped restore trust not just in Turkish Red Crescent, but also in the president. The participant said that, “[t]his shows that the president sees our thoughts, cares about us, [and] hears us.” Another participant independently brought up the issue of trust, and said the hypothetical scapegoating scenario described in the survey would have helped Erdoğan restore trust.

Not all non-partisan focus group participants saw it this way. One participant described the firing of the minister explicitly as ‘scapegoating,’ saying it was ‘playing to the audience,’ and that firing one minister wouldn’t change anything. However, this individual was the only non-partisan participant with this perspective. All the other non-partisan respondents expressed positive views about scapegoating, with three explicitly highlighting that it could restore trust and confidence.

Unfortunately, there was no variation across political knowledge among non-partisan focus group participants to exploit. One of the highly educated participants was the individual who viewed removing a minister as political theatre, but the other highly educated respondent was much more effusive than the less well-educated respondents about scapegoating’s potential to restore trust in the president. Thus, it is not clear from the focus group evidence why better educated non-partisan respondents were more susceptible to scapegoating than less well-educated non-partisan respondents.

Opposition supporters

The main views expressed by opposition-supporting focus group participants were anger towards the government and a feeling of hopelessness about their then-situation. This is perhaps unsurprising since the focus groups were conducted in July 2023, less than two months after the second round of the May presidential election when Erdoğan had extended his rule into a third decade. Despite this anger, however, there was consensus among all respondents that firing officials who are supposedly responsible for negative policy outcomes is the ‘right thing to do.’ These participants were sceptical that removals like the perceived firing of the Turkish Red Crescent president would make a difference, but they did all think that officials found guilty of wrongdoing should be removed. In other words, these participants all endorsed punishment for ‘guilty’ officials.

The small sample of opposition-supporting focus group participants exhibited variation on both their level of education and political knowledge. However, although the opposition-supporting participant with a high level of education was the strongest in terms of saying that firing seemingly responsible officials is the right thing to do, all opposition-supporting participants expressed broadly similar sentiments, regardless of their level of education or political knowledge.

Survey

Turkish	English
D1. Cinsiyetiniz nedir?	D1. What is your gender?
<01> Erkek <02> Kadın <03> İkili olmayan/üçüncü cinsiyet <04> Söylememeyi tercih ediyorum	<01> Male <02> Female <03> Non-binary/third gender <04> Prefer not to say
D2. Hangi yılda doğdunuz?	D2. In what year were you born?
D3. Eğitim seviyeniz nedir?	D3. What is your level of education?
< 01 > İlkokul < 02 > Ortaokul < 03 > Lise < 04 > Lisans Derecesi < 05 > Yüksekokul/profesyonel veya teknik diploma < 06 > Yüksek lisans derecesi veya üstü < 98 > Bilmiyorum	< 01 > Elementary < 02 > Preparatory/Basic < 03 > Secondary < 04 > Bachelor's degree < 05 > Mid-level diploma/professional or technical < 06 > Master's degree or above < 98 > Don't know
D4. Çalışıyor musunuz?	D4. Do you work?
< 01 > Tam zamanlı çalışıyorum (haftada 30 saat veya daha fazla) < 02 > Yarı zamanlı çalışıyorum (haftada 30 saatten az) < 03 > Emekliyim < 04 > Ev hanımıyım < 05 > Öğrenciyim < 06 > İşsizim (iş arıyorum) < 07 > Diğer < 98 > Bilmiyorum	< 01 > Full time (30 or more hours a week) < 02 > Part time (less than 30 hours a week) < 03 > Retired < 04 > A housewife < 05 > A student < 06 > Unemployed (looking for work) < 07 > Other < 98 > Don't know

D5. Hangi sektörde çalışıyoysunuz?

- < 01 > Kamu
- < 02 > Özel
- < 03 > Diğer
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

D5. What sector do you work in?

- < 01 > Public
- < 02 > Private
- < 03 > Other
- < 98 > Don't know

D6. İşinizdeki konumunuz nedir? (Eğer birden fazla işiniz varsa, asıl işinizdeki konumunuza belirtin.)

