# ABDK CONSULTING

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

**MORET** 


Solidity

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# **SMART CONTRACT AUDIT CONCLUSION**

by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich 12th January 2022

We've been asked to review certain files in a Github repo. We found 2 critical, 5 major, and a few less important issues. All critical and major issues were fixed.



# **Findings**

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-1	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-2	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-3	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-4	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-5	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-6	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-7	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-8	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-9	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-10	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-11	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-12	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-13	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-14	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-15	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-16	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-17	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-18	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-19	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-20	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-21	Critical	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-22	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-23	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-24	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-25	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-26	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-27	Minor	Bad datatype	Info

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-28	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-29	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-30	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-31	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-32	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-33	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-34	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-35	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-36	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-37	Minor	Documentation	Fixed
CVF-38	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-39	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-40	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-41	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-42	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-43	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-44	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-45	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-46	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-47	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-48	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-49	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-50	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-51	Critical	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-52	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-53	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-54	Major	Unclear behavior	Fixed
CVF-55	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-56	Moderate	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-57	Minor	Suboptimal	Info

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-58	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-59	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-60	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-61	Major	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-62	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-63	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-64	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-65	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-66	Major	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-67	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-68	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-69	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-70	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-71	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-72	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-73	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-74	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-75	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-76	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-77	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-78	Major	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-79	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-80	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-81	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-82	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-83	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-84	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-85	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-86	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-87	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-88	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-89	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-90	Moderate	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-91	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-92	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-93	Major	Readability	Fixed
CVF-94	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-95	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-96	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-97	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-98	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-99	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-100	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-101	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-102	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-103	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-104	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-105	Minor	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-106	Minor	Documentation	Fixed
CVF-107	Minor	Unclear behavior	Fixed
CVF-108	Minor	Unclear behavior	Fixed
CVF-109	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-110	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-111	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-112	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-113	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-114	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-115	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-116	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-117	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-118	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-119	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-120	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-121	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-122	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-123	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-124	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-125	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-126	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-127	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-128	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-129	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-130	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-131	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-132	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-133	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-134	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-135	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-136	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-137	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-138	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-139	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-140	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-141	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-142	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-143	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-144	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-145	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-146	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-147	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-148	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-149	Minor	Unclear behavior	Fixed
CVF-150	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-151	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-152	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-153	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-154	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-155	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-156	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-157	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-158	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-159	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-160	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-161	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-162	Moderate	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-163	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-164	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-165	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-166	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-167	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-168	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-169	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-170	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-171	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-172	Minor	Unclear behavior	Fixed
CVF-173	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-174	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-175	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-176	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-177	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-178	Minor	Unclear behavior	Fixed





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# 1 Document properties

# Version

Version	Date	Author	Description
0.1	January 11, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Initial Draft
0.2	January 12, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Minor revision
1.0	January 12, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Release
1.1	January 12, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Date fix
2.0	January 12, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Release

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#### 2 Introduction

The following document provides the result of the audit performed by ABDK Consulting at the customer request. The audit goal is a general review of the smart contracts structure, critical/major bugs detection and issuing the general recommendations. We have reviewed the repository with the following files:

- Exchange.sol
- MarketLibrary.sol
- MoretInterfaces.sol
- MoretMarketMaker.sol
- OptionLibrary.sol
- OptionVault.sol
- VolatilityChain.sol
- VolatilityToken.sol

The fixes were provided in a new commit.

#### 2.1 About ABDK

ABDK Consulting, established in 2016, is a leading service provider in the space of blockchain development and audit. It has contributed to numerous blockchain projects, and co-authored some widely known blockchain primitives like Poseidon hash function. The ABDK Audit Team, led by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich, has conducted over 40 audits of blockchain projects in Solidity, Rust, Circom, C++, JavaScript, and other languages.

#### 2.2 Disclaimer

Note that the performed audit represents current best practices and smart contract standards which are relevant at the date of publication. After fixing the indicated issues the smart contracts should be re-audited.

#### 2.3 Methodology

The methodology is not a strict formal procedure, but rather a collection of methods and tactics that combined differently and tuned for every particular project, depending on the project structure and and used technologies, as well as on what the client is expecting from the audit. In current audit we use:

General Code Assessment. The code is reviewed for clarity, consistency, style, and
for whether it follows code best practices applicable to the particular programming language used. We check indentation, naming convention, commented code blocks, code
duplication, confusing names, confusing, irrelevant, or missing comments etc. At this
phase we also understand overall code structure.



- Entity Usage Analysis. Usages of various entities defined in the code are analysed. This includes both: internal usages from other parts of the code as well as potential external usages. We check that entities are defined in proper places and that their visibility scopes and access levels are relevant. At this phase we understand overall system architecture and how different parts of the code are related to each other.
- Access Control Analysis. For those entities, that could be accessed externally, access control measures are analysed. We check that access control is relevant and is done properly. At this phase we understand user roles and permissions, as well as what assets the system ought to protect.
- Code Logic Analysis. The code logic of particular functions is analysed for correctness and efficiency. We check that code actually does what it is supposed to do, that algorithms are optimal and correct, and that proper data types are used. We also check that external libraries used in the code are up to date and relevant to the tasks they solve in the code. At this phase we also understand data structures used and the purposes they are used for.





# 3 Detailed Results

#### 3.1 CVF-1

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source Exchange.sol

**Description** Should be "^0.8.0".

#### Listing 1:

2 pragma solidity 0.8.10;

#### 3.2 CVF-2

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

Source Exchange.sol

**Description** The type of this variable should be "OptionVault". **Client Comment** This variable is replaced with external functions.

#### Listing 2:

13 address public vaultAddress;

#### 3.3 CVF-3

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• Source Exchange.sol

**Description** The type of this variable should be "MoretMarketMaker". **Client Comment** This variable is replaced with external functions.

#### Listing 3:

14 address public marketMakerAddress;

#### 3.4 CVF-4

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

Source Exchange.sol

**Description** The type of this mapping should be: mapping (uint256 => VolatilityToken)

#### Listing 4:

15 mapping(uint256=>address) public volTokenAddressList;



#### 3.5 CVF-5

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• Source Exchange.sol

**Description** These variables should be declared as immutable. **Client Comment** Added constant modifier for the variables.

#### Listing 5:

- 13 address public vaultAddress; address public marketMakerAddress;
- 17 MoretMarketMaker internal marketMaker;
   OptionVault internal optionVault;

#### 3.6 CVF-6

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

Source Exchange.sol

**Description** These variables duplicate the public variables "vaultAddress" and "marketMakerAddress".

Recommendation Consider removing.

Client Comment Removed the address variables.

#### Listing 6:

17 MoretMarketMaker internal marketMaker; OptionVault internal optionVault;

#### 3.7 CVF-7

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Readability

• Source Exchange.sol

**Description** This value could be rendered as "1.8e18".

**Client Comment** Fixed and renamed 'volCapacityFactor'.

#### Listing 7:

20 uint256 public volRiskPremiumMaxRatio= 18 \* (10 \*\* 17);



#### 3.8 CVF-8

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source Exchange.sol

**Description** The types of the arguments should be "MoretMarketMaker" and "OptionVault" respectively.

#### Listing 8:

24 constructor( address \_marketMakerAddress, address \_vaultAddress){

#### 3.9 CVF-9

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad naming

• Source Exchange.sol

**Description** The semantics of the returned values is unclear.

**Recommendation** Consider giving descriptive names to the returned values and/or adding a documentation comment.

**Client Comment** Created extra function 'calcOptionCost' with clearer semantics.

#### Listing 9:

32 function calcCost(uint256 \_tenor, uint256 \_strike, uint256 → \_amount, OptionLibrary.PayoffType \_poType, OptionLibrary.

→ OptionSide \_side) public view returns(uint256, uint256, → uint256){

#### 3.10 CVF-10

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

Source Exchange.sol

**Description** This commented line should be removed.

#### Listing 10:



#### 3.11 CVF-11

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source Exchange.sol

**Description** Inside these calls the number of funding token decimals is obtained.

**Recommendation** Consider obtaining it once in the constructor and storing in an internal variable for future use.

**Client Comment** Added internal variables for storing decimals in Exchange, OptionVault and MoretMarketMaker.

#### Listing 11:



#### 3.12 CVF-12

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Exchange.sol

**Description** Querying the option vault for the funding token every time is suboptimal. **Recommendation** Consider querying one in the constructor and storing in an internal variable. **Client Comment** Stored in internal variable 'fundingToken'.

#### Listing 12:

```
premium = MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals( premium, optionVault.
40
      \hookrightarrow funding());
    cost = MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals( cost, optionVault.funding())
       \hookrightarrow ;}
    require (ERC20 (option Vault.funding ()).transferFrom (msg.sender,
       → marketMakerAddress , payInCost) , 'Failed payment .');
    require (ERC20 (option Vault . funding ()) . transfer From (msg. sender ,
88
       → address(this), _premium), "vol payment error");
    require (ERC20 (option Vault . funding ()) . balance Of (address (this))>=
96
       → premium, "insufficient usdc in exchange.");
    require (ERC20 (option Vault.funding()).transfer (msg. sender,
99
       → premium), "payment error");
    require (ERC20 (option Vault . funding ()) . balance Of (address (this)) >=
       → premium, "insufficient usdc in exchange.");
   require (ERC20 (option Vault : funding ()) . transfer (market Maker Address
110

→ , premium), 'payment error');
    require (ERC20 (option Vault . funding ()) . transferFrom (msg. sender,
120
       → marketMakerAddress, _cost), 'payment error');
    require (ERC20 (option Vault.funding ()).transferFrom (msg.sender,
       → address(this), _premium), 'payment error');
```



#### 3.13 CVF-13

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source Exchange.sol

**Description** Fixed point multiplication and division is implemented multiple times. **Recommendation** Consider extracting into utility functions. **Client Comment** Moved to FullMath and use it for uint256.

