

EDWIN HU

Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F St NE, MS 4020
Washington, D.C. 20549

Last Updated: 2018-07-05
☎: (202) 551-8993
✉: eddyhu at g m a i l dot com
🌐: edwinhu.github.io

RESEARCH AND INTERESTS

Financial markets regulation, market microstructure, financial intermediation, causal inference.

EXPERIENCE

June 2016–Present: Financial Economist Fellow
Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.
[Division of Economic and Risk Analysis](#)

- I study the economic implications of rulemaking on financial markets.
 - I conducted [independent research](#) suggesting that 'speed bumps' may improve market quality, (see coverage in [Wall Street Journal](#)).
 - I conducted [independent research](#) suggesting that fragmentation of closing auction liquidity is not related to in-efficient price discovery, contrary to claims by incumbent exchanges.
- I am involved in modernizing the Commission's technology infrastructure through data science and cloud-computing initiatives.
 - I led the development of the DERA Open Source Analytics Server (R/Python Jupyter Notebook environment with custom environment support).
- I coordinate with SROs to acquire and construct regulatory datasets.
 - FINRA off-exchange trade executions reported to the Trade Reporting Facilities.

EDUCATION

2010–2016 [Rice University](#)

- Ph.D, M.A. [Finance](#). Jones Graduate School of Business.

2006–2010 [University of Washington](#)

- B.S. [Applied and Computational Mathematical Sciences](#).
- B.S. [Economics](#) *Cum Laude*.

WORKING PAPERS

Loan Syndication Networks *with Ioannis Spyridiopoulos*

We document a positive relationship between lender network centrality and the ability to offer competitive bids in syndicated lending markets. Better connected lenders are more likely to syndicate loans as lead arrangers, and provide lower costs of borrowing. We exploit exogenous variation in network structure resulting from bank mergers to provide evidence that greater connectivity reduces firms' costs of borrowing. The effects are larger for borrowers with

higher levels of information asymmetry—consistent with recent theory suggesting that superior networking facilitates information sharing and coordination.

[Intentional Access Delays, Market Quality, and Price Discovery: Evidence from IEX Becoming an Exchange](#)

- Covered in the [Wall Street Journal](#), [Globe and Mail](#), [Traders Magazine](#), [TabbFORUM](#)

This paper exploits cross-sectional variation in trading activity and the staggered securities phase-in when the Investors Exchange (IEX) becomes a national securities exchange to study the effects of intentional access delays on market quality and price discovery. Market quality improves after IEX becomes an exchange for securities with high historical IEX market share. Price discovery improves overall, although IEX's contribution to price discovery remains small. Intermarket Sweep Order activity decreases overall, coinciding with improvements in price discovery. In a second natural experiment where IEX's ECN goes dark in 28 symbols there is no change in market quality or price discovery. The findings in this paper suggest that protected markets with symmetric speed bumps may be a feasible solution to deemphasize speed in lieu of regulatory intervention.

[Does the PIN Model Mis-Identify Private Information and If So, What are our Alternatives?](#) *with Jefferson Duarte, and Lance Young*

- **Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Financial Economics**
- Presented at Rice University (2015), Texas A&M (2015*), Multinational Finance Society Conference (MFS, 2015*) **Best Paper Award**, China International Finance Conference (CICF, 2015*), Society of Financial Econometrics Conference (SoFiE, 2015*), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México Conference (ITAM, 2015*), American Finance Association Conference (AFA, 2016), University of Washington (2016*), University of Virginia (McIntire) (2017*), Southern Methodist University (2017*).
- **Data and Previous Refereed Versions**

We show that the PIN model is no more useful in identifying private-information arrival than simply looking at whether turnover is above average or not. This calls into question PIN as a measure of private information since turnover varies for many reasons unrelated to private-information arrival. We also examine an alternative to the PIN model, the Odders-White and Ready (2008) model. Our tests indicate that measures of private information based on the Odders-White and Ready (2008) model are promising alternatives to PIN.

[Credit Be Dammed: The Impact of Banking Deregulation on Economic Growth](#) *with Elizabeth Berger, Alexander Butler, and Morad Zekhnini*

- **Revise and Resubmit Journal of Financial Intermediation**
- Presented at Rice University (2012*), Financial Management Association Conference (FMA 2013), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2014*), Fordham University (2014*), University of Cincinnati (2014*), University of Kentucky (2014*), Yale School of Management (2015*).

We document a positive effect of financial integration on economic growth. Using US state-by-state financial deregulations, we find that economic growth occurred in states where bank deregulation solved a capital immobility problem. We use a matching method that constructs

synthetic counterfactual states to identify the channels that link bank deregulation to financial integration, and thereby to economic growth. Our results reveal a correlation between financial integration and subsequent banking sector changes including improved bank efficiency, better lending and borrowing rates, and an expansion in loan recipients. We show that financial integration democratizes lending and spurs economic growth.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Information Diffusion in Institutional Investor Networks

POLICY WORK

[Bats Market Close: Off-Exchange Closing Volume and Price Discovery](#)

- First SEC economic analysis to use regulatory audit trail and TRF data.
- Led to NYSE cutting its top tier MOC fees by two-thirds.

We analyze the correlation among closing price discovery and closing price efficiency—two established metrics from the academic finance literature—with off-exchange trading activity at the close. We analyze equity securities trading and quotation data during the first quarter of 2017 to determine the amount of closing auction volume, the amount of off-exchange Market-on-Close (MOC) activity, and estimates of closing price discovery and efficiency.

[Tick Size Pilot Program and Market Quality](#) *with Paul Hughes, John Ritter, Patti Vegella, and Hao Zhang*

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

- SEC Quant Brown Bag co-coordinator (2016–Present)
- DERA Cybersecurity Working Group (2017–Present)
- CICF Hangzhou 2017 discussant
- FMA International 2016 program committee
- FMA Chicago 2013 discussant

SKILLS

Data analysis, financial econometrics, high performance scientific computing, parallel computing, data visualization, causal inference.

Python, SAS, STATA, SQL, R, bash, git

CITIZENSHIP

USA (Born)

REFERENCES

Jefferson Duarte
Associate Professor of Finance and
Gerald D. Hines Associate Professor of Real Estate Finance
Rice University
713-348-6137
Jefferson.Duarte@rice.edu

Alexander W. Butler
Professor of Finance
Rice University
713-348-6341
Alex.Butler@rice.edu

Kerry E. Back
J. Howard Creekmore Professor of Finance
Professor of Economics
Rice University
713-348-4168
Kerry.E.Back@rice.edu

Jeffrey H. Harris
Gary D. Cohn Goldman Sachs Chair in Finance
American University
202-885-6669
jharris@american.edu