- < 01 > Bir kurumun yönetici veya yüksek dereceli devlet memuru
- < 02 > Silahlı kuvvetler mensubu veya polis
- < 03 > Hükümet çalışanı
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

D6. What is your position at your work? (If you have more than one job, answer with regard to your main job.)

- < 01 > Director of an institution or a high-ranking governmental employee
- < 02 > Working at the armed forces or the police
- < 03 > A governmental employee
- < 98 > Don't know

D7. Medeni durumunuz nedir?

- < 01 > Bekar
- < 02 > Evli
- < 03 > Boşanmış
- < 04 > Dul
- < 05 > Nişanlı
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

D7. What is your marital status?

- < 01 > Single
- < 02 > Married
- < 03 > Divorced
- < 04 > Widowed
- < 05 > Engaged
- < 98 > Don't know

D8. Dini inancınız nedir?

- < 01 > İslam
- < 02 > Hristiyan
- < 03 > Musevi
- < 04 > Diğer
- < 05 > Dini inancım yok
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

D8. What is your religion?

- < 01 > Islam
- < 02 > Christian
- < 03 > Jewish
- < 04 > Other religion
- < 05 > No religion
- < 98 > Don't know

D9. Her gün dua eder misiniz?

- < 01 > Her zaman
- < 02 > Çoğu zaman
- < 03 > Bazen
- < 04 > Nadiren
- < 05 > Hiçbir zaman
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

D9. Do you pray daily?

- < 01 > Always
- < 02 > Most of the time
- < 03 > Sometimes
- < 04 > Rarely
- < 05 > Never
- < 98 > Don't know

D10. Aylık hane geliriniz Türk Lirası olarak ne kadardır?

- < 01 > 2.500 TL'den az
- < 02 > 2.500 - 4.999 TL
- < 03 > 5.000 - 7.499 TL
- < 04 > 7.500 - 9.999 TL
- < 05 > 10.000 - 12.499 TL
- < 06 > 12.500 - 14.999 TL
- < 07 > 15.000 - 17.499 TL
- < 08 > 17.500 - 19.999 TL
- < 09 > 20.000 - 22.499 TL
- < 10 > 22.500 - 24.999 TL
- < 11 > 25.000 TL ve üzeri
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

D10. What is your monthly household income in Turkish lira?

- < 01 > Less than 2,500 TL
- < 02 > 2,500 - 4,999 TL
- < 03 > 5,000 - 7,499 TL
- < 04 > 7,500 - 9,999 TL
- < 05 > 10,000 - 12,499 TL
- < 06 > 12,500 - 14,999 TL
- < 07 > 15,000 - 17,499 TL
- < 08 > 17,500 - 19,999 TL
- < 09 > 20,000 - 22,499 TL
- < 10 > 22,500 - 24,999 TL
- < 11 > 25,000 TL or more
- < 98 > Don't know

D11. Hangi ilde yaşıyorsunuz?

- < 01 > Adana
- < 02 > Adiyaman
- < 03 > Afyonkarahisar
- < 04 > Ağrı
- < 05 > Amasya
- < 06 > Ankara
- < 07 > Antalya
- < 08 > Artvin
- < 09 > Aydın
- < 10 > Balıkesir
- < 11 > Bilecik
- < 12 > Bingöl
- < 13 > Bitlis
- < 14 > Bolu
- < 15 > Burdur

D11. In what province do you live?

- < 01 > Adana
- < 02 > Adiyaman
- < 03 > Afyonkarahisar
- < 04 > Ağrı
- < 05 > Amasya
- < 06 > Ankara
- < 07 > Antalya
- < 08 > Artvin
- < 09 > Aydın
- < 10 > Balıkesir
- < 11 > Bilecik
- < 12 > Bingöl
- < 13 > Bitlis
- < 14 > Bolu
- < 15 > Burdur

D11. Hangi ilde yaşıyorsunuz? (devam)

< 16 > Bursa
< 17 > Çanakkale
< 18 > Çankırı
< 19 > Çorum
< 20 > Denizli
< 21 > Diyarbakır
< 22 > Edirne
< 23 > Elazığ
< 24 > Erzincan
< 25 > Erzurum
< 26 > Eskişehir
< 27 > Gaziantep
< 28 > Giresun
< 29 > Gümüşhane
< 30 > Hakkâri
< 31 > Hatay
< 32 > Isparta
< 33 > Mersin (İcel)
< 34 > İstanbul
< 35 > İzmir
< 36 > Kars
< 37 > Kastamonu
< 38 > Kayseri
< 39 > Kırklareli
< 40 > Kırşehir
< 41 > Kocaeli
< 42 > Konya
< 43 > Kütahya
< 44 > Malatya
< 45 > Manisa
< 46 > Kahramanmaraş
< 47 > Mardin
< 48 > Muğla
< 49 > Muş

D11. In what province do you live? (cont.)

