The Awakening of Guatemalan Society: explaining the appearance of the social movement of 2015

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Abstract

The aim of the research is to analyze the relationship between institutional political actors and the emergence of the recent social movement in Guatemala that demanded the resignation of the presidential binomial. The existing literature has focused primarily on understanding the emergence of social movements in Europe and the US. These studies cannot explain the emergence of social movements in other countries with different levels of development; they may even overestimate the importance of resources (Theory of Resource Mobilization) for the process of mobilization. This explains the lack of research on social movements in Latin America, especially in Central America. This work aims to fill the academic vacuum by using the Theory of Political Process which remains within the mainstream approach. The aim is to use a mixed method, using a Snowball Sampling to conduct deep-in interviews, and social media monitoring to understand how the investigation conducted by the Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) became the trigger that generate a favorable environment for the emergence of the social movement composed of grassroots activists. Another goal is to expand the scope of research by adding the role that social media, Facebook and Twitter, had in the mobilization process of the social movement, reducing the cost of organization and generate a unifying framing among its participants.

Keywords: Social movements, protest cycle, mobilization, political processes

Introduction

On the first of September 2015 a human chain allowed the deputies to break through a group of protesters that were blocking the Congress entrance, so that they could cast their vote to take away the immunity of the then President, Otto Pérez Molina. For the first time in Guatemala's young democracy, Congress removed unanimously the immunity of a President, including the governing party. The following day, on September 02, Otto Pérez Molina resigned to the presidency.

Even the most skeptical analysts could not explain the outcome without mentioning the unprecedented five months in which citizens protested in the Central Plaza. It was impossible to ignore the social movement that emerged and how it celebrated the president's resignation in a peaceful and democratic fashion.

An article from BBC Mundo called it "The peaceful revolution in the most violent region in the world" (Paullier, 2015). Another editorial article from The New York Times indicated "powerful message to Guatemalans who aspire to be governed by honest leaders. It should also be studied, and possibly emulated, in neighboring countries" (Editorial, 2015). The high degree of emotionality that a social movement develops can skew the interpretation of the social phenomenon. This study aims to provide a theoretical framework that can be a path toward explaining the emergence of a movement that left a mark in the country's history.

Methodology

This paper is a case study that falls into the category of an interpretive case study (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691-692). According to this type of research the case is chosen by the interest that exists on the subject, not to generate a general theory. In this case, this investigation used the Political Process Framework to explain the Guatemalan social movement case starting on April of 2015 till this date. By doing this, the research does not pretend to formulate a hypothesis that would contribute to elaborate a general theory; instead its main objective is to give an explanation of the social phenomena based on an already formulated theory.

Although the scope is limited and does not contribute to the existing literature, one of the great strengths of this type of study is that it "focuses on a single case, that can be intensively examined even when the research resources at the investigator's disposal are relatively limited" (Lijphart, 1971, págs. 691-692). This further strengthens the validity of the study. There is no an optimal method for studying social movements, scholars recognized "no conceptual, theoretical, or methodological consensus has so far emerged" (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2008, p. 308).

Despite this, concern is placed not on finding correlations, but instead studies want to understand the mechanisms that "link effects to causes" (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2008, p. 309). In order to do so authors are adopting a mixed method approach.

The study used the method known as Respondent-Driven Sampling, also known as Snowball Sampling. This type of method is used in research with hidden populations, where the number of the sample is unknown, as it is the case with social movements. (Heckathorn & Salganik, 2003). According to this:

> *Respondents are selected not from a sampling frame but from the friendship network of existing members of the sample. The sampling process begins when the researchers select a small number of seeds who are the first people to participate in the study. These seeds then recruit others to participate in the study* (Heckathorn & Salganik, 2003, p.196).

By using this method, the study collected qualitative data from in-depth interviews with the two main protagonist groups: *RenunciaYa* (Later transformed into *JusticiaYa*) and the *Student Coordinator of Guatemala Universities* (CEUG). Although they were not the only actors in the protests, they were selected by direct references, using the Snowball Sampling method. Those that reply to the request were incorporate in the analysis. As a result, the study conducted eleven face-to face interviews, of the 15 planned. Furthermore, the research proposes to extend the scope of this method in future investigations.

