

Secure Bike Sharing System for Multi-modal Journey

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Abstract—Bike sharing systems (BSSs) are getting popular in many cities of the world as an integrated part of multi-modal journey due to its flexibility and eco-friendly nature. Future BSSs will have a pool of Internet of Things (IoT)-integrated smart bikes with computation and communication capabilities. Such systems will be able to provide the service providers with real-time and non-real-time information about user demands, bikes and environments for improved quality of services. However, manipulation of logistics data (e.g. showing availability of bikes or parking where none may exist) and mobility operations (e.g. unauthorized tampering with service-related data) may disrupt the whole service. This paper proposes a framework for secure bike sharing service under multi-modal journey environment using symmetric key encryption and digital signature. Our proposal lets a service provider to collect information from stations and external service providers, and communicate with users in a secure way so that the user gets correct information and a quality service. The proposed framework has the potential to offer enhanced quality of service through security features compared to existing systems for multi-modal transport users.

KeyWords: Bike Sharing System, Multi-modal Journey, IoT, Security

I. INTRODUCTION

Attention on intelligent transport systems as a sustainable solution has been accelerated in recent days due to its impact on reduced energy consumption and environment pollution. Bike Sharing Systems (BSS) are one of the major components of intelligent transport systems in smart cities. A numerous number of cities around the world offers bike sharing (BS) service with thousands of bikes available for sharing. BSS increases flexibility for commuters by allowing convenient access (e.g., pick up or drop off a bike at any station) to on demand-based rides for their daily life. The success of a BSS significantly depends on this flexibility [1].

To ensure a user-focused and robust service, BSSs should be a part of multi-modal journey environment [2] such that a user can plan her whole journey conveniently. BSS should offer services (e.g., cycle availability, reservation) to both bike users and Bike Sharing Service Operators (BSSOs) (e.g., bike distribution service, empty or overfilled station monitoring and management). BSSOs need to overcome a number of challenges in bike distribution and multi-modal service integration. User demand is typically unpredictable, and may fluctuate throughout a day due to factors like weather conditions, city events, traffic conditions, and so on. All these factors lead to

an imbalanced distribution of the bikes over time and space. Sensor-integrated smart bikes, along with their users' sensor-rich internet-enabled smartphones, will enable IoT(Internet of Things)-integrated BSSs [3]. IoT-integrated BSSs using physical as well as participatory sensing (PS) can provide BSS-related information including real-time information about the users' mobility patterns and demands.

Security of Bike Sharing Services

Security of a bike sharing service for multi-modal journey is important due to the nature of service and its impact on overall transport management. Manipulation of logistics (e.g. showing availability of bikes or parking where none may exist) data and mobility operations (e.g. unauthorized tampering with service-related data) may disrupt the whole service. If a user receives falsified information (due to adversarial attacks), then there is a high probability that she arrives at an empty bike station when starting the trip, or to an overfilled bike station when returning the bike. These situations will delay operations and create a bad customer experience. Also, mobile applications often log location information which may be stored insecurely. For example, traffic information and navigation services are often provided in exchange for collecting location, speed, and other information that is used to improve the quality and coverage of the service provided [4]. However, if the service provider has no security policy, then sensitive bike user data may be compromised, or the service itself may be manipulated (e.g. showing traffic congestion where none may exist). Authentication is important because parties (i.e., users and service providers) to communicate must also trust that they are speaking to a legitimate counterparty, rather than a third party that may be masquerading as the communication partner. Data transmitted can be captured by a third party that situates itself between two parties in the communications media. For bike sharing services, the integrity and confidentiality of services for road users are important. Bike user's integrity focuses on the integrity of data being stored in bikes or other connected IoT devices. User authentication controls are designed to verify an identity to process ticketing, reserving, parking services. User's privacy policies should obfuscate data to preserve the confidentiality of user data that may be fraudulently used for other purposes by an attacker. Such private data may include origin and destination location, route, speed, and other data generated by journey planning systems,

bikes or connected devices. On the other hand, bike service or external service operators may collect traffic, weather, parking, and multi-modal connections data, and may further process and package various information for dissemination to various communication channels (e.g. other service provider partners). Security controls must be applied to ensure the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of information to ensure that correct data is exchanged among authentic operators so that users do not get misinformed. Moreover, service providers need to authenticate the identity of the other party before transmitting data to prevent the disclosure of data.