< 16 > Bursa
< 17 > Çanakkale
< 18 > Çankırı
< 19 > Çorum
< 20 > Denizli
< 21 > Diyarbakır
< 22 > Edirne
< 23 > Elazığ
< 24 > Erzincan
< 25 > Erzurum
< 26 > Eskişehir
< 27 > Gaziantep
< 28 > Giresun
< 29 > Gümüşhane
< 30 > Hakkâri
< 31 > Hatay
< 32 > Isparta
< 33 > Mersin (ex İcel)
< 34 > İstanbul
< 35 > İzmir
< 36 > Kars
< 37 > Kastamonu
< 38 > Kayseri
< 39 > Kırklareli
< 40 > Kırşehir
< 41 > Kocaeli
< 42 > Konya
< 43 > Kütahya
< 44 > Malatya
< 45 > Manisa
< 46 > Kahramanmaraş
< 47 > Mardin
< 48 > Muğla
< 49 > Muş

D11. Hangi ilde yaşıyorsunuz? (devam)

< 50 > Nevşehir
< 51 > Niğde
< 52 > Ordu
< 53 > Rize
< 54 > Sakarya
< 55 > Samsun
< 56 > Siirt
< 57 > Sinop
< 58 > Sivas
< 59 > Tekirdağ
< 60 > Tokat
< 61 > Trabzon
< 62 > Tunceli
< 63 > Şanlıurfa
< 64 > Uşak
< 65 > Van
< 66 > Yozgat
< 67 > Zonguldak
< 68 > Aksaray
< 69 > Bayburt
< 70 > Karaman
< 71 > Kırıkkale
< 72 > Batman
< 73 > Şırnak
< 74 > Bartın
< 75 > Ardahan
< 76 > İğdır
< 77 > Yalova
< 78 > Karabük
< 79 > Kilis
< 80 > Osmaniye
< 81 > Düzce
< 98 > Bilmiyorum

D11. In what province do you live? (cont.)

< 50 > Nevşehir
< 51 > Niğde
< 52 > Ordu
< 53 > Rize
< 54 > Sakarya
< 55 > Samsun
< 56 > Siirt
< 57 > Sinop
< 58 > Sivas
< 59 > Tekirdağ
< 60 > Tokat
< 61 > Trabzon
< 62 > Tunceli
< 63 > Şanlıurfa
< 64 > Uşak
< 65 > Van
< 66 > Yozgat
< 67 > Zonguldak
< 68 > Aksaray
< 69 > Bayburt
< 70 > Karaman
< 71 > Kırıkkale
< 72 > Batman
< 73 > Şırnak
< 74 > Bartın
< 75 > Ardahan
< 76 > İğdır
< 77 > Yalova
< 78 > Karabük
< 79 > Kilis
< 80 > Osmaniye
< 81 > Düzce
< 98 > Don't know

D12. Aşağıdaki gazetelerden hangisini en sık okursunuz?

- < 01 > Hürriyet
- < 02 > Habertürk
- < 03 > Sabah
- < 04 > Milliyet
- < 05 > Hiçbiri
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

D12. Which of these media sources do you consume most often?

- < 01 > Hürriyet
- < 02 > Habertürk
- < 03 > Sabah
- < 04 > Milliyet
- < 05 > None of them
- < 98 > Don't know

D13. 2018 Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçiminde kime oy verdiniz?

- < 01 > Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- < 02 > Muharrem İnce
- < 03 > Selahattin Demirtaş
- < 04 > Meral Akşener
- < 05 > Diğer
- < 06 > Hiç kimseye oy vermedim
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

D13. Who did you vote for in the 2018 Turkey presidential election?