Finally, quantitative data was collected from the group #JusticiaYa Twitter Analytics excel sheets. This enables the research to include social media platforms as Facebook and Twitter into the social movement's analysis.

I. Framework

Since the different parts of the study will allude to the Political Process Framework, this section will briefly summarize its content. Before defining the theoretical framework is important to distinguish the field of study to which it belongs. Social movements belong to the study of contentious collective action, which can be explained as:

> *"Collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to representative institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities"* (Tarrow, 2011, p.7).

The study of social movements has focused on understanding the relationship between "ideas, individuals, events, and organizations that are linked to each other in broader processes of

collective action" (Della Porta, 2006, pág. 5). To explain this relationship, a large number of schools of thought have emerged in the field of sociology, since the 1960s.

The Political Process Framework is one of the multiple approaches to study the social movement phenomena (MacAdam, 1996). This framework highlights the importance of political environment, or the context in which a social movement arises. One of the biggest criticisms against this approach focuses on its rigidity and overvaluation of structural changes, leaving aside the cultural and social explanations (Della Porta, 2006, págs. 15, 16). Because of this, the framework underwent major changes in the late 90s.

Authors writing on the matter replace the *Classic Social Movement Agenda* with a *Dynamic Mobilization Model,* in which "political process analysts move away from their confreres by stressing dynamism, strategic interaction, and response to political environment" (MacAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, pág. 16). This strengthened the explanatory tool, by acknowledging that a movement arises from interconnected variables, rather than from structural predetermined change.

Additionally, this framework incorporated cultural variables by referring to the cognitive liberation, also known as the framing process. As the authors explain: "Shifting political conditions supply the necessary cognitive cues capable of triggering the process of cognitive liberation while existent organization affords insurgents the stable group-setting within that process" (MacAdam D. , 1999).

This article is divided into into the three broad categories of the Political Process theoretical framework: 1. opportunities and threats; 2. protest cycle; and 3. framing. Each category will serve to explain the appearance of the Guatemalan social movement. In the first part, the study analyses the different elements that enables a favorable environment necessary for the social movement to appear. In second part the study exposes the protest cycle to illustrate the behaviour of the mobilization and explain the types of repertoires used in the movement. Finally, in the last part the study will examine the development of a collective identity according to the Framing theory.

II. Opportunities and threats

According to the theory of Political Process, in order for a movement to emerge there has to be a catalyst that triggers challengers to organize in collective action. At the same time, challengers must possess a degree of organization: "movements develop in response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups and the larger sociopolitical environment they seek to change (MacAdam D., 1999, p.39). The combination of both: change in structural conditions and organized

activists creates what is called an opportunity. This section will explain how an opportunity was created by the exposure of a corruption case, and a group of activists that organized through social media platforms.

Opportunities

Opportunities appear when "institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available, the state capacity for repression declines, and challengers see an opportunities to advance their claims" (Tarrow, 2011, pág. 160). In Guatemala an opportunity developed when the Public Prosecutor (MP) and the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) brought to light a corruption network functioning within the state named *La Línea*. Although this case generated an institutional opening, it did not immediately mean that an opportunity was given. In order for an opportunity to occur it needs to be perceived by potential challengers (MacAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, pág. 43).

The movement started with the creation of a Facebook event, two days after the disclosure of *La Línea*. As in many other social movements in recent years, social media has played an essential role. Literature has acknowledged that these platforms are capable of reducing costs of coordination, thus, facilitating organization between activists (Shirky, 2011). Some even interpret this new technology as "catalyst in the emergence of social movements (Rohr, 2014, p. 10). None the less, many authors recognize the limitations and discuss the scope of these technologies (Earl, 2013).

To avoid creating bias in the interpretation, Dahlberg-Grundberg proposed the use of the media ecology framework that aims to "capture the coexistence of and interdependence between human actors and technologies" (2015, p. 3). It is crucial to the present analysis to understand how actors interacted with social media, as explained by Shirky "As with the printing press, the Internet spreads not just media consumption but media production as well- it allows people to privately and publicly articulate and debate a welter of conflicting views" (2011, p. 34).

