

## INTRODUCTION


- Boot loader for embedded systems
  - No run time configuration
  - Minimalistic design
- Focus on security and boot time
- Production software download
  - USB HS transfer speeds of 20 MBytes/s
- Software update primitives
  - A / B system switching to support atomic updates
  - Rollback

### SECURE BOOT - BASICS

- Why secure boot?
  - Prevent malicious software from running
  - Supply chain integrity

# CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURE


Software image HASH



SHA512

Encrypt hash

2b09d05a5f85075a6497307fc0 0971e6206dad99e36e90f3a8be 209d806d4b76c1b6d0f6920c7 5f5a3653310c0a9948f29899cd 683c0bcb96b2d97eabd48c3d5



RSA4096



Private key




Software image

Signature

# Software image

Signature


#### HASH



SHA512

2b09d05a5f85075a6497307fc0 0971e6206dad99e36e90f3a8be 209d806d4b76c1b6d0f6920c7 5f5a3653310c0a9948f29899cd 683c0bcb96b2d97eabd48c3d5


Decrypt hash



RSA4096

2b09d05a5f85075a6497307fc0 0971e6206dad99e36e90f3a8be 209d806d4b76c1b6d0f6920c7 5f5a3653310c0a9948f29899cd

683c0bcb96b2d97eabd48c3d5





### ROOT OF TRUST

- Public keys used for image verification must be fused into the CPU
- Size of the keys are unpractical to store in OTP fuses due to size
- Hash of public keys are stored in OTP fuses which can not be changed
- Every boot the mask rom compares stored public keys hash to the stored OTP hash

Software image

Public key

Signature

# WHAT PROBLEMS CAN PUNCHBOOT SOLVE

- Secure boot
  - · Load and authenticate next software image
  - Cryptographic accelerators for computing hash'es and signatures
  - · One hash and one signature for the complete image which might contain several images
- Production software download
  - Recovery mode allows high speed USB transfers which saves time in software download cell
  - Directly download boot loader image, kernel image and root filesystems
- Day-to-day development
  - Recovery mode can load images into RAM and execute them


# PROBLEMS PUNCH BOOT DOES NOT SOLVE

- Punchboot does not secure the entire device
  - Root filesystem integrity is not covered
  - There are many ways to make a device insecure even if the boot loader is secure
- · It does not provide a complete strategy for key management
- Punchboot is not tested in battle (yet)

### DESIGN

- · C99
- Supports ARMv7a and ARMv8 architectures
- GUID Partition Table (GPT) support
- A/B atomic updates and rollback support
- Platform support for IMX6UL, IMX8M, IMX8X
- Released under BSD 3

#### A/B system update and rollback logic



Recovery mode

- · If there is no active boot partition
- · If the active partition is corrupt
- External event.
- Recovery mode will automatically reset the device after a specified amount of time
- Authentication cookie (in v0.2 or v0.3)

#### PUNCHBOOT CLI

- Supports different communication backends
  - USB
  - Domain socket (for testing)
- Can easily be integrated into other tools

```
--- Punch B00T 3c0e ---
```

#### Bootloader:

```
punchboot boot -w -f <fn>
punchboot boot -r

punchboot boot -b -s A or B

punchboot boot -x -f <fn> [-s A or B]

punchboot boot -a -s A, B or none
```

- Install bootloader
- Reset device
- BOOT System A or B
- Load image to RAM and execute it
- Activate system partition

#### Device:

```
punchboot dev -l
punchboot dev -i [-f <fn>] [-y]
punchboot dev -w [-y]
```

- Display device information
- Perform device setup
- Lock device setup

#### Partition Management:

```
punchboot part -l
punchboot part -w -n <n> -f <fn>
punchboot part -i
```

- List partitions
- Write 'fn' to partition 'n'

#### PBIMAGE TOOL



#### PB Image manifest

[pbimage]

```
key_index = 1
key_source = ../pki/prod_rsa_private.der
output = jiffy.pbi

[component]
type = ATF
load_addr = 0x80000000
file = /work/imx-atf/build/imx8qxp/release/bl31.bin

[component]
type = DT
load_addr = 0x82000000
file = /work/linux-imx/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/jiffy.dtb

[component]
type = LINUX
load_addr = 0x82020000
file = /work/linux-imx/arch/arm64/boot/Image
```

#### Supported boot modes for IMX8X / M

• ATF+DT+LINUX

• ATF+DT+LINUX+TEE

v0.3

Loading auxiliary M4 core


# MODULE AND INTEGRATION TESTS

Test suite runs in QEMU

• 85 % coverage

- Integration tests also cover support tools
- Static code analysis performed with synopsys coverity

#### 15 MByte boot image on IMX8X



- Blockdev read
- SHA256
- RSA Signature