- < 01 > Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- < 02 > Muharrem İnce
- < 03 > Selahattin Demirtaş
- < 04 > Meral Akşener
- < 05 > Someone else
- < 06 > No one
- < 98 > Don't know

D14. Herhangi bir siyasi partije ne kadar bağlı hissediyorsunuz?

- < 01 > Hiç bağlı değil
- < 02 > Biraz bağlı değil
- < 03 > Ne bağlı, ne bağlı değil
- < 04 > Biraz bağlı
- < 05 > Çok kuvvetli derecede bağlı
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

D14. How attached do you feel to any political party?

- < 01 > Strongly unattached
- < 02 > Somewhat unattached
- < 03 > Neither attached nor unattached
- < 04 > Somewhat attached
- < 05 > Strongly attached
- < 98 > Don't know

D15. Aşağıdaki siyasi partilerden hangisine üyesiniz?

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| < 01 > Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi | < 01 > AKP |
| < 02 > Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi | < 02 > CHP |
| < 03 > Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi | < 03 > MHP |
| < 04 > İYİ Parti | < 04 > iYi Parti |
| < 05 > Halkların Demokratik Partisi | < 05 > HDP |
| < 06 > Yeşil Sol Parti | < 06 > YSP |
| < 07 > Saadet Partisi | < 07 > SP |
| < 08 > Türkiye İşçi Partisi | < 08 > TIP |
| < 09 > Hiçbiri | < 09 > None |
| < 98 > Bilmiyorum | < 98 > Don't know |

D15. Are you a member of a political party?

P1. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde toplam kaç milletvekili sandalyesi var? Lütfen en iyi tahmininizi belirtin.

P1. How many seats are there in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey? Give your best answer.

P2. Türkiye'nin şu an görevde olan Dışişleri Bakanı'nın adı nedir? Lütfen en iyi tahmininizi belirtin.

P2. What is the name of Turkey's current Foreign Minister? Give your best answer.

Lütfen aşağıdaki haber makalesini okuyun:
[Aşağıdaki makalenin yakın zamanda büyük tirajlı bir gazetede yayınlandığını varsayıyalım:]

[*Kontrol başlığı*]
Yıkım depremleri takip ediyor

[*Tretman başlıklarları*]
Erdoğan deprem sonrası meydana gelen yıkımdan [bakanı sorumlu tuttu.]

6 Şubat günü saat 04:17'de Kahramanmaraş'ı sarsan 7.8 büyüklüğündeki büyük depremde 50.000'den fazla kişi hayatını kaybetti. Birden fazla büyük ve küçük artçı sarsıntıları takiben saat 13.26'da 7.5 büyüklüğünde ikinci bir deprem Kahramanmaraş'ta meydana geldi. İlk büyük depremde hasar gören pek çok bina ikinci büyük dalganın etkisiyle çöktü. Deprem aynı zamanda Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Adana, Adıyaman, Malatya, Osmaniye, Hatay ve Kilis'i de salladı.

Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, depremden ilgili bakanı sorumlu tuttu. Erdoğan dün Çevre, Şehircilik ve İklim Değişikliği Bakanı Murat Kurum'u görevden aldı. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Sayın Kurum'un "ülkeyi depreme yeterli şekilde hazırlama yükümlülüğünü yerine getirmekte başarısız olduğunu ve halkı korumayı beceremediğini" söyledi.

Please read the following news article:
[Suppose the following article recently appeared in a major Turkish newspaper:]

[*Control headline*]
Devastation follows earthquakes

[*Treatment headline*]
Erdoğan says minister at fault for devastation following earthquakes

The powerful 7.8 magnitude earthquake that rattled the southern province of Kahramanmaraş on February 6 at 4:17am claimed the lives of over 50,000 people. After multiple large and small tremors, another 7.5 magnitude earthquake occurred in Kahramanmaraş at 1:26pm. Many buildings damaged in the first major earthquake collapsed by the impact of the second major earthquake. The earthquake also rocked the neighboring provinces of Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Diyarbakir, Adana, Adiyaman, Malatya, Osmaniye, Hatay, and Kilis.

President Erdogan says the relevant minister is to blame. President Erdogan yesterday fired Murat Kurum, the Minister of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change. President Erdogan said that Mr. Kurum had "failed in his duties to adequately prepare the country for an earthquake, and that he had failed to protect the people."

