

Homework #3

Due date: 24 November 2023

Notes:

- For Question 5, you can use a Python module for arithmetic in $GF(2^8)$.
- You are expected to submit your answer document as well as the Python codes you used.
- Brute-forcing the solutions (trying to query all possible solutions) in a server-related question would not be considered a valid answer and will result in a score of 0 for the respective question.
- Do not submit .ipynb files, **only .py** scripts will be considered. You can work on Colab but please, submit a Python file in the end.
- Zip your programs and add a readme.txt document (**if necessary**) to explain the programs and how to use them.
- Name your winzip file as “**cs411_507_hw03_yourname.zip**”

1. (15 pts) You are in a job interview, and you were given the following RSA parameters:

N=

22365785976614402332397512075124630827034962474834967508376992591878950
34976146624899681362879032402174196764503614296944218715118439577009702
18235759498443614833318092931765347216940713346359968279518075329167958
73629655454372863524613892925120878044667556713089187256277620400880942
67449215491946365907708865695556836507394680104113645504915425469409338
66887184619665711809176911780017788816413701783562918995081107754493978
73342307750859548327215761131604445299914396581941939357225594068024701
56301977446603456884493329985847799775443583165975769943149863223322845
80410046513600329892486466122703108374316422340853237281774848941313615
83681425555600156607217562397349329759129433534908756960805661036304391
08934583450923383815434902213347700326633618836715343980988824339498954
4021054933138433327774764351905291047781299766526170463628876778618958
16432682335827401878705944583782205741084481506390559086053735656140311
25387128925135332916959736300899479885278863339911134505004369987817266
35149401000636540614535711159426410828179415759829439555704024037537581
91438493616361452856840835486794570579705182218479249220132822428778059
37507851590516843339593375327842430003170696068876068797437618214033096
77083277828514944243054119009100504712199688593975568221513306723156884
00023275713385475636673375705418460899832831371793346707182198279244735
32685861642794873504118832531828344030201577499982915225832296328049335
69509872827094895016940943886412321094069042912067184654291452447271607
12334951148817109453889551067078695519930282020132174315707008087811410
28641836700217121954352851945714621142371128880855259924062736762516185
10314762959113098403437875872000055298048764042889369624300372225884514
93743068203434317795857684578223380732309464862655712412606898281225998
99301541810972769459376914733384588437545684656515385087580733584751932
3533

C=

10996907317744048201180239191184801878870026359954251163808786991823988
39204072169495677454061351187067291518696767449734569538264543011182408
38003555705364085507482373224955566405958979509042669782559203004942060
63326443644038077060867859678853573135463689576016437189518186799433888
57540103021087567684524465658391113407839387642187763991165704754307039
54649878421704627993437675253932151916097740731902858067340173902708102
57697704746005511384590358282243168705497528675364827201498077988713907
30269607077902128491358540075672275189364330649762937864320632331055818
92480718317178083599555304489864818867493161753564243757278735971734662
77727860357595136

e = 2⁴+1

You are asked to retrieve the plaintext “M” using only these given parameters, the plaintext is a 128-bit number and $M \ll N$ (which means that M is too small than N). Show your work.

Result:

- **Since $m^e < n$ (which is checked in the code file), we do not need modulo reduction for m. Meaning that we can directly find $m = c^{(1/e)}$: The plaintext M is: **340282366920938463463374607431768211456****
- **Possible “utf-8” decoding of the plaintext: 😊 (smiling face)**

- (20 pts)** Alice encrypts the private factors of the modulus using her public key. In order to increase security, she multiplies them with a random integer k (a process called blinding). Namely, she performs the following operations:

$$c_p = (kp)^e \bmod n \text{ and } c_q = (kq)^e \bmod n,$$

where:

$n =$

19183611594110704047944268098409679747777693533574914342013275888624116
34257797931230340362144109492849084860870935003922754310066663633684520
45717449925141244415163916556097303659155135064640066981760746153509294
67995146954635808899790086506055221316988321349606090745264195046707737
12974549258713219266086529801320700401681765125510257808966626173920533
48880495866486863856323591225962712524437746354453515200460749082471888
17066447525613684763393056337195755222389664186394854951462626817698807
21615070148094756692833171503752074705662188239798689102120997485064799
57592158602667131927181846125509231614343194096131658354647309923744975
54093731804089182916057801363331096233954143618550941403351980468446272
44986704201974351462960689505220298363091032183218874210416417719748655
05022657856438960391003887024801890732463761889931885281594686399919481
95126451096885004465294596624026184302367656235248167994715642845445947
38244329827946603609406266452608971474023507335797934547214673666130099
21843929894186517343883761488835334583725774585133982979515445799264349
07745133866160543325682099182609661124258828686229066139373979701887434

