

Chapter 15: Security





Chapter 15: Security

- The Security Problem
- Program Threats
- System and Network Threats
- Cryptography as a Security Tool
- User Authentication
- Implementing Security Defenses
- Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks
- Computer-Security Classifications
- An Example: Windows XP





Objectives

- To discuss security threats and attacks
- To explain the fundamentals of encryption, authentication, and hashing
- To examine the uses of cryptography in computing
- To describe the various countermeasures to security attacks





The Security Problem

- Security must consider external environment of the system, and protect the system resources
- Intruders (crackers) attempt to breach security
- **Threat** is potential security violation
- **Attack** is attempt to breach security
- Attack can be accidental or malicious
- Easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse





Security Violations

■ Categories

- **Breach of confidentiality**
- **Breach of integrity**
- **Breach of availability**
- **Theft of service**
- **Denial of service**


■ Methods

- **Masquerading (breach authentication)**
- **Replay attack**
 - ▶ **Message modification**
- **Man-in-the-middle attack**
- **Session hijacking**





Standard Security Attacks





Security Measure Levels

- Security must occur at four levels to be effective:
 - Physical
 - Human
 - ▶ Avoid **social engineering, phishing, dumpster diving**
 - Operating System
 - Network
- Security is as weak as the weakest chain





Program Threats

- Trojan Horse
 - Code segment that misuses its environment
 - Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be executed by other users
 - **Spyware, pop-up browser windows, covert channels**
- Trap Door
 - Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
 - Could be included in a compiler
- Logic Bomb
 - Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances
- Stack and Buffer Overflow
 - Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers)






C Program with Buffer-overflow Condition

```
#include <stdio.h>
#define BUFFER SIZE 256
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buffer[BUFFER SIZE];
    if (argc < 2)
        return -1;
    else {
        strcpy(buffer,argv[1]);
        return 0;
    }
}
```





Layout of Typical Stack Frame





Modified Shell Code


```
#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    execvp(``\bin\sh'', ``\bin \sh'', NULL);
    return 0;
}
```





Hypothetical Stack Frame



Before attack

After attack





Program Threats (Cont.)

■ Viruses

- Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
- Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications
- Usually borne via email or as a macro
 - ▶ Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive

```
Sub AutoOpen()  
Dim oFS  
Set oFS =  
CreateObject(''Scripting.FileSystemObject'')  
vs = Shell(''c:command.com /k format  
c:','',vbHide)  
End Sub
```






Program Threats (Cont.)

- **Virus dropper** inserts virus onto the system
- Many categories of viruses, literally many thousands of viruses
 - File
 - Boot
 - Macro
 - Source code
 - Polymorphic
 - Encrypted
 - Stealth
 - Tunneling
 - Multipartite
 - Armored





A Boot-sector Computer Virus






System and Network Threats

- Worms – use **spawn** mechanism; standalone program
- Internet worm
 - Exploited UNIX networking features (remote access) and bugs in *finger* and *sendmail* programs
 - **Grappling hook** program uploaded main worm program
- Port scanning
 - Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses
- Denial of Service
 - Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work
 - Distributed denial-of-service (**DDOS**) come from multiple sites at once





The Morris Internet Worm






Cryptography as a Security Tool

- Broadest security tool available
 - Source and destination of messages cannot be trusted without cryptography
 - Means to constrain potential senders (*sources*) and / or receivers (*destinations*) of *messages*
- Based on secrets (**keys**)





Secure Communication over Insecure Medium





Encryption

- Encryption algorithm consists of
 - Set of K keys
 - Set of M Messages
 - Set of C ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
 - A function $E: K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow C)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $E(k)$ is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages.
 - ▶ Both E and $E(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions.
 - A function $D: K \rightarrow (C \rightarrow M)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $D(k)$ is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts.
 - ▶ Both D and $D(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions.
- An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext $c \in C$, a computer can compute m such that $E(k)(m) = c$ only if it possesses $D(k)$.
 - Thus, a computer holding $D(k)$ can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding $D(k)$ cannot decrypt ciphertexts.
 - Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive $D(k)$ from the ciphertexts





Symmetric Encryption

- Same key used to encrypt and decrypt
 - $E(k)$ can be derived from $D(k)$, and vice versa
- DES is most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm (created by US Govt)
 - Encrypts a block of data at a time
- Triple-DES considered more secure
- Advanced Encryption Standard (**AES**), **twofish** up and coming
- RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have vulnerabilities
 - Encrypts/decrypts a stream of bytes (i.e wireless transmission)
 - Key is a input to psuedo-random-bit generator
 - ▶ Generates an infinite **keystream**





Asymmetric Encryption

- Public-key encryption based on each user having two keys:
 - public key – published key used to encrypt data
 - private key – key known only to individual user used to decrypt data
- Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme
 - Most common is RSA block cipher
 - Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
 - No efficient algorithm is known for finding the prime factors of a number





Asymmetric Encryption (Cont.)