#### Listing 13:

```
46 require (MulDiv (_amount, _price, OptionLibrary.Multiplier()) <=
      → marketMaker.calcCapital(true, false), 'insufficient capital
      \hookrightarrow ');
54 int256 newGamma = currentGamma + int256 (MulDiv (OptionLibrary).
      \hookrightarrow calcGamma(_price, _strike, _vol), _amount, OptionLibrary.
      → Multiplier() )) * (_side—OptionLibrary.OptionSide.Sell?
      \hookrightarrow -1: int(1));
   uint256 \ K = MulDiv(vol, volRiskPremiumMaxRatio, OptionLibrary.
      → Multiplier());
60 if (input < 0) { capacity += int256(MulDiv(uint256(-input),
      → OptionLibrary. Multiplier(), max));}
   if(_input > 0){ _capacity = int256(MulDiv(uint256(input)),}
      → OptionLibrary. Multiplier(), max));}
   return int256 (MulDiv (constant, OptionLibrary. Multiplier (),
      \hookrightarrow uint256 ( capacity))) - int256 ( constant);}
   volAmount = MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals(MulDiv( premium,
82
      → OptionLibrary . Multiplier () , vol) , volTokenAddressList [
      \hookrightarrow tenor]);}
```



#### 3.14 CVF-14

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Exchange.sol

**Description** Querying the multiplier from the option library each time is suboptimal. **Recommendation** Consider querying once in the constructor and storing in an internal variable

Client Comment Saved in internal constant variable.

#### Listing 14:

```
46 require (MulDiv (amount, price, Option Library. Multiplier()) <=
      → marketMaker.calcCapital(true, false), 'insufficient capital
      \hookrightarrow ');
54 int256 _newGamma = _currentGamma + int256 (MulDiv (OptionLibrary.
      \hookrightarrow calcGamma(_price, _strike, _vol), _amount, OptionLibrary.
      → Multiplier() )) * ( side=OptionLibrary.OptionSide.Sell?
      \hookrightarrow -1: int(1));
   uint256 K = MulDiv (vol, volRiskPremiumMaxRatio, OptionLibrary.
      → Multiplier());
59 int256 capacity = int256(OptionLibrary.Multiplier()); //
      \hookrightarrow capacity should be in (0,2)
   if (input < 0) { capacity += int256 (MulDiv(uint256(-input),
60
      → OptionLibrary. Multiplier(), max));}
   if (input > 0) { capacity -= int256 (MulDiv(uint256 (input)),
      → OptionLibrary . Multiplier(), max));}
   require ((_capacity >=0) && (_capacity <= int256(2 * OptionLibrary
      \hookrightarrow . Multiplier())), "Capacity breached.");
   return int256 (MulDiv (constant, OptionLibrary. Multiplier (),
      \hookrightarrow uint256( capacity))) - int256( constant);}
82 volAmount = MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals(MulDiv( premium,
      → OptionLibrary . Multiplier () , vol) , volTokenAddressList [
      \hookrightarrow tenor]);}
```



#### 3.15 CVF-15

• Severity Minor

- Status Fixed
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Source Exchange.sol

**Description** Overflow possible when converting to "int256".

**Recommendation** Consider using safe conversion.

**Client Comment** All replaced with 'SafeCast.toInt256'.

#### Listing 15:

```
48 require ((int256 (_vol)+_riskPremium) > 0,"Incorrect vol premium")

→;

_vol = uint256 (int256 (_vol)+_riskPremium);}

54 int256 _newGamma = _currentGamma + int256 (MulDiv (OptionLibrary.

→ calcGamma (_price, _strike, _vol), _amount, OptionLibrary.

→ Multiplier() )) * (_side=OptionLibrary.OptionSide.Sell?

→ -1: int(1));

60 if (_input < 0) { _capacity += int256 (MulDiv (uint256 (_input),

→ OptionLibrary. Multiplier(), _max));}

if (_input > 0) { _capacity -= int256 (MulDiv (uint256 (_input),

→ OptionLibrary. Multiplier(), _max));}

require ((_capacity>=0) && (_capacity <= int256(2 * OptionLibrary

→ .Multiplier())), "Capacity breached.");

return int256 (MulDiv (_constant, OptionLibrary. Multiplier(),

→ uint256 (_capacity))) - int256 (_constant);}
```

#### 3.16 CVF-16

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

Source Exchange.sol

**Description** This event is redundant, as the "transferFrom" and "mint" calls emit events containing enough information.

Client Comment Removed.

#### Listing 16:

```
90 emit volatilityTokenBought(msg.sender, block.timestamp, _tenor, 

→ _volAmount, _premium);}
```



#### 3.17 CVF-17

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source Exchange.sol

**Description** These checks are redundant as the consequent "transfer" calls will fail anyway in case of insufficient balance.

Client Comment Removed.

#### Listing 17:

```
96 require (ERC20 (option Vault.funding ()).balanceOf (address (this))>=

→ premium, "insufficient usdc in exchange.");
```

#### 3.18 CVF-18

• Severity Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

Source Exchange.sol

**Description** This event is redundant, as the "burn" and "transfer" calls emit events containing enough information.

Client Comment Removed.

#### Listing 18:

#### 3.19 CVF-19

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

Category Procedural

• Source Exchange.sol

**Description** These functions should emit some events.

Client Comment Added two new events 'volTokenAdded' and 'volTokenRemoved'.

#### Listing 19:

```
127 function addVolToken(uint256 _tenor, address _tokenAddress)

→ external onlyRole(ADMIN_ROLE){
```

```
130 function removeVolToken(uint256 _tenor) external onlyRole(

→ ADMIN ROLE){ volTokenAddressList[tenor] = address(0);}
```



#### 3.20 CVF-20

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source Exchange.sol

**Description** The expression "volTokenAddressList[\_tenor]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** This line has been modified so not relevant now.

#### Listing 20:

```
require (VolatilityToken (volTokenAddressList [_tenor]).tenor () 

→ _tenor & VolatilityToken (volTokenAddressList [_tenor]).

→ tokenHash () = optionVault.tokenHash (), 'mismatched token

→ address');

volTokenAddressList [ tenor] = tokenAddress; }
```

#### 3.21 CVF-21

Severity Critical

Status Fixed

• Category Flaw

Source Exchange.sol

**Description** The "volTokenAddressList" mapping is empty initially, and this function is the only way to populate it, however, this check calls the "tenor" and "tokenHash" functions on the current volatility token, which is initially zero, thus will not get meaningful result and most probably will fail.

**Recommendation** It should be "\_tokenAddress" here instead of "volTokenAddressList[ tender]".

**Client Comment** I've replaced 'volTokenAddressList[\_tenor]' with '\_tokenAddress', which should be the correct way of checking the tenor and token hash properties.

#### Listing 21:

```
require (VolatilityToken (volTokenAddressList [_tenor]) . tenor () ⇒ _tenor && VolatilityToken (volTokenAddressList [_tenor]) . ⇒ tokenHash () == optionVault . tokenHash (), 'mismatched token ⇒ address');

132 function resetLoanRate (uint256 _loanInterest) external onlyRole ( ⇒ ADMIN_ROLE) { loanInterest = _loanInterest;} function resetRiskPremiumMaxRatio (uint256 _newRatio) external ⇒ onlyRole (ADMIN_ROLE) { volRiskPremiumMaxRatio=_newRatio;} function resetTrading (bool _allowTrading) external onlyRole ( ⇒ DEFAULT ADMIN ROLE) { allowTrading = allowTrading;}
```



#### 3.22 CVF-22

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- **Status** Fixed
- **Source** MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** Should be "^0.8.0".

#### Listing 22:

2 pragma solidity 0.8.10;

#### 3.23 CVF-23

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** It is a good practice to put external imports at the beginning or at the end of the list, but not in the middle.

#### Listing 23:

```
4 import "./ MoretInterfaces.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import "./ FullMath.sol";
```



#### 3.24 CVF-24

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- **Status** Fixed
- **Source** MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** The type of the "\_protocolDataProviderAddress" arguments should be "IProtocolDataProvider".

Client Comment Replaced with 'IProtocolDataProvider'.

#### Listing 24:

12 function getLendingTokenAddresses(address → protocolDataProviderAddress, address tokenAddress) 17 function getTokenBalances(address contractAddress, address → protocolDataProviderAddress, address tokenAddress)  $\rightarrow$  public view returns (uint256, uint256, uint256) { 21 function getLTV(address protocolDataProviderAddress, address → tokenAddress) public view returns (uint256) { 26 function getLoanTrade(address contractAddress, address → protocolDataProviderAddress, int256 aggregateDelta, → address underlyingAddress, bool useVariableRate) public → view returns (int256 loanChange, uint256 targetLoan, → address loanAddress){ 33 function getCollateralTrade(address \_contractAddress, address → protocolDataProviderAddress, uint256 targetLoan, uint256 → price, address fundingAddress, address → underlyingAddress) public view returns (int256) → collateralChange , address collateralAddress ) {

#### 3.25 CVF-25

• **Severity** Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Bad naming

• **Source** MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** The semantics of the returned values is unclear.