In this matter, what motivated the Facebook event were several complains and calls for action posted in the public group called *political incorrect*:

> *"In Facebook there was a lot of talk about politics. There were plenty of discussions in the politically incorrect group of what was going on. When I commented something like – lets do something – the next day people were asking me when and where, at that time I felt I was summoned. I was suggested by Ale Calderon to create a Facebook Event. I did not have the slightest idea of what would happen. I thought that if 300 people arrived we were going to be successful"* (Medizabal, 2016).

This explains how through Facebook individuals were able to express their grievances, which can be defined as: "a claim that one's discontent is the product of an injustice that must be corrected … One important cognitive aspect is the attribution of responsibility for that situation" (Brockett, 2005, p. 41). Additionally, by using the Facebook platform, people were capable to surpass and reduce the role of the gate-keeper of mass media (Earl & Kimport, 2009).

It is important to note that the group of activists lacked an organizational structure when they organized the first protest.

> *"When the event was created we were three up to four organizers. The Facebook event had no image or message. Very instinctively I looked for names and asked a friend to design a logo and thus the named #RenunciaYa (ResignRightNow) was created. This happenned in the course of an hour. Everything developed very organically. We did not send the event to the media, but they sought us. We didn't even know each other at that time"* (Wer G. , 2016).

His narrative illustrates how the group *#RenunciaYa* did not had a planned strategy, but began to articulate as they perceive an opportunity. The Facebook platform served as a site of mobilization.

Like the group *#RenunciaYa*, other newly and already existing organizations contributed to the development of an opportunity. The *Student Coordinator of Guatemala Universities* (CEUG) began to consolidate at the end of the first protest. This organization is integrated by an alliance between student's associations from both public and private universities of Guatemala. On this point it is important to stress the leading role that students have had in the history of social movements in Latin America: University students are a major source of recruits for contentious movements in Nicaragua as in Guatemala and El Salvador, but their organizations played an important role as well, most especially in Guatemala. This has been true throughout the Third World (Brockett, 2005, p. 124-125).

Because of this context, many organization within universities already existed, being the most organized the *#USACesPueblo* group from the *University of San Carlos* (USAC), as another student group representative explains:

> "*We knew some students from USAC and decided to marched with them from Judicial Organization to the Central Plaza. After that first protest, there were other talks. In a meeting at the Red House a student say "lets create a Fanpage." After that first meeting, the clash was impressive. The students from USAC were very organized and hierarchical, we Landivarianos (organization form Rafael Landivar University) wanted to be more horizontal"* (Pérez, 2016).

Others, from distinct universities, also distinguished the role of the public university USAC, with is student organization *#USACesPueblo*. Despite difference in organizations, universities were united because of their common agenda on corruption:

"We started to meet with students from other universities. All of USAC students were already organized. What we all have in common was the idea that the country needed to be clean up of corruption for the sake of democracy. What we – CEUG- achieved was not a massive group of students, but an articulation of different universities" (Wer M., 2016).

This new alliance forged what is known as brokerage "forging of social connections between previously unlinked persons or sites […] allowing collective action to spread along the newly created network pathway (MacAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2008, p. 322). The fact that all of CEUG members were college students created an identity.

From the recollection of interviews, it can determine that few participants possess any working experience in formal political institutions (only three of the nine activists); but most of them had belonged to an NGO, pressure groups or civil organizations. Despite technological tools at their disposal, which makes communication impersonal, CEUG held continuous meetings that favored the strengthening of the network.

> *Whether or not these ties also reflect friendship or other interpersonal relations, at the   very   least   they imply face-to-face encounters that are likely to be crucial in micromobilization […] These interpersonal connections are likely to affect individuals' decisions to participate in collective action by exposing them to more social support for participation and raising the social costs of nonparticipation* (Fernandez & McAdam, 1988).

One important and interesting aspect is that most of the interviewed are under 35 years old (with only one exception). The young leadership was important and relevant for the analysis, because of the change in the generation. As recall by Mynor:

"We, after 20 years, had the first opportunity as a generation to decide to go out to the streets without past generations preventing us to do so, because quite simply it was our turn" (Alonso, 2016).

Threats

When studying a threat one is referring to "risks and costs of action or inaction, rather than the prospect of success" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 160). As in opportunities, a threat needs to be perceived, and is highly dependent on the perception of the challengers, who evaluate the degree of risk upon

the information available to them. Unperceived costs of action can lead to a violent confrontation with authorities; on the other side a misjudgment of the risk can generated inaction.