Our Contribution In this paper, we propose a secure bike sharing system. The proposal consists of two algorithms. The first algorithm allows a user to reserve a bike and parking space according to her journey plan (immediate or future) through her multi-modal journey planning application. The bike sharing system securely receives the user's request and communicates securely with the source and destination bike stations to reserve a bike for the user. In the second algorithm, we show how bike distribution management can be done in a secure way so that the system can distribute bikes to various stations according to the real-time demand. The dynamic nature of the distribution system allows it to handle both immediate and future journey demands of the users.

Considering the security issues in the BSS discussed previously and the potential of IoT in BSSs, this paper:

- summarizes a set of services and security requirements for a bike sharing system
- proposes a secure bike sharing and distribution system that has both operator-driven and user-driven functionalities supporting demand-driven reservations for immediate and future journey. Informally, the system provides security as follows:
 - Unless an attacker obtains user's private key or system-wide shared key, no one can impersonate a valid user or a component of the system name, respectively. An attacker cannot obtain the keys as it cannot break the underlying encryption scheme.
 - An attacker cannot falsify a valid information (e.g., bike or parking reservation request, reservation confirmation, external information on weather, event, traffic, etc.) as it is unable to obtain the digital signature key pairs of the system components. Thus the integrity of the information and authenticity of the valid system components are achieved.
 - Since the descriptions of a reserved bike or parking are sent to the user in encrypted form, an attacker cannot link a user's id to a particular bike or parking reservation information. Thus confirming data confidentiality.
- provides security analysis and comparison, in terms of features, with the existing bike sharing systems in the literature.

II. PREVIOUS WORK

The imbalanced distribution of bikes is a recurrent problem for BSSOs. Rebalancing or redistribution of bikes requires significant logistic work and poses major operational costs to operators. A solution to this problem should know the optimal time, the number of bikes should be removed or placed in each station (e.g., inventory decision) and the way (e.g., cost-effective distribution truck routing) to balance the system. Many solutions have been proposed and these solutions can be divided into two categories: user-driven [1], [5], [6], [7] and operator-driven [8], [9], [10], [11]. In a user-driven approach, the users are incentivized to balance BSSs, whereas in an operator-driven approach, the redistribution is done by the service staffs. Effective utilization of crowdsourcing [1] make user-driven distribution feasible for mid-term operations, but it is highly unpredictable and unsuitable for guaranteed services, especially for short-term users (e.g., work commuters). On the other hand, most operator-driven solutions (e.g., mathematical programming techniques based [11], [12], data mining-based [13], [14]) rely on historical data to find the optimal time, number of bikes to be removed or placed in each station and the way to redistribute the bikes. Real-time information about bikes and bike users, traffic mobility, demand and other factors (e.g., weather, city events) in rebalancing the system are not considered in most of these solutions. This is a critical issue when offering a guaranteed service to the short-term users, especially if bike sharing is integrated with a multi-modal journey plan. A parking reservation policy could improve service quality by guaranteeing a parking space at a destination bike station. Demand estimation, prediction, and service level computation methods for optimal management of bike sharing services has been considered in [15]. However, none of these proposals provides a framework for secure system that allows for integrating bike sharing system into multi-modal journey environment.

III. IOT-INTEGRATED BSS

A. Overview of BSS

The main characteristics of next generation BSSs are: (i) increased system flexibility (e.g., demand-responsive) (ii) improved bike distribution, (iii) integration with other transportation modes, (iv) smart bikes. Next generation BSSs with these characteristics should offer the following services:

Reservation Service (RS): This service should allow users to reserve and pay from online using their portable devices or computers. Most existing BSSOs do not support online reservation, they only support designated kiosks-based bike rental services. A reservation request can be made by a rider or by a journey planner (if it is a part of a multi-modal journey plan).