97372590948593901543975084744946005962187441191496287970898124145277567
 15416006852063181232015540335657245930749321809072404240556207462634556
 07699700524768075354406018616956119182772903779733007050892970918375262
 17352732496319085314920708082969122976857702438125484641488846223006033
 33609697539815317426726928647381987950131331715044601820176825782919092
 77355683737362686615312733563660679559873862037089763914089959724933586
 05228390683894692756825505389326726472693267858287411509970899277244713
 14364367502593122376235668982872064691932255585246865387923606731047553
 13300203837226598476214001721836367864196351049976579073142410364805784
 05353865022554985486575064306462132741635256070685397034325118442921285
 4679

$e = 65537$

a. (10 pts) Explain why this is not secure as anyone who obtains c_p or c_q can factor n .

Result:

- $C_p = (k \cdot p)^e \bmod n = (k \cdot p)^e - j \cdot n$ (where $j \in \mathbb{Z}$) $= (k \cdot p)^e - (j \cdot p \cdot q)$.
- $C_p = (k \cdot p)^e - (j \cdot p \cdot q) = p \cdot [(k^e \cdot p^{e-1}) - (j \cdot q)]$.
- Due to this final equation, $p = \gcd(C_p, n)$. Since we can find p easily, the system is not secure.
- Same rule applies for the q value too.

b. (10 pts) Factor n assuming

$C_p =$

851981557817028663180501789609647407567201542089841455627327356398545
 828618487300888192159283842112619538927550062944039231761324497687980
 388057286117564517137213293019868685782639869702929608521619592268535
 229492028029634820515189201256121144377516210646924865432305711831525
 008988947515797126410611036738460263123054867022095937573549240340925
 254091916638534390288411432539369888827553476153519678858720450565692
 176315412675291771897611394319368108029911640959591350150421488906242
 934415514983630107918903946261995406986686430038313043890273679453834
 690423843286897558114707250513165137877470596586573123707812665592592
 403567834932132278135356380337936297100779430354167187083997494595094
 626591016495726463422933061481013504294768979677472371131930976861335
 597522841734695274312040622145269057593028252460451835507800545385424
 502204384514998189188158541525373820209794737665646233760704396689189
 013105691772177688370635231713069776525934039464735163426253774229903
 564605724843628061985053109841452458158235245878493737946522700803668
 031486833088641375203452949089151179418388706769255178293828545447152
 214805300142824095390634151626234438344708486656313860224440149446722
 221773277601414826225728090233257030707578815037615238171938849710818
 800602540059212528045709993461890163651551768045405513467695102682020
 172652244680414719946537811168638190661135178875524417373837188607629
 650148437360728889262240823128194832387029814711445604226771482932408
 669331982883441090083879922610487695221496282020974515170482237913623
 702763753281683261062144500298216845651293952563391167113383475580475

CS 411-507 Cryptography

004579290031046918313469746663676387276717946185669112899532246928548
744793878632505301548248953025475737831739558711532898642671658507699
806421088325882846474494127348401007338603755298718246577185430053697
3027299524764873622012478186053079729537911008670556589