Even if the Facebook event created an opportunity, participants needed to weight the risk in order to attend the protest. A movement' success depends on "how threats and opportunities combine, rather than shifts in the prospect of success alone, that shapes decisions regarding collective action" (Tarrow, 2011, pág. 161). In this sense, challengers recognized:

> *"Government retaliation was a risk. I was very afraid to talk about the subject. People told me to be careful with Baldetti (vice president of that time)"* (Medizabal, 2016).

Despite the fact that almost all of the participants perceived some risk, they preceded to carry out the first protest, in part because there was an existing precedent that took place two years ago, with citizens protesting at the Central Plaza[15]. This episode of mobilization was very present in their collective memory. What is important was the fact that during this protests everything remained peaceful and there were not disturbances.

Also, the contentious collective action benefited from the wide extensive networks, that reduced the degree of risk, by: "mobilization involves ties between people and occurs through groups" (Brockett, 2005). Besides the group´s identity and strong ties, other actors showed their support, as the following statement indicates:

> *"There was an attempt to spread a black campaign. Someone began circulating a statement in which they claimed they were going to go out with stones, this caused a lot of fear and confusion […]part of it helped us to emphasize the peaceful component of the protest with the Counsel for Human Rights (PDH), even the San Carlistas (USAC) committed to go without hoods, which showed true transparency"* (Montenegro, 2016).

The involvement of actors from diverse sectors, both from public and private institutions, empowered the social movement, which surpassed the eminent risk. As the student leader from #USACesPueblo recognizes:

> *CEUG was rich because every student organization of each university has its natural alliances, for example, sancarlistas (USAC) has as naturally ally the Peasant Unity Committee (CUC)* (Alonso, 2016).

As his statement reflects the network was wide as to incorporate a variety of associations that created a safe net for a younger generation that had not witness the Armed Conflict, nor knew what was to live in a non-democratic regime.

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[15] The protest was held on 2009 as a consequence of a polemic video of a lawyer that accused the president at that time Álvaro Colom and congressman, Gustavo Alejos for the murder. When the video became public and viral, citizens went to the Central Plaza and wore white shirts and requested the resignation of the president. CICIG was responsible for the investigation, which culminated with the arrest of the hired killers and exonerated president Colom of the killing.

III. Protest Cycle

As explained above, social movements are the result of the active interaction between different actors that perceived an opportunity and outweigh the risk of action. Giving that opportunisms and threats are not static and tends to change over time, it is useful to capture the activity of the movement according to the different episodes by using the protest cycle model to represent and show the mobilization process, characterized by.

Rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors, a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention employed, the creation of new or transformed collective action frames, a combination of organized and unorganized participation, and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities (Tarrow, 2011, pág. 199)

Even though it often presents incomplete information, authors acknowledged that "protest cycle is an important part of the context in which social movement act" (Brockett, 2005, p.171). For this reason the study uses information from the Facebook and Twitter accounts of the group *#JusticiaYa*[16] to create the Protest Cycle of the social movement.

At first sighting, **Graph 1** and **Graph 2** show a similar behaviour: an increasing flow of activity, follow by high peak, from July to August, and finally a descent in activity both in the number of protests as in the interaction in Twitter on September of 2015, month in which elections were held. This illustrates a direct relationship between the number of protests and the attention it received from participants.

Furthermore, it also shows that the Twitter served as space to mobilized protests, given that both graph pike on August. In order to give an interpretation to each cycle, the study divided the movement into four phases: 1. mobilization cycle; 2. demobilization cycle; 3. innovation cycle; 4. the exhaustion cycle.

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[16] On the 28th of May, the group *#RenunciaYa* disappeared, but some of its members decided to formed the group *#Justicia Ya,* which remain the main coordinator of the protests that followed.

Cumulative number of protest held by the group #JusticiaYa

Graph 1[17]

Source: Events from April to November of 2015, data collected from the #JusticiaYa official fanpage

Total Number of Twitter Interaction on @Justiciayagt

Graph 2[18]

Source: Own elaboration from data collected from the #JusticiaYa Twitter Analytics sheets

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[17] The protest period is short, making it possible to count the number of events organized by the group of #JusticiaYa. Other groups were not included to avoid uneven information and bias. However, it is important to recognize that this graph presents an incomplete picture of events.