**Recommendation** Consider giving descriptive names to the returned values and/or adding a documentation comment.

Client Comment Removed as no longer needed.

#### Listing 25:

13 public view returns (address, address) {



#### 3.26 CVF-26

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- **Status** Fixed
- **Source** MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** The type of the returned values should be "IERC20". **Client Comment** Removed as no longer needed.

#### Listing 26:

13 public view returns (address, address) {

#### 3.27 CVF-27

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• **Category** Bad datatype

• **Source** MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** The type of the "\_tokenAddress" arguments should be "IERC20". **Client Comment** This has to be address as address is used as argument type in contract functions of Aave.

#### Listing 27:



#### 3.28 CVF-28

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** The value "4" should be a named constant.

Client Comment Moved to a constant variable.

#### Listing 28:

24 return OptionLibrary. ToDefaultDecimals ( ltv, 4); }

#### 3.29 CVF-29

• Severity Minor

- **Status** Fixed
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Source MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** Overflow is possible when converting to "int256".

**Recommendation** Consider using safe conversion.

Client Comment Used 'SafeCast.toInt256' instead of int256.

#### Listing 29:



#### 3.30 CVF-30

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Info
- **Source** MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** The "decimals" property is used by UI to render token amounts in a human-friendly way. Using this property in smart contracts is discouraged. Consider treating all token amounts as integers.

**Client Comment** The reason why decimals are used are that the balances of tokens (USDC etc.), price from Oracles, as well as some parameters in Aave are all used in the contract so that the hedge trades are properly calculated with the correct integer amounts. Without decimals, the integer amounts of ETH/WBTC trades would be incorrect.

#### Listing 30:

- 46  $return\ OptionLibrary. ToDefaultDecimals (ERC20 (\_tokenAddress).$ 
  - $\hookrightarrow$  balanceOf(\_accountAddress), ERC20(\_tokenAddress).decimals
  - $\hookrightarrow$  ());}
- 49 return OptionLibrary. ToDefaultDecimals (amount, ERC20(
  - → tokenAddress). decimals());}
- 52 return OptionLibrary.ToCustomDecimals( amount, ERC20(
  - → tokenAddress). decimals());

#### 3.31 CVF-31

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• **Category** Readability

• **Source** MarketLibrary.sol

**Description** Should be "else if" for efficiency and readability.

#### Listing 31:

67 if ( underlying Amt < 0 && funding Amt > 0) {

#### 3.32 CVF-32

• **Severity** Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

• Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** Should be "^0.8.0".

#### Listing 32:

2 pragma solidity 0.8.10;



#### 3.33 CVF-33

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** This interface should be moved to a separate file named "EOption.sol".

#### Listing 33:

7 interface EOption{

#### 3.34 CVF-34

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** Events are usually named via nouns, such as "NewOption", "Exercise", "CapitalAddition" etc.

#### Listing 34:

```
8 event newOptionBought(address indexed _purchaser, OptionLibrary.

→ Option _option, uint256 _cost, bool _inVol);
event optionExercised(address indexed _purchaser, OptionLibrary.

→ Option _option, uint256 _payoff);

10 event capitalAdded(address _recipient, uint256

→ _mintMPTokenAmount, uint256 _addedValue);
event capitalWithdrawn(address _recipient, uint256

→ _burnMPTokenAmount, uint256 _withdrawValue);
event volatilityTokenBought(address _purchaser, uint256 _time,

→ uint256 _tenor, uint256 _amount, uint256 _cost);
event volatilityTokenSold(address _seller, uint256 _time,

→ uint256 _tenor, uint256 _amount, uint256 _cost);

16 event volatilityChainBlockAdded(uint256 indexed _tenor, uint256

→ _timeStamp, PriceStamp _book);
```



#### 3.35 CVF-35

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** The " recipient", "purchaser", and " seller" parameters should be indexed.

#### Listing 35:

#### 3.36 CVF-36

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** This interface should be moved to a separate file named "IVolatilityChain.sol".

#### Listing 36:

15 interface IVolatilityChain{



#### 3.37 CVF-37

- Severity Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Fixed
- Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** The number formats used are unclear. **Recommendation** Consider documenting.

#### Listing 37:

- 20 struct VolParam{ uint256 initialVol; uint256 ltVol; uint256 → ltVolWeighted; uint256 w; uint256 p; uint256 q; }
- 22 function getVol(uint256 \_tenor) external view returns(uint256); function queryPrice() external view returns(uint256, uint256);

#### 3.38 CVF-38

• **Severity** Minor

Status Fixed

• **Category** Procedural

• Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** This interface should be moved to a separate file named "IU-niswapV2Router02.sol".

#### Listing 38:

27 interface IUniswapV2Router02 {

#### 3.39 CVF-39

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• **Category** Procedural

• Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** This interface should be moved to a separate file named "I1InchProtocol.sol". **Client Comment** This interface is not used anymore so deleted.

#### Listing 39:

35 interface | 11|nchProtocol {



#### 3.40 CVF-40

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** Such a long lines make the code harder to read.

**Recommendation** Consider splitting long lines.

**Client Comment** This interface is not used anymore so deleted.

#### Listing 40:

- function getExpectedReturn (IERC20 fromToken, IERC20 destToken
  - $\hookrightarrow$  , uint256 amount, uint256 parts, uint256 flags) external
  - → view returns ( uint256 returnAmount , uint256 [] memory
  - → distribution);

function getExpectedReturnWithGas(IERC20 fromToken,IERC20

- → destToken, uint256 amount, uint256 parts, uint256 flags,
- → uint256 destTokenEthPriceTimesGasPrice) external view
- → returns (uint256 returnAmount, uint256 estimateGasAmount,
- → uint256 [] memory distribution);

function getExpectedReturnWithGasMulti( IERC20[] memory tokens

- → , uint256 amount, uint256 [] memory parts, uint256 []
- → memory flags, uint256[] memory
- → destTokenEthPriceTimesGasPrices ) external view returns (
- → uint256 [] memory returnAmounts, uint256
- → estimateGasAmount, uint256[] memory distribution );
- 44 function getReserveConfigurationData(address asset) external
  - $\hookrightarrow$  view returns (uint256 decimals, uint256 ltv, uint256
  - → liquidationThreshold, uint256 liquidationBonus, uint256
  - → reserveFactor, bool usageAsCollateralEnabled, bool
  - → borrowingEnabled, bool stableBorrowRateEnabled, bool
  - → isActive, bool isFrozen);



# 3.41 CVF-41

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** The semantics of the returned values is unclear. Consider giving descriptive names to the returned values and/or adding documentation comments.

**Client Comment** This interface is not used anymore so deleted.

# Listing 41:

#### 3.42 CVF-42

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** This interface should be moved to a separate file named "IProtocolDataProvider.sol".

### Listing 42:

43 interface IProtocolDataProvider {

#### 3.43 CVF-43

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

• Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** This interface should be moved to a separate file named "ILendingPoolAddress-esProvider.sol".

### Listing 43:

47 interface | LendingPoolAddressesProvider {

# 3.44 CVF-44

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretInterfaces.sol

**Description** This interface should be moved to a separate file named "ILendingPool.sol".

# Listing 44:

51 interface | LendingPool {

### 3.45 CVF-45

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** Should be "^0.8.0".

### Listing 45:

2 pragma solidity 0.8.10;

### 3.46 CVF-46

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

Source MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** These variable should be declared as "immutable".

# Listing 46:

- 14 uint256 private multiplier;
- 17 OptionVault internal optionVault;
- 19 address internal underlying;
- 20 address internal funding;



# 3.47 CVF-47

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** These values could be rendered as: 0.005e18 and 0.0005e18 for readability.

### Listing 47:

```
15  uint256  public settlementFee= 5 * (10 ** 15);
    uint256  public exerciseFee= 5 * (10 ** 15);
23  uint256  public swapSlippage = 5 * (10 ** 14);
```

#### 3.48 CVF-48

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- **Status** Fixed
- Source MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The type of these variables should be "IERC20".

# Listing 48:

- 19 address internal underlying;
- 20 address internal funding;

#### 3.49 CVF-49

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad datatype

• **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** There should be named constants or even enum for the valid lending pool rate modes.

**Client Comment** Leave it as it is as the impact is small due to limited usage.

### Listing 49:

- 22 uint256 public lendingPoolRateMode = 2;
- require ( newRateMode == 1 || newRateMode == 2);



# 3.50 CVF-50

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The type of the "optionAddress" argument should be "OptionVault".

### Listing 50:

25 constructor(string memory \_name, string memory \_symbol, address → \_optionAddress) ERC20(\_name, \_symbol){

#### 3.51 CVF-51

- Severity Critical
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** This loop doesn't scale. In case there are too many expired options, this loop may not fit into the block gas limit.

**Recommendation** Consider terminating the loop if the remaining gas it below a certain threshold. Alternatively, consider accepting an additional argument specifying the maximum number of loop iterations.

