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 - [SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag](#)
 - [SIDtoday Blog](#)
 - [SIDtoday Series](#)
 - [SIGINT Worldwide VTC](#)
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- [SIDtoday Article](#)
 - [Letter to the Editor](#)
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(TS//SI//REL) SIGINT Obtains Details of Usama bin Laden Message to Top al-Qa'ida Leader in Iraq

FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13)
Run Date: 07/18/2007

(TS//SI//REL) In late April 2007, SIGINTers uncovered a message from Usama bin Laden (UBL) intended for al-Qa'ida's #1 man in Iraq: Abu-Ayyub al-Misri. The resulting SIGINT report provided a crucial window into al-Qa'ida's strategic plans and intentions for Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

(TS//SI//REL) The message shed light on UBL's mindset and revealed his knowledge of the current U.S. political situation. Much of the letter presented a timetable for the expansion of the authority of the "Islamic State of Iraq," with UBL apparently believing that they should delay until after an expected US "clash" with Iran or until the US President leaves office or loses authority in Congress. He felt that these events would leave the US in a weak position. Therefore, UBL advised Abu-Ayyub to try to prolong the war until these events took place.

(U//FOUO) Abu-Ayyub al-Misri, the al-Qa'ida leader in Iraq (AFP photo)

(TS//SI//REL) In addition, the letter revealed UBL's great anger towards the UAE for allowing Coalition forces to use UAE's airports and seaports. It further identified the new chief of al-Qa'ida's

external operations as Abu-'Ubaydah al-Misri, who had been charged with directing al-Qa'ida's plans against the UAE.

(TS//SI//REL) UBL's missive was dated 12 February 2007 and was passed via a communications conduit. The movement of the letter from Pakistan to Iran provided the U.S. Intelligence Community with unique insights into the communications path used by senior al-Qa'ida leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan to communicate with al-Qa'ida leaders in Iran and Iraq.

(TS//SI//REL) The full text of the report (3/OO/9464-07) can be found here: [UBL report](#).

(TS//SI//REL) A team of dedicated linguists and analysts in the Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13) collaborated to process this key piece of traffic and partnered with their counterparts in S2I11 (Al-Qa'ida Leadership and Target Pursuit Branch) and S2I12 (CT's Middle East and Iraq Division) to ensure the production of an analytically accurate and comprehensive SIGINT intelligence report.

(TS//REL) The report received rave reviews from senior U.S. policymakers, including the Vice President, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, who retained a copy of the report - a step that was described as "unprecedented."

(U//FOUO) If you have specific questions or comments on this topic, please visit [our homepage](#) or contact us at DL S2I13.

(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED], Chief/S2I13 (Global Jihad Support Network), [REDACTED]s

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- [SIDtoday Blog](#)
- [SIDtoday Series](#)
- [SIGINT Worldwide VTC](#)

- [SIDtoday Article](#)
- [Letter to the Editor](#)
- [SIGINT-y Social Media Page](#)

(U) What Does the Death of Usama bin Laden Mean?

FROM: the SIDtoday Editor

Run Date: 05/17/2011

(U//FOUO) SIDtoday recently met with **Jon Darby** (pictured), SID's Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism, to find out what impact the recent killing of Usama bin Laden is likely to have.

1. Q: (U) In recent years, was Usama bin Laden actually directing al-Qa'ida operations? ...or was he just a symbolic or inspirational figure who had no real control over what al-Qa'ida affiliates around the world were doing?

A: (S//REL) What we're finding from the media seized from his residence is that he was more involved in directing al-Qa'ida operations than we realized. He was definitely more than a symbolic figure. Despite the fact that he was isolated and had to conduct all of his business by courier -- in order to avoid detection -- he was effective as a leader and managed to exert influence. His strategic guidance

to al-Qa'ida was to focus on attacking the US.

2. (U) After 9/11, did NSA ever see reflections of UBL himself or members of his inner circle in SIGINT or did that access shut down completely?

(TS//SI//REL) Our loss of SIGINT access to bin Laden actually occurred prior to 9/11 -- it happened in 1998. After the Embassy bombings in Africa, it was reported in the press that bin Laden was using INMARSAT and we never again saw him in communications. The one possible exception was in late 2001 when we may have gotten intercept of him on the radio in Tora Bora [in Afghanistan]. His #2, Zawahiri, has **never** been seen in SIGINT. However, people in the al-Qa'ida hierarchy at the level just below that -- the #3 leader and below -- who are responsible for coordinating operations abroad have no choice but to communicate electronically, either personally (sporadically) or via communications cut-outs (preferred), and we have seen reflections of them in SIGINT.

3. (U) In NSA's assessment, how important is bin Laden's death in terms of weakening al-Qa'ida and terrorism in general?

(U//FOUO) We believe this was a very significant blow to al-Qa'ida -- the single biggest blow the US has ever dealt them. Bin Laden was the one-and-only leader of al-Qa'ida, a symbolic and unifying figure. He provided operational guidance to affiliates all over the world.

(U//FOUO) It is unclear who will take over that role now that he's gone. Zawahiri comes with baggage -- some members of al-Qa'ida don't like him, and he doesn't have bin Laden's fighter credentials. [Note: Usama bin Laden fought the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980's.] Who will step up? -- it's not clear. There is an opportunity now for us to be assertive in pressing them; they may get careless and leave themselves open for capture.

(S//REL) We are now mining the media captured during the raid on his residence, looking for lead information. It consists of nearly 3 terabits of data. It will take weeks and months to go through it all. An interagency task force has been put together to analyze the data. NSA is participating on that task force. Here at NSA, the SIGINT Forensics Center and many Product Line analysts both here at Fort Meade and in the extended enterprise are also examining the seized media. There's a lot to go around!