[18] Information on Graph 2 shows the number of times a user interacted (retweets, replies, follow-ups, I like, links, cards, labels, inserted, user name, profile photo or Tweet expansion of multimedia content) with a Tweet, estimated by thousands, since May of 2015 all through January 2016 from the Twitter account @JusticiaYagt.

1. The Mobilization Cycle

The first cycle took place from the first protest on April 25 to the second official protest on May 16. The act of participation was itself the catalyst for mobilization. The strategy used was one of direct diffusion "people's decisions to take advantage of opportunities that have been demonstrated by other groups' actions. It occurs when groups make gains that invite others to seek similar outcomes" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 192).

The group #RenunciaYa perceived the opportunity created by the CICIG-MP in the uncovered of a fraud scandals *La Línea*. Their claim was directly correlated to other actor's action. Transmission was made through personal contacts, organizational linkages or associational networks (Tarrow, 2011, p. 170).

> *"Those who know us, knew it was the real thing, but those who didn't, that is most people, we were not famous […]began to wonder who we were"* (Montenegro, 2016).

Even though the group became more organized for the second protest, they used the same repertoire. They continue to emphasize the peaceful characteristic of the protest and kept the place and time of the first protest. In between, on May 8 the Vice-president resigned, generating a feeling of accomplishment and triumph to the claims by the group in the first protest. As a result of this new opportunity, the mobilization of participants doubled (Plaza Pública, 2015). As described above:

> *For the second protest we had three weeks to prepare. We wanted to add forces by the May 16. Then we talked with virtually all organized groups in the country, and invite them. But on May 8 Baldetti (vice-president) resigned* (Montenegro, 2016).

2. Demobilization cycle

The second cycle was characterized by its demobilization that started after May 16 all though June. This period can be interpreted as a readjustment of the strategy. It is important to recognize that during this time the group #RenunciaYa disintegrated, and some of its members founded another group #JusticiaYa (on May 28). The changed from #ReuniciaYa to #JusticiaYa modify the strategy from a diffusion to a campaign strategy, which implied "Organized public effort making collective claims on targeted authorities (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, p. 119).

The group of activists of #JusticiaYa created Twitter and Facebook accounts. They became new actors and were giving a spaces in media. As a journalist form the magazine *Contrapoder* states:

> *"They were interviewed several times. They became reference sources"* (Enríquez, 2016).

This is important because "campaigns contain public performances, but they also contain media efforts, educational activities, and lobbying." (Tarrow, 2011, p. 191). Additionally, in this cycle the CEUG was created. Each university's group created their own Facebook account.

Even though on the 22nd of May, CICIG-MP uncorked another network of corruption in the Guatemalan Social Security Institute (IGSS), there was a lack of common purpose and objective. The agenda that at the first cycle was so evident - the resignation of the Vice-president - was now a pluralistic agenda with different objectives, by actors that were not used to unite interests. The lack of vision and clear frame (discuss in the next section) generated demobilization.

3. Innovation cycle

The third cycle started in July and ended on August. The core group of activists from #JusticiaYa continue their campaign strategy, but started to change their repertoire. The first changed was a gradual one from a protest held on the Central Plaza to a march at night on July 04. Both represent modern types of repertoire that act "within the bounds of accepted democratic norms" (Della Porta, 2006, pág. 170). However, the march on July 04 represented an innovative form of protesting. It added an element of surprise. When asked why they decided on this change:

> *"We organize it for three reasons: 1. condense the demands from the collective groups and political analysts; 2. we wanted to make a gesture of solidarity with was happening in Honduras; 3. In doing at night we wanted to remove the monotony that the movement was beginning to have"* (Wer G., 2016)

As a result the mobilization was abundant, media and other sources reported it as success (Plaza Pública, 2015). This also represented in **Graph 2**, where the number of interactions on Twitter increased substantially compared to previous months.

A month later began what would be the climax of the social movement in Guatemala. CICIG and the MP presented a report that pointed Otto Perez Molina as leader of *La Línea*. This took a lot of coverage from media. As the journalist form *Contapoder* magazine explains:

> *We threw the agenda again and again. In April was the case La Línea, and then came the other cases of CICIG and MP. There was a lack of coverage to the political campaign* (Enríquez, 2016).