Multi-modal Connectivity (MC): This service will connect a BSS with the multi-modal mobility service chain (e.g., train, bus). It is one of the key requirements of next generation BSSs.

Bike and Parking Availability Check (BPAC): BSSOs need to know (in real-time) the number of available bikes and parking spots in every bike station or list of bike stations before accepting users' reservation requests. Once the availability is confirmed at the requester's preferred station, BSSO confirms the reservation request. In case of bike or parking unavailability in a preferred station, BSSO can check with the bike distribution schedule. If distribution happens sufficiently before the requested start time, BSSO may continue with the reservation request. Otherwise, BSSO will offer the requester with few nearest stations to pick from and if she is happy with one of the alternatives, reservation request is confirmed. In most existing BSSs, users can check the station-wise realtime bike availability before renting one, but cannot pre-book a bike or a parking space.

Bike Distribution Service (BDS): An empty or an overfilled station damages not only the goodwill of a BSSO, but also the business directly in terms of money. BDS continuously monitors users' dynamic demand and refine the system accordingly to meet the demands. This service is the heart of a BSS to maintain service quality and satisfy users. In a BSS, this service can be either operator-driven (ODS) or user-driven (UDS). This service will play a key role in integrating BSSs with other transport modes, especially in journey planning.

B. IoT in BSS

BSSs integrated with IoT will be able to gather enormous amount and variety of data generated by the bike users, bikes and environment. These data can be used to improve existing service quality (e.g., improved BDS, bikers' safety). Most existing BSSs are not IoT-integrated and do not offer all the services summarized in the above section. Few initiatives are underway to integrate bikes as a part of an IoT. Number of BSSs or bike vendors are making smart bikes (e.g., GPS tracker, wireless connectivity) to use dumb docking station and/or kiosk free BSSs.

IV. PRELIMINARIES

In this Section, we explain the notations, system components, setup assumptions, the security properties that we achieve, and a management framework of our proposed system.

A. System Components and Model

A Bike Sharing System (BSS) has the following components: Bike & Parking Availability Check (BPAC), Multi-modal Connectivity (MC), Reservation System (RS) and Bike Distribution System (BDS). BDS has the following components: Service Level Manager (SLM), Operator-driven Distribution System (ODS), User-driven Distribution System (UDS) and Inventory Decision Manager (IDM). Different components can communicate with Source Bike Station (SBS), Destination Bike Station (DBS), External Service Providers and Bike Distribution Unit. MC is responsible for communicating with user.

External services include traffic, event, location and sensing information collected through Internet of Things (IoT) devices, data analytics services through cloud, etc.

There are S stations in a BSS, C_i is the parking capacity of the station i , B_T is the total number of bikes running in the BSS, P_T is the total number of available parking

spaces in the BSS such that $\sum_{i=1}^S C_i = B_T + P_T$. The source and destination stations for a bike user are SBS and DBS and the duration of an estimated ride (bike use time) can be estimated using distance between the SBS and DBS or the user provided information during renting or reservation. For the periodic monitoring and operation of a BDS, each day is sliced into 24 time slices as in [16]. The calculations (e.g., demand, reservation threshold) are time slice-specific.

We assume that the BSS management framework has several components. Sensing component consists of sensors and smartphones that are useful for participatory sensing and crowdsourcing. Data management component handles data management, data analysis and demand estimation by integrating heterogeneous sensing, computing and communications devices. The external services layer includes the necessary external services (e.g., weather, location, city events) for different BSSs services.

As discussed earlier, secure multi-modal connectivity and bike distribution schemes are yet to be considered in the BSS level. Section V-B demonstrates the potential of the framework by using it for the proposed BDS.

B. Notations

Table I explains the notations used in this paper.