(U) Is it possible that al-Qa'ida leaders will compete with each other in a struggle for the top leadership spot?

(U//FOUO) It is possible. There may be personal animosities between members of the organization that we could possibly exploit to create fissures.

4. (U) Has the recent success against UBL given us any lessons learned that we can apply in future to other terrorist targets? ... Any revelations?

(U) There haven't been any major revelations. It was not a surprise that he was living in a populated area -- other al-Qa'ida leaders have been captured in cities in the past. They don't all live in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border].

(U) I think the biggest lesson from this success is to highlight what we already knew: the power of cooperation across the Intelligence Community. No single source of intelligence alone could have

provided enough pieces of the puzzle; it was only through our cooperative efforts that we achieved what we did. SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT all contributed bits and pieces. When SIGINT would run out of leads, HUMINT would provide a clue, and then IMINT would add another key piece of information, and back to SIGINT again. They all played off each other.

(U) At right: The compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where bin Laden was found.

(U) Then, once the IC had put together a complete picture, we worked seamlessly with the military to bring about the successful raid. We saw the power of a true team effort across the US government. Nowadays we cooperate like this all the time, but for people who didn't understand how far the IC has come since 9/11 in terms of working together, this success was a real eye-opener.

(U) Besides the value of teamwork, another lesson learned is the need to be patient. This was a long and difficult problem and we had to stay focused on it, even though there was no tangible reward for our efforts right away.

5. (U) Are there any other thoughts you have for the readers?

(U//FOUO) We're under no illusions that the death of bin Laden will mean the end of al-Qa'ida... this struggle against violent jihadists could go on for decades. But this was a major blow to al-Qa'ida and it's important for all employees to know that NSA was in the middle of the operation right from the very beginning.

(S//SI//REL) For example, we played a key role in identifying the compound where bin Laden was found, and during the raid itself we provided force-protection support for the SEALs. In the aftermath of the raid, we have produced SIGINT on the reactions by governments, intelligence services, and terrorists to the operation. We played a critical role... it simply could not have come off without NSA. I am incredibly proud of all the NSAers, past and present, who contributed to this incredible success.

Comments/Suggestions about this article?

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 - [NSA Rolodex](#)
 - [SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag](#)
 - [SIDtoday Blog](#)
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(U) SIGINT Year in Review, November 2011

FROM: Teresa H. Shea
Director, Signals Intelligence Directorate
Run Date: 11/22/2011

(U) Introduction

(U) Colleagues: As I mark my first anniversary as SIGINT Director, it seems fitting to take a look back on what the SIGINT enterprise accomplished over the past year... and what a year it was! We were challenged with supporting the military campaigns related to the war on terrorism and the crises in the Middle East, natural disasters, global technological changes -- in addition to the ongoing demands of following our enduring targets. Not only did you respond brilliantly to all of these challenges, but you also continued to move forward with long-term enhancements to our capabilities and ways of operating that will pay dividends in the months and years ahead.

(U) As you read this account of what we accomplished together over the last year, I think you will be reminded that it isn't just one person or group that makes us successful, but rather *every* element of the Enterprise plays an indispensable role. In addition, we should always remember that we stand on the shoulders of those who have gone before us that built the SIGINT Enterprise. We owe them all a debt of gratitude.

I. (U) Operations

(S//SI//REL) This has been a milestone year in the **war on terrorism**. Certainly the most powerful and enduring accomplishment was the successful strike against Osama Bin Laden. For nearly a decade a dedicated group of SIGINT professionals would not let go of the search, and their persistence paid off in substantive contributions at critical points on the road to Abbottabad. In the end many of you brought your expertise to bear in the final weeks and hours, resulting in a tremendous outcome in our counterterrorism efforts. Even then you didn't rest on your laurels: you played a significant supporting role a few months later in the operations against Atiyah abd-Rahman in Pakistan and Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen. Key targets continue to be removed from the battlefield as a result of your outstanding SIGINT contributions.



Regional Command Southwest RC(SW) - Afghanistan Intelligence Summary

Period Covered 1800D 19 June to 1759D 20 June 2011

The overall classification of this INTSUM is SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

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Declassify on: 25X1-Human

POC: Fusion Officer: Major [REDACTED] @afg.usmc.smil.mil
SIPR: [REDACTED]
CENTRIXS: [REDACTED] @afgn.centcom.gctf.cmil.mil

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2d Intelligence Battalion, II MEF

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RC(SW), Southwest Analysis Center (SWAC) CENTRIXS Website: [http://\[REDACTED\]](http://[REDACTED])

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AOI

(U) Pakistan After the UBL Raid: Status of U.S. Relations and Internal Strife

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

- Pakistan continues to suffer from the destabilizing affects of civil unrest and international criticism in the wake of the 2 May Bin Laden raid.
- In addition to strained U.S. relations, Pakistan is experiencing a strong backlash from extremist organizations who feel the Government of Pakistan is weak and complicit with Western Powers.