The Popular Assembly and a group from USAC called for a national strike three days after CICIG declared that current President, Otto Perez Molina was part of the corruption case. At first the perception was divided, but the level of grievance began to increase.

> *"The resignation was left behind on previous protest, but with the report the issue was revived. After the report came out, the Popular Assembly chose a more moderate agenda than its initial anti-election speech."* (Reyes, 2016).

Once again the coalition of actors started to unify in a common frame that demanded the resignation of the President with a disruption strategy, which "obstructs the routine activities of opponents, bystanders, or authorities and forces them to attend to protesters" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 101). Even though disruption strategy can turn violent, in does not necessary implies it.

In this particular case the movement continued to manifest its commitment with peace and order. The national strike was previously announced, was notified to the institutional authorities, and took the former tactics of informing and getting the support of the Human Right Office. A key element of the national strike was the involvement of private business and institutions.

As a result, the national strike disruptive the workday of many businesses that closed that day, whether in support or not of the protest. Institutions were obligated to make statements about their positions. As narrated a member of *#USCAesPueblo* indicates:

> *"I think there was much doubt. First of all, who of our generation knows how to make a national strike? We did not know what that was like. Second, if it does not work, we showed weakness. Third, what do you do after a national strike? There's nothing stronger. Then there were many doubts, many, many doubts but there were also many meetings […] the strategy of #JusticiaYa was to advertise all companies, no matter how small, then they were going to protest, which created a snowball effect that happen between Monday and Wednesday. Quite simply the company that did not to support the national strike protest, was views as not supporting the civil society"* (Alonso, 2016).

The cycle of innovation created a substantial peak that is reflected in the both graphs presented before where the percentage of change of the number of Twitter interactions from June to August was about 74% higher.

4. The Exhaustion Cycle

Finally, the last cycle started from September to January. It was characterized by its downfall of number of interaction on Twitter, as well as a decreased of the number of protest announced by the group #JusticiaYa. Likewise, there was an evident demobilization of the total number of participants during these months.

On September elections were celebrated and participation on the polls remain constant compared with previous years, reflecting stability and wiliness to maintain the democratic system. The theory of Protest Cycle points out that participation and mobilization drops when the movements reaches the culminating point, in order to increased mobilization "new tactics are constantly being created in order to meet media criteria of newsworthiness" (Della Porta, 2006, p. 183).

IV. Framing process

As mentioned before, mobilization requires that citizens share a grievance. Continuous collective action is based upon the idea of change, and in that process citizens become challengers with an identifiable opponent. What drives them together and reunites them in a share space is the meaning and significance each one gives to the movement. The creation of that meaning is referred to as *framing*.

Master Frame

Frames are classified according to the "degree to which they are relatively exclusive, rigid, inelastic, and restricted" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 618). As mentioned previously, the social movement was characterized by its plurality of actors that joined forces to protest against corruption.

At the beginning the group of activists requested the resignation of the Vice-president because of her involvement in the corruption case. However, not everyone who attended the protest was in favor of this proposal. The messages that emanated in the Central Plaza were so diverse as to include issues on elections, institutional reforms, and many more. None the less, everyone that attended felt a discontent with the corruption case that linked the political figures. Because of that, many organizations were able to organize and share a common space.

As mentioned before the change from *#RenunciaYa* to *#JusticiaYa* also implied that the remaining participants of the group became more organized. The group was able to increase the amount of activity in social media, focusing in communicating and promoting the different protest they organize. But despite the efforts the message remained wide enough to be consider a master frame. This type of frame has the "capability to be sufficiently broad in interpretive scope, inclusivity, flexibility, and cultural resonance to function" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619). This type of frame has greater capabilities to mobilize and generate successful coalitions because it integrates multiple actors. As the chief editor of the electronic alternative media Plaza Pública explains:

> *"There was a change when RenunciaYa dissolved, but basically JusticiaYa did not have a message "per se", that is, it was unclear the aim of JusticiaYa, beyond keeping alive protests and beyond their own name, which is very powerful, but also a very vague message. For each of the people who were in the Central Plaza, justice meant a different thing and I think the strategy went well in the sense that they got what they wanted: appealing to a nationalist message, without any kind of criticism that generate discomfort rather than the*

political class, they managed to keep alive the protests. If JusticiaYa had assumed a more critical approach,
perhaps many people would not have been there" (Naveda, 2016).