C. Assumption

It is assumed that BSS is a centralized system where internal components work as different functionalities and the communication between the functionalities is secure. Communication channels between user and BSS, BSS and external service providers, BSS and Bike Distribution Unit, and BSS and Bike Stations are not assumed to be secure. A user registers himself with the system with her ID uid and a shared secret key ku generated by a symmetric key encryption scheme (KCipher-2 [17], for example) through a multi-modal journey planner (MJ), which could be typically a smartphone application software. We assume that MJ can securely collect information on other mode of transportation (e.g., bus or train) from publicly available sources and combine it with bike/parking reservation information to suggest journey options to a multi-modal journey user. MC, BPAC, SLM, SBS, DBS have their digital signature generation and verification key pairs generated by an efficient and secure signature scheme (Schnorr's signature scheme [18], for example.¹) Components of BSS share a symmetric key k with the stations, external service providers and distribution

¹Any high-performance symmetric cipher and signature scheme suitable for embedded systems can be used instead of KCipher-2 or Schnorr signature

Table I
NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER

uid	User ID
J_T	Journey Type
k	Shared Secret Key Among BSS, Stations and Other Service Providers
B_a	Total number of bikes available
B_{Res}	Request for Bike Reservation
P_{rn}	Parking Reservation Needed
P_a	No. of available parking
R_p	No. of reserved parking
R_b	No. of reserved bike
R_{pmax}	Maximum allowable R_p
B_{det}	Bike details
P_{det}	Parking details
ku	user's secret key shared with BSS
B_{au}, P_{au}, R_{pu}	Updated B_a, P_a, R_p
P_{NA}	Parking not available
B_{NA}	Bike not available
D_r, D_e	reservation demand, estimated demand
I_{in}, I_c	initial inventory, current inventory,
S_L	service level of a station
S_{Lt}	target S_L of a day,
S_{Lp}	S_L of previous day
S_{Ld}	allowable service level difference
J_d, U_t	journey destination, bike use time
W_{UDS}	willingness to participate in UDS
sk, vk	signing and verification keys of MC
xs, xv	signing and verification keys of external information provider
as, av	signing and verification keys of BPAC
ss, sv	signing and verification keys of SLM
sg, vg	signing and verification keys of SBS
sr, vr	signing and verification keys of DBS
TB_{inc}	total no. of bikes with incentive
Enc_k	Encryption with key k (Enc_{ku} for key ku)
Dec_k	Decryption with key k (Dec_{ku} for key ku)
$Sign(\cdot)$	Signature with signing key (\cdot)
$Ver(\cdot)$	Signature verification with key (\cdot)

unit. We also assume that BSS, stations, external service providers and distribution units are honest.²

Security Properties: Following the discussion in Section I, we briefly describe the security properties in the context of bike sharing system for multi-modal journey below.

- No Impersonation: No entity shall participate in the system with the identity of another entity.
- Unforgeability: No one should be able to falsify a valid information.
- Confidentiality: Attackers should not be able to link a bike and parking details to a particular user.
- Authenticity and Integrity: Authenticity and integrity of all data exchanged between the entities must be verifiable.

D. Reservation Policy

To integrate a BSS into a multi-modal transport systems, a reservation policy for bikes and parking spaces is necessary. This work considers a station-wise (e.g., stations close to train stations or bus stops) short-term reservation policy that allows a fraction of a station's capacity C_i for reservation. It is divided into R_b and R_p for bike and parking spaces. R_{pmax} and R_{bmax} are dynamic values

²We do not consider key management issues like key revocation, renewal and user revocation in this work.

that may change due to peak-hour demand. This can be estimated using the historical reservation demands data. The relationship $R_p + R_b < C_i$ should be true always for a station.

V. PROPOSED SECURE SYSTEM

A. Secure Multi-modal Connectivity Service

The algorithm 1 presents an implementation of the multi-modal connectivity (MC) service using the proposed framework. The algorithm consists of three phases: (i) service availability check, (ii) reservation for an immediate journey and (iii) reservation for a future journey. The implementation uses BDS, BPAC and RS, and these services use components of the framework to maintain multi-modal connectivity. First, we briefly introduce the algorithm and then we move on to explain it formally.

Phase 1: This phase checks service availability. If a BSS service is available, MC receives a reservation request for a specific journey type from a user through MJ. Based on the journey type, phase 2 or phase 3 is activated.