$C_q =$

481840298664363604495284312982970592272598829909770503091840104133429
708387402669960589564882745326799433253339913828385661768902915590951
047163160952994682086860237519873938678640684683675476253340298611644
451471067970735870998171972254926788874546499007912960592213046678850
271235001904569375670359398880187061346879629543066714462075142812804
693377981661541795907941297815977594271133066667709141027445297857502
163529394138183404237144169663527133174773536159137945022177934890635
861519276630746405021785100085199481432235286728710838680038183325580
823073100104889260912835689314010992269224282118532472630063169032809
486043104170975122972336150648885074336979724273438107955433290844704
554774601124399273754634264200434805982471716346751564474543154143168
010147841403678223200780563122421700652314574052373543883682988262626
055565406514565544785499920937894141761629329305262232749160465735783
073148132620587236630188290626418599438951025378390234248538603599305
890996491285365606950360984155080103977727943391938516943054066444068
240777914846080186389778286759908543916864954350522120137481870567787
718067714505896960150074352845990208577546227332683220614011378153697
204324467228191746838325461109101500590338511292274754440316602536200
817073720120287920450412264820261886896726850414012135036569685968452
862865401583341945821578694132085707023896197865214356700952282608050
844563374699708268398347506061814891641873337818396723512965428682703
342893493064538194299786321958056522054911165462229038429380301978454
562149441981973005359813664296944638360005703922303896239027526410477
488555244662402772070807508484838169841655834967849210103607268128340
331066841660547762499024738708078521397110907145752942416867861875208
265140255303922784980951983417127468195297494833725856801833466986306
5908317748964814977376118579837622866095503768197661413

and decrypt the following ciphertext

$C_m =$

172848288211416685603282354932360557971304059670763682199383435963868
500148706386534697210638390065530228267133581948041498904505178993814
709246745819492418376689358753522918376523234014124949810716237794880
580694971790977763648689436017132643101332471248541108959265828346683
832844081458155545765675070124650186739032982423587127281455778587634
781124790027712594935258076846574264513386531287376117948606657102686
393038586248002979140492947693573131139007314381474781938408307716833
963251800718979780571443537325408508047240097427436806820452665019208
185532305920139291552495894763989335439835817719740957265732107570025
545100042355203025131498999148945291892978898093833012754835506941859
064119833009544011419051103543206791596224369984223100745495349443635
647092809400249940376709338464949084207198123184305476857855749352971

821224837400061554821364342399132173772322306047721098584729481043319
178789341922232042370548196035735694344887475793552722848670366636796
039898579010488098662015401043739129264362079729625258989826963376632
855021468752069298038092356506751963797471127681548557726163971959183
308048398541583396562719850200716894128921616843291792231224770771296
188859608117033536180990203048365360571984059429934849548930023677107
432522510532345030063725400909468322747914183018679157609553010222962
120361168898245945104842943025306480915927643841940595576576345784412
927187873442141610419140468955306683198059500031909617696646193211695
824296022734313413912356798844029355290791743757022938354148262978207
948086266397804325039832972221950838870499908928290666475485857553146
251488931348249164625504403134811973360266186558663309179169550219069
181848860596780730272731808284248324370134092166003081555412464771999
511764520827336803735933565190673798603847390268697796704944590864251
26946501620976059825121468310171155789203387118965679588

Result:

- **Find the p value by finding $\gcd(c_p, n)$:**

348375397960405498713257599300924728067748083077651791167490636
714011869880499871551089391881129421614419015172537741912903661
133931128082666796637621282189548526874127067371876551272490934
420164918803298576766154181661322659737958291226353292398847291
918804694400491065678617090286344183861503211453337865932976128
950630533279408703207015063259339012277026422481160921067116335
029011968965768999795296038389482132161352725138507140962790484
668740965416244493611496774878387754868289247004968965713980508
241917234475778967209922561117319659136145363455975530730427561
621837535414109969617015252876273274461817006082206675864548099
634543492121154484646533760460328497741795958006077857004574398
660975871741055516608620338782772370415761347760939210434344105
682460380120505099126996615114944291985543585557633944902132740
238508060814779284746633322484038677656603613841977357271474071
5000463673060807424917001836481637488168119

- **Find the q value by finding $\gcd(c_q, n)$:**

550659194260640978600768369416432055266685376056399727811267395
625264206258023034128251460986727379794028506471370870569704543
021600180882949602545996576227759506581501531292895918217383687
478492470020442350048787954587149905327750954047038784236251532
025134682662495801759464514553487629622071393837422168208333846
076044897751167776519576220686473402050017654824244654528915423
626969509185023218027977448679905625062506240974520969000798215
763407333791852468904650279495096439403191649810227090596824668
120868366979749364197137434134103668206917923011896576040847462
777021391058252695658865542184024535941923181119194197862001871
001366185600572515598972373014865946999717581487828610766531755
762450852233926217144493832129260987261364700264184974243828866
408948693974779244525418282023494282266061655007543318754978992