O1. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Cumhurbaşkanlığı görevini yapış tarzını ne kadar onaylıyorsunuz?

- < 01 > Hiç onaylamıyorum
- < 02 > Biraz onaylamıyorum
- < 03 > Ne onaylıyorum ne onaylamıyorum
- < 04 > Biraz onaylıyorum
- < 05 > Kuvvetle onaylıyorum
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

O1. How much do you approve of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's way of carrying out his duties as the president?

- < 01 > Strongly disapprove
- < 02 > Somewhat disapprove
- < 03 > Neither approve nor disapprove
- < 04 > Somewhat approve
- < 05 > Strongly approve
- < 98 > Don't know

O2. Yaklaşan Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinde Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a oy verme ihtimaliniz nedir?

- < 01 > Hiç ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 02 > Biraz ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 03 > Ne ihtimal veriyorum ne de vermiyorum
- < 04 > Biraz ihtimal veriyorum
- < 05 > Çok yüksek ihtimal veriyorum
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

O2. How likely are you to vote for Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the upcoming presidential election?

- < 01 > Very unlikely
- < 02 > Somewhat unlikely
- < 03 > Neither unlikely nor likely
- < 04 > Somewhat likely
- < 05 > Very likely
- < 98 > Don't know

O3. Önümüzdeki genel seçimlerde oy kullanma ihtimaliniz nedir?

- < 01 > Hiç ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 02 > Biraz ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 03 > Ne ihtimal veriyorum ne de vermiyorum
- < 04 > Biraz ihtimal veriyorum
- < 05 > Çok yüksek ihtimal veriyorum
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

O3. How likely are you to vote in the upcoming general election?

- < 01 > Very unlikely
- < 02 > Somewhat unlikely
- < 03 > Neither unlikely nor likely
- < 04 > Somewhat likely
- < 05 > Very likely
- < 98 > Don't know

O4. Yaklaşan cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinde Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu'na oy verme ihtimaliniz nedir?

- < 01 > Hiç ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 02 > Biraz ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 03 > Ne ihtimal veriyorum ne de vermiyorum
- < 04 > Biraz ihtimal veriyorum
- < 05 > Çok yüksek ihtimal veriyorum
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

O4. How likely are you to vote for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in the upcoming presidential election?

- < 01 > Very unlikely
- < 02 > Somewhat unlikely
- < 03 > Neither unlikely nor likely
- < 04 > Somewhat likely
- < 05 > Very likely
- < 98 > Don't know

05. Yaklaşan parlamento seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy vereceksiniz?

- < 01 > Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
- < 02 > Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
- < 03 > Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
- < 04 > İYİ Parti
- < 05 > Halkların Demokratik Partisi
- < 06 > Yeşil Sol Parti
- < 07 > Saadet Partisi
- < 08 > Türkiye İşçi Partisi
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

05. Which party are you most likely to vote for in the upcoming parliamentary election?

- < 01 > AKP
- < 02 > CHP
- < 03 > MHP
- < 04 > iYi Parti
- < 05 > HDP
- < 06 > YSP
- < 07 > SP
- < 08 > TIP
- < 98 > Don't know

06. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın seçim kampanyası için gönüllü olma ihtimaliniz nedir?

- < 01 > Hiç ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 02 > Biraz ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 03 > Ne ihtimal veriyorum ne de vermiyorum
- < 04 > Biraz ihtimal veriyorum
- < 05 > Çok yüksek ihtimal veriyorum
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

06. How likely are you to volunteer for the campaign of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan?

- < 01 > Very unlikely
- < 02 > Somewhat unlikely
- < 03 > Neither unlikely nor likely
- < 04 > Somewhat likely
- < 05 > Very likely
- < 98 > Don't know

07. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu'nun seçim kampanyası için gönüllü olma ihtimaliniz nedir?

