

INTRODUCTION


- Boot loader for embedded systems
 - No run time configuration
 - Minimalistic design
 - Good test coverage
- · Focus on security and boot time while still being useable for day-to-day development
- Production software download
 - USB HS transfer speeds of 20 MBytes/s
 - Complete unit provisioning using only USB
- Software update primitives
 - A / B system switching to support atomic updates
 - Rollback

SECURE BOOT - BASICS

- Why secure boot?
 - Prevent malicious software from running
 - Supply chain integrity

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURE


Software image HASH



SHA512

Encrypt hash

2b09d05a5f85075a6497307fc0 0971e6206dad99e36e90f3a8be 209d806d4b76c1b6d0f6920c7 5f5a3653310c0a9948f29899cd 683c0bcb96b2d97eabd48c3d5



RSA4096



Private key




Software image

Signature

Software image

Signature


HASH



SHA512

2b09d05a5f85075a6497307fc0 0971e6206dad99e36e90f3a8be 209d806d4b76c1b6d0f6920c7 5f5a3653310c0a9948f29899cd 683c0bcb96b2d97eabd48c3d5


Decrypt hash



RSA4096

2b09d05a5f85075a6497307fc0 0971e6206dad99e36e90f3a8be 209d806d4b76c1b6d0f6920c7 5f5a3653310c0a9948f29899cd

683c0bcb96b2d97eabd48c3d5





ROOT OF TRUST

- Public keys used for image verification must be fused into the CPU
- Size of the keys are unpractical to store in OTP fuses due to size
- Hash of public keys are stored in OTP fuses which can not be changed
- Every boot the mask rom compares stored public keys hash to the stored OTP hash

Software image

Public key

Signature

WHAT PROBLEMS CAN PUNCHBOOT SOLVE

- Secure boot
 - · Load and authenticate next software image
 - Cryptographic accelerators for computing hash'es and signatures
 - · One hash and one signature for the complete image which might contain several images
- Production software download
 - Recovery mode allows high speed USB transfers which saves time in software download cell
 - · Directly download boot loader image, kernel image and root filesystems
- Day-to-day development
 - Recovery mode can load images into RAM and execute them


PROBLEMS PUNCH BOOT DOES NOT SOLVE

- Punchboot does not secure the entire device
 - Root filesystem integrity is not covered
 - There are many ways to make a device insecure even if the boot loader is secure
- · It does not provide a complete strategy for key management
- Punchboot is not tested in battle (yet)

DESIGN

- · C99
- Supports ARMv7a and ARMv8 architectures
- GUID Partition Table (GPT) support
- Uses crypto hardware for fast hashing and signature verification (CAAM on imx)
- A/B atomic updates and rollback support
- Platform support for IMX6UL, IMX8M, IMX8X
- Released under BSD 3

Code organisation - overview



Building and common build options

make BOARD=imx8qxpmek LOGLEVEL=<n>

- CROSS_COMPILER for specifying toolchain
- TIMING_REPORT Disables all uart output but as a last step before jumping to the image entry point it will print a timing report for the different steps in the boot process
- BOARD_DIR=<...> (v0.3)
- Special build target 'test' to invoke test suite

0: No uart output

1: Errors only

2: Info and errors

3: Verbose

MODULE AND INTEGRATION TESTS

Test suite runs in QEMU

• 85 % coverage

- Integration tests also cover support tools
- Static code analysis performed with synopsys coverity

Recovery mode

- · If there is no active boot partition
- If the active partition is corrupt
- External event
- Recovery mode will automatically reset the device after a specified amount of time if USB does not enumerate (v0.2)
- Authentication cookie (in v0.2 or v0.3)

PUNCHBOOT CLI

- Supports different communication backends
 - USB
 - Domain socket (for testing)
- Can easily be integrated into other tools
- Punchboot library for integrating into other Tools and environments (v0.3)

--- Punch B00T 3c0e ---

Bootloader:

```
punchboot boot -w -f <fn>
punchboot boot -r

punchboot boot -b -s A or B

punchboot boot -x -f <fn> [-s A or B]

punchboot boot -a -s A, B or none
```

- Install bootloader
- Reset device
- BOOT System A or B
- Load image to RAM and execute it
- Activate system partition

Device:

```
punchboot dev -l
punchboot dev -i [-f <fn>] [-y]
punchboot dev -w [-y]
```

- Display device information
- Perform device setup
- Lock device setup

Partition Management:

```
punchboot part -l
punchboot part -w -n <n> -f <fn>
punchboot part -i
```

- List partitions
- Write 'fn' to partition 'n'

PUNCHBOOT IMAGE (PBI)

Image header

Component 0 header

Component 15 header

Component 0 data

Component 15 data

```
struct pb_image_hdr {
    uint32_t header_magic;
    uint32_t header_version;
    uint32_t no_of_components;
    uint32_t key_index;
    uint32_t _reserved[23];
    uint8_t sign[1024];
    uint32_t sign_length;
    uint32_t _reserved2[4];
} _attribute__ ((packed));
```

```
struct pb_component_hdr {
   uint32_t comp_header_version;
   uint32_t component_type;
   uint32_t load_addr_low;
   uint32_t load_addr_high;
   uint32_t component_size;
   uint32_t component_offset;
   uint32_t _reserved[16];
} _attribute__ ((packed));
```

Max 16 components, Image always contains 16 Component headers even if All are not used

PBIMAGE TOOL



PB Image manifest

[pbimage]


```
key_index = 1
key_source = ../pki/prod_rsa_private.der
output = jiffy.pbi

[component]
type = ATF
load_addr = 0x80000000
file = /work/imx-atf/build/imx8qxp/release/bl31.bin

[component]
type = DT
load_addr = 0x82000000
file = /work/linux-imx/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/jiffy.dtb

[component]
type = LINUX
load_addr = 0x82020000
file = /work/linux-imx/arch/arm64/boot/Image
```

A/B system update and rollback logic



Supported boot modes for IMX8X / M


• ATF+DT+LINUX

• ATF+DT+LINUX+TEE

v0.3

Loading auxiliary M4 core

15 MByte boot image on IMX8X



- Blockdev read
- SHA256
- RSA Signature

