### PARTIAL AWARENESS

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- > Unawareness is a pervasive form of ignorance:
- An agent is unaware of an object/event/statement/etc if it is not on her radar screen.
- Existing formal models treat awareness as binary: An agent is either aware of a statement or an event or she is not

### This paper:

- 1. Develops a formal model of partial awareness.
  - Modal logic extending Halpern Rego (2009, 2013).
- 2. Applies the model to an (economic) contracting model with partially aware agents.
  - Examines the effect of awareness on welfare and efficiency of contracts.

### Why do we care?

- More realistic/nuanced representation of ignorance.
  - Satoshi Nakamoto is fully aware of bitcoin.
    My grandmother is fully unaware of bitcoin.
  - My grandmother is july unaware or biccom.
     Most people, however, are in-between these extremes.
  - As a form of introspection: allows the agent to reason about her own limitations.
    - Motivate learning, filling in missing data, etc.
  - Has important implications in economic markets.

The language has three building blocks:

- Objects, 𝒪 (and object variables, 𝑉)
   Following Levesque (1990), 𝒪 consists of standard names
   d<sub>1</sub>, d<sub>2</sub>,...
  - > Properties,  $\mathscr{P}$ : unary predicates (and predicate variables,  $\mathcal{V}^{\mathscr{P}}$ )
  - $\gt$  Concepts  $\mathscr{C}$ : Boolean combinations of properties.

In each state (possible world), each agent is aware of a subset of objects, properties, and concepts.

The logic also has two modalities:

st  $A_i arphi$ : agent i is **aware** of the formula arphi

\*  $K_i \varphi$ : agent i explicitly knows formula  $\varphi$ .

\* Read:  $\varphi$  is true at all possible worlds and  $A_i \varphi$ 

and quantification over both objects and properties.

 $\mathcal{L}(\mathscr{O},\mathscr{P},\mathscr{C})$  is the resulting Language.

Suppose a quantum computer (Q) is defined as a computer (C) that possesses an additional "quantum property" QP.

$$Q := C \wedge QP$$

- 1. A *partially aware* agent is aware of *Q* but unaware of the specific Boolean combination of properties that characterizes it.
- 2. A *fully unaware* agent is unaware of even the concept of a quantum computer
- 3. A *fully aware* agent is unaware is aware of both the concept of a quantum computer and also what it means to be one, i.e., the properties *C* and *QP*.

## **Semantics**

- $\triangleright \Omega$  of possible states.
- we take the domain D to be the standard names in  $\mathcal{O}$ .
- $\triangleright$  a binary relation  $\mathcal{K}_i$  on states; states i considers possible.
- \* an awareness set  $A_i(\omega) \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ , the symbols i is aware of.

An interpretation I: for each state  $\omega$ , we have a function  $I_{\omega}$ :

- \* taking  $\mathscr{O}$  to elements of the domain D, standard names are manned to themselves, so that  $L_{i}(d_{i}) = d_{i}$ 
  - are mapped to themselves, so that  $I_w(d_i) = d_i$ .  ${\mathscr P}$  to subsets of D.

 $\mathcal{E}$  to  $\mathcal{L}^{bc}$ . Boolean combinations of properties (i.e.,

predicates).

The truth of a sentences at a state  $\omega$  in

$$M = (\Omega, D, \Phi, A_1, \dots, A_n, \mathcal{K}_1, \dots, \mathcal{K}_n, I)$$

are defined as usual.

## Of interest:

- $(M,\omega) \models C(d) \text{ iff } (M,\omega) \models C_{\omega}^{I}(d),$
- $(M,\omega) \models \forall Y \varphi \text{ iff } (M,\omega) \models \varphi[Y/\psi], \text{ where } \psi \in \mathcal{L}^{bc}$ 
  - $(M,\omega) \models A_i \varphi \text{ iff } \varphi \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_i(\omega)),$

  - $(M,\omega) \models K_i \varphi \text{ iff } (M,\omega) \models A_i \varphi \text{ and } (M,\omega') \models \varphi \text{ for all }$  $\omega' \in \mathcal{K}_i(\omega)$ .