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Analyst Assessment: *Pakistan continues to suffer from the destabilizing affects of civil unrest and international criticism in the wake of the 2 May Bin Laden raid. Key officials from U.S. and Islamabad are undergoing reconciliation talks in an attempt to reaffirm commitments to counterterrorism operations and regain trust. Alterations to U.S. monetary aid will be extremely sensitive for Pakistan due to their current poor economic status and will greatly irritate the current situation. Pakistan's military will take little to no action to prevent the Taliban from operating in Southern Pakistan along RC(SW)'s border, largely due to their focus against more volatile extremists in Central and Northern Pakistan. The only way Pakistan will action Taliban elements in Southern Pakistan is if they feel they are a threat to the nation's internal stability, something that current Taliban networks in Southern Pakistan are aware of and avoid.*

FOCUS ON THE ENEMY

(U) The Safean Area of Lashkar Gah Municipal Center

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

- The Safean area of Lashkar Gah is exploited by insurgents due to its lawlessness, lack of GIRoA influence, and value to the insurgency by being close to the Municipal Center (MC).
- Insurgent commanders and fighters have utilized Safean to stage for Close Quarters Attacks (CQA) and to conduct planning, coordination, and staging for Suicide IED (SIED) attacks against the MC.

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Analyst Assessment: *As the Lashkar Gah security transition approaches, Safean will likely be a key area that insurgents will try to exploit in order to retain access to the MC for executing attacks. However, extending development projects and GIRoA presence into the Safean area would have a positive, lasting effect on local nationals' support for GIRoA, which would essentially degrade the Taliban's ability to utilize the area for attack planning and staging.*

FOCUS ON THE POPULATION

(U) The District Community Council and Voter Registration Impact in Garm Ser District

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

- The Garm Ser District Community Council (DCC) will expand to represent the entire district.
- District Executive Officer (DEO) █ organized a successful voter registration drive.
- The DCC elections will be held on 22 June, offering a chance to solidify this spring's gains and tie Southern Garm Ser firmly to GIRoA.

AOI**(U) Pakistan After the UBL Raid: Status of U.S. Relations and Internal Strife**

Written on 20 June 2011:

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Executive Summary:

- Pakistan continues to suffer from the destabilizing affects of civil unrest and international criticism in the wake of the 2 May Bin Laden raid.
- In addition to strained U.S. relations, Pakistan is experiencing a strong backlash from extremist organizations who feel the Government of Pakistan is weak and complicit with Western Powers.

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)

After 11 September 2001, U.S. relations with Pakistan became critical to enabling U.S. and CF operations in Afghanistan. Despite a mutual agreement to prosecute a War on Terror centered on al-Qaida and the Taliban, tensions between the two countries have ebbed and flowed, primarily over Pakistan's tacit, and sometimes active, support to extremist organizations, including the Taliban. While Pakistan has commonly voiced discontent with CF drone strikes along the AFG-PAK border; the 2 May raid into Abottabad, Pakistan against Usama Bin Laden has greatly strained U.S. – Pakistan relations. The raid against Bin Laden led to international criticism of Pakistan's military involvement in counterinsurgency operations, followed by accusations of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) Agency

providing intelligence that aids militant groups' ability to maintain influence in Afghanistan. As a result of Pakistan's inaction and suspected affiliations, the U.S. passed a bill that limits aid to Pakistan. The U.S. normally provides annual military funding to Pakistan in order to strengthen their counterterrorism campaign. However, U.S. officials believe Pakistan's government has used this monetary aid to improve their defense against India by advancing their nuclear capabilities rather than increasing their counterterrorism efforts. In mid June, legislation was approved by the House Appropriations Committee for this year's defense budget, stipulating that 75 percent of the \$1.1 billion in U.S. aid will be withheld until Pakistan reports to the U.S. Congress on how the monetary aid is to be used. Following international and domestic criticism of Pakistan military's counterterrorism efforts, General Kayani, the Pakistan Army Chief, cut the number of U.S. troops stationed in Pakistan and halted U.S. training programs for Pakistani soldiers. Furthermore, in early June, General Kayani reiterated a common complaint by Pakistan, telling U.S. commanders that drone strikes in the tribal areas near the AFG-PAK border were not acceptable under any circumstances.

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) In addition to strained U.S. relations, Pakistan is experiencing a strong backlash from extremist organizations who feel the Government of Pakistan is weak and complicit with Western Powers. As a result, persistent attacks throughout Pakistan have begun to raise suspicion as to whether the Pakistan military has become complacent or incapable of conducting effective counterterrorism operations. Attacks by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other groups that seek to conduct operations against the Government of Pakistan and the U.S. in retaliation for the killing of Bin Laden, have been on the rise. On 22 May, approximately 10 to 15 militants infiltrated the



Mehran Naval Station in Karachi, Pakistan. These militants initiated an attack that lasted approximately 18 hours, resulting in the destruction of a P 3C Orion aircraft and death of 10 to 12 Pakistan military personnel. On 1 June, heavily armed militants besieged a remote Pakistani post in Peshawar, Khyber Agency, killing at least one policeman. The Pakistan Army was forced to launch attack helicopters to prevent the 40 man outpost from being overrun. Later, on 12 June two separate suicide bombers detonated in an area of Peshawar that is home to political offices and army housing. The first explosion was reportedly small and used to draw in police officials and first responders for the second bomber, who drove into the area on a motorcycle packed with approximately 22 pounds of explosives. This coordinated attack resulted in the 34 killed and approximately 100 wounded (results of this attack did not specify between civilian, military personnel, or government officials). Though no insurgent group has taken responsibility for the attack yet, the incident was rumored to be in retaliation for U.S. raids against Bin Laden.

