

**University of Minnesota - Twin Cities**

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**Curriculum Vitae  
Fall 2018****EMILY MOSCHINI****Personal Data***Address*

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**Major Fields of Concentration**

Macroeconomics, Labor Economics

**Education**

<i>Degree</i>	<i>Field</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>Year</i>
PhD	Economics	University of Minnesota (expected)	2019
MA	Economics	Collegio Carlo Alberto (Torino, Italy)	2012
BA	Economics	University of Chicago	2010

**Dissertation**

Title: "Child Care Subsidies with One- and Two-Parent Families"

Dissertation Advisor: Professor Ellen McGrattan

Expected Completion: Summer 2019

**References**

Professor Ellen McGrattan	(612) 625-6714 erm@umn.edu	Department of Economics University of Minnesota 4-101 Hanson Hall
Professor Loukas Karabarbounis	(612) 625-7504 loukas@umn.edu	1925 Fourth Street South Minneapolis, MN 55455
Professor Joseph Mullins	(612) 625-7858 mullinsj@umn.edu	

## Honors and Awards

- Fall 2014      *Distinguished Teaching Assistant*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.  
2013 - 2014   *Bert and Susan Gross Fellowship*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.  
2006 - 2010   *National Merit Scholar*

## Teaching Experience

- Fall 2014      *Teaching Assistant*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Led Recitation Sections for *Intermediate Microeconomics*.

## Research Experience

- Fall 2015 -      *Research Assistant*, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,  
present        Minneapolis, Minnesota. Research assistant to Alessandra Fogli and Sam Schulhofer-Wohl.  
2012 - 2013   *Research Assistant*, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Torino, Italy. Research assistant to Filippo Taddei and Giovanni Mastrobuoni.  
2010 - 2011   *Associate Economist*, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Associate Economist for the Finance Group.  
Summer 2009 *Research Assistant*, Center for Population Economics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

## Papers

- “Child Care Subsidies with One- and Two-Parent Families,” job market paper  
“A Quantitative Evaluation of Workforce Re-Training,” with Kathleen McKiernan  
“Frictions in the College Application Portfolio Decision,” with Ming Xu

## Computer Skills

Fortran, Matlab, Stata, LaTeX, QGIS

## Languages

English (native), Italian (fluent)

## Abstracts

- “Child Care Subsidies with One- and Two-Parent Families,” job market paper

The implementation of child care subsidies has varied widely across countries and states, as well as over time, ranging from universal to poverty-tested eligibility. I study the implications of eligibility rules for child care subsidies in a general equilibrium, overlapping generations framework where altruistic parents invest in child skill. I allow for one- and two-parent families, and endogenize family formation with a marriage market. This explicitly incorporates single mothers, who currently parent 20\% of children under 5 in the United States. Using individual-level data from the US Department of Education, I estimate how mother time, father time, and non-parental child care affect child skill for each family structure. These estimates allow me to account for the differential effect of child care subsidies on one- and two-parent families. My general equilibrium framework accounts for the effect of the subsidy on government expenditures as well as the skill distribution and, through that,

on endogenous tax rates. I find that universal subsidies yield ex ante welfare gains of 5.9 percentage points, while targeting child care subsidies to one-parent families or poor families yields welfare gains of 2.4 and 2.0 percentage points, respectively. Universal subsidies more fully insure newborns against the risks they face than subsidies to one-parent families, and do not disincentivize skill investment as happens with subsidies to the poor.

“A Quantitative Evaluation of Workforce Re-Training,” with Kathleen McKiernan

In 2009, The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act appropriated \$750 million for worker training and placement of workers in high growth and emerging industries. This act provided an inflow of money to help serve unemployed and under-employed workers through education and re-training programs. These programs are targeted at several groups: youth, adults, and displaced workers. These groups differ in three important ways: their reason for unemployment, their probability of finding a job from unemployment, and the way in which participation in a government program impacts their future employment. Using data from the Department of Labor, we discipline skill composition and job finding probabilities for these three groups. We then build a search model to describe the effect on equilibrium skill and unemployment levels of the programs, and conduct a policy experiment where funds are redistributed entirely to each of the three groups in counterfactual funding structures. We compare the trade-offs of increasing funding for unemployment insurance with funding for retraining programs.

“Frictions in the College Application Portfolio Decision,” with Ming Xu

The colleges which high school students apply to determine their potential choice set for college enrollment. In this project, we examine the college application portfolio decision. Using data from the U.S. Department of Education, we first assess the relationship between heterogeneous college characteristics and high school students application portfolio with a simple empirical analysis (affirming work by Hoxby (2012) and Schoelmann et al. (2018)). We then apply matching techniques developed by Fox (2018) and Agarwal (2015) in a many-to-one matching market using observed matches to study how the characteristics of college and students jointly determine the match value and the match patterns. Finally, we build a search model of the college application process and quantify the relative magnitudes of the potential frictions that generate portfolio differences and matching outcomes, aggregating them into two general categories: information frictions and geographic frictions. Information frictions are determined by the average skill of the workers and other students at the student's location; geographic frictions are determined by the distance from their location to the schools that match their skill level. We run counterfactual experiments and show what effect policies aimed at mitigating each friction would have on the matching equilibrium and welfare.