Phase 2: This phase is active when the reservation request is for immediate journey. Upon forwarding the request to BPAC, MC receives the encrypted bike availability information from SBS. BPAC then sends an encrypted bike reservation request and a signature of the ciphertext to SBS. If the SBS can successfully verify the signature. It then decrypts the ciphertext to check the reservation request, reserves a bike and sends the encrypted details of the reserved bike to RS. If a parking is requested, then DBS sends encrypted parking availability information to RS. RS then encrypts the bike and parking details and sends them to the user. If no parking is available, only reserved bike information is sent to the user. RS updates the number of available bike, parking and reserved parking, and sends them to SBS and DBS in encrypted form.

Phase 3: When a user wants to reserve a bike for future journey then this phase is activated. This phase is almost similar to phase 2, except that the BDS checks the number of reserved bikes at SBS so that it does not go beyond a predefined threshold value). Also, a user may receive an encrypted "bike availability not guaranteed" message (during rush hours or city events when immediate journey reservation gets more priority due to excessive demand, for example).

B. Secure Bike Distribution Service

The proposed BDS is different than the existing operator-driven, user-driven and parking reservation-based BDS as it uses operator-driven and user-driven approaches and supports station-wise demand-driven reservation of bikes and parking spaces. Importantly, it exploits real-time (e.g., users' mobility, bike speed) and non-real-time (e.g., willingness to participate in a UDS W_{UDS}) information about bike users, bikes and environment through IoT-integrated bikes and mobile sensing to improve existing historical data-based demand estimation. Utilizing W_{UDS}

Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Secure Multi-modal Connectivity

```
1: User sends a multi-modal journey plan request to the MJ
2: Phase 1- Service Availability Check
3: if BSS = true then
4:   MJ encrypts reservation request req and  $J_T$  s.t.  $C_0 = Enc_{ku}(req||J_T)$  and sends  $C_0, uid$  to MC via BSS
5:   MC decrypts  $C_0$  using  $ku$  of uid and checks req,  $J_T$ 
6:   if  $J_T = 1$  then ▷ for immediate journey  $J_T = 1$ 
7:     Go to Phase 2
8:   else Go to Phase 3
9:   end if
10: else BSS is unavailable
11: end if
12: Phase 2- Reservation for Immediate Journey
13: MC receives  $C_1 = Enc_k(B_a)$  from SBS using BPAC and computes  $B_a = Dec_k(C_1)$ 
14: if  $B_a > 0$  then
15:   Send  $\{C_2 = Enc_k(B_{Res}), \sigma_1 = Sign_{sk}(C_2)\}$  to SBS for reserving a bike
16:   if  $Ver_{vk}(\sigma_1) == 1$  then
17:      $B_{Res} = Dec_k(C_2)$ , a bike is reserved, send  $C_3 = Enc_k(B_{det}), \sigma_2 = Sign_{sg}(C_2)$  to RS
18:     RS verifies  $\sigma_2$  using vg and decrypts  $C_3$  to get  $B_{det}$ 
19:     if  $P_{rn} = true$  then ▷ if parking is requested
20:       RS receives  $\{C_4 = Enc_k(P_a||P_{det}), C_5 = Enc_k(R_p), \sigma_3 = Sign_{sr}(C_4||C_5)\}$  from DBS
21:       RS verifies  $\sigma_3$  using vr and decrypts  $C_4, C_5$  to get  $P_a, P_{det}, R_p$ 
22:       if  $P_a > 0$  and  $R_p \leq R_{pmax}$  then ▷ if parking is available
23:         Send  $C_6 = Enc_{ku}(B_{det}||P_{det})$  to user ▷ confirmed  $P_{det}, B_{det}$  are sent to user
24:         Send  $C_7 = Enc_k(B_{au}), C_8 = Enc_k(P_{au}), C_9 = Enc_k(R_{pu})$  to SBS and DBS
25:         SBS and DBS decrypt  $C_7, C_8, C_9$  to get updated information
26:       else No parking available ▷  $P_{NA}$  = No parking available
27:       end if
28:     else Send  $C_6 = Enc_{ku}(B_{det}||P_{NA})$  to user ▷ confirmed bike details sent to user
29:     SBS receives  $C_7 = Enc_k(B_{au}), C_8 = Enc_k(P_{au})$  from RS and updates accordingly
30:   end if
31: else Error
32: end if
33: else No bike available at SBS
34:   Send  $C_{12} = Enc_{ku}(B_{NA})$  to user ▷  $B_{NA}$  = Bike not available
35: end if
36: Phase 3- Reservation for Future Journey
37: MC receives  $C_1 = Enc_k(B_a)$  from SBS and computes  $B_a = Dec_k(C_1)$ 
38: if  $B_a > 0$  then
39:   Send  $\{C_2 = Enc_k(B_{Res}), \sigma_1 = Sign_{sk}(C_2)\}$  to SBS for reserving a bike
40:   if  $Ver_{vk}(\sigma_1) == 1$  then
41:      $B_{Res} = Dec_k(C_2)$ 
42:     BDS receives  $\{C_{10} = Enc_k(R_b), \sigma_4 = Sign_{sg}(C_{10})\}$  from SBS, verifies  $\sigma_4$ , computes  $R_b = Dec_k(C_{10})$ 
43:     if  $R_b \leq R_{bmax}$  then ▷ bike reservation allowed
44:       Reserve a bike and parking at the SBS and DBS as in Phase 2
45:     else Bike availability is not guaranteed
46:       Send  $C_{11} = Enc_{ku}(B_{NG})$  to user ▷  $B_{NG}$  = Bike availability not guaranteed
47:     end if
48:   else Error
49:   end if
50: else No bike available
51:   Send  $C_{12} = Enc_{ku}(B_{NA})$  to user ▷  $B_{NA}$  = Bike not available
52: end if
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information received from users during renting or reservation in the BDS's incentive offer will motivate more users to participate in UDS. For instance, if a user gets an incentive offer (e.g., free 10 minutes) for a future distribution at the time of renting or reservation, she can manage her time better than if she gets the offer at the time of a bike return. ODS and UDS approaches are complementary to each other. The former one works mainly to handle the imbalances at a macro level by moving the bikes from a part of the city to the other, and the later one is dynamic and generally works at a micro level, incorporating the traffic flow and fluctuating demands. The BDS incorporates reservation policy to improve service quality, especially for short-term and BSS-integrated multi-modal transport users. A bike user in a multi-modal journey could miss her next mode of transport (e.g., train or bus) because of an empty or a full bike station. Initial distribution is static and generally operates during the night time when the congestion and demands are low.

A key factor to the success of a BSS is its reliable handling capability of its dynamic demands. To cope with dynamic demands, the BDS aims to improve the dynamic demand estimation method [15], using high resolution and real-time, and non-real-time information about the bike users, reservation demands, application environments (e.g., stations road condition), weather, city events, etc. The inventory, optimal time and route decision mechanisms are briefly mentioned in the following.

Bike users' type (e.g., registered, casual, short-term), which directly influences bikers' behavior model, can play an important role in type-wise bike demand estimation, BDS (e.g., user-driven distribution) implementation and improving service quality (e.g., offering reservation for short-term users). Bike users can be registered (i.e., yearly or monthly) or casual (e.g., tourists), which also can be short-term users (e.g., 30-45 minutes) or medium-term users (e.g., more than 30-45 minutes). If D_e is the estimated bike demand for a station, it can be expressed as a linear combination of the estimated non-reservation demand D_{enr} and estimated reservation demand D_{pr} as: $D_e = \alpha D_{enr} + \beta D_{pr}$, where α and β are demand sharing factors such that $\alpha + \beta = 1$. Likewise, we can estimate parking demand D_{pe} for a station. D_e and D_{pe} represent target inventory of a station for a specific time period such that $D_e + D_{pe} \leq C$. In a system, user-driven BDS DS_u and operator-driven BDS DS_o complements each other, where DS_u and DS_o are functions of D_e and D_{pe} . Especially, DS_u is a function that takes as input estimated non-reserved bike and parking demands (D_{enr}, D_{penr}) and outputs the current demand estimation of a particular time slot during a BDS, where $DS_u = D_{penr} - D_{enr}$.