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

(U) The TTP formed from a number of Islamist groups present in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in resistance to the Pakistani State. Formed in December 2007, their ultimate goal is to enforce their interpretation of Sharia law and instate Islamic rule. There is no clear leadership affiliation between the Taliban and the TTP, although both harbor a desire to attack U.S. troops. TTP has claimed responsibility for the 1 May 2010 failed Times Square bombing. However, TTP still almost exclusively targets Pakistani government and security infrastructure within Pakistan to further their goal and forego any pact with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

(SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) **Analyst Assessment:** *Pakistan continues to suffer from the destabilizing effects of civil unrest and international criticism in the wake of the 2 May Bin Laden raid. Key officials from U.S. and Islamabad are undergoing reconciliation talks in an attempt to reaffirm commitments to counterterrorism operations and regain trust. Alterations to U.S. monetary aid will be extremely sensitive for Pakistan due to their current poor economic status and will greatly irritate the current situation. Pakistan's military will take little to no action to prevent the Taliban from operating in Southern Pakistan along RC(SW)'s border, largely due to their focus against more volatile extremists in Central and Northern Pakistan. The only way Pakistan will action Taliban elements in Southern Pakistan is if they feel they are a threat to the nation's internal stability, something that current Taliban networks in Southern Pakistan are aware of and avoid.* [\(Philadelphia Inquirer, House Panel Votes To Slow Down U.S. Aid To Pakistan, 20110615; Philadelphia Inquirer, Pakistan Ties Vital, Say Mullen And Gates, 20110617; Financial Times, US Defends Support For Pakistan, 20110511; Atlanta Journal-Constitution, CIA Chief On Visit To Repair Ties With Pakistan, 20110611; Arizona Republic \(Phoenix\), Blasts Kill 34, Injure 98 In Pakistan, 20110612; McClatchy Newspapers, Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Commission Meets, 20110611; Washington Post, Pakistan's Top General Asks U.S. To Divert Aid To Civilians, 20110610; Wall Street Journal, Pakistani Army Pleads For Respect, 20110610 Wall Street Journal, Karzai To Press For Pakistan To Back Peace Talk, 20110609; Boston Globe, US Strikes Kill 23 In Pakistan, 20110609; Washington Post, Pakistan Relations Reach A New Low, 20110616; SAP20110601012001; SAP20110618114008; SAP20110618950055\)](#)



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Period Covered 1800D 23 June to 1759D 24 June 2011

The overall classification of this INTSUM is SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

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SIPR: [REDACTED]
CENTRIXS: [REDACTED] @afgn.centcom.gctf.cmil.mil

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*** AREA/NAD 'ALI ***

SERIAL: 110623 2 S REL ISAF NOT REL GCTF NOT REL GIROA INTREP UKTF

SECRET//REL TO ISAF, NOT REL GCTF, NOT REL GIROA

DOI: 22 JUN 11

SUBJ: NAD 'ALI TALIBAN SECURITY SITUATION IN SHIN KALAY

AS OF 22 JUN 11, DCC CHAIRMAN HAJI BARAKZAI (KHAROTI) (P64495) AND TALIBAN (TB) COMMANDER HAJI MAHMAT KHAN (NYPI) INTEND TO CREATE AN AFFILIATION BETWEEN THE ALP AND THE TB IN SHIN KALAY (41R PR 158 016).

APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AGO BARAKZAI SENT THREE KHAROTI TRIBAL ELDERS TO QUETTA (42R UU 08 42) TO REPRESENT HIM IN A MEETING WITH HAJI MAHMAT KHAN. DURING THE MEETING A PLAN WAS DISCUSSED TO CREATE AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE ALP AND THE TB. BARAKZAI AND KHAN PLAN A CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE TB AND ALP OFFICERS IN SHIN KALAY. THE INTENTION IS TO CREATE A PERCEPTION OF A SECURE DISTRICT, DEMONSTRATING TO ISAF THAT THE ALP CAN PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR LOCAL NATIONALS (LNS). WHEN THE ALP HAVE GAINED CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SHIN KALAY, MAHMAT KHAN AND HIS SUBORDINATES INTEND TO RETURN TO THE AREA WHERE THEY FEEL THEY WILL BE SAFE FROM ISAF. [REDACTED] (C/S [REDACTED]) (OBJ INDIA), C/S [REDACTED] AND OTHER TB FIGHTERS HAVE BEGUN MOVING BACK TO SHIN KALAY AS A RESULT OF THIS AGREEMENT.

BARAKZAI'S LONG TERM AIM IS TO GAIN INFLUENCE AND WEALTH FROM GIROA. TO ACHIEVE THIS BARAKZAI NEEDS TO APPEASE BOTH THE TB AND LNS. LNS IN SHIN KALAY NO LONGER FEEL SAFE UNDER ISAF SECURITY SINCE THE DEATH OF TWO LNS SHOT BY ISAF APPROXIMATELY 15 DAYS AGO. BARAKZAI HAS ENCOURAGED LNS TO SEPARATE THEMSELVES FROM ISAF AND IN RETURN HE WILL ENSURE THE ALP PROVIDES A SECURE DISTRICT. BARAKZAI PLANS TO ALLOW TB USE OF SHIN KALAY AS A SAFE HAVEN TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN NAD 'ALI (NDA) (41R PR 177 014). TB WILL BE PERMITTED TO USE COMPOUNDS AS BDLS AND WEAPON CACHES DUE TO THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AFFORDED BY BARAKZAI'S ARRANGEMENTS.

THE SHIN KALAY ALP IS CURRENTLY IN THE FINAL STAGES OF TRAINING AND IS AWAITING WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS. BARAKZAI AND NEWLY APPOINTED ALP REPRESENTATIVE GHULAM JILANI ARE INVOLVED IN THE RECEIPT OF THE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT FROM GIROA. JILANI IS ALSO AWARE OF THE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN BARAKZAI AND KHAN AND FULLY SUPPORTS IT.

