



A Fast Confirmation Rule for Ethereum

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
Section 1

What is a Confirmation Rule?





Canonical Chain





Our Fast Confirmation Rule is an algorithm that enables nodes to identify blocks that will never leave the canonical chain under good network conditions

- It outputs whether a block is **confirmed**.
- Properties of the Confirmation Rule
 - **Safety:** If a block B is confirmed by a validator at a given time, it will be part of the canonical chain forever.
 - **Monotonicity:** Once a block B is confirmed at a given time, it will remain confirmed at all future times.





Our Fast Confirmation Rule is an algorithm that enables nodes to identify blocks that will never leave the canonical chain under good network conditions


➤ It outputs whether a block is **confirmed**.

➤ Properties of the Confirmation Rule

Our focus for today

- **Safety:** If a block B is confirmed by a validator at a given time, it will be part of the canonical chain forever.
- **Monotonicity:** Once a block B is confirmed at a given time, it will remain confirmed at all future times.





Section 2

Why do we need a Fast Confirmation Rule?





Today, we just have finalization

...which takes 13 min in the best-case scenario




How do we know that a block will always be in the canonical chain?



They were useful in PoW world, but not anymore

What about block confirmations?



- For instance, because of balancing attacks



What does a Fast Confirmation Rule give us?

- **Improve Ethereum's UX:**
 - For small value transactions, we don't have to wait for finalization.
 - Reduces risk trade reversals for exchanges that allow to optimistically trade immediately upon deposit.
 - Improve wallets reliability: Some wallets tell users that a transaction is “confirmed” as soon as it is included in a block.
- **Useful for PBS:** Provides block builders with an indication of whether the block that they are building upon is unlikely to be reorged out.





Section 3

Quick recap of the Ethereum's protocol






Gasper Consensus Protocol

- Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus protocol.
- **LMD-GHOST**: A synchronous consensus protocol that determines the canonical chain.
- **Casper FFG**: A partially synchronous gadget that finalizes the blocks outputted by LMD-GHOST.






Gasper






LMD-GHOST Protocol







LMD-GHOST Protocol






LMD-GHOST Protocol






LMD-GHOST Fork-Choice function






LMD-GHOST Fork-Choice function







LMD-GHOST Fork-Choice function





LMD-GHOST Fork-Choice function






A Confirmation Rule Algorithm for LMD-GHOST





Assumptions


- LMD-GHOST votes are delivered by the end of a slot





Assumptions

- LMD-GHOST votes are delivered by the end of a slot



- Max fraction β of the stake of any set of committees is dishonest



😈 $\leq \beta * \text{total_stake}$




😊 $\geq (1-\beta) * \text{total_stake}$






A Confirmation Rule for Ethereum is about LMD-GHOST weight, not chain depth.






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


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
A Confirmation Rule for Ethereum is about LMD-GHOST weight, not chain depth.





A Confirmation Rule for Ethereum is about LMD-GHOST weight, not chain length.

$S(B11) > W * (1/2 + \beta)$



Assume that this block
is canonical


$\beta = 0.2$





A Confirmation Rule for Ethereum is about LMD-GHOST weight, not chain length.

$$\begin{aligned}S(B11) &> W * (1/2 + \beta) \\S(B11) &> 100 * 0.7 \\S(B11) &> 70 \\S(B11) &= 71\end{aligned}$$



Assume that this block
is canonical

$\beta = 0.2$






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
$$S(B12) < W * 1/2$$



A Confirmation Rule for Ethereum is about LMD-GHOST weight, not chain length.

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$S(B11) > W * (1/2 + \beta)$
 $S(B11) > 100 * 0.7$
 $S(B11) > 70$
 $S(B11) = 71$


$S(B12) < W * 1/2$
 $S(B11) < 100 * 0.5$
 $S(B11) < 50$
 $S(B11) = 49$



A Confirmation Rule for Ethereum is about LMD-GHOST weight, not chain length.

Assume that this block
is canonical

$\beta = 0.2$



$S(B11) > W * (1/2 + \beta)$ X

β equivocates

$S(B11) = 71 - 20 = 51$


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
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


What about when we move to the next slot?






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
$$S(B11) = 51 + 80 = 131$$

$$S(B13) = 80$$

- $S(B11) = 131$
- $W * (1/2 + \beta) = 200 * 0.7 = 140$

Assume that this block
is canonical

$\beta = 0.2$





What about when we move to the next slot?