Once the target inventory information (D_e, D_{pe}) are available, it is important to estimate whether near future's UDS will be able to maintain the target inventory or not. If not, an ODS should be operated based on service level (service level = (number potential of customers - number of unsatisfied customers)/ number of potential

customers; where the "number of unsatisfied customers" corresponds to the customers who could not rent a bike at an empty station or failed to return their bike at a full station.), which is continuously computed using users feedback. If the service level drops below a pre-determined threshold value, ODS is operated. An optimal routing mechanism of a distributor truck our algorithm utilizes the method described in [7]. Algorithm 2 describes the BDS framework formally.

VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

A. Security

- *No Impersonation*: Unless an attacker obtains user's private key ku or system-wide shared key k , no one can participate in the system in user's name or in system's name, respectively. Also, the key k is assumed to be securely stored with the BSS and other entities. So, the attacker can not break into them. If an attacker seeks to determine the keys from the public information, then he must use one of the following methods:
 - 1) The attacker derives ku : this requires breaking the security of underlying symmetric key encryption scheme. Note that, ku is available to BSS and the user only.
 - 2) The attacker gets k from the communication channel between BSS and other entities (i.e., stations, distribution unit and external service providers). In order to do so, he needs to break the security of underlying symmetric key encryption scheme.
- *Unforgeability*: An attacker cannot obtain $\{sk, vk\}, \{xs, xv\}, \{as, av\}, \{ss, sv\}, \{sg, vg\}$ and $\{sr, vr\}$ key pairs to forge MC, external service providers, BPAC, SLM, source station and destination station, respectively. The attacker needs to break the unforgeability property of the underlying signature scheme. This analysis confirms that an attacker cannot generate a valid message-signature pair where the message has not been signed by the legitimate signer.
- *Confidentiality*: Since the descriptions of a reserved bike or parking is encrypted and sent to the user, an attacker cannot link a user id to a particular bike or parking reservation information. The attackers will have to break the security of underlying encryption scheme to be able to link a biker's id and her reserved bike/parking information.
- *Authentication and Integrity*:
 - 1) Request req : Authenticity and integrity of the requests req sent by the MC, BPAC and SLM are preserved due to the use of Schnorr signature scheme. No other entity other than the MC, BPAC and SLM can generate a valid signature while sending req to the stations. Also, req cannot be modified by an adversary since the integrity of req is verifiable through the signature.

Algorithm 2 Algorithm for Secure Bike Distribution System

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1: Phase 1- Static Inventory
2: For each station  $i$ , IDM gets  $\{C_1 = Enc_k(D_r), C_2 = Enc_k(I_{in})\}$  from  $i$  through MC or RS and computes
    $\{D_r = Dec_k(C_1), I_{in} = Dec_k(C_2)\}$ 
3: IDM estimates demand  $D_e$ 
4: IDM gets  $S_{Lt}, S_{Ld}, S_{Lp}$  from SLM
5: if  $S_{Lt} - S_{Lp} > S_{Ld}$  then  $\triangleright S_{Lt} = \lfloor \text{avg. } S_L \text{ on that day} + (\text{current } S_L - S_{Lp}) \rfloor$ 
6:   Computes distribution request ( $D_{dr} = |I_{in} - I_c|$ ) and sends to ODS
7:   ODS computes  $C_3 = Enc_k(D_{dr})$  and sends to distribution unit
8:   Distribution Unit decrypts  $C_3$  using shared key  $k$  to get  $D_{dr}$ , and sends bikes accordingly
9: end if
10: Phase 2- User Driven System
11: for each time slot do
12:   UDS and IDM get  $\sigma = Sign_{xs}(\text{external information})$ 
13:   UDS and IDM Verify  $\sigma$  using  $xv$ 
14:   for each station  $i$  do
15:     BPAC and SLM send signed requests  $\{req, \sigma_1 = Sign_{as}(req)\}$  and  $\{req, \sigma_2 = Sign_{ss}(req)\}$  to  $i$ 
16:     station  $i$  verifies  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$  using  $av$  and  $sv$ , respectively
17:     station  $i$  sends  $C_4 = Enc_k(I_c)$  and  $C_5 = Enc_k(S_L)$  to BPAC and SLM, respectively
18:     BPAC and SLM decrypt  $C_4$  and  $C_5$  to get  $I_c$  and  $S_L$ , and forward them to UDS
19:     UDS receives  $C_6 = Enc_k(J_d || U_t || W_{UDS})$  from  $i$ , decrypts them, and computes  $DS_u$ 
20:     IDM estimates bike and parking demand  $D_e$  for next time slot and sends it to UDS
21:     SLM receives external information from UDS, and computes  $S_{Lt}$  from them
22:     SLM shares  $S_{Lt}, S_{Ld}$  with UDS
23:     while  $TB_{inc} \leq B_{max}$  do  $\triangleright B_{max} = \text{maximum no. of bike}$ 
24:       if  $S_{Lt} - S_L > S_{Ld}$  and  $D_e > I_c + DS_u$  then
25:         Offers encrypted incentive to  $W_{UDS}$  users  $C_7 = Enc_{ku}(inc)$  via MC
26:         if not sufficient response from users then
27:           UDS offers other users to participate
28:         end if
29:       end if
30:       Update  $DS_u$ 
31:     end while
32:      $S_c = S_c + 1$   $\triangleright S_c = \text{Stations performing critically}$ 
33:   end for
34:   go to Phase 3
35: end for
36: Phase 3- Dynamic Operator Driven System
37: ODS gets the  $DS_u$  of critical stations from UDS
38: if  $S_c > S_{cth}$  then  $\triangleright S_{cth} = \text{number of critically performing stations allowed before ODS}$ 
39:   ODS computes  $C_3 = Enc_k(D_{dr})$  and sends  $C_3$  to distribution unit  $\triangleright D_{dr} = D_e - I_c - DS_u$ 
40:   Distribution Unit decrypts  $C_3$  using shared key  $k$  to get  $D_{dr}$ , and sends bikes accordingly
41: end if
42: Go to phase 2
```

