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A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems

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C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y



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A Profile for U. S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems

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Reports on Computer Systems Technology

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Abstract

This Profile for U. S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems (FCKMSs) contains requirements for their design, implementation, procurement, installation, configuration, management, operation, and use by U. S. Federal organizations. The Profile is based on NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-130, *A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems (CKMS)*.

Keywords

access control; confidentiality; cryptographic key management system; disaster recovery; federal cryptographic key management system; integrity; metadata; security assessment; security functions; security policies; source authentication.

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Executive Summary

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cryptographic Key Management project covers major aspects of managing the cryptographic keys that protect sensitive, unclassified federal information. Associated with each key is specific information (e.g., the identifier associated with its owner, its length, and acceptable uses) called metadata. The computers, software, modules, communications, and roles assumed by one or more authorized individuals when managing and using cryptographic key management services are collectively called a Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS).

This Profile for U. S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems (FCKMSs) has been prepared to assist CKMS designers and implementers in selecting the features to be provided in their “products,” and to assist federal organizations and their contractors when procuring, installing, configuring, operating, and using FCKMSs. Other organizations may use this Profile as desired.

An FCKMS can be owned and operated by a federal organization or by a private contractor that provides key management services for federal organizations or other contractors performing federal information-processing services.

This Profile can also be used by agencies and organizations to understand their FCKMSs, and to adopt, adapt and migrate their FCKMSs to comply with the Profile requirements over time. NIST does not expect that these requirements would be implemented immediately, but that agencies would use these requirements when creating or procuring FCKMSs or FCKMS services for their Enterprise Architectures.

This Profile is based on [NIST Special Publication 800-130, A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems](#). The Framework specifies topics that should be considered by a CKMS designer when selecting the capabilities that a CKMS will have and the cryptographic key management services it will support. This Profile replicates all of the Framework requirements that must be satisfied in a CKMS and its design documentation, and includes additional information about installing, configuring, operating and maintaining an FCKMS.

The Framework and this Profile could be used by other organizations that have security requirements similar to those specified in these documents or could be used as a model for the development of other profiles.

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