**Client Comment** Added an argument '\_maxContracts' to specify the max number of expiry contracts. This will also help estimate the gas by using 'maxContracts = 1'.

### Listing 51:

38 while (expiringld >0) {



# 3.52 CVF-52

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** Inside these calls the decimals number of the funding token is obtained. **Recommendation** Consider obtaining it once in the constructor and storing in an immutable variable for future use.

**Client Comment** Changed the 'cvtDecimals' to 'toDecimals' which takes in decimals as an argument.

### Listing 52:

```
42 require ( payback < MarketLibrary.balanceDef(funding, address(

→ this)), "Balance insufficient.");
     require (IERC20 (funding).transfer (optionVault.getOptionHolder (
48
        expiringId), MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals( holderPayment,
        → funding)), "Failed payment to holder");
     require (IERC20 (funding). transfer (maintenanceAddress,
        → MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals( settleFeeAmount, funding)), "
        → Failed payment to maintenance");
     require (IERC20 (funding).transfer (exerciseFeeRecipient,
50
        → MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals( exerciseFeeAmount, funding)),
        → "Failed payment to exerciser.");}
62 uint256 mintMPTokenAmount = MulDiv(MarketLibrary.cvtDef(

→ depositAmount, funding), multiplier, calcCapital(false,
      \hookrightarrow true));
68 uint256 withdrawValue = MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals(MulDiv(

→ calcCapital(true, true), burnMPTokenAmount, multiplier)

      \hookrightarrow , funding);
```



# 3.53 CVF-53

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** Fixed point multiplication and division are implemented in multiple places. **Recommendation** Consider extracting to utility functions.

**Client Comment** Changed to utility function muldiv (in FullMath.sol file)

## Listing 53:

```
uint256 _holderPayment = _payoff == _payback? MulDiv(_payback,
44
            multiplier - settlementFee - exerciseFee, multiplier):
        → payback;
     uint256 _settleFeeAmount = MulDiv(_payoff, settlementFee,
        → multiplier);
     uint256 exerciseFeeAmount = MulDiv( payoff, exerciseFee,
        → multiplier);
58
   if(totalSupply() > 0) capital = MulDiv(capital, multiplier,
      → totalSupply());
   uint256 mintMPTokenAmount = MulDiv (MarketLibrary.cvtDef (

→ depositAmount, funding), multiplier, calcCapital(false,
      \hookrightarrow true));
  uint256 withdrawValue = MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals(MulDiv(

→ calcCapital(true, true), burnMPTokenAmount, multiplier)

      \hookrightarrow , funding);
```

#### 3.54 CVF-54

• **Severity** Major

- Status Fixed
- Category Unclear behavior
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** Usually, "\_payoff" equals "\_payback" for long positions, while for short positions this is also possible. It the intention is to subtract fees only from long position payoffs, then the condition should be based on the option side rather than on the "\_payoff" and "\_payback" values.

**Client Comment** The equal condition is removed and replaced with the condition based on option side.

### Listing 54:

```
44 uint256 _holderPayment = _payoff == _payback? MulDiv(_payback,

→ multiplier - settlementFee - exerciseFee, multiplier):

→ _payback;
```



# 3.55 CVF-55

- Severity Minor
- **Category** Documentation
- Status Info
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The decimals conversion could be performed in the same "MulDiv" call that calculates the "\_holderPayment", "settleFeeAmount", and "\_exerciseFeeAmount" values. **Client Comment** Still needs to run decimals conversion in the end to avoid getting the wrong payback amount

### Listing 55:

```
44 uint256 _holderPayment = _payoff == _payback? MulDiv(_payback,

→ multiplier - settlementFee - exerciseFee, multiplier):

      → _payback;
   uint256 settleFeeAmount = MulDiv( payoff, settlementFee,
      → multiplier);
   uint256 exerciseFeeAmount = MulDiv( payoff, exerciseFee,
      → multiplier);
48 require (IERC20 (funding). transfer (option Vault.get Option Holder (

→ expiringId), MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals( holderPayment,

→ funding)), "Failed payment to holder");
   require (IERC20 (funding). transfer (maintenance Address,
      → MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals(_settleFeeAmount, funding)), "
      → Failed payment to maintenance");
50 require (IERC20 (funding). transfer (exercise Fee Recipient,
      → MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals( exerciseFeeAmount, funding)), "
      → Failed payment to exerciser.");}
```



# 3.56 CVF-56

- **Severity** Moderate
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Info
- Source MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** In case the capital is not zero, but the total supply is zero, the capital is returned as is even when the " average" flag is set.

Recommendation Consider reverting in such a case or returning "multiplier".

**Client Comment** This was intended, as when the capital is not zero but the total supply is zero, there is assumed to be 1 liquidity pool (MoretMarketMaker) token. This obviously creates arbitrage opportunity for whomever deposits tiny amount into the pool and thus can withdraw the whole lot of the capital straightaway. This arbitrage opportunity prevents LP providers from withdrawing all LP tokens.

#### Listing 56:

#### 3.57 CVF-57

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The decimals conversion could be merged with the "MulDiv" call. **Client Comment** Decided to keep it as it is as the solution might be more complicated.

### Listing 57:



# 3.58 CVF-58

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** This event is redundant, as the preceding "transferFrom" and "\_mint" calls emit events that contain enough information about the operation.

**Client Comment** Removed this event.

### Listing 58:

65 emit capitalAdded(msg.sender, \_depositAmount, \_mintMPTokenAmount → );}

#### 3.59 CVF-59

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** This check is redundant, as the "transfer" call will anyway fail on insufficient balance.

Client Comment Removed.

#### Listing 59:

#### 3.60 CVF-60

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** This event is redundant, as the preceding "\_burn" and "transfer" calls emit events that contain enough information about the operation.

**Client Comment** Removed this event.

### Listing 60:

```
72 emit capitalWithdrawn (msg. sender, _burnMPTokenAmount, 

→ withdrawValue);}
```



# 3.61 CVF-61

- Severity Major
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The returned value is ignored.

**Client Comment** Added require clause to capture approve results.

### Listing 61:

### 3.62 CVF-62

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** Should be "else" instead of "if (...)".

Client Comment The whole block has been deleted as no longer used.

# Listing 62:

```
80 if (! _useAggregator) swapByRouter(_fromAddress, _toAddress, \rightarrow _router, _fromAmt, _toAmt, _parameter);}
```



# 3.63 CVF-63

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The type of the "\_fromAddress" and "\_toAddress" should be "IERC20". **Client Comment** Both functions are redundant and deleted.

### Listing 63:

#### 3.64 CVF-64

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The type of the " router" argument should be "IUniswapV2Router02".

### Listing 64:

```
82 function swapByRouter(address _fromAddress, address _toAddress, 

→ address _router, uint256 _fromAmt, uint256 _toAmt, uint256 

→ _deadline) internal {
```

#### 3.65 CVF-65

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The type of the "\_aggregator" argument should be "I1InchProtocol". **Client Comment** This function has been remodeled so this argument is not longer used.

### Listing 65:

```
89 function swapByAggregator(address _fromAddress, address \rightarrow _toAddress, address _aggregator, uint256 _fromAmt, uint256 
 \rightarrow _toAmt, uint256 _parts) internal {
```



# 3.66 CVF-66

- Severity Major
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The "increaseAllowance" function is not a standard ERC-20 function. **Recommendation** Consider using the combination of "allowance' and "approve" calls instead. **Client Comment** Changed to approve and added required clause (related to #62).

# Listing 66:

- 101 ERC20(funding).increaseAllowance(\_lendingPoolAddress, uint256(

  → collateralChange));
- 114 ERC20(\_collateralAddress).increaseAllowance(\_lendingPoolAddress, → uint256(-\_collateralChange));

#### 3.67 CVF-67

• Severity Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

Source MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** The expression "uint256(-loanTradeAmount)" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

# Listing 67:



# 3.68 CVF-68

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MoretMarketMaker.sol

**Description** These functions should emit some events. **Client Comment** Added events 'ResetParameter'.

## Listing 68:

#### 3.69 CVF-69

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** Should be "^0.8.0".

## Listing 69:

7 pragma solidity 0.8.10;

#### 3.70 CVF-70

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Info
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** We didn't review this file.

#### Listing 70:

9 import "./FullMath.sol";



# 3.71 CVF-71

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** Such a long line make the code harder to read. **Recommendation** Consider putting each field at a separate line.

# Listing 71:

17 struct Option { PayoffType poType; OptionSide side; OptionStatus → status; address holder; uint256 id; uint256 createTime; → uint256 effectiveTime; uint256 tenor; uint256 maturity; → uint256 exerciseTime; uint256 amount; uint256 spot; uint256

→ strike; uint256 volatility; uint256 premium; uint256 cost; }

# 3.72 CVF-72

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad naming

- **Status** Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This struct looks more like a simple fraction rather than a percent. Consider renaming.

Client Comment Removed as no longer used.

# Listing 72:

18 struct Percent { uint256 numerator; uint256 denominator; }

#### 3.73 CVF-73

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad naming

• Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** Constant are usually named IN\_UPPER\_CASE. **Client Comment** Renamed as BASE and DECIMALS.