- Formally, it is computationally infeasible to derive $D(k_d, N)$ from $E(k_e, N)$, and so $E(k_e, N)$ need not be kept secret and can be widely disseminated
 - $E(k_e, N)$ (or just k_e) is the **public key**
 - $D(k_d, N)$ (or just k_d) is the **private key**
 - N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q (for example, p and q are 512 bits each)
 - Encryption algorithm is $E(k_e, N)(m) = m^{k_e} \bmod N$, where k_e satisfies $k_e k_d \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$
 - The decryption algorithm is then $D(k_d, N)(c) = c^{k_d} \bmod N$






Asymmetric Encryption Example

- For example. make $p = 7$ and $q = 13$
- We then calculate $N = 7 * 13 = 91$ and $(p-1)(q-1) = 72$
- We next select k_e relatively prime to 72 and < 72 , yielding 5
- Finally, we calculate k_d such that $k_e k_d \bmod 72 = 1$, yielding 29
- We now have our keys
 - Public key, $k_e, N = 5, 91$
 - Private key, $k_d, N = 29, 91$
- Encrypting the message 69 with the public key results in the ciphertext 62
- Ciphertext can be decoded with the private key
 - Public key can be distributed in cleartext to anyone who wants to communicate with holder of public key



Encryption and Decryption using RSA

Asymmetric Cryptography





Cryptography (Cont.)

- Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations, asymmetric based on mathematical functions
 - Asymmetric much more compute intensive
 - Typically not used for bulk data encryption





Authentication

- Constraining set of potential senders of a message
 - Complementary and sometimes redundant to encryption
 - Also can prove message unmodified
- Algorithm components
 - A set K of keys
 - A set M of messages
 - A set A of authenticators
 - A function $S : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow A)$
 - ▶ That is, for each $k \in K$, $S(k)$ is a function for generating authenticators from messages
 - ▶ Both S and $S(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions
 - A function $V : K \rightarrow (M \times A \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\})$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $V(k)$ is a function for verifying authenticators on messages
 - ▶ Both V and $V(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions





Authentication (Cont.)

- For a message m , a computer can generate an authenticator $a \in A$ such that $V(k)(m, a) = \text{true}$ only if it possesses $S(k)$
- Thus, computer holding $S(k)$ can generate authenticators on messages so that any other computer possessing $V(k)$ can verify them
- Computer not holding $S(k)$ cannot generate authenticators on messages that can be verified using $V(k)$
- Since authenticators are generally exposed (for example, they are sent on the network with the messages themselves), it must not be feasible to derive $S(k)$ from the authenticators





Authentication – Hash Functions

- Basis of authentication
- Creates small, fixed-size block of data (**message digest**, **hash value**) from m
- Hash Function H must be collision resistant on m
 - Must be infeasible to find an $m' \neq m$ such that $H(m) = H(m')$
- If $H(m) = H(m')$, then $m = m'$
 - The message has not been modified
- Common message-digest functions include **MD5**, which produces a 128-bit hash, and **SHA-1**, which outputs a 160-bit hash





Authentication - MAC

- Symmetric encryption used in **message-authentication code (MAC)** authentication algorithm
- Simple example:
 - MAC defines $S(k)(m) = f(k, H(m))$
 - ▶ Where f is a function that is one-way on its first argument
 - k cannot be derived from $f(k, H(m))$
 - ▶ Because of the collision resistance in the hash function, reasonably assured no other message could create the same MAC
 - ▶ A suitable verification algorithm is $V(k)(m, a) \equiv (f(k, m) = a)$
 - ▶ Note that k is needed to compute both $S(k)$ and $V(k)$, so anyone able to compute one can compute the other





Authentication – Digital Signature

- Based on asymmetric keys and digital signature algorithm
- Authenticators produced are **digital signatures**
- In a digital-signature algorithm, computationally infeasible to derive $S(k_s)$ from $V(k_v)$
 - V is a one-way function
 - Thus, k_v is the public key and k_s is the private key
- Consider the RSA digital-signature algorithm
 - Similar to the RSA encryption algorithm, but the key use is reversed
 - Digital signature of message $S(k_s)(m) = H(m)^{k_s} \bmod N$
 - The key k_s again is a pair d, N , where N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q
 - Verification algorithm is $V(k_v)(m, a) \equiv (a^{k_v} \bmod N = H(m))$
 - ▶ Where k_v satisfies $k_v k_s \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$





Authentication (Cont.)