# An Application: Contracting

- ▶ Two agents, each has an endowment,  $End_i \subset D$ , and preferences over objects.
  - Utility of d depends only on the properties of d, and cannot vary (across states) unless the agent is aware of a difference between the states.
- Agents each consumes 1 object
- A contract is a mapping from a set of formulas to consumption for each agent.
  - Formulas must be mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive, in the awareness set of the agents.

#### A contract is

and one strictly.

- \* Acceptable for agent *i* if it is at least as good as consuming out of *End<sub>i</sub>* in each possible state.
- Efficient if there is no contract both agents would prefer

### Theorem.

Given M and a state  $\omega^* \in \Omega$  such that  $\mathcal{A}_1(\omega^*) = \mathcal{A}_2(\omega^*)$  then there exists a contract that is efficient and acceptable at  $\omega^*$ .

- Limited by symmetric awareness does not impinge the efficacy of contracts.
- The symmetry of awareness cannot be dropped.



## Example 1

A buyer (agent 1) is trying to purchase a computer from a firm (agent2).

- $End_1 = \{d^{\$}\}$ : where  $d^{\$}$  is a fixed amount of money
- $End_2 = \{d^{cmp}\}$ , and  $d^{cmp}$  is the computer in question.
- There are two states:  $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3\}$  and information partitions the whole space.
- There are three predicates,  $\mathscr{P} = \{P, Q, R\}.$
- One concept:  $\mathscr{C} = \{QC\}$

For now, assume both agents have full awareness.

Because the buyer does not know the state, she is

unwilling to make any unconditional trade (all constant

contracts are unacceptable for the buyer).

However, this is easily remedied by the use of a contract. The obvious contract,

the use of a contract. The obvious contract, 
$$Q(d^{cmp}) \mapsto (d^{cmp}, d^\$)$$

$$\neg Q(d^{cmp}) \mapsto (d^{\$}, d^{cmp})$$

is clearly efficient and acceptable to all parties.

# Example 2

Same as Example 1 except both agents are unaware of Q.

The previous contract is no longer articulable.

We can circumvent the agents' linguistic limitations by writing a contract in terms of the concept  $\it QC$ . Indeed, the contract

$$P(d^{cmp}) \wedge QC(d^{cmp}) \mapsto (d^{cmp}, d^{\$})$$
$$\neg (P(d^{cmp}) \wedge QC(d^{cmp})) \mapsto (d^{\$}, d^{cmp})$$

With limited awareness, we can use concepts as a method of indirect reference.

# Example 3

- $End_1 = \{d_1\} \text{ and } End_2 = \{d_2\}$
- Three states,  $\omega_1$ ,  $\omega_2$ , and  $\omega_3$
- $\triangleright$  three predicate symbols P, Q, and R.
  - $P_{\omega_1}^I = \{d_1\},$
  - $Q_{\omega_3}^I = \{d_2\},$
  - $P_{\omega_2}^I = P_{\omega_3}^I = Q_{\omega_1}^I = Q_{\omega_2}^I = \emptyset,$
  - \*  $R_{\omega}^{I}=\{d_{1}\}$  for all states  $\omega$ ,

both agents consider all three worlds possible at all worlds

\*  $\mathcal{A}_1(\omega) = (\mathcal{O}, \{P, R\}, \emptyset)$ , and  $\mathcal{A}_2(\omega) = (\mathcal{O}, \{Q, R\}, \emptyset)$  for

each state  $\omega$ .

## Consider what happens when

- ightharpoonup agent 1 wants  $d_1$  only when it has property P
  - \* wants to trade in states  $\omega_2, \omega_3$
- ullet agent 2 wants  $d_2$  only when it has property Q
  - $\blacktriangleright$  wants to trade in states  $\omega_1,\omega_2$

- an efficient contract must induce trade in state  $\omega_2$
- \* acceptable contract cannot induce trade except in state  $\omega_2.$
- neither agent alone can propose such a contract
  - from agents 1's perspective, states ω<sub>2</sub> and ω<sub>3</sub> are indistinguishable (he is unaware of Q)
    - \* from 2's perspective, states  $\omega_1$  and  $\omega_2$  are indistinguishable (she is unaware of P)