### Listing 73:

- 19 uint256 public constant DefaultMultiplier = 10 \*\* 18;
- 20 uint256 public constant DefaultDecimals = 18;



# 3.74 CVF-74

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This value could be rendered as "1e18".

# Listing 74:

19 uint256 public constant DefaultMultiplier = 10 \*\* 18;

### 3.75 CVF-75

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Info
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** Consider deriving the default multiplier from the default decimals to guarantee consistency between them.

Client Comment Leave it as it is.

#### Listing 75:

19 uint256 public constant DefaultMultiplier = 10 \*\* 18;

#### 3.76 CVF-76

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** These functions are redundant as they return constants that are public by themselves.

Client Comment Removed.

# Listing 76:

22 function Multiplier() public pure returns (uint256){return

→ DefaultMultiplier;}

function Decimals() public pure returns (uint256) {return

→ DefaultDecimals;}



# 3.77 CVF-77

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This constant is used directly in many calculations.

**Recommendation** Consider implementing utility functions for fixed–point arithmetic to make the code simpler and easier to read.

**Client Comment** Moved to FullMath as part of utility.

### Listing 77:

19 uint256 public constant DefaultMultiplier = 10 \*\* 18;

#### 3.78 CVF-78

- Severity Major
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This function cannot handle numbers with more than 18 decimals.

**Recommendation** Consider implementing support for such ability.

**Client Comment** Added clauses to adjust decimals if the number is more than 18 decimals.

### Listing 78:

- 24 function ToDefaultDecimals (uint256 \_rawData, uint256 → \_rawDataDecimals) public pure returns (uint256) {
- 27 function ToCustomDecimals(uint256 \_rawData, uint256 → rawDataDecimals) public pure returns(uint256){

#### 3.79 CVF-79

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This calculation could be simplified in a quite common case when "\_rawDataDecimals" equals to "DefaultDecimals".

**Client Comment** The default case is defined first before the if clauses are executed.

### Listing 79:

- 26 return \_rawData \* (10\*\* (DefaultDecimals \_rawDataDecimals));}
- 29 return rawData / (10\*\* (DefaultDecimals rawDataDecimals));}



# 3.80 CVF-80

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** For consistency with the argument names, a better name would be "ToRawDecimals".

Client Comment Moved to MarketLibrary and renamed 'toDecimals'.

# Listing 80:

27 function ToCustomDecimals(uint256 \_rawData, uint256  $\hookrightarrow$  \_rawDataDecimals) public pure returns(uint256){



# 3.81 CVF-81

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** The "MulDiv" function is very efficient in general case, while in specific cases more efficient approaches do exists. For example, when the denominator is known at compiler time, its modular inversion could be precomputed. Also, when the denominator is less than 2^128, the approach described here could be used: https://medium.com/coinmonks/mathin-solidity-part-3-percents-and-proportions-4db014e080b1#4821

**Client Comment** Interesting approach. A new function is created in FullMath.ethmul. However, after testing it, there seem to be unexpected behaviour such as very large result. Therefore this approach is not used here.

#### Listing 81:

```
return MulDiv( intrinsicValue, amount, DefaultMultiplier); }
35
   return MulDiv( amount * 4, MulDiv( b, volatility, a —
43

→ moneyness), 10 * DefaultMultiplier);}
     uint256 timeValue = MulDiv(calcTimeValue( strike, price,
47

→ _volatility , _amount) , _price , DefaultMultiplier);
   53
     \rightarrow = MulDiv( amount, strike, DefaultMultiplier) - cost;}
   if ( side == OptionSide.Sell && poType == PayoffType.Call){
     \rightarrow _cost = MulDiv(_amount, _price, DefaultMultiplier) - cost
     \hookrightarrow ;}}
  return MulDiv(_option.amount, _price, DefaultMultiplier);}
80 if (_adjustUpward) _adjustedAmount = MulDiv(_amount,
     → DefaultMultiplier + _slippage + _loanInterest ,
     → DefaultMultiplier);
```



# 3.82 CVF-82

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This function is overcomplicated. It could be simplified as: uint v = DefaultMultiplier < volatility? DefaultMultiplier: volatility; uint <math>v = volatility? DefaultMultiplier: volatility; uint v = volatility? MulDiv (volatility: mulDiv (volatility: multiplier); return MulDiv (volatility: multiplier); Volatility: v = volatility? Volatility: v =

#### Listing 82:

```
37 function calcTimeValue(uint256 _strike, uint256 _price, uint256 

\hookrightarrow _volatility, uint256 _amount) private pure returns (
\hookrightarrow uint256){
```

#### 3.83 CVF-83

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** "return 0" would be more clear.

### Listing 83:

38 if (volatility = 0) return volatility;

### 3.84 CVF-84

- Severity Minor
- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** Phantom overflow is possible here, i.e. a situation when the final calculation result would fit into the destination type, while some intermediary calculation overflow. Consider using the "MulDiv" function.

### Listing 84:

```
39 uint256 _moneyness = _strike > _price? (_price *

→ DefaultMultiplier / _strike) : (_strike *

→ DefaultMultiplier / _price); // always in (0,1]
```



# 3.85 CVF-85

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This variable is redundant. Just calculate "\_b" as "(\_volatility > DefaultMultiplier? DefaultMultiplier, volatility) / 2" and " a" as "DefaultMultiplier + b".

### Listing 85:

```
40 uint256 _midPoint = DefaultMultiplier - (_volatility >

→ DefaultMultiplier? DefaultMultiplier: _volatility) / 2;

→ // always in [0.5, 1]
```

#### 3.86 CVF-86

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• **Category** Readability

• Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** The same name "\_moneyness" is used for different values. This makes the code harder to read.

Recommendation Consider using different names.

#### Listing 86:

#### 3.87 CVF-87

• **Severity** Minor

- Status Info
- Category Unclear behavior
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This will revert when \_a==\_moneyness but volatility!=0 (e.g. it equals 1). Consider returning 0 in this case.

**Client Comment** a' by definition is larger than 'm'.

#### Listing 87:

```
43 return MulDiv(_amount * 4, MulDiv(_b, _volatility, _a — 

→ _moneyness), 10 * DefaultMultiplier);}
```



# 3.88 CVF-88

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This "MulDiv" call should be moved into the "calcTimeValue" function.

# Listing 88:

```
47 uint256 _timeValue = MulDiv(calcTimeValue(_strike, _price, 

→ _volatility, _amount), _price, DefaultMultiplier);
```

#### 3.89 CVF-89

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This code could be simplified as: if  $\_$ side == OptionSide.Sell) { if ( $\_$ poType == PayoffType.Put) { ... } else if ( $\_$ poType == PayoffType.Call) { ... } }

### Listing 89:



# 3.90 CVF-90

- **Severity** Moderate
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- **Status** Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** The conversion into "int256" may overflow.

**Recommendation** Consider using safe conversion.

**Client Comment** int256() has been replaced with 'SafeCast.toInt256()' to raise exception at overflow events. The same change has also been applied on other contracts.

# Listing 90:

#### 3.91 CVF-91

• Severity Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** The expression "MulDiv(2 \* DefaultMultiplier, DefaultMultiplier, \_vol)" is equivalent to "2 \* DefaultMultiplier \* DefaultMultiplier / vol"

# Listing 91:



# 3.92 CVF-92

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This expression is coded twice.

**Recommendation** Consider extracting into a utility function.

Client Comment Leave it as it is.

### Listing 92:

### 3.93 CVF-93

- **Severity** Major
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** This line should be moved to the "else" branch of the conditional statement below.

**Client Comment** This logic has been deleted and no adjustedStrike is now used.

### Listing 93:

```
73 _adjustedStrike = adjustSlippage(_strike, false, _slippage, 0); \hookrightarrow // downward
```



# 3.94 CVF-94

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** The expression "DefaultMultiplier + \_slippage + \_loanInterest" is coded twice. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once before the conditional statement. **Client Comment** Leave it as it is.

# Listing 94:

# 3.95 CVF-95

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** Should be "else" instead of "if (...)".

# Listing 95:

```
81 if (!_adjustUpward) _adjustedAmount = MulDiv(_amount,

→ DefaultMultiplier, DefaultMultiplier + _slippage+

→ _loanInterest);}
```

#### 3.96 CVF-96

- Severity Minor
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Status Fixed
- Source OptionLibrary.sol

**Description** Over- and underflow possible when converting types. Consider using safe conversions

Client Comment Used SafeCast.toInt256.

#### Listing 96:

```
84 _oppositeAmount = int256(MulDiv(adjustSlippage(_amount >=0 ? 
 \hookrightarrow uint256(_amount): uint256(__amount), _amount>0, _slippage, 
 \hookrightarrow 0), _price, DefaultMultiplier)) * (_amount >=0? int256 
 \hookrightarrow (-1): int256(1));}
```



# 3.97 CVF-97

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Should be "^0.8.0".

# Listing 97:

7 pragma solidity 0.8.10;

### 3.98 CVF-98

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal
- **Status** Fixed
- **Source** OptionVault.sol

**Description** These two variables could be merged into a single variable of type "OptionLibrary.Option []".

# Listing 98:

18 mapping (uint256=> OptionLibrary.Option) internal optionsList; uint256 public optionCounter = 0;

### 3.99 CVF-99

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

• Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** These variables should be declared as immutable.