- Why authentication if a subset of encryption?
 - Fewer computations (except for RSA digital signatures)
 - Authenticator usually shorter than message
 - Sometimes want authentication but not confidentiality
 - ▶ Signed patches et al
 - Can be basis for **non-repudiation**






Key Distribution

- Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
 - Sometimes done **out-of-band**
- Asymmetric keys can proliferate – stored on **key ring**
 - Even asymmetric key distribution needs care – man-in-the-middle attack



Man-in-the-middle Attack on Asymmetric Cryptography





Digital Certificates

- Proof of who or what owns a public key
- Public key digitally signed a trusted party
- Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity
- Certificate authority are trusted party – their public keys included with web browser distributions
 - They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on





Encryption Example - SSL

- Insertion of cryptography at one layer of the ISO network model (the transport layer)
- SSL – Secure Socket Layer (also called TLS)
- Cryptographic protocol that limits two computers to only exchange messages with each other
 - Very complicated, with many variations
- Used between web servers and browsers for secure communication (credit card numbers)
- The server is verified with a **certificate** assuring client is talking to correct server
- Asymmetric cryptography used to establish a secure **session key** (symmetric encryption) for bulk of communication during session
- Communication between each computer then uses symmetric key cryptography





User Authentication

- Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user ID
- User identity most often established through *passwords*, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
 - Also can include something user has and /or a user attribute
- Passwords must be kept secret
 - Frequent change of passwords
 - Use of “non-guessable” passwords
 - Log all invalid access attempts
- Passwords may also either be encrypted or allowed to be used only once





Implementing Security Defenses

- **Defense in depth** is most common security theory – multiple layers of security
- Security policy describes what is being secured
- Vulnerability assessment compares real state of system / network compared to security policy
- Intrusion detection endeavors to detect attempted or successful intrusions
 - **Signature-based** detection spots known bad patterns
 - **Anomaly detection** spots differences from normal behavior
 - ▶ Can detect **zero-day** attacks
 - **False-positives** and **false-negatives** a problem
- Virus protection
- Auditing, accounting, and logging of all or specific system or network activities






Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks

- A network firewall is placed between trusted and untrusted hosts
 - The firewall limits network access between these two security domains
- Can be tunneled or spoofed
 - Tunneling allows disallowed protocol to travel within allowed protocol (i.e. telnet inside of HTTP)
 - Firewall rules typically based on host name or IP address which can be spoofed
- **Personal firewall** is software layer on given host
 - Can monitor / limit traffic to and from the host
- **Application proxy firewall** understands application protocol and can control them (i.e. SMTP)
- **System-call firewall** monitors all important system calls and apply rules to them (i.e. this program can execute that system call)





Network Security Through Domain Separation Via Firewall





Computer Security Classifications

- U.S. Department of Defense outlines four divisions of computer security: **A**, **B**, **C**, and **D**.
- **D** – Minimal security.
- **C** – Provides discretionary protection through auditing. Divided into **C1** and **C2**. **C1** identifies cooperating users with the same level of protection. **C2** allows user-level access control.
- **B** – All the properties of **C**, however each object may have unique sensitivity labels. Divided into **B1**, **B2**, and **B3**.
- **A** – Uses formal design and verification techniques to ensure security.





Example: Windows XP

- Security is based on user accounts
 - Each user has unique security ID
 - Login to ID creates **security access token**
 - ▶ Includes security ID for user, for user's groups, and special privileges
 - ▶ Every process gets copy of token
 - ▶ System checks token to determine if access allowed or denied
- Uses a subject model to ensure access security. A subject tracks and manages permissions for each program that a user runs
- Each object in Windows XP has a security attribute defined by a security descriptor
 - For example, a file has a security descriptor that indicates the access permissions for all users



End of Chapter 15