- < 01 > Hiç ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 02 > Biraz ihtimal vermiyorum
- < 03 > Ne ihtimal veriyorum ne de vermiyorum
- < 04 > Biraz ihtimal veriyorum
- < 05 > Çok yüksek ihtimal veriyorum
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

07. How likely are you to volunteer for the campaign of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu?

- < 01 > Very unlikely
- < 02 > Somewhat unlikely
- < 03 > Neither unlikely nor likely
- < 04 > Somewhat likely
- < 05 > Very likely
- < 98 > Don't know

08. Hükümeti depremler karşısındaki yaklaşımını ne kadar onaylıyorsunuz?

- < 01 > Hiç onaylamıyorum
- < 02 > Biraz onaylamıyorum
- < 03 > Ne onaylıyorum ne onaylamıyorum
- < 04 > Biraz onaylıyorum
- < 05 > Kuvvetle onaylıyorum
- < 98 > Bilmiyorum

08. How much do you approve of the government's response to the earthquakes?

- < 01 > Strongly disapprove
- < 02 > Somewhat disapprove
- < 03 > Neither unlikely nor likely
- < 04 > Somewhat approve
- < 05 > Strongly approve
- < 98 > Don't know

LM1. Aşağıda isimleri bulunan siyasetçilerden toplam kaç tanesini beğeniyorsunuz? Kim olduğunu bilmek istemiyoruz, sadece kaç tanesini desteklediğinizi söylemeniz yeterlidir:

- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- Aleksandr Lukashenko
- Viktor Orbán
- Vladimir Putin

- <01> Sıfır
- <02> Bir
- <03> İki
- <04> Üç
- <05> Dört
- <98> Bilmiyorum

LM2. Aşağıda isimleri bulunan siyasetçilerden toplam kaç tanesini beğeniyorsunuz? Kim olduğunu bilmek istemiyoruz, sadece kaç tanesini desteklediğinizi söylemeniz yeterlidir:

- Aleksandr Lukashenko
- Viktor Orbán
- Vladimir Putin

- <01> Sıfır
- <02> Bir
- <03> İki
- <04> Üç
- <98> Bilmiyorum

FMC1. Anket sırasında daha önce okuduğunuz yazı aşağıdakilerden hangisi hakkında dayanır?

- <01> Gıda fiyatlarındaki artışlar
- <02> Türkiye'deki depremler
- <98> Bilmiyorum

LM1. How many of these politicians do you support? We do not want to know whom, just how many:

- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- Aleksandr Lukashenko
- Viktor Orbán
- Vladimir Putin

- <01> Zero
- <02> One
- <03> Two
- <04> Three
- <05> Four
- <98> Don't know

LM2. How many of these politicians do you support? We do not want to know whom, just how many:

- Aleksandr Lukashenko
- Viktor Orbán
- Vladimir Putin

- <01> Zero
- <02> One
- <03> Two
- <04> Three
- <98> Don't know

FMC1. In the article you read, which one of the following was described?

- <01> Increases in food prices
- <02> The earthquakes in Turkey
- <98> Don't know

Bilgilendirme

Anketimize katıldığınız için teşekkür ederiz. Sorulara verdığınız tüm cevaplar gizlidir ve güvenli bir şekilde saklanacaktır.

Bu ankete katılmadan önce, verdığınız yanıtların bilimsel bir araştırma için kullanılacağını belirtmiştim. Çalışmamızdaki amaç katılımcıların haberlere verdiği tepkiye göre Cumhurbaşkanı hakkındaki görüşlerini anlamaktı.

[Bu yüzden varsayımsal bir haber okumanızı istedik. Tekrarlamak gerekirse Bakan Murat Kurum'un görevden alınmasına ilişkin haber gerçek değildir ve bilimsel araştırma amacıyla oluşturulmuştur. Murat Kurum görevine devam etmektedir.]

Herhangi bir başka soru veya yorumunuz olursa lütfen turkeysurveygroup@gmail.com ile iletişime geçiniz.

Ödemenizi almak için lütfen aşağıdaki ok işaretine tıklayın.

Debrief

Thank you for participating in this survey. All your answers to the questions will be kept strictly confidential.

Before taking this survey, you knew that it was for academic research. The purpose was to ascertain participants' views of the president based on your reaction to news stories.

[We asked you to read a hypothetical news story about Minister Murat Kurum being fired; just to reiterate, this story was fictitious. It was made up for the purpose of academic research. Murat Kurum has not been fired.]

Please contact turkeysurveygroup@gmail.com with any further questions or comments.

Please press the arrow below to receive your payment.