### Listing 99:

- 22 IVolatilityChain internal volatilityChain;
- 24 address public volChainAddress;
   address public aaveAddress;
   address public underlying;
   address public funding;



# 3.100 CVF-100

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The type of this variable should be "IVolatilityChain".

# Listing 100:

24 address public volChainAddress;

### 3.101 CVF-101

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- **Status** Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The type of this variable should be "ILendingPoolAddressesProvider".

# Listing 101:

25 address public aaveAddress;

#### 3.102 CVF-102

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The type of these variables should be "IERC20".

Client Comment Used ERC20 for decimals.

# Listing 102:

26 address public underlying;
 address public funding;

#### 3.103 CVF-103

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• **Category** Bad datatype

• Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The types of the arguments should be: "IVolatilityChain", "IERC20", "IERC20", "ILendingPoolAddressesProvider" respectively.

### Listing 103:

29 constructor( address \_volChainAddress, address \_underlying, → address funding, address aaveAddress){



# 3.104 CVF-104

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Description} & \textbf{The "abi.encodePacked" call is redundant.} & \textbf{Just do: kec-cak256(bytes(volatilityChain.getDecription()))} \\ \end{tabular}$ 

Client Comment Deleted.

### Listing 104:

38 function descriptionHash() external view returns (bytes32) {

- → return keccak256 (abi.encodePacked (volatilityChain.
- → getDecription());}

#### 3.105 CVF-105

• Severity Minor

• **Status** Fixed

• Category Flaw

• Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** There are no range checks for arguments. Consider adding proper checks. **Client Comment** Added check for tenor.

### Listing 105:

40 function addOption(uint256 \_tenor, uint256 \_strike, uint256

- → \_amount, OptionLibrary.PayoffType \_poType, OptionLibrary.
- → OptionSide side, uint256 premium, uint256 cost, uint256
- → price, uint256 volatility, address holder) external
- → onlyRole(EXCHANGE ROLE) returns(uint256 id) {

#### 3.106 CVF-106

• Severity Minor

- Status Fixed
- **Category** Documentation
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Consider adding comments to the zero values with the argument names.

### Listing 106:

```
43 optionsList[id] = OptionLibrary.Option(poType, side,
```

- $\hookrightarrow$  OptionLibrary.OptionStatus.Draft, \_holder, \_id, block.
- $\hookrightarrow$  timestamp, 0, \_tenor, 0, 0, \_amount, \_price, \_strike,
- $\hookrightarrow$  volatility, \_premium, \_cost);}



# 3.107 CVF-107

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This function silently returns zero address for invalid option ID. Consider reverting in such a case.

Client Comment Deleted.

### Listing 107:

45 function getOptionHolder(uint256 \_id) external view returns(

→ address) { return optionsList[id].holder;}

#### 3.108 CVF-108

• Severity Minor

- Status Fixed
- Category Unclear behavior
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This function silently returns empty option for invalid option ID.

**Recommendation** Consider reverting in such a case.

Client Comment Added require clause.

### Listing 108:

48 function getOption(uint256 \_id) external view returns(

→ OptionLibrary.Option memory) {return optionsList[id];}

# 3.109 CVF-109

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This loop doesn't scale. In case of too many active options, it could exceed the block gas limit.

**Recommendation** Consider maintaining the aggregating notional value in the storage and updating it when options are created or expired.

Client Comment This function is deleted as is obsolete.

### Listing 109:



# 3.110 CVF-110

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The expression "activeOptions.length()" is calculated on every loop iteration. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once before the loop. **Client Comment** Replaced with 'activeContractCount'.

# Listing 110:

```
for (uint256 i=0;i<activeOptions.length();i++){

70 for (uint256 i=0;i<activeOptions.length();i++){

96 for (uint256 i=0;i<activeOptions.length();i++){

109 for (uint256 i=0;i<activeOptions.length();i++){

123 for (uint256 i=0;i<activeOptions.length();i++){

132 for (uint256 i=0;i<activeOptions.length();i++){
```

#### 3.111 CVF-111

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Info
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This function is not able to return negative capital.

**Recommendation** Consider implementing such ability.

Client Comment Negative capital is not allowed conceptually. The min would be zero.

### Listing 111:

```
55 function getGrossCapital(address _address) external view returns \hookrightarrow (uint256 _capital){
```



# 3.112 CVF-112

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The :"MulDiv" function is efficient in general case but in certain special cases more efficient approaches do exists. For example, when the denominator is known at compile time, its modular inverse could be precomputed. Also, when the denominator is less than 2^128, the approach described here could be used: https://medium.com/coinmonks/mathin-solidity-part-3-percents-and-proportions-4db014e080b1#4821

**Client Comment** ethmul' and 'ethdiv' are implemented using the method you prescribed.

# Listing 112:

```
_capital = _funding_balance + _collateral balance + MulDiv(
58
    → _underlying_balance, _price, OptionLibrary.Multiplier());
require(_capital > MulDiv(_debt_balance, _price, OptionLibrary.
       → Multiplier()), "Negative equity.");
    _capital — MulDiv(_debt_balance, _price, OptionLibrary.
60
       → Multiplier());}
   return MulDiv (Math.max (deltaZero >= 0? uint 256 (deltaZero): uint 256
       \rightarrow (-_deltaZero), _deltaMax>=0?uint256(_deltaMax):uint256(-
       → deltaMax) ), price, OptionLibrary.Multiplier());}
         delta = int256(MulDiv(OptionLibrary.calcDelta(_price,
89
            \hookrightarrow optionsList [ id]. strike, vol), optionsList [ id].

→ amount, OptionLibrary. Multiplier() ));
      gamma = int256 (MulDiv (OptionLibrary.calcGamma ( price,
103

→ optionsList [_id]. strike , _vol) , optionsList [_id]. amount ,
         → OptionLibrary.Multiplier());
      repaySwapValue = MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals(MulDiv(
178

→ repayAmount, price, OptionLibrary. Multiplier()),
         → funding);
```



# 3.113 CVF-113

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The expression "MulDiv(\_debt\_balance, \_price, OptionLibrary.Multiplier())" is calculated twice. Consider calculating once and reusing.

# Listing 113:



# 3.114 CVF-114

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Fixed-point multiplication is implemented in many places. Consider moving to a utility function.

```
Listing 114:
```

```
capital = funding balance + collateral balance + MulDiv(
       \hookrightarrow _underlying_balance, _price, OptionLibrary.Multiplier());
    require (_capital > MulDiv(_debt_balance, _price, OptionLibrary.
       → Multiplier()), "Negative equity.");
60
    capital — MulDiv (debt balance, price, OptionLibrary.
      → Multiplier());}
66 return MulDiv (Math.max (delta Zero >= 0? uint 256 (delta Zero): uint 256

→ (- deltaZero), deltaMax>=0?uint256( deltaMax): uint256(-
       → deltaMax) ), price, OptionLibrary.Multiplier());}
        delta = int256 (MulDiv (OptionLibrary.calcDelta (price,
89
           \hookrightarrow optionsList[ id].strike, _vol), optionsList[_id].

→ amount, OptionLibrary. Multiplier() ));
103
      gamma = int256 (MulDiv (OptionLibrary .calcGamma (price,

→ optionsList [ id ]. strike , vol) , optionsList [ id ]. amount ,

         → OptionLibrary. Multiplier() ));
    gamma = int256 (OptionLibrary.calcGamma(OptionLibrary.Multiplier

→ (), OptionLibrary. Multiplier(), vol));}
      repaySwapValue = MarketLibrary.cvtDecimals(MulDiv(
178

→ repayAmount, price, OptionLibrary. Multiplier()),
         \hookrightarrow funding);
```

# 3.115 CVF-115

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• **Source** OptionVault.sol

**Description** The "1e5" value should be a named constant. **Client Comment** Replaced with constant variable SCALING.

#### Listing 115:

```
64 int256 _deltaZero = calculateAggregateDelta(_price / 1e5, true); int256 _deltaMax = calculateAggregateDelta(_price * 1e5, true);
```



# 3.116 CVF-116

- Severity Minor
- **Category** Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Consider implementing and using a generic "abs" function, to make the code simpler and easier to read.

# Listing 116:

```
66 return MulDiv(Math.max(_deltaZero>=0?uint256(_deltaZero):uint256

→ (-_deltaZero), _deltaMax>=0?uint256(_deltaMax):uint256(-

→ _deltaMax)), _price, OptionLibrary.Multiplier());}
```

#### 3.117 CVF-117

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This loop doesn't scale. Consider maintaining the sell PUT collateral variable in the storage and updating it when an option is created or expired.

Client Comment Saved to variable 'sellPutCollaterals'.

#### Listing 117:

70 for (uint256 i=0; i < activeOptions.length(); <math>i++){

#### 3.118 CVF-118

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The "optionsList[\_id].status == OptionLibrary.OptionStatus.Active" part is redundant as the loop is iterating over active options only.

**Client Comment** Function is removed.

#### Listing 118:

```
72 if (optionsList [_id]. status == OptionLibrary . OptionStatus . Active

→ && optionsList [_id]. side == OptionLibrary . OptionSide . Sell

→ && optionsList [_id]. poType == OptionLibrary . PayoffType . Put){
```



# 3.119 CVF-119

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The expression "optionsList[\_id]" is calculated several times. Consider calculating once and reusing.

Client Comment Function is removed.