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- $S(B11) = 131$
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- $S(B11) < W * (1/2 + \beta)$


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


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


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


Let us assume we know who is honest






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Let us assume we know who is honest

$$H(B11) > W * \frac{1}{2}$$





Let us assume we know who is honest

$H(B11) > W * \frac{1}{2}$

Never equivocate

Assume that this block
is canonical

$\beta = 0.2$

B10

B11

$W = 100$

$J = 80$

Stake of the honest
validators in the
committee






Let us assume we know who is honest

$$H(B11) > W * \frac{1}{2}$$
$$H(B11) > J * \frac{1}{2} * / (1-\beta)$$

Assume that this block
is canonical

$\beta = 0.2$



Stake of the honest
validators in the
committee





Let us assume we know who

$$J \geq (1-\beta) * W$$
$$J / (1-\beta) \geq W$$

Implies

$$H(B11) > W * \frac{1}{2}$$
$$H(B11) > J * \frac{1}{2} * / (1-\beta)$$

Assume that this block
is canonical

$$\beta = 0.2$$

B11

$$W = 100$$

$$J = 80$$

B10


Stake of the honest
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committee



Let us assume we know who is honest

$$\begin{aligned} H(B11) &> W * \frac{1}{2} \\ H(B11) &> J * \frac{1}{2} / (1-\beta) \\ H(B11) &> 80 * 0.5 * 1/0.8 \\ H(B11) &> 50 \\ H(B11) &= 51 \end{aligned}$$

Implies



Assume that this block
is canonical

$\beta = 0.2$

Stake of the honest
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Let us assume we know who is honest


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Implies

$$P(B11) := H(B11)/J = 51/80$$

Assume that this block
is canonical

$$\beta = 0.2$$



Stake of the honest
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committee



Let us assume we know who is honest


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Implies

$$P(B11) := H(B11)/J = 51/80 \gtrapprox 0.63 > \frac{1}{2} / (1-\beta) = 0.625$$

Assume that this block
is canonical

$$\beta = 0.2$$




Stake of the honest
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


What happens at the next slot?





What happens at the next slot?





What happens at the next slot?


$$H(B11) = 51 + 80 = 131$$

$$P(B11) = H(B11)/J = 131/160 \approx 0.81$$

$$H(B13) = 80$$

Assume that this block
is canonical

$$\beta = 0.2$$





What happens at the next slot?


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$$H(B13) = 80$$

Assume that this block
is canonical

$$\beta = 0.2$$





What happens at the next slot?

$$H(B11) = 51 + 80 = 131$$


$$P(B11) = H(B11)/J = 131/160 \gtrsim 0.81 > \frac{1}{2} / (1-\beta) = 0.625$$

$$H(B11) > W * \frac{1}{2}$$

Assume that this block
is canonical


$$\beta = 0.2$$

$$H(B13) = 80$$






What happens if the next slot is in a new epoch?






What happens if the next slot is in a new epoch?





What happens if the next slot is in a new epoch?





What happens if the next slot is in a new epoch?

$$H(B11) \geq 51 + X$$

$$P(B11) = H(B11)/J \geq (51 + X) / (80 + X)$$

$$H(B13) = 80$$

New epoch

B11

B13

B10

Assume that this block
is canonical


$\beta = 0.2$

$$J = 80 + X$$

X new honest nodes are
added to the committee
of block B13




What happens if the next slot is in a new epoch?





What happens if the next slot is in a new epoch?





What happens if the next slot is in a new epoch?

$$H(B11) \geq 51 + X$$

Add X to both numerator and denominator

$$H(B13) = 80$$

$$P(B11) = H(B11)/J \geq (51 + X) / (80 + X) \geq 51 / 80 \gtrapprox 0.63 > \frac{1}{2} / (1 - \beta) = 0.625$$

New epoch

B11

B13

Assume that this block
is canonical

$$\beta = 0.2$$

B10

$$J = 80 + X$$

X new honest nodes are
added to the committee
of block B13

What happens if the next slot is in a new epoch?

$$H(B11) = 51 + X$$

$$P(B11) = \frac{1}{1+e^{-X}}$$

is

$$\beta = 0.3$$

➤ **$P(B11)$ never decreases**

➤ **$P(B11) > \frac{1}{2} / (1-\beta)$**
means $B11$ is canonical forever



How do we measure $P(B11)$





How do we measure $P(B11)$

$$S(B11) / W > 1/2 + \beta$$



Implies



$$P(B11) = H(B11) / J > 1/2 / (1-\beta)$$






How do we measure $P(B11)$?

- $Q(B11) := S(B11)/W > \frac{1}{2} + \beta$
- implies $P(B11) > \frac{1}{2} / (1 - \beta)$
- which means **B11 is canonical forever**




What about B10 and the other blocks?






