

# Home Assignment 2

Advanced Web Security

2016

## B-assignments

Complete the four B-assignments below and solve them in groups of two students.

**B-1** DC-nets and mixnets are the two fundamental existing techniques for anonymous communication. Mixnets have received much more attention and are also in focus in this course. However, the treatment of anonymity would not be complete without having mentioned at least the basic ideas behind the DC-nets. Read about the Dining Cryptographers (DC) problem. It was first proposed in

D. Chaum. The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. In *Journal of Cryptology*, 1(1), pp. 65–75, Springer-Verlag, 1988.

but for this course you only have to read the introduction. A perhaps more clear explanation can be found on the Wikipedia entry:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining\\_cryptographers\\_problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_cryptographers_problem)

Assume that you are sitting around a table with two friends who happen to be named Alice and Bob. You decide to implement the DC-protocol referred to above, but instead of sending a single bit, you wish to allow sending 16-bit anonymous messages at the same time. This can be accomplished by just running 16 parallel instances of the protocol. Implement a program that takes as input

- Your shared 16-bit secret with Alice (SA).
- The broadcasted data sent by Alice (DA).
- Your shared 16-bit secret with Bob (SB).
- The broadcasted data sent by Bob (DB).
- A 16-bit message  $M$  that you *may* wish to send anonymously.
- A bit  $b$ , such that if  $b = 0$  you do not wish to send the message and if  $b = 1$  you wish to send the message.

The program output should be

- If  $b = 0$ , your broadcasted data in hex format, immediately followed by the anonymous message sent by some other party (0000 if no anonymous message was sent).
- If  $b = 1$ , your 16-bit broadcasted in hexadecimal format.

**Example:**

SA	SB	DA	DB	M	b	Program output
0C73	80C1	A2A9	92F5	9B57	0	8CB2BCEE
27C2	0879	35F6	1A4D	27BC	1	0807

**Assessment:**

- Upload your code to Urkund, paul.stankovski.lu@analys.urkund.se. It is enough that one student per group does this.
- There will be one Moodle question following the problem statement above. There will be a test quiz on Moodle, where you can try your implementation as many times as you like. The test quiz will not be graded. Both students must finish the quiz.

**B-2** The Tor design paper refers to Tor as the “second-generation onion router.”

R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson and P. Syverson, Tor: The Second-generation Onion Router, Proceedings of the 13th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13, 2004.

The paper listed below describes what can then be considered the “first-generation onion router”.

D. M. Goldschlag, M. G. Reed, and P. F. Syverson. Hiding routing information. In *Information Hiding*, pp. 137–150, Springer-Verlag, 1996.

Using these papers, identify how the two generations differ from each other.

**Assessment:**

- There will be one Moodle-question with statements about differences. Four of these statements are correct and your task is to identify these. You will receive 0.5p for each correct answer and -0.5p for each wrong answer. You can never get less than 0.0p. It can be a good idea to have the paper accessible when you answer the questions, but it is extremely recommended that you read and understand it in advance. Both students must finish the quiz.
- To aid you in your work, in the Tor paper, focus on Sections 1-4 and 6, and in the first generation onion routing paper, focus on the first 3 sections.

**B-3** The Tor design paper includes a description of hidden services. Read about Hidden Services in the Tor paper (Section 5) and answer the following questions:

- a) When Alice wants to connect to Bob’s hidden service in Tor, she connects to an address of the form `r35h7ajng4k6mfos.onion`. Why can she not connect to `bob.onion` or some other much simpler name, instead?
- b) Why are there both introductory points and rendezvous points — couldn’t all the introductory points act as “introductory-and-rendezvous points”?
- c) Why can not the rendezvous point read the communication between Alice and Bob?

**Assessment:**

- Answer the questions and save the answers as a pdf file. Upload the file to moodle (It will be manually graded). Both students must do this.

**B-4** There have been some research results on how to break the anonymity of Hidden Servers in Tor. The first paper detailing how such an attack would proceed, together with proposed countermeasures is

L. Overlier and P. Syverson - Locating Hidden Servers. SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2006.

Read this paper and understand how the attacks work.

**Assessment:**

- There will be 4 Moodle questions related to this assignment. Each question will give you 0 - 0.5 points. If you work in a group, both students must answer the quiz, but you may help each other within a group. It can be a good idea to have the paper accessible when you answer the questions, but it is extremely recommended that you read and understand it in advance. Both students must finish the quiz.

## C-Assignments

Complete one out of the two C-assignments below and solve them in groups of two students.

**C-1** Implement the disclosure attack and simulate the performance of the attack with some different values for  $b, m$  and  $N$ . Keep  $n$  fixed. Show how the attack complexity is affected by the different choices. How is the attack affected by different usage patterns, i.e., if the attacked user is a very frequent or infrequent mailer?

**Assessment:**

- Summarize your work in a short report, making it clear that the program works as intended.
- Upload your report to Urkund, paul.stankovski.lu@analys.orkund.se. It is enough that one student per group does this.
- Upload your report to Moodle (it will be manually graded). Both students must do this.

**C-2** Mixmaster and Mixminion are two of the most well known remailers, i.e., systems based on the original Chaum mixes. Read about these systems in e.g.,

G. Danezis, R. Dingledine, and N. Mathewson. Mixminion: Design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol. In 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 2–15. IEEE CS, May 2003.

U. Möller, L. Cottrell, P. Palfrader, and L. Sassaman. Mixmaster Protocol Version 2. Draft, July 2003. Available at <http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/mixmaster-spec.txt>.

Write a short report focusing on

- How the implementations address some different problems in Mix networks.
- How the implementations differ from each other.

The report should be 2-3 pages.

**Assessment:**

- Upload your report to Urkund, paul.stankovski.lu@analys.orkund.se. It is enough that one student per group does this.
- Upload your report to Moodle (it will be manually graded). Both students must do this.