TALIBAN CONTINUING TO EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTIES

IN MUSA QAL'AH, TALIBAN MEMBERS REPORTEDLY ATTACKED AND KILLED TWO OF THEIR OWN TO COVER UP THE FACT THEY WERE CONDUCTING AN UNSANCTIONED TALIBAN CHECKPOINT TO ROB PASSERS BYE DUE TO THEIR LACK OF FUNDS. SUPPLY ISSUES AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES ARE CAUSING DISCORD BETWEEN SOME INSURGENTS AND THEIR COMMANDERS. TO THE SOUTH IN NAHR E SARAJ, AN INSURGENT KILLED A LOCAL NATIONAL DURING A FIST FIGHT OVER THE LOCAL POPULACES' REFUSAL TO PROVIDE FOOD TO THE TALIBAN. THE LOCAL NATIONALS RETALIATED BY KILLING ONE INSURGENT AND WOUNDING ANOTHER. THIS INCIDENT IS FURTHER EXAMPLE OF THE LOSS OF LOCAL NATIONAL SUPPORT, WHICH HAS REDUCED THE TALIBAN'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (FoM). IN SOUTHERN GARM SER, THE ASSOCIATES OF [REDACTED] (OBJ HASTINGS) AND ANOTHER TALIBAN COMMANDER ARE REPORTEDLY UNABLE TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONS EFFECTIVELY. PREVIOUS REPORTING INDICATES INSURGENTS IN SOUTHERN GARM SER SUFFER FROM A LACK OF COMPETENT COMMANDERS AND LOGISTICAL ISSUES. THESE ISSUES ARE PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECREASED KINETIC ACTIVITY IN THE REGION THIS YEAR COMPARED TO LAST.

*** AREA/MUSA QAL'AH ***

SERIAL: IIR 6 224 2154 11

SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

DOI: 20110617

SUBJ: EVIDENCE OF TALIBAN SUPPLY SHORTAGES EMBODIED BY THE MURDER OF TWO IED SUB COMMANDERS BY UNIDENTIFIED INSURGENTS DURING A ROBBERY IN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT, HELMAND PROVINCE, AFG

SUMMARY: ON OR AROUND 12 JUNE 2011, CALL SIGNS KAMYAB AND MINAWAL WERE KILLED BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED TALIBAN DURING AN ATTEMPTED ROBBERY IVO TIZNI, NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT, HELMAND PROVINCE, AFG. SUCH ACTIVITY REVEALS SUPPLY SHORTAGES AND FRUSTRATIONS AMONG SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS, WHICH HAVE BEEN EXACERBATED BY THE DEATH OF OSAMA BIN LADEN.

OVERVIEW. ON OR AROUND THE AFTERNOON OF 12 JUNE 2011, TALIBAN SUB-COMMANDERS AND WELL-KNOWN IED MAKERS, CALL SIGN (C/S) KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL WERE KILLED BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED (UID) TALIBAN MEMBERS IN BAYGHAZ VILLAGE //CNA//, IVO TIZNI VILLAGE //MGRS: 41S PS 572 196//, NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT, HELMAND PROVINCE, AFG (SOURCE COMMENT THE TRUE NAMES OF C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL ARE UNKNOWN). SOME LOW-LEVEL TALIBAN MEMBERS IN NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT, SUCH AS THE TWO WHO KILLED C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL, ARE ATTEMPTING TO SUPPLEMENT MONETARY AND RESOURCE SHORTAGES, NOW COMMON TO THE INSURGENCY ACROSS MUCH OF NORTHERN HELMAND PROVINCE SINCE LATE 2010 WITH PETTY THEFT. INFIGHTING AMONG SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS FROM AFG, AND PAK //MGRS: 42R UU 095 445//, STEADILY MORE PRONOUNCED SINCE MID-2010, CONTINUES TO DISRUPT TALIBAN SUPPLY CHAINS. SUCH DISSENT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE DEATH OF OSAMA BIN LADEN (OBL) ON OR ABOUT 2 MAY 2011.

ELABORATION OF THE KILLING. THE TWO UID TALIBAN WHO KILLED KAMYAB AND MINAWAL WERE STAGED ALONG AN UNKNOWN, RURAL ROUTE BETWEEN QATS VILLAGE //MGRS: 41S PR 637 933//, NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT, AND TIZNI VILLAGE, LYING IN WAIT TO ROB PASSERSBY. UPON RECOGNIZING KAMYAB AND MINAWAL, WHO WERE HEADING NORTH TO THE TIZNI BAZAAR //MGRS: 41S PS 571 199//, NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT ON A MOTORCYCLE, THE TWO UID TALIBAN REALIZED THEY WOULD BE PUNISHED IF THE SUB-COMMANDERS LATER REPORTED AN UNSANCTIONED CHECKPOINT TO SENIOR TALIBAN COMMANDERS (SOURCE COMMENT IT IS UNCERTAIN WHERE THE SUB COMMANDERS BEGAN THEIR DRIVE. IT IS LIKELY THEY RODE ON A PAMIR BRAND MOTORCYCLE). RATHER THAN FACE UNKNOWN PUNISHMENT FROM MORE SENIOR TALIBAN COMMANDERS, THE TWO UID TALIBAN QUICKLY DETERMINED IT WAS BEST TO KILL C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL. ONE OF THE UID TALIBAN SHOT C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL WITH AN AK 47, LEAVING THEIR BODIES BEHIND (SOURCE COMMENT IT IS UNCLEAR WHICH MAN FIRED ON KAMYAB AND MINAWAL). THE UID TALIBAN DROVE OFF WITH THE MOTORCYCLE USED BY THE TWO SUB COMMANDERS, AND ALSO STOLE AN AK 47 CARRIED BY EITHER C/S KAMYAB OR C/S MINAWAL (NFI). C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL WERE LIKELY BURIED SOMETIME DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 13 JUNE 2011 IN SAREE WALI //CNA//, A VILLAGE LOCATED NORTH OF SARBECHA VILLAGE //MGRS: 41S PR 626 973//, NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT.

NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH TALIBAN SUPPLIES. SUPPLIES REMAINING IN ABUNDANCE TO THE TALIBAN IN NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT INCLUDE AK 47, PKM, AND RPG ROUNDS. THE AVAILABILITY OF IED COMPONENTS; MORE COSTLY THAN SMALL-ARMS, MEDIUM MACHINEGUN, AND RPG ROUNDS; IS DECLINING IN NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT DUE TO CONTINUED DISRUPTIONS OF TALIBAN FINANCING, SOME OF WHICH IS RELATIVE TO SENIOR TALIBAN LEADER INFIGHTING. NFI.

SENIOR TALIBAN INFIGHTING. FEW AFGHAN OR PAKISTANI SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS TRULY BELIEVED OBL WAS MAINTAINING A HUMBLE, PIOUS LIFESTYLE AS WAS OFTEN PUBLICIZED. UNTIL HIS DEATH, EVEN FEWER SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS WERE LIKELY TO VERBALIZE SUCH SKEPTICISM FOR FEAR OF APPEARING UNFAITHFUL TO AL QAIDA IDEALS, SOME OF WHICH ARE SHARED BY THE TALIBAN. **SOME SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS FROM AFG VIEW REVELATIONS REGARDING THE EXTRAVAGANT NATURE OF OBL'S LIVING CONDITIONS AS INDICATIVE OF HIS SELF-INTEREST AND AS A TRUE, LOW MEASURE OF HIS ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAIDA.** SINCE OBL'S DEATH, SOME AFGHAN SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS HAVE CANDIDLY DENOUNCED TIES TO OBL, BLAMING HIS DECADENCE FOR A LACK OF FUNDING TO BOTH AL QAIDA AND THE TALIBAN. MOREOVER, **SOME SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS IN AFG BLAME PAKISTANI TALIBAN FOR MISJUDGING OBL'S SUPPOSEDLY AUSTERE LIFESTYLE, SEEDING MISGIVINGS RELATIVE TO HOW TALIBAN LEADERS IN PAK ARE FUNDING THE WAR AGAINST COALITION FORCES (CF) AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG.** THE CONFLUENCE OF SUCH DOUBTS RESULTS IN FURTHER SUPPLY AND FINANCIAL SHORTAGES TO LOW-LEVEL TALIBAN FIGHTERS, CAUSING SOME, AS IN THE CASE OF THE TWO UID TALIBAN WHO KILLED C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL, TO ACT ON THEIR OWN ACCORD TO SURVIVE. PRIVATELY, **SOME LOW-LEVEL TALIBAN FIGHTERS VIEW THE DEDICATION OF THEIR MID AND SENIOR-LEVEL COMMANDERS WITH HESITATION, PROMPTING THE FEELING EVERY MAN IS FIGHTING AND ACCOUNTABLE ONLY FOR HIMSELF** (SOURCE COMMENT OF COURSE IN GROUPS OR MEETINGS, NONE OF THE FIGHTERS WOULD EXPRESS SUCH DOUBTS).



**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS
EUROPE**

**GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES
EN EUROPE**



B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref: 0106/SOC/SCT

Tel: +32-(0) [REDACTED] (Operator)

Tel: +32-(0) [REDACTED]

NCN: [REDACTED]

Fax: +32-(0) [REDACTED] (Registry)

Date: 01 Jun 11

TO: NATO HEADQUARTERS, SITUATION CENTRE

SUBJECT: SHAPE Weekly Report on NATO-led Operations

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) – AFGHANISTAN

Overview

1. With the poppy harvest coming to a close, the expected increase in INS activity is steadily materializing. The past week saw a number of incidents, including the 24 May 11 failed attempt by INS to take over the Do Ab District Centre (Nuristan Province, RC(E)), the 26 May 11 Kandahar IED strike that killed eight USA ISAF soldiers and the 28 May 11 remote-controlled IED in the Governor's Palace in Taloqan District (Takhar Province (RC(N)) that killed the Regional Chief of Police LTG Daoud Daoud and wounded the RC(N) commander, MG Kneip. The Taloqan attack is the latest in a series¹ of high profile attacks in RC(N), targeting senior provincial GIRoA figures.

2. The 19 May 11 spike in INS activity in RC(SW) reported in last week's SHAPE Weekly effectively marked the beginning of the fighting season. However, despite the incidents mentioned in Paragraph 1, Regional Commands continue to report INS activity below normal levels for the Spring period. For example, RC(N) noted that the INS are focusing on defending their remaining area of operations against ANSF and ISAF instead of executing offensive operations. Intelligence indicates that although some INS leaders are planning to retake key terrain to regain some influence, they also fear a possible ISAF and ANSF reaction should they expose their fighters.

3. RC(SW) provided some interesting and encouraging insights into the 19 May spike of incidents in Helmand. It appears the INS had planned to execute a three day offensive but required rest and refit after just one day of operations. Also, unlike previous operations, the Taliban (TB) leadership was closely involved in the tactical planning and the execution of the attacks. This is a possible indication of low level commanders

¹ On 8 Oct 10, 10 Feb 11, 21 Feb 11, 10 Mar 11 and 14 Mar 11 IED attacks targeted key GIRoA personnel in RC(N), killing among others the Kunduz Provincial Chief of Police and the Kunduz Provincial Governor.

incapable or unwilling to commit themselves and illustrates the growing gap between the senior leadership and tactical commanders. Intelligence sources assess that ISAF and ANSF targeting of the INS command and control structures and logistical chain during the past months appears to be having an impact. However, it should be noted that the ability and willingness of the INS to fight, although diminished, is still present. ISAF anticipates a further increase in kinetic activity over the summer, but with a greater number of lulls between attacks, since the INS are forced to rest and resupply more frequently as a consequence of the increased ANSF and ISAF footprint and operations.