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


What about B10 and the other blocks?





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


Section 5


Adding FFG Casper




FFG-Casper and LMD-GHOST




FFG-Casper and LMD-GHOST



FFG-Casper and LMD-GHOST



FFG-Casper and LMD-GHOST





Final rule

- **isLMDConfirmed(B)**





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- **B is not filtered out when considering Casper-FFG**





Final rule

- **isLMDConfirmed(B)**
- **B is not filtered out when considering Casper-FFG**
 - **$\text{epoch}(\text{Justified}(B)) = \text{current_epoch} - 1$**

**B is not filtered out in
the current epoch**



Final rule

- **isLMDConfirmed(B)**
- B is not filtered out when considering Casper-FFG
 - $\text{epoch}(\text{Justified}(B)) = \text{current_epoch} - 1$
 - $\text{FFG_votes}(\text{checkpoint}(B))$
$$\begin{aligned} & - \beta * \text{committee_stake}([\text{first_slot_epoch}, \dots, \text{current_slot}]) \\ & + (1-\beta) * \text{committee_stake}([\text{current_slot}+1, \dots, \text{last_slot_epoch}]) \\ & \geq \frac{2}{3} \text{total_stake} \end{aligned}$$

B is not filtered out in
the current epoch

B is not filtered out in
any future epoch





Final rule

- **isLMDConfirmed(B)**
- B is not filtered out when considering Casper-FFG
 - $\text{epoch}(\text{Justified}(B)) = \text{current_epoch} - 1$
 - **FFG_votes(checkpoint(B))**
$$\begin{aligned} & - \beta * \text{committee_stake}([\text{first_slot_epoch}, \dots, \text{current_slot}]) \\ & + (1-\beta) * \text{committee_stake}([\text{current_slot}+1, \dots, \text{last_slot_epoch}]) \\ & \geq \frac{2}{3} \text{total_stake} \end{aligned}$$

Minimum stake that FFG votes for checkpoint(B) up until the current slot





Final rule

- **isLMDConfirmed(B)**
- B is not filtered out when considering Casper-FFG
 - $\text{epoch}(\text{Justified}(B)) = \text{current_epoch} - 1$
 - $$\begin{aligned} & \text{FFG_votes(checkpoint}(B)\text{)} \\ & - \beta * \text{committee_stake } ([\text{first_slot_epoch}, \dots, \text{current_slot}]) \\ & + (1-\beta) * \text{committee_stake } ([\text{current_slot+1}, \dots, \text{last_slot_epoch}]) \\ & \geq \frac{2}{3} \text{ total_stake} \end{aligned}$$

Minimum stake that FFG votes for checkpoint(B) up until the current slot

Minimum stake that FFG votes for checkpoint(B) from next slot till the end of the epoch



Final rule


- **isLMDConfirmed(B)**
- B is not filtered out when considering Casper-FFG
 - $\text{epoch}(\text{Justified}(B)) = \text{current_epoch} - 1$

Minimum stake that FFG votes for checkpoint(B) up until the current slot

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{FFG_votes(checkpoint(B))} \\ & - \beta * \text{committee_stake } ([\text{first_slot_epoch}, \dots, \text{current_slot}]) \\ & + (1-\beta) * \text{committee_stake } ([\text{current_slot}+1, \dots, \text{last_slot_epoch}]) \\ & \geq \frac{2}{3} \text{ total_stake} \end{aligned}$$

Minimum required FFG stake to justify checkpoint(B)

Minimum stake that FFG votes for checkpoint(B) from next slot till the end of the epoch



Initial Experimental Results



Initial Experimental Results by

Setup

- Run the Confirmation Rule over 6 days
- 56 blocks were detected as re-orged, including a 2-block re-org.
- Confirmation Rule executed by polling a Beacon Node at 10s intervals, rather than executing it at the beginning of each slot
- FFG weight estimated from LDM weight



**Blog post coming
soon. Stay tuned!**





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Results

- **None of the re-orged blocks were confirmed under the rule, no matter how the adversarial thresholds were tuned.**





Initial Experimental Results by




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


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- 56 blocks were detected as re-orged, including a 2-block re-org.
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- FFG weight estimated from LDM weight

If implemented directly into a beacon node,

we expect ≈ 12 sec



Results

- None of the re-orged blocks were confirmed under the rule, no matter how the adversarial thresholds were tuned.






Paper

Our technical report is also linked to the talk description.

If you are interested in implementing this Fast Confirmation Rule, please get in touch with us!

You can find our contact details on the talk page.



Thank you!



Consensus Spec
PR #3339

