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**Curriculum Vitae
Fall 2018****EMILY MOSCHINI****Personal Data***Address*

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Contact Information

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Citizenship: USA, Canada, Italy

Major Fields of Concentration

Macroeconomics, Labor Economics

Education

<i>Degree</i>	<i>Field</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>Year</i>
PhD	Economics	University of Minnesota (expected)	2019
MA	Economics	Collegio Carlo Alberto (Torino, Italy)	2012
BA	Economics	University of Chicago	2010

Dissertation

Title: "Child Care Subsidies with One- and Two-Parent Families"

Dissertation Advisor: Professor Ellen McGrattan

Expected Completion: Summer 2019

References

Professor Ellen McGrattan	(612) 625-6714 erm@umn.edu	Department of Economics University of Minnesota 4-101 Hanson Hall
Professor Loukas Karabarbounis	(612) 625-7504 loukas@umn.edu	1925 Fourth Street South Minneapolis, MN 55455
Professor Joseph Mullins	(612) 625-7858 mullinsj@umn.edu	

Honors and Awards

- Fall 2014 *Distinguished Teaching Assistant*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
2013 - 2014 *Bert and Susan Gross Fellowship*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
2006 - 2010 *National Merit Scholar*

Teaching Experience

- Fall 2014 *Teaching Assistant*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Led Recitation Sections for *Intermediate Microeconomics*.

Research Experience

- Fall 2015 - *Research Assistant*, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
present Minneapolis, Minnesota. Research assistant to Alessandra Fogli and Sam Schulhofer-Wohl.
2012 - 2013 *Research Assistant*, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Torino, Italy. Research assistant to Filippo Taddei and Giovanni Mastrobuoni.
2010 - 2011 *Associate Economist*, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Associate Economist for the Finance Group.
Summer 2009 *Research Assistant*, Center for Population Economics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

Papers

- “Child Care Subsidies with One- and Two-Parent Families,” job market paper
“A Quantitative Evaluation of Workforce Re-Training,” with Kathleen McKiernan
“Frictions in the College Application Portfolio Decision,” with Ming Xu

Computer Skills

Fortran, Matlab, Stata, LaTeX, QGIS

Languages

English (native), Italian (fluent)

Abstracts

- “Child Care Subsidies with One- and Two-Parent Families,” job market paper

The implementation of child care subsidies has varied widely across countries and states, as well as over time, ranging from universal to poverty-tested eligibility. I study the implications of eligibility rules for child care subsidies in a general equilibrium, overlapping generations framework where altruistic parents invest in child skill. I allow for one- and two-parent families, and endogenize family formation with a marriage market. This explicitly incorporates single mothers, who currently parent 20% of children under 5 in the United States. Using individual-level data from the US Department of Education, I estimate how mother time, father time, and non-parental child care affect child skill for each family structure. These estimates allow me to account for the differential effect of child care subsidies on one- and two-parent families. My general equilibrium framework accounts for the effect of the subsidy on government expenditures as well as the skill distribution and, through that,

on endogenous tax rates. I find that universal subsidies yield ex ante welfare gains of 5.9 percentage points, while targeting child care subsidies to one-parent families or poor families yields welfare gains of 2.4 and 2.0 percentage points, respectively. Universal subsidies more fully insure newborns against the risks they face than targeted subsidies, and do not disincentivize skill investment as happens with subsidies to the poor.

“A Quantitative Evaluation of Workforce Re-Training,” with Kathleen McKiernan

In 2009, The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act appropriated \$750 million for worker training and placement of workers in high growth and emerging industries. This act provided an inflow of money to help serve unemployed and under-employed workers through education and re-training programs. These programs are targeted at several groups: youth, adults, and displaced workers. These groups differ in three important ways: their reason for unemployment, their probability of finding a job from unemployment, and the way in which participation in a government program impacts their future employment. Using data from the Department of Labor, we discipline skill composition and job finding probabilities for these three groups. We then build a search model to describe the effect on equilibrium skill and unemployment levels of the programs, and conduct a policy experiment where funds are redistributed entirely to each of the three groups in counterfactual funding structures. We compare the trade-offs of increasing funding for unemployment insurance with funding for retraining programs.

“Frictions in the College Application Portfolio Decision,” with Ming Xu

In the United States, there is documented misallocation for high-skill students who come from poor families when they enroll in college (Hoxby Avery 2012). In this project, we examine the college application and enrollment patterns of high school students in the United States, and build a model to examine the effects of policy aimed at mitigating this misallocation. Using the High School Longitudinal Study, 2009 (HSLs:09) from the US Department of Education, we document the relationship between neighborhood composition, location, and student skill and college application and enrollment outcomes of the student. We build a model where students who are heterogeneous in neighborhood, family income and skill decide to search for college admittance in different submarkets. Each submarket is a different quality college, and has a fixed cost with both an information and a geographic component indexed to the student. We apply matching techniques developed by Fox (2018) and Agarwal (2015) in a many-to-one matching market using observed matches to study how the characteristics of college and students jointly determine the match value and the match patterns. Here, each student can apply to several colleges, and the HSLs:09 contains information on this choice and the attributes of each student, while college characteristics are publicly available. We then use this model to examine what would happen if policy changed the fixed costs faced by different students, by affecting its geographic component, the information component, or both.