4. Insurgent Command and Control (C2). Taliban senior leaders (TBSL) primarily operate out of PAK and rarely venture into AFG out for fear of ANSF and ISAF targeting. This distance limits leaders' situational awareness, inhibits effective communications, and complicates command of operations in AFG. Additionally, the autonomy exercised at lower levels of the insurgency limits the effective control exercised by the TB hierarchy, interfering with implementation of a coherent strategy. Despite continued TB assertions of confidence in their success, the insurgency currently faces pressure on virtually all aspects of operations. C2 issues have been of particular concern for TBSL, and are exacerbated by a continuing degradation of facilitation lines, loss of AFG sanctuaries, and strained resources. Limited influence over tactical commanders and leadership degradation will also pose obstacles to the insurgency. The level of ANSF/ISAF pressure on the insurgency will continue to challenge the bonds between TBSL in PAK and the local networks that make up the majority of the INS fighting force. Weakened links between TB echelons will likely impede implementation of a coherent INS military strategy and lead to disparate elements operating in a manner counter-productive to the strategic aims of the insurgency.

5. ISAF Lines of Communication. Since the death of Osama Bin Laden, both the PAK government and public have expressed anger over the USA raid on PAK soil. On 14 May 11, the PAK Parliament passed a resolution calling for a commission to investigate the Abbottabad raid, as well as calling for an end to UAV strikes. The resolution threatened that continuation of UAV strikes may lead to PAK government withdrawal of NATO transit authority. However, subsequent UAV strikes and the 17 May 11 helicopter cross border² incident have not provoked any additional PAK reactions. Previous closures of the border crossings have lasted two to twelve days, with no effect on ISAF's ability to conduct operations over the short term (14 days or less). Further, border closures have significant economic and employment impacts within PAK and hence PAK is unlikely to respond with such a stance.

6. Concerning the issue of shipping ISAF equipment using the northern lines of communication, during the Lisbon Summit (Nov 10) an agreement was reached with Russia to allow reverse transit of weapons-free vehicles, and Kazakhstan indicated it would allow the same. Despite this, NATO will not be able to use the northern route to their full potential until Uzbekistan also permits transit or alternate agreements are made. Following the Uzbekistan presidential visit to Brussels in Jan 11, the country announced it would not allow NATO to make reverse shipments or move armoured vehicles through its territory, even without weapons.

7. Improvements to Afghan Health Care. During the 64th World Health Assembly in Geneva on 17 May 11, the AFG Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) stated that AFG has

² On 17 May 11 two CF attack helicopters supporting operation Oqab Behar VI in Khost Province (RC(E)) inadvertently crossed into PAK airspace in Khost (RC(E)). The helicopters received fire from a PAKMIL OP and subsequently returned fire, wounding two PAKMIL.



**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS
EUROPE**

**GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES
EN EUROPE**

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM



Our ref: 1305/SOC/SCT

Tel: +32-(0) [REDACTED] (Operator)

Tel: +32-(0) [REDACTED] + ext

NCN: [REDACTED] + ext

Date: 13 May 11

Fax: +32-(0) [REDACTED] (Registry)

TO: NATO HEADQUARTERS, SITUATION CENTRE

SUBJECT: SHAPE Weekly Report on NATO-led Operations

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) – AFGHANISTAN

Overview

1. **Security.** The southern half of AFG is halfway through the poppy harvest and continuing ANSF and ISAF operations have maintained pressure on insurgents (INS). Most of the kinetic activity occurred in RC(E), although this is expected to change back to RC(SW) towards the end of May. INS continue to avoid direct contact with ISAF and to a lesser degree ANSF, preferring to target GIRoA.
2. On 07 May, the INS attempted to execute their first spring offensive-related complex attack in Kandahar City. At least 4 Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED) and 14 Person Borne IEDs (PBIED) were used as the INS tried to attack nine key GIRoA buildings¹. Although the attack appeared more complex and better coordinated than any previous one, it still failed to outmanoeuvre the ANSF. ISAF intelligence reporting indicates INS commanders have expressed disappointment over the outcome of the attack considering the amount of planning effort involved and resources expended. The INS had 17 killed and 20 captured, resources and personnel that will be difficult to replicate within the next few weeks.
3. During the past winter, cache finds have been featured regularly in reporting from Theatre. However, since March, the number of cache discoveries has decreased significantly. Reporting indicates the INS have adjusted tactics—rather than storing materials in a few large caches they are beginning to store smaller quantities of materials in more dispersed locations to prevent significant loss and captures from a single ANSF or ISAF find. Although this might make the caches harder to find, a significant disadvantage to the INS is that it prevents caches from being readily available for large events, thereby requiring them to control more area for effective dispersion.

¹ The Provincial Governors Palace, NDS HQ, Old Corps HQ and Police District Sub Station 1, among others.