019046633414923988970537763104184380773629868368290337444206944
5140251407366732295733356931580544159902241

- **Find the $\phi(n)$ value by finding $(p-1)*(q-1)$:**

19183611594110704047944268098409679747776935335749143420132758
886241163425779793123034036214410949284908486087093500392275431
006666363368452045717449925141244415163916556097303659155135064
640066981760746153509294679951469546358088997900865060552213169
883213496060907452641950467077371297454925871321926608652980132
070040168176512551025780896662617392053348880495866486863856323
591225962712524437746354453515200460749082471888170664475256136
847633930563371957552223896641863948549514626268176988072161507
014809475669283317150375207470566218823979868910212099748506479
957592158602667131927181846125509231614343194096131658354647309
923744975540937318040891829160578013633310962339541436185509414
033519804684462724498670420197435146296068950522029836309103218
321887421041641771974865505022657856438960391003887024801890732
463761889931885281594686399919481951264510968850044652945966240
261843023676562352481679947156428454459473734529523572555713209
224048389161469068907387666388302823591563379082314230077603618
583258596975808694489831561383723885722159099892668367787437532
976875763702453475428966230133995639299400100795654857422926192
855523634247602883583472981135286937086336349725211922498403068
606367272732234658494602652156012126204659743263206218751424431
581427812881393123372589274707123193940884320571413376748507255
469981363570153986797856010432462253273038488277240887487216046
071064806464129037000794940780997702529179903536757281174095506
675988424988998980738273173389615105791590333670944726390599625
539256130577014558364601650757551768244600185744892750666368364
918662335031094458521293319936139051630535554747255326973140989
056085501919040467956378069552273464438288037724480514078296682
311643288194514840824238083499491997967468737755030342820404052
386539499018229543478907277521888034862544611867012721331671333
19984483122247564784320

- **Find the private key by finding $e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$:**

189670030740435370888909278723873845097693090604552195648173434
511066552733574213879079549637383253441784261912894968413541527
731494580880809118610153086033495801903906206958465984135301994
041265547967576613347296448980200073170347937760079853038768280
039101345869640359016135380246462730384162102080456512517923518
283448933843988644106650056625228789124934730144661195192292875
776136666400406579377306399811166886722893890946149420113877228
120239495227349630491347663620593836674899663370295623786744116
606475877671278073475942785273513881946647291846972144397881721
497964494880403774165518746408816724612273920805759236254422413
920821874362972296520983076035185827080849755507808817011954369
304819915225584496686457225956836675077381933670689340423287017
068271956623514379642878986358136031915945442358955514382533741

115009524114872066031263174322637166731564112616939185146402405
 820325043947239128335984490225294025719982903952111615284382086
 731017035758361097669896373330528679375963688823057435743755156
 222277603616910691317234778567544389019008242607156754619872588
 374545964274041806115182642079932182426464872228757004385817912
 300828004460715688047336600067491457686243441920511420146314656
 399999697441607171009884005245176278158648357175732385620886657
 814391534419879308103417416622632430501662897600834224532295110
 131504072741432593535570378686730497662893860336914686154525506
 771240463622933140219120646013493265342985950065936212341698072
 021667485145981154994856139526174374932903227960941230693069318
 645454926118052586147536401790394463081089433994717725329640827
 954202409677126319923161622471306317477208482856369736513398792
 557901220193906727530546558017282812383962494170211695236757711
 273746893283793553883884753597457665018204553157952013728637584
 608550893661354955655625903864775302424406109757035312939687617
 33601393912938881171393

- **Find the message value by finding $c_m^{\text{private_key}} \bmod n$:**

638430993074629687195837936481159006693552285988028013368030841
 243284972629648604448109734668091466074510200197045977080275481
 509858813617320605969234825499359653656530495654596514919349064
 617114149002930871172405935648860559671540513381615320335361620
 724965447066373540766149046617848968335576132622105768790894594
 492599420083997078646795696149541761157224739200181378368968266
 501730694986378199803088188901855697322097918673080384564212532
 124778222986091542091264548448179852908954422806679427419346552
 561737

- **As the final step, decode the message and reverse it:** I am free. Every single thing that I've done I decided to do. My actions are governed by nothing but my own free will. Do you wanna know what I hate more than everything else in this world? Anyone who isn't free.