#### Listing 119:

```
72 if (optionsList [_id]. status — OptionLibrary . OptionStatus . Active

→ && optionsList [_id]. side — OptionLibrary . OptionSide . Sell

→ && optionsList [_id]. poType — OptionLibrary . PayoffType . Put) {

_collateral += optionsList [_id]. calcNotionalExposure (

→ optionsList [_id]. strike); }}
```

#### 3.120 CVF-120

• **Severity** Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** For a short position, the payback value returned by this function is min(strike, price) \* amount regardless of the option type. This fact allows significantly simplifying the function.

Client Comment The logic has been updated.

#### Listing 120:

```
75 function getContractPayoff(uint256 _id) external view returns(

→ uint256 payoff, uint256 payback){
```



# 3.121 CVF-121

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The expression "optionsList[\_id]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing. **Client Comment** Moved to 'OptionLibrary.calcPayoff'.

### Listing 121:

#### 3.122 CVF-122

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This could be simplified as: if (optionsList[\_id].side == OptionLibrary.OptionSide.Sell) { if (optionsList[\_id].poType == OptionLibrary.PayoffType.Call) {...} else if (optionsList[\_id].poType == OptionLibrary.PayoffType.Put) {...} } **Client Comment** Fixed in 'OptionLibrary.calcPayoff'.

# Listing 122:



# 3.123 CVF-123

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Should be "else if" for readability.

# Listing 123:

81 if (optionsList [\_id]. side = OptionLibrary . OptionSide . Sell && 
→ optionsList [\_id]. poType=OptionLibrary . PayoffType . Put) {

# 3.124 CVF-124

- Severity Minor
- **Category** Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This function looks cumbersome with three levels of nested conditional statements.

Recommendation Consider refactoring.

Client Comment Moved to 'OptionLibrary.calcDelta'.

### Listing 124:

84 function calculateContractDelta(uint256 \_id, uint256 \_price,

→ bool \_includeExpiring) public view returns(int256 \_delta){



### 3.125 CVF-125

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The expression "optionsList[\_id]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

### Listing 125:

```
if (optionsList[id].status — OptionLibrary.OptionStatus.Active
      \hookrightarrow && (_includeExpiring || (optionsList[ id]. maturity > block
      → .timestamp))){
     if (optionsList [ id]. side—OptionLibrary . OptionSide . Buy) {
       uint256 vol = volatilityChain.getVol(optionsList[id].

→ maturity — Math.min(optionsList[id].maturity, block.
          → timestamp));
       delta = int256 (MulDiv (OptionLibrary.calcDelta (price,
          \hookrightarrow optionsList[_id].strike, _vol), optionsList[_id].
          → amount, OptionLibrary.Multiplier());
       if (optionsList[ id].poType=OptionLibrary.PayoffType.Put) {
90
          \rightarrow delta = -int256 (optionsList [id].amount) + delta; }}
     if (optionsList [ id]. side—OptionLibrary. OptionSide. Sell &&
        → optionsList[ id].poType==OptionLibrary.PayoffType.Call){
       delta = int256(optionsList[ id].amount);}}} // collateral
          → for sell call options. zero for sell put options
```



# 3.126 CVF-126

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Overflow is possible when converting to "int256". **Recommendation** Consider using safe conversion.

```
Listing 126:
```

```
delta = int256 (MulDiv (OptionLibrary.calcDelta ( price,
89
          → optionsList[_id].strike , _vol), optionsList[_id].
          → amount, OptionLibrary.Multiplier());
        if (optionsList[ id].poType=OptionLibrary.PayoffType.Put) {
90

→ delta = −int256(optionsList[id].amount) + delta; }

        _delta = int256(optionsList[ id].amount);}}} // collateral
92
          → for sell call options. zero for sell put options
      gamma = int256 (MulDiv (OptionLibrary .calcGamma ( price ,
103

→ optionsList[id]. strike, vol), optionsList[id]. amount,
        → OptionLibrary. Multiplier() );
   gamma = int256 (OptionLibrary.calcGamma(OptionLibrary.Multiplier

→ (), OptionLibrary. Multiplier(), vol));}
    tradeUnderlyingAmount = (aggregateDelta >= 0?aggregateDelta:
159

→ int256(0)) — int256(MarketLibrary.balanceDef(underlying,
      → address));
```

#### 3.127 CVF-127

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This could be simplified as: if (...) delta -= int256(optionsList[ id].amount);

```
Listing 127:
```



### 3.128 CVF-128

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Should be "else if" for readability.

# Listing 128:

91 if (optionsList [\_id]. side = OptionLibrary . OptionSide . Sell && 
→ optionsList [\_id]. poType = OptionLibrary . PayoffType . Call) {

### 3.129 CVF-129

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Theseloops don't scale. In case of too many active options they could exceed the block gas limit.

Recommendation Consider refactoring.

Client Comment Related functions are supposed to be used in view only.

### Listing 129:

- 96 for (uint256 i=0; i < active Options . length (); <math>i++){
- 109 for (uint256 i=0; i < activeOptions.length(); <math>i++){



# 3.130 CVF-130

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This commented out code should be removed.

### Listing 130:

#### 3.131 CVF-131

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This function is redundant, as "getExpiringOptionId" function could be used instead.

Client Comment Keep it as it is. No additional gas is consumed as it is view only.

#### Listing 131:

```
121 function anyOptionExpiring() external view returns(bool 

→ isExpiring) {
```

# 3.132 CVF-132

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This loop doesn't scale. In case active options would be sorted or grouped by maturity, it would be easy to tell whether any of them is expiring.

**Client Comment** It would be alternative way to group by maturity. However, the available maturities are infinite, making grouping impossible.

### Listing 132:

123 for (uint256 i=0; i < activeOptions.length(); <math>i++){

### 3.133 CVF-133

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** This loop doesn't scale. In case active options would be sorted or grouped by maturity, it would be easy to find an expiring option.

**Client Comment** It would be alternative way to group by maturity. However, the available maturities are infinite, making grouping impossible.

### Listing 133:

132 for (uint256 i=0; i < activeOptions.length(); <math>i++)

#### 3.134 CVF-134

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

 $\textbf{Description} \ \, \textbf{The expression "activeOptions.at(i)" is calculated twice}.$ 

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 134:

```
133 if(isExpiring(uint256(activeOptions.at(i)))){
    _id = uint256(activeOptions.at(i));
```



# 3.135 CVF-135

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** These functions should emit some events.

Client Comment Added two events 'StampNewOption' and 'StampExpire'.

### Listing 135:

#### 3.136 CVF-136

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The expression "optionsList[\_id]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 136:

```
optionsList [_id]. effectiveTime = block.timestamp;

optionsList [_id]. maturity = optionsList [_id]. effectiveTime +

→ optionsList [_id]. tenor;

optionsList [_id]. status = OptionLibrary.OptionStatus.Active;
```

#### 3.137 CVF-137

- **Severity** Minor
- -
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The value "optionsList[\_id].effectiveTime" is read from the storage right after it was written into it.

**Recommendation** Consider using "block.timestamp" instead.

#### Listing 137:



### 3.138 CVF-138

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The expression "optionsList[\_id]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

### Listing 138:

```
optionsList[_id].exerciseTime = block.timestamp;
optionsList[_id].status = OptionLibrary.OptionStatus.Expired;
activeOptionsPerOwner[optionsList[_id].holder].remove(_id);
```

### 3.139 CVF-139

• Severity Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Inside these calls, the underlying decimals number is obtained. **Recommendation** Consider obtaining the underlying decimals once in the constructor and storing in an internal variable for future use.

#### Listing 139:



### 3.140 CVF-140

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** Inside these calls, the funding decimals number is obtained.

**Recommendation** Consider obtaining the funding decimals once in the constructor and storing in an internal variable for future use.

#### Listing 140:

#### 3.141 CVF-141

• **Severity** Minor

Status Info

• Category Bad naming

Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** There should be named constants or even enum for the valid lending pool rate modes.

Client Comment Leave it as it is.

#### Listing 141:



### 3.142 CVF-142

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source OptionVault.sol

**Description** The expression "uint256(-\_loanTradeAmount)" is calculated twice. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

### Listing 142:

#### 3.143 CVF-143

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

Description Should be "^0.8.0".

#### Listing 143:

2 pragma solidity 0.8.10;

#### 3.144 CVF-144

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** These variables should be declared as internal.

#### Listing 144:

```
15 AggregatorV3Interface internal priceInterface; bytes32 public tokenHash; string public description;
23 uint256 internal priceMultiplier; uint256 internal quoteAdjustment;
29 uint256 public volParamDecimals;
30 uint256 internal parameterMultiplier;
```



### 3.145 CVF-145

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** This variable is not used. **Recommendation** Consider removing it.

### Listing 145:

22 uint256 internal priceDecimals;

#### 3.146 CVF-146

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The type of the " priceSourceId" argument should be "AggregatorV3Interface".