As he indicates, to proclaim Justice was something that favored the movement because of its
amplitude. Those who supported the group did it within their own views on justice. If the group had
adopted a more concise posture the amount of supports would have limited to specific groups.

Table 1

Rank	Date	Tweet Count	Description
1.	2015-09-11	4169	Mail unveiled today by @el_Periodico: Involved in protecting Baldetti: Cardona and Monzon. http://t.co/hYqpFRsANf
2.	2015-08-29	3440	USAC students making its stament http://t.co/QdyweqvsiY
3.	2015-07-02	3432	We have an ad! RT thousand! The drums sound loud this #4J. #JusticeRightNow http://t.co/lBRXGnJ2D1
4.	2015-08-29	3392	This are little big steps. #IPaintMyFuture http://t.co/I9KA8jJr93
5.	2015-09-04	3260	We have a video #25J! Share, invite, this is the time to shine. Here´s the event: https://t.co/GOntK4upWx http://t.co/nBldV9EZeS
6.	2015-09-01	3080	Marco Lemus was unmarked from the electrónica board. We will not forget his face. #IDemandMy105Votes http://t.co/JmnNPmFnIe
7.	2015-08-26	2125	#Beware: The @UFMedu doesn't join the national strike. http://t.co/pv3qdfckpB
8.	2015-06-10	2058	We have a poster! The RT is an excellent form of support. #13J #JusticeRightNow http://t.co/aPYUWXAhBY
9.	2015-08-09	2046	@Ivan_Velazquez_ observer position or office http://t.co/hbORphBBIp

10.	2015-07-24	1727	The CICIG works but knows that the future lies on Guatemalan, @Ivan_Velasquez_ https://twitter.com/justiciayagt/status/624623712084492288

Source: Own elaboration from data collected from the @JuticiaYagt Twitter Analytics from May of 2015 to January of 2016.

Table 1 shows the top 10 Tweets based on the number of interactions. As the description reveals the type of information shared was descriptive and focus principally on promoting the protest by showing the posters, images and videos of the events. Likewise, the group followed up on the cases of corruption on public figures.

Something worth noticing is their frequent interaction with other groups. The second most interacted Tweet was a reference to the USAC. The group also used in a positive connotation the roll of CICIG. The last two Tweets in the rank were dedicated to empower the institution and showed their support.

Table 1 also illustrates the wide range of the messages; none had a specific claim that identifies the group with an ideological posture. This enforces the idea of a master frame that is able to incorporate a lot of ideas that involves a variety of actors.

Conclusions

This study used the theoretical Political Process Framework to study the complex social phenomenon of the social movement that emanated in April 2015 in Guatemala. The study demonstrated that there was an opening caused by the relationship between the revelation of the case *La Línea* discovered by CICIG and MP, and the high degree of grievance that this generated in the population, through Facebook and Twitter. This allowed the articulation of new and existing student groups, which develop an identity and created strong network ties.

The large scope of the network that emanated from these groups and others not included in this study, reduced the perception of risk. Although there were attempts to prevent the mobilization in the first protest, the movement had the institutional support of a vast number of organizations and the media. Once the first protest was carried in a peaceful manner the perceived risk was reduced.

The study was able to construct the cycles of protest of the social movement. This showed how the repertoires of protest affected the mobilization. It explained that in the first phase the

strategy of diffusion created an ascendant mobilization. Later, in the second phase the social movement continue with its repertoire, but implemented a campaign strategy that required a readjustment among the group of activists. This improved their organization approach to new organizations, which allowed them to seek alliances. As a result of this readjustment, and the lack of novelty, citizens were demobilized. In the third phase a disruptive strategy was implemented with the national strike, which increased mobilization significantly. This was the peak of the social movement. As explained by the theory of protest of cycle this was followed by a period of pronounced demobilization. This was verified with the decrease in number of events and the fall of interactions on Twitter.

Finally, Process Framing theory demonstrated that the movement, despite having a variety of messages, managed to create a master frame that was embraced in the concept of justice. This allowed several organizations with different levels of organization and agendas to be articulated in the same space.

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