3. (15 pts) Consider the combining function given in the following table, that is used to combine the outputs of four **maximum-length** LFSR sequences:

$$F(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) = x_4 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4.$$

Analyze the function F in terms of three criteria:

- Nonlinearity degree
- Balance
- Correlation

Is this a good combining function? Explain your answer.

Short answer: No, it is not.

Reminder: No code file exists for this question since it is not required.

- **Nonlinearity degree:** 4 (due to $x_1x_2x_3x_4$).

- **Balance & Correlation:**

- To find the balance and correlation, start with finding the truth table of the $F(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4)$.

x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4	$F(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4)$
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	1
0	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	1	1
0	1	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	1
0	1	1	0	0
0	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	0
1	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	1	0
1	1	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	1
1	1	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	0

- **Balance:** The # of 0s should be equal to the # of 1s in the output sequence. In our case: # of 0s = 11, # of 1s = 5. So, the combiner function is not balanced.
- **Correlation:** Analyze the x_4 input of the combiner function. 13 out of 16 values of the truth table matches with the output of the function. Hence, the correlation of $P(x_4 = F(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4)) = 13/16$, which is very high.
- **Result:** Since the function is not balanced and the correlation of x_4 and the output of the function is high, it is not a good combiner function.

4. (15 pts) We challenge you to get the plaintext of a ciphertext C that was calculated using an RSA setting, however, we lost the decryption keys, we only have the following:

$N = 9244432371785620259$

$C = 655985469758642450$

$e = 2^{16} + 1$

(RSA Encryption: $m^e \bmod N$ | Decryption: $C^d \bmod N$)

Can you retrieve the message using only this information? If yes, show how.

- You are not allowed to use external tools (including online tools).

Result:

- **Find the p and q values s.t. $p \cdot q = n$:**
 $p = 2485770689$, $q = 3718940131$.
- **To find $d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$, first find $\phi(n)$:**
 $\phi(n) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1) = 9244432365580909440$

- **Now find the d value:**
 $d = 4032669742276769153$.
- **As a final step, find $m = c^d \bmod n$ and decode it:**
 $m = 71933981384993$,
 The message is: Aloha!

5. (15 pts) Consider $GF(2^8)$ used in AES with the irreducible polynomial $p(x) = x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x + 1$. You are expected to query the server using `get_poly()` function which will send you two binary polynomials $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ in $GF(2^8)$. Polynomials are expressed as bit strings of their coefficients. For example, $p(x)$ is expressed as '111000011'. You can use the Python code “`client.py`” given in the assignment package to communicate with the server.

a. (7.5 pts) You are expected to perform $c(x) = a(x) \times b(x)$ in $GF(2^8)$ and return $c(x)$ as bit string using `check_mult()` function.

Result:

- $a(x) = 01101101$, $b(x) = 00011001$
- $c(x) = (1 + x^2 + x^3 + x^5 + x^6) * (1 + x^3 + x^4) \bmod (x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x + 1) = 10011100 = x^2 + x^3 + x^4 + x^7$.
- Received the “Congrats” message.

b. (7.5 pts) You are expected to compute the multiplicative inverse of $a(x)$ in $GF(2^8)$ and return $a^{-1}(x)$ using `check_inv()` function.

Result:

- $a^{-1}(x) = 01101110 = x + x^2 + x^3 + x^5 + x^6$.
- Received the “Congrats” message.

6. (20 pts) We want to perform modular multiplication for the three values given below (i.e., $a_i \times b_i \bmod q_i = r_i$).

$$\begin{aligned} a_1 &= 2700926558 \\ b_1 &= 967358719 \\ q_1 &= 3736942861 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} a_2 &= 1759062776 \\ b_2 &= 1106845162 \\ q_2 &= 3105999989 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} a_3 &= 2333074535 \\ b_3 &= 2468838480 \\ q_3 &= 2681377229 \end{aligned}$$

However, instead of performing three different modular multiplications to calculate the results r_1, r_2, r_3 for these values, we want to perform only one multiplication operation modulo Q where $Q = \prod_{i=1}^3 q_i$ and get a result R . Utilizing the Chinese Remainder Theorem techniques discussed in the lectures, show that you can reconstruct the results of the three operations (r_1, r_2, r_3) from R .