4. In RC(SW), Sangin remains one of the most volatile districts in Helmand Province, although due to the poppy harvest and associated tax collection, kinetic activity decreased during the past few weeks. ISAF assesses that the fighting season in Sangin will commence in earnest after the poppy harvest. Reporting indicates that INS continue to prepare for summer operations, to include an extensive intimidation campaign, executing attacks against off duty ANSF members and their families and use of out of area fighter reinforcements. Sangin District will likely continue to be one of the most contested areas for the insurgency this summer. However, ISAF assesses that GIRoA's improvements in Helmand Province are gaining support among local nationals, even as INS commanders continue to reinforce the area with fighters and increase kinetic activity during the summer.

5. In RC(S), Operation MOUNTAIN JAGUAR began during this reporting period. It aims to disrupt INS preparation for the summer offensive and achieved effects across the region. Notably, INS finance and logistic networks were significantly affected by two air assault operations in the troublesome Zharay and Maiwand Districts. The air assaults, executed by Task Force SPARTAN (10th MTN DIV), resulted in the seizure and destruction of 7 ½ tons of hashish, 150 kg of homemade explosives, 120 kg of opium and a large quantity of IED-making materials. Intelligence sources indicate that key INS leadership has taken notice of the operation and expressed concern about its effects.

6. Governance. On 30 Apr 11, municipal elections were held in Laskar Gah, the capital of Helmand in RC(SW). The ANSF took the lead, planning and executing a highly effective plan that saw the ANP running security and the Operational Coordination Centre - Province (OCC-P) delivering coherent command and control for the ANA and ANP. ISAF assisted by conducting an initial search of facilities and providing a quick reaction force. 1,900 Elders and notables from every mosque elected a 25 member municipal body (including two women) which will improve the resolution of disputes and help bridge the communication gap between the mayor and the people. Although ANSF and ISAF made headway by removing the INS from Laskar Gah, certain key malign local (non INS) actors² remain in place. The abuse of their position presents the most insidious threat to further improving governance.

7. Development. The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) is collecting the biggest portion of the revenues for the AFG government, approximately US\$ 129 million for 2010 and an estimated US\$ 150 million this year. Approximately 85% of AFG population currently has access to telecommunication services. The telecommunications network is planned to expand to the remaining 15% of the population, which include some of the country's less secure areas such as Zabul and Helmand provinces, by the end of 2011. To date, a total of US\$ 1.5 billion has been invested in the AFG telecommunications sector, which is the largest foreign direct investment in any sector.

Current Issues

8. Insurgency Largely Unaffected by Osama bin Laden's (OBL) Death. A number of factors since 2001 have strained the relationship between Al Qaida and the Taliban, including conflicting strategic visions, isolation of organizational leadership, geographic separation, and Al Qaida's reduced capacity to provide financial and operational support

² Examples: Senator Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, related to President Karzai through marriage. He is the single most powerful powerbroker in Helmand and is known to be involved in narcotics activities. Abdul Rahman Jan is a key powerbroker in Marjeh and former Chief of Police of Helmand, and is also involved in narcotics.

following counter terrorism strikes in PAK's tribal areas. These tensions as well as the Taliban's ability to draw upon alternate financial sources of support will ensure that OBL's death will have a limited impact on the Taliban's ability to sustain their campaign. Furthermore, ISAF sources estimate that only about 100 or so Al Qaida militants currently operate in AFG, mostly in the remote mountainous areas along the northeastern frontier with PAK. Areas such as Nangahar, Nuristan, and Kunar retain Al Qaida connections through the Haqqani Network (HQN), which remains a key enabler for Al Qaida to operate in AFG.

9. The Taliban's relationship with Al Qaida has not been a key factor influencing the senior leadership's opposition to a political settlement with the AFG government and their demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops. OBL's death offers an opportunity for the Taliban to highlight that they were not harboring OBL, in an attempt to detach themselves from international terrorism and increase their political and moral legitimacy.

10. Following the successful operation against OBL, an increase in operational security (OPSEC) in the short term might limit the operational communications of Al Qaida and Taliban. Due to the decentralized nature of the AFG insurgency, this potential disconnect with their leadership is unlikely to translate into a reduced operational tempo.

11. Private Security Companies (PSC). After signing the PSC bridging strategy, ISAF continues to support the AFG Government with the implementation of the plan. To accelerate the AFG Public Protection Force (APPF) growth and to minimize the chances of further disruptions to new and ongoing projects, ISAF is assisting the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in developing APPF training procedures and directives to relicense legal PSCs, register vehicles and weapons, issue visa and implement the bridging *tashkil*³ procedures. The unresolved issue on APPF ownership within the AFG government remains a concern.

OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP)

Overview

12. Security. The situation on the ground remains strategically unchanged over the past week. The arms embargo and no fly zone remain effective, and the air campaign continues to degrade the regime's capability to threaten the civilian population and population centers through the use of kinetic strikes against deliberate and dynamic targets, along with non-kinetic methods.

13. In the East. There are no significant strategic changes in the disposition of pro-Gadhafi and opposition forces along the coastal strip from Brega to Ajdabiyah. Regime and opposition forces continue to conduct tactical probes likely aimed at determining the disposition of each other's forces in this area.

14. Misurata. The Misurata port re-opened on 04 May after the sea mine threat from 29 Apr was minimised. Despite continued hit and run indirect attacks against Misurata by regime forces, 4 ships entered the port in the past 7 days bringing urgently needed supplies and enabling more evacuations. During 05 to 07 May, pro-Gadhafi helicopters conducted night operations at the port, and reportedly dropped landmines on port facilities, hitting the piers. Mines were also thought to have been fired from artillery, possibly BM-21, over the city. Mines that fell in the water are not considered a threat to shipping. Similarly, on 06-07 May, a large fuel storage tank was set on fire at the Steel and Iron

³ Afghan "tashkil" refers to table of equipment.