

Chapter 14: Protection





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- Goals of Protection
- Principles of Protection
- Domain of Protection
- Access Matrix
- Implementation of Access Matrix
- Access Control
- Revocation of Access Rights
- Capability-Based Systems
- Language-Based Protection





Objectives

- Discuss the goals and principles of protection in a modern computer system
- Explain how protection domains combined with an access matrix are used to specify the resources a process may access
- Examine capability and language-based protection systems





Goals of Protection

- Operating system consists of a collection of objects, hardware or software
- Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations.
- Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so.





Principles of Protection


- Guiding principle – principle of least privilege
 - Programs, users and systems should be given just enough privileges to perform their tasks





Domain Structure

- Access-right = $\langle \text{object-name}, \text{rights-set} \rangle$
where *rights-set* is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object.
- Domain = set of access-rights





Domain Implementation (UNIX)

- System consists of 2 domains:
 - User
 - Supervisor


- UNIX
 - Domain = user-id
 - Domain switch accomplished via file system.
 - ▶ Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit).
 - ▶ When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed. When execution completes user-id is reset.





Domain Implementation (MULTICS)

- Let D_i and D_j be any two domain rings.
- If $j < i \Rightarrow D_i \subseteq D_j$





Access Matrix

- View protection as a matrix (*access matrix*)
- Rows represent domains
- Columns represent objects
- $Access(i, j)$ is the set of operations that a process executing in Domain _{i} can invoke on Object _{j}





Access Matrix

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	printer
D_1	read		read	
D_2				print
D_3		read	execute	
D_4	read write		read write	





Use of Access Matrix

- If a process in Domain D_i tries to do “op” on object O_j , then “op” must be in the access matrix.
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection.
 - Operations to add, delete access rights.
 - Special access rights:
 - ▶ *owner of O_i*
 - ▶ *copy op from O_i to O_j*
 - ▶ *control – D_i can modify D_j access rights*
 - ▶ *transfer – switch from domain D_i to D_j*





Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy.
 - Mechanism
 - ▶ Operating system provides access-matrix + rules.
 - ▶ If ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced.
 - Policy
 - ▶ User dictates policy.
 - ▶ Who can access what object and in what mode.





Implementation of Access Matrix

- Each column = Access-control list for one object
Defines who can perform what operation.

Domain 1 = Read, Write

Domain 2 = Read

Domain 3 = Read

⋮

- Each Row = Capability List (like a key)
Fore each domain, what operations allowed on what objects.

Object 1 – Read

Object 4 – Read, Write, Execute

Object 5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy





Access Matrix of Figure A With Domains as Objects

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	read write		read write		switch			

Figure B





Access Matrix with Copy Rights

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	execute		write*
D_2	execute	read*	execute
D_3	execute		

(a)

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	execute		write*
D_2	execute	read*	execute
D_3	execute	read	

(b)





Access Matrix With Owner Rights

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	owner execute		write
D_2		read* owner	read* owner write
D_3	execute		
(a)			
object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	owner execute		write
D_2		owner read* write*	read* owner write
D_3		write	write
(b)			





Modified Access Matrix of Figure B

object domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch control
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	write		write		switch			






Access Control

- Protection can be applied to non-file resources
- Solaris 10 provides **role-based access control** to implement least privilege
 - Privilege is right to execute system call or use an option within a system call
 - Can be assigned to processes
 - Users assigned roles granting access to privileges and programs





Role-based Access Control in Solaris 10





Revocation of Access Rights

- *Access List* – Delete access rights from access list.
 - Simple
 - Immediate

- *Capability List* – Scheme required to locate capability in the system before capability can be revoked.
 - Reacquisition
 - Back-pointers
 - Indirection
 - Keys





Capability-Based Systems

■ Hydra

- Fixed set of access rights known to and interpreted by the system.
- Interpretation of user-defined rights performed solely by user's program; system provides access protection for use of these rights.

■ Cambridge CAP System

- Data capability - provides standard read, write, execute of individual storage segments associated with object.
- Software capability - interpretation left to the subsystem, through its protected procedures.





Language-Based Protection

- Specification of protection in a programming language allows the high-level description of policies for the allocation and use of resources.
- Language implementation can provide software for protection enforcement when automatic hardware-supported checking is unavailable.
- Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on whatever protection system is provided by the hardware and the operating system.





Protection in Java 2

- Protection is handled by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
- A class is assigned a protection domain when it is loaded by the JVM.
- The protection domain indicates what operations the class can (and cannot) perform.
- If a library method is invoked that performs a privileged operation, the stack is inspected to ensure the operation can be performed by the library.





Stack Inspection

protection domain:	untrusted applet	URL loader	networking
socket permission:	none	*.lucent.com:80, connect	any
class:	gui: ... get(url); open(addr); ...	get(URL u): ... doPrivileged { open('proxy.lucent.com:80'); } <request u from proxy> ...	open(Addr a): ... checkPermission (a, connect); connect (a); ...



End of Chapter 14