### Listing 146:

32 constructor( address \_priceSourceId , uint256 \_parameterDecimals ,  $\hookrightarrow$  string memory \_tokenName ) {

#### 3.147 CVF-147

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The "abi.encodePacked" call is redundant here. Just do: kec-cak256(bytes( tokenName))

# Listing 147:

35 tokenHash = keccak256 (abi.encodePacked (tokenName));



### 3.148 CVF-148

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The "priceInterface.decimals()" expression is calculated twice. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

### Listing 148:

```
42 priceMultiplier = 10 ** priceInterface.decimals();
  quoteAdjustment = 10 ** (18 - priceInterface.decimals());
```

#### 3.149 CVF-149

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** This will revert in case priceInterface.decimals() > 18. **Recommendation** Consider refactoring the code to support such a case as well. **Client Comment** Removed and replaced with 'FullMath.ethdiv'.

#### Listing 149:

43 quoteAdjustment = 10 \*\* (18 - priceInterface.decimals());

#### 3.150 CVF-150

• Severity Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** This could be calculated as: 1e18 / priceMultiplier **Client Comment** Removed and replaced with 'FullMath.ethdiv'.

#### Listing 150:

```
43 quoteAdjustment = 10 ** (18 - priceInterface.decimals());
```



# 3.151 CVF-151

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Info
- **Source** VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** This function reverts in case there are no tenors. Probably not an issue. **Client Comment** The missing tenors would be interpolated within the function.

### Listing 151:

47 function getVol(uint256 \_tenor) external override view returns(

→ uint256 \_vol){

### 3.152 CVF-152

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** Should be "else {".

#### Listing 152:

50 if (!tenors.contains( tenor)) {

#### 3.153 CVF-153

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The "\_upperVol" and "\_lowerVol" variables may be updated several times. **Recommendation** Consider updating once after the loop.

### Listing 153:

# 3.154 CVF-154

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- **Source** VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** Should be "else if (...)".

#### Listing 154:

```
if (_tenorl < _tenor && (_tenorl > _lowerTenor || _lowerTenor ==

→ 0) ){    _lowerTenor = _tenorl;    _lowerVol = priceBook[

→ _tenorl][latestBookTime[_tenorl]]. volatility; }}
```

#### 3.155 CVF-155

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** Should be "else if (...)".

#### Listing 155:

60 if (\_lowerTenor==0) { \_vol = \_upperVol;}

#### 3.156 CVF-156

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** This expression "\_upperTenor - \_lowerTenor" is calculated twice. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 156:



# 3.157 CVF-157

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** Should be "else".

#### Listing 157:

### 3.158 CVF-158

- Severity Minor
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Status Fixed
- **Source** VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** Underflow is possible when converting "\_price" to "uint256". **Recommendation** Consider using safe conversion.

### Listing 158:

```
66 return (uint256(_price) * quoteAdjustment, uint256(_timeStamp))

→ ;}

70 uint256 _updatePrice = uint256(_price);

103 uint256 _updatePrice = uint256(_price);
```

#### 3.159 CVF-159

- Severity Minor
  - Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The conversion of "\_timeStamp" to "uint256" is redundant, as this variable is already has type "uint".

#### Listing 159:

```
66 return (uint256(_price) * quoteAdjustment, uint256(_timeStamp)) \hookrightarrow ;}
```



# 3.160 CVF-160

- Severity Minor
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** Underflow is possible when converting "\_price" to "uint256". **Recommendation** Consider using safe conversion.

### Listing 160:

70 uint256 updatePrice = uint256 ( price);

### 3.161 CVF-161

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The expression "tenor.length" is calculated on every loop iteration. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 161:

72 for (uint i = 0; i < tenors.length(); i++) {

#### 3.162 CVF-162

• Severity Moderate

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** This loop doesn't scale. In case of too many tenors it could not fit into the block gas limit.

**Recommendation** Consider implementing an ability to update only some of the tenors.

**Client Comment** The number of tenors are controlled by the deployer address only. The number is intended to be only limited (below 5). Also the update function is only executed and monitored from limited amount of addresses, which allows them to adjust gas in case the number of tenors increases.

### Listing 162:

72 for (uint i = 0; i < tenors.length(); i++) {



### 3.163 CVF-163

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The expression "latestBookTime[\_tenor]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

### Listing 163:

```
74 if ( updatePrice > priceBook [ tenor] [latestBookTime [ tenor]].
      → highest){
     priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].highest= updatePrice
        \hookrightarrow ;}
   if ( updatePrice<priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].lowest
      \hookrightarrow ) {
      priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].lowest= updatePrice
  if(_timeStamp>= (latestBookTime[_tenor] + _tenor)){
79
     priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].endTime = timeStamp
80
     priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].close = updatePrice
     uint256 periodMove = (priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor
        → ]]. open < updatePrice)? (MulDiv(updatePrice,</p>
        → priceMultiplier , priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor
        → ]].open) - priceMultiplier) : (priceMultiplier - MulDiv(
        → updatePrice, priceMultiplier, priceBook[ tenor][
        → latestBookTime[ tenor]].open ));
     uint256 largestMove = Math.max(MulDiv(priceBook[ tenor][
        → latestBookTime[ tenor]]. highest, priceMultiplier,
        → priceBook [ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].open) -
        → priceMultiplier , priceMultiplier — MulDiv(priceBook[

→ tenor [[latestBookTime[ tenor]]. lowest, priceMultiplier,
        → priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].open ));
   (... 86, 90)
```



### 3.164 CVF-164

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The expression "priceBook[\_tenor][latestBookTime[\_tenor]]" is calculated several times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 164:

```
74 if ( updatePrice > priceBook [ tenor] [latestBookTime [ tenor]].
      → highest){
     priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].highest= updatePrice
   if ( updatePrice<priceBook [ tenor] [latestBookTime [ tenor]]. lowest
      priceBook[\_tenor][latestBookTime[\_tenor]].lowest=\_updatePrice
     priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].endTime = timeStamp
80
     priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].close = updatePrice
     uint256 periodMove = (priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor
        → ]]. open < updatePrice)? (MulDiv(updatePrice,</p>
        → priceMultiplier , priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor
       → ]].open) - priceMultiplier) : (priceMultiplier - MulDiv(
        → updatePrice, priceMultiplier, priceBook[ tenor][
        → latestBookTime[ tenor]].open ));
     uint256 largestMove = Math.max(MulDiv(priceBook[ tenor][
        → latestBookTime[ tenor]]. highest, priceMultiplier,
        → priceBook [ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].open) -
        → priceMultiplier , priceMultiplier — MulDiv(priceBook[

→ tenor [[latestBookTime[ tenor]]. lowest, priceMultiplier,
        → priceBook[ tenor][latestBookTime[ tenor]].open ));
   (... 86)
```



# 3.165 CVF-165

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The expression "priceBook[\_tenor][latestBookTime[\_tenor]].highest" is calculated several times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

Client Comment Left it as it is as impact is small.

#### Listing 165:

#### 3.166 CVF-166

- **Severity** Minor
- Minor Status Info
- Category Suboptimal

• **Source** VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The expression "priceBook[\_tenor][latestBookTime[\_tenor]].lowest" is calculated several times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

**Client Comment** Left it as it is as impact is small.

#### Listing 166:



# 3.167 CVF-167

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The expression "priceBook[\_tenor][latestBookTime[\_tenor]].open" is calculated several times.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 167:



# 3.168 CVF-168

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The expression "volatilityParameters[\_tenor]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

### Listing 168:

#### 3.169 CVF-169

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The expression "volatilityParameters[\_tenor]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing. **Client Comment** Left it as it is, as impact is small.

### Listing 169:



# 3.170 CVF-170

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** The expression "priceBook[\_tenor][\_timeStamp]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

### Listing 170:

#### 3.171 CVF-171

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** This function should emit some event.

#### Listing 171:

110 function removeTenor(uint256 tenor) external onlyOwner{

#### 3.172 CVF-172

• **Severity** Minor

- Status Fixed
- Category Unclear behavior
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** For a non existing tenor this function silently returns an empty price book. **Recommendation** Consider reverting in such a case **Client Comment** Added require clause.

### Listing 172:



# 3.173 CVF-173

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityChain.sol

**Description** These functions are redundant as the corresponding variables are already public. Just rename the functions in the interface to match the variables names.

### Listing 173:

#### 3.174 CVF-174

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityToken.sol

**Description** Should be "^0.8.0".

### Listing 174:

2 pragma solidity 0.8.10;

#### 3.175 CVF-175

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityToken.sol

**Description** This role is not used. **Recommendation** Consider removing it.

### Listing 175:

9 bytes32 public constant ADMIN ROLE = keccak256 ("ADMIN ROLE");



# 3.176 CVF-176

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source VolatilityToken.sol

**Description** This constant is not used. **Recommendation** Consider removing it.

#### Listing 176:

11 uint256 private constant ethMultiplier = 10 \*\* 18;

#### 3.177 CVF-177

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** VolatilityToken.sol

**Description** The "abi.encodePacked" call is redundant. Just do: kec-cak256(bytes( tokenName))

### Listing 177:

19 tokenHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(tokenName));}

#### 3.178 CVF-178

• **Severity** Minor

- Status Fixed
- Category Unclear behavior
- Source VolatilityToken.sol

**Description** This function allows burning tokens from arbitrary accounts. This looks dangerous.

**Recommendation** Consider allowing burning only caller's token or token explicitly approved to the caller.

Client Comment Allowance check is added.

### Listing 178:

22 function burn(address \_account, uint256 \_amount) public onlyRole  $\hookrightarrow$  (EXCHANGE\_ROLE){ \_burn(\_account, \_amount);}