

# How long non-finality could kill Ethereum



..or a healthy dose of fear-mongering to get people prioritize this


dapplion

Core dev @ Sigma Prime




The failure mode


# What's finality?




# What's finality?



# A non-finality case




# A non-finality case



Ups! Block A is rejected by a client that has >33% stake


# A non-finality case



Faulty client builds  
its own fork


Other clients build  
on the majority fork

# A non-finality case



# A non-finality case

One of the faulty nodes fails again, considering itself synced at B'




Proposes a very expensive block X''

..that everyone else must process

# (tangent) Skips slots and epoch transitions

1 - Grab  $B'$  post state



2 - Advance post state to  $X''$  slot

3 - Apply  $X''$  block

# (tangent) Skips slots and epoch transitions


```
def process_epoch(state: BeaconState) -> None:
    process_justification_and_finalization(state)
    process_inactivity_updates(state)
    process_rewards_and_penalties(state)
    process_registry_updates(state) # [Modified in Electra:EIP7251]
    process_slashings(state) # [Modified in Electra:EIP7251]
    process_eth1_data_reset(state)
    process_pending_deposits(state) # [New in Electra:EIP7251]
    process_pending consolidations(state) # [New in Electra:EIP7251]
    process_effective_balance_updates(state) # [Modified in Electra:EIP7251]
    process_slashings_reset(state)
    process_randao_mixes_reset(state)
    process_historical_summaries_update(state)
    process_participation_flag_updates(state)
    process_sync_committee_updates(state)
```

x 225 times + hashing!



# A non-finality case


One of the faulty nodes fails again, considering itself synced at B'



Proposes a very expensive block X''


..that everyone else must process

# A non-finality case




The expensive  $X''$  cause other nodes to fall out of sync and start building on new forks

# A non-finality case




# A non-finality case



Branches may lose LMD-Ghost weight due to nodes going offline (full disk)


. . . eventually causing a re-org (too deep for EL)

# A non-finality case




Crashing clients (i.e. OOM) have to sync all forks, from already overwhelmed nodes. Sync issues cause more rogue blocks like X''


**When proposing a block, the set of possible pre-states increases quadratically with time to last finalized checkpoint**



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# Malicious attacks



An attacker can produce this very expensive blocks / attestations and DOS the network

# Malicious attacks

## Blocks

- Require stake
- Must bruteforce a valid proposal slot

## Aggregated attestations

- Require stake
- Must bruteforce a valid aggregator duty

## Unaggregated attestations

- Do not require stake
- If invalid, must target each node




# Past incidents: Mainnet 2023



# Past incidents: Mainnet 2023

A node incorrectly  
considers itself  
synced at an old block



Produces (a lot of)  
attestations that are  
expensive to process

..other clients choke  
attempting to process  
all of them

# Past incidents: Mainnet 2023

Process attestation  
(100 seconds)

Process attestation  
(100 seconds)


Process attestation  
(100 seconds)

Produce block  
(2 seconds)

Work queue is clogged  
with “garbage”

No blocks / attestations  
get produced in time  
= drop in participation

# Past incidents: Medalla event



# Past incidents: Goerli



Potuz @potuz\_eth · Mar 15

Prysm computed erroneously during epoch 242678 that it would be justified at the end of it. The bug was triggered by a combination of massive slashing of Nimbus validators that had occurred not long before and the fact that the network was borderline justifying close to 2/3. 7/12

3



11

2.4K



...



Potuz @potuz\_eth · Mar 15

At the start of epoch 242679 Prysm's validators where erroneously attesting with "source" epoch being 242678, believing it would be justified. But every single block that arrived did not, in fact, justify that epoch, so no block could be head according to prysm. 8/12

1



9

2.3K



...




# Past incidents: PeerDAS devnet

```
[2024-10-25 01:53:17.16] ERROR blockchain: Could not process slots to get payload attribute error=could not process slots: could not process deneb epoch: could not process registry updates: could not get active validator count: could not update committee cache: context deadline exceeded
[2024-10-25 01:53:17.16] INFO blockchain: Called fork choice updated with optimistic block finalizedPayloadBlockHash=0x6250cb5cd6eb
headPayloadBlockHash=0xc8ad3f87a7b9 headSlot=16575
[2024-10-25 01:53:17.17] INFO blockchain: Chain reorg occurred
commonAncestorRoot=0xd79e57606d6aebe6136d06d9ffe9ab146873cd307f19ee8e7035ef0d3989
6059 depth=131725 distance=131735
newRoot=0x2bb1b092deab8e546551ea8c85dc68cd007fd55ff42435b5a7e3c03c5fb0f639
newSlot=16575 newWeight=0
oldRoot=0xc0ecd36fd4e490877402b490e8b061fb687aefdf6643905a5f3b52e4f83700f7
oldSlot=148290 oldWeight=2160000000000
[2024-10-25 01:53:17.19] ERROR sync: Could not handle p2p pubsub error=could not update justified checkpoint: context deadline exceeded
topic=/eth2/0d99d9c5/beacon_block/ssz_snappy
```


# SPIRALOOOR



# Worst case non-finality?



# Worst case non-finality?



Source: [https://hackmd.io/@dapplion/inactivity\\_leak\\_maxeb](https://hackmd.io/@dapplion/inactivity_leak_maxeb)




**What to do**

# Mitigations

- Don't release buggy clients
- Don't run out of resources
  - Disk space
  - Memory
  - CPU time to process canonical things
- Reject expensive useless network objects
  - Attestations
  - Blocks?

## Another trilemma

Resource exhaustion




Timely processing

Liveness



# Don't run out of disk space



Only store states of epochs with blocks

Only store states of valid blocks

Store only every N epochs


**Store states as diffs :)**

# Unfinalized states diffs


Slot diff	Diff size (bytes)	Compute time	Apply time
64	574,203	56 ms	39 ms
32,000	4,983,576	143 ms	55 ms
320,000	8,499,854	151 ms	57 ms
3,200,000	50,795,068	700 ms	127 ms

Diffs against a recent Mainnet state (~200 MB)

# Unfinalized states diffs



# Unfinalized states diffs




# Don't run out of memory

- Tree states :)

# Prioritize useful blocks / attestations

Remember the past incident Mainnet 2023



Work queue is clogged  
with “garbage”

No blocks / attestations  
get produced in time  
= drop in participation

# Prioritize useful blocks / attestations

Priority 0:  
descendants of recent  
heads, production

Produce block  
(2 seconds)

Priority 1:  
else


Process attestation  
(100 seconds)

Process attestation  
(100 seconds)

Process attestation  
(100 seconds)

# Reject certain blocks / attestations

- Dangerous optimizations that can affect liveness





**Next steps**

## Next steps

Run a cyclic non-finality tests of 1 month

Update and deploy attack tools

Progressively harden against the found failure modes = don't wait for mainnet to break

**h/t ethpanda ops**

Non-finality  
could  
kill ethereum



core devs  
will never  
let ethereum  
not finalize



all core  
devs are  
on holiday  
in Thailand



# 99.5%

Average participation in 2024



Core dev, Sigma Prime  
@dapplion