- 2) User Authentication: A user is authenticated by the system by her uid . The system has stores uid and the corresponding key ku in its database. When a user sends encrypted req, J_T (under her key ku) to the system, the system looks up its database using uid and authenticates the user if it can decrypt the received ciphertext. As an attacker cannot get ku , he cannot authenticate himself with the system.
- 3) Service information: Authenticity and integrity of the external information of each information service providers are also achieved. Each ser-

vice provider signs its information before sending them to UDS and IDM. In order to break the authenticity and integrity, an attacker needs to break the unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme.

B. Evaluation

Table II summarizes a comparative evaluation between our proposed system and existing BDS schemes in terms of type, integration of multi-modal journey, reservation options, types of information used, authenticity, integrity, unforgeability, no impersonation, and confidentiality. It

shows that our proposed system has the potential to perform better both in terms of security and features in next-generation BSSs compared to most existing BDS.

Table II
COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK

	This Work	[1]	[12]	[16]
Type	ODS, UDS	UDS	ODS	ODS, UDS
Reservation Support	Bike, Parking	No	Parking	Bike, Parking
Information Source	real-time, historical	historical	historical	real-time, historical
Multi-modal Journey Support	Yes	No	No	Yes
Authenticity	Yes	No	No	No
Integrity	Yes	No	No	No
Unforgeability	Yes	No	No	No
No Impersonation	Yes	No	No	No
Confidentiality	Yes	No	No	No

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This paper proposes a framework for secure bike sharing service under multi-modal journey environment using symmetric key encryption and digital signature. Through this framework, a service operator can collect relevant information from stations and external service providers, and can communicate with users in a secure way to provide correct information to a user. The framework allows to maintain a flow of correct data throughout the system so that the service is not disrupted. The proposal, using IoT-provided real-time and non-real-time information, has the potential to offer better service quality compared to most existing BDS, especially to BSS-integrated multi-modal transport users in smart cities.

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